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TELEGRAM

27/1/75

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NOD673

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02046 171108Z

CONTROL: 41830
RECD: 17 APR 75
7:09AM

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

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P 170947Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4861

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 2046

NODIS

E.U. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (ROCKEFXELLER; NELSON A.)
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR VP PARTY
AF-2 VC 137/86970

REF: WH 50708

I HAVE READ SUBSTANTIVE HIGHLIGHTS OF APRIL 17 MEETING
REFTEL AND OFFER FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS, LEAVING IT TO
DRAFTERS WHETHER POINTS SHOULD BE COVERED IN HIGHLIGHTS OR
DETAILED MEMCON:

1. IN THE COURSE OF THE PREMIER'S REMARKS AS RECORDED
IN PARA 6-8 I RECALL HXIS REFERRING TO POSSIBLE DIFFICULT
PROBLEMS WHICH LIE AHEAD IMPLYING NEVERTHELESS THAT THE
GRUC EXPECTED TO FACE THESE WITHOUT SEEKING SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES.
2. AT THE END OF THE COMMENTS RECORDED PARA 6, THE PREMIER
SAID THAT WITH THIS POSITION IN MIND HE HAD LAID HXIS CARDS
ON THE TABLE IN HIS RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR UNGER AT
THEIR FIRST MEETING(LAST MAY) AND THEREAFTER; HE HAD ALSO
CARRIED OUT EVERYTHING THAT HE SAID HE WOULD
DO.
3. THE VICE PRESIDENT REMARKED TO THE PREMIER

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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02046 171108Z

ON THE HIGH-LEVEL FOREIGN REPRESENTATION IN TAIPEI TO TAKE PART IN THE FUNERAL CEREMONIES AND HE ESPECIALLY MENTIONED THE TWO FORMER JAPANESE PRIME MINISTERS; THIS WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BUT DID NOT ELICIT ANY VIEWS FROM THE PREMIER ABOUT NATURE AND STATE OF CURRENT ROC-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

4. I ALSO RECALL REFERENCE AT ONE POINT TO A DESIRE ONLY FOR "AMERICAN SPIRITUAL AND MORAL SUPPORT"; IN THE CONTEXT, HOWEVER, I DID NOT TAKE IT TO BE INTENDED TO EXCLUDE A POSSIBLE CALL FOR ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK. UNGER

NOTE: NOT PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

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FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4882

090084

CONTROL: 4781Q

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 2089

RECD: APRIL 19, 1975

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS/3

TAGS: SREF, VS

SUBJECT: STAGING AREAS FOR EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM

REF: STATE 090485

1. AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED QUESTION OF TEMPORARY STAGING OF REFUGEES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEN CHIANG-HUAN, APRIL 19, ALONG LINES REFTEL EXCEPT FOR PARA 3. HE EMPHASIZED NODID TO KEEP SUBJECT IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE AND THAT INQUIRY WAS FOR PURPOSE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING ONLY AS INSTRUCTED REFTEL.

2. SHEN AFFIRMED ROC WILLINGNESS "IN PRINCIPLE" BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE, BUT POINTED OUT THAT ROC'S CAPABILITIES WERE LIMITED. HE ASSUMED THAT USG WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSUME FULL FINANCIAL BURDEN FOR ALL REFUGEES WHILE THEY TEMPORARILY STAGED ON TAIWAN. IN THIS CONNECTION, SHEN MADE POINT THAT USG BORE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR WELFARE AND SAFETY ANY EVACUEES. HE NOTED ALSO THAT ROC MUST KEEP UPPERMOST IN MIND ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITY TO CHINESE NATIONALS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS WELL AS TO THE MANY SINO-VIETNAMESE THERE WHO WOULD BE LOOKING TO THE ROC FOR ASSISTANCE. THESE PEOPLE, MANY OF WHOM WOULD BE COMMUNIST TARGETS, WOULD HAVE THE FIRST CLAIM ON ROC RESOURCES.

3. SHEN ALSO STATED OBVIOUS NEED TO HAVE AS MUCH DETAILED

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

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BY 66 MARA DATE 4/23/01

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PAGE 02 TAIPEI C2089 191052Z

INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE REGARDING NUMBERS OF REFUGEES WE MIGHT BE CONSIDERING FOR STAGING TAIWAN, CATEGORIES, I.E. NATIONALITY, SEX, AGE; WHETHER OR NOT ANY HAD SOME CONNECTION TAIWAN, I.E. RELATIVES, BUSINESS CONTACTS, ETC.

