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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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NOD214

PAGE 01 STATE 255671

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/SE:WLEAGLETON:EUR:WSTABLER:MJB  
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EUR - MR. HARTMAN  
S/S: REW000S

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

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NODIS  
70SEC 132

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, TU  
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMBASSADOR MACOMBER RE CYPRUS

1. SUBMITTED BELOW FOR YOUR APPROVAL AND ONWARD TRANSMISSION ARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMBASSADOR MACOMBER TO APPROACH NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT RE CYPRUS.

2. REGIN MESSAGE: ACTION: ANKARA. INFO: ATHENS, NICOSIA. SUBJECT: APPROACH TO NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT RE CYPRUS. REF: (A) ANKARA 8772 (B) ANKARA 8886

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. AS SOON AS YOU BELIEVE IT FEASIBLE YOU SHOULD SEE PRIME MINISTER IRMAK AND FOREIGN MINISTER ESENDEL TOGETHER OR SEPARATELY TO REVIEW BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS ON CYPRUS WHICH WERE INTERRUPTED BY ECEVIT'S RESIGNATION. YOU SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE UP WHERE ECEVIT LEFT OFF WITH RESPECT TO THE UNILATERAL GESTURES WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING.



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2. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT IN OUR VIEW, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT PROGRESS BE MADE ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS ISSUE NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING THE TENSIONS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AREA, BUT ALSO

BECAUSE DOMESTIC PRESSURES IN THIS COUNTRY FOR VISIBLE SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BUILD UP AGAIN SHORTLY IN RELATION TO THE FOREIGN AID BILL AND THE SUBJECT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY. YOU SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT IRMAK UNDERSTANDS THAT ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION WILL DO ITS BEST TO OPPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD WILL BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED IF TRUE PROGRESS TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING TURKISH GESTURES, CAN BE ACHIEVED.

3. IF QUESTION OF AGREED PRINCIPLES ARISES, YOU SHOULD OBTAIN CURRENT TURKISH VIEWS. YOU MIGHT NOTE THAT NOVEMBER 1 UNGA RESOLUTION PROVIDES SOME GENERAL GUIDANCE; AND ON QUESTION OF GEOGRAPHIC FEDERATION, CLERIDES' REALISTIC SPEECH OF NOVEMBER 6 SHOULD SATISFY TURKISH REQUIREMENTS.

4. IF THE TURKS RAISE THE QUESTION OF MAKARIOS, YOU MAY TELL THEM WE UNDERSTAND HE INTENDS TO RETURN TO THE ISLAND BUT TIMING IS UNCERTAIN. YOU MAY ADD THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO SPECULATE ON WHAT HIS ROLE THERE WILL BE, AND IN THE MEANTIME, WE SHOULD PROCEED ON ASSUMPTION CLERIDES WILL CONTINUE TO REPRESENT GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH DENKTASH. THEREFORE, WE STILL BELIEVE NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL ISSUES CAN BE CONDUCTED IN DENKTASH-CLERIDES FORUM.

5. YOU MIGHT ASK ESENDEL WHETHER HE INTENDS TO BE IN WASHINGTON WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS TO MAKE HIS OFFICIAL DEPARTURE (TURKISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON THINKS THIS IS LIKELY). IF SO, I WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING HIM TO DISCUSS CYPRUS AND OTHER MATTERS. ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR MY DIRECT PERSONAL CONTACT WITH GREEK AND TURKISH FORMERS WOULD BE IN BILATERALS DURING NATO MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS DECEMBER 11-13.

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6. AFTER ABOVE WAS DRAFTED WE RECEIVED ANKARA 9055 IN WHICH YOU REPORT ESENREL'S SUGGESTION THAT I SHOULD VISIT ANKARA BEFORE END OF MONTH. YOU MAY TELL ESENREL I WOULD LIKE TO RESCHEDULE VISIT TO ANKARA AT EARLIEST FEASIBLE DATE. HOWEVER, BEFORE ANY PLANS CAN BE MADE IN CONNECTION EITHER WITH MY RETURN FROM CHINA OR JUST BEFORE NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HAVE CLEAR ASSURANCE OF POSITIVE OUTCOME OF VISIT, INCLUDING MEANINGFUL TURKISH GESTURES. INGERSOLL

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NOD223

PAGE 01 STATE 255704

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
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INFO AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE  
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CONTROL: 5670Q  
RECD: NOV 20.1974  
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NOD13  
TOSEC 139

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EFIN, PFOR, IDB, US, EC, FR

SUBJECT: ECUADOR AND THE IDB

TO THE SECRETARY FROM ROGERS AND KATZ  
IDA-TYPE TERMS IS COMING UP FOR A FORMAL BOARD VOTE  
ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21. ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20,  
UNLESS WE SUCCEED IN HAVING THE LOAN WITHDRAWN, IT  
WILL BE DISCUSSED INFORMALLY IN A MEETING OF IDB'S  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS. THE U.S. DIRECTOR WILL BE  
EXPECTED TO STATE THE U.S. POSITION AT THAT TIME.

