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DATE WITHDRAWN 09/05/2001

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6/8/12

USSR/JAPAN: (FOXBAT Exploitation) 30 SEP 76

(MAP) Round-the-clock exploitation of the Soviet
MIG-25/FOXBAT by [redacted] Japanese teams is continuing at
Hyakuri. [redacted]

[redacted]

The return of the FOXBAT to the Soviets is scheduled
for mid-October. The crated aircraft components will be
loaded aboard a Russian ship at one of these two ports
(FLIP).

Meanwhile, an engine run-up test is scheduled to take
place at Hyakuri on 2 October. ~~The status of exploitation~~
~~as of yesterday morning is shown here (RR).~~ Some of the
requirements will not be met because they would involve
detailed testing and lab work ... activities that are not
contemplated. (SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL)

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 09-087, # 27

DIA 21310; NASIC 421 51311; CIA 421 61812

By d.e.l. NARA, Date 10/26/12



KYODO REPORTS JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY LETTER ON BELENKO

0W30045 TOKYO KYODO IN ENGLISH 0022 GMT 30 SEP 76 0W

(TEXT) TOKYO, SEPT 30 KYODO--THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WEDNESDAY PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION WITH AN EXPLANATORY LETTER TO COUNTER THE "SLANDEROUS PERVERSION" OF THE TRUTH ABOUT THE RECENT DEPARTURE OF A SOVIET AIR FORCE OFFICER FROM JAPAN TO THE UNITED STATES TO SEEK ASYLUM.

THE FOUR-PAGE LETTER WAS HANDED AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO VIKTOR DENISOV, COUNSELLOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN TOKYO, BY TAKESHIRO TOGO, DIRECTOR OF THE MINISTRY'S FIRST EUROPE DIVISION.

IT SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN FALSIFYING THE FACTS ABOUT THE SOVIET PILOT'S SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES TO "GROUNDLESSLY SLANDER" JAPAN IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT THE INCIDENT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN CHARGING THAT THE PILOT, LT VIKTOR IVANOVITCH BELENKO, WHO FLEW ON A SOVIET TOP SECRET MIG-25 PLANE TO HAKODATE IN HOKKAIDO ON SEPTEMBER 6 TO SEEK ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES, WAS FLOWN TO THE UNITED STATES FORCIBLY AGAINST HIS WILL.

THE CHARGE WAS MADE IN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS HANDED OVER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR DMITRIY POLYANSKIY AND ALSO AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD BY THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY IN MOSCOW TUESDAY.

BESIDES HANDING OVER THE LETTER, TOGO ALSO SHOWED DENISOV PHOTOGRAPHS AND OTHER MATERIAL TO PROVE THAT THE SOVIET PILOT HAD LEFT JAPAN TO LIVE IN THE UNITED STATES IN EXILE ON HIS OWN WILL.

TOGO ALSO SHOWED TWO HANDWRITTEN LETTERS WITH SIGNATURES BY BELENKO STATING THAT THE SOVIET PILOT DECIDED TO LIVE IN THE UNITED STATES ON HIS OWN FREE WILL AND THAT HE DOES NOT WISH TO MEET WITH ANY OFFICIAL OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS SAID THAT THEY TRIED TO HAND OVER THE TWO LETTERS, DATED SEPTEMBER 7, TO POLYANSKIY TO THE PAST. BUT THE SOVIET ENVOY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE LETTERS BY SAYING THAT BELENKO COULD HAVE BEEN FORCED TO WRITE SUCH LETTERS AGAINST HIS WILL, THEY SAID.

ACCORDING TO A TOP FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL, MEANWHILE, JAPAN WILL HAVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION SHORTLY ON THE PROPOSED RETURN OF THE MIG-25 PLANE.

THE PLANE WAS TRANSPORTED FROM HAKODATE TO THE HYAKURI BASE OF THE AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE IN IBARAKI PREFECTURE LAST WEEK TO CONTINUE EXAMINATIONS BY ASDF EXPERTS TO FIND EVIDENCE OF THE SUSPECTED INTRUSION OF THE JAPANESE TERRITORIAL AIR SPACE BY THE AIRCRAFT.

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE TIMING OF THE HANDING OVER OF THE PLANE WILL DEPEND ON HOW AND WHERE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WISH TO RECEIVE THE PLANE.

HE SAID THAT HE HOPES THE SOVIET UNION CARRIES BACK THE PLANE FROM A JAPANESE PORT ABOARD A NONMILITARY SOVIET CARGOSHIP.

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TOKYO (AP) -- JAPANESE DEFENSE EXPERTS SAY THE SOVIET UNION'S TOP FIGHTER JET, THE MIG25, IS A "FLYING TANK," A HIGH-ALTITUDE INTERCEPTOR RATHER THAN A DOGFIGHTER, DEFENSE AGENCY SOURCES SAID TODAY.

EXPERTS EXAMINING THE MIG FLOWN TO JAPAN BY A DEFECTOR THREE WEEKS AGO CONSIDER THE FORMERLY SUPER-SECRET PLANE IS ONE OF WORLD'S TOP FIGHTERS DESPITE SOME OUTDATED EQUIPMENT.

THE MIG FLOWN TO HAKODATE IN NORTHERN JAPAN BY LT. VIKTOR BELENKO WAS DISMANTLED AND CLOSELY ANALYZED BY JAPANESE AND U.S. EXPERTS AT A JAPANESE AIR FORCE BASE IN NORTHERN JAPAN. BELENKO WAS GRANTED ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE EXAMINATION AND JAPAN'S REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE MOSCOW'S DEMANDS FOR IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE PLANE AND PILOT HAVE BROUGHT SHARP CRITICISM FROM THE SOVIETS. SIX JAPANESE FISHING VESSELS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN SEIZED BY THE RUSSIANS SINCE THE DEFECTION, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT ACKNOWLEDGED THE REPORTS.

THE JAPANESE EXPERTS SAID THE MIG25 HAD AN EJECTION SEAT, CONTRADICTING REPORTS THAT THERE WAS NONE.

THEY SAID OUTDATED VACUUM TUBES WERE USED IN ITS ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT. WHETHER THE MIG25'S ELECTRONICS WERE BACKWARD IS STILL UNDETERMINED AND AWAIT FURTHER THOROUGH EXAMINATION.

THE EXPERTS ALSO NOTED THE MIG25 HAD NO CANNONS, WHICH WERE APPARENTLY SACRIFICED TO GIVE MORE SPEED TO THE PLANE.

THE JAPANESE TECHNICIANS MADE PARTICULAR NOTE OF THE MIG25'S TWO HUGE ENGINES, WHICH HAVE EXHAUST PORTS OF ABOUT ALMOST FIVE FEET IN DIAMETER, 50 PER CENT LARGER THAN THOSE ON THE U.S. PHANTOM JET FLOWN BY THE JAPANESE AIR FORCE, THE SOURCES SAID.


THEY WERE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE MIG25'S MAXIMUM THRUST IS BELIEVED TO EXCEED THAT OF THE PHANTOM BY EIGHT TONS AND THAT OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE'S F14 AND F15 FIGHTERS BY 15 TONS.

