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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME Jay Taylor

RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

CREATION DATE 07/01/1976

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400145

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 14

FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (14)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/07/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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9/18/08

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

July 1, 1976

PRC

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JAY TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Chinese Activity in Taiwan Strait Area

Since late April there has been unusual PRC military activity at the southern end of the Taiwan Strait. Several PRC naval vessels, including landing ships, one missile frigate, two oilers, one water carrier, and at least ten small landing craft, moved through the Taiwan Strait earlier in June. Two submarines also apparently moved into the same area at the end of June. A second missile frigate moved up to the area from the south. Most of these ships appear to have remained in the Swatow-Amoy region.

..... two regiments of MIG-19s and some additional IL-28s have also recently moved into the southern part of Fukien Province.

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..... indicate widespread rumors in Fukien Province of special war preparations. reported that the situation is tense, that militia is being mobilized, that citizens have been told not to go out at night, and that cadre have been instructed to return from leave. One..... explained the preparations as due to a report that Premier Chiang Chang-kuo had held a war council in Taipei to map out plans for military action against the mainland. Another said he had heard there would be an attack on Quemoy.

OCI and DIA believe that the increased activity is in preparation for a joint exercise involving coastal defense or is involved with inter-coastal shipment of military and other supplies. Sporadic rail interruptions in

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WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5

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DIA ser 12/19/07, Retake ser 3/6/08; CIA-UW 9/18/08
MR 08-19, #16; USA 12/12/07



BY dal NARA DATE 3/6/09

much of China since the beginning of the year may have forced the Chinese to use landing craft for transportation, a practice they have employed in the past.

The Chinese Nationalists are concerned that the operations may presage a Chinese attempt to take control of the Pratas Islands, a Nationalist controlled reef about 386 kilometers southwest of Taiwan.

Comment

There was a PRC naval exercise at the upper end of the Taiwan Strait last year. Over the past year and a half, Peking also has been asserting its right of transit in the Strait and may now be extending this to the air space -- at least within 15 miles off the coast. An exercise could have sparked the rumors which are now being reported by travellers and letter writers. I do not recall, however, that last year there was a similar number of such reports.

One concern is that Taiwan may be attempting to play up the prospect of a PRC military move.
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The possibility of PRC military action against either the off-shore islands or Pratas would seem to be remote. Such a contingency in the immediate future is conceivable only in light of the tense and uncertain political situation in Peking, which presumably raises the possibility of irrational decisions.

Thus at this point the recent PRC operations in the Fukien area appear to be non-threatening but a reflection of China's increasing assertion of its transit rights in the Strait. The possibility of the death of Chairman Mao and a desire to warn off the ROC from any adventures might also be behind the recent military activity.



SHALLOW TAIWAN STRAIT WOULD COMPLICATE MILITARY OPERATIONS




FIGURE 1

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CI-CH-3-6/74



~~SECRET~~ AUTHORITY *NIA & AC Declass 8/7/03*
 BY *W* NLF, DATE *10/9/05*

CAPABILITIES OF OPPOSING
FORCES IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT (U)



PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

DIAIAPPR 173-75
20 NOVEMBER 1975

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: Shenas Activity on the Taiwan Strait Area

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

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LATIN AMERICA					
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ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT _____

MEMO FOR PRES _____

REPLY FOR _____

APPROPRIATE ACTION _____

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RECOMMENDATIONS _____

JOINT MEMO _____

REFER TO _____ FOR: _____

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____

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COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 19, 1976

SECRET - GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: The Passing of Chu Te and China's Domestic Politics

The death of Chu Te, the 90-year old Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress, has further reduced the ranks of the old guard. Chu Te, as the founder of the Peoples Liberation Army, was the only Chinese leader after the death of Chou En-lai whose historical role and prestige approached that of Mao. Although his formal role in the regime was only ceremonial, Chu probably represented an independent voice in the Politburo during critical decisions. Chu, for example, reportedly supported the moderate policies of Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Two poems by Chu, published in March, implicitly criticized the campaign against Teng and the resultant disunity in the Party.

The Central Leadership Organs

Chu's death brings to four the number of vacancies in the Politburo Standing Committee (out of a membership of nine) and probably enhances the strength of the two Shanghai leftist leaders in the Standing Committee, Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao and Wang Hung-wen. The only remaining moderate in the Standing Committee is the aging and ailing Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying. Premier Hua Kuo-feng, who is now Senior Vice Chairman of the Party, is presumably a Standing Committee member, although he has not been identified as such.

