

**The original documents are located in Box 10, folder “Korea - North Korean Tree Incident, 8/18/76 (2)” of the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974-77 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

August 19, 1976

TOSCO \_\_\_\_\_

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM HYLAND *for*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 94-39, # 24 U.S. Archivist 9/1/94

By KBH, NARA, Date 2/23/95

1. I have just finished a fairly lengthy conversation with Bill Clements and Admiral Holloway. Phil Habib could not join us, but he claims his views are well known to Secretary Kissinger. (As you probably know, he is deeply concerned that we not set off a series of escalatory and dangerous incidents.). As I see it, we will need reasonably clear guidance no later than 0900 eastern daylight time tomorrow on three issues: (1) the beginning of the B-52 exercises; (2) the great tree surgery operation, and (3) any additional military action either in conjunction with or following on the tree operation.

2. As for the B-52's, regardless of how we decide to proceed with the tree, we should start the B-52 exercise. I believe everyone here agrees with that, and an execute message will go out this evening so that the necessary lead time will put the B-52's in the air and over the target area. at about the same time that Stillwell would launch his tree operation, that is, 1800 EDT tomorrow. So unless we hear otherwise this will proceed.

3. On taking out the tree, there are strong differences in Washington. The JCS support General Stillwell's plan. After listening to Holloway, I conclude they are supporting it out of



loyalty to the Field Commander and in recognition that we must make a strong show of manhood in an area we were driven out of two days ago. The Chiefs, however, recognize that there are severe risks and there could be casualties. Bill Clements does not support the Stillwell plan; he feels it will lead to a major fight, that the Koreans are in effect baiting an attack and that we should take out the tree by some other method. He suggests, for example, running a helicopter in, dropping a satchel with napalm, and igniting the tree which would make a tremendous fireworks display for all to witness. The third option would be to ignore the tree, and some time at our choosing tomorrow, attack the North Korean barracks with artillery fire treating that as our tit-for-tat. A further option unanimously opposed by Clements, the Chiefs, and I think Habib would be to conduct an artillery attack at the same time we were chopping down the tree. As the Chiefs point out this runs a major risk of an attack by fire on the tree choppers who would be in an exposed area. A final option would be to conduct the Stillwell tree chopping plan and, if it runs into major trouble, to withdraw and then attack the North Korean barracks with artillery.

4. Obviously, General Stillwell will need substantial lead time to prepare for whatever option is decided, particularly if his general plan, which involves movement of a US rifle company, a Korean battalion, etc, is to be in place and ready to go at 1800 EDT.

5. My recommendation after considerable agonizing is as follows: (a) to proceed with the Stillwell plan; (b) to instruct Stillwell that if he receives unfriendly fire, to withdraw immediately and, once his forces are secured, to launch an artillery attack on the North Korean barracks and then be prepared to accept the inevitable retaliatory artillery attack from the North Koreans. If this scenario should develop, you, the President and Henry would then need to pause and consider very carefully the next US move. Basically I share <sup>with</sup> the others the conviction that the North Koreans are prepared to play a bloody game, but, in my view, probably will let the Stillwell tree-chopping go without a fire fight.

6. In sum, we need a go or no-go decision on the Stillwell plan or any of the alternatives.

7. If and only if you decide to bypass the tree operation in preference for a retaliatory artillery strike, <sup>then</sup> we would certainly need to go to the <sup>South</sup> Koreans, explain our plan and permit Stillwell sufficient time for his forces within artillery range to protect themselves, etc.

But I think it is safe to assume that he could accomplish this quite easily after a decision is made tomorrow morning our time.


8. Perhaps you can see in this some other variance or better scenario, but this seems to be the situation as I see it after arguing all day with various protagonists and listening to the TV events in my old home town.



9. ' Let me highlight two practical contingencies that you should keep in mind. First, if the tree surgery team arrives and finds the area occupied by a large group of North Koreans, Stillwell will almost certainly need instructions on whether to charge in and start a fracas or to withdraw for a later time. This could occur about 1800 tomorrow or thereabouts when key people such as yourself, the President or Kissinger may not in fact be immediately available. Second, if there is an unfavorable turn of events during the tree chopping and a real fire fight develops, it will also occur around 1830 tomorrow EDT, and we will need some clear, fast guidance on whether we retaliate immediately. At this point our only option might well be to blast away at the bridge of no return and the North Korean barracks area.

10. To wrap this all up, keep in mind that a number of moves are coinciding. The F-111's will be in place about 0400 our time. Task group 77.4 will get underway about 1900 our time tomorrow and the B-52 exercise will be occurring in between.

