


The original documents are located in Box 8, folder “Japan - State Department Telegrams: From SECSTATE - NODIS (7)” of the National Security Adviser Files: Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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TELEGRAM

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NODIS

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS:PFUR, JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON SECRETARY

1. AMBASSADOR YASUKAWA CALLED ON SECRETARY JULY 8 FOR BRIEF DISCUSSION PRIOR TO AMBASSADOR'S RETURN TO TOKYO FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING AND CONSULTATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER MIKI.

2. YASUKAWA NOTED THAT SECRETARY'S SPEECH TO JAPAN SOCIETY HAD COVERED WHOLE RANGE OF US POLICY TOWARD JAPAN AND ASIA, BUT ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY SPECIAL ASPECT WHICH SECRETARY WOULD LIKE HIM TO EMPHASIZE. SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT SPEECH WAS CAREFUL DELINEATION OF US POLICY AIMS. OUR PROBLEM NOW WAS HOW TO IMPLEMENT THESE GOALS. YASUKAWA AGREED AND SAID THIS COULD BE A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION DURING MIKI VISIT.

3. REFERRING TO UPCOMING VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER, SECRETARY ASKED YASUKAWA WHETHER IT WOULD CAUSE GREAT INCONVENIENCE FOR JAPANESE, IF WE WERE TO ASK THAT DATES BE SLIGHTLY CHANGED. HE EXPLAINED THAT DATES FOR UPCOMING

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 STATE 100659

EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE KEEP SHIFTING AND THAT IT WOULD GIVE US A GREAT DEAL MORE FLEXIBILITY IF WE COULD SET DATES FOR MIKI'S MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR

AUGUST 7-8 REPEAT 7-8, RATHER THAN AUGUST 5-6 REPEAT 5-6. YASUKAWA SAID OF COURSE HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT TOKYO. SECRETARY ASKED THAT HE EXPLORE SUBJECT WITH HIS GOVERNMENT ON INFORMAL BASIS AND REPORT REACTION. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO CAUSE GREAT INCONVENIENCE, BUT IF PRIME MINISTER COULD REARRANGE HIS SCHEDULE TO CARRY OUT HIS ENGAGEMENTS IN NEW YORK AND LOS ANGELES BEFORE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IT COULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO US. YASUKAWA AGREED REPORT BACK AS SOON AS HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM GOJ. (EMBASSY SHOULD NOT PURSUE THIS DIRECTLY UNLESS GAIMUSHU RAISES IT; BUT RATHER LEAVE IT TO YASUKAWA TO SECURE REPLY.)

4. YASUKAWA ASKED SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON CURRENT INDOCHINA SITUATION, NOTING THAT SOUTH VIETNAM HAD REQUESTED WITHDRAWAL OF FORMER JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AND HAD NOT YET INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT REPLACEMENT. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION SOUTH VIETNAM WAS ONLY WILLING ACCEPT CHARGES D'AFFAIRES FOR PRESENT AT LEAST. HE SAID IT WAS HIS GUESS HANOI WISHED ASSERT ITS SUPREMACY GRADUALLY--PEKhaps OVER A YEAR'S TIME--BUT THAT HANOI WOULD NOT WANT A SEPARATE SOUTH VIETNAM INDEFINITELY. YASUKAWA EXPLAINED CURRENT STATUS OF JAPAN'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI.

5. YASUKAWA SUGGESTED THAT SECRETARY SEEK MIKI'S VIEWS REGARDING JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF MIKI'S RECENT STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT HE CONSIDERED SECURITY IN KOREA DIRECTLY RELATED TO SECURITY OF JAPAN. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO HAVE MIKI REAFFIRM THIS IN CONNECTION WITH VISIT. KISSINGER

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WITHDRAWAL ID 013800

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC
RECEIVER'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TITLE Nuclear Transit Issue
CREATION DATE 08/14/1975
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400282
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 8
FOLDER TITLE Japan - State Department Telegrams:
From SECSTATE - NODIS (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN 09/06/2001
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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

TAGS: MARR, JA

MR 07-38 #16; state ltr 8/13/07

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TRANSIT

BY dal NARA DATE 8/13/08

REF: TOKYO 11840
SEOUL FOR ZURHELLEN

1. WE AGREE WITH YOUR CONCLUSION PARA. 7 REFTTEL THAT TRAN-
SIT ISSUE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE RAISED WITH GOJ AT THIS
TIME.