THE MIG25 WEIGHS ABOUT 20 TONS WITH NO LOAD, MUCH HEAVIER THAN ORIGINALLY EXPECTED, AND WOULD WEIGH ABOUT 35 TONS WITH FUEL AND ARMS, THE EXPERTS SAID.

THE PLANE IS MADE MOSTLY OF STEEL INSTEAD OF TITANIUM, THE STRONG, LIGHT METAL USED IN U.S. INTERCEPTORS, THEY SAID.

THE SOURCES SAID THE EXPERTS BELIEVE THE SOVIET PLANE IS PROBABLY NOT ABLE TO FLY AT MORE THAN MACH 3, OR THREE TIMES THE SPEED OF SOUND. IT WAS APPARENTLY DEVELOPED TO INTERCEPT THE U.S. AIR FORCE'S B70 BOMBER EXPERIMENTALLY PRODUCED IN 1964 AND 1965 TO REPLACE THE B52.

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*Soviets still aggressive over MIG issue;
little permanent damage to USSR-60J
relations seen.*

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3655/56
AMCONGEN HONG KONG 7445/46
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2266/67
USLO PEKING 1858/59
USFU YOKOTA AB JAPAN
CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 14619

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA, UR, MARR

SUBJ: JAPAN/SOVIET RELATIONS; KOSAKA-GROMYKO MEETING IN NEW YORK

SUMMARY: DURING TOUGH BILATERAL AT UNGA SOVFORMIN GROMYKO SAID GOJ HAD HANDLED MIG-25 AS IF JAPAN-USSR "AT WAR," ACCUSING JAPANESE OF PREYING ON PLANE LIKE "MOUNTAIN DOG" AND OFFERING IT AS PRIZE TO AMERICAN MILITARISTS, GROMYKO THREATENED COMPETITION OF PRESSURE AND DEMANDED IMMEDIATE RETURN OF PLANE.

KOSAKA STOOD HIS GROUND STATING THAT MIG-25 WOULD BE RETURNED IN NEAR FUTURE AT TIME WHICH WOULD BE MADE KNOWN TO GROMYKO THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, HE REITERATED THAT BELENKO HAD SOUGHT ASYLUM OF FREE WILL AND THAT JAPAN HAD WORKED TO GAIN SOVIET ACCESS TO HIM. JAPANESE MEDIA HAS GIVEN SUBSTANCE AND ATMOSPHERE OF MEETING FULL TREATMENT, FONOFF EXPECTS SOVIETS BOTH TO KEEP PRESSURE ON AND TO TAKE SOME RETALIATORY MEASURE, BUT BELIEVES INCIDENT WILL HAVE NO LASTING EFFECT ON SOVIET-JAPAN RELATIONS. IN MEANTIME, THOUGH MIG-25 ISSUE CONTINUES TO DOMINATE JAPAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HERE, SOME ROUTINE BUSINESS IS BEING TRANSACTED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. END SUMMARY.

1. BRIEFING EMBOFF FROM TEXT OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM NEW YORK, FIRST EAST EUROPEAN DIVDIR T000 DESCRIBED KOSAKA-GROMYKO SEPTEMBER 27 AS "VERY TOUGH MEETING," ONE HOUR AND 15 MINUTE ENCOUNTER ATTENDED ON SOVIET SIDE BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AND ON JAPANESE SIDE BY DEFFONMIN ARITA AND PERMREP ABE. KOSAKA BEGAN WITH GENERAL STATE-

*****WHHR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, LL

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PAGE 01

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E.O. 12858, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/23/02
BY HR NARA, DATE 1/28/03



MENT ON SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 20 YEARS HAD PASSED, HE SAID, SINCE THE RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND JAPAN WAS ANXIOUS TO CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH INCLUDED REVERSION OF THE FOUR NORTHERN TERRITORY ISLANDS, THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE UPCOMING FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AGREED TO LAST JANUARY. KOSAKA ASKED GROMYKO TO PROMOTE VISIT TO JAPAN BY A TOP RANKING SOVIET LEADER.

2. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT THOUGH IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TALK ABOUT A PEACE TREATY AS HE HAD LAST JANUARY, THERE WAS NO QUESTION WHATSOEVER OF DISCUSSING THE FOUR ISLANDS, AND NO POINT OF MENTIONING THIS SUBJECT. NOTHING WOULD COME OF SUCH A DISCUSSION. HE HAD AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF A PEACE TREATY IN MOSCOW WITH THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER BUT KNEW NOTHING OF INCLUDING TALK ABOUT THE FOUR ISLANDS. HE WAS HOWEVER PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT OTHER ASPECTS OF PEACE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS. THE JAPANESE SIDE OFTEN TALKED OF A DESIRE FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS, GROMYKO CONTINUED, BUT A WIDE GAP EXISTED BETWEEN JAPANESE WORDS AND DEEDS. KOSAKA REMINDED GROMYKO THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD AGREED TO NEGOTIATE A PEACE TREATY, DISCUSSING IN THE PROCESS UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF WHICH THE FOUR ISLANDS WERE ONE. GROMYKO REPEATED FLATLY THAT THERE WAS NO USE TALKING ABOUT THIS SUBJECT.

3. FOR THE RECORD, KOSAKA THEN BROUGHT UP JAPANESE COMPLAINTS ABOUT SOVIET FISHING ACTIVITIES NEAR JAPANESE WATERS, HARRASSMENT OF JAPANESE FISHING VESSELS, AND NEW SOVIET REGULATIONS REGARDING JAPANESE VISITS TO GRAVES ON ISLANDS (SINCE MAY 1976 SOVIETS HAVE DEMANDED THAT JAPANESE VISITORS TO HABOMAI AND SHIKOTAN CARRY PASSPORTS AND BE ISSUED SOVIET VISAS INSTEAD OF GOJ FOREIGN MINISTRY CARDS ROUTINELY CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT BEFORE).

4. TURNING TO MIG-25, KOSAKA DESCRIBED PROBLEM AS TROUBLESOME AND ONE WHICH JAPAN ANXIOUS TO SOLVE WITHOUT DAMAGE TO FRIENDLY JAPAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE EXPLAINED THAT MIG HAD BEEN OBSTACLE TO CIVIL AVIATION WHERE IT HAD LANDED IN HAKODATE, AND HAD CONSEQUENTLY BEEN MOVED TO HYAKURI AIR BASE. KOSAKA SAID JAPAN WOULD RETURN THE PLANE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2509

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3655/56
AMCONGEN HONG KONG 7445/46
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2266/67
USLO PEKING 1858/59
USFJ YOKOTA AB JAPAN
CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 TOKYO 14619

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5. GROMYKO RESPONDED WITH "VIOLENT" DENUNCIATION, TOGO REPORTED. SOVPOPMIN SAID WORDS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PROMISED FRIENDLY RELATIONS BUT ACTIONS DEMONSTRATED ANIMOSITY TOWARD SOVIET UNION. HAD JAPANESE SIDE WANTED FRIENDLY RELATIONS IT WOULD HAVE GIVEN BACK PLANE AND PILOT IMMEDIATELY. INSTEAD, GOJ "ACTED AS IF BOTH COUNTRIES AT WAR," IN CONTRADICTION TO BASIC RULES OF DECORUM BETWEEN NATIONS DEVELOPED OVER CENTURIES. EVEN DURING VIETNAM WAR WHEN UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT MADE EMERGENCY LANDING IN SOVIET FAR EAST, SOVIETS HAD RETURNED PLANE NEXT DAY. ON ANOTHER OCCASION, WHEN AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HAD STRAYED INTO SOVIET TERRITORY IN THE CAUCASUS SIX YEARS AGO, SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD QUICKLY RETURNED AIRCRAFT. NOT ONLY HAD JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PREYED ON PLANE LIKE "MOUNTAIN DOG," BUT HAD ALSO OFFERED IT AS PRIZE TO AMERICAN MILITARISTS.