4. SMEN, IN SHORT, SAW MOST OF PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD ARISE IF SIZEABLE NUMBERS INVOLVED. HE SUGGESTED THAT A US/ROC TASK FORCE WOULD BE BEST MEANS OF HANDLING PROBLEM, AND INDICATED THAT ROC MILITARY WOULD NO DOUBT BE MOST EFFECTIVE ELEMENT TO HEAD UP SUCH A TASK FORCE ON ROC SIDE. HE STRESSED NEED FOR ADEQUATE ADVANCE PLANNING AND SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS SITUATION WITH APPROPRIATE HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS TAKING CARE TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY. AMBASSADOR ENDORSED TASK FORCE IDEA AND SAID WE READY TO START AS SOON AS THEY DESIGNATE CONTACT.

5. AMBASSADOR ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR FORMIN'S UNDERSTANDING AND HELPFUL ATTITUDE AND ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD KEEP GROC AS FULLY INFORMED AS POSSIBLE OF DEVELOPING SITUATION IN SAISON. AMBASSADOR ALSO MENTIONED PRELIMINARY SURVEY CONDUCTED BY US MILITARY ON TAIWAN OF OUR CAPABILITIES HANDLING TRANSITING REFUGEES AT SUCH LOCATIONS AS CHING CHUAN KANG (CCK) AB AND TAINAN USING US ASSETS. AMBASSADOR ALSO EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF ROC'S CONCERN ABOUT CHINESE AND SINO-VIETNAMESE WHO MAY SEEK EVACUATION FROM SOUTH VIETNAM AND SAFE-HARBOR IN TAIWAN. (SEE SEPTEL REGARDING GROC'S CONCERN ABOUT SAFETY AND USE OF ITS FOUR LST'S PRESENTLY ASSISTING IN REFUGEE RELIEF SUPPLY ACTIVITY IN SVN WATERS.)

6. COMMENT: WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT GROC WILL COOPERATE AS FULLY AS ITS RESOURCES PERMIT, BUT WE WILL CERTAINLY NEED CLEARER IDEA OF NUMBERS CONTEMPLATED FOR POSSIBLE STAGING THROUGH TAIWAN. IT IS ALSO MOST IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND STRONG ROC FEELING THAT IT BEARS PRIORITY OBLIGATION TO CHINESE NATIONALS AND, TO SOMEWHAT LESSEK EXTENT, PEOPLE OF CHINESE DESCENT. THIS OBLIGATION INCLUDES NOT ONLY PROVIDING PLACE OF REFUGE, BUT ALSO ASSISTING IN EVACUATION. GROC DOES NOT WISH TO BE PLACED IN POSITION OF APPEARING

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PAGE 03 TAIPEI 02069 191052Z

TO HAVE IGNORED THOSE WHO LOOK TO IT DIRECTLY FOR HELP IN FAVOR OF NON-CHINESE.

7. DEPT PLEASE PASS FOR INFO TO APPROPRIATE ADDRESSEES.
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NOD177

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02120 210841Z

CONTROL: 4907Q
RECD : APRIL 21, 1975
4:43 A.M.

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

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R 210824Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4897

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 2120

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
E.O. 11652: XGDS/3
TAGS: SREF, V9, TW
SUBJECT: STAGING AREAS FOR EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM

REF: A. STATE 090485
B. TAIPEI 2089

VICE MIN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, T'ISAI WEI-PING HAS INFORMED DCM THAT MG LVU CH'ENG-HSIEN, CAF, HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS "LIAISON OFFICER" TO WORK WITH US AS NEED ARISES IN HANDLING MATTERS RELATED TO POSSIBLE STAGING ON TAIWAN OF REFUGEES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. UNGER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 66 NARA, DATE 4/23/01



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R 040550Z OCT 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7243

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR, TW, CH
SUBJECT: ROC POLICY TOWARD PRC VESSELS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

REF: STATE 225027

1. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION OCTOBER 4 WITH PREMIER CHIANG ABOUT SECRETARY'S AND PRESIDENT'S FORTHCOMING TRIPS TO PEKING, I RECALLED OUR EFFORTS ON SIMILIAR PREVICUS OCCASIONS TO AVOID ANY ACTIVITIES OR INCIDENTS WHICH COULD HAVE DAMAGING EFFECTS. I SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO NAVAL ACTION IN FORMOSA STRAITS. PREMIER REPLIED WE NEED HAVE NO WORRY ABOUT GROC MILITARY ACTION IN THE STRAITS AND ADDED THAT WE WILL RECALL THAT IN THE PAST SUCH ACTIONS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

2. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH REPEAT TO PEKING AND HONG KONG AND CINCPAC.
UNGER

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

Retain Class'n Change to _____
 Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X() () () _____
 Declassify After _____
 With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)
IPS by: JK Date 2/3/00

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5


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BY gb, NARA, DATE 4/23/01

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state visit 2/3/00

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PAGE 02 STATE

BECAUSE HIS PAST EFFORTS THROUGH THIS EMBASSY HAVE BROUGHT HIM NO RESPONSE WHATSOEVER. THIS MATTER LAST DISCUSSED EMBTEL 3834.


3. PREMIER'S LETTER SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED BY PRESIDENT FORD, AND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE, AS MATTER COURTESY TO LEADER OF A FRIENDLY NATION. MORE IMPORTANT, IT IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST TO SUSTAIN THE OPEN DIALOGUE, NOT YET SERIOUSLY DAMAGED, WHICH WE HAVE TRIED TO MAINTAIN WITH PREMIER CHIANG AS AN ESSENTIAL, PERHAPS THE MOST ESSENTIAL ELEMENT, IN THE CONDITIONING PROCESS BY WHICH WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO PREPARE THE ROC FOR THE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF OUR CHINA POLICY AND TO TRY TO ASSURE THE ROC'S CONSTRUCTIVE REACTION THERETO. A FORTHCOMING SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IF WE SHOULD BE CONTEMPLATING ANY MAJOR STEPS IN OUR CHINA POLICY.

4. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PREMIER'S LETTER, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR US HERE TO BE OF MUCH HELP IN OUR STATE OF NEAR-TOTAL IGNORANCE ABOUT WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER CONTEMPLATES DURING HIS CURRENT VISIT TO THE PRC. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS CAN PERHAPS BEST BE PROVIDED ON THE BASIS OF THREE CONTINGENCIES, DEPENDING ON U.S. GOVERNMENT INTENTIONS:

A. IF ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PRC AND DE-RECOGNITION GROCC IS NOT REPEAT NOT FORESEEN AT ANY EARLY DATE, THEN IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO REPLY TO PREMIER WITH THANKS FOR SHARING WITH US FRANKLY HIS VIEWS AND CONCERNS BUT GIVING HIM TO UNDERSTAND WE DO NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN RELATIONS AT PRESENT TIME.

B. IF U.S. GOVERNMENT PRESENTLY UNDECIDED WHETHER OR NOT FURTHER SIGNIFICANT STEPS WILL BE MADE SOON, PERHAPS WISHING FIRST TO ASSESS OUTCOME OF SECRETARY'S CURRENT TALKS IN PEKING, THEN IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO PRESENT ONCE AGAIN OUR REASONS FOR PROCEEDING WITH NORMALIZATION AND REFUTING PREMIER'S NEGATIVE COMMENTS, SAYING NEVERTHELESS WE APPRECIATE HIS FRANK EXPRESSIONS AND WE EXPECT TO KEEP IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH ON THESE MATTERS. WE SHOULD ALSO ASSERT THAT CONSEQUENCES FORESEEN PARA 4 REFTEL NOT AT ALL WHAT WE WOULD

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
EXPECT OR COUNTENANCE AND CONCERNS EXPRESSED PARA 5 CAN ALSO BE AVOIDED AS ROC HAS TO SOME EXTENT ALREADY DEMONSTRATED IN THE RELATIVE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION WHICH IT HAS ALREADY EXPERIENCED. BELIEVE PRESIDENT SHOULD TELL PREMIER WE WILL KEEP ROC CONCERNS VERY MUCH IN MIND AND TO AVOID DAMAGE TO LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF A LONG-STANDING FRIEND.