2. FOR ZURHELLEN: YOU SHOULD REVIEW BIDDING WITH EMBASSY
DURING YOUR TOKYO VISIT, BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCUSSION
OF ISSUE WITH JAPANESE. INGERSOLL

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NODIS

E.O. 116521 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA

SUBJECT: ECONOMIC SUMMIT

REFS: (A) TOKYO 13754) (B) STATE 228933

FOR THE CHARGE FROM SONNENFELDT

1. JAPANESE EMBASSY MINISTER NESHIDA CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING TO MAKE A SIMILAR INQUIRY TO THAT REPORTED REF. (A) CONCERNING ATTENDANCE OF SECOND PERSON AT OCTOBER 5-6 MEETING. I TOLD HIM THAT MATTER OF ATTENDANCE AND AGENDA HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH BETWEEN USHIBA AND FORMER SECRETARY SHULTZ, WHO WAS HOSTING MEETING. QUESTION OF AGENDA FOR EVENTUAL SUMMIT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT OCTOBER 5-6 MEETING. OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT SUMMIT WOULD FOCUS ON BROADER POLITICO/ECONOMIC ISSUES RATHER THAN NEGOTIATING ESSENTIALLY TECHNICAL ECONOMIC OR MONETARY ISSUES.

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PAGE 02 STATE 232521

2. WITH RESPECT TO ATTENDANCE AT THE OCTOBER 5-6 MEETING, SHULTZ TOLD USHIBA THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TWO PARTICIPANTS, SHULTZ AND MYSELF, AND THAT THE OTHERS COULD EITHER HAVE ONE, OR TWO, AS THEY CHOSE.

3. I TOLD NESHIDA THAT IT WAS UP TO HIS GOVERNMENT WHO AND HOW MANY (UP TO TWO) PEOPLE THEY SENT. IF THEY CHOSE TO SEND A SECOND PARTICIPANT, USHIBA SHOULD URGENTLY INFORM SHULTZ, THE MEETING HOST.

4. JAPANESE INQUIRY HAS NOW BEEN ANSWERED, YOU SHOULD NOT ENGAGE IN FURTHER DISCUSSION AT YOUR END. IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER REPORTING ON THIS SUBJECT, PLEASE ENSURE THAT IT IS SENT VIA THE NODIS CHANNEL, PER REF (B). INGERSOLL

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EA/K - MR. MISCH (DRAFT)
S/S - JPHOFFAT
IO - AMB. BLAKE (SUB)

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NORIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, JA, UNGA, KS, KN

SUBJECT: KOREAN QUESTION IN UN

1. AMBASSADOR YASUKAWA CALLED ON HABIB NOV 7, POINTING OUT THAT BOTH HE AND AMBASSADOR SAITO AT UN HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONSULT WITH US ON STRATEGY FOR HANDLING KOREAN QUESTION AT UN. HE NOTED THAT SAITO HAD CALLED ON MOYNIHAN EARLIER IN DAY. YASUKAWA SAID THAT GOJ WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT VOTE IN PLENARY AND FEARED THAT MOST LIKELY OUTCOME WOULD BE THAT BOTH RESOLUTIONS WOULD PASS AS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN FIRST COMMITTEE VOTING. GOJ BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD GAIN NOTHING AND WOULD ENCOURAGE NORTH KOREANS TO INTENSIFY THEIR POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. AT THIS JUNCTURE HE STRESSED THAT GOJ WAS AT A LOSS AS TO HOW TO COPE WITH SITUATION OR FIND WAY OUT OF IMPASSE IN VIEW OF TOTAL NORTH

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PAGE 02 STATE 265078

KOREAN INTRANSIGENCE. THEY HAD NO SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE BUT HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONSULT INFORMALLY WITH US AND EXPLORE OUR THINKING.

