

**The original documents are located in Box 7, folder “Japan - MIG - Incident (7)” of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013760

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re MIG-25

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/06/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Sanitized 9/12/05*  
*9/28/10*

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
MR # 09-141, #12  
CIA UIV 9/25/10  
By del NARA, Date 12/14/10

(1)

MIG-25P RADAR GROUND OPERATION

(25X1)

(25X1)



THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0417 76

(25X1)

1. THERE IS A GROUND CHECK OF THE MIG-25P RADAR PERFORMED BY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL [REDACTED] THIS CHECK REQUIRED COOLING AIR (NOT REFRIGERATED) PROVIDED BY AUXILIARY GROUND EQUIPMENT (AGE) [REDACTED] THE EQUIPMENT IS CONNECTED.

THERE IS ALSO A RADAR SYSTEM CHECK WHICH CAN BE PERFORMED BY THE PILOT JUST PRIOR TO TAKEOFF AND CAN BE PERFORMED USING EXTERNAL POWER OR

~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

X1

ENGINE POWER; BATTERY POWER IS INSUFFICIENT.

2. THE TEST SEQUENCE DESCRIBED BELOW CAUSES THE AIR INTERCEPT RADAR TO CHECK ITSELF FOR MALFUNCTIONS. THE SWITCHES ARE LOCATED ON A PANEL ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE COCKPIT JOINT BELOW THE SO-63 PANEL. TO PERFORM THE TEST, PLACE THE SWITCH IN THE TOP ROW, IN THE UP ("VKL APPAR") POSITION. THEN THE LOWER LEFT SWITCH (IN THE THIRD ROW LABELED "KONTR") IS PLACED IN THE UP ("AVTOM") POSITION. THE RADAR SCOPE SHOULD ILLUMINATE AND THE CHECK OUT WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY ACCOMPLISHED AS FOLLOWS: A VERY SHORT SIMULATED INTERCEPT WITH MOVING "BLIPS", ETC., APPEARS ON THE RADAR SCREEN IF THE SET IS WORKING PROPERLY. IF THE SCOPE IS BLANK, GOES OUT, OR FAILS TO LIGHT, THE PILOT KNOWS THERE IS A MALFUNCTION. COOLING FOR THIS TEST IS PROVIDED BY THE ON-BOARD ALCOHOL COOLING SYSTEM.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013761

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

TITLE . . . . . Daily Summary

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Syria, Soviet Union (including  
MIG-25), Angola, Thailand, Lebanon,  
Saudi Arabia, and China

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/08/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

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*Exempt 11/9/07*

FBIS 36

AFP: USSR WILL TO DISCUSS JAPAN'S RETURN OF MIG 25

OW091351 HONG KONG AFP IN ENGLISH 0957 GMT 9 OCT 76 OW

(EXCERPT) TOKYO, OCT 9 (AFP)--THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITH JAPAN ON THE RETURN OF A MIG-25 "FOXBAT" FIGHTER WHICH A DEFECTING RUSSIAN PILOT LANDED AT HAKODATE, HOKKAIDO ON SEPTEMBER 6.

MINISTER COUNSELLOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN TOKYO IVAN TSEKHONYA CONVEYED THIS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HERE TODAY.

MR TSEKHONYA, HOWEVER, GAVE NO INDICATION OF WHAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE WOULD BE TO A JAPANESE REQUEST TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES THE SUPERSONIC FIGHTER DID TO THE AIRPORT FACILITIES AT HAKODATE WHEN IT LANDED THERE.

LAST WEEK, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORMED THE SOVIET UNION JAPAN WOULD RETURN THE MIG ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 15 AND SOVIET AUTHORITIES SHOULD COLLECT IT AT A JAPANESE SEA PORT TO BE NAMED LATER.

AT THAT TIME, THE MINISTRY ALSO ASKED THE SOVIET UNION TO PAY THE DAMAGES AND PACKING AND TRANSPORT EXPENSES INVOLVED.

9 OCT 1534Z DEH/KK



*Scowcroft, Hyland, U*

4

MIKI SCORES USSR FOR ATTACKS ON JAPAN OVER MIG INCIDENT

OW011819 HONG KONG AFP IN ENGLISH 1610 GMT 10 OCT 76 OW

(TEXT) TOKYO, OCT 1 (AFP)--PRIME MINISTER TAKEO MIKI TODAY HARSHLY CRITICIZED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR ITS ATTACKS ON JAPAN OVER THE MIG-25 AFFAIR INSTEAD OF APOLOGIZING FOR THE AIRCRAFT'S INTRUSION INTO JAPANESE AIRSPACE.

IN HIS FIRST REPLY TO THE REPEATED ATTACKS BY THE SOVIET UNION, MR MIKI DECLARED THAT THE SOVIET WOULD BE WARNED AGAINST A RECURRENCE OF SUCH AN INCIDENT WHEN JAPAN RETURNS THE AIRCRAFT.

THE PREMIER WAS REPLYING TO A DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST INTERPELLATOR IN THE BUDGET COMMITTEE OF THE LOWER HOUSE WHO ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF BEING "WEAK-KNEED" IN COUNTERING THE SOVIET STANCE.

MR MIKI SAID THAT IT WAS NATURAL FOR JAPAN TO CARRY OUT A COMPLETE EXAMINATION OF THE PLANE ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE.

AS TO WHY JAPAN HAD TO ASK FOR U.S. HELP IN EXAMINATION OF THE PLANE, STATE MINISTER MICHITA SAKATA, DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE AGENCY, SAID A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TECHNOLOGICAL HELP FROM U.S. EXPERTS WAS ESSENTIAL.

WHILE ATTACKING THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN HANDLING THE CASE, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS SUGGESTED THE CREATION OF A DIET COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE PROBLEM.

THE GOVERNMENT IS SCHEDULED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS SATURDAY WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY REGARDING THE TIMING AND METHOD OF RETURNING THE MIG-25 FOXBAT TO THE SOVIET UNION.


ADJUSTMENTS OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE DEFENSE AGENCY HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES THOUGHT THAT THE PLANE COULD BE RETURNED TO THE SOVIETS BY OCTOBER 10, AT THE EARLIEST OR BY OCTOBER 20, AT THE LATEST.

IN THE MIG-RETURNING TALKS, THE JAPANESE SIDE WILL PROPOSE:

--TRANSPORTATION BY LAND FROM HYAKURI AIR FORCE BASE IN IBARAKI, 100 KILOMETERS (60 MILES) NORTHEAST OF TOKYO, WHERE THE AIRCRAFT IS NOW HELD, TO THE PORT OF HITACHI, 70 KILOMETERS (42 MILES) AWAY;

--THE PLANE BE PUT ABOARD A SOVIET FREIGHTER AT HITACHI PORT. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS EXPECTED TO REQUEST THE SOVIETS TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR THE DAMAGE DONE TO HOKKAIDO'S SAPPORO AIRPORT FACILITIES, SUCH AS THE CONTROL TOWER ANTENNA, BY THE MIG-25 ON MAKING A FORCED LANDING AND EXPENSES FOR TRANSPORTING THE PLANE FROM SAPPORO TO HAYAKURI AND FROM HAYAKURI TO HITACHI.

