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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2539
INFO USLO PEKING
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 TOKYO 11412

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OREP (PERCY, CHARLES), CH
SUBJ: CODEL PERCY: CHINA TRIP: INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
REF: PEKING 1553

CODEL PERCY DURING STOPOVER YOKOTA AFB REQUESTED
EMBASSY TO PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SEN PERCY,
SEN JAVITS, SEN PELL, SEN STEVERSON,
CONGRESSMAN FINDLEY, CONGRESSMAN HECKLER, CONGRESSMAN
MC CLOSKEY, AND DR. JOHN LEWIS TO THE WHITE HOUSE
(PRESIDENT, NSC ET AL), THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND INFO POSTS
LISTED ABOVE. SENATOR PERCY WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE A COPY BEING
PASSED TO NADINE JACOBSON OF HIS OFFICE (TEL: 202-654-6488).
BEGIN TEXT CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO SECSTATE:
OUR DELEGATION TODAY COMPLETED INTENSELY INTERESTING
AND WE HOPE SUCCESSFUL TWO-WEEK TRIP
TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. IT VISITED SEVEN
CITIES AND ENVIRONS IN NORTH AND EAST CENTRAL CHINA,
SOME OF WHICH HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN OPENED TO
AMERICAN DELEGATIONS. WE HELD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS
WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING AND OTHER GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS.
IN RESPECT TO THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS,
WE HAVE THESE INITIAL OBSERVATIONS TO BE



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FULLY SUPPLEMENTED IN OUR FORTHCOMING REPORT:

1. THE CHINESE EMPHASIZED THEY DO EXPECT PRESIDENT FORD TO VISIT CHINA THIS FALL AND THAT HE WILL BE WARMLY WELCOMED. THE AGENDA WILL BE ESSENTIALLY THE PRESIDENT'S AND NEED NOT INCLUDE TAIWAN. THE VISIT IS IMPORTANT TO THEM.
2. THERE IS WIDESPREAD SUSPICION OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE. WE WERE ASKED REPEATEDLY: "WHICH DO YOU CONSIDER MORE IMPORTANT: FORD'S VISIT TO HELSINKI OR TO CHINA?"
3. THE CHINESE APPEAR TO HAVE MODERATED AND EXTENDED SLIGHTLY THEIR POSITION ON ARMS CONTROL. THEY NO LONGER STATE THAT "THE SUPERPOWERS MUST WITHDRAW FROM ABROAD ALL THEIR ARMED FORCES." THEY HAVE CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEY AFFIRMED THEIR HOPE THAT THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE ITS STRONG SUPPORT OF NATO.
4. THE CHINESE ARE INCREASING THE ROLE OF THE CIVILIAN MILITIA IN MAINTAINING ORDER AND SECURITY AND IN SOME AREAS HAVE SHIFTED TO DEPENDENCE ON THE REGULAR MILITIA FOR DEFENSE.
5. WITH RESPECT TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA, WE USED EVERY OCCASION AT EVERY LEVEL TO EMPHASIZE OUR TREATY RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA AS CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE. WE FURTHER NOTED THAT WE CONSIDER IT OUR OBLIGATION TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO RESTRAIN PARK FROM ADVENTUROUS MOVES IN THE NORTH, AND WE WOULD EXPECT CHINA TO DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO RESTRAIN THE NORTH IN THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE. THE CHINESE STATED THAT KOREA "SHOULD BE UNIFIED AND SHOULD HAVE PEACE AND THIS IS THE POLICY THAT WE SUPPORT."
6. IN TERMS OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES, THE CHINESE SEEM TO BE CONCENTRATING ON INTERNAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WHILE NOT PREOCCUPIED WITH EXTERNAL TRADE ISSUES, CHINA'S LEADERS SEEM INTERESTED IN RECTIFYING INBALANCES IN TRADE OVER A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME WITH THE U.S. AND APPRECIATED OUR INTEREST IN THIS OBJECTIVE. WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIONS TOWARD THIS END.



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7. FOLLOWING TALKS WITH PROVINCIAL AND LOWER-LEVEL LEADERS, WE BELIEVE THE POSSIBILITY MAY EXIST FOR LATER U.S.-CHINESE MUTUAL COOPERATION "HERE ON EARTH" INCLUDING COOPERATION IN SUCH AREAS AS FLOOD CONTROL AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. AS SUCH COOPERATION DEVELOPS, AREAS NOW QUITE UNEXPECTED AND UNEXPLORED BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS MIGHT DEVELOP AND MIGHT EVEN BE MORE BROADLY BENEFICIAL TO THE PEOPLES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, HIGHER LEVEL OFFICIALS ARE SKEPTICAL AND WANTED NO PUBLIC MENTION OF THIS SO WE CONFINED COMMUNIQUE TO BILATERAL RELATIONS.

8. CHINESE LEADERS RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE REQUEST FOR A VISIT OF CONGRESSWOMEN AND HAVE HAD FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS ON THE WOMEN WHO MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE DELEGATIONS.



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9. IN THE AREAS WE VISITED, CROP YIELDS ARE EXPECTED TO BE "QUITE" HIGH THUS REDUCING THE NEED FOR OPEN MARKET FOOD PURCHASES THIS YEAR. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF OUR UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED COMMUNIQUE FROM SHANGHAI AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE 6PM ETD, AUGUST 17, 1975. PLEASE USE YOUR OWN JUDGMENT CONCERNING WHAT, IF ANYTHING, IS TRANSMITTED IN ADVANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LIAISON OFFICE IN WASHINGTON AND MISSION AT THE UN OF THIS MESSAGE TO YOU AND COMMUNIQUE. END TEXT CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO SECSTATE. BEGIN TEXT OF DEPARTURE COMMUNIQUE.

SHANGHAI, AUGUST 16, 1975, FOR RELEASE AFTER SUNDAY, AUGUST 17, 1975, 6PM EDT - THE SEVENTEEN MEMBERS OF THE SEVENTH UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO VISIT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LEFT TODAY FOR HOME AFTER A THIRTEEN-DAY VISIT AT THE OFFICIAL INVITATION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SENATOR CHARLES H. PERCY SERVED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DELEGATION, AND SENATORS JACOB K. JAVITS AND CLAIBORNE PELL AS CO-CHAIRMEN. THE OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN THE DELEGATION ARE SENATOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON AND REPRESENTATIVES PAUL FINDLEY, MARGARET M. HECKLER, AND PAUL N. CM CLOSKEY, JR. DR. JOHN W. LEWIS SERVED

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AS ADMINISTRATOR.

THE DELEGATION MET FOR FOUR HOURS WITH VICE PREMIER OF THE STATE COUNCIL TENG HSIAO-PING. IT HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER LEADING OFFICIALS AT THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, MUNICIPAL, AND RURAL LEVELS. ITS DISCUSSIONS IN EACH PLACE WERE FRIENDLY, STIMULATING, AND INFORMATIVE AND COVERED IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND OTHER TOPICS OF MUTUAL CONCERN. DURING ITS TRAVELS THE DELEGATION MEMBERS ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE STRUCTURE OF CHINA'S GOVERNMENT, ITS SOCIETY, AND ITS IDEOLOGY. IN EXPRESSING ITS APPRECIATION FOR THE HOSPITALITY SHOWN THE DELEGATION THROUGHOUT CHINA, THE DELEGATION PARTICULARLY SINGLED OUT FOR PRAISE THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LED BY VICE PRESIDENT CHOU CHIU-YEH.

IN PEKING AND OTHER PLACES THE DELEGATION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE MANY FACETS OF LIFE IN MODERN CHINA AND TO SEE VARIOUS HISTORICAL SITES. DURING ITS STAY, IT VISITED NOT ONLY PEKING, SHANGHAI, AND NANKING, BUT ALSO THE CITIES AND ENVIRONS OF TSINAN, TSINGTAO, YANGCHOW AND WUHSI. SOME OF THESE PLACES HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN OPENED TO AMERICAN DELEGATIONS.

THE DELEGATION AT THESE STOPS EXAMINED DIFFERENT TYPES OF AGRICULTURAL COMMUNES, HANDICRAFT AND LIGHT INDUSTRIES, AND HEAVY INDUSTRY. IN EACH PLACE ITS MEMBERS TALKED WITH MANAGERS AND WORKERS, OLD AND YOUNG, AND DEVELOPED AN INSIGHT INTO THE IMPORTANT WOMEN'S ROLE IN THE SOCIETY. THEY VISITED THE FLOOD CONTROL, IRRIGATION, POWER GENERATION, AND LAND RENEWAL PROJECTS ON THE YELLOW RIVER AND THEN WERE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE THIS PROJECT WITH THE VAST KIANGTU WATER CONTROL PROJECT ON THE HUAI RIVER IN EAST CENTRAL CHINA.