It is unlikely that the regime will in the near future be able to fill the vacant positions in the Politburo and the Standing Committee or to name a replacement for Teng Hsiao-p'ing as PLA Chief of Staff. The empty slots in the central leadership indicate the continuing standoff between the contending factions. It is problematical whether the Standing Committee itself is still functioning or whether an ad hoc group within the Politburo may currently be the ultimate decision-making body.

SECRET - GDS

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The Left

In any event, the leftists, with Mao's support, appear to have the political initiative. They should obtain further leeway with the passing of Chu Te. In addition to the Standing Committee and Party headquarters, leftist political strength resides in the central media, the students, the militia, the PLA political department, and the industrial heart of China -- Shanghai.

There are still many constraints on the leftists, however. Most importantly, they seem to have little support among provincial leaders, military commanders, or the government bureaucracy. The leftists also would be unlikely to control a meeting of the Central Committee as presently composed.

Thus, the leftists, a disparate group apparently led by Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao, are probably anxious to exploit the advantage they currently enjoy at the center before Mao dies. They must move on two fronts -- seeking where possible to weaken their opposition and at the same time broaden their own support. The July 1 joint editorial marking the Chinese Communist Party anniversary, while relatively constrained, indicated the regime's preoccupation with the domestic political struggle, and clearly suggested the need for the removal of at least a small group of Teng and Chou supporters.

The left is most probably concerned about gaining allies among the military. The role of people like Chien Hsia-lien, the Commander of the Peking Military Region, will be critical. The alignment of military commanders, however, remains the murkiest element of the obscure Peking domestic scene. Most military commanders are probably biding their time until the Chairman dies.

The role of Premier Hua Kuo-feng, and several others in the leadership who are apparently not factional partisans but essentially Mao loyalists, will also be vital to the course of the power struggle. Hua's control over the Public Security organs has obvious implications. In line with Mao's proclivities, Hua will presumably seek to protect the left. But, like Mao, the thrust of Hua's leadership may be to retain a dynamic balance between the left and the right. If so, Hua will probably not wish to see the left consolidate or expand its position at the Party center in the wake of the death of Chu Te.



The Prospect

The political structure in the PRC is probably more fragile today than it has ever been -- including during the Cultural Revolution. Mao's presence remains the key, but it is now a lingering presence and the old Chairman presumably cannot assert a dynamic role. Yet, so long as he lives, he retains the aura of political authority and the leadership stalemate is likely to continue. Realignment that will determine the shape of the post-Mao regime, however, may already be taking shape.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET GDS

ANALYSIS

July 13, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES *X*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on China's Domestic Scene

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President discussing the implications of the death of Chu Te and assessing the current domestic political scene in China.

We are doing another memorandum on the foreign policy implications of the current political struggle and will forward this to you shortly.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to the President.

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HR 5/10/01



Tab A Audit 26
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INFORMATION

SECRET - GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET GDS

ANALYSIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: The Passing of Chu Te and China's Domestic Politics

formal
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(out of membership of mind)
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The Prospect

The political structure in the PRC is probably more fragile today than it has ever been -- including during the Cultural Revolution. Mao's presence remains the key, but it is now a lingering presence and the old chairman presumably cannot assert a dynamic role. Yet so long as he lives, ~~even if in a coma, he should remain the core~~ of political authority and the leadership stalemate is likely to continue. Realignments ~~may, however, already be at work~~ that will determine the shape of the post-Mao regime,

however, may already be taking shape, retains the aura



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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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
SUBJECT: Implications on PRC domestic politics
by death of CHU TE

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
ADV CYS S'CROFT/WGH						MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. ()
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES. ()
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR ()
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
FAR EAST/PRC					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATIONS ()
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO ()
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: ()
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: _____
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ GDSINFORMATION

July 22, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES X

SUBJECT: Chinese Continue to Promulgate Line on Taiwan

(Begin Unclassified)

Leslie Gelb of the New York Times called Jay Taylor July 22 to say that the PRCLC had invited him and several of his colleagues to dinner a few days ago. Counselor Hsieh Chi-mei asked Gelb to select the guests. During the dinner, Hsieh and the other Chinese present constantly returned to the subject of Taiwan. The Chinese emphasized categorically that Taiwan could not be liberated by peaceful means and that only military force could achieve this objective. The Kuomintang regime was too oppressive for the people to overthrow it. In discussing this point, Hsieh referred several times to Mao's quote that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Gelb said that he asked Hsieh what lay behind their taking this position. The Chinese replied that this position had always been PRC policy, and he denied that their restatement of it related to any current development. Gelb said he asked Hsieh whether he recognized that promulgation of such a hard line in the United States would make normalization very difficult. Hsieh simply said this was our problem.