11. A final addendum concerns the War Powers Act notification. If I know the bureaucracy, they will all decide that notification is the better part of valor and the President will be stuck with it some time when he is in the great State of Kansas, but since the law allows us 48 hours we probably can do it after you arrive in Vail, but you may want to advise the President that the legal



eagles will probably conclude the addition of 18 F-4's and 20 F-111's "substantially enlarges US Armed Forces" in the area.

12. Will await to hear from you tomorrow morning or late tonight.

13. Warm regards.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 05827

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Minute

TITLE . . . . . Korean WSAG, 8/19/76

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Minutes from Korean WASAG meeting,  
8/19/76

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/19/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 8 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500064

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT  
PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM  
UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National  
Security Advisors)

BOX NUMBER . . . . . A1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Korea - North Korean Tree Incident,  
8/18/76 (1)-(3)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/29/1993

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*Exempted from declassification 4/6/94*

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REDACTED *5/12/12*



~~TOP~~

~~SECRET~~

<sup>2a</sup>  
XGDS

Korean WASAG August 19<sup>th</sup> 1976

Decisions:

1. Seek Presidential approval of a military action to cut down the tree and try to do it in such a way as to avoid confrontation.
2. To <sup>Seek Presidential approval</sup> start the B-52 exercise. The first such B-52 run should be timed to coincide with the tree cutting.
3. To start moving the ~~1st~~ Naval Task Force south into either the Sea of Japan or the Yellow Sea.
4. To start moving 18 F-11s from Mountain Home Idaho
5. To develop a contingency plan for shelling a North Korean barracks.

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted  
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 1.3

MR# 10-227:47

NSC Letter 5/2/12

By del. NARA Date 7/12/12



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XGDS



Korean- WASAG August 19, 1976  
Started 8:12 am

Kissinger: I would like some account of why it took so long for our reaction force to go in.

Holloway: We have not received an account which satisfies us. Stillwell was in Japan when the incident took place and is investigating.

Kissinger: I complained to the Chinese yesterday. They asked a good ~~question~~ question. They wanted to know why we had cameras there if we were not expecting an incident?

Holloway: It was a precaution because of previous incidents.

Kissinger: Okay. Their next question was --if we had a photographer there, why didn't we do something.

Holloway: We have not received a satisfactory answer from Stillwell on that.

Kissinger: Why did Stillwell go into see Park along when he was ~~specifically~~ specifically instructed to go in with the DCM.

Abromowitz: Well he called Stern and Stern said for him to go ahead.

Kissinger: But did he tell Stern that Stern was supposed to accompany him?

Abromowitz: He felt that Park was supposed to be informed right away. That was the environment.

Kissinger: We are not going to let Stillwell run loose. We are not going to let him act like MacArthur. We could have cut him out completely and insured that the whole thing be handled by the DCM.

Holloway: He talked to the Minister of Defense, then ---

Kissinger: It should not happen again.

Clement: I will send him a message.

Kissinger: I heard on the radio this morning a report that the Pentagon says that military action is inconceivable. The President will hit the ~~roof~~ ceiling when he hears that because I told him we would be discussing possible military actions and that is what the President wants.

Holloway: It must have been press conjecture.

Clements: It was probably from our PA.

Kissinger: George, do you have a briefing

Bush: (Begins briefing) see attached

Kissinger: We must brief our NATO allies.'

Bush (continues briefing)

Habib: Neutral observers won't go.

Bush (finishes briefing)

Kissinger: The fact is that they beat two of our men to death. Lets not lose sight of that.

Clements: Yesterday Henry asked a question about the order of battle. Holloway judgement was that they are relatively in balance. Is that also your judgement George?



Bush: Evelyn?

Colbert: Yes, we basically agree. Our ground forces don't count for much. There is a lack of firepower.

Kissinger: How come 40,000 Americans don't count for much?

Habib: They consist of one division. The rest are air and ground support

Holloway: Our air and mobile forces count for more than is reflected in the numbers. They have great influence.

Kissinger: I am uneasy about these net assessments. You can look at military history. Wars are often one by the side with the smaller forces. You look at World War I where the Germans were outnumbered. Then again in World War II, the Germans were outnumbered by the French and the British. They were able to concentrate their forces at decisive, key points and win.

Habib:

~~McLiswax~~: Our battle plan for Korea is based on exactly that assumption.