THE DELEGATION NOTED IN PARTICULAR SEVERAL POINTS RELEVANT TO THE NORMALIZATION OF UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS. IT FORESEES NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE, THE EXPANDED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY, THE GROWTH OF TRAVEL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE, AND THE FURTHERING OF MUTUAL



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UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO SOCIETIES. THE DELEGATION GAVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN THE VAST AREA INVOLVED. IT REAFFIRMED WITH THE CHINESE THAT TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS, TO BE OF LASTING VALUE TO BOTH, MUST BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. SINCE THE OPENING OF SINO-U.S. TRADE IN 1972, A GREATER TWO-WAY BALANCE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED THOUGH IN THE LAST MONTHS THE SCOPE OF THAT TRADE HAS BEEN REDUCED. THE CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION NOTED THEIR INTENTION TO STUDY FURTHER QUESTIONS OF TRADE AND COMMERCE AND TO DETERMINE, ON THE U.S. SIDE, HOW TO ESTABLISH SUITABLE AREAS IN WHICH THE ECONOMIC TIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES CAN BE STRENGTHENED, INCLUDING OUTREACH TO REARRANGE THE IMPORT-EXPORT BLAANCE.

THE DELEGATION NOTED FURTHER THAT TECHNICAL INTERCHANGE IS OF GROWING IMPORTANCE AND SAW POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER MUTUAL COOPERATION AS FOR EXAMPLE IN THE TECHNOLOGY OF WATER CONTROL. AS SUCH COOPERATION DEVELOPS, THE MEMBERS STATED, AREAS NOW QUITE UNEEXPECTED AND UNEXPLORED BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS MIGHT DEVELOP.



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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W


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INFO USLO PEKING
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PARTICULAR ATTENTION WAS PAID TO ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR TECHNICAL EXCHANGE IN THE SCIENTIFIC FIELDS OF AGRICULTURE AND AQUACULTURE. THE DELEGATION STATED THAT THESE SHOULD BE EXPANDED WHERE POSSIBLE AND WHERE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. SIMILARLY, FROM ITS VISITS TO HOSPITALS, CONVALESCENT HOMES, AND CHILDCARE CENTERS, IT COULD SEE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT FROM EXPANDING TECHNICAL INTERCHANGE AND RESEARCH COOPERATION IN THE MEDICAL AND HEALTH FIELDS AS FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE PART OF THE U.S., IN PEER REVIEW AND CANCER RESEARCH AND, ON THE PART OF CHINA, IN ACUPUNCTURE ANESTHESIOLOGY AND RURAL MEDICAL PRACTICE. AS TO TRAVEL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES, THE DELEGATION NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA ALREADY ENJOY AN INCREASING EXCHANGE AND THAT THERE IS A VAST INTEREST IN TRAVEL TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UNITED STATES. THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION LOOK FORWARD TO FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL VISITS TO CHINA INCLUDING THOSE OF CONGRESSWOMEN. IN RESPECT TO ITS POSITION, THE DELEGATION EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPANDING TRAVEL FROM CHINA TO THE U.S. THE DELEGATION EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IT MIGHT RECIPROCATE THE HOSPITALITY SHOWN TO IT AND OTHER CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS. THE MEMBERS



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LOOK FORWARD TO THE TIME WHEN OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, WILL VISIT THE UNITED STATES AND, WHEN THE TIME IS PROPITIOUS, TO ENGAGE IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. THEY EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO EXPOSE BOTH SYSTEMS TO FIRST-HAND OBSERVATION AND THAT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CAN DERIVE AS MUCH BENEFIT FROM THAT PROCESS AS HAD BEEN DERIVED FROM THE DELEGATION'S VIEW OF CHINA.

AS TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE, THE DELEGATION CONSIDER THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AN EXCELLENT BASIS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. IT HOPES THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT FORD TO CHINA LATER THIS YEAR WILL FURTHER CEMENT THIS BASIS. FURTHERMORE ITS MEMBERS EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IN THE SPIRIT OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE NOTHING WILL OCCUR TO BREACH THE PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD DEVOTE ITS VERY BEST EFFORTS TO THIS END.

THE DELEGATION WILL MAKE A WRITTEN REPORT TO PRESIDENT FORD AND TO THE CONGRESS SHORTLY AFTER ITS RETURN. IT STATED THAT COPIES OF THIS REPORT WILL ALSO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ITS HOSTS IN CHINA AND TO AMBASSADORS HUANG CHEN AND HAN HSU OF THE LIAISON OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN WASHINGTON AND AMBASSADOR HUANG HUA, CHINA'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN. IN THIS REPORT, BASED UPON ITS DIRECT OBSERVATIONS, THE DELEGATION PROPOSES TO ENDEAVOR TO CORRECT MISCONCEPTIONS HELD IN THE U.S. ABOUT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND IT SINCERELY HOPES SIMILAR EFFORTS MAY BE MADE ON THE CHINESE SIDE ABOUT MISCONCEPTIONS REGARDING THE U.S. HELD IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION THROUGHOUT THE VISIT NOTED FREQUENT REFERENCES TO THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. THEY CONSIDERED THESE REFERENCES A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM THE TWO DECADES OF ALIENATION IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS NEW SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP -- THE SPIRIT OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE -- WOULD CONTINUE TO DEEPEN





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AND TO ANIMATE BOTH PEOPLES AND BOTH COUNTRIES IN THE YEARS AHEAD, AND EXPRESSED THEIR GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE GENEROUS RECEPTION GIVEN THE DELEGATION THROUGHOUT ITS ENTIRE STAY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. END TEXT DEPARTURE COMMUNIQUE.
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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2645

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 11610

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID, JA, EG
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *TD 9/23/02*
BY HR2, NARA, DATE 1/27/03

REFS: A) TOKYO 11157; B) TOKYO 10947

SUMMARY: FONOFF REP SAYS FINANCE MINISTRY IS STUDYING POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL 50 MILLION DOLLARS SOFT EMERGENCY AID TO EGYPT BUT OHIRA IS NEGATIVE TOWARDS IDEA. AS FALL BACK, FONOFF IS STUDYING POSSIBILITY OF LESS CONCESSIONAL 50 MILLION DOLLAR LOAN FROM JAPAN EXIM BANK. HOWEVER, CHANCES OF FAVORABLE GOJ ACTION WOULD BE ENHANCED BY A) DIRECT REQUEST BY EGYPT TO JAPAN FOR ADDITIONAL 50 MILLION DOLLARS EMERGENCY AID, B) ADDITIONAL INFO ON ACTION FRG WILL TAKE RE EMERGENCY AID, AND C) ADDITIONAL INFO ON STATUS OF THAT PORTION OF USG AID WHICH WILL REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. EMBASSY SUGGESTS DEPT ENCOURAGE GOE TO MAKE DIRECT REQUEST TO GOJ; AND REQUESTS ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON FRG AND USG CONTRIBUTIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR BRIEFING RE CURRENT STATUS GOJ EFFORTS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY AID TO EGYPT OVER AND ABOVE EQUIVALENT 50 MILLION DOLLARS COMMODITY AID RECENTLY PLEDGED (REF B). FONOFF REP ON AUGUST 19 TOLD EMBOFF QTE IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNQTE AND ON CONDITION HE NOT BE QUOTED THAT ON AUGUST 15 PM MIKI HAD PERSONALLY REQUESTED FINANCE MINISTER OHIRA TO RECONSIDER HOW JAPAN MIGHT PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL 50 MILLION DOLLARS COMMODITY AID FROM OVERSEAS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FUND AT SAME SOFT TERMS AS INITIAL PLEDGE (I.E. 3.5 PERCENT). OHIRA RESPONDED QTE



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VERY NEGATIVELY UNQTE TO THIS REQUEST, CITING FOLLOWING THREE REASONS:

A) ON AUGUST 3 GOJ INFORMED GOE FOREIGN VICE MINISTER IN CAIRO THAT GOJ WOULD PROVIDE 50 MILLION DOLLARS EMERGENCY NON-PROJECT AID AS WELL AS THE EARLIER PLEDGED 50 MILLION DOLLARS PROJECT AID; SINCE THEN, GOJ HAS RECEIVED NO REACTION OR RESPONSE FROM THE GOE. AS GOE HAS NOT RESPONDED NOR DIRECTLY REQUESTED GOJ TO PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL 50 MILLION DOLLARS EMERGENCY AID, HOW CAN GOJ BE SURE WHAT GOE'S ATTITUDE IS? (EMBOFF NOTED IN RESPONSE THAT GOE HAS MADE CLEAR TO USG ITS EXPECTATION THAT AT LEAST 100 MILLION DOLLARS IN EMERGENCY AID WILL BE FORTHCOMING FROM GOJ, BUT FONOFF REP REPLIED THAT ABSENCE OF ANY DIRECT GOE REQUEST TO GOJ PUTS FONOFF IN VERY WEAK POSITION IN DEALING WITH OTHER MINISTRIES, ESPECIALLY FINANCE).

B) GOJ IS STILL UNCLEAR CONCERNING FINAL ATTITUDE OF FRG RE EMERGENCY AID, HAVING RECEIVED NO RECENT INFO ABOUT FRG EITHER DIRECTLY OR FROM USG.

IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE NOTED UNCERTAINTIES, SAID OHIRA, THERE IS NO NEED FOR GOJ TO HURRY DECISION RE POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY AID. FURTHERMORE,

C) VERY TIGHT GOJ BUDGET THIS FY PRECLUDES ADDITIONAL GOJ EMERGENCY AID.

2. UPON HEARING OHIRA'S REMARKS, PM MIKI AGAIN REQUESTED HIM TO CONSIDER HOW ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY AID COULD BE PROVIDED, AND OHIRA SAID HE WOULD STUDY MATTER FURTHER.

3. IN MEANTIME, FONOFF IS PREPARING A FALL BACK POSITION PAPER FOR CIRCULATION TO OTHER MINISTRIES PROPOSING ADDITIONAL 50 MILLION DOLLAR LOAN TO EGYPT FROM JAPAN'S EXIM BANK ON LESS CONCESSIONAL TERMS, PERHPAS CLOSE TO 25 PERCENT GRANT ELEMENT. FONOFF HAS ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH INFORMALLY WITH EXIM AND EXIM HAS NOT FLATLY REJECTED PROPOSAL, SO FONOFF FEELS POSSIBILITY OF EXIM LOAN IS WORTHT EXPLORING. HOWEVER, IN PURSUING THIS POSSIBILITY AS WELL AS POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL OECF LOAN, ADDITIONAL INFO ON FRG INTENTIONS, AS WELL AS STATUS OF THAT PORTION OF USG EMERGENCY AID WHICH WILL REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, IS NEEDED. (EMBOFF IN RESPONSE UNDERTOOK TO SOLICIT SUCH INFO ON URGENT BASIS.

4. EMBASSY COMMENT. FONOFF SOURCE STRESSED EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF INFO REGARDING PRIVATE MIKI-OHIRA CONVERSATION (PARA 1 AND 2 ABOVE)



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AND THAT THIS INFO SHOULD NOT FIND ITS WAY TO NON-USG PARTIES, IN PARTICULAR TO GOJ EMBASSY CAIRO. ANY APPROACH MADE IN CAIRO SHOULD AVOID REFERENCES TO MIKI-OHIRA TALKS. HOWEVER, DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO INFORM GOE THAT DIRECT GOE REQUEST TO GOJ FOR ADDITIONAL AID COULD EXERT POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON GOJ DECISION RE THAT MATTER, AND ENCOURAGE GOE TO MAKE SUCH A REQUEST. END COMMENT.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO RE A) FRG INTENTIONS AND B) STATUS OF PORTION OF USG ASSISTANCE REQUIRING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL WHICH WE COULD PASS ON TO FONOFF.
HODGSON



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INFO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE

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E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS
SUBJ: JAPAN RED ARMY TERRORISTS

REFS: A) TOKYO 11312; B) STATE 197043

SUMMARY: AS INSTRUCTED, DCM DISCUSSED JRA PROBLEM WITH DEP FONMIN ARITA. ARITA CATALOGUED DIFFICULTIES AND CONTRADICTIONS IN SITUATION CONFRONTING GOJ DURING KL INCIDENT AND URGED CONCERTED EFFORT WITH LIBYAN GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. DCM OBTAINED URGENT MEETING EVENING AUGUST 20 WITH DEP FONMIN ARITA TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING JRA. AFTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR GOJ'S HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS AND RELIEF THAT HOSTAGES WERE FINALLY SAFE, DCM MADE POINTS IN PARA 3, REF B, STRONGLY ADVOCATING EFFORTS BY ALL GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED TO BRING TEN TERRORISTS TO TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT. HE COMMENTED THAT SINCE LARG DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE MADE FINAL DECISION REGARDING DISPOSITION OF TERRORISTS, CONCERTED EFFORTS AND LARG MIGHT SUCCEED IN DENYING FREEDOM TO TERRORISTS. DCM NOTED WITH SATISFACTION PM MIKI'S INTEREST, AS EXPRESSED TO US CONGRESSMEN, IN CALLING AN INTERGATIONAL CONVENTION TO DENY FUTURE SAFEHAVEN TO TERRORISTS.

2. ARITA RESPONDED FORCEFULLY WITH EXPLANATION OF GOJ RATIONALE IN RECENT INCIDENT. DECISION TO RELEASE TERRORISTS



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FROM JAPAN WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR GOJ. FACT THAT MALAYSIAN NOT JAPANESE POLICE CONTROLLED SITUATION GREATLY INFLUENCED GOJ DECISION. FURTHERMORE, GOM SOUGHT GOJ ACTION AND INSISTED THAT GOJ ACT QUICKLY. CRITICISM OF GOJ HAS STEMMED FROM CONTRADICTORY NATURE OF SITUATION. DECISIONS WERE MADE OUT OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIVES. AT SAME TIME, GOJ SEEKS ERADICATION OF TERRORISM--WHETHER PERPETRATED BY JRA, ARAB TERRORISTS, OR IRSH REPUBLICAN ARMY. GOJ HAS SUPPORTED EFFORTS AT UN TO CONTROL TERRORISM BUT THERE IS STILL NO CONCLUSIVE CONCERTED EFFORT AGREED TO BY WORLD COMMUNITY. IN THIS CASE, JOINT ACTION BY US, GOM, GOS, LARG, AND GOJ ARE REQUIRED AND GOJ HOPES US WILL TAKE LEAD IN EXERTING PRESSURE ON LARG.

3. ARITA POINTED OUT THAT USG AND GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL MAINTAIN A FIRM POLICY OF NO COMPROMISE WHATSOEVER WITH TERRORISTS. THIS POLICY IS IN MANY WAYS EASIER THAN THAT PURSUED IN KL BY GOJ. IN THAT CASE, GOJ WAS DEALING WITH GOM WHICH ADOPTED ATTITUDE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF USG. FOR EXAMPLE, GOM AGREED WITH TERRORISTS' DEMANDS THAT JAL PLANE LEAVE KL WITHOUT DESTINATION. TERRORISTS WERE WELL AWARE THAT INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE IS CHANGING AND COUNTRIES ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THEM. WHEN PERMISSION TO LAND WAS DOUBTFUL, THEY STILL INSISTED ON DEPARTURE WITH EXPLOSIVES SO THAT THEY COULD FORCE A LANDING WITH THEIR BOMBS, IF NECESSARY. AS USG KNOWS, IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND DESTINATION OR EVEN TO OBTAIN OVERFLIGHT PERMISSION. IRAN, FOR EXAMPLE, THREATENED TO SEND UP FIGHERS AND SHOOT THE PLANE DOWN IF IT OVERFLEW IRANIAN TERRITORY. AT SAME TIME, USG POSITION REMAINED VERY FIRM AND USG REFUSED TO HELP FIND A DESTINATION OR TO HELP OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR OVERFLIGHT. USG POSITION WAS LOGICAL FROM BEGINNING TO END. BUT IF GOJ DID SAME, ARITA SAID, US CONSUL MIGHT BE DEAD.

4. DCM ASSURED ARITA THAT USG CERTAINLY DID NOT INTEND ANY CRITICISM OF GOJ ACTIONS IN FACILITATING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES IN KL. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT NEITHER GOJ OR US CAN IGNORE FACT THAT IF THESE TERRORISTS REMAIN AT LARGE, OUR EFFORTS TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH TERRORIST THREAT WILL BE UNDERCUT. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IF LARG CAN BE PERSUADED TO INSURE THAT THESE TERRORISTS RECEIVE THE PUNISHMENT



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THEY DESERVE, THEN ONE MORE GAP IN THE TERRORISTS ESCAPE ROUTE MIGHT BE CLOSED. DCM THEN NOTED JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS THAT LIBYAN AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN BUKRES HAS SAID THAT LARG WOULD STUDY SERIOUSLY ANY REQUEST BY GOJ FOR RETURN OF THE TEN TERRORISTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THERE REMAINS AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY THAT LEADERS OF LIBYAN GOVERNMENT ARE SENSITIVE TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ELIMINATING THREAT OF TERRORISM AND THAT THIS POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT GO UNEXPLORED. ACKNOWLEDGING THE PRACTICAL AND LOGICAL PROBLEMS CONFRONTING GOJ IN CONSIDERING AN APPROACH TO LIBYA, DCM URGED THAT GOJ CAN REASONABLY MAKE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN NATURE OR GOJ AND LARG ACTIONS DURING THE CRISIS IN KL, BUT ARGUE THAT PHASE HAS PASSED AND THAT STEPS NOW SHOULD BE TAKEN TO DENY FREEDOM TO THESE TERRORISTS.