The Chinese had said that the discussion should be off the record. Later, Gelb called and asked Hsieh if he could write an article on the subject. Hsieh said he should not quote or cite any Chinese official or any Chinese source for the statements on the Taiwan question. Gelb's editor said that he could not print this story by simply citing "diplomatic sources." When Gelb went back to Hsieh, the latter refused to permit any more direct sourcing.

Gelb asked Taylor what he made of this behavior. Jay said that the stated position was always implicit in the Chinese attitude on the liberation of Taiwan. The Chinese did not usually so categorically rule out the peaceful alternative, however. Jay suggested to Gelb that the

~~SECRET~~ GDS

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editorials in the New York Times and other U. S. papers advocating self-determination for Taiwan may have in part stimulated the PRCLLO lecture on the subject.

(End Unclassified)

Comment

(Begin ~~Secret~~)

The PRCLLO approach to the newsmen is clearly a follow-up to the heated discussion between Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Senator Scott. It confirms that Chang's position is the considered and official line, which the regime appears determined to convey to American Congressmen and newsmen and presumably ultimately the American public. So far, however, we have not seen any reaffirmation of the hard line in Chinese media. We are currently preparing an analysis for you of the significance of this affair.

(End ~~Secret~~)

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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
SUBJECT: Info Memo re Chinese Interview to Komulgate Line on Taiwan

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

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INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO ()
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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ANALYSIS

July 29, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES *TJB*
SUBJECT: Toughening of Peking's Position on Taiwan

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President containing an analysis of Peking's toughened line on the "liberation of Taiwan."

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

*Not forwarded to
the President --
OBE*

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/66, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *5/10/01*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ANALYSIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Toughening of Peking's Position on Taiwan

Introduction and Summary

The PRC appears to have toughened its line on the "liberation" of Taiwan. The result is to complicate the possibility of finding a mutually acceptable formula on the Taiwan issue that would meet our political needs.

The new line reflects the influence of the left faction as well as reaction to resurgent interest in the United States and in Japan in a "two-China" or "one-China, one-Taiwan" arrangement. Peking's less flexible political position on the method of "liberating" Taiwan, together with recent extensive PRC military exercises in the Taiwan Strait area, suggests ascendancy of a view among Chinese leaders that the PRC cannot let the Taiwan issue lie on the shelf. They apparently believe that they must underscore the military option as a matter of principle, as a pressure tactic against the U. S., and as a preparation for future contingencies. While all evidence indicates that the Chinese wish to continue the current level of detente with us on the basis of our common concerns with Soviet expansionism, the new posture on Taiwan not only complicates advancement to full normalization but could conceivably lead to future problems in our relations. The Chinese, however, have so far retained basic flexibility on the Taiwan issue by not making the new line public, and by giving no indication of a change in their basic policy toward the U. S.

Background

In a July conversation with Senator Scott in Peking, Vice Premier and Politburo Standing Committee member Chang Ch'un-ch'iao made the toughest statements on Taiwan by any PRC leader since normalization began. Scott indicated to Chang the importance of conditioning the

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

State Dept Review

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

SW 9/26/02

BY *KR*, NARA, DATE *2/3/03*



American people on the question of Taiwan, and he underscored our desire for a peaceful settlement. Chang replied that there was "very little possibility of a peaceful settlement" and that "it is more reliable to settle this question through war." Chang said that Taiwan is "a noose around the neck of the United States" and that if we did not take it off "the PLA will cut it off."