Holloway: On balance the South Korean forces with US assistance are adequate to stop the North Koreans from reaching Seoul. However a surprise attack could upset that. But that is no longer a possibility since we have gone to DEFCON 3. Of course a lot depends on how the troops fight for they can be breakthroughs. One breakthrough can raise havoc. A bold stroke could cause a lot of trouble. But the North Koreans by their attack on the two men have given away the element of surprise.

Kissinger: If they had wanted to launch an attack they would not have beat the two Americans to death.

Hyland: It is obvious from their propaganda that the Chinese were cool to the North Korean August 5 statement. If the North Koreans really want to fight they will need Chinese and Russian support.

Kissinger: If we do nothing they will think of us as the paper tigers of Saigon. They might then try to create a series of events. If we do nothing there may be another incident and then another.

Hyland: There is a substantial body of opinion in the US that we should pull out of Korea. Ed Reichauer in the Christian Science Monitor wrote that we should not honor our commitment even if ~~XXXXXXXX~~ attacked.

Robinson: When was this article?

Hyland: About three weeks ago. There may be a problem if the ~~xx~~ North Korean think that this crisis will cause controversy in this country.

Kissinger: Certainly there will be controversy. There would be a controversy if we did nothing. ~~of~~ The only way to act is to do something effective

Bush:  They have spotted a lot of West Coast Naval activity. There is also the unusual participation of civil transportation facilities, unusual bomber readiness. Their alert is very different from previous alerts.

Kissinger: What kind of alert did they have for the EC-121?

Bush: There was no such strip alert at that time.

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Colbert: It was intended to demonstrate to the US a high degree of readiness and to give us pause from undertaking military action. They layed everything on before publicizing their alert.

Kissinger: You still think that yesterday's incident was a planned action?

Colbert: Yes. The way they handled the alert was another indication that it was planned. Within one hour of our going on DEFCON 3 they had their strip alert.

Kissinger: You do think it was planned.

Colbert: An incident was planned but the actual killing of the two Americans may not have been in the plan. Those guards have been indoctrinated to hate Americans. The Koreans are very violent. The weight of the evidence including the number of Korean reinforcements ready prior to the incident indicates that our interpretation is true.

Kissinger: Obviously the tree was going to be a contentious issue and it was probably clear to the North Koreans that our going-in was likely to create an incident. So why didn't we also anticipate this. Where was our reaction force? We had no authority to prune the tree. We went in, advised the North Korean Officer who said good and then all hell broke loose.

Clements: Well I agree. I remeber our discussion yesterday and what you (to Holloway) said about our troops being Vietnam vetrans trained to obey the rules. But they were armed and I can't understand how they could have let the Koreans get that close to them and get themselves clobbered and chopped up.

Kissinger: What military options do we have?

Holloway: <sup>What happened.</sup> Stillwell was in Japan during the incident and still does not understand. It was ~~s~~ a surprise to him. One thing he did point out on the telephone is that once the two officers were killed ~~and~~ the troops were leaderless.

Kissinger: What about the guy in the observation tower.

Holloway: Our information on that is garbled. There is no reasonable excuse. Since yesterday's meeting we have gone up to DEFCON 3 and our F-4s arrived in Korea before nightfall. The North Koreans are aware of it because they complained about it <sup>at</sup> the MAC meeting.

Kissinger: Why?

Habib: Technically speaking any introduction of forces into Korea is illegal. We have done this thousands of times and the North Koreans have always complained. They do it too. The introduction of any weapc not there at the time of the agreement is illegal

Kissinger; What are we going to do?

Holloway: The first priority is to prune or cut the tree. The preliminary plan is to move in with some forces and chop it down quickly.

Kissinger: Does the Army have highly trained tree choppers?

Holloway: It would be done by specially trained Army engineers. The second option mentioned by Stillwell would be to announce to the press and observers and the North Koreans what we were going in to cut down the tree. Stillwell says this would be okay politiaally but



might cause some military problems.

Kissinger: I respect Stillwell's military judgements but politics is not his forte. Can you imagine inviting the world press to a tree cutting. We would be a laughing stock. It would be theatrical. The trick is to do it and then get out. The press could be invited in to look at the stump.

Holloway: The plan as we know it is not entirely adequate. They are getting it to us.

Clements: This business of sending in a squad is nonsense. It will just lead to a confrontation and may get a bunch of others killed. What for a tree? One guy with explosives, some plastique, could do the job. He could go in on a bicycle. Why risk a bunch of people for a tree? I don't like it at all. It makes no sense. We should not expect unarmed Americans to go in there and get killed over a tree.

