

The original documents are located in Box 8, folder “Japan - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (5)” of the National Security Adviser Files: Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NOD890

PAGE 01 TOKYO 05192 190453Z

00
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES

087262

O 190436Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WSSHOC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9552

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 5192

NODIS

CONTROL: 4730Q

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: SREF, VS, JA
SUBJ: STAGING AREAS FOR EVALUATION OF REFUGEES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM

RECD: APRIL 19, 1975

REF: STATE 090485

1. IN ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR WHO OUT OF TOWN, DCM CALLED ON DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS KEISUKE ARITA URGENTLY AT NOON SATURDAY APRIL 19 TO MAKE APPROACH INSTRUCTED REPTEL. BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA AND VICE MINISTER TUGO WERE UNAVAILABLE.

2. IN RESPONSE TO DCM'S PRESENTATION OF SUBSTANCE REPTEL, ARITA ASSURED HIM THAT OUR APPROACH WOULD BE HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. HE SAID GOJ WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO STUDY THE MATTER CAREFULLY AND WOULD PROVIDE RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN IMMEDIATE PERSONAL REACTION, HOWEVER, ARITA COMMENTED THAT GOJ WOULD FIND NO DIFFICULTY IN COOPERATING IN THE STAGING OF EVACUATION OF U.S. NATIONALS THROUGH U.S. FACILITIES IN JAPAN, BUT POSSIBILITY OF SUBSTANTIAL FLOW OF VIETNAMESE NATIONALS THROUGH JAPAN WOULD OBVIOUSLY RAISE SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR GOJ. HE SAID IT WOULD BE "ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE" TO CONSIDER USING JAPANESE "NATIONAL ASSETS" AS STAGING AREAS FOR REFUGEE OPERATION, AND SO QUESTION FOR GOJ PROBABLY WOULD COME DOWN TO POSSIBILITY OF PERMITTING USE OF U.S. FACILITIES FOR EVACUATION

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY GA, NARA, DATE 8/31/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TOKYO 05192 190453Z

STAGING AREAS. HE COMMENTED PRELIMINARILY THAT PROBLEM FOR GOJ WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT THE LARGER THE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES INVOLVED, THE LONGER THEY REMAIN IN JAPAN, AND THE MORE DIRECT THE INVOLVEMENT OF GOJ AGENCIES.

3. ARITA PROMISED AT LEAST PRELIMINARY RESPONSE BY MONDAY OR TUESDAY. HE NOTED THAT MOST SENIOR OFFICIAL IN MINISTRY UNAVAILABLE UNTIL MONDAY MORNING AT EARLIEST. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY MAY HAVE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING RELEVANT DETAILS OF U.S. PLANS THAT ARE STILL UNCLEAR TO THEM BASED ON PRESS AND OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION. IN CONCLUSION, ARITA REAFFIRMED BASIC GENERAL ATTITUDE OF GOJ THAT IT SHOULD COOPERATE IN EVERY FEASIBLE WAY WITH TRULY HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS.
HOUGSON

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

~~SECRET~~

NOD313

TELEGRAM
ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 TOKYO 05319 220950Z

00
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

116799

O 220940Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9611

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 5319

CONTROL: 5206Q

RECD: 4/22/75

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, VS
SUBJ: STAGING AREAS FOR EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM SOUTH
VIETNAM

REF: STATE 91727

1. SINCE WE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD EXPEDITE REPLY TO OUR REQUEST FOR GOJ COOPERATION IN POSSIBLE EVACUATION EFFORT, DCM CONVEYED SUBSTANCE REFTEL PARA 7 TO DEPUTY VICE MINISTER ARITA ON APRIL 22. ARITA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, SAID GOJ WISHES BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE, AND EXPRESSED HOPE HE WOULD HAVE GOJ REPLY SOMETIME DURING APRIL 23.
2. DCM AGAIN EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE KNOWLEDGE OF USG CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND ARITA READILY AGREED.
HOOGSON

~~SECRET~~

4/3/01



ACTION COPY

COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES *LH-WH*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

N00732

PAGE 01 TOKYO 05550 251131Z

CONTROL: 60752
RECD: 25 APR 75
7:30AM

00
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

042616

O 251020Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9724

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 5558

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: SREF, VS, JA
SUBJ: STAGING AREAS FOR EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM SYN

REF: TOKYO 5192

1. DIRGEN AMERICAN AFFAIRS YAMAZAKI APRIL 25 PROVIDED DCM WITH GOJ RESPONSE TO OUR APRIL 19 APPROACH CONCERNING POSSIBILITY OF STAGING VIETNAM EVACUEES THROUGH U.S. MILITARY BASES IN JAPAN. (REFTEL). BASIC GOJ POSITION SET FORTH IN BRIEF WRITTEN MEMORANDUM, EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF WHICH FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

WE AUTHORIZE THE USE OF US FACILITIES AND AREAS IN JAPAN BY US GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS WHICH TRANSPORT US EVAUEES (U.S. CITIZENS AND THEIR SPOUSES AND CHILDREN ARE ANTICIPATED) ENROUTE FROM VIETNAM TO THE UNITED STATES. SUCH USE OF FACILITIES AND AREAS WOULD HAVE CREATED PROBLEMS UP TO NOW UNDER THE TERMS OF THE SECURITY TREATY AND THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, SINCE SUCH USE ARISES OUT OF THE NEED TO MEET HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES, WE WILL RECOGNIZE SUCH USE AS LONG AS IT IS CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE OBJECTIVES FOR WHICH THE FACILITIES AND AREAS ARE PROVIDED.