2. TREASURY WISHES TO INITIATE A NEW POLICY WITH A  
NEGATIVE U.S. VOTE ON THE ECUADOR LOAN THIS  
WEEK, ON THE GROUNDS THAT ECUADOR'S BALANCE OF

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PAYMENTS POSITION DOES NOT JUSTIFY ACCESS TO THE IDB

SINCE IT CAN FINANCE ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT, EB IS PREPARED TO OPPOSE THE LOAN ON CONCESSIONAL TERMS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT ECUADOR HAS ALREADY RECEIVED DOLLARS 11 MILLION IN IDB-FSO LOANS AND THAT IT IS INDEFENSIBLE TO PROVIDE IT FURTHER CONCESSIONAL FINANCING, BUT WOULD LIKE THE U.S. DIRECTOR TO STATE THAT WE WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE PROJECT IF IT WERE PRESENTED AS AN ORDINARY CAPITAL LOAN. THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE POSITION WE TOOK IN VOTING AGAINST TWO ADB SOFT LOANS TO INDONESIA LAST MONTH, THE DIFFERENCE BEING THAT IN THE ADB CASE THE LOANS WERE PASSED DESPITE OUR VOTE, WHILE IN THE IDB OUR OPPOSITION MEANS A VETO. ARA RECOMMENDS THAT THE U.S. RELUCTANTLY VOTE AFFIRMATIVELY, EVEN AT SOFT TERMS, ON A LAST-TIME BASIS, GIVEN THE ADVANCED STAGE OF PROJECT CONSIDERATION, WHILE EXPLAINING OUR RESERVATIONS AND URGING THAT THE IDB COMPLETE ITS WORK ON COUNTRY ELIGIBILITY, IN LIGHT OF CHANGES IN WORLD AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. THE REASONS FOR THE ARA POSITION FOLLOW:

A. REGARDLESS OF HOW THE U.S. DIRECTOR EXPLAINS HIS "NO" VOTE, ECUADOR WILL CONSIDER THE U.S. ACTION AS RETALIATION FOR GOE ADHERENCE TO OPEC AND MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO REACT BY HARDENING ITS STAND ON VARIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES, E.G. TEXACO-GULF INVESTMENT PROBLEMS, ADA COMPENSATION CASE, AND EVEN CURRENT CIVIL AVIATION BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. IT COULD ALSO CAUSE A STRONG ADVERSE REACTION AT THE MFM WORKING GROUP MEETING ON HNC'S THIS WEEK AT THE DEPARTMENT.

B. ECUADOR'S REACTIONS WILL BE FURTHER INFLUENCED BY THEIR BELIEF THAT THE U.S. SHOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A POOR COUNTRY WITH MODEST OIL EXPORTS AND THE MAJOR OPEC COUNTRIES.

C. ALTHOUGH THE ECUADORIAN CASE FOR ACCESS TO FSO LOANS IS NOT PERSUASIVE, A U.S. ACTION WHICH

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WOULD ALSO OPPOSE AN OC LOAN IS DIFFICULT TO DEFEND. NEITHER BANK NOR U.S. POLICY HAS CALLED FOR A CESSATION OF LOANS TO ANY IDB MEMBERS. TO DATE, U.S. STATEMENTS HAVE REFERRED ONLY TO REDUCING AND ELIMINATING ACCESS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES TO FSO FUNDS (BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, MEXICO AND VENEZUELA), NOT TO OC LOANS. FOR THE U.S. TO VOTE "NO" ON THE LOAN AT THIS STAGE, WITH THE LOAN SO FAR ALONG, WHETHER FSO OR OC, IS TO APPEAR ARBITRARY, ABRUPT AND APPLYING SANCTIONS FOR ACTIONS UNRELATED TO THE LOAN.

D. IDB STUDIES ARE UNDERWAY TO RECONSIDER WHAT COUNTRIES SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR SOFT LOANS. HOWEVER, ECUADOR IS STILL IN THE SOFT LOAN CATEGORY. ACTION BY THE U.S. TO CHANGE THIS UNILATERALLY WOULD BE REGARDED AS A DEPARTURE FROM WHAT YOU HAVE DECLARED TO BE OUR STANCE IN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS.