6. KOSAKA REPLIED THAT THERE WAS MUCH MISUNDERSTANDING SURROUNDING THE CASE. THE PILOT HAD SOUGHT ASYLUM OF HIS FREE WILL AND THE GOJ HAD ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CUSTOM, RESPECTING THE WISHES OF THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED. THE AIRCRAFT HAD LANDED IN A CIVILIAN AIRPORT WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION, AND JAPAN HAD TAKEN ACTION ACCORDINGLY AS A SOVEREIGN NATION. HELP HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE US AS NECESSARY TO MOVE THE AIRCRAFT, NOT AS A JOINT EFFORT BUT UNDER JAPANESE INITIATIVE AND DIRECTION. GOJ CONSIDERED MIG AFFAIR A SMALL INCIDENT, AND WOULD RETURN PLANE SOON, KOSAKA REPEATED.

7. GROMYKO RESPONDED WITH A DIATRIBE OVER THE HANDLING OF DEPEC-

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, LL

PSN1006654 RECALLED PAGE 01 TOR:274/05:49Z DTG:300430Z SEP 76



TOR BELENKO, REHEARSING FAMILIAR POINTS OF SOVIET POSITION. PILOT HAD FLOWN OFF COURSE, AND BEEN FORCED UNDER INFLUENCE OF NARCOTICS TO TRAVEL TO UNITED STATES AGAINST HIS WILL. INCIDENT HAD STARTED AS SMALL ONE TO BE SURE, BUT JAPANESE ACTION HAD TURNED IT INTO MAJOR ISSUE WHICH HAD DAMAGED SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS. "AT INSTIGATION OF THIRD PARTY, JAPAN TRIED TO PUT PRESSURE ON SOVIET UNION," GROMYKO CONTINUED. "IF JAPAN WANTS IT, THEN LET US TRY TO SEE WHICH SIDE CAN EXERT THE MOST PRESSURE," JAPAN OR THE USSR. HE THEN ASKED FOR PRECISE DATE, TIME AND MEANS BY WHICH AIRCRAFT WOULD BE RETURNED. KOSAKA REPLIED THAT GROMYKO WOULD BE INFORMED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. HE THEN REITERATED JAPANESE POSITION ON HANDLING OF BELENKO

STRESSING EFFORTS JAPANESE HAD MADE TO ARRANGE SOVIET ACCESS TO DEFECTOR PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM JAPAN.

8. ADDRESSING HIMSELF IN CONCLUSION TO COMPLAINTS KOSAKA HAD LISTED DURING OPENING PRESENTATION, GROMYKO SAID JAPANESE SIDE WOULD HAVE TO RESPECT SOVIET LAWS GOVERNING GRAVE VISITS, AND SISHING IN SOVIET WATERS. OFFENDERS WOULD BE PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE LAWS. ALL ACTIONS TAKEN BY SOVIET FISHERMEN IN AREAS OF JAPAN WERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

9. COMMENTS MEETING HAS RECEIVED HEAVY AND DETAILED TREATMENT IN PRESS, INCLUDING GROMYKO'S THREAT TO ENGAGE IN A COMPETITION OF PRESSURE. MUCH HAS BEEN MADE IN MEDIA HERE OF SEVERE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING MEETING, INCLUDING KOSAKA COMMENT, "NOT A CUP OF WATER WAS OFFERED."

10. TOGO INTERPRETED GROMYKO BLUSTER AS SOVIET EFFORT TO EXERT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR RETURN OF PLANE. ONCE AIRCRAFT BACK IN SOVIET HANDS SOME RETALIATORY MEASURE SEEMED LIKELY. IN LONG RUN, TOGO CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY POWER BALANCE CONSIDERATIONS THAT SHAPE BASIC RELATIONSHIP NOW AND INCIDENT WOULD HAVE LITTLE LASTING EFFECT.

11. JAPANESE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO HAVE AT EACH OTHER IN TOKYO ON SUBJECT OF MIG. TOGO CALLED DENISOV IN SEPTEMBER 29 TO HAD HIM WRITTEN REPUTATION OF SOVIET COMPLAINTS DENISOV HAD MADE TWO DAYS BEFORE. BOTH COMPLAINTS AND REPUTATION COVERED FAMILIAR GROUND AGAIN. AT SAME TIME THERE ARE SOME SIGNS OF BUSINESS AS USUAL BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. A FEW HOURS BEFORE GROMYKO-KOSAKA MEETING, AMBASSADOR POLYANSKY WAS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY HERE SIGNING JOINT AGREEMENT TO WHALING QUOTAS.

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Thursday, Sept. 30, 1976



United Press International

Photo distributed by Soviets shows Mig pilot Viktor Belenko with son, Dmitry.

Mig Pilot Tells Soviets He's in U.S. Voluntarily

The State Department arranged a meeting here Tuesday between representatives of the Soviet embassy and Viktor Belenko, the Soviet air force lieutenant who flew a Mig-25 jet fighter to Japan and defected.

State Department officials confirmed yesterday that the meeting took place, but would reveal few details. They said that Belenko agreed

been coerced to defect. Japanese and U.S. officials have denied this.

The Soviets held a press conference in Moscow Tuesday at which Belenko's wife and mother tearfully declared that the pilot could not possibly have defected voluntarily.

Tuesday's meeting at the State Department was a courtesy to the Soviet Union, American officials indicated. The consular convention between the two countries does not apply in a case of defection to the United States, had





United Press International

Photo distributed by Soviets shows Mig pilot Viktor Belenko with son, Dmitry.

Mig Pilot Tells Soviets He's in U.S. Voluntarily

The State Department arranged a meeting here Tuesday between representatives of the Soviet embassy and Viktor Belenko, the Soviet air force lieutenant who flew a Mig-25 jet fighter to Japan and defected.

State Department officials confirmed yesterday that the meeting took place, but would reveal few details. They said that Belenko agreed voluntarily to the 50-minute meeting.

Belenko told the Soviet diplomats that he had defected voluntarily and had no desire to return to the U.S.S.R., American officials said.

[Japan yesterday announced it is ready to start negotiations within the next few days for the return of the Mig-25 to the Soviet Union, Reuter reported in Tokyo.]

[The Japanese Foreign Ministry yesterday released copies of two letters it said were written by Belenko, saying he did not want to return to the Soviet Union and that he had made the decision of his own free will to reside in the United States, Reuter said.]

There were indications yesterday that Belenko is residing in the Washington area. He is undergoing debriefing by the Central Intelligence Agency and other government agencies, according to official sources.