1 OCT 1935Z BB/SAJ



# The MIG-25 is a 'Potemkin village'

When on Sept. 6 Soviet Air Force pilot Viktor Belenko flew his Soviet MIG-25 plane to a Japanese air base — we of the Western world were told that this was an event of major military importance.

Well, it was. But not for the reason generally assumed at that time.

The first reports of the event referred to the Soviet MIG-25 as being the world's fastest, highest-flying, longest-range, and most powerful fighter-interceptor in the world. We were about to find out the secrets of Moscow's great aviation triumph.

That was a month ago. Since then Japanese and American experts have gone over that MIG-25 plane — thoroughly. They have also asked a lot of questions of Soviet pilot Belenko. And they have had a lot of answers. The question now is whether the facts and answers are more embarrassing to the Soviets or to the Western military community.

The MIG-25 turns out to be the fastest and highest flying interceptor-fighter in the world — for altitudes where no one else flies. But down where other planes fly it is heavy, sluggish, and slow, with out-of-date technology. As a fighter it is inferior to the U.S. Navy's F-14 and to the U.S. Air Force's F-15. As an interceptor it would be splendid — up where there is

nothing to intercept, but useless for intercepting the latest Western bombers which fly low. The MIG-25 has no "look-down" radar ability.

In other words the Soviets' vaunted and feared superfighter-interceptor turns out to be a plane designed for the wrong mission at the wrong time. It was designed against the high-flying American B-70 bomber which was cancelled way back in 1960 when the Soviets shot down Gary Powers in his U-2. Ever since the U.S. has been working on low-flying bombers.

So for 10 years now the Soviets have been flying a plane which was virtually useless before it was issued to the Soviet Air Force. And so also, for some 10 years Americans have been worried about supposed and alleged Soviet air superiority.

From 1774 to 1791 Russia was ruled by Grigori Alexandrovich Potemkin, first minister to the Czarina Catherine the so-called Great. He is remembered for the splendid tour he arranged for the Czarina, her court, and foreign ambassadors down the Volga. The purpose of the trip was to show how happy the Russian peasants were under the allegedly benign rule of Czarina Catherine.

As the imperial barges sailed majestically down the mighty river they passed pretty peas-

ant villages from which charmingly dressed peasants emerged to wave their grateful obeisance to their sovereign. What those on the barges did not know at the time was that the peasants came from the various theaters of St. Petersburg and the villages were stage scenery taken down each night and put up again the next day — downstream.

The MIG-25 is not in the true sense a Potemkin village. It was, after all, a serious attempt to build the answer to what Moscow expected the Americans to be doing next in aviation. Its workmanship is described as practical and effective. It would have been a good answer to the American B-70, if the Americans had gone on building the B-70.

Guessing wrong in weaponry is not a Soviet monopoly. There have been American mistakes too. But the story of the MIG-25 should remind us that the Soviets are not always 20 feet tall. Yes, they have the second largest number of men under arms of the big powers. China is ahead of them. Yes, they build good, practical aircraft — and a lot of them. Yes, they have more tanks (19,000) facing Western Europe than the members of the NATO alliance can muster against them (7,300). But, they don't always get it right.

Today, we know that they misguessed when they committed themselves to the MIG-25. Perhaps they have misguessed about tanks. The credibility of their invasion threat against Western Europe is important to their diplomacy. But they have built this on the assumption that the big battle tank is still queen of battle. But is it? The 1973 war in the Middle East was the graveyard of tanks. Anti-tank weaponry had jumped ahead of the tank. The United States has been working hard ever since to perfect new and still better anti-tank weapons. Besides, NATO forces are equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. Is it conceivable that they would go unused if a major Soviet armored force started moving across the north German plain? A mass of big battle tanks would present an easy target for tactical nuclear weapons.


Soviet diplomacy depends heavily on the assumption of Soviet offensive capability. To underestimate that capability would be criminal. But to overestimate it — plays directly into the hands of Soviet diplomacy.

Too much of the time, I think, we let the Soviets bluff us into thinking they are 20 feet tall, when in reality they are only about five feet six inches — if that.





DEFENSE



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Leckler

"No, he's not a U. S. Air Force official . . . ! He's a representative of the Tootsie Toy Company!"

Chicago Tribune, 10/14/76



6

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013762

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report  
  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re MIG-25  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/13/1976  
VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)  
  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

**EXEMPTED**  
1/26/10



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013763

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re MIG-25 crash in 1969  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/13/1976  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Sanitized 9/21/05*  
*1/4/10*

**DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted**

E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NR 09-141; #15

CIA-~~U~~ 11410; DIA-~~U~~ 912910; AF-~~U~~ 513111

By dal NARA, Date 8/24/11

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
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1. [Redacted] (THEN) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF , APVO, KADOMTSEV, WAS KILLED IN 1969 WHILE TEST FLYING A MIG-25. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO CONTRACTING FOR PURCHASE OF THE MIG-25 FROM THE AVIATION INDUSTRY. KADOMTSEV HAD REFUSED TO BE BRIEFED ON THE AIRCRAFT EJECTION SYSTEM AND WAS KILLED

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
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(classification)



WHEN THE AIRCRAFT CAUGHT FIRE AND CRASHED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS BROUGHT INTO THE ACTIVE INVENTORY DESPITE THE ACCIDENT BECAUSE OF U.S. SR-71 ACTIVITIES.

2. (AIR FORCE COMMENT: OTHER SOURCES INDICATE THAT A GENERAL-LIEUTENANT ANATOLIY LENONIDOVICH KADOMTSEV, DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FOR AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE, DIED IN APRIL 1969 AS A RESULT OF AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT.)



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013764

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re MIG-25

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/14/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Santizal 9/12/05*  
*1/4/10*

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

LRG 09-141 # 16

CIA Ltr 1/4/10; DIA Ltr 3/29/10; AF Ltr 5/31/11

By dal NARA, Date 8/24/11

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
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1. THE MIG-25P WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE U.S. XB-70 BOMBER. SINCE THE XB-70 DEVELOPMENT NEVER REACHED FRUITION, THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE MIG-25P HAS BECOME TO INTERCEPT THE SR-71. THE

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MIG-25P ALSO POSSESSES A LIMITED CAPABILITY AGAINST LOWER ALTITUDE TARGETS.

2. [REDACTED] THE ONLY WAY THE MIG-25P CAN SUCCESSFULLY INTERCEPT THE SR-71 IS FROM A HEAD-ON SNAPUP ENGAGEMENT. THIS IS TRUE SO LONG AS THE SR-71 REMAINS IN ITS HIGH-ALTITUDE, HIGH-SPEED ENVIRONMENT; HOWEVER, IF THE SR-71 DEVELOPS MECHANICAL PROBLEMS AND IS FORCED TO DECELERATE AND DESCEND, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO REAR HEMISPHERE ATTACKS.