4. IN VIEW OF THE VERY SHORT TIME FUSE, WE PROPOSE YOU SEND SECRETARY SIMON THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, CHOOSING THOSE BRACKETED PHRASES WHICH EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS:

"I HOPE YOU ARE SUCCESSFUL IN POSTPONING IDB BOARD ACTION ON FSO BAN TO ECUADOR PENDING DEFINITION BY OUR STAFFS OF A NEW U.S. POLICY ON IFI LENDING TO OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES. (EB RECOMMENDATION: HOWEVER, SHOULD THE LOAN COME TO A VOTE, I URGE YOU TO FOLLOW THE SAME LINE WE TOOK ON THE RECENT ADD INDONESIA LOANS, I.E., THE U.S. OPPOSES THE LOAN IF FSO, BUT WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT IF PRESENTED AS AN ORDINARY CAPITAL LOAN.) (ARA RECOMMENDATION: HOWEVER, SHOULD THE LOAN COME TO A VOTE, I URGE YOU NOT TO OPPOSE THE LOAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT AN ABRUPT REVERSAL, WITHOUT WARNING, OF OUR PREVIOUS POSITION IN THE IDB WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY ECUADOR AS A SANCTION RELATED TO OUTSTANDING BILATERAL ISSUES (E.G., INVESTMENT DISPUTES) AND COULD PROVOKE COUNTER-REACTIONS INTIMICAL TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS, BILATERAL AND REGIONAL.)" INGERSOLL

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S/S :REWOODS

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 255670

NODIS  
TOSEC 131

E.O. 11652: GDS  
SUBJECT: ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL

FOR EAGLEBURGER FROM SISCO

I TOOK ACTION RECOMMENDED IN SECTO 26. THERE WAS NOTHING  
IN TRAIN. INGERGOLL

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S/S:REWOODS

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O 200102Z NOV 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 255665

NODIS  
TOSEC 127

E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CY, GR  
SUBJECT: PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO CARAMANLIS

REF: ATHENS 8285 (TOSEC 67) ; LONDON 15077 (TOSEC 62)

I. SUGGESTED DRAFT MESSAGE TO CARAMANLIS, SUBMITTED BELOW FOR YOUR APPROVAL, WAS PREPARED IN GREATER PART IN LONDON BY WELLS STARLER ON THE BASIS INSTRUCTIONS HE RECEIVED FROM YOU NOVEMBER 16. WE HAVE MODIFIED STARLER'S DRAFT IN THE PART DISCUSSING MULTI-CANTONAL AND BI-ZONAL APPROACHES TO A CYPRUS SOLUTION. WE HAVE ALSO ELIMINATED HIS PARAGRAPH REGARDING A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATION DEALING WITH ALL ISSUES AFFECTING GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS SINCE WE FEEL THIS WAS NOT BEST TIME TO BRING THIS LARGER AND MORE COMPLICATED ISSUE FORWARD. RE ZONAL APPROACHES, OUR SUGGESTED FORMULATION TAKES INTO ACCOUNT AMBASSADOR KUBISCH'S CONVERSATION WITH BITSIOS (REFTEL) AND ATTEMPTS TO AVOID GIVING CARAMANLIS IMPRESSION YOU HAVE COMPLETELY ADOPTED THE TURKISH POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT THOUGH A BI-ZONAL SOLUTION APPEARS TO BE BY FAR THE MOST PRACTICAL ONE, WE SHOULD PERHAPS LEAVE OPEN POSSIBILITY



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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TO 9/23/02  
BY He, NARA, DATE 4/27/03

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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THAT THERE COULD BE A LARGE TURKISH ZONE IN NORTH AND TWO OR THREE MUCH SMALLER ZONES OR POCKETS IN SOUTH.

2. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: YOUR MAGNIFICENT AND INDEED OVERWHELMING POPULAR CONFIRMATION AS THE LEADER OF REBORN GREECE WILL NOW PERMIT YOU TO TURN YOUR FULL ATTENTION TO THE MANY PRESSING PROBLEMS WHICH FACE YOUR COUNTRY AS WELL AS TO THOSE WHICH IN A MORE GENERAL WAY AFFECT EACH AND EVERY WESTERN COUNTRY. I AM CERTAIN THAT AS YOU FACE THESE PROBLEMS YOU WILL AGREE THAT YOUR BURDEN WILL BE GREATLY LIGHTENED IF THE CYPRUS QUESTION CAN BE REMOVED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE FROM THE HEAVY AGENDA WITH WHICH YOU MUST DEAL AND THAT THE DECISIONS ON THE OTHER ISSUES WILL BE MADE EASIER WITHOUT THE EMOTION WHICH THE CYPRUS QUESTION INEVITABLY GENERATES.