5. ARITA RESPONDED THAT PRESS REPORTS OF AMB BUKRES' POSITION DO NOT FULLY CONVEY SITUATION. BUKRES IS PERSONALLY UNDER GREAT PRESSURE; HE HAS RECEIVED MANY THREATENING PHONE CALLS AND LETTERS FROM JAPANESE CRITICIZING ACCEPTANCE BY LIBYA OF THE TERRORISTS AND INSISTING THEY BE RETURNED TO JAPAN. FONOFF ME BUREAU DIRGEN NAKAMURA MET INFORMALLY WITH AMB BUKRES AUG 19 TO DISCUSS PRESS REPORTS AND INQUIRED INFORMALLY ABOUT ARRANGING RETURN OF TERRORISTS TO JAPAN OR AT LEAST KEEPING THEM INCARCERATED IN LIBYA FOR SOME TIME. AMB BUKRES SAID IF HE WERE OFFICIALLY APPROACHED HE WOULD TRANSMIT REQUEST TO TRIPOLI. GOJ HAS NOT YET ASKED BUKRES TO DO SO. WHEN DCM ASKED IF SUCH REQUEST POSES SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR GOJ, ARITA EXPLAINED DILEMMA AS FOLLOWS: GOJ HAD URGENTLY SOUGHT LARG'S AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT TERRORISTS. ALTHOUGH GOJ AGREED TO NO CONDITIONS THERE IS LITTLE BASIS, EXCEPT FOR INTERNATIONAL OPINION, TO ASK FOR THEIR RETURN TO JAPAN NOW. GOJ IS NOT HESITANT ABOUT MAKING REPRESENTATIONS BUT DOES NOT WANT TO OFFEND LIBYA. ARITA REPEATED THAT CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IS REQUIRED. AGAIN HE STRESSED NECESSITY FOR US, MALAYSIA AND SWEDEN ALSO TO PRESSURE LIBYA. NONETHELESS, ARITA INDICATED THAT QUESTION OF APPROACH TO LIBYA UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION WITHIN FOREIGN OFFICE, AND HE STATED THAT AT LEAST GOJ MIGHT CONVEY FORMAL REQUEST THROUGH AMBASSADOR BUKRES THAT TERRORISTS BE DETAINED OR RETURNED TO JAPAN.

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6. ARITA INSTRUCTED DIRECTOR CONSULAR DIVISION TAKASE (CONSULAR DIVISION HANDLES TERRORISM CASES), WHO ATTENDED MEETING, TO PREPARE FULL REPORT OF CONVERSATION FOR PONMIN MIYAZAWA.

7. DURING COURSE OF THIS CONVERSATION, ARITA SEVERAL TIMES INDICATED THAT AT LEAST HE PERSONALLY HAS SERIOUS DOUBTS WHETHER GOJ SHOULD AGAIN BECOME INVOLVED IN OBTAINING THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES HELD BY RED ARMY TERRORISTS. HE REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO THE "CONTRADICTIONS" IN WHICH SUCH ACTION PLACED JAPAN AND AT ONE POINT SAID THAT SHOULD SUCH A SITUATION ARISE AGAIN PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BEST FOR JAPAN TO REFUSE ANY DEALINGS WITH THE TERRORISTS WITHOUT REGARD TO THE STATUS OR NATIONALITY OF THE HOSTAGES THEY ARE HOLDING. "THAT", HE INSISTED, "WOULD AT LEAST BE THE EASIEST AND MOST CONSISTENT COURSE TO FOLLOW."

8. COMMENT: ARITA WAS UNCHARACTERISTICALLY DEFENSIVE AND PERHAPS SOMEWHAT IRRITATED BY OUR APPROACH. GOJ BELIEVES THAT DESPITE ITS ABHORRANCE OF TERRORISTS IT ACTED FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS TO SAVE LIVES, PARTICULARLY AMERICAN ONES, AND UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES IN ANOTHER COUNTRY, MALAYSIA, IN WHICH THEY EXERCISED LITTLE CONTROL OVER DEVELOPMENTS. PERHAPS BECAUSE OF JAPANESE SENSITIVITIES TO CONTRADICTIONS IN SITUATION, ARITA SEEMED TO INTERPRET OUR DEMARCHE, AT LEAST INITIALLY, AS IMPLYING CRITICISM OF GOJ HANDLING OF RECENT INCIDENT. WE HOPE THIS MISIMPRESSION WAS CORRECTED. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, GOJ WILL GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO OUR VIEWS AND WILL PROBABLY MAKE SAME APPROACH TO LARG URGING TERRORISTS NOT BE PERMITTED TO GO FREE. GOJ, HOWEVER, OBVIOUSLY FEELS BRUSED BY KL INCIDENT AND PROBABLY FEELS THAT PRIMARY EFFORT TO INSURE TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF THESE TERRORISTS CAN BEST BE MADE AND SHOULD BE MADE BY USG.
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, JA
SURJ: SALT BRIEFING

REF: STATE 215403

1. EMBASSY PROPOSES FOLLOWING SCHEDULE FOR AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S TOKYO BRIEFING ON SEPT 22:
 - 0930 ATTEND EMBASSY STAFF MEETING
 - 1230 INFORMAL LUNCH WITH AMBASSADOR AND KEY OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN OFFICE AND JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA)
 - 1430 SALT BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION FOR JDA VICE MINISTER KUBO AND SENIOR JDA STAFF
 - 1550 FOREIGN OFFICE BRIEFING. ATTENDEES WILL INCLUDE VICE MINISTER SATO (IN ABSENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER), FORMER VICE MINISTER TOGO AND STAFF.

2. RE PROPOSED JDA BRIEFING, FONOFF HAS RECOMMENDED THIS BRIEFING AND WE UNDERSTAND KUBO IS EAGER. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE KUBO HAS EMERGED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS AS THE BEST DEFENSE THINKER AT THE POLICY LEVEL AT JDA AND HE HAS BEEN CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH



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
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SAKATA'S EFFORTS TO STIMULATE UNDERSTANDING OF JAPAN'S BROAD SECURITY INTERESTS. EMBASSY BELIEVES JDA BRIEFING WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. IN VIEW OF LATE DATE EMBASSY HAS GONE AHEAD WITH TENTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS BUT WILL HAVE NO TROUBLE CANCELLING IF AMBASSADOR JOHNSON WOULD PREFER NOT TO MEET WITH JDA OFFICIALS.

3. FONOFF HAS ASKED WHETHER DEPT ANTICIPATES PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF VISIT. PLEASE ADVISE. NO ANNOUNCEMENT PLANNED HERE. BRIEFINGS WILL ATTRACT NOTICE AND WE WILL BE DISCUSSING PRESS GUIDANCE WITH FONOFF AND WITH AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL.

4. EMBASSY POL MIL OFFICER HOWARD MCELROY IS CONTROL OFFICER.

5. REQUEST APPROVAL AND OR COMMENTS SOONEST RE PROPOSED SCHEDULE. HODGSON



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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRZORITY
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AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR UNGA KS JA
SUBJ: UNGA: KOREA

REF: A) STATE 236888; B) USUN 4718; C) STATE 233134

1. SUMMARY. PER REF A, CHARGE URGED MOFA LOBBY STRONGLY, ESPECIALLY ASEAN STATES (STARTING WITH THAI FONMIN CHATCHAI) FOR VOTE AGAINST HOSTILE KOREA RESOLUTION AND SEEK HEAD OFF "COMPROMISE" ASEAN DRAFT WHICH NOT AT ALL HELPFUL TO OUR SIDE. UN BUREAU DIRGEN WAS SYMPATHETIC BUT NON-COMMITTAL. HE NOTED JAPANESE BELIEVED ASEAN DRAFT MUST NOT ON ANY ACCOUNT BE SURFACED NOW, BUT IT IS "WELL-INTENTIONED" AND CONCEIVABLY "COULD BE USEFUL." OKAWA APPRECIATED RECEIVING VIEWS PRIOR TO FONMIN'S MEETING WITH CHATCHAI. CHARGE AND IKAWA COMPARED NOTES ON ASEAN STATES', BURMESE AND SRI LANKA POSITIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. CHARGE SAW UN BUREAU DIRGEN OKAWA ON OCT 6, SEVERAL HOURS PRIOR TO FONMIN'S MEETING WITH THAI FONMIN



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CHATCHAI. AS INSTRUCTED REF A, HE SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ON JAPANESE (1) CONFUSION PROPOSED ASEAN RESOLUTION WOULD ENGENDER, (2) NEED FOR VIGOROUS GOJ EFFORTS TO SWING VOTES AGAINST ALGERIAN RESOLUTION, AND (3) OUR BELIEF THAT JAPANESE PARTICULARLY ABLE TO LOBBY STRONGLY THE ASEAN STATES. CHARGE ASKED THAT FONOFF MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT TO PERSUADE CHATCHAI THAT THAILAND SHOULD VOTE AGAINST HOSTILE RESOLUTION. OKAWA LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY BUT MADE NO PROMISES.

