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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 0039

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 05091 03 OF 03 141133Z

12
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

064535

R 140800Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2645
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 TAIPEI 5091

EXDIS

SPECAT FOR MIL ADDRESSEES

UPON THE PRESENCE HERE OF A FORMAL US COMMAND STRUCTURE, AT A MUCH FURTHER REMOVE, IT MAY RPT MAY BE ASSURED BY MODALITIES OTHER THAN THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, OR THAT SECURITY COULD BE EFFECTIVELY GUARANTEED EVEN AFTER THE ENF OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

C. THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP": IT IS GROC POLICY TO CLING AS TIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE US, AND TO LOOK TO US AS THE ROC'S PROTECTOR AND PATRON. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS WE HAVE BEGUN BACKING AWAY FROM THIS ROLE WHICH WE PREVIOUSLY PLAYED FOR SO LONG, AND IN MY FIRST PUBLIC SPEECH (JUNE), I TRIED TO TAKE A FURTHER STEP BY OPEN DISCUSSION OF THE BENEFITS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND OUR RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE PRC. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE PROGRESSIVELY TOWARD A LESS PATERNALISTIC RELATIONSHIP. I BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME TO RECONSIDER THOSE PORTIONS



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OF THE 1973 PARA WHICH STATE WE SHOULD "ENCOURAGE GROWTH OF ROC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES THAT RECOGNIZE THE PRC"; NOR SHOULD WE PERFORM THE GROC'S OWN FUNCTION BY GOING OUT OF OUR WAY TO "HELP MAINTAIN" FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CONFIDENCE ON TAIWAN IN THE STABILITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA." TO BE SURE, SO LONG AS THE FUTURE CONTINUES UNCERTAIN AND SEVERE SHOCKS WILL THREATEN TAIWAN, IT WILL BE IN OUR INTEREST TO GIVE REASONABLE SUPPORT TO THE GROC EFFORTS TO SUSTAIN ITS ECONOMIC POSITION. BUT ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISIONS THAT MAINTAIN OR WEAKEN POLITICAL STABILITY, SUPPORT OR WEAKEN THE ECONOMY, MUST REST WITH THE GROC.

D. MILITARY PROFILE: THE PROGRESSIVE REDUCTIONS CARRIED OUT SINCE LAST FALL HAVE BY AND LARGE GONE SMOOTHLY. THE REMOVAL OF THE F-4S WENT PARTICULARLY WELL, SHOWING, I BELIEVE, THAT WE HAVE LEARNED THE APPROPRIATE LESSONS FROM THE C-130 WITHDRAWAL. REDEPLOYMENTS ARE VERY MUCH A PART OF THE CONDITIONING PROCESS AND WE SHOULD USE THEM AS SUCH IN PURPOSEIVE BUT SOPHISTICATED WAYS. PROBLEMS CAN BE GREATLY EASED IF WE STAGE EVENTS CAREFULLY AND IN SMALL RATHER THAN LARGE BITES; GIVE AMPLE NOTICE OF OUR INTENTIONS; LINK CHANGES IN MILITARY POSTURE HERE TO SIMILAR EVENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION AND THE WORLD; AND LET THE GROC, RATHER THAN THE US, DO THE EXPLAINING TO THE PUBLIC HERE. LONG LEAD TIMES AND CAREFUL PLANNING ARE ESSENTIAL. IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE I PLAN TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS AS THE SHAPE OUR MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE SHOULD ASSUME IN FY76 AND THEREAFTER.

E. OVERALL SECURITY POLICY: THE COURSES OF ACTION ENUMERATED IN THE FY73 PARA SEEM SOUND AND SENSIBLE. WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT AS WE REDUCE OUR MILITARY PROFILE FURTHER, PARTICULARLY AS WE CUT BACK OUR MAAG AND TDC STAFFS, WE WILL NEED TO HANDLE MILITARY AND ADVISORY RELATIONSHIPS WITH EVEN GREATER ADROITNESS AND SOPHISTICATION THAN HTERETOPORE. ADDITIONALLY, WE ARE FINDING THAT MODERN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY BLURRS THE FORMERLY SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN "OFFENSIVE" AND DEFENSIVE" WEAPONRY. ULTIMATELY, WE MAY HAVE TO DEVISE A NEW DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE -- ONE WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS

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AS WELL AS THE PURELY MILITARY. ESSENTIALLY, ROC SECURITY DEPENDS UPON THREE THINGS: (1) US DETERRENCE WHICH, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IS MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY (WE NEED TO DO MORE TO MAKE THAT DIFFICULT POINT ACCEPTED HERE); (2) THE ABILITY OF THE ROC MILITARY TO EXACT A SIGNIFICANT PRICE IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK; (3) THE DOMESTIC CREDIBILITY OF THE ROC DEFENSE EFFORT AND THE OVERALL DETERRENT.

F. DEALING WITH PREMIER CCK: WE NEED TO BEAR IN MIND THAT MUCH OF THE PREMIER'S EFFECTIVENESS AS A LEADER LIES IN PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT HE IS ABLE TO MAKE THE US TAKE INTO FULL ACCOUNT THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE ROC AND THE CONCERNS OF ITS PEOPLE. IF WE HAVE A BITTER PILL TO ADMINISTER -- AND THERE WILL BE SUCH OCCASIONS IN THE FUTURE -- A MODEST AMOUNT OF SUGAR-COATING WILL OFTEN PROVE TO BE A WISE INVESTMENT. WE HAVE SEEN THAT PROBLEMS OFTEN STEM MORE FROM THE FORM AND PRESENTATION THAN THE SUBSTANCE OF CHANGE. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES -- AND THEY SHOW NO SIGN OF SIGNIFICANT EARLY ALTERATION -- CCK IS IN CHARGE, IS A PRAGMATIC REALIST, AND IS BEST ABLE TO BRING TAIWAN ALONG THE ROAD WE WILL WISH IT TO TRAVEL WITHOUT COMING APART AT THE SEAMS. POLITICAL INSTABILITY HERE, WHICH COULD RESULT FROM AN UNDERMINING OF HIS POSITION, WOULD NOT ADVANCE US INTERESTS OR OVERALL CHINA POLICY. ON THE CONTRARY, ANYTHING THAT MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PREMIER TO KEEP A TIGHT REIN ON THE ROC MILITARY, THE SECURITY APPARATUS, THE KMT "OLD GUARD", OR THE INDEPENDENCE-MINDED TAIWANESE, IS UNLIKELY TO BE OUR ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE.