3. [REDACTED] ALL INTERCEPTS ARE DIRECTED/CONTROLLED BY GCI DATA LINK. THE PILOT MERELY FOLLOWS THE INDICATIONS DISPLAYED IN THE COCKPIT. SPECIFICALLY, HE MANIPULATES THE THROTTLES TO MAINTAIN THE GCI DIRECTED AIRSPEED AND FIRES THE SEMIACTIVE AND/OR INFRARED MISSILES WHEN THE INTERCEPT IS COMPLETE. DUE TO RAPIDLY CHANGING ENGAGEMENT PARAMETERS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH-SPEED, HIGH-ALTITUDE TARGETS (SR-71) AND TO SOVIET PREFERENCE FOR GCI (DATA LINK) CONTROLLED INTERCEPTS, AUTONOMOUS ENGAGEMENTS ARE UNLIKELY.

4. THE HEAD-ON INTERCEPT PROFILE, FLOWN AGAINST THE SR-71, ESTABLISHES THE MIG-25P 7,000 METERS BELOW THE TARGET. AN INTERCEPT SPEED OF MACH 2.34 IS MAINTAINED BY THE MIG-25P TO UTILIZE THE BEST


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(classification)



FUEL CONSUMPTION RATES, TO AVOID EXCEEDING AFTERBURNER OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS, AND TO OPTIMIZE THE SEARCH AND TRACK FUNCTIONS OF THE MIG-25P RADAR. [REDACTED] THE 7,000-METER SEPARATION AND MACH 2.34 INTERCEPT SPEED WOULD BE MAINTAINED EVEN IF THE TARGET AIRCRAFT CHANGED ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED.

5. THE MISSILE CARRIED BY THE MIG-25P HAS BOTH A RADIO AND AN OPTICAL FUZE. THE RADIO FUZE IS THE PRIMARY FUZE FOR WARHEAD DETONATION; THE OPTICAL FUZE IS A BACKUP. IF THE TARGET SPEED EXCEEDS 3,250 KILOMETERS/HOUR (1,760 KNOTS), THE RADIO FUZE IS UNABLE TO DETECT THE TARGET. THEREFORE, AT TARGET SPEEDS GREATER THAN 3,250 KILOMETERS/HOUR, THE MISSILE IS DEPENDENT UPON THE OPTICAL FUZE FOR WARHEAD DETONATION. THE MAXIMUM CLOSURE RATE THAT THE FUZING AND FIRING CIRCUITRY CAN ACCOMMODATE IS 2,800 METERS/SECOND (APPROXIMATELY 5,440 KNOTS). AT HIGHER CLOSURE RATES, THE MISSILE WARHEAD WOULD DETONATE AFTER PASSING THE TARGET. WITH THE MIG-25P MAINTAINING AN INTERCEPT SPEED OF MACH 2.34, THE TARGET PLATFORM WOULD HAVE TO EXCEED MACH 4.4 FOR THIS TO OCCUR.



[REDACTED]

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*114110*

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DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re MIG-25

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/26/1976

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COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NRG 09-14; #18

CIA/OS 1/4/10; DIA/OS 3/29/10; AF/OS 5/31/11

By del NARA, Date 8/24/11

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
EMERGENCY ORDNANCE DROP AREA NEAR CHUGUYEVKA

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1. [Redacted] THERE IS AN EMERGENCY ORDNANCE DROP AREA NEAR CHUGUYEVKA AIR BASE (44-04N, 133-52E), USSR. IT IS LOCATED ON A HEADING OF 270 DEGREES AT A RANGE OF 25 TO 30 KM [FROM THE AIR BASE]. THIS AREA IS OVER DRY LAND BUT IS VERY RARELY USED BECAUSE OF THE HIGH COST OF R-40 MISSILE ORDNANCE FOR THE MIG-25P.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013767

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COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
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PACIFIC  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)  
  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

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9/28/10

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E.O. 12958 (b) (7) - (D) SEC 8.3

# 09-141 #19

CIA llw 9/28/10

By del NARA, Date 12/14/10

(X1)

INFORMATION ON THE MIG-25P ENGINES

(25X1)

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
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0488 76.

(X1)

1. THE ENGINE POWERING THE MIG-25 IS CONSIDERED [ ] TO BE RELIABLE. THOUGH INSTRUCTORS INDICATED THE ENGINES WERE PREVIOUSLY USED ON A PILOTLESS VEHICLE AND ADAPTED TO THE MIG-25 DESIGN, THE ENGINE PERFORMS ALMOST FLAWLESSLY

DIA review(s) completed.

USAF review(s) completed.



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ITS MIG-25 ROLE. THERE WAS NO KNOWN AREA WHERE THE AFTERBURNER OR MAIN ENGINE WOULD FLAME OUT, EVEN IN A ZOOM CLIMB TO 30 KILOMETERS. (25X1)

2. IN ADDITION TO THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED MAXIMUM AFTERBURNING THRUST 11,200 KILOGRAMS, A THRUST OF 8,500 KILOGRAMS WAS PROVIDED AT MAXIMUM (25X1) NON-AFTERBURNING (MILITARY) POWER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: [REDACTED] PREVIOUSLY REPORTED 11,200 KILOGRAMS THRUST FOR ENGINE IN [REDACTED] DATED (25X1) SEPTEMBER.) THE ENGINE IS REPORTED [REDACTED] TO BE 6,385 MILLIMETERS IN LENGTH AND 1,640 MILLIMETERS IN DIAMETER. WEIGHT OF THE ENGINE IS 2,635 (25X1) KILOGRAMS. [REDACTED] WHETHER THIS WEIGHT IS WITH OR WITHOUT ACCESSORIES. (25X1)

3. AFTER 250 HOURS OF OPERATION, THE ENGINES ARE REMOVED FROM THE AIRCRAFT AND RETURNED TO THE FACTORY FOR OVERHAUL.

4. THE MIG-25 AIRCRAFT PRODUCES A TELLTALE PUFF OF SMOKE WHEN THE AFTERBURNER IS CUT OFF ON CLIMBOUT FROM TAKEOFF. (25X1)

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(classification)

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013768

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Soviet Air Force

CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/04/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Sanitized 9/21/05*  
*9/28/10*



DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

E.O. 13526 (b) (1) SEC 9.3

NRD 09-141 #20

CIA Utr 9/22/10

By del NARA, Date 12/14/10

SUBJECT APVO COMBAT FLIGHT TRAINING

25X1

25X1

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0446-76.

1. AT AN APVO TRAINING REGIMENT IN SALS, THE AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT TRAINING IN THE MIG-17 (COMBAT EMPLOYMENT) LASTS APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AND STUDENTS FLY ONCE EACH DAY, FIVE DAYS PER WEEK. THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IS COMPRISED OF 33 TO 35 SORTIES AND IS BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

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
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**SECRET**

(classification)

DIA review(s) completed.

USAF review(s) completed.



25X1

A) ONE AGAINST ONE, NO MANEUVERS: AN INSTRUCTOR PILOT (IP) FLIES THE LEAD (TARGET) AIRCRAFT AND DOES NOT ENGAGE IN ANY MANEUVERS. THE STUDENT FLIES BEHIND THE IP AIRCRAFT AND MANEUVERS IN "S" PATTERNS IN AND OUT OF GUN RANGE (300-800 METERS; MINIMUM RANGE IS 200 METERS). THIS AREA OF TRAINING INCLUDES FOUR TO SIX DUAL SORTIES [IN A TWO-SEAT TRAINER WITH AN INSTRUCTOR] AND FOUR SOLO SORTIES.