Kissinger: The basic point is that we know we have the right to cut down the tree. They have killed two American and if we do nothing they will do it again. We have to do something.

Holloway: The Chiefs are looking at the tree as a military action and looking to see if we have the force to back it up. One option we are looking at is to have the SR-71 penetrate North Korean air space for reconnaissance purposes and advertise this to the world. Nobody would get hurt if we did this.

Kissinger: Why advertise?

Holloway: Advertising would tend to embarrass them.

Kissinger: Advertising would get us involved in a UN debate.

Holloway: We can advertise or not advertise it. With regard to the B-52 training flights they will proceed from Guam to South Korea and approach to within 43 miles of the DMZ. They will drop radar bombs and return. One option would be to use live conventional ordnance and bring them closer to the DMZ. We could also adjust the profile of B-52s so that North Korean radar can detect them.

Hyland: How many aircraft?

Holloway: There would be two to three aircraft per cell. They could have a live load of bombs.

Kissinger: There is not much point in having a live load unless it was always part of the plan.

Smith: No, it wasn't.

Kissinger: Then let's just do it. It is better to talk less and do more.

Holloway: Is that an execute order?

Kissinger: Let me check it out with Kansas City. What else can we do?

Holloway: This show of force in our air operations would not be too impressive to the North Koreans. We could reinforce our ground forces in Korea. The Marines on Okinawa could get there in five days. Or we could keep them afloat. We could fly the Marines from Okinawa in C-130s but a couple of battalions of Marines might not make much difference. We could also send in a Ranger battalion. That could be done in five days. They can do unconventional warfare tasks.





Clements: We all agree that taking out that tree is a must. But we should also do these other things. We have to get that task force moving and do the B-52 s. But what I would like to do is to have a party land up that coast and blow the hell out of an industrial sight. It could be done from a submarine.

Holloway: It could be a "seal " operation. We would need to have 24 hours and two selected targets. They could go in on a rubber boat. There would be a high risk of success.

Kissinger: What does that mean - a high probability of success?

Holloway: It could be dangerous as hell. If we pick a target which is significant in their view we would have a 50% chance of doing it without getting some people killed. The North Koreans are in a high state of alert.

Clements: ~~✓~~ What do you think, Henry?

Kissinger: I am a bit leary of getting Americans captured that far up the coast. We have to make it clear that we will not be pushed around and that we are not afraid of the North Koreans. If we let this incident go then there will be other incidents. Ideally we should do something quickly and then generate our forces afterwards. I remember with the EC-121 incident that by the time we had identified our targets, and had meetings and moved the carriers --- it was too late.

Bush: If we try to take that tree down probably that same group of North Koreans as before will come out.

Kissinger: If we shell the barracks maybe we don't need to take the tree down.

Habib: The barracks are outside of the Joint Security Area. They have reaction forces outside of the JSA. We are only talking about two miles.

Clements: I don't like the idea of shelling the barracks. It could start something. What do we do after we shell them. The North Koreans would certainly ~~react violently~~ react violently. I think we should go up the coast.

Holloway: If we did that we ~~would~~ <sup>might</sup> have difficulty getting the guys out.

~~Clements:~~

Kissinger: Why should that operation be with frogmen rather than airplanes. Airplanes would be a lot safer. Also a coastal operation would risk an infinitely more violent North Korean reaction. However the barracks are clearly related to the incident. If we aren't willing to accept some risk then we should not do anything.

Clements: I like the other operation better. It could be a harbor and we could blow up a couple of ships. They would be wondering what happened and who did it.

Kissinger: If we don't take down that tree tonight we will have to forget about the tree.

Bush: They will react

Abromowitz: If we send in 35 guys, would they mortar.?

Habib: No, they would either leave us alone or move in 100 people.



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Kissinger: What do I tell the President?

Holloway: That we are going in to cut down the tree. That our forces will be in position and ready to act depending on what happens. And they will take it from there.

Hyland: If necessary could we withdraw our forces and then plaster them.

Clements: Why can't we just send one guy in there.

Kissinger: The purpose of doing something is to show that we are ready to take risks. The trick is to do something from which they will back off.

Hyland: Then we will get Stillwell's plan and use all men possible.

Kissinger: It should be done quickly.

Hyland: Stillwell will need fairly precise instructions about what happens if a fight starts.

Habib ( explains situation from a map)

Holloway: There could be 200-300 people and a guy with a chain saw.

Abromowitz: The North Koreans probably expect this and are making plans for it.

Kissinger: One always assumes the unlimited willingness of opponents to take risks. The purpose of this exercise is to overawe them. We are 200 million people and they are 16 million.