14. I HAVE USED MY FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT FROM TAIPEI TO PRESENT A RELATIVELY PERSONAL VIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION OF THE ROC, ITS BASIC POLICIES AND WHERE I BELIEVE IT IS HEADED, TOGETHER WITH THE IMPLICATIONS WE SHOULD DRAW THEREFROM. THIS REPORT, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REVISED COUNTRY BACKGROUND STATEMENT TO THE PARA (TAIPEI 2855) -- SUBMITTED BEFORE MY ARRIVAL BUT WITH WHICH I CONCUR -- SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN AS COMPLETING OUR "OFF-YEAR" PARA REQUIREMENT (EXCEPT FOR STATISTICAL SECTIONS), PENDING NEXT YEAR'S SUBMISSION OF A NEW PARA. UNGER

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
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R 140800Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2644
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING
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AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

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SPECAT FOR MIL ADDRESSEES

BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, THE CURRENT ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, THOUGH NOT SEVERE BY CONTEMPORARY WORLD STANDARDS, IS SERIOUSLY WORRYING.

8. CENTRALITY OF THE US RELATIONSHIP: I CANNOT EMPHASIZE TOO STRONGLY THE DEGRZR TO WHICH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HERE CONSIDER THAT CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE ROC WITH ITS PRESENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS, AS AN ENTITY SEPARATE FROM THE MAINLAND, DEPENDS UPON WHAT THE US DOES OR DOES NOT DO -- OR THE CIRTUAL UNANIMITY WITH WHICH CONTINUED SEPARATION IS DESIRED ON TAIWAN. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP WHICH FAVORS UNIFICATION WITH A COMMUNIST MAINLAND, AND THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP WHICH DESIRES ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE ASSOCIATION WITH THE KUS. DESPITE RUMORS THAT ONE OR ANOTHER ELEMENT HERE MIGHT, IN EXTREMIS, BE READY TO EX-

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9. MORE A SOVIET CONNECTION, THE PREMIER'S POLICY OF NO NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING, NO CONTACT WITH MOSCOW, TOTAL RELIANCE ON THE US HAS SOLID, ALMOST UNANIMOUS BACKING.

9. SPECIFICALLY POLITICAL TIES TO ONE SIDE, THE US IS THE ROC'S MOST IMPORTANT TRADING PARTNER, THE SOURCE OF HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT AND ESSENTIAL LOANS; THE ONLY REASONABLY RELIABLE SOURCE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, ADVICE AND TRAINING; THE PLACE TO WHICH UPWARDS OF 2,000 UNIVERSITY STUDENTS GO EACH YEAR FOR GRADUATE TRAINING; AND THE TRADITIONAL FRIEND AND PROTECTOR. THESE ELEMENTS COMBINE TO CREATE THE LOCAL SENSE OF SECURITY SYMBOLIZED BY THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY.

10. WHAT THE US DOES IN ITS RELATIONS WITH PEKING IS SEEN AS THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE ROC. ALTHOUGH SENIOR OFFICIALS WILL ONLY RARELY DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS -- AND THEN ONLY IN THE MOST GUARDED TERMS -- MOST OF THE POLITICALLY SOPHISTICATED IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT SEEM NOW TO BELIEVE US DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF PEKING IS INEVITABLE. SOME OF THE MOST SOPHISTICATED SPECULATE QUIETLY ON SPECIFIC RECOGNITION FORMULAS THAT MIGHT BE USED. MOST, HOWEVER, FIND THE PROBLEM JUST TOO WORRYING AND TOO DIFFICULT TO THINK ABOUT, AND IN ANY CASE THE "PARTY LINE" DOES NOT SANCTION SUCH DANGEROUS THOUGHTS. PEOPLE FERVENTLY HOPE THE EVIL DAY WILL BE PUT OFF AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AND THAT WHEN IT COMES, THE USG WILL ACT RESPONSIBLY AND (IN THEIR TERMS) "MORALLY", SO THAT TAIWAN WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST DISTINCT FROM THE MAINLAND.

11. SENATOR JACKSON'S PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENTS AND RUMORS OF SECRETARIAL AND POSSIBLY PRESIDENTIAL VISITS TO PEKING HAVE RESURFACED ANXIETIES ABOUT THIS WIDELY FEARED EVOLUTION OF US POLICY. IRONICALLY, THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE IS NOW SEEN BY MOST AS AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR US-ROC RELATIONS, LARGELY BECAUSE OF CONCERN THE US WILL ADVANCE BEYOND IT. THIS IS ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING THAT WHAT IS DESIRED ABOVE ALL ELSE IS AN INDEFINITE PROLONGATION OF THE PRESENT STATUS QUO, AND WHAT IS FEARED ABOVE ALL ELSE IS THAT IN DEALING WITH PEKING, THE US



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WILL AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL RESULT IN SUCH ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ENFEEBLING AS TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ROC TO CONTINUE TO EXIST, TO THE EXTENT THAT INDIVIDUALS HAVE THOUGHT BEYOND PRESENT ARRANGMENTS -- AND TO THE EXTENT THEY ARE WILLING TO REVEAL THEIR INNER THOUGHTS -- THEY TEND TO BELIEVE THAT IF THE STATUS QUO CANNOT BE MAINTAINED, THE NEXT MOST DESIRABLE SITUATION WOULD BE ONE IN WHICH CHANGE IS CONFINED SOLELY TO THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA, LEAVING THE PRESENT ECONOMIC, SECURITY AND TRAVEL LINKAGES WITH THE US ESSENTIALLY UN-AFFECTED.