B) ONE AGAINST ONE, MANEUVERING: THE INSTRUCTOR PILOT, AGAIN IN THE LEAD AIRCRAFT, FLIES AGGRESSIVE (BUT PREBRIEFED) MANEUVERS INCLUDING ROLLS AND VERTICAL MANEUVERS. THE STUDENT TRIES TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO TRACK AND FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTOR. THIS IS DONE IN A SERIES OF THREE DUAL SORTIES AND TWO SOLO SORTIES.

C) ONE AGAINST ONE INTERCEPTS DURING DAY VFR (VISUAL FLIGHT RULES) CONDITIONS: THE INSTRUCTOR TAKES OFF SEVERAL MINUTES AHEAD OF THE STUDENT AND FLIES IN A PREBRIEFED TRACK IN A DESIGNATED ZONE. THE STUDENT INTERCEPTS THE INSTRUCTOR'S AIRCRAFT AND A PREBRIEFED ENGAGEMENT, AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1B ABOVE, ENSUES. THIS SECTION OF TRAINING INVOLVES TWO DUAL SORTIES AND THREE SOLO SORTIES.

D) TWO AGAINST ONE INTERCEPTS IN DAY VISUAL FLIGHT RULES

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CONDITIONS: THE INSTRUCTOR PILOT TAKES OFF SEVERAL MINUTES AHEAD OF THE STUDENT WHO IS FLYING AS WINGMAN FOR ANOTHER INSTRUCTOR PILOT. THE STUDENT/INSTRUCTOR PILOT ELEMENT ACCOMPLISHES INTERCEPT OF THE TARGET AND MILD MANEUVERING ENSUES. THIS TRAINING IS CARRIED OUT IN TWO DUAL SORTIES AND THREE SOLO SORTIES.

E) TWO AGAINST ONE IN DAY INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES CONDITIONS (VISUAL FLIGHT RULES CONDITIONS ABOVE THE CLOUDS): THE SCENARIO FOR THIS EXERCISE IS THE SAME AS FOR THAT IN PARAGRAPH D ABOVE EXCEPT FOR THE WEATHER CONDITIONS. IF THE STUDENT IS IN A DUAL PLACE TRAINING AIRCRAFT (WITH AN INSTRUCTOR IN THE OTHER SEAT) HE WILL STAY ON HIS ELEMENT LEADER'S WING UNTIL THEY ARE ABOVE THE CLOUDS. IF HE IS SOLOING, THE STUDENT WILL TURN 15 DEGREES AWAY FROM HIS ELEMENT LEADER FOR 10 TO 15 SECONDS AND FOLLOW A PARALLEL COURSE UNTIL BOTH MEMBERS OF THE ELEMENT ARE ABOVE THE CLOUDS. IF IN-FLIGHT VISIBILITY IS BETTER THAN 50 METERS, THE STUDENT WILL STAY IN POSITION ON THE ELEMENT LEADER'S WING. THIS EXERCISE IS DONE IN ONE DUAL SORTIE AND TWO SOLO SORTIES.

G) ONE AGAINST ONE AT NIGHT UNDER VISUAL FLIGHT RULES CONDITIONS: THE TRAINING SCENARIO IS THE SAME AS IN PARAGRAPH

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1C ABOVE EXCEPT THAT IT OCCURS AT NIGHT AND WITH NO MANEUVERING. THE STUDENT IS VECTORED TO A POINT TWO KILOMETERS FROM THE INSTRUCTOR PILOT'S AIRCRAFT (TARGET) AND THEN BREAKS OFF THE INTERCEPT AND RETURNS TO HIS BASE. THIS IS DONE IN TWO DUAL SORTIES AND FIVE SOLO SORTIES.

2. EXCEPT FOR NIGHT TRAINING INTERCEPT, ALL AIR-TO-AIR TRAINING SORTIES USE GUN CAMERA FILM AND ALL ATTACKS ARE BASED UPON THE USE OF [THE INTERCEPTOR'S] GUNS [NO MISSILES].

[REDACTED]

WOULD NEVER TRUST A STUDENT TO DO SO BECAUSE THE STUDENT MIGHT DOWN THE TOW PLANE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE APVO PRACTICES HIGH ANGLE GUN ATTACKS AT UP TO 90 DEGREES ANGLE-OFF, BUT NO GREATER THAN 90 DEGREES.

3. BECAUSE OF THE INEXPERIENCE OF THE STUDENTS, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS CAUSING DANGEROUS SITUATIONS DURING FLIGHT TRAINING, ALL FLIGHT METHODS AND TECHNIQUES ARE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE. INSTRUCTOR PILOTS HAVE NO FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN WHAT MANEUVERS ARE PERFORMED AND AN INSTRUCTOR WILL GET INTO TROUBLE IF HE PERFORMS MANEUVERS OTHER THAN THOSE PREPLANNED. WHILE THE STUDENT AND INSTRUCTOR CANNOT REVERSE ROLES (TARGET AND ATTACKER), TWO INSTRUCTORS CAN GO OUT TO PRACTICE AGAINST

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



EACH OTHER. EVEN THEN HOWEVER, THE INSTRUCTORS CANNOT DO WHATEVER MANEUVERS THEY DESIRE. IF THEY DO THEY HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFUL THAT THEY DO NOT "GET CAUGHT". WHEN ASKED IF THEY TALK ON THE RADIO WHEN THEY ARE DOING UNAUTHORIZED MANEUVERS, [REDACTED] ANSWERED WITH EMPHATIC "NO."

4. SOME STUDENTS DO NOT COMPLETE THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION BECAUSE OF "SIE" (SELF INDUCED ELIMINATION). FOR SOME, THIS OCCURS BECAUSE OF APPREHENSION (E.G., SEEING A CRASH AND NEVER GETTING OVER IT). SOME DROP OUT FOR MEDICAL REASONS. THE MAIN REASON, HOWEVER, IS THAT AFTER 2 YEARS OF TRAINING, THE STUDENT COMES TO FEEL THE BURDEN OF THE TIME INVOLVED WITH MILITARY SERVICE, AND HE MAKES A DECISION TO GO BACK TO A FACTORY OR SOME OTHER TYPE OF WORK. [REDACTED] THIS (APVO TRAINING REGIMENT) IS A BURDEN. [REDACTED] (25X1)

5. [REDACTED] HAS NEVER PARTICIPATED IN, NOR HEARD OF, DISSIMILAR AIR COMBAT TRAINING (I.E., MIG-25 AGAINST MIG-17, ETC). [REDACTED] THE PROFICIENCY OF THE GRADUATE OF THE (SALSK?) APVO SCHOOL IS POOR. [REDACTED] DOES NOT FEEL THAT HE WOULD WANT TO GO INTO COMBAT WITH A RECENT GRADUATE AND STATED THAT HE WOULD NEED ANOTHER YEAR TO TEACH AND OBSERVE THE GRADUATE. (AIR FORCE COMMENT: [REDACTED]) (25X1)


REF (classification) (dissem. controls)





5X1

SOVIET PVO (AIR DEFENSE) UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM.  
HE HAS ONLY 30 OPERATIONAL  
HOURS IN THE MIG-25P AND WAS STILL IN THE COMBAT READINESS  
COURSE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEFECTION.)