2. YASUKAWA SAID JAPAN HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT SYG HAD HAD SOME DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY ON THIS MATTER AND WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT SOME SORT OF OPENING DEMARCHE COULD BE MADE WITH NORTH KOREANS WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A DIALOGUE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE ROK.

ASKED WHETHER HE MEANT BEFORE OR AFTER PLENARY VOTE, HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS THINKING ABOUT BEFORE.

3. HABIB AGREED THAT NORTH KOREAN STUBBORNNESS MADE BARGAINING OF ANY KIND DIFFICULT. HE NOTED THAT VOTE WAS NOW SCHEDULED FOR NOV 18, AND THAT MEANWHILE HE WERE CONSULTING URGENTLY WITH CORE GROUP IN UN. MENTIONED THAT ONE OF POSSIBILITIES WAS THAT PLENARY COULD SIMPLY "TAKE NOTE" OF FACT THAT FIRST COMMITTEE HAD PASSED BOTH RESOLUTIONS AND LEAVE IT AT THAT. HOWEVER, NORTH KOREANS WERE SEEKING MORE THAN THAT; THEY WANTED IT TO APPEAR THAT PLENARY HAD "ACCEPTED" UNFRIENDLY RESOLUTION WHICH HE DID NOT THINK WOULD BE SATISFACTORY. HABIB MENTIONED THAT WHEN HE HAD SEEN PRESIDENT PARK IN SEOUL, PRINCIPAL POINT PARK HAD MADE WAS THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GO THROUGH EXERCISE AGAIN NEXT YEAR. PARK AGREED WORST THAT COULD HAPPEN IN PLENARY WOULD BE THAT BOTH RESOLUTIONS MIGHT PASS. THIS WOULD NOT CHANGE OBJECTIVE SITUATION, AND AFTER VOTE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US, ROK, AND FRIENDS TO CONSULT ABOUT NEW APPROACHES. PARK HAD BEEN VERY STRONG HOWEVER, THAT NO CONTACTS BE UNDERTAKEN WITH NORTH KOREA UNTIL AFTER VOTE. THIS WOULD DESTROY ROK POSITION AT UN.

4. YASUKAWA SAID THAT GOJ WAS NOT PROPOSING ANY SUCH CONTACT. HE RECALLED, HOWEVER, THAT SECRETARY HAD MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF SOME PRELIMINARY CONTACTS IN SEPT 27 BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MIYAZAWA. HABIB REMINDED YASUKAWA THAT IN LATER TOKYO MEETING SECY INFORMED MIYAZAWA THAT IF UNFRIENDLY RESOLUTION WERE ADOPTED, SUCH CONTACT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR A TIME. HABIB SUMMED

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PAGE 23 STATE 265078

UP SITUATION AT MOMENT AS ONE OF CONSIDERING OPTIONS, TALKING WITH ALLIES AND COUNTING VOTES. WHILE WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE WHICH WAS UNCONDITIONAL,

THE NORTH KOREANS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WERE PRESSING FOR MUCH MORE.

5. YASUKAWA SAID THAT SAITO HAD MENTIONED SOME POSSIBILITY OF DESIGNATING RESOLUTIONS AS IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. HABIB SAID THAT ROK HAD SUGGESTED THAT UN-FRIENDLY RESOLUTION BE SO DESIGNATED, BUT THAT WE BELIEVED THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND ON LOGICAL GROUNDS IF OUR OWN RESOLUTION WERE NOT ALSO SO DESIGNATED. IN ANY CASE WE WERE NOT SURE THAT THIS WOULD PUT US IN A GOOD TACTICAL POSITION. WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER FURTHER.