Abromowitz: They could overawe us locally.

Hyland: ~~XXXXXX~~ If a fight starts we should get our men out and then plaster the area.

Holloway: We have to cut down the tree before that happens. We can go in with a full battalion.

Kissinger: We can start the B-52s before.

Holloway: Yes.

Clements: We can cut the tree down and plan the B-52 exercise so that they see the B-52s coming. That will give them something to occupy themselves with in Pyongyang. We can cut the ~~B~~ tree down while the B-52s are on their way and then keep the B-52s going for a few days.

Kissinger: How many days

Holloway: Five days

Kissinger: And make a contingency plan for shelling the barracks.

Clements: And the Navy task force should move in that direction.

Holloway: And we can move the F-111s.

Kissinger: Yes and start the task force moving.

Meeting ended 9:15am



DPRK AIDE AT COLOMBO DISCUSSES PANMUNJOM INCIDENT

OW191724 HONG KONG AFP IN ENGLISH 1709 GMT 19 AUG 76 OW

(TEXT) COLOMBO, AUG 19 (AFP)--A MEMBER OF THE NORTH KOREAN DELEGATION TODAY SAID THE DEATH OF TWO AMERICANS AT THE HANDS OF NORTH KOREANS AT PANMUNJOM WOULD NOT BE TAKEN UP BY THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT CONFERENCE HERE. THE UNIDENTIFIED NORTH KOREAN OFFICIAL TOLD THE AFP IN AN INTERVIEW: THE PANMUNJOM EVENT WAS AN AFFAIR THAT CONCERNED KOREA AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

A FULL REPORT OF THE PANMUNJOM INCIDENT, WHEREIN NORTH KOREAN SECURITY MEN AXED THE AMERICANS TO DEATH IN "SELF-DEFENSE", WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE DELEGATIONS HERE TOMORROW, HE SAID. THE REPORT, WHICH HE SAID HE RECEIVED FROM THE SUPREME COMMAND OF NORTH KOREAN ARMY, CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING:

FOURTEEN AMERICAN SOLDIERS ENTERED THE SECURITY AREA WITH AXES IN HAND AND, WITHOUT ANY PERMISSION FROM THE NORTH KOREAN SIDE, BEGAN TO CHOP DOWN TREES.

DESPITE NORTH KOREAN SECURITY'S CAUTIONING THE AMERICANS NOT TO CHOP DOWN TREES BECAUSE THESE WERE PLANTED BY THE NORTH KOREANS, THE AMERICANS PERSISTED, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT.

WHAT HAPPENED, THE REPORT ADDED, WAS THAT THE U.S. SOLDIERS PROVOKED THE NORTH KOREAN, AND A FIGHT ENSUED WHEN THE NORTH KOREANS FOUGHT BACK IN SELF-DEFENSE. TWO AMERICANS DIED WHILE FIVE NORTH KOREANS WERE WOUNDED.

ABOUT 40 TO 45 AMERICAN SUPPORT TROOPS WERE RUSHED TO AID THE 14 AMERICAN SOLDIERS, THE REPORT CONTINUED. WHAT TRANSPIRED AFTERWARDS WAS THAT AN AMERICAN CAPTAIN AND A SOUTH KOREAN TOOK PHOTOS, WHILE 100 AMERICANS TROOPS MATERIALIZED ON A NEARBY HILL.

U.S. PRESIDENT GERALD FORD AND SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, ACCORDING TO THE NORTH KOREAN OFFICIAL, ACCUSED THE NORTH KOREANS OF PROVOKING THE INCIDENT.

THE NORTH KOREAN SIDE WANTED TO CONVENE A MEETING OF SECURITY OFFICERS IN PANMUNJOM BUT ITS SOUTH KOREAN COUNTERPART REFUSED, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT. THE AMERICANS AND SOUTH KOREANS WANTED A MEETING OF SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS.

THE NEXT AMERICAN MOVE, THE REPORT CONTINUED, WAS TO ISSUE AN ORDER DECLARING COMBAT READINESS. IN RESPONSE, THE SUPREME NORTH KOREAN COMMANDER ORDERED ALL MEMBERS OF WORKERS GUARDS, PEASANTS AND YOUNG RED GUARDS TO BE ALSO COMBAT READY.

THE AXING INCIDENT OCCURRED AT 1030 A.M.