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013769

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Soviet Air Force

CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/04/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Sanitized* 9/21/05  
9/28/10

DEClassified w/ portions exempted

EO 12958 (b)(1), (b)(3)

REF ID: A66002

CIA Act 9/28/10

By olae NARA, Date 12/14/10

DIA review(s) completed.

APVO FIGHTER TACTICS AND CHARACTERISTICS [25X1]

[25X1] [25X1]

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0445 76.


1. FOLLOWING IS [ ] DESCRIPTION OF COMBAT TACTICS EMPLOYED BY VARIOUS SOVIET APVO FIGHTERS AND [ ] COMMENTS ON THE CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHTERS:

[25X1]

A) THE MIG-25 AND SU-15 WILL BE USED AS HIGH-TO-MEDIUM ALTITUDE INTERCEPTORS AND ARMED WITH MISSILES. THE MIG-17 WILL BE USED AS A LOW-TO-MEDIUM ALTITUDE INTERCEPTOR AND WILL

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RELY UPON GUN ARMAMENT.

B) GROUND CONTROL INTERCEPT STATIONS WILL VECTOR A MIG-25 TO A HEAD-ON ATTACK REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE TARGET HAS AN ALL-ASPECT MISSILE CAPABILITY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN SUCH AN ATTACK, THE MIG-25 PILOT WOULD USE THE TECHNIQUE OF DELAYING THE OPERATION OF HIS AI RADAR UNTIL IN MISSILE LAUNCH RANGES. HE WOULD THEN TURN ON THE RADAR, ACHIEVE LOCK-ON, AND LAUNCH HIS IR MISSILE FOLLOWED BY HIS RADAR MISSILE.

C) IN ALL CASES, THE MIG-25 WILL ATTEMPT TO ATTACK ITS TARGET FROM AN ALTITUDE LOWER THAN THE TARGET SO THAT THE MIG-25'S RADAR WILL HAVE A GOOD "LOOK-UP" ANGLE AND NOT BE AFFECTED BY GROUND CLUTTER. IF THE MIG-25 ATTACKS FROM AS LOW AS 500-1,000 METERS (M) ABOVE GROUND LEVEL, THE PILOT WILL SELECT THE LOW ALTITUDE (OR 25 KILOMETER) POSITION ON HIS RADAR CONTROL PANEL. THE SU-15 PILOTS DO NOT TRAIN FOR LOW-ALTITUDE INTERCEPTS EVEN THOUGH THE SU-15 HAS THE SAME 50 METER MINIMUM EMPLOYMENT ALTITUDE FOR ITS IR MISSILE AS DOES THE MIG-25.

D) THE MIG-17 HAS A "GUNS ONLY CAPABILITY" AND THAT IS HOW UNITS WITH MIG-17'S PRACTICE ALL OF THEIR INTERCEPTS. [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE KNEW OF NO MIG-17'S WITH AN AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE CAPABILITY. THE MIG-17 IS GAINING INCREASED EMPHASIS AS A LOW

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


25X1

ALTITUDE "ATTACK FIGHTER" IN FRONTAL AVIATION (VVS) BECAUSE OF ITS PERFORMANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

E) THE MIG-27 (SIC, MIG-25?) AND SU-15 CAN ONLY INTERROGATE SOVIET IFF. THEY HAVE NO CAPABILITY TO INTERROGATE FREE WORLD IFF SETS. THE SU-15 HAS AN INTERLOCK CIRCUIT ON ITS RADAR WHICH PREVENTS LOCK-ON TO AN AIRCRAFT WHICH HAS A SOVIET IFF UNLESS THE SU-15 IFF INTERROGATOR IS SWITCHED OFF.

F) THE SU-15/MIG-23/MIG-25 PRODUCE A NOTICEABLE STREAK OR PLUME OF FUEL WHEN DISENGAGING AFTERBURNER. THERE IS NO PLUME WHEN ENGAGING AFTERBURNER.



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013770

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Soviet Air Force

CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/10/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Sanitized 9/21/05*  
*9/28/10*

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]  
EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
MR# 09-141-R 22  
CIA [redacted] 9/28/10  
By [redacted] NARA, Date 12/14/10

1. SUBJECT APVO USE OF MIG-15 UTILITY TRAINER AIRCRAFT (25X1)

(25X1)

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0462 76.


1. [redacted] TWO TO THREE DUAL-COCKPIT MIG-15 TRAINERS ARE ASSIGNED TO EVERY COMBAT INTERCEPTOR REGIMENT IN THE SOVIET AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE FORCE. HE REVEALED THAT THESE ARE USED FOR WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE AND TO CONDUCT INSTRUMENT FLYING PRACTICE ("UNDER HOOD" FLIGHTS). HE ALSO SAID THAT HIS OWN REGIMENT AT

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DIA review(s) completed


USAF review(s) completed

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(classification)



SOKOLOVKA, ALTHOUGH EQUIPPED WITH MIG-25P AND MIG-25 TRAINERS,  
RETAINED TWO TO THREE MIG-15UT (TRAINER) AIRCRAFT FOR WEATHER  
RECONNAISSANCE AND "UNDER HOOD" FLIGHTS.

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(classification)



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013771

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Soviet Air Force

CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/10/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Sanitized 9/21/05*  
*9/28/10*

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-6/BJW/STP

E.O. 12958 (a) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

REF ID: A623

CIA 9/28/10

By dal / ARA, Date 12/14/10

SOVIET PVO STRANY OPERATIONS AND OPTIONS

(25X1)

(25X1)

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND THE MISSILE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0469 76.

1. CENTRAL CONTROL OF THE PVO STRANY (AIR DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY/ STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE) IS, BY POLICY, VESTED IN A CENTRAL COMMAND POST IN MOSCOW. ALL REQUESTS FOR COORDINATION OF PVO WEAPONS UNITS (FIGHTER/ SAM/AAA) MUST GO TO THIS CENTRAL COMMAND POST FOR A FINAL DECISION; HOWEVER, [REDACTED] THIS WAS ALL THEORY, AND THAT IF THEY


DIA review(s) completed.

USAF review(s) completed.

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Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC\_EA\_P-7-8-10-9

(classification)



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25X1

(FIELD COMMANDS) ACTUALLY HAD TO WAIT FOR THE CENTRAL COMMAND POST TO MAKE A DECISION AND RESPOND, THEY MAY AS WELL GIVE UP PART OF THE COUNTRY. REALISTICALLY, THE CORPS IS CLOSER TO THE SITUATION AND IS BETTER ABLE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY COMBAT DECISIONS. BASED ON VARIABLES SUCH AS AIR TRAFFIC, ALERT STATUS, AND WEAPONS RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN EACH SITUATION.