AMERICAN EVACUEES WOULD NORMALLY HAVE IN THEIR POSSESSION PASSPORTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, BUT THERE MAY BE SITUATIONS IN WHICH THEY WILL NOT HAVE TIME TO OBTAIN VISAS. FOR THE TIME

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY gh NARA, DATE 2/31/01



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TOKYO 05558 251131Z

BEING, WE WILL GRANT THEM TEMPORARY LANDING PERMITS. WE EXPECT ENTRIES AND DEPARTURES TO TAKE PLACE AT YUKOTA AND KADENA AIR BASES AND YUKOSUK AND SASEBU NAVAL BASES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ADVANCE NOTICE OF ARRIVALS WILL BE GIVEN, THAT NECESSARY CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION, AND QUARANTINE PROCEDURES WILL BE ADHERED TO IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS, THAT THE EVACUEES WILL REMAIN IN JAPAN FOR MINIMUM PERIODS, AND THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR DEPARTURE FROM JAPAN.

END TEXT.

2. IN SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS ON ABOVE POSITION, YAMAZAKI NOTED IT WAS ADOPTED ONLY AS RESULT OF DECISION AT POLITICAL LEVEL AND EXTENSIVE BU-
DAUCRATIC COORDINATION. HE SAID INTENT OF GOJ IS TO BE AS COOPERATIVE AS POSSIBLE WITH HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES OF USG. HE NOTED THAT GOJ POSITION IS CAST IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF OBVIOUS PRINCIPLES, BUT GOVERNMENT EXPECTED IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE IN EVERY REGARD.

3. IN PARTICULAR, YAMAZAKI POINTED OUT THAT PROVISIONAL ENTRY PERMITS IN PRINCIPLE GRANTED UNDER THIS DECISION ONLY TO AMERICAN CITIZENS AND THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN OF WHATEVER NATIONALITY. HE SAID DECISION DOES NOT EXTEND TO MORE DISTANT RELATIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZEN FAMILIES (PARENTS, ETC.), NOR TO VIETNAMESE EVACUEES OF NO RELATIONSHIP TO AMERICAN CITIZENS. IN RESPONSE TO CLOSE QUESTIONING BY DCM CONCERNING THIS LIMITATION, HOWEVER, YAMAZAKI SAID THAT GOJ WOULD CONTINUE TO INTERPRET THIS PROVISION FLEXIBLY FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN REASONS DESPITE OBVIOUS POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES THAT COULD BE FORESEEN. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID GOJ ADDRESSED CASE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND CLOSELY RELATED DEPENDENTS AS MOST LIKELY CASE TO ARISE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HE SAID IF REQUIRE-
MENT ARISES FOR DEALING WITH FLOW OF UNRELATED VIETNAMESE REFUGEES, GOJ REMAINS WILLING TO EXAMINE THAT PROBLEM URGENTLY AND WITH AS MUCH COOPERATION AS POSSIBLE.

4. IN DISCUSSION OF FURTHER DETAILS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF GOJ DECISION, YAMAZAKI AND HIS STAFF SAID GOJ WOULD REQUIRE AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE AS POSSIBLE OF ARRIVAL OF AIR-

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 TOKYO 05558 251131Z

CRAFT OR SHIPS CARRYING VIETNAM EVACUEES IN ORDER TO DETAIL NECESSARY PERSONNEL FOR CIQ PROCEDURES TO PORTS OF ENTRY. ON OCCASION OF FIRST ARRIVAL, THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AT LEAST 48 HOURS' NOTICE TO GET MACHINERY ROLLING. IN ADVANCE NOTICE THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE DATE-/TIME OF ARRIVAL, PORT OF ARRIVAL, NUMBER OF EVACUEES ABOARD, AND THEIR NATIONALITY. THEY ASKED THAT WE NOT CONCENTRATE EVACUEES IN KADENA OR OTHER FACILITY IN OKINAWA BECAUSE OF FAMILIAR ADVERSE LOCAL POLITICAL CLIMATE.

5. RE CUSTOMS PROCEDURES: GOJ REQUESTS U.S. AUTHORITIES PROVIDE DESIGNATED AREA WITHIN U.S. FACILITY WHERE GOJ CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CAN INSPECT BELONGINGS OF INCOMING EVACUEES. ALSO REQUEST U.S. SIDE PROVIDE CONTROLLED STORAGE AREA FOR SURPLUS BELONGINGS. GOJ CANNOT SANCTION USE OF DUTY-FREE SOFA-COVERED SOURCES OF FOOD AND SUPPLIES (PX AND COMMISSARIES), BUT YAMAZAKI MADE CLEAR THAT SERVICE OF ESSENTIAL HUMAN NEEDS (NOT LUXURY OR CASUAL SHOPPING) FROM SUCH SOURCES WOULD IN EFFECT NOT BE CHALLENGED BY GOJ.

6. IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES: GOJ IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES WILL RETAIN THE RIGHT TO DESIGNATE PLACE WHERE EVACUEES WILL BE ACCOMMODATED, THROUGH IN PRACTICE THIS DECISION WOULD OF COURSE BE TAKEN IN CO-OPERATION WITH U.S. AUTHORITIES ON THE SCENE. GOJ IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES ALSO WILL STIPULATE PERMITTED DURATION OF EVACUEES' STAY IN JAPAN, BUT YAMAZAKI EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOJ'S INTENTION IS TO BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT THIS, WITH NO MAXIMUM TIME LIMIT SET. EXIT OF EVACUEES FROM JAPAN IS RESPONSIBILITY OF USG; NO EVACUEES WILL BE ACCEPTED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN JAPAN. EVACUEES MUST BE HELD WITHIN BOUNDS OF U.S. FORCES FACILITIES AND AREAS, AND NO PERMITS WILL BE ISSUED FOR EXIT FROM BASES FOR SIGHTSEEING OR INDIVIDUAL DESIRES.

7. QUARANTINE PROCEDURES: SINCE VIETNAM IS LISTED UNDER JAPANESE LAW AS CONTAGIOUS DISEASE AREA, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT QUARANTINE PROCEDURES. ALSO UNDER JAPANESE LAW, U.S. BASES ARE NOT AUTHORIZED AS NORMAL PORTS OF ENTRY AND EXIT, SO QUARANTINE OFFICIALS CANNOT BE DETAILED TO CONDUCT LEGALLY REQUIRED QUARANTINE INSPECTIONS OF INCOMING EVACUEES ON U.S. BASES, EXCEPT IWAKUNI. BECAUSE OF THIS LEGAL TECHNICALITY, WHICH FONOFF WAS UNABLE TO GET WAIVED DESPITE LENGTHY AND STRENUOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH, GOJ

~~SECRET~~



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~


PAGE 04 TOKYO 05556 251131Z

ASKS THAT ALL INCOMING AIRCRAFT LAND FIRST EITHER AT IWAKUNI OR NAHA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR INITIAL QUARANTINE INSPECTION. FOLLOWING THIS INSPECTION, WHICH FOREIGN OFFICE ENVISAGED AS SERVING LEGALLY REQUIRED FORM RATHER THAN EXHAUSTIVE EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL EVACUEES AND THEIR BAGGAGE, AIRCRAFT WOULD BE FREE TO PROCEED TO SUCH OTHER U.S. FACILITY IN JAPAN AS U.S. AUTHORITIES DETERMINE FOR EACH FLIGHT. IN CASE OF NAHA, FONOFF SUGGESTED U.S. MAY WISH SIMPLY TO HAVE EVACUEES DEPLANE AT NAHA AND BORAD BUSES OR TRUCKS FOR SHORT RIDE TO OTHER U.S. FACILITY AFTER INITIAL QUARANTINE INSPECTION. WITHIN U.S. BASES, NORMAL SOFA-PRESCRIBED QUARANTINE REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES WOULD APPLY.

8. IN TWO FINAL NOTES, YAMAZAKI SAID GOJ WOULD EXPECT AHT ALL AIRPLANES AND SHIPS USED UNDER THIS PLAN WOULD BE USG-CONTROLLED (MILITARY OR USG CHARTERED AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS). HE ALSO ASSUMED THAT USG WOULD FEEL FREE TO USE ALL AVAILABLE U.S. MILITARY MEDICAL FACILITIES TO SERVE NEEDS OF EVACUEES.

9. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE GOJ HAS MADE HONEST EFFORT TO BE HELPFUL, FULLY SUPPORTED BY POLITICAL DECISION OF FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA AND CABINET. DESPITE ANKWARDNESS OF DETAILED REQUIREMENTS FOR QUARANTINE INSPECTION AND IMPLIED LIMITATIONS ON USING MILITARY SUPPLY RESOURCES FOR EVACUEES, WE THINK GOJ RESPONSE ALLOWS US NOW TO ACCUMODATE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF AMERICAN CITIZEN EVACUEES AND MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY IN JAPAN IF NEED ARISES. GOJ'S INITIAL FOCUS ON AMERICAN CITIZENS AND THEIR FAMILIES REFLECTS REAL POLITICAL DIFICULTY THEY WOULD HAVE IN ACCOMODATING NON-RELATED VIETNAMESE. THEIR ASSURANCE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER FURTHER PROPOSAL FOR LATTER CATEGORY OF EVACUEES STRUCK US AS SINCERE AND FORTHCOMING.
HODGSON

~~SECRET~~



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOD949

TELEGRAM
ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 STATE

00
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

067134

O 270355Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9733

CONTROL: 6434Q
RECD: 4/27/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 5568

NODIS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: AMEG, SREF, JA
SUBJECT: STAGING AREAS FOR EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM SVN

REF: STATE 097638

FOR DEAN BROWN

1. BECAUSE OF TEMPORARY UNAVAILABILITY DVER ELECTION AND HOLIDAY WEEKEND OF MORE SENIOR OFFICERS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY, POLCOUNS CONVEYED URGENT REQUEST FOR GOJ DECISION REFTEL TO DIRECTOR, SECURITY DIVISION YAMASHITA. YAMASHITA IN ANY EVENT IS THE EFFECTIVE WORKING LEVEL OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH STAFF WORK ON THIS PROBLEM AND WAS PRINCIPAL CUORDINATOR OF GOJ POSITION REGARDING PRIMARILY USCIT REFUGEE FLOW PROVIDED APRIL 25 (TOKYO 5558).

2. YAMASHITA PROMOSSED TO ATTEMPT TO INFORM SENIOR OFFICIALS OF OUR APPROACH TODAY, APRIL 27, BUT SINCE RESPONSE WILL REQUIRE POLITICAL LEVEL DECISION (FONMIN MIYAZAWA AND CABINET) HE WARNED THAT HE COULD NOT REALISTICALLY PROMISE TO PROVIDE ANSWER APRIL 28. HE ACKNOWLEDGED FULL UNDERSTANANDING OF URGENCY OF OUR INQUIRY AND PROMISED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO EXPEDITE RESPONSE.