Senator Scott's dogged pursuit of this delicate question may in part have accounted for Chang's intemperate language. Ambassador Gates, however, believes that Chang knew just what he was saying, and that he probably had whatever prior clearance he needed within the leadership for his statements. Gates' view gained credence when, about ten days after the Scott-Chang talks, the PRC Liaison Office (PRCLO) in Washington conveyed the same point, but even more inflexibly than Chang, to a group of prominent U.S. newsmen. The PRCLO invited Leslie Gelb and several other journalists to dinner, and the Chinese spent most of the evening categorically asserting that peaceful liberation of Taiwan was out of the question and that military force would have to resolve the issue. The PRC officials, however, insisted that the journalists could not directly or indirectly cite Chinese sources in reporting this stated position on Taiwan.

Previous Policy

On the crucial question of a "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan issue, the U.S. and Chinese positions differ in the Shanghai Communiqué -- the U.S. asserting its interest in such a settlement and the Chinese reaffirming that the liberation of Taiwan is an internal matter. None of the top Chinese leaders -- including Chou, Mao and Teng -- has ever lifted the threat that the Taiwan problem would ultimately need resolution by military means. While their formulations have varied, they have referred to the military liberation of Taiwan as probably inevitable.

Nevertheless, the degree to which the Chinese publicly have been willing to admit the theoretical possibility of a peaceful solution has changed over time. For example, several important and considered statements in early 1973 publicly affirmed the alternative of "peaceful liberation." This more flexible posture seemed to come from Chou En-lai and the moderate group around him. So far as we know, Defense Minister Yeh Ching-ying, in a meeting with a group of overseas Chinese during the summer or early fall of 1973, was the last to use the phrase. In mid-1973 the left faction, of which Chang Ch'un-ch'iao is the presumed head began to criticize

certain aspects of Chou's foreign policy, while accepting the basic geopolitical rationale of detente with the United States. After the Tenth Party Congress in September 1973, the phrase "peaceful liberation" disappeared.

During the anti-Confucius, anti-Lin Piao Campaign in 1974 there was criticism in Chinese media of Lin's alleged efforts to negotiate with the Nationalists during the civil war. By implication, such efforts today would also be out of the question.

It is apparent that there have been differences within the Peking leadership on the following issues regarding Taiwan:

- The possibilities of a peaceful settlement with the Taipei regime.
- The dangers of allowing the Taiwan issue to remain on the shelf.
- The best strategy for obtaining fundamental concessions from the United States on the Taiwan question.
- The wisdom of beginning to enhance the PRC's capability to employ the military option.
- The weight of progress on the Taiwan issue relative to the geopolitical benefits vis-a-vis the Soviets of PRC detente with the United States.

Elements Behind the New Line

The new, tougher language on the liberation of Taiwan is consistent with the more militant adherence of the left to ideological principle. It also fits in with the left's inclination to underscore China's long-term adversary relationship with the United States. Thus in part it reflects the increased influence of the left faction, particularly that of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. The left is currently concerned with improving its influence among the military, and conceivably some Chinese military leaders would approve a bellicose posture towards Taiwan, and one that emphasized enhancing China's military capabilities in the Taiwan Strait.

In any event, the Taiwan question, involving as it does ideology, nationalism and security, is a likely issue to become entangled in the domestic

power struggle. The moderate group was probably vulnerable to charges that over the past several years it had been too soft on Taiwan. Chairman Mao's current input on decisions is problematical but presumably it is continuing to slip away. As on domestic issues, access and influence over Mao by the leftist group including Madam Mao (Chiang Ching) may have allowed new scope to the militants on Taiwan policy.

The Chinese statements must also be seen in the context of recent developments that seem to point in the direction of a hardening of U. S. and Japanese positions toward consolidation of the Taiwan status quo. These developments include:

-- The jelling of American editorial opinion in the most prestigious and influential papers behind the need to preserve the rights of the Taiwanese while normalizing relations with the PRC.

-- Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa's comments highlighting Japan's "satisfaction" at the current state of U. S. - PRC - Taiwan relations, and indicating Japan's concern at any change in the status quo.

-- Our positions on the question of Canada's restriction of the ROC's participation in the Olympic Games.

Military Activity in the Taiwan Strait Area

The new political line on Taiwan has emerged at the time of large-scale PRC military exercises in the coastal area in the southern region of the Taiwan Strait. Ships from both the East and South Sea Fleet have taken part, and for the first time in years PRC aircraft have extended their operations several miles into the airspace over the Strait. The exercise has involved armies from two military regions, and amphibious and airborne operations against PRC coastal islands.