6. YASUKAWA SAID THE SYG HAD INFORMED SAITO THAT IN TALKS WITH NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES LATTER HAD INDICATED THEY WOULD NEGOTIATE ABOUT CEASE FIRE ONLY WITH US, BUT THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT QUESTIONS INVOLVING KOREAN PENINSULA AS A WHOLE WITH ROK. HABIB REPLIED THAT NORTH KOREAN POSITION WAS THAT THEY WOULD DISCUSS "PEACE TREATY" WITH US, INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US FORCES FROM KOREA. YASUKAWA WONDERED WHETHER, "FOR ARGUMENT'S SAKE", US MIGHT CONSIDER TALKING WITH NORTH KOREANS IN ITS CAPACITY OF REPRESENTATIVE OF UNC WHICH MIGHT GIVE A DIFFERENT CHARACTER TO TALKS. HABIB SAID WE HAD NOT CONSIDERED TALKS WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE ROK REPRESENTATION.

7. HABIB MADE CLEAR TO YASUKAWA THAT ANY PUBLICITY OR HINT FROM TOKYO OFFICIAL SOURCES THAT GOJ MIGHT BE URGING CHANGE IN POSITION OR PROPOSING CONTACTS WITH NORTH WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE. IT WOULD SERIOUSLY CONCERN ROK AND GREATLY COMPLICATE OVERALL SITUATION. YASUKAWA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. HE SAID THAT HIS APPROACH WAS TO BE CONSIDERED INFORMAL AND EXPLORATORY; HOWEVER, HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO COME IN BY FOMMIN MIYAZAWA, AND HE REQUESTED THAT HIS APPROACH BE MADE KNOWN TO SECRETARY. HABIB ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD APPRISE THE SECY OF GOJ

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PAGE 04 STATE 265078

INTEREST AND CONCERN AND AGREED TO BE IN TOUCH SHORTLY AGAIN REGARDING OUR APPRAISAL OF UN SITUATION.

8. WE HAVE SINCE RECEIVED USUN REPORT ENDORSING JAPANESE PROPOSAL ON DEALING WITH NORTH KOREANS ON ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH ASSISTANCE OF UNSYG ALONG ABOVE LINES BUT WITH A SPECIFIC RESOLUTION IN MIND. THIS IS UNDER STUDY AND WE AWAIT FULL REPORT FROM USUN ON MEETING WITH AMB SAITO. GUIDANCE ON RESPONSE TO JAPANESE WILL BE FORTHCOMING. MEANWHILE, HAS USUN ANY FURTHER WORD ON VARIOUS CHINESE SUGGESTIONS FOR HANDLING KOREAN QUESTION IN PLENARY SESSION?

9. WE HAVE NOT AS YET DISCUSSED JAPANESE PROPOSALS WITH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES.

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FOR AMBASSADOR FROM MILLER, ACTING; WELLINGTON FOR HABIB

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PINT, JA, US

SUBJECT: LOCKHEED AFFAIR: CHURCH SUBCOMMITTEE REQUEST
TO MEET WITH YOU.

1. WE HAVE LEARNED PRIVATELY FROM STAFF MEMBER THAT CHURCH SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH YOU AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. SUBCOMMITTEE HAS NO REPEAT NO EVIDENCE THAT YOU WERE IN ANYWAY IMPLICATED IN THIS AFFAIR, BUT WISHES, FOR RECORD, TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU AND HEAR YOUR VIEWS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE APPEARANCE REPEAT APPEARANCE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST. SUBCOMMITTEE IDEA IS, THAT YOU WOULD MEET WITH MEMBERS INFORMALLY, NOT IN FORMAL EXECUTIVE SESSION AND CARE WOULD BE EXERCISED TO AVOID ANY PUBLICITY WHATEVER.