3. YAMASHITA AGREED TO MEET AGAIN MONDAY MORNING APRIL 28, TO GO OVER FURTHER QUESTIONS THEY MAY REQUIRE ANSWERED IN PRESENTING PROBLEM FOR POLITICAL DECISION. AS IMMEDIATE THOUGHT HOWEVER, HE REFERRED TO STATUS OF PHILGOVT ACCOMMODATION OF REFUGEES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66 5/31/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~PAGE 00 STATE~~

HE NOTED APRIL 26 VERNAACULAR TOKYO PRESS STORIES THAT RPG IS RESISTING FREE FLOW OF REFUGEES THROUGH PHILLIPINES. HE SPECIFICIALLY ASKED WHETHER IT IS TRUE THAT RPG HAS PLACED THREE CONDITIONS ON ACCOMODATION OF EVACUEES: A) LIMIT OF 200 INCOMING REFUGEES PER DAY; B) REFUGEES REQUIRED TO REMAIN WITHIN BOUNUS OF U.S. FACILITY AT CLARK AFB; AND C) REFUGEES MUST BE MOVED ONWARD WITHIN THREE DAYS OF ARRIVAL IN PHILLIPINES.

4. REQUEST FOR USE IN MEETING WITH FONOFF MORNING APRIL 28 TOKYO TIME IMMEDIATE ANSWER TO YAMASHITA'S SPECIFIC QUESTION PARA 3 ABOVE AND ANY OTHER CLARIFICATION RE STATUS OF RPG ACCOMODATION OF REFUGEES APPROPRIATE TO PASS TO GOJ.

5. YAMASHITA PROMISED APRIL 29 RESPONSE TO QUERY RE SPEED WITH WHICH QUARANTINE CAN PROCESS INCOMING FLOW (PARA 4 REFTEL). WE ARE ALSO CHECKING SIZE AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT THAT CAN BE ACCOMODATED, ESPECIALLY AT IWAKUNI, IF GOJ FINDS IT IMPOSSIBLE TO MODIFY ITS PRESENT ANKWARD PROCEDURAL RULE ON QUARANTINE INSPECTIONS OF INITIAL ARRIVALS OF REFUGEES IN JAPAN.
HODGSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



271-511

15



Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TELEGRAM ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 TOKYO 05668 281153Z

O 281130Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9774
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 5668

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMEG, SREF, JA
SUBJECT: STAGING AREAS FOR EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM SVN

REF: A. TOKYO 5568
B. STATE 897854


1. SINCE OUR APPROACH APRIL 27 (REF A), WE HAVE HAD AMPLE EVIDENCE AT STAFF LEVEL IN FOMOFF THAT THEY IMMEDIATELY CONVEYED OUR NEW REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO HIGHEST LEVELS IN GOJ AND HAVE BEEN WORKING HARD TO OBTAIN POLITICAL LEVEL RESPONSE. IN ORDER TO DRAMATIZE IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY ATTACHED BY USG TO IMMEDIATE CONSTRUCTIVE ASSISTANCE IN HANDLING HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS OF VIETNAM EVACUATION, AMBASSADOR CALLED ON VICE MINISTER TOGO LATE APRIL 28.

2. AMBASSADOR PRESSED TOGO FOR FORTHCOMING RESPONSE INDICATING WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT FLOW OF REFUGEES THROUGH U.S. FACILITIES IN JAPAN AS REQUIRED BY EMERGENCY IN OTHER STAGING AREAS IN REGION AND UP TO CAPACITY OF OUR BASES TO HANDLE THEM. HE OFFERED TO SEEK SUCH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS GOJ MIGHT REQUIRE TO REACH ITS DECISION. TOGO APOLOGIZED FOR THE UNAVAILABILITY OF FOMMIN MIYAZAWA, WHO IS PREPARING TO DEPART FOR AUSTRALIA APRIL 30. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD URGENCY OF PROBLEM AND VOUCHER FOR INTENSIVE STUDY BEING GIVEN IT BY GOJ. HE SAID DISCUSSING WITH POLITICAL LEADERS OF GOJ WERE NOT COMPLETE, SO HE THEREFORE UNFORTUNATELY WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE RESPONSE. HE SAID HE WOULD TRY TO LET US KNOW APRIL 29. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, DESPITE DISRUPTIONS OF THIS WEEK'S HOLIDAY SCHEDULE.

4. AMBASSADOR ALSO MADE ORAL DEMAPCHE INSTRUCTED REF B. TOGO BRIEFLY NOTED HISTORICAL DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY IMMIGRATION OF KOREAN MINORITY INTO JAPAN AND LACK OF JAPANESE TRADITION OF HOSPITALITY TO REFUGEES OF WHATEVER NATIONALITY. HE ACCEPTED OUR REQUEST FOR STUDY AND RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

HODGSON

BT



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

44 8/31/01



27/11
Department of State

6
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOD246

PAGE 01 TOKYO 05677 291335Z

ACTION COPY

00
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

093360

0 291305Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9780

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 5677

NODIS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: AMER, SREF, VS, JA
SUBJECT: STAGING AREAS IN JAPAN FOR REFUGEES FROM SVN