MEANWHILE, THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT CONFERENCE HERE, CAUGHT UP BY A CROWDED LAST DAY SCHEDULE, WAS SLOW TO REACT TO REPORT FROM SEOUL OF TWO AMERICANS BEING AXED TO DEATH BY NORTH KOREANS. MOST DELEGATIONS WERE EVEN UNAWARE OF THE SENSATIONAL INCIDENT, AND FOR THEM THE KOREAN PROBLEM REMAINED WHAT IT HAS BEEN DURING DELIBERATIONS HERE--THE NEED TO REUNIFY KOREA AND FOR AMERICAN TROOPS TO LEAVE SOUTH KOREA.

THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS HERE HOWEVER HAS BEEN VERY SPIRITED WITH THE NORTH KOREAN DELEGATION TWICE DENOUNCING SOUTH KOREA IN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS FOR ITS MILITARY BUILD-UP. THIS BUILDUP, ACCORDING TO NORTH KOREA, INCLUDES MORE THAN 1,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SCORES OF NUCLEAR BOMB-CARRYING PLANES BROUGHT TO SOUTH KOREA BY THE U.S., AND SUBSEQUENTLY A SQUADRON OF THE LATEST AMERICAN FIGHTER BOMBER F-111.

NORTH KOREAN VICE PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER MO I/M CHARGED THAT THE EXPLOSIVE POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTRODUCED INTO SOUTH KOREA BY THE U.S. IS 820 TIMES MORE POWERFUL THAN THE ATOM BOMB AMERICAN DROPPED IN HIROSHIMA.

NOT TO BE OUTDONE, SOUTH KOREA, THROUGH ITS TRADE REPRESENTATION IN COLOMBO, HAS BEEN ISSUING PRESS RELEASES DENOUNCING NORTH KOREA'S "WARLIKE PREPARATIONS," SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM BY NORTH KOREAN AGENTS.

A SOUTH KOREAN DOCUMENT RELEASED AT THE PRESS CENTRE HERE IS ENTITLED "NORTH KOREA: UNDERMINING THE TRUCE". THIS INCLUDED THE MILITARY TUNNELS BUILT BY NORTH KOREA ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED LINE TO "THREATEN SOUTH KOREA'S DEFENSE LINE."

WASHINGTON, ACCORDING TO REPORTS REACHING HERE, HAS ALREADY ISSUED TWO COMMUNIQUE ON THE AXING INCIDENT. THE NORTH KOREAN DELEGATION HERE IS ALSO EXPECTED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT ON THE MATTER.

19 AUG 1339Z JPC/SAJ\*\*\*\*\*



Sent to Bud

Hyland, LL

0126

P

U.S.-KOREA

URGENT

BY FRED S. HOFFMAN

WASHINGTON (AP) -- IN A PRECAUTIONARY MOVE, THE UNITED STATES SENT ADDITIONAL AIR POWER TO SOUTH KOREA THURSDAY AS U.S. GROUND AND AIR FORCES THERE WERE PLACED ON ALERT FOLLOWING THE SLAYING OF TWO U.S. ARMY OFFICERS BY NORTH KOREANS.

FORD ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAID ABOUT 25 F4 FIGHTER PLANES AND RE4 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN FLOWN INTO SOUTH KOREA FROM OKINAWA.

MEANWHILE, THE SOURCES SAID, ABOUT 15 SWING-WING F111 FIGHTER BOMBERS AT MOUNTAIN HOME, THE AIR FORCE BASE IN IDAHO, WERE ALERTED FOR POSSIBLE MOVEMENT TO SOUTH KOREA.

OFFICIALS STRESSED THAT THE AIR REINFORCEMENT WAS A PRECAUTIONARY MOVE AND DID NOT PRESSAGE ANY AMERICAN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST NORTH KOREA.

HOWEVER, THE MOVEMENT OF ADDITIONAL AIR UNITS TO REINFORCE THE 54 U.S. F4 FIGHTER PLANES ALREADY IN SOUTH KOREA WAS TAKEN AS A WARNING TO NORTH KOREA.

U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT SOUTH KOREA'S 560,000-MAN ARMY COULD HOLD ITS OWN AGAINST NORTH KOREA'S 410,000-MAN ARMY IF THE NORTH KOREANS LAUNCHED AN ATTACK ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE SEPARATING THE TWO KOREAS.

A SINGLE U.S. ARMY DIVISION, THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION, IS IN POSITION NORTH OF SEOUL TO DEFEND THE CAPITAL. HOWEVER, U.S. MILITARY LEADERS LONG HAVE FELT THAT NORTH KOREA'S AIR FORCE OF NEARLY 600 RUSSIAN-BUILT COMBAT PLANES MIGHT OVERWHELM SOUTH KOREA'S

U.S.-SUPPLIED AIR SQUADRONS WHICH NUMBER ONLY ABOUT 215 WARPLANES.