3. OKAWA SAID THAT JAPANESE HAVE RECEIVED FROM INDONESIAN PERMREP SANI TEXT OF ASEAN DRAFT IDENTICAL TO THAT REPORTED BY USUN (REF B). SANI GAVE ORAL ASSURANCES THAT ASEAN STATES HAVE NO INTENTION THAT REFERENCE TO "FORCES UNDER UN FLAG" SHOULD REFER TO THOSE IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER BILATERAL AGREEMENT, AND THAT "ALL PARTIES CONCERNED" INCLUDES ROK. OKAWA SAID HE FULLY APPRECIATED OUR SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS TO ASEAN DRAFT (WHICH CHARGE DREW FROM PARAS 2 AND 3 OF REF B). HE COMMENTED THAT CALL IN ASEAN DRAFT FOR IMMEDIATE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES "GOES TOO FAR." HE ALSO AGREED COMPLETELY WITH CHARGE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ASEAN NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WITHOUT FULL CONSULTATION WITH CORE CO-SPONSORS OF FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. ITS CIRCULATION NOW WOULD UNDERCUT FRENCH EFFORTS TO WIN SUPPORT FOR THEIR AMENDMENTS. HOWEVER, SAID OKAWA, BEARING IN MIND INDONESIAN ASSURANCES, HE THOUGHT ASEAN TEXT "COULD BE USEFUL." THE ASEAN DRAFT IS WILL-INTENTIONED, OKAWA SAID, MOTIVATED BY THEIR CONCERN THAT THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION (AS INTRODUCED) WOULD FAIL. WE OUGHT NOT SEEK TO "NIP IT IN THE BUD," BUT RATHER TO "KEEP IT UNDER WRAPS."

4. JAPANESE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY SANI AND BY THAI CHIEF DELEGATE THAT ASEAN IS INTENT ON PRODUCING A TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH ROK AND DPRK. ON BASIS OF SOUNDING OF DPRK, ALGERIANS, ETC, ASEAN PLANS TO DECIDE WHETHER TO LAUNCH DRAFT AS AMENDMENT TO HOSTILE RESOLUTION OR AS NEW RESOLUTION. OKAWA CONFIRMED THAT ROLE FOR SECURITY COUNCIL IN TERMINATION OF UNC (REF C) WAS INCLUDED IN



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EARLIER ASEAN DRAFT, BUT DROPPED UPON ITS FLAT REJECTION BY NORTH KOREANS.

5. CHARGE AND OKAWA COMPARED NOTES ON POSITION OF ASEAN STATES, BURMA AND SRI LANKA. THE BURMESE DECISION WHETHER TO ABSTAIN OR VOTE FOR HOSTILE RESOLUTION, OKAWA BELIEVES, SEEMS TO HANG ON HOW NE WIN IS RECEIVED IN PEKING. THE MALAYSIANS ARE HOPING FOR A COMPROMISE TEXT; IF NONE EMERGES, THEY WILL PROBABLY ABSTAIN. OKAWA BELIEVES THE US HAS BEEN TOO SANGUINE ABOUT THE FILIPINOS AND THAI; THE FILIPINOS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE ANXIOUS TO WIN ADMISSION TO THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP.



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INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY
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6. SUBSEQUENTLY, MOFA UN POLDIVDIR KOBAYASHI TOLD EMBOFF BY TELEPHONE THAT CHATCHAI MADE FOLLOWING POINTS IN CONVERSATION WITH MIYAZAWA:
A. THE THAI GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS AND WILL VOTE FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION ON KOREA, BUT WILL NOT CO-SPONSOR IT;
B. THE BASIC AIR OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT IS TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE. TO THIS END, AND TO AVOID CONFRONTATION, HE HAS INSTRUCTED THAI AMBASSADOR TO UN TO CONSULT OTHER ASEAN AMBASSADORS, WORK OUT A DRAFT COMBINING ELEMENTS OF BOTH RESOLUTIONS AND THEN TO SOUND OUT "CERTAIN COUNTRIES" ON IT. IF REACTION IS FAVORABLE, THAI AMBASSADOR IS TO TABLE RESOLUTION, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE SURFACED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE "OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED." THE THAI ARE VERY FLEXIBLE ON THIS MATTER.
KORAYASHI SAID THE QUESTION OF HOW THE THAI WOULD VOTE ON THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION DID NOT ARISE.

7. COMMENT: THOUGH JAPANESE DO NOT SAY SO DIRECTLY, EMBASSY HAS GOTTEN THE IMPRESSION IN THIS AND OTHER RECENT CONVERSATIONS THAT FONOFF BELIEVES WE WILL BE FORTUNATE IF



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ANY SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES VOTE AGAINST THE HOSTILE DRAFT. THE JAPANESE ARE RESOLVED TO CONTINUE HARD WORK FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AT OUR SIDE WORLD-WIDE, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEY DO NOT SEEM PREPARED TO MAKE AN ALL-OUT EFFORT AGAINST THE HOSTILE ONE. THEY ARE CLEARLY MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN WE. KOBAYASHI TOLD EMBOFF OCT 3 THAT FONOFF POLL OF POSTS REVEALED ONLY 42 SURE OR ALMOST-SURE VOTES FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION, PLUS A LARGE GROUP WHICH MAY RESPOND TO THE FRENCH AMENDMENTS OR OTHER MOVES OUR SIDE MAY MAKE, BUT FOR THE MOMENT ARE "AMBIGUOUS."
SHOESMITH

THESE ARE THE VOTES
FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION
AND AGAINST THE HOSTILE DRAFT
AS REVEALED BY THE FONOFF POLL
ON OCTOBER 3. THE RESULTS
SHOW ONLY 42 SURE OR ALMOST-SURE
VOTES FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION,
PLUS A LARGE GROUP WHICH MAY
RESPOND TO THE FRENCH AMENDMENTS
OR OTHER MOVES OUR SIDE MAY MAKE,
BUT FOR THE MOMENT ARE "AMBIGUOUS."

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3884
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JA, TH, CH, US
SUBJ: THAI FONMIN CHARTCHAI'S TALKS WITH MIKI AND MIYAZAWA

SUMMARY: DURING OCT 4-7 VISIT BY THAI FONMIN CHATCHAT TO TOKYO, JAPANESE OFFICIALS WERE AMAZED TO DISCOVER DEGREE OF "TILT" TOWARD CHINA SHOWN IN CHATCHAI'S DISCUSSION OF THE ASIAN SCENE. DURING 50 MINUTE TALKS WITH PM MIKI AND OVER HOUR WITH FONMIN MIYAZAWA, CHATCHAI CONCENTRATED ON FOUR AREAS OF INTEREST:

- A) PREDOMINANT DRV AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN VN AND LAOS IS "VERY DANGEROUS" DEVELOPMENT.
- B) TO BALANCE INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE, THAILAND MUST CULTIVATE CLOSE TIES WITH PEKING.
- C) US-THAI RELATIONS MUST REMAIN GOOD AND CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF US MILITARY MAY REMAIN IN THAILAND BEYOND NEXT MARCH DEADLINE.
- D) IN DISCUSSION OF THAI-JAPAN RELATIONS, CHATCHAI CALLED FOR INCREASED PURCHASES OF THAI BY



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PRODUCTS BY JAPAN AND MADE A GENERALIZED PLEA FOR JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN SEVERAL THAI PROJECTS. END SUMMARY.

1. FONOFF FIRST SE ASIA ACTING DIVDIR TSUKADA BRIEFED US ON TALKS AS FOLLOWS:

INDOCHINA. CHATCHAI TOLD MIKI AND MIYAZAWA THAT WITH EXCEPTION OF CAMBODIA REMAINDER OF INDOCHINA IS UNDER DRV AND SOVIET INFLUENCE. PRESENCE OF 35,000 NVN TROOPS IN LAOS AND 1,500 SOVIET ADVISORS CREATE SITUATION WHICH IS "VERY DANGEROUS" FOR THAILAND, WHO HOPED FOR BUFFER STATES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA. TSUKADA SAID CHATCHAI MADE CLEAR HANOI IS MAJOR THREAT BUT THAI FONMIN DID NOT SPECIFY WHETHER THREAT WAS DIRECT MILITARY ACTION BY HANOI OR SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY. TO COUNTER THIS AND RESTORE SOME BALANCE TO POWER CONFIGURATION IN SE ASIA, THAILAND SOUGHT CLOSE RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

2. AS FOR FUTURE THAI-DRV RELATIONS, CHATCHAI SAID THAT DIFFERENCES WITH HANOI HAVE BEEN NARROWED TO QUESTION OF RETURN OF PLANES AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT "STOLEN" FROM VIETNAMS AT END OF VIETNAM WAR. DESPITE EMPHASIS ON RETURN OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, CHATCHAI ALSO MENTIONED (BUT DID NOT EMPHASIZE) THAT HANOI DEMANDED CLOSURE OF US BASES IN THAILAND. NO DATES HS BEEN FIXED, BUT CHATCHAI SAID HE EXPECTED TO GO TO HANOI "SOON" TO DISCUSS AGAIN NORMALIZATION OF HANOI-BANGKOK RELATIONS.