12. I ALLUDED EARLIER TO THE ROC'S "WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS" POLICY, SEEKING TO BIND ITSELF TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN CONCRETE, PRACTICAL WAYS SO AS TO PREVENT TRUE ISOLATION. SOMETHING SIMILAR TAKES PLACE VIS-A-VIS THE US, ALTHOUGH HERE THERE IS ALSO AN ACTIVE CAMPAIGN AIMED AT CREATING CONSTITUENCIES WHICH WILL SPEAK FOR THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING CLOSE CONNECTIONS WITH TAIWAN. ACCORDING TO SRF INFORMATION, FUNDS FOR THAT PURPOSE WILL INCREASE GREATLY DURING THE CURRENT YEAR. WE MUST ANTICIPATE A HIGHLY DEVELOPED LOBBYING CAMPAIGN TO PERSUADE THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PEOPLE THAT THE PRESENT US-ROC RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED.

13. CUES FOR US POLICY

A. LEVERAGE: WITH THE ROC SO HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON THE US IN SO MANY KEY AREAS OF NATIONAL EXISTENCE, IT SEEMS REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THE US HAS ENORMOUS LEVERAGE HERE. WE SHOULD BE MINDFUL, HOWEVER, THAT THIS VERY DEPENDENCY -- WHICH IS KEENLY FELT -- PRODUCES A NATURAL DESIRE TO PROVE VIRILITY. IT IS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, TO AVOID THE TEMPTATION TO THROW OUR WEIGHT AROUND ON ISSUES SIGNIFICANT TO US. WE ARE A FACTOR THEY MUST AND DO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. WE NEED HAVE NO QUALMS ABOUT CALLING THE ROC TO HEEL ON ISSUES OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO US -- FOR EXAMPLE, ATTEMPTS TO SABOTAGE US-PRC RAPPROCHEMENT OR TO HEIGHTEN TENSIONS IN THE REGION. BUT WE SHOULD AVOID INTERVENING WHEN THE MATTER IS ONE OF US CONVENIENCE (E.G. THE EXACT TIMING OR PUBLIC HANDLING OF OUR

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MILITARY REDEPLOYMENTS) RATHER THAN US INTEREST. ABOVE ALL, WE WANT OUR INFLUENCE TO BE STABILIZING, RATHER THAN ONE-SHOT FASHION. AND WE WANT TO AVOID DEEPENING ANXIETIES TO THE POINT WHERE GOVERNMENT OR PEOPLE, FEELING THEMSELVES IN EXTREMIS, BEGIN TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER ABANDONING THE PRESENT POLICY OF ACCOMODATING TO OVERALL US CHINA POLICY.

B. THE CONDITIONING PROCESS: I AGREE WITH PAST EMBASSY ANALYSIS THAT THE OPERATION OF A "CONDITIONING PROCESS" HAS MADE DIGESTIBLE, IF NO TERRIBLY PALATAVLE, PROGRESSIVE CHANGE IN ROC RELATIONSHIPS WITH US AND THE REST OF THE WORLD. I BELIVE WE CAN AND SHOULD USE THIS PROCESS WITH MORE DELIBERATION AND PLANNING. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE GRADUALLY ACCUSTOMED ELITES HERE TO THE IDEA THAT REDUC-TIONS IN US MILITARY PROFILE DO NOT ALTER OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT THE ROC IF THE NEED ARISES. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND CERTAINLY WOULD REQUIRE MUCH TIME, THOUGHT AND CAREFUL HANDLING, BUT IT SHOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH THE IDEA THAT SECURITY FROM ATTACK DOES NOT DEPEND

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

R 140800Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2643
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USIO PEKING
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AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 TAIPEI 5091

MR 02-22 #1: dt. rev 3/6/02

EXDIS

By dal NARA, Date 4/16/02

SPECAT FOR MIL ADDRESSEES

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TW

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S REPORT: CUES FOR US POLICY TOWARD THE ROC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: THE GROC HAS ABSORBED THE SHOCKS OF 1971-72 AND HAS ACHIEVED A NEW EQUILIBRIUM MORE OR LESS ADEQUATE TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. WE MAY NOT BE CONTEMPLATING A MAJOR FORWARD STEP TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION WITH THE PRC. IF SO WE SHOULD BEGIN TO FORMULATE A PROGRAM, FOR EARLY IMPLEMENTATION, DESIGNED TO LEAD THE GROC TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE CAN BE YET A FURTHER VIABLE, ALBEIT LESS ATTRACTIVE, EQUILIBRIUM FOR TAIWAN, ONE WHICH IT WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT AND FOR WHICH IT MIGHT WELL BEGIN TO PERPARE ITS OWN PEOPLE. THE NEW

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EQUILIBRIUM WOULD INVOLVE LESS FORMAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONS. WHAT FOLLOWS BELOW PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND FOR THESE THOUGHTS, AND HIGHLIGHTS THE IMPORTANCE OF PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO TO THE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.

2. BASIC SITUATION OF THE GROC AND ITS CONCERNS - WITH 92 COUNTRIES HAVING RECOGNIZED PEKING, AND WITH SOME OF ITS CLOSEST SEA NEIGHBORS CONTEMPLATING SIMILAR ACTION, THE FIRST CONCERN OF THE GROC IS THAT IT CONTINUE TO SURVIVE AS A POLITICAL ENTITY DISTINCT FROM THE MAINLAND. ALTHOUGH IN PRINCIPLE IT CONTINUES TO CLAIM THE SOLE RIGHT TO SPEAK FOR ALL OF CHINA, THE ESSENCE OF THE GROC'S POSITION COULD BE RESTATED AS: "WE CANNOT PREVENT YOU FROM DEALING WITH THE PRC AS A SOVEREIGN ENTITY, BUT YOU MUST TREAT US AS EFFECTIVELY SOVEREIGN OVER TAIWAN." PRESS REFERENCES TO THE ROC AS A COUNTRY OF 16 MILLION PEOPLE AND EVEN PRESS USAGE OF THE PHRASE, "ONE CHINA, TWO GOVERNMENTS" ARE NOW COMMON-PLACE, THOUGH THE LATTER IS USUALLY ATTRIBUTED TO OUTSIDE OBSERVERS (AMERICAN SCHOLARS, OVERSEAS CHINESE IN HONG KONG OR THE US, ETC.). CERTAINLY THE GOVERNMENT BEHAVES IN THIS WAY IN ESTABLISHING A TRADE AND INFORMATION OFFICE IN CARACAS, FOR EXAMPLE, OR CONCLUDING AN INFORMAL AGREEMENT ON VISA ISSUANCE WITH THE MALAYSIANS.

3. CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO HEAD OFF PHILIPPINE RECOGNITION OF PEKING, ARE ANOTHER EXAMPLE, AND ARE BASED NOT ON JURIDICAL CLAIMS, BUT RATHER ON APPEALS TO NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY, PAST FRIENDLY COOPERATION, AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE LARGE OVERSEAS CHINESE COMMUNITY IN THE PHILIPPINES WOULD BECOME A PRC FIFTH COLUMN. THE GROC WILL WORK HARD TO PREVENT PHILIPPINE RECOGNITION OF PEKING, BUT IF IT COMES WILL ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT WITH THE GOP AS INSTITUTIONALIZED AS POSSIBLE A SET OF PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO HANDLE TRADE, MILITARY COOPERATION AND INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES, VISAS AND TOURISM, NEWS-GATHERING AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES, AND OFFICIAL LIAISON BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

4. SECURITY ASPECTS OF THIS POLITICAL SURVIVAL ARE OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. WHILE WE SEE TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN

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STRAIT AT THEIR LOWEST EBB WITHIN RECENT MEMORY, THE GROC SEES PEKING AS UNPREDICTABLE, INHERENTLY AGGRESSIVE AND, ABOVE ALL, AS MANY TIMES STRONGER THAN ITSELF. IN TRYING TO FORESEE THE FUTURE OF PRC-US-ROC RELATIONS, FOR THE GROC THE ULTIMATE QUESTION IS: "HOW WOULD THE PRC BEHAVE IF NO LONGER INHIBITED BY A US GUARANTEE OF TAIWAN'S SECURITY?" THUS PEOPLE HERE ARE HYPER-SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBLE TERMINATION OF OUR DIPLOMATIC TIES LEST THIS ALSO BRING TO AN END, OR LEAST CAST SERIOUS DOUBTS ON OUR SECURITY COMMITMENT, AND THEY REMAIN HIGHLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RELYING INCREASINGLY ON POLITICAL AS OPPOSED TO MILITARY DETERRENENTS.

5. BEHIND THE PHRASE, "FEAR OF DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION", HIDES A MORE PRACTICAL FEAR: THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL CEASE TREATING THE ROC IN CONCRETE WAYS AS AN ENTITY OF 16 MILLION PEOPLE HAVING A DEFINABLE AREA OF JURISDICTION (TAIWAN AND ASSOCIATED ISLANDS, NOT THE MAINLAND), AND THAT, ACCORDINGLY, THE ROC WILL LOSE ITS CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN WAYS WHICH ENHANCE ITS TRADE AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN GENERAL. NO ONE HERE DOUBTS THAT THIS DENIAL OF ACROSS-THE BOARD ACCESS IS THE PRC'S INTENTION.

6. TO COUNTER THIS THREAT, THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCTS AN ACTIVE AND INCREASING PROGRAM OF INVITATIONAL AND OSTENSIBLY PRIVATE "PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE DIPLOMACY", IN MANY WAYS SIMILAR TO PRC EFFORTS BEFORE IT ACHIEVED GENERAL RECOGNITION, IN ORDER TO CONVINCE AN MANY OPINION-MOULDERS AS POSSIBLE OF THE IMPORTANCE AND VIABILITY OF TAIWAN. ALTHOUGH SPORTS AND CULTURAL EVENTS PLAY THEIR PART, THE KEY DEVICE IN ATTRACTING INTEREST MOST COMMONLY LIES IN THE ECONOMIC AREA: TRADE, INVESTMENT AND CAREFULLY SELECTED ASSISTANCE PROJECTS.

7. THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMICS: EMBASSY REPORTING HAS RIGHTLY EMPHASIZED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN'S "ECONOMIC MIRACLE" IN MAINTAINING DOMESTIC CONFIDENCE DESPITE THE POLITICAL TRAUMAS OF THE PAST FEW YEARS. EMPHASIS SHOULD ALSO BE PLACED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN'S ECONOMIC ATTRACTIVENESS AS A TRADING PARTNER AND

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FOCUS OF INVESTMENT IN KEEPING THE ROC FROM BECOMING TRULY ISOLATED FROM THE WORLD COMMUNITY. IT IS THIS ECONOMIC ATTRACTIVENESS WHICH HAS ENABLED THE GROC TO CONDUCT A SUCCESSFUL "WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS" POLICY, WHETHER IT IS A MATTER OF A TRADE OFFICE IN FRANCE, A WEST GERMAN SPONGE IRON PLANT IN SOUTHERN TAIWAN, OR AN ROC SUGAR MILL IN SAUDI ARABIA, AND THUS TO MAINTAIN WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH MOST OF THE WORLD. THE PREMIER'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE "TEN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS" SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT. IT IS, AT BOTTOM, A POLITICAL DECISION; TO MODERNIZE TAIWAN'S INFRASTRUCTURE SO AS TO INSURE FUTURE COMPETITIVENESS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THUS ENHANCE SURVIVABILITY AS A POLITICAL ENTITY. ACCORDINGLY, WITH SO MUCH AT STAKE



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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

DESCRIPTION Re Madame Chiang Ching-Kuo

CREATION DATE 08/15/1974

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400127

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/26/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG



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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 05482 300813Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 180-00 1031 W

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R 300720Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2818
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO JCS WASHDC
CINCPAC
COMUSTDC TAIPEI
CHMAAG TAIPEI
327TH AD

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 5482

EXDIS

R.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PFOR, TW
SUBJ: FUTURE USE OF TAINAN AIR BASE

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

1. SUMMARY: I BELIEVE USAF PROPOSAL TO MAINTAIN A GROUP OF 300 AT TAINAN AIR BASE FOR WAR RESERVE MATERIEL STORAGE IS UNNECESSARY, WASTEFUL AT A TIME WHEN PRESIDENT HAS CALLED FOR MAXIMUM BUDGETARY SAVINGS, AND POLITICALLY MOST INADVISABLE. END SUMMARY.