2. SHOULD THE CORPS CONTROL BE DESTROYED, DIRECT WEAPONS RESPONSIBILITY WOULD REVERT TO THE REGIMENT LEVEL. (AIR FORCE/MIA

COMMENT: [ ] REFERRED TO THE AAA REGIMENT AS BEING SEPARATE FROM THE INTERCEPTOR AND SAM REGIMENTS.) REGIMENTAL WEAPONS CONTROL WOULD BE EXERCISED IN THAT REGIMENT'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. COORDINATION BETWEEN WEAPONS TYPES WOULD BE HANDLED BY THE INDIVIDUAL REGIMENTS IN DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. THE REQUIREMENT FOR SENIOR CONTROL, IN THOSE AREAS WHERE CLOSE COORDINATION IS NECESSARY BETWEEN WEAPON TYPES, IS SOLVED BY DELEGATION OF THIS AUTHORITY TO THE REGIMENT (INTERCEPTOR OR SAM) WITH THE GREATER AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. [ ] SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT, IF THE FIGHTER AVIATION HAS A SMALL ROLE, THEN IT BECOMES SUBORDINATE TO THE SAM REGIMENT.

IF THE INTERCEPTOR REGIMENT HAS A LARGER SECTOR, IT HAS BETTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESSFULLY CARRYING OUT THE

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MISSION, THEREFORE THEY REVERSE THE COMMAND. THE CORPS PREDETERMINES THESE FACTORS AS A CONTINGENCY PLAN MADE KNOWN BEFOREHAND TO RESPONSIBLE PARTICIPANTS IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. SUCH A SITUATION IS REQUIRED SINCE THERE IS NO ALTERNATE COMMAND POST FOR THE 23RD PVO CORPS, THE COMMAND [REDACTED] INTERCEPTOR REGIMENT.

25X1

3. [REDACTED] THERE ARE NO INSTANCES OF COLLOCATION OF SAM AND INTERCEPTOR REGIMENTS, HENCE, CURRENTLY A COMMUNICATION LINK BETWEEN THEM IS REQUIRED. [REDACTED] REFERRED TO THIS AS AN "RF" (RADIO COMMUNICATIONS) LINK.

25X1

AIR FORCE/MIA COMMENTS:

25X1

A. IN PARAGRAPH TWO, [REDACTED] SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO CORPS CONTROL BEING DESTROYED AND CITED NO OTHER REASONS FOR LOSS OF CORPS CONTROL (E.G., COMMUNICATIONS JAMMING).

B. [REDACTED] THE AAA REGIMENT IN PARAGRAPH TWO, COLLECTOR BELIEVES THAT HE PROBABLY HAS LITTLE ADDITIONAL DATA ON IT.


C. SINCE [REDACTED] THERE IS CURRENTLY A COMMUNICATIONS LINK BETWEEN UNITS (PARA 3), COLLECTOR BELIEVES THAT IT IS PROBABLY IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS.

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(dis em) Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC\_EA\_P-7-8-10-9

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013772

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report  
  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Soviet Air Force  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/30/1976  
VOLUME . . . . . 5 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)  
  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Saintizd 9/21/05*  
*9/28/10*

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

REF ID: A66094

CIA UTR 9328/10

By dal JARA, Date 12/14/10

SOVIET PVO GROUND CONTROLLED INTERCEPT OPERATIONS AND PERSONNEL.

25X1

25X1

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0470 76.

L. GCI COMMAND AND CONTROL IN SOVIET FIGHTER TACTICS IS A FUNDAMENTAL PART OF BOTH PVO AND FRONTAL AVIATION OPERATIONS. IN PVO UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING, ALL INTERCEPTS ARE CONDUCTED UNDER GCI CONTROL. IN THE PVO COMBAT TRAINING COURSES, NON-GCI CONTROLLED INTERCEPTS ARE NOT PRACTICED. ONLY UNITS WITH A LOW-ALTITUDE INTERCEPT MISSION, SUCH AS THOSE EQUIPPED WITH MIG-17'S ACTUALLY




SECRET

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PRACTICE IN A NON-GCI ENVIRONMENT. IN OTHER OPERATIONAL UNITS, SECTOR RESPONSIBILITY IN A NON-GCI CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT IS DISCUSSED BUT NOT PRACTICED.

2. A GCI SITE IS COLOCATED WITH THE REGIMENT COMMAND POST (RCP) IN EACH REGIMENT. EACH RCP HAS THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO CONTROL ITS ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT. [REDACTED] MIG-25 REGIMENT, THE CONTROLLER CADRE WAS COMPOSED OF EIGHT CONTROLLERS: FOUR NAVIGATORS, THREE FORMER PILOTS (NO LONGER ON FLYING STATUS), AND ONE "SH.B.U." (EXPANSION NOT GIVEN) OFFICER WHO WAS THE ACTUAL WEAPON'S CONTROLLER. NAVIGATORS ATTENDED A FOUR-FIVE MONTH CONTROLLER TRAINING COURSE AT THE 148TH CENTER FOR COMBAT APPLICATIONS (CCA). FORMER PILOTS ALSO RECEIVED TRAINING AT THE 148TH CCA. SH.B.U. PERSONNEL ARE CONSIDERED THE ELITE OF THE GCI FORCE. THEY ARE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WHO WERE GRADUATED WITH A FOUR-YEAR ENGINEERING DEGREE FROM THE SH.B.U. SCHOOL AT STAVROPOL. SH.B.U. PERSONNEL ARE RATED AS "NAVIGATOR-ENGINEERS." THE SH.B.U. SCHOOL AT STAVROPOL OPENED APPROXIMATELY FIVE YEARS AGO.



3. PVO PILOTS WERE INCESSANTLY WARNED NOT TO TAKE ANY FLIGHT ACTIONS (DURING GCI) WITHOUT CONTROLLER APPROVAL. THE PILOTS WERE INSTRUCTED IN THE COMBAT CONTROL SECTIONS TO STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE COMMANDS OF THE CONTROLLER. IN REGIMENTAL PREFLIGHT BRIEFINGS, THE

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PILOTS HAD DIRECT INTERFACE WITH THE CONTROLLERS AND DISCUSSED FLIGHT PLANS - INCLUDING WORK AREAS, VECTORING METHODS, TIMES AND CALL SIGNS. THE CONTROLLERS AND ALL OTHER FLIGHT ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL WERE ALSO PRESENT DURING THE POSTFLIGHT DEBRIEFING WHILE THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER OR HIS DEPUTY EVALUATED THE DAY'S FLIGHT ACTIVITY. THE CONTROLLERS AND THE PILOTS WERE CRITICIZED IF AN INTERCEPT EXERCISE WAS NOT PROPERLY EXECUTED. ULTIMATELY, THE FLIGHT RECORDERS WERE REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHO WAS AT FAULT AND, GENERALLY, THE PILOTS BORE THE BRUNT OF ANY BLAME. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] RELATIONS BETWEEN PILOTS AND CONTROLLERS WERE GENERALLY GOOD BUT MOST WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED CLOSE FRIENDS.

[REDACTED] DID NOT PERSONALLY KNOW ANY OF THE CONTROLLERS AT SOKOLOVKA (MIG-25 BASE) BUT DID KNOW SOME AT SAL'SK.