3. BY IMPLICATION, CHATCHAI LINKED PRC, CAMBODIA, AND THAILAND IN QUASI ALLIANCE. TSUKADA EXPRESSED VIEWS THAT CHINESE SEEM TO HAVE ENCOURAGES CAMBODIANS TO NORMALIZE TIES WITH BANGKOK. MOFA OFFICIAL WHO ACCOMPANIED CHATCHAI TOLD TSUKADA THAT CAMBODIAN DEP PREMIER TENG SARY WILL VISIT BANGKOK LATER THIS MONTH TO DISCUSS NORMALIZATION OF CAMBODIAN-THAI RELATIONS.

4. THAILAND-PRC. ADDING DETAIL TO THE SAGA OF KUKRIT'S VISIT TO PEKING, CHATCHAI TOLD JAPANESE WHEN PREPARATORY TEAM HEADED BY AMB ANAND VISITED PEKING





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IN JUNE TO MAKE ADVANCE ARRANGMENTS FOR PM KUKRIT'S LATER VISIT, CHINESE ACCEPTED ALL THAI PROPOSALS. BECAUSE CHINESE WERE SO ACCOMODATING, AND WAS ABLE TO LEAVE IN ONLY TWO DAYS AND THE DATE OF THE KUKRIT TRP WAS ADVANCED EIGHT DAYS. ACCORDING TO TSUKADA, CHATCHAI ALSO TOOK GREAT DELIGHT IN REVEALING TO MIKI AND MIYAZAWA HIS REMARKS, TO CHINESE AS HE REMEMBERED THEM, REGARDING THAT TERRITORIAL RIGHTS TO CHINA'S YUNAN PROVINCE. DURING STOPOVER IN KUN MING, YUNAN'S CAPITAL, CHATCHAI EXPLAINED TO CHINESE THAT SINCE THAIS HAD ORIGINATED IN YUNNAN'S WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER QUESTION OF HOW TO "LIBERATE" THIS LOST THAI TERRITORY.

5. THAILAND-US. CHATCHAI TOLD THE JAPANESE THAT THAIS AND AMERICANS HAD BEEN "TOO GOOD FRIENDS" AND AS GOOD FRIENDS OCCASIONALLY DO, AMERICANS SOMETIMES FORGOT "COURTESIES IN DEALING WITH THEIR THAI FRIENDS." ONE SUCH LAPSE WAS MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT, CHATCHAI SAID, WHEN AMERICANS FAILED TO INFORM GOT WHAT THEY WERE DOING. WITH FOREKNOWLEDGE THAT US EMBASSY WOULD BE MOBBED AND SACKED, GOT ISSUED ITS "STERN PROTEST" OVER US ACTION TO TRY VERY DELIBERATELY (AND SUCCESSFULLY) TO ABORT THE MOB ACTION. CHATCHAI WAS APPARENTLY VERY PROUD HE HAD SUCCEEDED.



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P R 071007Z OCT 75
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3885
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING



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6. CHATCHAI MADE CLEAR BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT THAILAND AND THE US SHOULD REMAIN GOOD FRIENDS. HE TOLD MIYAZAWA THAT GOT DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN TWO KINDS OF US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THAILAND:

A) COMBAT STRIKE FORCES WERE STATIONED IN THAILAND IN CONNECTION WITH INDOCHINA WAR; THESE MUST BE REMOVED BY MARCH 1976 DEADLINE.

B) US MILITARY WHICH WERE RELATED TO US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND, WHICH IS STILL SORELY NEEDED, WOULD REMAIN, ASSUMING, OF COURSE, THAT US CONTINUED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THAIS. TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT CLEARLY, MIYAZAWA SUMMARIZED CHATCHAI'S REMARKS USING, AT ONE POINT, THE FOLLOWING PHRASEOLOGY: "US MILITARY WHICH WERE INVOLVED IN TRAINING THAIS ON US MILITARY BASES IN USE OF US EQUIPMENT WOULD BE PERMITTED TO REMAIN AFTER MARCH DEADLINE." CHATCHAI CONFIRMED THIS INTERPRETATION.

7. THAI MILITARY CONTINGENT ASSIGNED TO UN COMMAND IN JAPAN WAS NOT MENTIONED BY JAPANESE OR CHATCHAI.

8. BEGIN UNDERLINE: THAILAND-JAPAN. END UNDERLINE

TSUKADA SAID THAT BILATERAL ECONOMIC MATTERS OCCUPIED ONLY VERY SMALL PORTION OF CHATCHAI TALKS WITH MIKI AND MIYAZAWA. IN

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GENERAL TERMS CHATCHAI REQUESTED CONTINUED JAPANESE COOPERATION AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT AS A NECESSARY JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND INCREASED JAPANESE IMPORTS OF THAI GOODS.

9. AT LATER PRESS CONFERENCE, CHATCHAI REPORTEDLY PLACED MORE EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC SUBJECTS, STATING

-- A) PRIMARY PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT TO JAPAN WAS TO REQUEST GOJ TO INCREASE JAPANESE PURCHASES OF THAI GOODS, AND THAT HE HAD EMPHASIZED THIS POINT TO BOTH MIKI AND MIYAZAWA;

-- B) JAPANESE AND THAI WORKING TOGETHER CAN SOLVE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING JAPANESE ENTERPRISES IN THAILAND, AND THAILAND CONTINUES TO WELCOME JAPANESE PRIVATE INVESTMENT, WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO THAILAND'S DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS REGARD, THAILAND IS EASING RESTRICTIONS UNDER ITS IMMIGRATION LAW. (ON THIS POINT, TSUKADA TOLD FONOFFS JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN AND MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY REMAIN VERY CAUTIOUS RE INVESTING IN THAILAND BECAUSE OF AMBIGUOUS RTG ACTIONS AND POLICIES RE INVESTMENT.)

-- C) ASEAN SUMMIT CONFERENCE WILL BE PRECEDED BY TWO OR THREE WORKING LEVEL CONFERENCES AS WELL AS ONE MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING. SUMMIT MEETING WILL PROBABLY CONCERN ITSELF MAINLY WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND STUDY OF AN ASEAN FREE TRADE ZONE OR COMMON MARKET;

-- D) ANOTHER PURPOSE OF TRIP TO JAPAN WAS TO CONVERY TO JAPANESE INDUSTRY THAILAND'S HOPE THAT JAPAN WOULD COOPERATE IN CONSTRUCTING LARGE SCALE STEEL MILL SOMEWHERE IN ASEAN REGION.

10. OVERALL, DESPITE ALARMS EXPRESSED OVER THE THREAT FROM HANOI AND MOSCOW, TSUKADA DESCRIBED CHATCHAI AS CONFIDENT, EVIDENCING NO SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THAILAND'S FUTURE. HE WAS VOLUBLE AND PERHAPS UNREALISTIC IN HIS EVALUATION OF PROSPECTS IN SE ASIA. MORE THAN ONE FONOFF OFFICIAL WONDERED TO US IF CHATCHAI IS PART CHINESE. FONOFF, NEVERTHELESS, REGARDS TALKS AS VERY SATISFACTORY AND REVEALING ABOUT THAI POSITIONS.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O R 071017Z OCT 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3886
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USMISSION UN NEW YORK
USLO PEKING

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 14291

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR, CH, KS, TH
SUBJ: ROK MESSAGE TO PEKING

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 TD 9/23/02
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY H2, NARA, DATE 1/27/03

REF: TOKYO 14290(NOTAL)

1. DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH PM MIKI AND FONMIN MIYAZAWA (REPORTED REFTEL), THAI FONMIN CHATCHAI EXPRESSED VIEW SEVERAL TIMES THAT ROK SHOULD ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH PRC. IN BRIEFING US, FIRST SE ASIA ACTING DIVDIR TSUKADA SAID THAT WHEN JAPANESE ASKED CHATCHAI WHAT EVIDENCE THERE WAS THAT PEKING WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE RELATIONS WITH SEOUL, CHATCHAI MERELY RESPONDED THAT "TIMES HAVE GREATLY CHANGED" AND HE TOUGHT PEKING WOULD RESPOND IF SEOUL UNDERTOOK AN INITIATIVE. HE THEN REVEALED THAT ROK AMBASSADOR IN BANGKOK CONTACTED HIM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR TOKYO AND ASKED CHATCHAI TO CONTACT PRC EMBASSY IN TOKYO WITH MESSAGE THAT SEOUL WANTED TO START DIALOGUE WITH PEKING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. FONOFF (TSUKADA) BELIEVES CHATCHAI WAS IN TOUCH WITH PRC AMB CHEN CHU DURING HIS STAY AND PASSED ON SEOUL'S MESSAGE.

2. TSUKADA EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT CHATCHAI'S ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS VENTURE MIGHT BE RELATED TO HIS HOPE TO SUCCESSFULLY DRAFT AN



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ASEAN RESOLUTION ON KOREAS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SIDES.