2. I UNDERSTAND USAF HAS PROPOSED MAINTAINING A GROUP OF 300 AT TAINAN AIR BASE FOR WAR RESERVE MATERIEL STORAGE PURPOSES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT A STUDY CONDUCTED BY MILITARY OFFICERS CONCERNED HAS DETERMINED IT IS COMPLETELY FEASIBLE AND HIGHLY COST EFFECTIVE TO CONTRACT WITH GROC FOR SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE OF THIS WAR RESERVE MATERIEL, WITH ONLY A FEW-- PERHAPS LESS THAN 20 -- US PERSONNEL

14 AUG 30 PM 1:54
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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 05482 300813Z

OPERATING AS QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTORS. ESSENTIALLY, THIS IS NOW THE SITUATION AT CHIAYI, EXCEPT THAT THE QUALITY CONTROL PEOPLE ARE RESIDENT AT CCK AIRBASE AND COMMUTE.

3. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO PLAN FOR 40-50 PEOPLE FOR PERIMETER SECURITY, ANOTHER 40-50 FOR ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, AND 200 OR SO TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT, RUN SCHOOLS AND OPERATE PX'S, CAN BE DESCRIBED ONLY AS UNNECESSARY AND WASTEFUL. CERTAINLY, IT SEEMS IN CONTRADICTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO SAVE EVERY POSSIBLE BUDGETARY DOLLAR.

4. ENTIRELY ASIDE FROM THESE CONSIDERATIONS OF COST EFFECTIVENESS, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE POLITICAL INADVISABILITY OF THE USAF PROPOSAL, TO ENVISAGE A PERMANENT OR EVEN SEMI-PERMANENT US MILITARY INSTALLATION ON TAIWAN IS DIRECTLY COUNTER TO THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HAVING MANAGED TO SECURE PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO'S UNDERSTANDING AND ACQUIESCENCE IN TAINAN AND GOING INTO CARETAKER STATUS--EXPLAINED AS MEANING A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE--BY THE END OF THIS CALENDAR YEAR, I CONSIDER IT MOST INADVISABLE TO SEE THAT NUMBER VASTLY INFLATED AND THEN AT SOME FUTURE TIME, BECAUSE OF OUR OBJECTIVES AS STATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE, TO HAVE TO RE-OPEN A HEALED WOUND AND EXPLAIN A NEW DECISION TO REMOVE FORCES FROM TAINAN. IT SEEMS TO ME MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE CONTINUE TO GIVE THE PREMIER EVERY EVIDENCE THAT OUR ACTIONS ARE TAKEN IN A FULLY PLANNED, FULLY COORDINATED AND HIGHLY DEPENDABLE MANNER. DECISIONS TAKEN AND THEN HASTILY UNTAKEN OR REVISED ARE TO BE AVOIDED.

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4

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012696

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

DESCRIPTION Re Republic of China

CREATION DATE 09/09/1974

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400127

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/26/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

EXEMPTED 7/02

5

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012697

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

DESCRIPTION Re People's Republic of China and
Republic of China

CREATION DATE 09/14/1974

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400127

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/26/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

EXEMPTED 7/02
4/28/10

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012699

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

DESCRIPTION Re Republic of China

CREATION DATE 09/20/1974

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400127

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/26/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

Sanitized 4/16/02



Department of State

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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 05879 200847Z

12
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 /031 W

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R 200712Z SEP 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO /SECSTATE WASHDC 2995
SECDEF WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
INFO CNO WASHDC
COMUSTDC TAIPEI
CHMAAG TAIPEI
CINCPAC

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (d)

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 5879

EXDIS

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

MR 02-22, #4, et. seq. 3/6/02

By dal NARA, Date 4/16/02

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL, MARR, MASS, TW
SUBJ: ROC ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE EC-121

1. SUMMARY. SENIOR ROC MILITARY HAVE COMPLAINED TO MISSION OFFICERS THAT STATE DEPT IS BLOCKING ACQUISITION OF TWO EC-121 AIRCRAFT AND HAVE ASKED FOR COUNTRY TEAM ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE INFORMED THEM EC-121 PROPOSAL DOES NOT HAVE COUNTRY TEAM APPROVAL AND IS NOT ADVOCATED BY DOD OR CNO. GRCC WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR AIRBORNE CAPABILITY. FOR THIS REASON, MISSION WISHES URGE AGAIN THAT IT BE INFORMED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON ALL PROPOSALS WHICH SURFACE IN WASHINGTON FOR MAJOR ROC EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS, INCLUDING ITEMS AS SENSITIVE AND POTENTIALLY PROVOCATIVE TO ROC END SUMMARY.

2. GENERAL LAY, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, AND OTHER SENIOR ROC MILITARY HAVE COMPLAINED TO SENIOR MISSION OFFICERS THAT STATE DEPT IS BLOCKING ROC ACQUISITION

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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 05879 200847Z

OF EC-121 AIRCRAFT DESPITE CNO AND DOD APPROVAL OF THAT ACQUISITION. THESE OFFICERS HAVE VOICED A STRONG DESIRE FOR ROC AIRBORNE SIGINT CAPABILITY AND FOR IMPROVED ELECTRONIC WARFARE KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY. THEY ARE AWARE OF EW DEVELOPMENTS AND TACTICS IN MID-EAST OCTOBER WAR (A GROUP OF ISRAELI DEFENSE OFFICIALS ARE CURRENTLY IN TAIPEI AND EW MATTERS PROBABLY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED). ALTHOUGH ROC EW TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE IS VERY LIMITED, ROC OFFICERS TEND TO WANT ANY AND ALL OPTIONS.

3. AFTER DISCUSSION IN COUNTRY TEAM MILITARY SECURITY COMMITTEE, FOLLOWING COORDINATED POSITION WAS GIVEN GENERAL LAI BY CHIEF MAAG:

A. WE WILL CONTINUE WITH POSITIVE ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE THROUGH EW ANNEX OF DATA EXCHANGE AGREEMENT AND OTHER APPROVED EW PROJECTS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE EW ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION.

B. SOME ROC AIRBORNE EW INTERESTS ARE NOT VALID MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND OTHERS CAN BE SATISFIED BY OTHER MEANS. DEDICATED AIRBORNE ASSETS ARE VERY COSTLY, OFTEN PROVOCATIVE, AND FREQUENTLY NOT EFFECTIVE.

C. COST ALONE OF INTRODUCING AND MAINTAINING EC-121 SYSTEM IS PROHIBITIVE. COUNTRY TEAM UNANIMOUSLY AGREE IN NOT SUPPORTING EC-121 ACQUISITION. EC-121 ACQUISITION IS NOT ADVOCATED BY DOD OR CNO AS ALLEGED BY ROC MILITARY OFFICIALS.