A spokesman for the Soviet embassy declined to discuss the matter yesterday, but said he might be able to today—an indication that the embassy is seeking guidance from Moscow.

The Soviets have contended publicly that Belenko flew his Mig-25 to Japan by mistake, and must have

been coerced to defect. Japanese and U.S. officials have denied this.

The Soviets held a press conference in Moscow Tuesday at which Belenko's wife and mother tearfully declared that the pilot could not possibly have defected voluntarily.

Tuesday's meeting at the State Department was a courtesy to the Soviet Union, American officials indicated. The consular convention between the two countries does not apply in a case of defection, so the United States had no obligation to make Belenko available to Soviet officials here.

The Soviets had an opportunity to raise the Belenko matter on a high level last night when Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was scheduled to dine in New York with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.



DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt

AUTHORITY RAC Review 9/21/05
BY ldn NLF, DATE 5/16/07

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USAF review(s) completed

DIA review(s) completed

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THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0411 76.

SUMMARY: THIS REPORT DISCUSSES SOVIET AIR FORCE PRELIMINARY FLIGHT PLANNING AND PREPARATION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED THE DAY PRIOR TO AND ON THE DAY OF ACTUAL FLIGHT.

1. A) SOVIET PILOTS ASSIGNED [Redacted] DEVOTE THE ENTIRE DAY PRIOR TO SCHEDULED FLIGHT TO SORTIES PLANNING, TRAINING, AND FAMILIARIZATION. FOR DUTY REQUIREMENTS, PILOTS

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REFER TO A WEEKLY FLIGHT SCHEDULE.

B) ON THE MORNING PRIOR TO ACTUAL FLIGHT, PILOTS REPORT TO THE UNIT HEADQUARTERS WHERE SORTIE REQUIREMENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO EACH PILOT BY THE FLIGHT COMMANDER. NORMALLY, THREE PILOTS ARE ASSIGNED THE SAME MISSION PROFILE AND ARE INDIVIDUALLY INSTRUCTED ON THE DETAILS OF THE FLIGHT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE FLIGHT COMMANDER INSTRUCTS ONE PILOT TO FLY TWO COMBAT MANEUVER SORTIES IN A CERTAIN AREA AND ONE NAVIGATIONAL TRAINING FLIGHT ALONG A SPECIFIED ROUTE; HE THEN TURNS TO ANOTHER PILOT PARTICIPATING IN THE SAME FLIGHT AND REPEATS THESE SAME VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS. PILOTS ARE REQUIRED TO WRITE DOWN ALL INSTRUCTIONS IN GREAT DETAIL IN CLASSIFIED TRAINING NOTEBOOKS. AT THIS TIME THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR ORDERS ALL PILOTS TO PREPARE FLIGHT PLANS FOR EACH SORTIE. PILOTS ARE REQUIRED TO PREPARE THREE FLIGHT PLANS FOR EACH SCHEDULED SORTIE -- ONE PLAN FOR VFR [VISUAL FLIGHT RULES] CONDITIONS, ONE PLAN FOR A FLIGHT IN WHICH HE MAY ENCOUNTER BOTH VFR AND IFR [INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES] CONDITIONS, AND ONE PLAN FOR IFR CONDITIONS. THUS FOR THREE SORTIES EACH PILOT MUST PREPARE NINE DIFFERENT FLIGHT PLANS.

C) FLIGHT PLANS MUST PORTRAY EVERY DETAIL OF EACH SORTIE

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BY USE OF APPROPRIATE NOTATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND SCHEMATICS. FOR THEIR PLANNING, THE PILOTS REFER TO CLASSIFIED REFERENCE MATERIALS SUCH AS THE "COMBAT TRAINING COURSE" MATERIALS WHICH OUTLINES THE FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH TYPE OF MISSION. THE FOLLOWING IS A DEPICTION, OF A TYPICAL MISSION PREPARATION. THE PILOT DRAWS A GRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE ENTIRE MISSION IN HIS NOTEBOOK, INDICATING EVERY ASPECT OF THE MISSION PLAN. EXAMPLES ARE: TAKEOFF AND CLIMB--15 METERS; GEAR UP, 100 METERS; RETRACT FLAPS, 1,000 METERS; TURN OFF AFTERBURNER; 45 DEGREE BANKED TURN--AIRSPEED, 700 KM/HR, 85 PERCENT POWER. THE FLIGHT ROUTE IS DIAGRAMMED IN DETAIL AND EVERY ACTION IS PLANNED AND NOTED. EVERY PHASE OF EVERY MANEUVER (DIVES, COMBAT TURNS, PULLOUTS AND PULLOUT SPEEDS, AND CLIMBS) IS DRAWN AND ANNOTATED IN THIS MANNER. IF A MANEUVER IS TO BE REPEATED OR A SIMILAR COURSE FLOWN DURING ANY STAGE OF THE MISSION, THE PILOTS MUST ACCOMPLISH NEW DIAGRAMS OR SCHEMATICS AND ANNOTATE ALL ACTIONS AS INDICATED ABOVE. DATA ON MODES OF COMMUNICATION (CALLSIGNS, FREQUENCIES, ETC), BEARING, SPEEDS, ALTITUDES, AND ALL OTHER PERTINENT FLIGHT INFORMATION ARE WRITTEN OUT IN THE PROFILES. EVEN INFORMATION CONCERNING AERODYNAMICS (E.G., DISTRIBUTION AND EFFECTS OF THE LIFT FORCES) IS INCLUDED.

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
PILOTS ARE REQUIRED TO INCLUDE ALL THIS INFORMATION EVEN THOUGH IT HAS ALREADY BEEN MEMORIZED. AFTER A PROFILE IS COMPLETED, IT IS REVIEWED AND EVALUATED BY THE FLIGHT COMMANDER.

D) IN THE AFTERNOON, THE PILOT TAKES HIS NOTEBOOK TO AN AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AND SIMULATES THE ENTIRE PREPLANNED MISSION. WITHOUT TURNING ON THE AIRCRAFT POWER, THE PILOT PRACTICES ALL PREFLIGHT AND INFLIGHT CHECKS, SAFETY CHECKS, EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, AND EVERY ACTION HE WILL UNDERTAKE ON THE ACTUAL MISSION. THIS SIMULATION INCLUDES EVERY MOTION THE PILOT WILL MAKE--MOVEMENT OF THE STICK, TURNING ON SWITCHES, ETC. DURING THIS SIMULATION PERIOD PILOTS ARE EVALUATED BY THEIR FLIGHT COMMANDER, AND APPROPRIATE NOTATIONS ARE MADE IN A SQUADRON/REGIMENTAL LOG INDICATING PILOT PERFORMANCE AND PREPAREDNESS FOR FLIGHT. PRIOR TO THE END OF THIS DUTY DAY, THE SQUADRON COMMANDER OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE (NORMALLY, THE DEPUTY REGIMENTAL COMMANDER) PERFORMS A FINAL EVALUATION BACK AT THE UNIT HEADQUARTERS, USING INFORMATION LOGGED IN THE SQUADRON/REGIMENTAL LOG. BEFORE BEING DISMISSED, THE PILOTS ARE QUIZZED ON FLIGHT OR SAFETY PROCEDURES AND NOTATIONS ARE MADE IN THE LOG CONCERNING THEIR RESPONSES. NO MATTER WHAT ANSWER A PILOT GIVES, IT IS NEVER TOTALLY ADEQUATE AND THE PILOT IS ADMONISHED. TO FINISH

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(classification)

(dis) Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-6-3-9



25X1

THE DUTY DAY, PILOTS ARE USUALLY REQUIRED TO UNDERGO PHYSICAL TRAINING FOR 1 HOUR.