REF: TOKYO ~~5668~~ 5668

1. FONMIN MIYAZAKA SPOKE WITH AMBASSADOR HODGSON LATE APRIL 29 CONCERNING GOJ RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING STAGING AREAS FOR REFUGEES FROM SVN (REFTEL). HE EXPLAINED THAT, WITH THIS WEEK'S NATIONAL HOLIDAY SCHEDULE AND HIS OWN IMPENDING DEPARTURE ON MISSION TO AUSTRALIA APRIL 30, IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO ASSEMBLE CABINET FOR FULL GOJ DECISION CONCERNING COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST. SINCE CABINET WILL NOT MEET UNTIL FRIDAY, MAY 2, HOWEVER, AND IN RESPONSE TO OUR PLEA OF URGENT NEED FOR REPLY TO USG, HOWEVER, HE HAD CONSULTED INDIVIDUALLY WITH CABINET OFFICERS IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED AND HAD CONSULTED PERSONALLY WITH PRIMIN MIKI EARLIER APRIL 29.


2. ON BASIS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, GOJ HAS DECIDED THAT, WITHOUT FULL CABINET CONSENT, GOJ IS ABLE AT THIS TIME TO PROVIDE FOLLOWING RESPONSE:

A. GOJ UNDERSTANDS AND SYMPATHIZES WITH HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES OF USG IN ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE HAVEN FOR ENDANGERED VIETNAMESE IN PRESENT SITUATION IN SVN

B. GOJ IS WILLING TO PERMIT TRANSIT OF ANY AMERICANS AND UP TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6/1 8/31/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 TOKYO 05677 291335Z

2,000 VIETNAMESE OF WHATEVER IDENTITY THROUGH U.S. FACILITIES IN JAPAN;

C. WITH RESPONSE TO VIETNAMESE, TRANSIT IS DEFINED IN TERMS OF JAPANESE IMMIGRATION LAW TO MEAN MAXIMUM OF 72 HOURS' STAY IN JAPAN;

D. HOWEVER, GOJ IS WILLING TO RECOGNIZE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF REFUGEES, AND WILL EXTEND LIMITS OF STAY IN JAPAN INDEFINITELY FOR ANY REFUGEES WHO WARE ILL, UNDERNOURISHED OR HAVE OTHER BONA FIDE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS PREVENTING ONWARD MOVEMENT BEFORE THE TIME LIMIT SET BY JAPANESE LAW;

E. ABOVE FLEXIBILITY IN INTERPRETATION OF IMMIGRATION LAW MAY ALSO PERTAIN TO IMMEDIATE FAMILIES OF REFUGEES WHO FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE ON WITH NORMAL TRANSIT PERIOD, OR OTHER ACCOMPANYING VIETNAMESE REQUIRED TO CARE FOR THOSE UNABLE TO MOVE ON;

F. WHILE ABOVE REPRESENTS MAXIMUM GOJ OFFER AT THIS TIME (AND WITHOUT FULL CABINET DECISION), GOJ REMAINS WILLING TO CONSIDER FURTHER REQUIREMENTS INVOLVING JAPAN AT ANY TIME IN ORDER TO MET THE HUMANITARIAN INTERESTS OF REFUGEES USG IS ATTEMPTING TO HELP.

3. STAFF LEVEL OFFICIALS OF FONMIN URGED THAT THIS POSITION BE SENT IMMEDIATELY, IN VIEW OF URGENT NATURE OF US REQUEST FOR RESPONSE. THEY ALSO URGED THAT WE KEEP THEM IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM AND U.S. REQUIREMENTS IN RELATION TO REFUGEES. THEY NOTED THAT CONSULAR PROCEDURES WOULD GENERALLY BE THE SAME AS DESCRIBED FOR PREDOMINANTLY USCIT FLOW TRANSMITTED APRIL 25, INTERPRETED FLEXIBILITY TO MEET REAL NEEDS OF REFUGEES.
HODGSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NOD487

PAGE 01 TOKYO 45013 011005Z

ACTION COPY
COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES

00
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

120365

P 010942Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9849

CONTROL: 0031Q
RECD: MAY 01.1975

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 5813

NODIS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, KS, US
SUBJECT: U.S. GOJ-ROK SUMMIT PROPOSAL

REF: SEOUL 3025 (RPTD STATE 099207)

1. WITHOUT WEIGHING OTHER IDEAS WHICH MAY BE UNDER CON-
SIDERATION FOR BOLSTERING NORTHEASTERN ASIAN SECURITY OR
POSSIBLE SCHEDULING COMPLICATIONS, I BELIEVE THAT TRILATERAL
SUMMIT MEETING OUTLINED REFTEL COULD PROVIDE USEFUL DEMONSTRATION
OF COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS AMONG THREE GOVERNMENTS IN
FACE OF UNCERTAINTIES NOW BEING VOICED CONCERNING IMPACT
OF INDOCHINA DEVELOPMENTS ON SITUATION IN NORTHEAS ASIA.
IN ADDITION, IT COULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR LAYING GROUND-
WORK FOR CLOSER CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THREE
GOVERNMENTS LOOKING TO DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON LONGER -RANGE
STRATEGY TO INSURE STABLITY ON KOKEAN PENINSULA.

2. THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY THOSE WITHIN GOJ, PARTICULARLY
IN FOREIGN OFFICE BUREACRACY AND IN CONSERVATIVE LDP CIRCLES,
WHO WOULD WELCOME SUCH A DEMUNSTRATION OF SOLIDARITY BETWEEN
U.S., JAPAN AND ROK. TOP POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, HOWEVER, CAN
BE EPXECTED TO BE APPREHENSIVE THAT OPPOSITION, AS WELL AS
CERTAIN ELEMENTS WITHIN LDP, WOULD CRITICIZE SUCH SUMMITT
MEETING AS AN ATTEMPT BY U.S. TO FORGE NEW NORTHEAST "ALLIANCE"
AND THEREBY DRAW JAPAN MORE CLOSELY INTO U.S. STRATEGY FOR
DEFENSE OF ROK. POLITICAL LEDERSHIP MIGHT ALSO BE APPREHEN
SIVE THAT SUCH SUMMIT MEETING IS CERTAIN TO BE CRITICIZED BY

~~SECRET~~

46 3/31/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TOKYO 05010 011005Z

PYONGYANG AND CONCURRENTLY BY PEKING.

3. NOT WITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, I BELIEVE THE ROK'S INFORMAL PROPOSAL IS WORTH EXPLORING IN TERMS OF OUR OWN INTEREST IN PROMOTING IURTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY. SHOULD THIS PROPOSAL BE CONSIDERED ADVISABLE AND FEASIBLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THE INITIATIVE COMES FROM THIS SIDE OF THE PACIFIC. IF WE WISH TO PURSUE THE ROK PROPOSAL, THEREFORE, WE MIGHT SUGGEST TO THE ROK THAT PRIME MINISTER KIM CHONG-Phil'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MIKI ON MAY 9 WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR IT TO MAKE AN INITIAL LOW-KEY SOUNDING OF GOJ REACTIONS. THIS WOULD HAVE THE VIRTURE OF ENCOURAGING THE ROKG TO APPROACH JAPAN DIRECTLY ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN RATHER THAN TO WORK THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE U.S. MOST IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST TAKE EVERY PRECAUTION TO AVOID CREATING THE IMPRESSION HERE THAT THE U.S. IS ATTEMPTING TO OFFSET THE RECENT SETBACK IN VIETNAM BY HASTILY CONSTRUCTING SOME NEW ARRANGMENET IN NORTHEAST ASIA.

4. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SEOUL.
HOUGSON

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SEOUL

~~SECRET~~



Ldy - WH



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 TOKYO 08210 191106Z

11
ACTION NODS-00

COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES

INFO OCT-01 ISD-00 /001 W

096998

O 191251Z JUN 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1015

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 8210

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARK, JA, KS, KN, US
SUBJ: DIET DISCUSSIONS RE KOREA AND NUCLEAR ISSUE

REF: A) STATE 140063 B) STATE 142401

1. WE ARE SENDING TWO SEPARATE TELEGRAMS WHICH SET FORTH KEY STATEMENTS

MADE DURING THE COURSE OF RECENT DIET DEBATE BY GOJ LEADERS ON THE SUBJECTS MENTIONED REFTELS AND OTHER FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS. SEPTELS DESCRIBE THE CONTEXT OF THE DIET DEBATE AND ATTEMPT TO CONVEY SOME FLAVOR OF THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE OF THIS EXTENDED DIET SESSION. GIVE AND TAKE ON THESE SUBJECTS AND OTHERS IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE UNTIL THE END OF THE SESSION JULY 4 OR AT LEAST UNTIL NPT ISSUE IS FINALLY RESOLVED.

2. IN THE MEANTIME, AS SUGGESTED BY OUR SEPTELS, EMBASSY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO OFFER FIRM ASSESSMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS UNTIL WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS AND PROBE GOJ POLICY INTENTIONS WITH AUTHORITATIVE GOJ OFFICIALS.
HODGSON

~~SECRET~~

64 8/31/01



ACTION COPY

10

COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

N00858

PAGE 01 TOKYO 85548 270420Z

CONTROL: 58760
RECD: 27 JUN 75
12:32AM

11
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

071612

O 271653Z JUN 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1170

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 8548

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG
SUBJ: JAPANESE ON ALTERNATIVE SOURCE POLICY

FOR SECRETARY FROM ENDERS

1. IN 14 HOURS OF TALKS TODAY JAPANESE OFFICIALS (MITI MINISTER KOMOTO, FINANCE VICE MINISTER YOSHIDA, FOREIGN MINISTRY ECONOMIC BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL MIYAZAKI) MADE CLEAR THEIR MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE MINIMUM SUPPORT PRICE (MSP). THERE IS NO MINISTERIAL CONSENSUS, THEY SAID, PERMITTING THEM TO BEGIN A PROCESS WHICH LOGICALLY WOULD LEAD TO A REQUEST TO THE DIET FOR IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION. THEY VERY MUCH DOUBT SUCH LEGISLATION WOULD PASS. THEREFORE THEY WANT TO LEAVE THE MARCH 20 AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AS IS.

2. I REPLIED THAT MSP IS AN INDISPENSIBLE ELEMENT IN ALTERNATIVE SOURCES POLICY, BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE MOST IMPORTANT. R AND D WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE A PARAMOUNT EFFECT. BUT IF TOKYO REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE POLICY SERIOUSLY, WHOLE IEA PROGRAM WOULD BE AT RISK, FOR IT WOULD BE CLEAR THAT NO BALANCE OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES COULD BE NEGOTIATED IN THIS OR OTHER FIELDS. ON OTHER HAND, IF THEY ENGAGE, WE CAN BE ACCOMMODATING ON TIMETABLE.