4. GENERAL LAI AGREED EC-121 WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE AND PROBABLY NOT COST EFFECTIVE, BUT FELT IT WOULD BE EDUCATIONAL TOOL FOR CHUNG SHAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND MIGHT OFFER SOME AIRBORNE OPTIONS IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. LAI PERSISTS IN WANTING AIRBORNE EW CAPABILITY, ARGUING HIS STAFF BELIEVE THERE ARE CERTAIN EW TASKS WHICH CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISHED AIRBORNE. HE CONCLUDED WITH PLEA THAT IF NOT EC-121, WE HELP ROC DEVELOP CAPABILITY USING C-54, C-119 OR C-123.

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PAGE 03 TAIPEI 05879 200847Z

5. HAD ESSENTIALLY SIMILAR CONVERSATIONS WITH ADMIRAL WU, ROCN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF, AND ADMIRAL SOONG, NAVY CINC.

6. COMUSMTC STATES ROC ACQUISITION OF TWO EC-121 AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT ADD SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY TO US/ROC DEFENSE POSTURE.

7. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT ROC OFFICIALS WHO PUSHED EC-121 PROPOSAL WILL NOT BE DETERRED BY THIS ONE FAILURE AND WE ANTICIPATE THEY WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO BROADEN THEIR AIRBORNE.....CAPABILITY, PERHAPS IN WAYS WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO US INTERESTS. FOR THIS REASON, MISSION AGAIN EMPHASIZES GENERAL RULE THAT ROC MILITARY SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROPOSALS WHICH SURFACE IN WASHINGTON--PARTICULARLY ITEMS AS SENSITIVE AND POTENTIALLY PROVOCATIVE TO PRC AS.....--BE PROMPTLY REFERRED TO COUNTRY TEAM MISSION SECURITY COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW.
UNGER

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012701

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

DESCRIPTION Re Republic of China

CREATION DATE 12/31/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400127

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/26/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

EXEMPTED 7/02

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 01535 271258Z

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ACTION 53-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
----- 003759

O R 270018Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4586
AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY MANILA

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 1535


EXDIS

EO 11652 GDS
TAGS MASS VS TW

SUBJECT: LST LOAN
REF: A. STATE 069147 B. SAIGON 3595

1. CHIEF MAAG GENERAL NASH AND POL COUNSELOR CALLED ON GENERAL LAI MING-TANG TOGETHER WITH ADMIRAL YU PO-SHENG LATE TODAY AND MADE APPROACH BASED ON PARA (2) REPTEL B. GENERAL LAI, WHO HAD ALREADY RECEIVED SIMILAR REQUEST FROM GVN RELAYED BY GROC EMBASSY SAIGON, ASKED HOW MANY SHIPS WERE NEEDED. NASH INDICATED THAT NEED WAS VERY GREAT, AND THAT UP TO TWELVE COULD BE USED.

2. GENERAL LAI SAID THAT HE COULD MAKE TWO LST'S WITH ROC CREWS AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT ONCE THESE WERE ON THE SCENE ROC COULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING ADDITIONAL SHIPS. HE INDICATED THAT HE ALREADY HAD THE PREMIER'S APPROVAL AND THAT TWO SHIPS WILL BE READY TO SAIL "TOMORROW" AS SOON AS THE GROC HAS RECEIVED DETAILS BEING REQUESTED VIA ITS EMBASSY IN SAIGON ABOUT WHERE AND TO WHOM SHIPS SHOULD REPORT. GEN LAI ASSUMES



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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 01535 271258Z

THAT BUNKERING, PROVISIONING, ETC. WILL BE PROVIDED BY GVN. ALTHOUGH HE ADDED THAT TWO LST'S WOULD LEAVE WITH PROVISIONS FOR ONE MONTH. THERE WAS NO RPT NO MENTION OF FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS.


3. GENERAL LAI SAID THAT THE TWO SHIPS WOULD SAIL WITHOUT ESCORT AND WOULD REQUIRE ABOUT SIX DAYS' SAILING TIME. CAREFUL PRECATIONS WOULD BE TAKEN TO KEEP SHIP'S DEPARTURE AND COURSE SECRET. THE SHIP'S COURSE WOULD CARRY THEM WELL SOUTH OF THE PARACELS.

4. AS BOTH GENERAL LAI AND ADMIRAL YU SHOWED EVERY INDICATION THAT THE GROC WISHES TO BE BOTH RESPONSIVE AND PROMPT IN MEETING THE GVN'S URGENT REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, SUGGEST THAT EMBASSY SAIGON FOLLOW THROUGH AND MAKE SURE THAT THE GROC EMBASSY IS GETTING THE DESIRED INFORMATION ASAP FROM THE GVN.

5. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF LOANED SHIPS. WE ASSUME DEPT WILL NOT NEED SHIP IDENTIFICATION FOR PRIOR NOTICE TO CONGRESS (REF A PARA 7).

6. FYI. DOES EMBASSY SAIGON BELIEVE THAT ROCAF C-119'S, (WITH ROC AIR CREWS) CARRYING APPROXIMATELY FIFTY PERSONS PER TRIP COULD BE USEFUL AT THIS STAGE?

7. SUGGEST DEPT CONSIDER REPEATING THIS AND OTHER PERTINENT CABLES TO SEDEF, JCS AND CINCPAC.
UNGER





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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 01577 291029Z

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 291013Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4606
PHNOM PENH AMEMBASSY IMMEDIATE 279

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 1577

EXDIS

EO 11652 GDS
TAGS PFOR OVIP XB

SUBJECT: LON NOL VISIT TO TAIWAN

PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO PASSED TO ME TODAY, MARCH 29, A MESSAGE THAT GROC REPRESENTATIVE IN PHNOM PENH, AMBASSADOR KUNG LIN CHEN, WAS REQUESTED BY GKR PRIME MINISTER LONG BORET TO ASK GROC TO RECEIVE VISIT FROM MARSHAL LON NOL IN TAIPEI FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. ACCORDING TO PREMIER, GROC HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPAL. THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHERE VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE OR FOR HOW LONG IT WOULD LAST.
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SECRET 4522