3. IT IS MY FIRM CONVICTION THAT NO TIME SHOULD BE LOST IN AGAIN TAKING STEPS TO MOVE THE CYPRUS QUESTION TOWARD A SPEEDY SETTLEMENT. I AM CONCERNED THAT A CONTINUED STALEMATE WILL HARDEN POSITIONS AND MAKE PROGRESS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. IN THE IMMEDIATE PERIOD AHEAD I THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT EVERY SUPPORT BE GIVEN TO THE CLERIDES-DENKTASH TALKS AND THAT WAYS BE FOUND TO EXPAND THOSE DISCUSSIONS TO INCLUDE POLITICAL ISSUES. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WHEN YOU SEE ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS EARLY NEXT WEEK YOU WILL IMPRESS UPON HIM THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE CLERIDES-DENKTASH TALKS IN A WAY WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. I AM SURE THAT YOUR WISE COUNSEL WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR IN THE ARCHBISHOP'S THINKING.

4. AS YOU KNOW, I AM FULLY PREPARED TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT. I AM ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH THE NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO SOUND OUT THEIR POSITION AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO RESUME THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH I HAD HAD WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT AND WHICH HAD REACHED AN ADVANCED STAGE AT THE TIME OF HIS LEAVING OFFICE. IN THIS PERIOD AHEAD IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR ALL CONCERNED TO EXERCISE THE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT ON THEIR PUBLIC POSTURES SINCE, AS I KNOW YOU AGREE, WE MUST ALL PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT GOOD FAITH EFFORTS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT ARE UNDERWAY.

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5. AS WE CONTEMPLATE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT REALISTIC OBJECTIVES BE ESTABLISHED. DURING MY DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS IN ROME, HE EXPLAINED THE GREEK PREFERENCE FOR A FEDERAL SYSTEM BASED ON A NUMBER OF TURKISH CANTONS. I TOLD HIM I WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS APPROACH WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT BUT THAT IN MY JUDGMENT THE TIME WHEN A MULTI-CANTONAL APPROACH WOULD FIND ACCEPTANCE HAD PROBABLY PASSED. I SAID ESSENTIALLY THE SAME THING TO ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS WHEN I

SAW HIM NOVEMBER 13. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I REMAIN READY TO EXPLORE THE MULTI-CANTONAL POSSIBILITY WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, THOUGH I FRANKLY RETAIN MY DOUBTS REGARDING THE PRACTICALITY OF SUCH AN OBJECTIVE.

6. I WOULD CONCLUDE BY MAKING THE SUGGESTION THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL AT THE TIME OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC MINISTERIAL COUNCIL NEXT MONTH IN BRUSSELS FOR ME TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE THESE QUESTIONS FURTHER WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF GREECE AS WELL AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF TURKEY. CONSIDERATION MIGHT ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE THREE OF US.

7. I SHALL LOOK FORWARD, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO RECEIVING YOUR OWN VIEWS ON THE VARIOUS POINTS I HAVE RAISED.

8. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END TEXT. INGERSOLL

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NOD311

## TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 256058

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 R

DRAFTED BY P:EPDJEREJIAN:BOF  
APPROVED BY P:JJSISCO  
S/S - JMEALUM

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

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NODIS  
CHEROKEE TOSCO 172

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, SY, IS  
SUBJECT: UNDOF RENEWAL

FOR SECRETARY FROM BISCO

REF: SECTO 45

1. DINITZ CAME IN THIS MORNING AT 9:30 AND I PASSED ON YOUR MESSAGE PER REFTEL AND PER FOGLEBURGER TELECON CONCERNING ASAD'S PROPOSAL ON THE RENEWAL OF UNDOF. I HANDED DINITZ TEXT (UNCHANGED) OF PROPOSAL WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY IMMEDIATELY TO JERUSALEM. HE SAID HE WILL PASS ON GOI'S REACTION TO ME AS SOON AS HE RECEIVES IT, AND ESTIMATED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE SUCH REACTION WITHIN NEXT FEW HOURS. DINITZ COMMENTED THAT "ON THE FACE OF IT, THE PROPOSAL LOOKS PROMISING." I STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF NO LEAKS.
2. DINITZ INFORMED ME SHORTLY AFTER OUR MEETING HE HAD CONVEYED PROPOSAL TO ALLON AND THAT HE SHOULD HAVE REACTION SOON.

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *TD 9/23/02*

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES ~~SECRET~~

BY HR, NARA, DATE 1/27/03







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3. I ALSO TOLD DINITZ THAT WE WILL BE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH UNSYG WALDHEIM TO TELL HIM THAT WE WANT HIM TO DELAY ISSUANCE OF ANY REPORT ON UNDOF, SINCE WE ARE TALKING TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED. I ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT I WAS NOT AT THIS POINT CONFIDING WITH WALDHEIM THAT WE HAD A SYRIAN PROPOSAL.