C. IF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PRC AND DE-RECOGNITION OF GROC EXPECTED TO RESULT FROM SECRETARY'S AND PRESIDENT'S VISITS THEN, WITHOUT IN FACT REVEALING THAT, BELIEVE PRESIDENT SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY PREMIER CHIANG, EXPRESS VIEW THAT CONSEQUENCES FORESEEN SUCH AS THOSE MENTIONED PARAS 4 AND 5 ARE OVERSTATED AND SAY THAT IN NEAR FUTURE EMBASSY WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE UP WITH PREMIER SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED IN HIS MESSAGE. LETTER SHOULD STATE OUR INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH NORMALIZATION, WHEN WE DETERMINE IT IS WISE AND NECESSARY TO DO SO, IN A MANNER WHICH SEEKS IN EVERY WAY TO AVOID DAMAGE TO ROC INTERESTS. IT COULD BE STATED WE HAVE GIVEN THIS QUESTION EXTENDED STUDY AND BELIEVE THAT EMBASSY'S EXPOSITION WILL DEMONSTRATE TO PREMIER THAT U.S. ACTIONS NEED NOT HAVE DIRE CONSEQUENCES FORESEEN IN HIS LETTER AND WE HOPE HE WILL BE READY TO CONTINUE WITH US THE SPECIAL DIALOGUE AS IN THE PAST SO THAT WE CAN ALSO PASS TOGETHER THROUGH THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD SUCCESSFULLY.

5. WHICHEVER COURSE IS FOLLOWED IN PRESIDENT'S REPLY, BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO INTRODUCE LANGUAGE SPECIFICALLY RECOGNIZING WHAT GROC HAS ACCOMPLISHED HERE, VALUE WE ATTACH TO FRANK AND OPEN DIALOGUE WE HAVE HAD IN PAST AND REGARD FOR STEADFAST FRIEND AND ALLY.

6. SUGGEST THIS TELEGRAM BE REPETED FOR SECRETARY AND PARTY TO PEKING AND TOKYO.
UNGER

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FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7442

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 6932

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EA FOR HABIB AND GLEYSTEEN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TRIP TO PEKING

REFERENCE: STATE 241599

1. IF I CAN CONFIDENTLY "PRESUME WE WILL FOLLOW SAHG PRO-
CEDURES AS IN PAST" THEN I WILL EXPECT INSTRUCTIONS ALONG
LINES SECTO 265 OF NOVEMBER 29, 1974 (OR HOPEFULLY, WITH
MORE INFORMATION THAN THAT CONTAINED) PRIOR TO ISSUANCE
ANY COMMUNIQUE OR OTHER OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON SECRETARY'S
JUST COMPLETED VISIT TO PEKING. NEWSPAPERS HERE CARRY
STORIES OF BRIEFINGS ALREADY PROVIDED GROK AND GOJ.

2. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT IMMEDIATE TO TOKYO.
UNGER

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FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7801

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TAIPEI 7774

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FOR MILLER FROM AMBASSADOR

PLEASE PASS PRESIDENT'S PARTY IMMEDIATELY FOR HABIB

E.D. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP C.)
SUBJECT: HABIB POST-CHINA TRIP

DOES YOUR LATEST MESSAGE (SECTO 231082) CONSTITUTE AUTHORITY
FOR ME TO INFORM PREMIER OF YOUR PROSPECTIVE VISIT? IF NOT, I
REQUIRE SUCH AUTHORITY ASAP.
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FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7842

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FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPT PLS PASS SINGAPORE FOR ASST SEC HABIB AND OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED

EO 11652 GDS
TAGS PFOR TW CH
SUBJECT: ASST SEC HABIB MEETING WITH PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB MET WITH PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO LATE AFTERNOON DECEMBER 9 TO BRIEF HIM ON PRESIDENT FORD'S CONVERSATIONS IN PEKING. AMBASSADOR UNGER, DCM, FORMIN SHEN, VICE FORMIN CHIEN (WHO INTERPRETED) AND PREMIER'S AIDE, JAMES SOONG, WERE PRESENT.

2. IN PRESENTING GENERAL OUTLINE PEKING TALKS, HABIB EMPHASIZED THAT BULK OF CONVERSATIONS DEVOTED TO BROAD INTERNATIONAL ISSUES BILATERAL PRC/US RELATIONS TOUCHED UPON BUT NOT EXTENSIVELY. AT OUTSET, HABIB STRESSED THAT CONTRARY TO SOME PRESS COMMENTARY WHICH HAD APPEARED, THERE HAD BEEN NO COOLING IN US/PRC RELATIONS. FORD VISIT HAD NOT PRODUCED ANY DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PRC, BUT PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED US COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HABIB NOT IN POSITION TO PREDICT PRECISELY HOW NORMALIZATION PROCESS WILL DEVELOP, NOR ITS TIMING. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO REDUCE OUR MILITARY PRESENCE ON TAIWAN, AS AN INDEPENDENT US DECISION, NOT DISCUSSED IN PEKING. WHILE IT UNCERTAIN HOW NORMALIZATION WILL AFFECT OUR RE-