2. DAY OF ACTUAL FLIGHT:

A) PRIOR TO THE START OF DAILY FLYING ACTIVITY, THE FLIGHT SUPERVISOR MUST FLY A WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. THE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT IS CONDUCTED ALONG A DESIGNATED ROUTE TO DETERMINE WHICH CONDITIONS--VFR, VFR/IFR, OR IFR--WILL PREVAIL IN THE AREA WHERE MISSIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE FLOWN. THE FLIGHT SUPERVISOR FLIES THIS MISSION BECAUSE HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL FLIGHT ACTIVITY THAT DAY AND WOULD HAVE TO ANSWER TO SUPERIORS SHOULD A MISHAP OCCUR.

B) ON THE MORNING OF THE SCHEDULED FLIGHT, EACH PILOT IS EXAMINED BY A MILITARY PHYSICIAN, AFTER CHECKING BLOOD PRESSURE, "EENT" (EYES, EARS, NOSE, AND THROAT), AND INQUIRING ABOUT MENTAL AND PHYSICAL WELL-BEING, THE PHYSICIAN ISSUES A MEDICAL CERTIFICATE FOR FLYING.

C) AFTER MEDICAL CHECKS, ALL PILOTS REPORT TO UNIT HEADQUARTERS FOR AIRCREW BRIEFINGS. THIS ENTIRE BRIEFING SESSION IS TAPE RECORDED. THE FIRST BRIEFING CONDUCTED IS THE DAILY WEATHER BRIEFING--CONSISTING OF A COMPOSITE OF A WEATHER FORECAST AND THE RESULTS OF THE WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE. NEXT, THE "REGIMENTAL

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TO

ENGINEER" AND DUTY NAVIGATOR (WHO ACTS AS ASSISTANT FLIGHT SUPERVISOR) BRIEF ON OPERATIONS. THE REGIMENTAL ENGINEER BRIEFS THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS, COVERING SUCH TOPICS AS RECOMMENDED MAXIMUM RPM AND ENGINE TEMPERATURES. HE ALWAYS REMINDS THE PILOTS THAT HIGH-SPEED TAXIING IS PROHIBITED. THE DUTY NAVIGATOR DESIGNATES AIR OPERATIONS AREAS, PROVIDES NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATIONS DATA, AND CONTROLS FLIGHT OPERATIONS. HE INFORMS THE PILOTS WHERE NAVAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT WILL BE OPERATING AND AT WHAT ALTITUDES TO CROSS THESE AREAS. HE ALSO PROVIDES IFF [IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE] CODES AND CALLSIGNS.

D) NEXT, THE FLIGHT SUPERVISOR NORMALLY SUMMARIZES AND EXPOUNDS ON SAFETY MEASURES. [REDACTED] THE PILOTS ARE INCESSANTLY BOMBARDED WITH SAFETY LECTURES AND REMINDED NOT TO EXCEED LIMITATIONS SET FOR AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.

E) ONCE THE AIRCREW BRIEFING IS COMPLETED, PILOTS PREPARE THEIR FLIGHT APPAREL, TO INCLUDE APPROPRIATE FLIGHT SUITS, HELMETS, OXYGEN MASKS, ETC. (AIR FORCE COMMENT : INFORMATION ON SOVIET FLIGHT APPAREL WILL BE DESCRIBED IN A FUTURE REPORT.) AT A DESIGNATED TIME , PILOTS REPORT TO THE FLIGHT LINE, ACCEPT AN AIRCRAFT AND BEGIN IMMEDIATE PREFLIGHT PREPARATIONS. (AIR FORCE COMMENT: INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PREFLIGHT CHECKLIST

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AND AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN SUBSEQUENT REPORTS).

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(classification)

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013742

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION Re Soviet Air Force

CREATION DATE 09/30/1976

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400272

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 7

FOLDER TITLE Japan - MIG-25 Incident (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

Exempt 9/21/05

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013743

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION Re Soviet Air Force

CREATION DATE 09/30/1976

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400272

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 7

FOLDER TITLE Japan - MIG-25 Incident (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

Exempt ~~9/21/05~~

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013744

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION Re MIG-25 and SU-15

CREATION DATE 09/30/1976

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400272

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 7

FOLDER TITLE Japan - MIG-25 Incident (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

Sanitized 9/21/05

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt

AUTHORITY RAC Review 9/21/05
BY lha NLF, DATE 5/14/07

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
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1. [Redacted] THE MIG-25 AND SU-15 TM ARE PROVIDED

WITH AN AUTOMATED GUIDANCE SYSTEM TIED IN WITH AIRCRAFT CONTROLS WHICH ALLOWS GROUND CONTROLLERS TO FLY THE AIRCRAFT WITH THE PILOT IN A "HANDS OFF" MODE. [Redacted] WHEN FULLY

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DEVELOPED, THE SYSTEM WOULD BE CAPABLE OF AUTOMATICALLY VECTORING

DIA review(s) completed

USAF review(s) completed

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
AN AIRCRAFT TO INTERCEPT, FIRING THE MISSILES AND RETURNING THE AIRCRAFT TO FINAL APPROACH (TO WITHIN 50 METERS ALTITUDE OF TOUCHDOWN). (25X1)

2. THE SYSTEM HAS NOT YET BEEN FULLY PERFECTED. ITS USE IS RESTRICTED TO TRAINING MISSIONS ONLY. (25X1)

IT WAS NOT YET KNOWN HOW AN AIRCRAFT WOULD REACT UNDER AUTOMATED CONTROL TO A NONSYMMETRICAL MISSILE LAUNCH. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: A NONSYMMETRICAL MISSILE LAUNCH CONDITION WOULD INVOLVE THE FIRING OF THE OUTERMOST OF THE TWO AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES ON ONE SIDE OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE INNERMOST MISSILE ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE, THEREBY LEAVING THE AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION NONSYMMETRICAL.)

(1) THIS QUESTION HAD NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT. UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS, IT WOULD THEREFORE BE REQUIRED TO TURN OFF THE AUTOMATED SYSTEM AND ASSUME MANUAL CONTROL PRIOR TO

(1) MISSILE LAUNCH. WORK ON FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM IS CONTINUING. (AIR FORCE/DIA COMMENT: A MORE DETAILED REPORT ON THE SYSTEM WILL BE PUBLISHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013745

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION Re Soviet Air Force
CREATION DATE 09/30/1976
VOLUME 4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400272
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 7
FOLDER TITLE Japan - MIG-25 Incident (5)
DATE WITHDRAWN 09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

Sanitized 9/21/05
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DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt

AUTHORITY RDC Review 9/21/05

BY lan NLF, DATE 5/11/07

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1. (AIR FORCE/DIA COMMENT: INFORMATION IN THE FOLLOWING REPORT CONCERNING THE TRAINING OF AN INCREASED NUMBER OF PILOTS FOR A PROJECTED APVO FORCE EXPANSION HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.) [Redacted] PVO FIGHTER AVIATION WAS SCRAMBLING TO CATCH UP AFTER YEARS OF NEGLECT UNDER KHRUSHCHEV.