4. PILOTS ARE UNDER RCP AND GCI CONTROLLER COMMAND FROM THE TIME THE PILOT BOARDS HIS AIRCRAFT. [REDACTED] IN THE MIG-25, ALL INTERCEPT ACTIVITIES ARE CONTROLLED VIA DATA-LINK (PRIMARY SYSTEM ON THE MIG-25) OR BY VOICE GCI CONTROL. WHEN OPERATING VIA DATA-LINK, THE PILOT IS LITTLE MORE THAN A PASSENGER FROM THE TIME HE RAISES HIS GEAR AFTER TAKEOFF UNTIL 50 METERS ALTITUDE ON RECOVERY. HIS ONLY PURPOSE FOR BEING IN THE AIRCRAFT IS TO PULL THE TRIGGER, BREAK AWAY, LOWER THE GEAR, AND OCCASIONALLY

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PUSH A BUTTON. FIRING INSTRUCTIONS WERE ALSO RECEIVED FROM THE RCP - INCLUDING THE SPECIFIC TYPE OF ORDNANCE TO BE EXPENDED.

1) [ ] ONLY ONE INSTANCE WHERE A PILOT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO FIRE OF HIS OWN VOLITION: IF THE RCP INFORMS HIM THAT AN UNIDENTIFIED TARGET IS CLOSING IN ON HIM, HE MAY FIRE IF HE DETERMINES THAT THE TARGET IS AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT.

5. COMMAND FUNCTION AT THE RCP IS EXERCISED BY THE "SENIOR RATED OFFICER OF THE COMMAND POST". CONTROLLERS FUNCTION ONLY AS CONTROLLERS. IN TRAINING, SUCH AS AT SA'LSK, STUDENT CONTROLLERS CONTROLLED STUDENT PILOTS UNTIL THE FINAL STAGES AND THEN INSTRUCTOR CONTROLLERS TOOK OVER.

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6. TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEGREE OF CONTROL THAT THE RCP AND GCI CONTROLLERS MAINTAIN OVER THE PILOTS, [ ] RELATED THE FOLLOWING HEARSAY INFORMATION: IN 1972 OR 1973, A MIG-21 PILOT RAMMED A PHANTOM F-4 FLYING OUT TO TURKEY NEAR THE SOUTHERN COAST OF THE BLACK SEA. THE MIG-21 PILOT WAS KILLED, THE F-4 PILOTS EJECTED.

3) [ ] THE F-4 WAS A TRAINER (PROBABLY BECAUSE OF ITS TWO SEATS). THE MIG-21 HAD TAKEN OFF WITHOUT MISSILES AND WAS COMMANDED TO VECTOR FOR A MISSILE PASS AT THE TARGET. THE PILOT NEVER RECEIVED ANY COMMAND TO FIRE HIS CANNONS AND RAMMED THE F-4, MAYBE ACCIDENTLY. (NFI)


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
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AIR FORCE COMMENT: VALIDITY OF THE HEARSAY INFORMATION IS DOUBTFUL AS THE INFORMATION CANNOT BE CONFIRMED AT PRESENT.



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013773

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Soviet Air Force  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/30/1976  
VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Sanitized 9/21/05*  
9/28/10

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 9.8  
MR# 09-141-#25  
CIA ex 9/28/10  
By del NARA, Date 12/14/10

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APVO REGIMENTAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

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THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0474 76.

1. THE APVO REGIMENTAL MAINTENANCE SECTION COMMANDER TYPICALLY IS A NONRATED LT. COLONEL WHO IS SUBORDINATE TO THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER. HIS ENTIRE CAREER PROBABLY WILL HAVE BEEN IN MAINTENANCE AND HE WILL PROBABLY POSSESS AN ENGINEERING DEGREE WITH A SPECIALTY IN AVIONICS, ARMAMENT, ETC. HE WILL HAVE PROGRESSED UP THROUGH THE RANKS IN

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USAF review(s) completed.

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THE PVO. HE IS GENERALLY UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER TO HAVE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT READY.

2. THERE ARE TWO MAIN DIVISIONS IN THE MAINTENANCE SECTION: THE ENGINEERING SECTIONS AND THE TECHNICAL EXPLOITATION BRANCH (TEB). THE FIRST DIVISION IS SUBDIVIDED INTO SIX SECTIONS, EACH COMMANDED BY A NONRATED MAJOR. THE SECTIONS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ROUTINE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE. THE SECTIONS ARE: ENGINE, WEAPONS/ARMAMENT, AUTOPILOT (SAU), RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, RADAR EQUIPMENT, AND AVIATION EQUIPMENT (GENERAL). AT THE REGIMENTAL LEVEL THESE SECTIONS PRIMARILY SERVE A QUALITY CONTROL FUNCTION; THE "WORKING-BEE" SPECIALISTS ARE MAINLY IN THE SQUADRON. THE SECOND DIVISION IS SUBDIVIDED INTO THE SAME SECTIONS AS THE ENGINEERING SECTIONS AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PHASE MAINTENANCE OF THE AIRCRAFT.

3. THERE IS A PRELIMINARY PREPARATION OF THE AIRCRAFT PRIOR TO A FLIGHT. IN ADDITION, BY REGULATION, THERE ARE TWO "SERVICING DAYS" PER MONTH. FINALLY, A PHASE OR "SERIES" INSPECTION OF PARTICULAR COMPONENTS OF AIRCRAFT IS CONDUCTED WHEN DUE. THERE ARE TIME LIMITS BETWEEN MAINTENANCE TASKS. DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEM, MAINTENANCE WORK IS DONE, FOR EXAMPLE, EVERY 50 HOURS. THERE ARE ALSO 24-HOUR, 100-HOUR, AND 200-HOUR JOBS. EACH TIMESPAN HAS ITS OWN PARTICULAR CHECKLIST, AND ALL TECHNICAL WORK IS DONE AT THE

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


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TECHNICAL EXPLOITATION SECTION (TECH). ENGINES ARE CHANGED APPROXIMATELY EVERY 200 TO 250 HOURS. OLD ENGINES ARE SENT TO A FACTORY IN THE MOSCOW AREA AND ARE OVERHAULED.

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4. [REDACTED] THE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM DESCRIBED IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS FOR FRONTAL AVIATION UNITS, BECAUSE PVO INHERITED THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FROM THE SOVIET AIR FORCE (VVS). AIR FORCE COMMENT: OTHER SOURCES HAVE INDICATED THAT REGIMENTAL MAINTENANCE SECTION COMMANDERS ALSO POSSESS COLLEGE EDUCATIONS FROM A MILITARY TECHNICAL SCHOOL (SUCH AS THE FOUR-YEAR DAUGAVPILS AVIATION TECHNICAL SCHOOL, WHICH PARALLELS THE HIGHER AVIATION SCHOOL SYSTEM FOR PILOTS).



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013774

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Soviet Air Force

CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/01/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400274

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*Sanitized 9/21/05*  
9/28/10

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted  
E.O. 12958 (EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE)  
19 09-141 #26  
CIA 02N 9128/10  
By del NARA, Date 12/14/10

COMPOSITION OF AN APVO SQUADRON

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THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0473 76.