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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 07054 100943Z

LATIONS WITH ROC, HABIB ASSURED PREMIER THAT USG WELL AWARE OF ROC INTERESTS AND WOULD ACT RESPONSIBLY AND WITH PRUDENCE, KEEPING IN MIND THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF ROC. IT WAS CLEAR THAT PRC HOPED FOR ARRANGEMENT ALONG LINES OF "JAPANESE MODEL", BUT US POSITION WAS THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE TIME FOR NORMALIZATION PROCESS TO MATURE. WE HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT OUR INTERST IN AN ULTIMATELY PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. WE HAD ALREADY MADE THAT CLEAR IN SHANHAI COMMUNIQUE. ON THEIR PART, CHIESE COMMUNISTS HAD NOT PRESSEN THE ISSUE.

3. HABIB NOTED THAT DISCUSSION BILATERIAL MATTERS DID NOT GO INTO GREAT DETAIL AND WERE MORE IN NATURE OF CONTINUATION OF DIALOGUE BEGUN MORE THAN FOUR YEARS AGO. BOTH SIDES HAD STATED THEIR VIEWS AND CONVERSATION CENTERED ON OTHER TOPICS.

4. AFTER THANKING HABIB FOR PRESENTATION, PREMIER NOTED THAT IN ACCOUNTS OF PEKING CONVENATIONS THERE HD APPEARED REFERENCES TO EXPECTED IMPROVEMENTS IN US/PRC RELATIONS "IN MONTHS AHEAD". PREMIER ASKED WHAT SPECIFIC MEASURES US MIGHT HAVE IN MIND. HABIB REPLIED THAT PERHAPS SOME CONFUSION ON PART OF PRESS HAD GROWN OUT OF CASUAL "ON CAMERA" REMAKS BY PRESIDENT FORD REGARDING CHINESE DECISION RELEASE INFORMATION ABOUT SEVERAL AMERICAN MIA'S. APART FROM THIS, PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY KISSINGER EMPHASIZED IN THEIR COMMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE THE CAREFULLY CHOSEN STATEMENT THAT "OUR RELATIONS ARE GOOD AND WILL BE IMPROVED GRADUALLY".

5. THE PREMIER ASSERTED THAT FROM HABIB BRIEFING HE COULD CONCLUDE 1) THAT EXISTING RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND ROC REMAIN UNCHANGED AND 2) THAT CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGES WITH ROC WILL BE CONTINUED ON CURRENT BASIS. HABIB CONFIRMED VALIOITY THESE CONCLUSIONS.

6. THE PREMIER STATED CONTINUING GROF INTEREST IN EXCHANGING CANDID VIEWS WITH USG ON SITUATION IN ASIA. IN THIS CONTEXT, PREMIER THEN REITERATED THAT GROC POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE BASED ON LINES LAID OUT BY PRESIDENT CHIANG; THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE. THIS INCLUDED "RETURN TO MAINLAND"? BUT AS HIS FATHER HAD ASURED PRESIDENT NIXON, PREMIER COULD REASSURE US THAT GROC WOULD DO NOTING TO DISRUPT SITUATION OR TO COMPLICATE PROBLEMS

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PAGE 03 TAIPEI 07854 100943Z


FOR USG. BASIC ELEMENT IN ROC POLICY WAS, AND WOULD REMAIN, THE MAINTENANCE OF CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH USG. ALTHOUGH GROC COULD NOT AGREE THAT "DETENTE" WAS WISE POLICY, ISSUES ON WHICH WE DID AGREE FAR OUTWEIGHED POINTS OF DIVERGENCE. USG SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT ROC WAS ASSET TO US RATHER THAN A LIABILITY AND ALL THAT ROC NEEDED FROM US WAS CONTINUED MORAL SUPPORT. PREMIER REFERRED TO IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN AS TRADING PARTNER AND ATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY FOR US BUSINESS. PEKING, ON OTHER HAND, IN PREMIER'S VIEW, OFFERED LITTLE TO USG AND DIFFERED IN IDEOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS. "NORMALIZATION" FOR PEKING WAS CONSPIRATORIAL SCHEME DESIGNED TO TARNISH US IMAGE AS RELIABLE ALLY, AND TO GET US OUT OF ASIA.