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USAF review(s) completed
DIA review(s) completed

USAF review(s) completed

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DURING THIS TIME MAJOR EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON DEVELOPMENT OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM) FORCES. THE AVIATION ARM OF PVO BEGAN STRIVING TO MODERNIZE AND EXPAND WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR TO THE HIGH COMMAND THAT AIRCRAFT HAD DEVELOPED THE MEANS TO COUNTERACT SAM DEFENSES. HOWEVER, SERIOUS PROBLEMS HAVE HAMPERED EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE THE FORCE AND TRAIN MORE PILOTS. RAPID CONVERSION OF REGIMENTS IN THE 11TH INDEPENDENT AIR ARMY TO MORE MODERN AIRCRAFT WAS PROVIDED AS A PRIME EXAMPLE. [REDACTED]

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25X1

[REDACTED] FOUR REGIMENTS IN THE ARMY WHICH WERE AT A LOW STATE OF COMBAT READINESS BECAUSE PILOTS WERE CONVERTING OR HAD JUST CONVERTED TO NEW AIRCRAFT. REACHING FULL COMBAT READINESS COULD TAKE UP TO 2 YEARS.

2. [REDACTED] REGIMENT AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM.

IT BEGAN CONVERTING FROM MIG-17'S TO MIG-25'S IN AUGUST 1975.

AT THE TIME OF [REDACTED] IT STILL HAD NOT RECEIVED ITS FULL COMPLEMENT OF 36 AIRCRAFT. ONLY FIVE INSTRUCTOR PILOTS WERE AVAILABLE TO CONDUCT TRAINING. OTHER REGIMENTS WITH POOR COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE 11TH INDEPENDENT AIR ARMY, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ARE AS FOLLOWS:

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LOCATION

CAPABILITY

YELIZOVO

CONVERTED FROM YAK-28P TO SU-15TM
BEGINNING OF 1975. STILL NOT FULLY
CAPABLE.

10TH DISTRICT

CONVERTING FROM SU-9 TO MIG-23.
VERY LOW COMBAT CAPABILITY.

UGLOVOYE

CONVERTING FROM SU-9 TO MIG-23.
VERY LOW COMBAT CAPABILITY.

3. WITHIN THE STAVROPOL AND ARMAVIR PVO FLIGHT ACADEMIES

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[REDACTED] ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS AS FOLLOWS:

A) SUPERSONIC TRAINER AIRCRAFT WERE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

MIG-21'S WERE BEING UTILIZED FOR TRAINING IN SOME SQUADRONS BUT,

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[REDACTED] THIS WAS NOT ADEQUATE AS THERE WERE NO
MIG-21'S IN APVO. ONLY ONE REGIMENT WAS EQUIPPED WITH SU-15'S.

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[REDACTED] THESE AIRCRAFT ADEQUATE BUT IN SHORT SUPPLY.

B) MIG-17'S UTILIZED BY THE FLIGHT TRAINING REGIMENTS
WERE TOTALLY INADEQUATE FOR PREPARING PILOTS FOR SUPERSONIC
INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT. AS A RESULT, MUCH BASIC FLIGHT FAMILIAR-
IZATION WAS CARRIED OUT AT COMBAT INTERCEPTOR REGIMENTS.

C) EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON GRADUATING PILOTS AND STANDARDS
WERE SUBSEQUENTLY LOWERED.

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[REDACTED]

DESPITE PROBLEMS, THE BASIC FLIGHT

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TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT WAS EXPANDING NEVERTHELESS. AT LEAST ONE NEW AIRFIELD WAS UNDER CONSTRUCTION NEAR STAVROPOL. AN ADDITIONAL AIRFIELD AT MARINOVKA, WHICH HAD BEEN EQUIPPED WITH AN SU-9 COMBAT INTERCEPTOR REGIMENT, WAS RECENTLY CLOSED AND TRANSFERRED TO THE SCHOOL TO PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR TWO SQUADRONS OF MIG-17'S TO BE USED FOR EXPANDED TRAINING OF CADETS. (AIR FORCE/

DIA COMMENT: 1) ADDITIONAL AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION IN THE STAVROPOL REGION AND REEQUIPPING OF MARINOVKA HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY OTHER

SOURCES. 2) EVIDENCE HAS BEGUN TO ACCUMULATE [REDACTED] THAT AIRFIELDS ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION FOR ADDITIONAL COMBAT INTERCEPTOR REGIMENTS PROJECTED FOR THE APVO FORCE.)

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[REDACTED]

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(classification)

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt

AUTHORITY RDC Review 9/21/05

BY lha NLF, DATE 5/11/07

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
1. [redacted] INDICATED STRONG INTEREST IN THE KIEV AND ITS YAK AIRCRAFT BUT CLAIMED THAT HE HAD SEEN NOTHING (NO SUBSTANTIVE DATA) PUBLISHED ON EITHER SUBJECT. HOWEVER, HE HAD SEEN A PHOTO OF THE KIEV IN RED STAR AND

DIA review(s) completed

USAF review(s) completed

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(classification)

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BECAUSE OF PERSONAL INTEREST DID SOME ANALYSIS BY MEASURING (ESTIMATING) THE FLIGHT DECK LENGTH. FROM THESE ESTIMATES HE DETERMINED THAT SHE COULD NEVER HOUSE A STANDARD FIGHTER OR INTERCEPTOR. THE THEORY OF THE "KIEV", [REDACTED] IS THAT THIS PLATFORM ALLOWS ADDITIONAL DEPTH OF DEFENSE BY PLACEMENT OF A SHIP SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES OFFSHORE, PROVIDING STAND-OFF AT GREATER RANGES FROM THE HOMELAND. (NAVY COMMENT: [REDACTED] THEORY COULD BE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY HIS OWN PVO STRANY ORIENTATION

2. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY CONCERNING SOVIET INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY OVER (NAK DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT, [REDACTED] THE NEW V/STOL AND (KIEV WERE ONLY IN DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES AND AS SUCH WERE STILL OF SMALL SIGNIFICANCE AS RELATED TO THE MISSION OF OTHER SERVICES, PVO STRANY, FOR EXAMPLE. HE ADDED THAT THE REMAINDER OF SOVIET NAVY AIRCRAFT WERE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED.

3. [REDACTED] THE MISSIONS/ROLES OF OTHER SOVIET AIRCRAFT AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) MIG-25R (RECONNAISSANCE VERSION) IS CONSIDERED A STRATEGIC ASSET.
- (2) MIG-23 IS A MEDIUM ALTITUDE, HIGH-SPEED INTERCEPTOR.
- (3) MIG-27, A MIG-23 VARIANT. IT IS A TACTICAL AIRCRAFT.
- (4) MIG-17 IS NOW RECEIVING NEW ATTENTION AS IT IS BEING CONVERTED TO A TACTICAL ROLE.