3. JAPANESE OFFICIALS TOOK THIS POINT. THEY WILL NOW CONSULT MINISTERS. THEY PREDICT A NEGATIVE DECISION.

4. I ASKED TO BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE SO THAT I COULD SEEK YOUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

44 8/31/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 TOKYO 88548 270426Z

INSTRUCTIONS IF TOKYO SAYS IT IS UNABLE TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THE KEY ISSUES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE FACED IN ORDER TO REACH FORMAL AGREEMENT ON MSP AT A LATER DATE. IF JAPANESE DELEGATION TO GOVERNING BOARD CAN ONLY ACCEPT SOME COSMETIC SOLUTION WITH NO COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, I WILL RECOMMEND THAT YOU SUSPEND OR SHORTEN THE MEETING.

5. MEETING WAS NONCONTENTIOUS AND BUSINESS LIKE.
HODGSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 315Q

OO RUEHCR
DE RUEHHK #8793 1830235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020230Z JUL 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO USMISSION OECD PARIS IMMEDIATE 3554
BT
~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 8793

NODIS

E. O. 11652: XGDS2
TAGS: ENRG
SUBJ: JAPANESE POSITION AT IEA/GB

REF: TOKYO 8665

USOCD FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS

IF IEA/GB CONTINUING IN SESSION JULY 2 AND BEYOND, ENDERS SHOULD READ SI REPORT 3/00/20515-75 SOONEST.

HODGSON



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/23/02
BY: *HR*, NARA, DATE *1/28/03*

HODGSON

ACTION COPY

COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES

LDX

12



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

N00661

PAGE 01 TOKYO 10186 251030Z

CONTROL: 62410
RECD: 25 JUL 75
5:52AM

12
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISU-00 /001 W

065477

P 250857Z JUL 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1919

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 10186

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, JA, TW
SUBJ: MIKI VISIT PAPER: TAIWAN, THE UNDISCUSSED TOPIC

1. US VIEWS ON A SOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN PROBLEM MAY HAVE BEEN WHAT PRIME MINISTER MIKI HAD IN MIND WHEN HE SUGGESTED TO AMBASSADOR ON JULY 15 THAT US AND JAPAN EXPLORE IN COMPLETE CANDOR SUBJECTS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN TOUCHED ON THUS FAR. THE JAPANESE HAVE BEEN SILENT ON THIS SUBJECT LATELY. TAIWAN WAS NEVER MENTIONED DURING EXTENSIVE ROUND OF CONTACTS IN RECENT MONTHS CONDUCTED TO PIECE TOGETHER JAPAN'S ASSESSMENT OF POST-WAR SITUATION IN ASIA. YET THOUGH JAPAN RESTORED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PEKING IN 1972, CUTTING FORMAL TIES WITH TAIWAN, THERE IS STILL CONSIDERABLE INTEREST ON PART OF WIDE RANGE OF JAPANESE POLITICAL SPECTRUM IN TAIWAN'S PRESENT AND FUTURE WELFARE. THIS IS, OF COURSE, PARTICULARLY TRUE WITHIN MIKI'S LDP. ONLY SMALL PART OF LDP LEFT ADVOCATES THAT JAPAN (OR US) FULLY ACCEPT PEKING'S DEMANDS REGARDING TAIWAN.

2. JAPAN'S POSITION -- JAPAN'S LINKS WITH TAIWAN ARE HISTORIC, SENTIMENTAL, AND ECONOMIC. THE JAPANESE RULED TAIWAN SUCCESSFULLY AS A COLONY FROM 1895-1945, AND TAIWANESE MISSED THEM WHEN THEY WERE GONE. JAPANESE RESPECTED CHIANG KAI-SHEK FOR LACK OF VINDICTIVENESS WITH WHICH HE TREATED JAPAN AFTER ITS DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II. THEY APPRECIATED TAIWAN AS A TRADING PARTNER (MORE THAN 3 BILLION DOLLARS BOTH WAYS IN 1974), AN AREA FOR PROFITABLE

~~SECRET~~

66 8/31/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TOKYO 10186 251000Z

INVESTMENT (140 MILLION DOLLARS) AND A HAVEN FOR TOURISTS.

3. JAPANESE POLICYMAKERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AN ASSUMPTION OF CONTROL OVER TAIWAN BY PEKING WOULD POSE A DIRECT MILITARY THREAT TO JAPAN OR THE SECURITY OF ITS SEA LANES. THEY THINK THAT GOJ RECOGNITION OF PEKING IN 1972 FITTED BOTH THE REALITIES OF THE WORLD SITUATION AND THE DESIRES OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE. WITH EXCEPTION OF EXTREME RIGHT FRINGE, NO ONE WANTS OR EXPECTS POLICY TO BE REVERSED. FURTHERMORE, MOST JAPANESE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME, AND PROBABLY SHORT AT THAT, BEFORE US SHIFTS DIPLOMATIC TIES TO PEKING AND ENDS ITS SECURITY TREATY WITH GROC. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR OWN RECOGNITION OF PEKING NOTWITHSTANDING, JAPANESE WANT TAIWAN TO CONTINUE ITS EXISTENCE AS SEPARATE ENTITY, IN FACT IF NOT IN NAME, FREE FOR THEM TO ENJOY, TRADE WITH, AND INVEST IN. US IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTION OF TAIWAN'S AMBIGUOUS AUTONOMY AND JAPANESE INTERESTS WHICH DEPEND ON THIS STATUS. AS A RESULT, THE WAY IN WHICH WE ACCOMPLISH NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PEKING IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE JAPANESE AND ULTIMATELY TO US RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. IF THE TERMS UNDER WHICH WE RECOGNIZE PEKING ASSURE TAIWAN'S SEPARATE EXISTENCE FOR TIME BEING AND PROMISE THAT CHANGES WILL OCCUR GRADUALLY AND PEACEFULLY, JAPANESE WILL CONSIDER THEIR INTERESTS PROTECTED AND APPLAUD US LEADERSHIP AND FINESSE. IF ON OTHER HAND, WAY IN WHICH WE MANAGE CHANGE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING DESTABILIZES TAIWAN ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY, RESULTING IN SOCIETAL COLLAPSE AND/OR ACTION WHICH FORCES PEKING TO TRY MILITARY TAKEOVER, JAPAN WOULD BE PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED, AS MUCH BY QUESTIONS RAISED OVER US ABILITY TO HANDLE POWER AND INFLUENCE EFFECTIVELY IN ASIA, AS BY DEVELOPMENTS THEMSELVES. US RELIABILITY AS ALLY AND GUARANTOR OF JAPAN'S FUTURE SECURITY WOULD ALSO BE QUESTIONED.