3. COMMENT: WE, LIKE FONOFF, ARE AT LOSS TO EXPLAIN CHATCHAI'S OPTIMISM ABOUT PEKING'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SEOUL, BE WE ARE INTRIGUED BY ALLEGED ROK INITIATIVE AS WELL AS ROLE CHATCHAI IS ATTEMPTING TO PLAY. WE ARE PROBING FURTHER.
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
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O R 221201Z OCT 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 15111

EXDIS

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CORRECTED COPY (PARA 2)

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JA, NV
SUBJ: JAPANESE GO TO HANOI

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 TD 9/23/02
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY hr, NARA, DATE 1/27/03

REF: TOKYO 14030

SUMMARY: DURING WEEK VISIT TO HANOI, JAPANESE DELEGATION OPENED
EMBASSY, SIGNED 8.5 BILLION YEN GRANT ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT, HELD
CANDID EXCHANGE WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS, AND
HAD TOUGH TALKS WITH PRG REPS. IN RESPONSE TO POINTED QUERING,
NORTH VIETNAMESE DISAVOWED INTENTION TO CREATE INDOCHINESE
CONFEDERATION. THEY ALSO ASSERTED HANOI WOULD SUPPORT





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LIBERATION MOVEMENTS "POLITICALLY" BUT WOULD NOT PROVIDE "MATERIAL" SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES IN THAILAND AND MALAYSIA. JAPANESE EMPHASIZED CLOSE TIES WITH US AND HOPE THAT JAPAN COULD SERVE AS CHANNEL TO HELP IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND HANOI. NORTH VIETNAMESE WELCOMED JAPANESE EFFORTS BUT SAID US MUST END HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARD VN AND HONOR ARTICLE 21 OF PARIS ACCORDS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS. INITIATIVE MUST BE AMERICAN. NORTH VIETNAMESE SCRUPULOUSLY TREATED MOSCOW AND PEKING EVEN-HANDEDLY. TALKS WITH PRG REPS WENT BADLY AND GOJ PLANS TO REDUCE PERSONNEL AND PERHAPS ELIMINATE ITS EMBASSY IN SAIGON. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING OCT 10-17 VISIT TO HANOI, JAPANESE DELEGATION ACCOMPLISHED ITS FOUR OBJECTIVES: A) EMBASSY WAS OPENED OCT 11 IN TWO ROOMS AT THONG NHUT HOTEL, WHICH WILL BE SHARED AS QUARTERS AND OFFICE BY CHARGE YUKIO IMAGAWA AND TWO ASSISTANTS. B) 8.5 BILLION YEN GRANT AID AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY GOJ DELEGATION HEAD AMB SUGANUMA (FROM VIENTIANE) AND VICE FONMIN HOANG VAN TIEN. C) SEVERAL HOURS OF CONVERSATION WERE HELD BY JAPANESE WITH DEP PREMIER AND FONMIN NGUYEN DUY TRINH, VICE FONMIN TIEN, MIN FOREIGN TRADE PHAN ANH, AND MIN OF MATERIALS TRAN DANH TUYEN. D) THREE HOURS OF TALKS WERE HELD WITH "PRG OFFICE REPRESENTATIVE" NGUYEN VAN TIEN (WHOM, FONOFF FIRST SE ASIA DIVDIR ITO SAID, WAS POWER BEHIND MME BINH AT PARIS PEACE TALKS, AND "VERY MACHIAVELLIAN".)

2. ITO, DEPUTY DELEGATION HEAD WHO GAVE MOST OF JAPAN SIDE'S PRESENTATION, BRIEFED US AS FOLLOWS (READING FROM TRANSCRIPT): OBJECTIVES (A) AND (B) WERE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT A HITCH. TALKS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE ALSO WENT EXTREMELY WELL. ITO SAID THEY REMINED HIM OF US-JAPAN PLANNING TALKS IN WHICH HE PARTICIPATED DURING HIS RECENT ASSIGNMENT TO WASHINGTON. VN INITIAL TALKS WITH VICE FONMIN TIEN, ITO FIRST SAID JAPAN AND DRV SHOULD MOVE FROM A NEGOTIATING TO A CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP AND THEN OUTLINED THREE PILLARS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF JAPAN: A) FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSEST OF TIES WITH US; B) MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH ASIAN NATIONS; C) PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE WITH COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURES.

3. TIEN RESPONDED WITH FOUR PILLARS OF DRV'S FOREIGN POLICY



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A) FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION AND CHINA (ITO SAID NORTH VIETNAMESE ALWAYS REFERRED TO RUSSIANS AND CHINESE IN THAT ORDER); B) SOLIDARITY WITH LAOS AND CAMBODIA; C) PARTNERSHIP WITH AFRO-ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN WORLD; D) RELATIONS WITH ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL NATIONS; TIEN MENTIONED FOUR, IN FOLLOWING ORDER: JAPAN, FRANCE, AUSTRALIA, AND SWEDEN.

4. IN COURSE OF ENSUING DISCUSSION ITO POSED SEVERAL SENSITIVE QUESTION TO TIEN. A) HE ASKED TIEN IF HANOI INTENDED TO CREATE AN INDOCHINESE FEDERATION. TIEN RESPONDED FIRST BY SAYING THAT THE DRV AND LAOS HAD VERY CLOSE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS. LAOS HAD NO ACCESS TO THE SEA AND HANOI INTENDED TO PROVIDE SUCH AN OUTLET THROUGH VIETNAM. RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA WERE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. CAMBODIA HAS OUTLET TO THE SEA AND CAMBODIANS WERE CONSTRUCTING THE NEW CAMBODIA IN THEIR OWN WAY. FINALLY, TIEN DENIED THAT HANOI HAD EVER OR INTENDED IN FUTURE TO CREATE AN INDOCHINESE CONFEDERATION. B) ITO NOTED THAT SOME OF NEIGHBORING STATES IN SE ASIA, PARTICULARLY THAILAND AND MALAYSIA, WERE WORRIED THAT HANOI WOULD SUPPORT INSURGENCIES IN THEIR COUNTRIES. TIEN OUTLINED TWO POLICIES IN THIS CONNECTION. HE SAID THAT HANOI WOULD ALWAYS SUPPORT JUST STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION, BUT SUPPORT WOULD BE POLITICAL AND NOT MATERIAL. SECOND POLICY CALLED FOR PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE WITH STATES OF DIFFERENT SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURES. THERE WAS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN TWO POLICIES, TIEN STRESSEED, BECAUSE SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WOULD ONLY BE POLITICAL. C) DISCUSSING REGIONAL AFFAIRS, ITO ASKED IF HANOI PLANNED TO PARTICIPATE IN



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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O R 221201Z OCT 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000X
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 15111

EXDIS

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JA, NV
SUBJ: JAPANESE GO TO HANOI

REF: TOKYO 14030

SUMMARY: DURING WEEK VISIT TO HANOI, JAPANESE DELEGATION OPENED EMBASSY, SIGNED 8.5 BILLION YEN GRANT ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT, HELD CANDID EXCHANGE WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS, AND HAD TOUGH TALKS WITH PRG REPS. IN RESPONSE TO POINTED QUERYING, NORTH VIETNAMESE DISAVOWED INTENTION TO CREATE INDOCHINESE CONFEDERATION. THEY ALSO ASSERTED HANOI WOULD SUPPORT LIBERATION MOVEMENTS "POLITICALLY" BUT WOULD NOT PROVIDE "MATERIAL" SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES IN THAILAND AND MALAYSIA.



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3. TIEN RESPONDED WITH FOUR PILLARS OF DRV'S FOREIGN POLICY: A) FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION AND CHINA (ITO SAID



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NORTH VIETNAMESE ALWAYS REFERRED TO RUSSIANS AND CHINESE IN THAT ORDER); B) SOLIDARITY WITH LAOS AND CAMBODIA; C) PARTNERSHIP WITH AFRO-ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN WORLD; D) RELATIONS WITH ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL NATIONS; TIEN MENTIONED FOUR, IN FOLLOWING ORDER: JAPAN, FRANCE, AUSTRALIA, AND SWEDEN.

4. IN COURSE OF ENSUING DISCUSSION ITO POSED SEVERAL SENSITIVE QUESTION TO TIEN. A) HE ASKED TIEN IF HANOI INTENDED TO CREATE AN INDOCHINESE FEDERATION. TIEN RESPONDED FIRST BY SAYING THAT THE DRV AND LAOS HAD VERY CLOSE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS. LAOS HAD NO ACCESS TO THE SEA AND HANOI INTENDED TO PROVIDE SUCH AN OUTLET THROUGH VIETNAM. RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA WERE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. CAMBODIA HAS OUTLET TO THE SEA AND CAMBODIANS WERE CONSTRUCTING THE NEW CAMBODIA IN THEIR OWN WAY. FINALLY, TIEN DENIED THAT HANOI HAD EVER OR INTENDED IN FUTURE TO CREATE AN INDOCHINESE CONFEDERATION. B) ITO NOTED THAT SOME OF NEIGHBORING STATES IN SE ASIA, PARTICULARLY THAILAND AND MALAYSIA, WERE WORRIED THAT HANOI WOULD SUPPORT INSURGENCIES IN THEIR COUNTRIES. TIEN OUTLINED TWO POLICIES IN THIS CONNECTION. HE SAID THAT HANOI WOULD ALWAYS SUPPORT JUST STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION, BUT SUPPORT WOULD BE POLITICAL AND NOT MATERIAL. SECOND POLICY CALLED FOR PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE WITH STATES OF DIFFERENT SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURES. THERE WAS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN TWO POLICIES, TIEN STRESSED, BECAUSE SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WOULD ONLY BE POLITICAL. C) DISCUSSING REGIONAL AFFAIRS, ITO ASKED IF HANOI PLANNED TO PARTICIPATE IN

NOTE BY OC/T: TOKYO 15111 SECTION 1 OF 2, RECEIVED WITH PARA 2 GARBLED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.