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4. (NAVY COMMENTS: [REDACTED] THE "KHRUSHCHEV ERA IS PAST".

IN OTHER WORDS, THE CONCEPT OF USING ROCKETS (MISSILES) FOR CLOSE-IN DEFENSE OF AIRCRAFT IS NO LONGER VALID. CANNONS ARE REPLACING ROCKETS (MISSILES) OR CLOSE-IN DEFENSE.)

[REDACTED]

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(classification)

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013747

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Intelligence Report

TITLE The MIG-25 Foxbat

DESCRIPTION Defense Technical Intelligence Report

CREATION DATE 09/30/1976

VOLUME 18 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400272

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 7

FOLDER TITLE Japan - MIG-25 Incident (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

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6/8/12

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
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Defense Technical Intelligence Report



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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR# 09-087-#35

DIA etv 8/13/10; NASIC etv 5/3/11; CIA etv 6/8/12

By dcl NARA, Date 10/26/12

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT EXPLOITATION REPORT *The MIG-25 FOXBAT*

30 SEPTEMBER 1976



Classified by DIA-DT
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule Of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 1 & 2
Declassify Upon Notification By The
Originator

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
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
MIG-25 FOXBAT

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT EXPLOITATION REPORT

30 SEPTEMBER 1976

These special equipment exploitation reports are being issued to provide timely reporting on the status and results of exploitation activities relating to a MiG-25 FOXBAT which landed in Japan on 6 September 1976. The information is preliminary in nature and may be revised as the exploitation process continues. The data have been obtained by the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) as well as the U.S. exploitation team.

This document was prepared under the direction of the Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, for publication by authority of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.



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
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DEFENSE
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
REPORT

30 SEPTEMBER 1976

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
EXPLOITATION REPORT

The MIG-25 FOXBAT



PREPARED BY



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*This is a Department of Defense intelligence product prepared
by the Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence of
the Defense Intelligence Agency*



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30 September 1976

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT EXPLOITATION REPORT
MiG-25/FOXBAT

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A/I Radar	5
Automatic Flight Control System	7
Short Range Navigation Landing System	7
Data Link	7
Cockpit Visibility	9
Implications	10



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CLASSIFICATION/CORRECTION
NOTICE

Reference "Special Equipment Exploitation Report dated
24 September 1976, Short Title DST-1320R-900-76-RPT 6

Front Cover - Delete caveat

Page 2, paragraph 2, line 5 -
Change (g limit) to read (q limit).

Page 8, paragraph d, line 3 -
Change perchance to read penchant;
line 6 - delete caveat



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SPECIAL EQUIPMENT EXPLOITATION REPORT
MiG-25 FOXBAT

Summary

(S/NOFORN) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On-site technical exploitation ceased on 22 September and final disassembly preparations for loading and shipment via a C-5A aircraft were conducted on 23 September. On 24 September, the FOXBAT was airlifted to Hyakuri Air Base about 60 nm east of Tokyo.

(S/NOFORN) The Phase II exploitation is being conducted in accordance with the Japanese Self Defense Force Test Plan, as modified by requirements from the [REDACTED] on-site exploitation team. During Phase II, power will be applied to all systems and in-depth exploitation will begin in earnest. [REDACTED]

(S/NOFORN) The JET plan covers four primary areas: Avionics/electronics, aerodynamics, structures/materials, and propulsion. Under these areas the general exploitation plan calls for emphasis in obtaining the data necessary for a detailed wind tunnel model, taking avionics/electronics measurements with power on; and performing engine measurements with the engines running and the aircraft tied down. Although requested by the U.S., no IR plume or radar cross-section tests are in the present plan due to time constraints.

*Details on Phase I activity are contained in Defense Technical Intelligence Report dated 24 September 1976 (DST-1320R-900-76-RPT-6)



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Materials and Structures

(S/NOFORN) Tests to determine the material composition of the FOXBAT are continuing. These tests have been performed using a Barcol Hardness tester; however, the utility of this device is limited to aluminum and lower strength alloys. A Rockwell Hardness Tester will be used to verify the hardness of steel and titanium. Chemical and magnetic tests are also being performed.

(S/NOFORN) Based on the Barcol tester, the following components were determined to be aluminum:

- Fin
- Rudder
- Ailerons
- Flaps
- Horizontal stabilizer
- Gear doors
- Spine
- Outer wing trailing edge

(S/NOFORN) Based on magnetic inspection, the following components were determined to be steel:

- Upper fuselage skins aft from the engine inlet
- Upper bleed air dump door
- Lower and side fuselage skins aft from the main gear
- Wing skin between the first and fourth spars (from the root to about three to four feet from the tip)
- Major load transfer fittings of the wing, fin, and horizontal tail
- Landing gear

(S/NOFORN) Chemical analysis was used to determine the composition of the following components.

Titanium



- Engine inlet ramp (inboard leading edge)
- First compressor stator
- After burner secondary nozzle
- Wing outboard leading edge

Steel

- Engine first stage compressor blade
- Afterburner flap nozzle
- Wing span and fuselage fittings
- Portions of the wing and fuselage skin



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FOXBAT: TYPICAL PHASE I (Open Air) EXPLOITATION SCENES

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Aluminum

Engine inlet lower ramp

(S/NOFORN) Except for the titanium engine inlet ramp, all materials corresponded to known Soviet alloys and the engine materials are exactly those based on the Tumanskiy R11 (FISHBED) engine for the same parts.

Aerodynamics

(S/NOFORN) The wing root chord has a 3.7 percent thickness to chord (T/C) ratio. Maximum thickness occurs at 44 percent of chord length. The wing tip has a 5 percent T/C with maximum thickness at 37 percent of chord. The horizontal tails have a T/C of about 5 percent at the root.

(S/NOFORN) The wing span, measured between the center of the wing-tip pods, is 45.44 feet and 44.9 feet with the pods removed. The wing has a break in the leading edge at the outboard pylon station.

(S/NOFORN) The aircraft has two speed brakes--one on the bottom and one on the top of the fuselage. The one on the top is located forward of and beside the drag chute pod. The speed brake is part of the spine sections and is trapezoidal shaped, with a cut-out for the drag chute pod.

(S/NOFORN) The control cables are in the spine and are made of steel wire. The actuators for the ailerons are in the top of the fuselage and tubular control rod linkage is used from the fuselage through the wing to the ailerons. The actuators for the rudders and stabilators are also in the top of the aft fuselage. The actuators for the plain type flaps are in the trailing edge of the wing.

(S/NOFORN) There are three attachment points for the external fuel drop-tank on the bottom of the fuselage. One point is aft on the centerline and two points are forward and to each side of the centerline.

(S/NOFORN) The aft end of the 35-foot long tank appears to be nearly even with the aft end of the exhaust nozzle. This tank appears compatible with the 10,000 pound centerline fuel tank previously estimated for FOXBAT.