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STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY 1/7, NARA, DATE 8/31/01



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PAGE 02 STATE 042860

2. STAFF MEMBER WAS INFORMED OF YOUR MARCH TRAVEL TO UNITED STATES, INCLUDING MARCH 6-10 IN WASHINGTON. HE ASKED THAT YOU CONSIDER COMING HERE FOR A DAY OR SO PRIOR TO YOUR ENGAGEMENTS IN CALIFORNIA, SO THAT SUBCOMMITTEE COULD LAY FULLY TO REST THIS ASPECT OF ITS INQUIRY. I THINK YOUR MEETING WITH SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD HAVE SALUTARY EFFECT, AND RECOMMEND THAT IF POSSIBLE YOU MOVE FORWARD YOUR DEPARTURE FROM TOKYO BY A DAY OR TWO TO ACCOMMODATE THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S DESIRES. PLEASE ADVISE. EAGLEBURGER

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (NIXON, RICHARD M.) CH, JA, US


SUBJECT: NIXON STOPOVER IN TOKYO

FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY, WE UNDERSTAND THAT FORMER
PRESIDENT NIXON HAS DECIDED TO FLY COMMERCIALY TO
TOKYO WHERE HE WILL CATCH THE PRC AIRCRAFT FOR THE TRIP
TO PEKING. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS ARRANGEMENTS
BECOME KNOWN AND WILL PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON HANDLING THE
STOPOVER. INGERSOLL

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E.0116521 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JA, US
SUBJECT: CIA IN JAPAN
1. JAPAN COUNTRY DIRECTOR SHERMAN CALLED IN JAPANESE EMBASSY
COUNSELOR HAZUMI ON APRIL 15 TO DISCUSS GOJ REQUEST FOR
USG STATEMENT CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS IN US PRESS OF CIA
INVOLVEMENT IN JAPAN WITH LOCKHEED AND "ONE OR MORE"
POLITICAL PARTIES. SHERMAN TOLD HAZUMI THAT WE HAD
CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE QUESTIONS THAT HE HAD ASKED ON
APRIL 3 (REFTEL) AND WISHED NOW TO DISCUSS OUR LIKELY
RESPONSE WITH HIM ON A PERSONAL BASIS. SHERMAN NOTED
THAT IT IS LONG STANDING US POLICY NEVER TO COMMENT ON
MATTERS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT
WE SAW NO COMPELLING REASON TO CHANGE THIS POLICY, AND
THEREFORE DID NOT INTEND TO DO SO. SHERMAN SAID THAT HE
WAS CONFIDENT THAT THIS WOULD BE THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE
CONVEYED TO THE GOJ SHORTLY, BUT BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN
FOR THE SENSITIVITY OF THE LOCKHEED AFFAIR IN JAPAN HE
WISHED TO INFORM HAZUMI ON A PERSONAL BASIS BEFOREHAND.
2. HAZUMI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION. HE SAID THE SUBSTANCE
OF OUR INTENDED RESPONSE WAS NOT A PROBLEM, BUT THE GOJ
NEEDED TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHEN AND HOW IT SHOULD

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PAGE 02 STATE 091029

OFFICIALLY RECEIVE OUR ANSWER. HAZUMI SAID THAT HE WOULD CHECK WITH HIS AMBASSADOR AND WITH TOKYO ABOUT THIS PROBLEM. SHERMAN SAID THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY SUGGESTIONS THE GOJ HAD ON THE TIMING OR HANDLING OF OUR RESPONSE. KISSINGER

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NODIS
FOR CHARGE FROM HABIB

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: JA, MARR

SUBJECT: MIG 25

YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HIGHEST LEVELS ARE INTERESTED IN MAXIMIZING BENEFIT WE DERIVE FROM JAPANESE POSSESSION OF MIG 25. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SEEK COMPLETE ACCESS TO THE AIRCRAFT BY AMERICAN EXPERTS FOR AS MUCH TIME AS NECESSARY. YOU SHOULD APPROACH GOJ AT HIGHEST LEVEL YOU BELIEVE NECESSARY TO GAIN JAPANESE COOPERATION. IN ANY EVENT THE JAPANESE SHOULD NOT BE IN HURRY TO RETURN AIRCRAFT BEFORE IT HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY EXAMINED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. ROBINSON

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
E.O. 652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, JA

SUBJECT: ANTICIPATED PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR POLICY STATEMENT