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 01581 310335Z

61
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

040942

O 310316Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4609
INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 1581

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F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR OVIP XB
SUBJECT: LON NOL VISIT TO TAIWAN

REF: TAIPEIH 1577

IN PENULTIMATE LINE REFTEL, CHANGE "WHERE" TO READ "WHEN"
REPEAT "WHEN".
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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 01864 100937Z

12
ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 89-14 180-00 INR-05 PRS-01 SP-02 CCR-01 PA-01

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FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4768

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EO 11652 NA
TAGS PGOV, PFOR TW US
SUBJECT: LOCAL DISSATISFACTION WITH U.S. RESPONSE TO
PRESIDENT CHIANG'S DEATH

REF: TAIPEI 1840

1. DURING THE COURSE OF APRIL 10 THE EMBASSY CONTINUED TO
RECEIVE COMPLAINTS FROM AMERICANS AND BEGAN TO RECEIVE
DIRECT COMPLAINTS FROM INDIVIDUAL CHINESE ABOUT THE
SELECTION OF SECRETARY BUTZ TO REPRESENT THE U.S. AT
PRESIDENT CHIANG'S FUNERAL. THE MAIN THEME OF THE PROTESTS
WAS THAT WHATEVER THE POLITICAL SITUATION, THE U.S. SHOULD
REMEMBER THAT PRESIDENT CHIANG HAD LED AN IMPORTANT ALLY
OF THE U.S. DURING WORLD WAR II. THEREFORE, THE U.S.
SHOULD SEND A HIGHER RANKING OFFICIAL TO SHOW PROPER
RESPECT FOR THIS GREAT WORLD LEADER.

2. AMERICANS WHO PROTESTED FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED THE
SELECTION OF BUTZ AS "HUMILIATING". THE PRESIDENT OF A
VERY LARGE AND LONG ESTABLISHED AMERICAN FIRM IN
TAIWAN DESCRIBED THE APPOINT AS "A (CENSORED) SHAME,
AN INSULT, AND A DISGRACE."

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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 01864 100937Z

3. ONE AMERICAN DESCRIBED CHINESE REACTION TO BUTZ'S SELECTION AS "STUNNED". ANOTHER, WHO HAS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH A BROAD SEGMENT OF THE AMERICAN AND CHINESE BUSINESS COMMUNITIES, SAID THE OVERWHELMING FEELING OF BOTH COMMUNITIES WAS THAT THE SELECTION OF BUTZ WAS "INSULTING."

4. CHINESE WHO INDIVIDUALLY CALLED THE EMBASSY EXPRESSED THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SELECTION AND HOPE THAT A OFFICIAL OF GREATER PRESTIGE COULD BE CHOSEN TO HEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION. ONE KMT SOURCE TOLD AN EMBOFF THAT ALMOST EVERYONE HE HAD SPOKEN TO IN THE KMT CONSIDERED THE APPOINTMENT TO BE A SLAP IN THE FACE AND THAT THERE WOULD BE OPEN CRITICISM OF THE APPOINTMENT IN THE PRESS AFTER THE FUNERAL OCCURS.

5. IN SEVERAL INSTANCES, BOTH AMERICANS AND CHINESE CLAIMED TO BE REPRESENTING THE VIEWS OF A GROUP RATHER THAN SPEAKING AS INDIVIDUALS. SOME OF THOSE WHO REGISTERED COMPLAINTS ASKED THAT THE EMBASSY RELAY THEIR VIEWS TO WASHINGTON. OTHERS STATED THAT THEY PLANNED TO SEND TELEGRAMS TO THE WHITE HOUSE.
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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02015 161550Z

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

038403

O R 161331Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4846
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 2015

EXDIS

F.O. 11652; XGDS-1
TAGS: OVIP (ROCKEFELLER, NELSON A.)
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KIM CHONG-PIL

1. VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER MET FOR APPROXIMATELY FORTYFIVE MINUTES MORNING APRIL 16 WITH RIME MINISTER KIM CHONG-PIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. DEPTASSTSEC ZURHELLEN AND VICE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CAPT. HOWE WWERE PRESENT AND MR. HAN SANG-KOOK ACTED AS INTERPRETER FOR PRIME MINISTER.

2. PM KIM SAID THAT PRESIDENT PARK HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY WARM PERSONAL REGARDS TO PRESIDENT FORD. VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE MESSAGE AND HE KNEW PRESIDENT FORD WOULD BE VERY PLEASED. VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT THE US HAS A FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND EXPECTS TO LIVE UP TO IT. THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM WAS SPECIAL AND DID NOT IMPLY ANYTHING TOWARDS SOUTH KOREA AND THE REST OF THE NORTHEAST ASIA AREA. WE HAVE EVERY INTENT TO KEEP AN AMERICAN PRESENCE AND AMERICAN FORCES IN KOREA. WE HAVE

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY lan DATE 4/22/01
Sta visit 8/3/00

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 Retain Class'n Change to _____
 Declassify in part and excise as shown
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 With concurrence _____ (not) (obtained)
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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02015 161550Z

A STRONG AND CLEAR DETERMINATION TOWARDS THE ROK AND WE APPRECIATE THE ROLE OF THE ROK IN OUR OWN SECURITY.

3. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THERE IS A FREE PRESS IN THE US, HOWEVER, WHICH CRITICIZED SOME OF THE METHODS USED IN THE ROK, AND THIS CRITICISM WAS PICKED UP IN THE CONGRESS. HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND HAD NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO TELL THE ROK HOW TO HANDLE ITS AFFAIRS, BUT THIS CRITICISM DID EXIST.