1. A TYPICAL APVO SQUADRON HAS 13 AIRCRAFT (12 FIGHTERS AND ONE TRAINER) AND 16 PILOTS ASSIGNED. THREE SQUADRONS COMPOSE A REGIMENT. SQUADRONS ARE DESIGNATED 1ST, 2ND OR 3RD AVIATION SQUADRON. THERE ARE NO EXCLUSIVE DESIGNATORS IN AN OPERATIONAL PVO SQUADRON AND NO NICKNAMES, CRESTS, OR PATCHES. THE SQUADRON'S ORGANIZATION IS COMPOSED OF

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USAF review(s) completed.

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5X1 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE UNITS.

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2. TO A LIMITED EXTENT, THE OPERATIONS OF A PVO SQUADRON ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF A REGIMENT. THE SQUADRON COMMANDER IS TYPICALLY A LT. COLONEL INSTRUCTOR PILOT - PILOT 1ST CLASS. [REDACTED] INCOMING COMMANDER (OF THE MIG-25 UNIT) WAS A MAJOR WHO HAD RECENTLY GRADUATED FROM SENIOR COMMANDER UPGRADE TRAINING. THE COMMANDER-DESIGNATE ASSUMES COMMENSURATE RANK (WITH THE OLD COMMANDER) AFTER COMPLETING COMBAT. SOURCE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER OR NOT ALL COMMANDERS HAD TO BE GRADUATES OF SENIOR COMMANDER UPGRADE TRAINING.

3. (IN [REDACTED] MIG-25 REGIMENT) THE SQUADRON COMMANDER HAD FIVE DEPUTIES - EACH WITH THE RANK OF MAJOR. THE DEPUTY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MAINTAINED SQUADRON PARTY AFFAIRS AND ALSO WORKED WITH THE COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE. THE DEPUTY FOR FLIGHT TRAINING AND THE DEPUTY SQUADRON COMMANDER WERE PILOTS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE ENGINEER (SQUADRON MAINTENANCE OFFICER) WERE NONFLYING DEPUTIES. THERE WAS NO WEAPONS/ TACTICS OFFICER AT THE SQUADRON LEVEL.

4. EACH PVO SQUADRON IS SUBDIVIDED INTO THREE FLIGHTS - FOUR PILOTS TO A FLIGHT. THE FLIGHT COMMANDER IS AN INSTRUCTOR PILOT BUT NOT NECESSARILY A PILOT 1ST CLASS. THE FLIGHT COMMANDER HOLDS THE RANK OF CAPTAIN AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAINING THE PILOTS ASSIGNED TO HIS FLIGHT. THE THREE PILOTS ASSIGNED MAY BE OF ANY CLASS, ANY RANK.

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BELOW CAPTAIN, AND GENERALLY VARY IN EXPERIENCE LEVEL. EACH PILOT IS TERMED A CREW COMMANDER (REFER TO THE PILOT/CREW CHIEF RELATIONSHIP DISCUSSED BELOW).

5. ONE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IS ASSIGNED FOR EACH PILOT POSITION IN A FLIGHT (THREE FLIGHTS X FOUR PILOTS - 12 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT PER SQUADRON). FOR READINESS (ALERT) PURPOSES, EACH PILOT IS ASSIGNED A SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT. ON A DAILY BASIS, HE MAY FLY ANY OF THE ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO DEFINITE SCHEDULE, SIDE NUMBERS (DEBRIEFER'S NOTE: TAIL NUMBERS IN U.S. TERMINOLOGY) CHANGE PERIODICALLY (ONE MONTH TO SIX MONTH INTERVALS).

6. IN ADDITION TO BEING SUBORDINATE TO THE SQUADRON COMMANDER, THE PVO SQUADRON MAINTENANCE OFFICER (ENGINEER) IS ALSO SUBORDINATE TO THE REGIMENTAL MAINTENANCE OFFICER. HE IS NONRATED, HOLDS THE RANK OF MAJOR, AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO HIS SQUADRON.


7. THE SQUADRON MAINTENANCE SECTION IS COMPOSED OF SIX "SUBUNITS." THE SUBUNITS SPECIALIZE IN ENGINE, WEAPONS/ARMAMENT, AUTOPILOT (SAU), RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, RADAR EQUIPMENT, AND AVIATION EQUIPMENT (GENERAL) SERVICES. THE MAJORITY OF ROUTINE MAINTENANCE IS ACCOMPLISHED AT SQUADRON LEVEL.

8. IN A SOVIET FIGHTER UNIT, EACH CREW CHIEF IS AN OFFICER WITH

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(X1) A FOUR-YEAR ENGINEERING DEGREE AND HOLDS A RANK OF SENIOR LIEUTENANT OR LESS. HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE OF ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT AND REPORTS TO THE PILOT TO WHOM THE AIRCRAFT IS ASSIGNED (FOR READINESS PURPOSES). THE PILOT RATES THE CREW CHIEF, APPROVES LEAVE, ETC. SHOULD THE AIRCRAFT GO TO "TECH" (REGIMENTAL MAINTENANCE) FOR PERIODIC MAINTENANCE, THE CREW CHIEF ACCOMPANIES THE AIRCRAFT TO ASSIST IN SOME OF THE WORK AND INSPECTIONS. TWO ENLISTED MEN ASSIST THE CREW CHIEF IN ROUTINE MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS. PILOTS ARE TERMED CREW COMMANDERS BECAUSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS BETWEEN A PILOT AND CREW CHIEF - THAT OF THE PILOT BEING THE CREW CHIEF'S REPORTING OFFICIAL AND IN LINE OF COMMAND.

9. ALTHOUGH A CREW CHIEF IS AN OFFICER AND MAY BE OF RANK EQUIVALENT TO THE PILOT (HIS CREW COMMANDER/REPORTING OFFICIAL) ASSIGNED TO AN AIRCRAFT, HE DOES NOT ENJOY THE SAME PRESTIGE. [REDACTED]

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(3) [REDACTED] CREW CHIEFS ARE TREATED POORLY IN TERMS OF RANK, PROMOTIONS, AND OTHER OPPORTUNITIES - AND, DO NOT ENJOY AUTHORITY COMMENSURATE TO RESPONSIBILITY. THE CREW CHIEFS DO NOT TAKE PRIDE IN THEIR WORK BUT DO INSURE THAT MAINTENANCE IS PERFORMED CORRECTLY.

(3) [REDACTED] PILOTS TRUST THE CREW CHIEFS TO THE POINT THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT AND FLY THE AIRCRAFT BASED ON THE CREW CHIEF'S VERBAL ASSURANCE THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS OPERATIONALLY READY-

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
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WITHOUT A PREFLIGHT CHECK. NONETHELESS, THE PILOTS PERFORM THE PREFLIGHT CHECKS BY THE REGULATIONS. IF A MALFUNCTION RESULTING IN AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT OCCURRED WHICH COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO A CREW CHIEF ERROR, THE CREW CHIEF WOULD FACE STRICT DISCIPLINARY ACTION - POSSIBLY INTERNMENT.



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