1. THE SECRETARY REQUESTS THAT, AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME YOU DELIVER TO FOREIGN MINISTER THE FOLLOWING LETTER DEALING WITH THE UPCOMING ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON NEW US POLICIES TOWARD NON-PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING US POLICIES TOWARD DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REPROCESSING. THESE INITIATIVES ARE BASED UPON THE RESULTS OF THE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT LAST JULY, WHICH RECENTLY PRESENTED TO HIM ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR NUCLEAR POLICY INITIATIVES. YOU SHOULD ALSO DELIVER AN ATTACHMENT TO THIS LETTER EXPLAINING IN MORE DETAIL THE

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY 64, NARA, DATE 7/24/01

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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PAGE 02

STATE 243171

RESULTS OF THE NUCLEAR POLICY REVIEW WHICH IS BEING SENT BY SEPTEL.

2. THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. BEFORE DOING SO, HOWEVER, HE REQUESTED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE, ON A MOST CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, INFORM IN ADVANCE HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE KEY NUCLEAR SUPPLIER STATES WITH WHOM WE HAVE HAD CONTINUING AND PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION FIELD AND FROM WHOM WE WOULD SEEK SUPPORT FOR OUR INITIATIVES. YOU SHOULD TREAT THIS INFORMATION AND THE

MATERIAL IN THE FOLLOWING LETTER IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE AND URGE THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO DO THE SAME. WE WILL NOTIFY YOU WHEN THE SPECIFIC TIMING OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT BECOMES CLEAR.

3. SIMILAR LETTERS WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS ALSO BEING DELIVERED TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF UK, FRG, JAPAN AND CANADA. EMBASSY MOSCOW WILL CONVEY SUBSTANCE OF LETTER ORALLY TO ATOMIC ENERGY CHAIRMAN MOROKHOV.

4. LETTER TO JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER FOLLOWS:

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

A. AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT FORD COMMISSIONED AN INTENSIVE REVIEW OF OUR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CIVIL NUCLEAR POLICIES. I WISH TO GIVE YOUR GOVERNMENT ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW WHICH WE HAD UNDERTAKEN OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND THESE USEFUL AS YOU PURSUE YOUR OWN INTERNAL STUDIES, AND THAT THE CONCLUSIONS OF OUR RESPECTIVE EXERCISES CAN FORM A STRONG BASIS FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS IN OUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

B. THESE RESULTS ARE DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED INFORMAL PAPER WHICH SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POLICY ASSESSMENT. IN ORDER TO ENSURE CONTINUED DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR OUR NUCLEAR EXPORT AND NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES, THE PRESIDENT WISHES SHORTLY TO COMMUNICATE

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PAGE 03

STATE 243171

THESE POLICY APPROACHES TO THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. WE THEREFORE WISH TO ADVISE AND CONSULT OUR MAJOR NUCLEAR PARTNERS IN ADVANCE AND TO ENCOURAGE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE MULTILATERAL CONSENSUS IN OUR NUCLEAR EXPORT DELIBERATIONS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.


C. BEYOND THE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY CONCERNS GUIDING OUR NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS, THREE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLIE OUR INTERNATIONAL POLICY CONCLUSIONS. THE FIRST IS THAT STRONG INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES AND NUCLEAR PARTNERS, IS INDISPENSABLE TO THE SUCCESS OF THESE EFFORTS. THE SECOND IS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BALANCE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROLS WITH POSITIVE INDUCEMENTS, PARTICULARLY ASSURED SUPPLY OF NON-SENSITIVE FUEL AND EQUIPMENT. THE THIRD CONSIDERATION IS THAT SUCH INDUCEMENTS SHOULD PLACE NO NUCLEAR SUPPLIER AT COMMERCIAL DISADVANTAGE.

D. WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, WE HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED BOTH TRADITIONAL AND MORE RECENT NON-PROLIFERATION APPROACHES, MANY OF WHICH ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THE LONDON SUPPLIERS' MEETINGS AND AT THE IAEA. ON THE ONE HAND, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO MEET FULLY THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE AND UNIFORM APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS AND FOR PROMPT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THEIR VIOLATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO ESTABLISHING VIABLE, LONG-TERM ALTERNATIVES TO THE SPREAD OF NATIONAL REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT PLANTS WHICH CAN LEAD DIRECTLY TO A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION.

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E. THE PRESIDENT THEREFORE INTENDS TO REITERATE STRONG US SUPPORT FOR THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM TO SPECIFY HOW THE UNITED STATES MIGHT AMPLIFY ITS SUPPORT, AND TO UNDERSCORE THE GRAVITY WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD VIEW ANY FURTHER PROLIFERATION OR THE VIOLATION OF ANY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED PAPER. WE WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME PARALLEL STATEMENTS ALONG SIMILAR LINES FROM IAEA MEMBERS AND BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD JOINTLY EXPLORE FURTHER WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS, RELIABILITY AND INVIOABILITY

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PAGE 04

STATE 243171

OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH ITS STATUTE.

F. THE PRESIDENT ALSO INTENDS TO RENEW THE US PROPOSAL TO ALL RELEVANT NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS THAT THERE BE NO MORE EXPORTS OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS, AND THAT WE EXPLORE TOGETHER LONG-TERM ARRANGEMENTS TO OFFER MORE ECONOMICAL ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING SERVICES INSTEAD OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO MEET NUCLEAR CONSUMERS' LEGITIMATE ENERGY NEEDS. IN ADDITION, MY GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS INTERNATIONAL RATHER THAN NATIONAL STORAGE OF SPENT REACTOR FUEL AND SEPARATED PLUTONIUM WHICH ARE IN EXCESS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR NEEDS, AND WOULD HOPE TO ACTIVELY PURSUE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS INTERNATIONAL REGIME WITH NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONSUMERS. IN ADDITION, IN SELECTED INSTANCES WE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER PURCHASE OR EXCHANGE OF FRESH FOR SPENT REACTOR FUEL WHEN THIS APPROACH ENTAILS NON-PROLIFERATION BENEFITS, PARTICULARLY IN DETERRING THE SPREAD OF NATIONAL ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING CAPABILITIES.

G. IN MAKING THESE PROPOSALS, I FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT COMMERCIAL CAPABILITIES VARY AMONG SUPPLIERS IN THE CRITICAL ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING SECTORS. IN THE UNITED STATES, WE SEEK TO EXPAND URANIUM ENRICHMENT CAPACITY THROUGH THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND A GOVERNMENT ADD-G. FACILITY. THE PRESIDENT ALSO INTENDS TO MOVE FORWARD IN SUPPORTING EXPERIMENTATION TO ASSESS THE FEASIBILITY AND SAFETY OF REPROCESSING BASED ON A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT, AS WELL AS TECHNOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES TO REPROCESSING. HE WILL EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE NO PRECONCEPTIONS AS TO THE NECESSITY, COMMERCIAL UTILITY, AND VIABILITY OF REPROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM RECYCLE, AND THAT WE WILL ASSIGN FIRST PRIORITY TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY FACTORS IN MAKING FUTURE JUDGMENTS. AS IN OUR CONCEPT FOR NEW ENRICHMENT FACILITIES, THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM WOULD ALLOW FOR APPROPRIATE PARTICIPATION BY OTHER NATIONS AND EXPLORATION OF FUEL SERVICE ARRANGEMENTS. THIS CONFORMS TO OUR PAST

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PAGE 05 STATE 243171

PROPOSALS THAT NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS OFFER SUCH SERVICES TO HELP DISCOURAGE THE FURTHER SPREAD OF REPROCESSING FACILITIES.