4. I TALKED TO WALDHEIM PER YOUR INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL AND TOLD HIM WE WERE ACTIVELY DISCUSSING UNDOF ISSUE WITH SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS AND THAT IF HE ISSUED HIS REPORT NOW, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNHELPFUL. WALDHEIM AGREED FULLY, SAYING HE UNDERSTOOD ABSOLUTELY THAT NOTHING WOULD BE ISSUED BEFORE WE HAVE COORDINATED FULLY. WALDHEIM REFERRED TO HIS PRESS STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 19 URGING RESTRAINT ON THE PARTIES AND IN EFFECT ENCOURAGING THE EXTENSION OF THE UNDOF MANDATE. I TOLD HIM HIS STATEMENT WAS HELPFUL AND I AGREED WITH WALDHEIM'S OBSERVATION THAT IT MADE IT LESS DIFFICULT FOR ASAD TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE UN. CONCERNING PLANS FOR WALDHEIM TO VISIT M.C., HE SAID IF HE GETS A POSITIVE REACTION FROM THE SYRIANS ON HIS APPEAL, A TRIP WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. IF HE HAD NO POSITIVE INDICATION FROM SYRIANS, HIS PLAN WOULD BE TO LEAVE SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 23, FOR SYRIA AND USE FOUR SUBSEQUENT DAYS TO CONVINCING SYRIANS TO EXTEND UNDOF. HE CONCLUDED BY ASSURING ME ONCE AGAIN HE WOULD ISSUE NO REPORT WITHOUT COORDINATING WITH US. INGERSOLL.

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NOD315

THREAT

PAGE 01 STATE 258803

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TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

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NODIS  
TOSEC 173

E.O. 11652:003

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: ALLON VISIT

FOR EAGLEBURGER FROM BREMER

1. AS YOU KNOW, SISCO AND DINITZ HAVE AGREED TO THE ALLON VISIT DECEMBER 9. WITH DINNER DECEMBER 8.

2. NEXT QUESTION IS ACTUAL SCHEDULING OF TALKS DECEMBER 9. DOES THE SECRETARY WANT TO HOST A LUNCH FOR ALLON DECEMBER 9? WOULD HE PREFER A MEETING BEFORE AND/OR AFTER LUNCH? SO FAR ONLY THINGS SCHEDULED ARE THE USUAL 7:45 AM BREAKFAST, 8:00 AM STAFF MEETING AND 9:00 AM MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. INGERSOLL

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*Lee W*  
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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 R

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NODIS  
TOSOC 139

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EFIN, PFOR, IDB, US, EC, FR

SUBJECT: ECUADOR AND THE IDB

TO THE SECRETARY FROM ROGERS AND KATZ  
OECD PARIS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS

1. A 4 MILLION DOLLAR IDB-IBO LOAN TO ECUADOR ON  
IDA-TYPE TERMS IS COMING UP FOR A FORMAL BOARD VOTE  
ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21. ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20,  
UNLESS WE SUCCEED IN HAVING THE LOAN WITHDRAWN, IT  
WILL BE DISCUSSED INFORMALLY IN A MEETING OF IDB'S  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS. THE U.S. DIRECTOR WILL BE  
EXPECTED TO STATE THE U.S. POSITION AT THAT TIME.

2. TREASURY WISHES TO INITIATE A NEW POLICY WITH A  
NEGATIVE U.S. VOTE ON THE ECUADOR LOAN THIS  
WEEK, ON THE GROUNDS THAT ECUADOR'S BALANCE OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR

46 8/30/01



NODS-00





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PAYMENTS POSITION DOES NOT JUSTIFY ACCESS TO THE IDB

SINCE IT CAN FINANCE ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT, EA IS PREPARED TO OPPOSE THE LOAN ON CONCESSIONAL TERMS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT ECUADOR HAS ALREADY RECEIVED DOLLARS 11 MILLION IN IDB-FSO LOANS AND THAT IT IS INDEFENSIBLE TO PROVIDE IT FURTHER CONCESSIONAL FINANCING, BUT WOULD LIKE THE U.S. DIRECTOR TO STATE THAT WE WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE PROJECT IF IT WERE PRESENTED AS AN ORDINARY CAPITAL LOAN. THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE POSITION WE TOOK IN VOTING AGAINST TWO ADB SOFT LOANS TO INDONESIA LAST MONTH, THE DIFFERENCE BEING THAT IN THE ADB CASE THE LOANS WERE PASSED DESPITE OUR VOTE, WHILE IN THE IDB OUR OPPOSITION MEANS A VETO. ARA RECOMMENDS THAT THE U.S. RELUCTANTLY VOTE AFFIRMATIVELY, EVEN AT SOFT TERMS, ON A LAST-TIME BASIS, GIVEN THE ADVANCED STAGE OF PROJECT CONSIDERATION, WHILE EXPLAINING OUR RESERVATIONS AND URGING THAT THE IDB COMPLETE ITS WORK ON COUNTRY FLIGIBILITY, IN LIGHT OF CHANGES IN WORLD AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. THE REASONS FOR THE ARA POSITION FOLLOW:

A. REGARDLESS OF HOW THE U.S. DIRECTOR EXPLAINS HIS "NO" VOTE, ECUADOR WILL CONSIDER THE U.S. ACTION AS RETALIATION FOR GOE ADHERENCE TO OPEC AND MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO REACT BY HARDENING ITS STAND ON VARIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES, E.G. TEXACO-GULF INVESTMENT PROBLEMS, ADA COMPENSATION CASE, AND EVEN CURRENT CIVIL AVIATION BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. IT COULD ALSO CAUSE A STRONG ADVERSE REACTION AT THE MFM WORKING GROUP MEETING ON MNC'S THIS WEEK AT THE DEPARTMENT.