4. MORE THAN LIKELY, MIKI WILL BRING UP TOPIC AS PART OF GENERAL REVIEW OF JAPAN AND US-CHINA POLICIES. HE BELIEVES THAT EVER TIGHTER US-CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP IS WAY OF FUTURE. HAVING PROTECTED HIS RIGHT FLANK WITH RECENT AGREEMENT TO RESTORE AIRLINK TO TAIWAN, HE PLANS NEXT A CONCERTED EFFORT TO SIGN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH PEKING, AND WILL WANT TO KNOW HOW HIS PLANS

~~SECRET~~



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 TOKYO 10186 251030Z

DOVETAIL WITH THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES, AT SAME TIME, HE WILL HOPE TO HEAR CANDID TALK ABOUT OUR IDEAS ON HOW TAIWAN'S SEPARATE EXISTENCE MIGHT BE MAINTAINED.

5. RECOMMENDED US POSITION -- AMONG OTHER THINGS, WE MIGHT TELL MIKI THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIP THAT JAPAN HAS HAD WITH TAIWAN OVER THE YEARS AND JAPAN'S REASONS FOR DEEP INTEREST IN WELFARE OF ISLAND. US ALSO HAS STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT TAIWAN, OLD TIES, AND IMPORTANT ECONOMIC LINKS. AT SAME TIME, NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PEKING IS AS IMPORTANT A GOAL FOR US AS IT WAS FOR JAPAN, AND WE ARE EQUALLY DETERMINED IN DUE COURSE TO REDEFINE OUR FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REALITIES OF PEKING'S POSITION. JAPAN HAS NOT BEEN RESPONSIBLE, AS IS THE UNITED STATES, FOR TAIWAN'S SECURITY. IT IS THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL REQUIRE THE MOST CAREFUL HANDLING IN ANY CHANGES THAT ARE MADE AND NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE UNDERTAKEN. MIKI SHOULD BE ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT WELFARE OF TAIWAN AND ITS PEOPLE WILL BE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN US CALCULATIONS AS SOLUTION WITH PEKING IS WORKED OUT.

6. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS TO USLO PEKING AND AMEMBASSY TAIPEI.
SHOESMITH

~~SECRET~~



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

LDX-WH



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOD228

ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 TOKYO 11705 210942Z

21
ACTION NOUS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

012939

O 210910Z AGU 75
FM ANEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2687~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 11705

NODIS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: ENRG, FR
SUBJ: FRENCH CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

REF: STATE 197496

1. DRAWING ON REFTTEL, EMBOFFS OUTLINED U.S. POSITIONED ON FRENCH CONSENSUS PROPOSAL TO FONOFF DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ECONOMICS BUREAU NOMURA AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR RESOURCES DIVISION KATAKURA WHO TOOK CAREFUL NOTES. NOMURA SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT U.S. HAD ACCEPTED FRENCH PROPOSAL IN GENERAL, BUT GOJ WAS STILL STUDYING IT AND HAD NOT YET REPLIED. WITH REGARD TO CLAIRIFICATION POINTS, HE SAID POINTS 2-1, 4-9 AND 5-2 CERTAINLY SEEMED REASONABLE, BUT WONDERED WHAT U.S. POSITION WOULD BE IF PRODUCERS REFUSED TO ACCEPT POINT 4-1. NOMURA SAID JAPAN WAS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE AND WANTED TO DO NOTHING TO DELAY START OF DIALOGUE. NOMURA NEVERTHELESS AGREED TO AT LEAST REFER TO U.S. REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION IN JAPANESE REPLY WHICH HE ANTICIPATED WOULD BE FORTHCOMING, AT LEAST IN PRELIMINARY FORM, BUT THIS WEEKEND.

2. NOMURA ALSO SAID THAT BELGIAN EMBASSY HAD DELIVERED INVITATION FROM DAVIGNON TO ATTEND INFORMAL MEETING ON PREPCON ON MONDAY, AUG 25, AND THAT JAPANESE WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF ITS OECD DELEGATION IN PARIS IF SUCH A MEETING IS HELD.
MOUGSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Gh 8/31/01



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013828

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

TITLE Nuclear Transit

CREATION DATE 08/25/1975

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400290

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Japan - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - NODIS (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/06/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

EXEMPTED

8/13/07

Exempted
9/21/10