H. IN PURSUING SERVICES AND POSSIBLE NUCLEAR FUEL EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS INSTEAD OF TECHNOLOGY, HOWEVER, WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THESE NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS SHOULD NOT RESULT IN COMMERCIAL TENSION. WE ARE THEREFORE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WAYS OF COORDINATING AND PERHAPS POOLING OUR RESOURCES TO ENSURE CONSUMERS UNINTERRUPTED AND ECONOMICAL SUPPLY OF NON-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FUEL, SUPPLIERS UN-DIMINISHED COMMERCIAL RETURN FOR THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORT COMMITMENTS, AND ALL COUNTRIES SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED ASSURANCE AGAINST THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITIES.

I. IN THIS REGARD, WE MAY WISH TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF FUEL EXCHANGES, WHICH COULD NOT ONLY HELP COORDINATE NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND EXCHANGE BUT FACILITATE BROAD ADHERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL SPENT FUEL AND PLUTONIUM STORAGE REGIME WHICH WE ARE JOINTLY SEEKING TO ESTABLISH. SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD BE A LONGER-TERM OBJECTIVE, BUT THE CONCEPT MAY WARRANT JOINT STUDY.

J. FINALLY, IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PLUTONIUM CONTROL, WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE SUBSTANTIAL STEPS AND TO CONSULT ON FURTHER WAYS TO SUPPORT AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL STORAGE REGIME UNDER IAEA AUSPICES. IN PARTICULAR, THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE THAT, IN PRINCIPLE, THE US IS PREPARED TO PLACE ITS OWN EXCESS CIVIL SPENT FUEL AND SEPARATED PLUTONIUM IN IAEA DEPOSITORIES, PENDING US NEED, IF A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE REGIME CAN BE DEVELOPED AND ESTABLISHED. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO GIVE ACTIVE SUPPORT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH AN IAEA REGIME AND PLAN TO REFLECT THIS SUPPORT IN OUR NEW AND AMENDED AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION. OF COURSE, THE PRESIDENT VERY MUCH HOPES THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS OTHERS, WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS OF ITS OWN TO FOSTER THIS IMPORTANT APPROACH. WE SINCERELY BELIEVE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 06

STATE 243171

TH THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF AN IAEA STORAGE REGIME, AS CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE XII OF THE STATUTE, WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REINFORCE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT ASSURANCE THAT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR POWER CAN DEVELOP IN A SAFE AND PRUDENT MANNER.
K. IN PURSUING THESE NEW APPROACHES, I AM OF COURSE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF OUR OWN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE CIVIL NUCLEAR FIELD. I GREATLY WELCOME JAPAN'S COMPLETION

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OF ITS NPT RATIFICATION PROCESS AND THE SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN US IN THE MULTILATERAL SUPPLIERS' CONSULTATIONS. I RECOGNIZE THAT YOU HAVE SPECIAL INTERESTS IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE PLANNING, AND I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED PROMPTLY WITH OUR PLANNED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON MUTUAL SOLUTIONS IN THIS FIELD.

L. I AM ASKING OUR AMBASSADOR TO BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE ANY REACTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE TO THE PROPOSALS IN THIS LETTER AND IN THE ATTACHED PAPER. I ALSO PLAN TO DIRECT OUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE IAEA AND THE LONDON MEETINGS OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO PURSUE THESE AND OTHER PROMISING APPROACHES WHICH CAN MEET THE CRITICAL NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AHEAD OF US.

M. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AND I REMAIN ALWAYS READY TO RESPOND PERSONALLY TO ANY SPECIAL POINTS WHICH YOU WISH TO BRING TO MY ATTENTION.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

HIS EXCELLENCY
ZENTARO KOSAKA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TOKYO

KISSINGER

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TAGS: PFOR, PARM, JA

SUBJECT: ANTICIPATED PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR POLICY STATEMENT

REF: STATE 243171

1. REF VEST TELCON OF OCTOBER 1, YOU SHOULD NOW IMPLEMENT ORIGINAL REFERENCED INSTRUCTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, STRESSING OUR CONCERN THAT THIS MATTER BE TREATED WITH ABSOLUTE CONFIDENTIALITY AND LIMITED TO MINIMUM NECESSARY OFFICIALS.

END TEXT. KISSINGER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 66, NARA, DATE 2/31/01

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