7. HABIB TOLD PREMIER THAT USG HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT NATURE OF PEKING GOVERNMENT AND FULLY AWARE DIFFERENCES WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN US. FOLLOWING FALL OF VIETNAM, USG MADE CONCERTED EFFORT RESTATE ITS COMMITMENTS IN ASIA; THERE WOULD BE NO US WITHDRAWAL. WE WILL PURSUE OUR PRESENT COURSE WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING FOR ROC AND ITS CONCERNS.

8. HOWEVER, HABIB EMPHASIZED, WE BELIEVE IT IN ROC INTEREST TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT TOWARD ADJUSTMENTS IN US-CHINA POLICY. THE ROC WILL NOT BENEFIT BY ENGAGING IN A CONTEXT WITH USG OVER NORMALIZATION. PERSONAL ATTACKS ON THE SECRETARY WOULD NOT BE APPRECIATED AND WOULD MAKE OUR TASK MORE DIFFICULT. THE PREMIER RESPONDED THAT ROC ALSO APPROACHED THE PROBLEM "PRUDENTLY AND WITH ENDURANCE" AND STATED THAT GROC HAD NEVER MADE ANY PERSONAL ATTACK ON ANY USG OFFICIAL AND WOULD NOT DO SO. HABIB EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THIS STATEMENT AND SAID HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO WASHINGTON. (NEED TO REFRAIN FROM PERSONAL ATTACKS WAS REINFORCED DURING SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER CHOU SHU-KAI, A CLOSE AND TRUSTED ADVISER TO CCK, WHO CAN BE EXPECTED RELAY HABIB COMMENTS TO PREMIER AND UNDERLINE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING "OVERZEALOUS PERSONS" UNDER CONTROL.)

9. PREMIER TURNED TO KOREA AND ASKED WHAT HABIB COULD TELL HIM ABOUT DISCUSSIONS WITH PEKING. HABIB SAID CHINESE DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS AT GREAT LENGTH. ALTHOUGH OUR PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING ON KOREA NOT ACCEPTABLE TO PEKING, NEITHER DO WE BELIEVE PRC EXPECTING NK ATTACK. WE WILL KEEP OUR PROPOSAL ON

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Department of State

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PAGE 04 TAIPEI 07854 100943

THE TABLE. IN THE MEANTIME, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN OUR FORCES IN KOREA AND TO SUPPORT THE SOUTH KOREANS WITH BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

10. MEETING ENDED WITH MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS REGARDING DESIRABILITY OF CONTINUING FRANK AND CANDID DIALOGUE. PREMIER HOPEO THAT HABIB COULD VISIT AGAIN SOON AND EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR BRIEFING. ATMOSPHERE WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT DISCUSSIONS.
UNGER

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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 00639 250211Z

03
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 130-00 /001 W

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R 200140Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8340

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 0639

NODIS

E.O. 11652 XGDS-3
TAGS PFOR TW CH
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO CHIANG CHING-KUO LETTER

REF: STATE 019617

CHARGE DELIVERED TO PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO JANUARY 27, TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO HIS OCTOBER 14 LETTER AS INSTRUCTED REFTEL. PREMIER DID NOT CHOOSE TO READ TEXT IN CHARGE'S PRESENCE BUT DID TAKE OCCASION TO RAISE UNRELATED SUBJECT WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.
POPPLE

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 66 NARA DATE 4/23/01



14

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012720

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC
DESCRIPTION Re Republic of China
CREATION DATE 08/26/1976
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400131
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 5
FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN 04/27/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

EXEMPTED 7/02

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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NOD847

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 06494 241201Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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O 241035Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WAHDC IMMEDIATE 1154