B. ECUADOR'S REACTIONS WILL BE FURTHER INFLUENCED BY THEIR BELIEF THAT THE U.S. SHOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A POOR COUNTRY WITH MODEST OIL EXPORTS AND THE MAJOR OPEC COUNTRIES.

C. ALTHOUGH THE ECUADORIAN CASE FOR ACCESS TO FSO LOANS IS NOT PERSUASIVE, A U.S. ACTION WHICH



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WOULD ALSO OPPOSE AN OC LOAN IS DIFFICULT TO DEFEND. NEITHER BANK NOR U.S. POLICY HAS CALLED FOR A CESSATION OF LOANS TO ANY IDB MEMBERS. TO DATE, U.S. STATEMENTS HAVE REFERRED ONLY TO REDUCING AND ELIMINATING ACCESS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES TO FSO FUNDS (BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, MEXICO AND VENEZUELA), NOT TO OC LOANS. FOR THE U.S. TO VOTE "NO" ON THE LOAN AT THIS STAGE, WITH THE LOAN SO FAR ALONG, WHETHER FSO OR OC, IS TO APPEAR ARBITRARY, ABRUPT AND APPLYING SANCTIONS FOR ACTIONS UNRELATED TO THE LOAN.

D. IDB STUDIES ARE UNDERWAY TO RECONSIDER WHAT COUNTRIES SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR SOFT LOANS. HOWEVER, ECUADOR IS STILL IN THE SOFT LOAN CATEGORY. ACTION BY THE U.S. TO CHANGE THIS UNILATERALLY WOULD BE REGARDED AS A DEPARTURE FROM WHAT YOU HAVE DECLARED TO BE OUR STANCE IN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS.

4. IN VIEW OF THE VERY SHORT TIME FUSE, WE PROPOSE YOU SEND SECRETARY SIMON THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, CHOOSING THOSE BRACKETED PHRASES WHICH EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS:

"I HOPE YOU ARE SUCCESSFUL IN POSTPONING IDB BOARD ACTION ON FSO BAN TO ECUADOR PENDING DEFINITION BY OUR STAFFS OF A NEW U.S. POLICY ON IFT LENDING TO OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES. (EB RECOMMENDATION: HOWEVER, SHOULD THE LOAN COME TO A VOTE, I URGE YOU TO FOLLOW THE SAME LINE WE TOOK ON THE RECENT ADB INDONESIA LOANS, I.E., THE U.S. OPPOSES THE LOAN IF FSO, BUT WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT IF PRESENTED AS AN ORDINARY CAPITAL LOAN.) (ARA RECOMMENDATION: HOWEVER, SHOULD THE LOAN COME TO A VOTE, I URGE YOU NOT TO OPPOSE THE LOAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT AN ABRUPT REVERSAL, WITHOUT WARNING, OF OUR PREVIOUS POSITION IN THE IDB WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY ECUADOR AS A SANCTION RELATED TO OUTSTANDING BILATERAL ISSUES (E.G., INVESTMENT DISPUTES) AND COULD PROVOKE COUNTER-REACTIONS INTIMICAL TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS, BILATERAL AND REGIONAL.)" INGERSOLL

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E.O.: 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: OVIP, IS  
SUBJ: ALLON VISIT

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 667 NARA, DATE 2/20/01

REF: SECTO 57

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. DURING MEETING WITH DINITZ NOVEMBER 20, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO PASS ON YOUR MESSAGE PER SECTO 57 THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH HAVING ALLON IN WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 9, AND THAT WERE SIMCHA TO GIVE A DINNER FOR ALLON ON EVENING OF DECEMBER 9, YOU WOULD ATTEND. DINITZ TELEPHONED TO SAY HE HAD PASSED THIS ON TO ALLON WHO SAID DATES ARE FINE FOR DINNER AND MEETING. DINITZ SAID WE SHOULD AGREE TO A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE VISIT WHICH COULD BE ISSUED IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM ON WEDNESDAY. HE SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

2. QUOTE: THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS INVITED THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL, YISRAEL ALLON, TO WASHINGTON TO HOLD TALKS ON DECEMBER 9 ON







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MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH COUNTRIES AND TO FURTHER  
EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. END  
QUOTE.