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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 221201Z OCT 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4287
INFO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
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AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS SUCH AS ESCAP, SEAMED, ETC.? TIEN REPLIED THAT HANOI WAS BESET WITH SO MANY URGENT PROBLEMS THAT THEY HAD NOT YET HAD TIME TO CONSIDER SUCH MATTERS. SUBSEQUENTLY, PROGRAMS WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON CASE BY CASE BASIS WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO FUNDS AVAILABLE AT LOW INTEREST RATES. D) ITO RETURNED TO QUESTION OF US, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US TO JAPAN. HE NOTED THAT HANOI WAS A "NEW FRIEND" BUT JAPAN HOPED TO DO WHATEVER WAS POSSIBLE TO HELP IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND DRV. AFTER PONDERING THIS QUESTION, TIEN SAID THE US MUST DO TWO THINGS: FIRST, US MUST END ITS HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARD VIETNAM, CITING THE US VETO OF DRV'S UN APPLICATION AS AN EXAMPLE. (HE DID NOT MENTION US VETO OF RGSVN'S APPLICATION). SECONDLY, US MUST HONOR ARTICLE 21 OF PARIS ACCORDS (ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR RECONSTRUCTION VN). WITH FULFILLMENT

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OF THESE TWO CONDITIONS US-DRV RELATIONS WOULD BE NORMALIZED US MUST TAKE INITIATIVE, HOWEVER.

5. FINALLY, BI-LATERAL RELATIONS WERE DISCUSSED. ITO NOTED THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE KNEW VERY LITTLE ABOUT JAPAN SINCE THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD CONTACTS WITH VERY LIMITED GROUP (MAINLY THOSE RECOMMENDED BY JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY). ITO PROPOSED SENDING TO DRV REPS FROM VARIOUS GOJ MINISTRIES TO DISCUSS TRANSPORTATION, FINANCE, ETC., EXCHANGE OF MULTI-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATIONS, AND BUSINESS MISSIONS. TIEN WELCOMED THE PROPOSAL AND AGREED THAT TRAFFIC SHOULD MOVE IN BOTH DIRECTIONS.

6. IN LATER MEETING WITH DEP PREMIER AND FONMIN NGUYEN DUY TRINH, ITO SAID TWO MATTERS OF INTEREST WERE DISCUSSED. JAPANESE ASKED FOR HANOI'S SECRET IN BEING ABLE TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, DESPITE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TWO. TRINH SAID DRV SUCCEEDED IN THIS REGARD BY FOLLOWING AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. HE THEN QUOTED HO CHI MINH AS HAVING SAID THAT THE DISPUTE BETWEEN SOCIALIST BROTHERS WAS SADDENING BUT SOMEDAY THROUGH POLICIES OF INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL PROGRESS, DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIALIST GIANTS WOULD VANISH.

7. WITH TRINH, JAPANESE ALSO REITERATED IMPORTANCE OF US TO JAPAN AND SAID JAPAN WOULD LIKE TO SERVE AS A BRIDGE TO HELP IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND DRV. TRINH RESPONDED THAT JAPAN WOULD BE A GOOD INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE US AND DRV, BUT THE ENORMOUS SUFFERING AND DAMAGE THE US HAD CAUSED NVN AND SVN SHOULD BE REMEMBERED. US MUST HONOR ARTICLE 21 OF PARIS ACCORDS.

8. NORTH VIETNAMESE EXPRESSED HOPE TO OPEN THEIR EMBASSY IN TOKYO VERY SOON, BUT ITO COULD NOT GUESS WHEN THIS MIGHT MEAN.

9. STRESSING SENSITIVITY OF TALKS WITH PRG REP NGUYEN VAN TIEN (AND PROMISING TO PROVIDE FULL BRIEFING LATER), ITO SAID THREE HOURS OF TALKS WITH TIEN HAD GONE VERY BADLY, CHARACTERIZED BY REPEATED CLASH. GOJ HAS DECIDED TO REDUCE PERSONNEL IN SAIGON FROM PRESENT NINE AND, ALTHOUGH DECISION IS NOT YET MADE, MAY DECIDE TO CLOSE THE EMBASSY ALTOGETHER. ASKED IF HE THOUGHT NVN AND SVN WOULD SOON BE UNITED, ITO ONLY REMARKED THAT BOTH NOTE-TAKERS AT HIS TALKS WITH PRG REP TIEN WERE DRV FONOFF JAPAN



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DESK OFFICERS.

10. AS GENERAL OBSERVATIONS, ITO WAS VERY SURPRISED WITH CORDIALNESS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE. DRV IS DESPARATE FOR FUNDS FOR RECONSTRUCTION, RESEMBLING A "BEGGAR SEEKING ALMS." VERY FEW FOREIGNERS ARE VISIBLE IN HANOI. SOVIET NOR CHINESE PRESENCE IS EVIDENT. NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE IMPECCABLY CAREFUL IN REFERRING TO RUSSIANS AND CHINESE IN EQUAL TERMS. ITO FELT, NEVERTHELESS, THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DISLIKE THE RUSSIANS BUT MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH MOSCOW AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO HEAVY CHINESE PRESENCE ON NORTH VIETNAM'S BORDERS. EXCEPT AS MENTIONED IN PARA 4 (A) ABOVE, ITO DETECTED NO EVIDENCE OF DRV-PRC RIVALRY IN CAMBODIA. FEELINGS ABOUT US ARE PROFOUND; ITO SAID EVEN MENTION OF US NOTICEABLY EXCITED AND DISTURBED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

11. ITO CONCLUDED, EMPHASIZING THAT ANY LEAK OF BRIEFING COULD JEOPARDIZE JAPAN'S CREDIBILITY WITH HANOI AND SERVE TO UNDERMINE DRV-JAPAN RELATIONS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT NO OTHER GOVERNMENT WOULD RECEIVE THIS FULL BRIEFING.
HODGSON



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

126434

0 R 030850Z DEC 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC 5249
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
USLO PEKING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 17210

EXDIS

USDEL FOR ASST SEC HABIB

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JA, CH
SUBJECT: PRC-JAPAN PEACE FRIENDSHIP TREATY

REF: TOKYO 16298

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 TD 9/23/02
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY hr2, NARA, DATE 1/27/03

1. FOLLOWING PUBLICIZING NOV 7 BY FONMIN MIYAZAWA OF GOJ APPROACH TO RESOLVING HEGEMONY ISSUE (REFTEL), FONOFF HAS SENT ADDITIONAL, HIGHLY SECRET SIGNALS TO PEKING SEEKING REACTION TO GOJ APPROACH INITIALLY PROPOSED TO PRC FONMIN CHIAO KUAN-HUA OVER TWO MONTHS AGO IN NEW YORK. THUS FAR, CHINESE HAVE NOT RESPONDED. FONOFF CHINA DIVDIR FUJITA TOLD US DEC 2 THAT HE ASSUMES CHINESE HAVE BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH PREPARATIONS FOR PRES FORD VISIT AND ARE STILL STUDYING THE PROPOSAL. IN INTERIM, FONOFF IS GRATEFUL THAT THE CHINESE ARE MAINTAINING THEIR SILENCE PUBLICLY. FUJITA ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT CHINESE MAY BE ACTING ON ASSUMPTION, PUBLICIZED BY CHIAO KUAN-HUA, THAT "HEAVENS WILL NOT FALL IF THE TREATY IS NOT CONCLUDED," AND THEY MAY SIMPLY BE BIDDING THEIR TIME. NEVERTHELESS, FUJITA EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER, IN COURSE OF CONVERSATIONS



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WITH CHIAO KUAN-HUA, MIGHT DETECT SOME HINT OF CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD GOJ APPROACH FOR DEALING WITH HEGEMONY ISSUE MADE BY MIYAZAWA.

2. FUJITA COMMENTED THAT MIYAZAWA'S APPROACH HAS BEEN FAVORABLY RECEIVED BY WIDE SPECTRUM OF LDP DIETMEN.
HODGSON



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013812

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC
TITLE CAAC Officials Comments on Former
President Nixon's PRC Visit
CREATION DATE 02/20/1976
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400285
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 8
FOLDER TITLE Japan - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - EXDIS (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN 09/06/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

Exempt 4/12/05