~~TOP SECRET~~ TAIPEI 6494

NODIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

EO 11652 XGDS-3
TAGS PINR MARR TW
SUBJECT: FORCE REDUCTIONS ON TAIWAN

REF: STATE 236790

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MR:02-22 #20; at rev 3/6/02

By dal NARA Date 4/17/02

1. AS I INTERPRET REFTTEL, ALL DOD PERSONNEL, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN (WITH CERTAIN EXCLUSIONS), IN EXCESS OF 1400 WOULD HAVE TO BE PHYSICALLY RPT PHYSICALLY REMOVED FROM TAIWAN BEFORE JANUARY 1, 1977. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE MOVEMENT DURING THE REMAINING 3 MONTHS OF THIS YEAR OF AROUND 900 INDIVIDUALS (ASSIGNED STRENGTH AS OF AUG 31 WAS 2313, INCLUDING 2129 MILITARY AND 184 CIVILIAN.
2. I WOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND FROM REFTTEL THAT OF THE APPROXIMATELY 900 PERSONNEL TO BE MOVED OUT OF TAIWAN BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, WASHINGTON SHOULD INCLUDE AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE DOD PERSONNEL PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO SHULINKOU. BUT INFO AVAILABLE TO US HERE SUGGESTS THAT ONLY A RELATIVELY FEW OF THOSE COULD, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, DEPART PRIOR TO JANUARY 1.
3. WITH REGARD TO DOD PERSONNEL NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS INCLUDED WITHIN THE 1400 END-OF-YEAR CEILING, I UNDERSTAND THEY WOULD BE THOSE ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY (E.G., MARINE GUARDS, DAD PERSONNEL, FAS, AND LANGUAGE SCHOOL STUDENTS). WE ALSO ASSUME THAT ATG PERSONNEL (54 PRESENTLY ASSIGNED) ARE EXCLUDED. THE DEFINITION

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Department of State

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PAGE 02

TAIPEI 06494 241201Z

OF CONTRACTUAL PERSONNEL TO BE EXCLUDED FROM END-OF-YEAR 1400 CEILING NEEDS TO BE MORE PRECISELY SPELLED OUT, ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS CATEGORY WOULD INCLUDE THOSE WHO WILL EVENTUALLY BE SENT OUT TO INSTALL/OPERATE GINSENG. APART FROM THIS GROUP, WHAT OTHER DOD CONTRACT PERSONNEL ARE TO BE EXCLUDED?

5. YESTERDAY COMUSTDC BRIEFED ME ON REDUCTION INSTRUCTIONS HE HAS RECEIVED FROM JCS VIA CINCPAC. ACCORDING TO COMUSTDC, THESE INSTRUCTIONS WOULD REQUIRE ONLY THAT AUTHORIZED RPT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF DOD MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (WITH CERTAIN EXCLUSIONS) BE REDUCED TO 1400 BY END OF YEAR. IN OTHER WORDS, PHYSICAL DOD MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCE ON TAIWAN COULD ACTUALLY EXCEED 1400 AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1976, AND NUMBERS IN EXCESS COULD REMAIN HERE INTO 1977, PRESUMABLY AS LONG AS OPERATIONAL NEEDS ACTUALLY REQUIRE. IN FACT, COMUSTDC INTERPRETS HIS INSTRUCTIONS AS PERMITTING HIM TO ANTICIPATE THAT THE APPROXIMATELY 750 CURRENT STRENGTH OF SHULINKOU WILL EVENTUALLY BE REDUCED TO ZERO (SAY AROUND MARCH 1 WHEN GINSENG IN FULL OPERATION) AND THAT THIS REDUCTION

IN AUTHORIZED NUMBERS CAN BE COUNTED IN ADVANCE AS PART OF THE OVERALL REDUCTION REQUIRED TO REDUCE OUR TOTAL PRESENCE TO 1400. IN THIS WAY, GREATER PART OF 900 MENTIONED PARA 1 WOULD BE MADE UP OF SLK PERSONNEL WHOSE SLOTS WOULD NO LONGER BE AUTHORIZED FOR TAIWAN AS OF JANUARY 1 BUT MOST OF WHOM WOULD NEED TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT FOR SOME FURTHER MONTHS.

6. MY INTERPRETATION OF INSTRUCTIONS (AS STATED PARA 1 ABOVE) BASED UPON LITERAL READING OF REFTTEL, ARE IN OBVIOUS CONFLICT WITH COMUSTDC'S READING OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS. THIS ISSUE REQUIRES IMMEDIATE CLARIFICATION AND CERTAINLY BEFORE ARRIVAL OF NSACSS GINSENG TEAM MENTIONED IN NSACSS FT. MEADE, MD, DTG 232121Z SEPT 76. I WOULD HOPE THAT WASHINGTON'S INTENTION IS AS INTERPRETED BY COMUSTDC, I.E., THAT WE WILL BE REQUIRED ONLY TO **REDUCE**