3. I TOLD DINITZ I WOULD PASS THIS ON TO YOU AND IF YOU

APPROVED, WE COULD WORK OUT A PARALLEL ANNOUNCEMENT IN  
JERUSALEM AND EITHER WASHINGTON OR TOKYO ON WEDNESDAY AS  
HE SUGGESTED. DINITZ FELT THAT THE EARLIER AN ANNOUNCEMENT  
IS MADE THE BETTER.

4. I AGREE AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT IS DESIRABLE. IT WILL  
HELP COOL MATTERS IN THE AREA. IF YOU AGREE, BELIEVE YOU  
WILL WANT TO SEND LETTERS TO SADAT, ASAD, HUSSEIN,  
BOUMEDIENE AND FAISAL GIVING THEM PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF  
ANNOUNCEMENT. THIS WILL TAKE TIME AND YOU MAY WANT  
THEREFORE TO CONSIDER THURSDAY AS A MORE PRACTICAL DATE  
FOR ANNOUNCEMENT. INGERSOLL.

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TOSEC 184

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFDR, PHIL, SY, IS  
SUBJECT: UNDOF RENEWAL

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. PURSUANT TO YOUR REQUEST, FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED DRAFT INSTRUCTION TO SCALI FOR YOUR APPROVAL ON HOW TO HANDLE UNDOF RENEWAL. IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE SENT TO SCALI UNTIL WE HAVE RECEIVED ISRAELI APPROVAL. ALSO, AS I INDICATED TO EAGLEBURGER, BELIEVE YOU WILL WISH TO WRITE TO YOUR PEN PALS BEFOREHAND TO LET THEM KNOW WHERE MATTERS STAND AND HOW WE INTEND TO PROCEED. WE HAVE NOT INFORMED SCALI OF THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL.
2. BEGIN QUOTE: FOR AMBASSADOR SCALI

SEPTEL INCLUDES TEXT OF RESOLUTION WHICH SYRIANS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT. WE URGED ISRAELIS TO AGREE TO IT, AND THEY HAVE DONE SO. YOU SHOULD NOW PUT IN TRAIN NECESSARY CONSULTATION TO ENSURE ITS ADOPTION IN MOST NON-CONTENTIOUS POSSIBLE WAY. FORTUNATELY, AS COUNCIL PRESIDENT, YOU ARE IN IDEAL POSITION TO CONTROL OUTCOME.

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3. SUGGEST YOU START BY SEEING WALDHEIM AND ADVISE HIM OF RESULTS OUR EFFORTS TO BRING SYRIANS AROUND ON UNDOF EXTENSION. WE OF COURSE WOULD THEN WITHDRAW OUR OBJECTION TO HIS RELEASING HIS REPORT AND ASSUME HE WOULD ISSUE IT IMMEDIATELY. GIVEN THE KEY ROLE WE HAVE PLAYED IN THIS EXERCISE, YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, REQUEST OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW ANY COMMENTS HE MAKES IN THE REPORT GOING BEYOND A STRICTLY FACTUAL DESCRIPTION ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.

4. ASAD SUGGESTS ONE OF COUNCIL MEMBERS SUCH AS INDONESIA, AUSTRIA OR PERU MIGHT SPONSOR RESOLUTION. WE DEDUCE FROM THIS THAT HE PREFERS TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE ORIGINAL US SOVIET FRAMEWORK WHEREBY WE JOINTLY SPONSORED RESOLUTION 350 ESTABLISHING UNDOF. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THIS PROVIDED MEMBER CONCERNED IS COMPLETELY RELIABLE AND WILL NOT ACCEPT CHANGES IN TEXT. ON BALANCE, WE BELIEVE AUSTRIA BEST CHOICE.

5. OF COURSE, A GREAT DEAL DEPENDS UPON THE INTEGRITY AND SKILL OF THE INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATIVE CONCERNED AND IF YOU HAVE ANY OTHER VIEWS, WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR IMMEDIATE REACTION.

6. RE TIMING OF SC MEETING, BELIEVE IT BEST HELD EARLY NEXT WEEK, FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF PALESTINE DEBATE. INGERSOLL

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, SY, IS

SUBJECT: RENEWAL OF UNDOF

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. ISRAELIS HAVE NOW PROVIDED COMMENTS ON SYRIAN RESOLUTION EXTENDING UNDOF. IN CONVEYING CHANGES, ALLON WISHED TRANSMIT EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION TO YOU FOR YOUR EFFORTS AND THE SUCCESS WHICH THEY HAVE PRODUCED.