In his conversation with Senator Scott, Chang indicated that the current exercises in the Strait were intended for their effect on both the United States and Taiwan. Chang declared, "At present we're still making preparations. This is no military secret. In recent days in Fukien we have conducted small-scale military exercises. Taiwan is very nervous." Chang was apparently referring to this activity when later in the conversation he said "I want to show you that our civil war has not stopped."

The decision to underscore and enhance the military option in this fashion is very likely supported not only by the left but also by some military elements. A Central Committee directive of last summer on modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) called for the build-up of a military capability for the "liberation of Taiwan." The directive gave a five year time frame for achieving this capability.

Conclusions

It is impossible at the moment to sort out and define the precise intention behind Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's comments to Scott and the concurrent military exercises in the Strait. But in any event, the result is to narrow the already limited ambiguity of the Chinese position on the question of their use of force in resolving the Taiwan issue. If and when the new Chinese line becomes known in the United States, the explicitness of the threat to Taiwan will make considerably more difficult the development of a formulation on the issue that would meet U. S. political needs, both international and domestic.

Peking, however, has still been careful to keep open the possibility of an accommodation with the U. S. on the question of Taiwan. No Chinese public statement has yet affirmed the categorical rejection of a peaceful settlement. The July 1 joint editorial on the 55th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, for example, did not even include the usual shibboleth "We are determined to liberate Taiwan." There is no indication that the current Chinese regime is prepared to see a worsening of relations with the United States because of a lack of progress on the Taiwan issue.

The leftists and possibly some elements in the military may be arguing that international developments have reduced the geopolitical advantage for China of detente with the United States. But from all appearances, the entire spectrum of the Chinese leadership, including the left, still believes that continued relaxation of tensions with the United States is desirable in terms of power politics. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao himself, in his remarks to Scott, indicated this was the case. In an earlier meeting with Ambassador Gates, Premier Hua Kuo-feng suggested no change in China's policy toward the U. S.

Nevertheless, while the more militant line on Taiwan may be largely reactive and tactical, it is not clear where it will lead or what will be its effect on basic U. S. -China relations. The toughened language,



together with Peking's demonstration of force in the Taiwan Strait and its efforts to enhance its long-term military capability in the area, raise worrisome questions. The Chinese posture suggests that if over the next year or two the U. S. does not complete normalization and does not sever its ties to Taiwan, the tone of U. S. -PRC relations could become more acrimonious.

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INITIAL ACTION

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: SECSTATE Barnes S/S: _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT _____

SCOWCROFT F SECDEF _____ LOU NO FORM NODIS _____

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
SUBJECT: Transfer of LeKing Position
re Taiwan

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
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STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES: _____
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR: _____
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION: _____
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						MEMO _____ TO _____
FAR EAST/PRC						RECOMMENDATIONS: _____
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LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY?: _____
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: _____
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

July 30, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: Visitors to China

State has informed us of several potential visits to China.

Ambassador Gates has invited Arthur Burns to come to Peking as a personal visitor. Burns will be traveling to East Asia to attend a World Bank and IMF meeting in early October, and intends to visit Peking at that time.

Frank Zarb, of the Federal Energy Administration, is also toying with the idea of a visit to Peking when he makes a swing through major oil consuming and producing countries in East Asia in late September/early October. According to one of his office staff members, Zarb mentioned the idea of a China trip to you. Bill Gleysteen explained to the FEA staffer that he doubted the PRC would give Zarb a visa for an official visit, and the Chinese would shy away from extensive discussion with an unofficial visitor. Bill also emphasized that Secretary Kissinger and perhaps the President would have to address the policy connotations. It was understood that Zarb would not proceed further unless he talked directly to you or the Secretary.

Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's visit to China is now scheduled for September. The Chinese have apparently already included Sinkiang and Tibet on his schedule. These two provinces are major areas of Chinese security concern. State understands Schlesinger has requested an itinerary that would not include these areas.



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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OTHER Barnes _____ TS SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Status rpt on visitors to PRC

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

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CONGRESSIONAL						MEMO FOR PRES. _____
ECONOMIC						REPLY FOR _____
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						APPROPRIATE ACTION. _____
FAR EAST/PRC						MEMO _____ TO _____
INTELLIGENCE						RECOMMENDATIONS. _____
LATIN AMERICA						JOINT MEMO. _____
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
NSC PLANNING						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						CONCURRENCE. _____
SCIENTIFIC						DUE DATE: _____
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

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AUG 12 1976