THEFEOFPE, OFFICIALS SAY, IT IS NECESSARY TO REEF-UP U.S. AIRPOWER TO DETER ANY NORTH KOREAN THOUGHT OF AIR STRIKES INTO THE SOUTH.

AT A PENTAGON BRIEFING, SPOKESMAN TOD HULLIN TOLD NEWSMEN "I DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT WE HAVE ANY PLANS AT THIS TIME TO TAKE MILITARY RETALIATORY ACTION" BECAUSE OF THE ATTACK BY NORTH KOREAN SOLDIERS ON THE U.S.-SOUTH KOPEAN PARTY ON THE DMZ.

HULLIN REFUSED TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ACTION LATER, BUT THIS IS THE KIND OF NONCOMMITAL POSITION GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN USUALLY TAKE SO AS TO KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN.

28-19-76 15:46EDT





UP-106

(KOREA)

(BY JOHN MILNF)

*Hyland, LL*

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER MET THURSDAY WITH HIS TOP-LEVEL EMERGENCY TASK FORCE AND THE PENTAGON PLACED U.S. TROOPS IN KOREA ON SPECIAL ALERT IN RESPONSE TO THE "DELIBERATE MURDER" OF TWO AMERICAN OFFICERS BY NORTH KOREAN GUARDS.

THE ALERT CANCELED ALL LEAVES AND PASSES FOR THE 42,000 AMERICAN SERVICEMEN IN SOUTH KOREA, PUTTING THEM IN A STATE OF READINESS MIDWAY BETWEEN PEACETIME AND ALL-OUT WARTIME STATUS.

NORTH KOREAN PRESIDENT KIM IL-SUNG, IN TURN, ORDERED HIS FORCES "ON A WAR POSTURE," ACCORDING TO A NORTH KOREAN RADIO BROADCAST MONITORED IN WASHINGTON.

QUESTIONED ABOUT NORTH KOREAN STATEMENTS THE HEIGHTENED TENSIONS INCREASED THE DANGER OF WAR, A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN REPLIED: "IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT DECREASE THE DANGER OF WAR."

PENTAGON SPOKESMAN TOD HULLIN SAID: "OUR FORCES IN KOREA WERE PUT ON AN INCREASED ALERT STATUS" BY A FORMAL ORDER FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS "A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE."

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID KISSINGER PRESIDED OVER TWO URGENT MEETINGS OF THE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP -- A TASK FORCE CALLED UP TO HANDLE FOREIGN CRISIS SITUATIONS -- ON WEDNESDAY NIGHT AND THURSDAY MORNING BEFORE FLYING TO KANSAS CITY WITH A PLANELOAD OF FOREIGN AMBASSADORS.

STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN FREDERICK BROWN SAID THE ALERT STATUS OF U.S. TROOPS IN SOUTH KOREA WAS RAISED TWO STEPS FROM NORMAL READINESS TO DEFENSE CONDITION 3.

THIS MEANT U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE CALLED BACK TO THEIR UNITS FROM LEAVE, SECURITY AROUND THEIR BASES WAS TIGHTENED, RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING WERE STEPPED UP, ALL EQUIPMENT WAS CHECKED TO MAKE SURE IT WAS IN WORKING ORDER AND VEHICLES WERE GASSED UP READY TO MOVE.

"I DON'T HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT WE HAVE ANY PLANS TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AT THIS TIME," HULLIN SAID. BUT, HE SAID, "I'M NOT RULING ANYTHING IN OR OUT."

UPI 08-19 04:11 PED



FBIS 34 (SEE 33)\*\*\*\*\*

*Hyland, LL*

BULLETIN

MORE ON PYONGYANG RADIO ON KPA WAR POSTURE

OW190343 FOR YOUR INFORMATION

PYONGYANG DOMESTIC SERVICE IN KOREAN AT 0823 GMT 19 AUG  
TRANSMITS A KPA SUPREME COMMAND REPORT WHICH SAYS THAT:

"THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS SENT AN ULTIMATUM TO OUR  
SIDE ON THE ONE SIDE, AND ON THE OTHER HAND ORDERED THE  
U.S. UNITS IN SOUTH KOREA ON AN EMERGENCY ALERT AND  
ENTERED INTO A WAR POSTURE. THIS IS REGARDED AS A  
PREMISE THAT THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS CAN COMMIT  
AN ADVENTURE OF WAR.