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Avionics

Airborne Intercept (A/I) Radar

(S/NOFORN) The basic designator for the FOX FIRE A/I radar used on FOXBAT appears to be SMA. The radar processor and centralized fire control system is designated SMA 2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The circuitry of the radar processor and the fire control computer appears to be completely analog, using "peanut" vacuum tubes for IF/video with some semi-conductor devices for power supply control and motor drive.

(S/NOFORN) The A/I radar consists of an I-Band and a J-Band radar. The I-Band radar appears to serve as both a target tracker in range and angle as well as an illuminator for the semiactive missiles. A sample of the I-Band magnetron RF signal is sent by coaxial cable to each of the four missile pylons. A small horn is mounted on each pylon to provide this I-Band reference signal to each missile seeker head. Since there is no antenna scanning capability to allow the single J-Band feed to angle track, it appears that J-Band radar is range-only. No sample of the J-Band magnetron power goes to the pylons.

(S/NOFORN) The radar antenna system contains a very complex feed system which is completely different from the simple feed assemblies seen on earlier Soviet A/I radars. The actual feed assembly is completely enclosed in a glass bell, suggestive of a pressurized system. The feed assembly contains at least four separate I-Band horns in the center with eight additional horns, probably J-Band, four on each side of the I-Band horns. These I-Band horns support the previous estimate of a LORO (Lobe On Range Only) track mode for the FOX FIRE radar. The function of these eight other horns is unknown. This new and sophisticated approach to antenna design is far advanced over known MIG-21 radar systems.

(S/NOFORN) A thin layer of Radar Absorbent Material (RAM) is present on the bottom of the inner radome. The material is similar to that used on FIDDLER. It helps suppress ground clutter from side-lobe echos. As yet there is no evidence of processing techniques which help to eliminate main beam clutter, i.e., to provide a look-down capability.

(S/NOFORN) There is considerable emphasis on ECCM features, including:

a. Dual, separate I/J Band systems for range information.



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b. Dual channel I-Band angle tracking capability (specific configuration undetermined) believed capable of providing protection against amplitude modulated noise or deception angle scan rate ECM.

c. An additional antenna, basically an open-ended I-Band wave guide, believed to be a side-lobe blanker. It is located directly above the primary scanning antenna.

d. An additional I-Band feed system (function unknown) which consists of a two element dipole array located near the four horn I-Band tracking feeds.

e. Extremely high powered magnetrons. Some components (such as the isolator) consist of two identical devices in parallel for additional power handling capability. A rough estimate of power is 600 to 800 kW for I-Band and 300 to 400 kW for J-Band.

f. Countermeasures against rear-launched chaff exist and are believed to be similar to the MiG-21 SPIN SCAN radar, except a capability to handle both approaching and receding targets has been added. The concept appears to be based on range rate determination to detect lock-on to stationary chaff.

g. Tunable transmitter magnetrons. There are four discrete preset I-Band frequencies which can be changed by simply changing a receiver preselection waveguide filter and changing switch settings on the radar central processor/synchronizer. Measurements of this filter indicate the I-Band frequency is 9327 MHz. The J-Band magnetron has two preset frequencies changed by turning a screw on the magnetron.

(S/NOFORN) Dual-channel capability during tracking with the I-Band is probably accomplished by alternately lobing the four horns. This suggests that FOX FIRE has a scan-with-compression capability. The use of two RF bands would necessitate the jamming of both bands simultaneously. If only the I-Band channel were jammed, angle information would be provided by the I-Band while range information would be provided to the fire control computer by the J-Band, allowing for a missile launch.



(S/NOFORN) Since the J-Band signal may have no scan capability, and no J-Band RF energy is fed to the missile seeker, the probable function of the J-Band signal is a range-only radar. This raises the possibility that the pulsed J-Band portion of TWIN SCAN (carried on FLAGON E) is a range-only radar and not a missile illuminator as previously thought. Further

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analysis of the technology used by FOX FIRE is needed before any firm conclusions can be reached concerning the exact function of the J-Band signals.

Automatic Flight Control System

(S/NOFORN) The mach-function of the SAU-155 Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) is different from any similar system previously seen. Ordinarily the pilot would attain the speed he wishes prior to engagement of the AFCS. With the SAU-155, however, the pilot may preselect one of the following mach numbers: 0.8, 1.2, 1.4, 1.8, 2.1, 2.4, or 2.7. This may be accomplished regardless of the speed at the time of the engagement and may be changed by simply selecting a different mach number. There appears to be small servo motors attached to the throttle linkage which would cause SAU signals to reposition the engine throttle to maintain the new constant speed.

Short Range Navigation Landing System


(S/NOFORN) Convergence angles are used to correct the azimuth signal of the RSBN ground station from an orthodromic north reference system to a true or magnetic reference system. The convergence angle input has the capability to store four convergence angles along with seven waypoints or RSBN stations. Whether each stored convergence angle is associated with one waypoint or can be used interchangeably with all stored waypoints is unknown. This capability to arbitrarily set the north references of the ground station and convert back to true or magnetic in the aircraft has been estimated to give the RSBN a relatively secure mode of operation.

Data Link

(S/NOFORN) During Phase I exploitation, power could not be applied to the aircraft and data link exploitation consisted of identifying system components, inspecting the internals of these units and performing cable tracing as time permitted. All expected components were identified and inspected internally with the exception of the receiver control panel. This unit could not be reached without removing the pilot's ejection seat.



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AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (SAU-155)
MACH-HOLD PANEL




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The data link is called LAZUR, individual processor units are the ARL-SM and LAS. The receiver is designated ZHP and appears to be a modified R802 VHF transceiver.

(S/NOFORN) The data link system appears to be very new (mid-to-late 1975). The receiver contains the carrier pair modulator and uses miniature vacuum tube technology. The tone decoder and associated processor units use transistors and relays.

(S/NOFORN) The existence of an autopilot interface or a down-link could be neither confirmed nor denied because of lack of time for cable tracing. A unit with autopilot nomenclature 6SZ was located in the data link bay. The rest of the 6SZ was concentrated in a separate bay.



Cockpit Visibility

(S/NOFORN) Photography taken from the FOXBAT cockpit indicates the pilot has rather severe visibility restrictions. These are due in part to:

- a. The pilot's ejection seat position which is slightly forward of and nearly level with the wide engine inlet ducts.
- b. A wide overhead canopy bar.



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c. No rearview mirror.

d. A solid bulkhead directly behind the canopy.

e. A flat windshield whose thickness probably hampers visibility.

(S/NOFORN) Compared to U.S. experience, the windshield design does not appear to be adaptable to flight at high mach numbers. A special effort is being made to determine the optical characteristics, the material used, and whether it is of laminated construction.

Implications

(S/NOFORN) The estimated power on the I-Band and J-Band radar magnetrons are three to four times that previously estimated (200kw) for the FOX FIRE I-Band channel. The greater power could explain the long acquisition and extremely long missile launch ranges associated with the FOXBAT A.


(S/NOFORN) Use of the automated guidance system is another example of the Soviet desire to maintain direct centralized control during combat situations by eliminating one of the variables, the human factor in the interceptor. In theory, when fully developed the automated guidance system could also provide the Soviets with an intercept capability even if the pilot is incapacitated after takeoff. (SECRET/

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MIG-25 (FOXBAT) COCKPIT AREA

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