AUTHORIZED RPT AUTHORIZED DOD MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STRENGTH TO THE 1400 LIMIT BY END OF YEAR. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE RELATIVELY ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF PERSONNEL STRETCHED OUT OVER SAY 6 TO 9 MONTHS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE ARE REQUIRED TO REACH A "PHYSICALLY PRESENT" CEILING OF 1400 BY THE END OF THE YEAR, IT WOULD NOT ONLY CAUSE SERIOUS LOGISTICAL DISLOCATIONS AND

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03

TAIPEI 06494 241201Z

SEVERE PERSONAL HARDSHIP TO THOSE TO BE MOVED, BUT WOULD ALSO HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF A MASS EXODUS. THIS, IN TURN, WOULD UNAVOIDABLY GENERATE UNDESIRABLE RUMORS AND SPECULATION EXACERBATING OUR PROBLEMS HERE AND LIKELY TO CAUSE CONSIDERABLE CONSTERNATION WHICH WILL INEVITABLY BE COMMUNICATED WIDELY BOTH HERE AND AT HOME.
UNGER

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NON-SECRET

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012722

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

TITLE STAT

DESCRIPTION Force Reductions on Taiwan

CREATION DATE 09/25/1976

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400131

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/27/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 06503 250548Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
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P 250520Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1151

~~TOP SECRET~~ TAIPEI 6503

NODIS

EO 11652 XGDS-3
TAGS PINR MARR TW
SUBJECT: FORCE REDUCTIONS ON TAIWAN

1. CONGRESSMAN CHARLES WILSON WILL BE VISITING TAIWAN OCTOBER 7-12. ACCORDING TO DOD MESSAGE (OSAF WASHDC/SAFLL 241730Z SEP 76) CONGRESSMAN HAS REQUESTED USTDC BRIEFING TO INCLUDE "PROBLEMS WITH DRAWDOWN" AND [REDACTED] PERSONNEL PROBLEMS".


2. IN LIGHT OF CURRENT DECISION MOVE RAPIDLY AHEAD ON GENERAL DRAWDOWN AND IMPLEMENTATION [REDACTED] REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ON HOW WE SHOULD HANDLE BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSMAN.
UNGER

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

MR 02-23, #21; CIA Rev 7/12/02

By dal NARA, Date 8/1/02

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012723

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

DESCRIPTION Re force reductions on Taiwan

CREATION DATE 09/30/1976

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400131

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/27/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

EXEMPTED 7/02

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012724

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

DESCRIPTION Re force reductions on Taiwan

CREATION DATE 10/12/1976

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400131

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/27/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

EXEMPTED 7/02

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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 07440 051116Z

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ACTION NODS-00

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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R 050857Z NOV 76
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1624

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

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me 02-22 #24: ex ltr 3/6/02

NODIS

By dal NARA Date 4/17/02

STADIS

EO 11652 XGDS-3
TAGS PINR MARR TW CH
SUBJECT: US FORCE REDUCTIONS ON TAIWAN

REFS: (A) STATE 266444, (B) JCS WASHDC 042248Z NOV 76

1. COMUSTDC HAS SENT MESSAGE TO CINCPAC NOTING THAT REF B DID NOT RPT NOT ADDRESS CINCPAC'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO JCS (CINCPAC 072355Z OCT 76) THAT (1) NAMRU II SPACES BE EXCLUDED FROM 1400 CEILING, AND (2) USA (PMD) AND DET 3, 7602 AIG ALSO BE EXCLUDED FROM CEILING AND PLACED UNDER DAO.

2. COMUSTDC MESSAGE "STRONGLY URGES" THAT THESE UNITS "BE EXCLUDED FROM CEILING". COMUSTDC DOES NOT TAKE POSITION ON WHETHER OR NOT USA(PMD) AND DET 3 7602 AIR SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER DAO.

3. EMBASSY FEELS IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO USE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE AS SHELTER FOR UNITS MENTIONED ABOVE, AND WE URGE DEPARTMENT TO OPPOSE ANY SUCH RECOMMENDATION, OR TO SEEK TO REVERSE DECISION IF IT HAS BEEN MADE.

4. EMBASSY HAS NOT SEEN CINCPAC'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO JCS AS CONTAINED CINCPAC 072355Z OCT 76.
POPPLE

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STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
 Retain Class'n Change to _____
 Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X()()
 Declassify After _____
 With concurrence POB (not)(obtained)
PS by lv Date 8/3/00

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