"FACED WITH THIS RECKLESS WAR CLAMOR OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS,  
THE KPA SUPREME COMMANDER HAS ORDERED ALL KPA UNITS, ALL  
PERSONNEL OF THE WORKER-PEASANT MILITIAMEN AND THE RED GUARD  
YOUTH UNITS TO ENTER INTO WAR POSTURE.

"WE WILL NOT PROVOKE OTHERS FIRST, BUT WE WILL NEVER  
TOLERATE THE ENEMY'S PROVOKING US.

"THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS MUST TAKE A STRAIGHT LOOK AT THE  
REALITY, AND ACT WITH DISCRETION. IF THEY PERSIST IN  
STARTING A WAR IN DEFIANCE OF OUR STRICT WARNINGS, THEY WILL BE  
BOUND TO RECEIVE AN ANNIHILATING BLOW."

TEXT AS AVAILABLE.

19 AUG 0911Z BR/TM\*\*\*\*\*



Hyland, LL

FBIS 36 (SUB FOR 33)

DPRK: KPA SUPREME COMMAND ORDERS WAR POSTURE

OW190919 PYONGYANG DOMESTIC SERVICE IN KOREAN 0823 GMT 19 AUG 76 OW

(KPA SUPREME COMMAND REPORT)

(TEXT) THE KPA SUPREME COMMAND REPORT:

THE KPA SUPREME COMMANDER HAS ISSUED AN ORDER TO ALL  
KPA UNITS AND ALL PERSONNEL OF THE WORKER-PEASANT MILITIA  
AND THE RED GUARD YOUTH UNITS ON PUTTING THEMSELVES IN  
WAR POSTURE.

AS ALREADY REPORTED, THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS,  
WHO ARE RUNNING MADLY AMUCK IN TRYING TO START A NEW WAR IN  
KOREA, COMMITTED A GRAVE PROVOCATIVE ACTION AT THE JOINT  
SECURITY AREA AT PANMUNJOM ON 18 AUGUST.

(MORE)

19 AUG 0933Z BR/IM



**Dear Mrs. Barrett:**

**I was deeply saddened by the report of the death of your husband, First Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett, United States Army, while serving in Korea.**

**In this time of your bereavement, no words of consolation are really adequate. I believe you can be proud, however, that your husband was actively serving in a position of leadership at the time of his death, and was contributing directly to the cause of freedom this nation represents throughout the world.**

**Mrs. Ford joins with me in sending our heartfelt sympathy in this hour of grief.**

**Sincerely,**

**Mrs. Mark T. Barrett  
3773-C Gilmer Street  
Columbia, South Carolina 29207**

**GRF:BS:feg:8/19/76**



GRF/BS/1/8-19-76

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Bonifas:

I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of your son, Captain Arthur G. Bonifas, United States Army.

I know at this time of bereavement words alone cannot provide solace; however, you can be justly proud of your son's service to his country. He contributed directly to maintaining the freedom our country supports throughout the world.

Mrs. Ford joins me in sending our heartfelt sympathy in this hour of grief.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. Raymond A. Bonifas  
7428 Jackson Street  
Omaha, Nebraska 68114





**Dear Mrs. Barrett:**

**Mrs. Ford and I were deeply saddened to learn of the death of your son, First Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett, United States Army.**

**Words alone cannot provide solace; however, I believe you can be justly proud, as I am, of your son's service to his country. His bravery and dedication under duress contributed directly to maintaining the freedom that our country supports throughout the world.**

**A grateful nation joins with me in sending our heartfelt sympathy in this hour of bereavement.**

**Sincerely,**

**Mrs. Helen Barrett  
6667 Almond Avenue  
Jacksonville, Florida 32210**

**GRF:BS:feg:8/19/76**



**Dear Mrs. Bonifas:**

**I was deeply saddened by the report of the death of your husband, Captain Arthur G. Bonifas, United States Army, while serving in Korea.**

**In this time of your bereavement, no words of condolence are really adequate. I believe you can be proud that your husband was actively serving his country in a position of leadership at the time of his death. He was contributing directly to the cause of freedom our country represents throughout the world.**

**Mrs. Ford joins with me in sending our heart-felt sympathy in this hour of grief.**

**Sincerely,**

**Mrs. Arthur G. Bonifas  
4045-B Clark Stewart Terrace  
Newburgh, New York 12550**

**GRF:BS:sl:8-19-76**

Green copies  
to KC

telex sent  
from  
Washington

19/3:00 pm