2. ISRAELIS' MAIN CHANGE IS REQUEST TO DELETE SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH WHICH READS "EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE PREVAILING STATE OF TENSION WHICH THREATENS WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY." AT MINIMUM THEY WISH REFERENCE TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY TO BE DELETED, FEARING THIS MAY BE SETTING STAGE FOR EVENTUAL DETERMINATION THAT SITUATION IN AREA FALLS UNDER CHAPTER 7, WHERE MANDATORY MEASURES CAN BE TAKEN. THEY WOULD BE PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO SAY "EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE PREVAILING STATE OF TENSION IN THE AREA."

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3. I BELIEVE THEIR CONCERN IS EXAGGERATED. BECAUSE THIS IS GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF ARFA SITUATION, IT DOES NOT

RPT NOT MAKE A CHAPTER 7 FINDING OF THE KIND THE ISRAELIS ARE WORRIED ABOUT. IT WOULD BE BETTER, OF COURSE, IF WE DID NOT HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE SYRIANS AT ALL. NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE WE CAN REASONABLY GO BACK TO THE SYRIANS CONVEYING YOUR DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE WISE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH DEMONSTRATED BY ASAD AND SAY TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION GENERALLY LOOKS ALL RIGHT TO US ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE PHRASEOLOGY IN PREAMBULAR 2 ON THREATENING WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY OPEN TO MIS-INTERPRETATION SINCE IT DOES INVOLVE TERMS USED IN CHAPTER 7 OF CHARTER. ACCORDINGLY, IF SYRIANS COULD AGREE TO SLIGHT MODIFICATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH, REPLACING "WHICH THREATENS WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY" BY PHRASE "IN THE AREA", WE WILL BE HAPPY TO WORK TOWARD ADOPTION OF THEIR TEXT IN THE COUNCIL IN THE MOST NON-CONTENTIOUS POSSIBLE WAY.

4. ISRAELIS ALSO REQUESTED DELETION OF WORD "ONLY" IN THIRD PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AND RENEWAL OF "MANDATE" OF UNDOF RATHER THAN "PERIOD" OF UNDOF. I CONSIDER BOTH OF THESE CHANGES OF AN INCONSEQUENTIAL CHARACTER AND DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD REQUEST SYRIANS TO MAKE THEM.

5. IF YOU CONCUR IN GOING BACK TO SYRIANS AS SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION TO BE CONVEYED TO ASAD:

"SECRETARY RECEIVED WITH PLEASURE THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ASAD REGARDING THE RENEWAL OF UNDOF."

"THE SECRETARY IS PARTICULARLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH PRESIDENT ASAD HAS TO TAKE THIS DECISION, HE HAS CHOSEN THE COURSE OF STATESMANSHIP FOR THE SAKE OF GIVING EVERY POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO GO FORWARD."



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"THE SECRETARY HAS REVIEWED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY SYRIA. HE FINDS IT A COMMENDABLE DRAFT AND IS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH ALL OF THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS WHICH ARE OF COURSE THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF THE RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY NOTES THAT PREAMBULAR PARA 2, IN DESCRIBING THE PREVAILING STATE OF TENSION, SPEAKS OF THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY. THIS TERMINOLOGY IS SO CLOSE TO CHAPTER 7 LANGUAGE IN THE UN CHARTER THAT IT IS OPEN TO MISINTERPRETATION THAT

THE COUNCIL IS ACTING UNDER CHAPTER 7. THEREFORE, SECRETARY KISSINGER INQUIRES WHETHER PRESIDENT ASAD WOULD FIND IT AGREEABLE TO MODIFY PREAMBULAR PARA 2 TO READ AS FOLLOWS: 'EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE PREVAILING STATE OF TENSION IN THE AREA.'

"IF THE PRESIDENT FINDS SUCH A MODIFICATION ACCEPTABLE, WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD QUICKLY WITH THE NECESSARY CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK TO TRY AND ASSURE ADOPTION OF THE TEXT WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE CONTROVERSY. THE UNITED STATES OCCUPIES THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER AND WOULD SEEK TO ADVANCE THE CONSULTATIONS ON THIS ITEM IN THE SAME CONSTRUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE SPIRIT WHICH PRESIDENT ASAD HAS SHOWN US IN PROVIDING THIS DRAFT." INGERSOLL

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TOSEC 106

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PE, US, PFOR  
SUBJECT: CHARLES ROBINSON AND MARCONA CORP'S INVESTMENT  
IN PERU

REF: TOSEC 122

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM INGERSOLL

I HAVE DISCUSSED CABLE FROM LEWIS AND EINAUDI WITH CHUCK ROBINSON AND SEE NO REASON FOR UNDUE ALARM. ROBINSON NOTES THAT MARCONA HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN MUTUALLY CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU TOWARD EVENTUAL OWNERSHIP BY THE GOP. MARCONA HAS SEEN NO REASON TO INVOLVE THE USG IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND, OF COURSE, ROBINSON WILL NO LONGER BE CONNECTED WITH MARCONA WHEN HE BECOMES UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. INGERS

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