4. PM KIM EXPRESSED HIS SINCEREST APPRECIATION FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S HAVING RECONFIRMED THE US DETERMINATION WHICH HE HAD WANTED TO HEAR. HE FELT REASSURED. HE SAID THE US HAS AN ABLE AMBASSADOR IN KOREA WHO COMMANDS HIGH RESPECT. THE ROK WAS DOING ITS BEST TO MAINTAIN UNFALTERING FRIENDSHIP AND THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND KOREA IN SEOUL. HE EXPLAINED HOW THE ROK GOVERNMENT FEELS THAT NORTH KOREA IS UTILIZING STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, ANTI-GOVERNMENT MEETINGS, AND OTHER MEANS OF CAUSING DIFFICULTY WITHIN THE ROK. THE SITUATION, HOWEVER, WAS NOT AS SERIOUS AS EOPLE ABROAD THOUGHT. SOMETIMES PRESIDENT PARK TOOK STONG MEASURES BUT IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE USING AGAINST SOUTH KOREA HTE SAME MEHTODS BY WHICH THEY HAD DESTROYED THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT IN CHINA AND DRIVEN CHIANG KAI-SHEK FROM THE MAINLAND. THE COMMUNISTS TODAY IN KOREA ARE PARTICULARLY WORKING THROUGH RELIGIOUS GROUPS, ESPECIALLY THOSE CONCERNED WITH URBAN EVANGELIZATION. THE ROK HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED CLERGYMEN AS ANTICOMMUNIST BUT THESE DAYS THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE. THE EOPLE ARE BEING AGITATED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT BY SLOGANS

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PAGE 03 TAIPEI 02015 161550Z

AND CLAIMS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS ANTI-DEMOCRACY AND SUPPRESSES FREEDOM. THIS IS MEANT TO CONFUSE THE PEOPLE AND INCAPACITATE THE GOVERNMENT.

5. PM KIM SAID IN CONCLUSION HE WANTED TO ASSURE THE US THAT KOREA WAS A STONG ALLY. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPSONDED THAT WE WANT IT TO STAY THAT WAY. HE WAS HAPPY TO HAVE HAD THIS CHANCE TO MEET THE PM, EVEN THOUGH UNDER SAD CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO EXPRESS THE DETERMINATION OF THE US. PM KIM SAID THAT KOREA WOULD TAKE CASE OF ITSELF AND DO ITS BEST TO MAINTAIN STABILITY AND NOT BECOME A BURDEN ON THE US. HE HOPED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT FORD WOULD LOOK UPON KOREA IN THIS WAY AND COUNT ON IT TO RESPOND IF THE IME CASE WHEN WE HAD TO WORK TOGETHER.
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02013 161000Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 160949Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4843

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TAIPEI 2013

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: JA, OVIP (EMPEROR HIROHITO)
SUBJ: EMPEROR'S VISIT TO THE U.S.

1. PLEASE INFORM FONOFF OFFICE OF PROTOCOL THAT ROGER WALLACE S/CPR OFFICER TRAVELING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY, WOULD BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES DURING ONE HOUR STOPOVER AT HANEDA ON APRIL 17. PLEASE CONFIRM IF THIS IS CONVENIENT WITH FONOFF OFFICE OF PROTOCOL.

2. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY, TRAVELLING ABOARD AIR FORCE II VC137 TAIL NO. 86970 WILL ARRIVE AS REQUESTED AT 1600 HRS APRIL 17.
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Department of State

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PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02256 260535Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 260455Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4970
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 2256

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR, VS, TW
SUBJECT: FORMER RVN PRESIDENT THIEU ARRIVES IN TAIPEI

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4. FOR SAIGON AND DEPT: IN EXAMINING THE PAROLE



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
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DOCUMENTS WE NOTED THAT THE DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY PREPARED FOR A TRAN VAN PHAN HAD HIS NAME INKED OUT AND HAD SUBSTITUTED THE NAME OF LT. COLONEL NGUYEN LIN THAN. WE ALSO NOTED THAT SIX PEOPLE -- COL. VO VAN CAM, COL. NHAN VAN THIET, COL. TRAN THANH DIEN, COL. NGUYEN VAN DUC, LT. COL. TON THAT AI-CHIEU, AND MAJOR HO VUONG MINH-- ARE INCLUDE JOINTLY ON ONE DOCUMENT IN THREE IDENTICAL ORIGINALS; IN THIS CASE ALSO NAMES ARE HANDWRITTEN.

5. WE OF COURSE ARE NOT FULLY AWARE OF THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR ISSUING PAROLE DOCUMENTS IN SAIGON, BUT WISHED TO BRING THESE APPARENT DISCREPANCIES TO YOUR NOTICE IN CASE THEY MIGHT RESULT IN DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING ENTRY TO THE US.

6. WE DO NOT KNOW WHEN ANY MEMBERS OF THE PARTY PLAN TO LEAVE TAIPEI FOR THE US BUT WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE. UNGER



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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, VS, TW
SUBJECT: PAROLE DOCUMENTS FOR MEMBERS OF EX-PRESIDENT THIEU'S
ENTOURAGE

REF: A. SAIGON 5672
B. STATE 97656
C. TAIPEI 2256

1. ON APRIL 30 RVN EMBASSY FIRST SECRETARY DANG DUC HIEN CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON EMBOFFS TO DISCUSS THE PAROLE DOCUMENTS HELD BY SIX OF THE GROUP WHO ARRIVED IN TAIPEI ON APRIL 26 WITH FORMER RVN PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU. AS NOTED IN PARA 4 REF C, SIX OF THE GROUP POSSESS A JOINT PAROLE DOCUMENT IN THREE IDENTICAL ORIGINALS.

2. HIEN SAID THAT SINCE THE SIX WOULD BE TRAVELING SEPARATELY TO THE US AT AN UNSPECIFIED TIME IN THE FUTURE, THEY WOULD REQUIRE SEPARATE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS. ACCORDINGLY, HE REQUESTED THAT EMBASSY TAIPEI REISSUE SIX SEPARATE PAROLE DOCUMENTS.


3. HIEN ADDED THAT AT LEAST ONE AND POSSIBLY MORE OF THE GROUP HAD WIVES AND CHILDREN (NOT INCLUDED IN THE PAROLE DOCUMENTS) WHO HAD COME EARLIER TO TAIPEI (AND ARE STILL IN TAIPEI) AND WHO WOULD BE TRAVELING WITH THEIR PRINCIPALS.

4. EMBOFFS EXPLAINED TO HIEN THAT AT PRESENT EMBASSY TAIPEI HAD NO AUTHORIZATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT TO AMEND ANY

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PREVIOUSLY ISSUED PAROLE PAPERS AND THAT GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED. HIF LEFT THE THREE ORIGINAL PAROLE PAPERS IN QUESTION WITH US PENDING RECEIPT OF GUIDANCE. HE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION ON PRINCIPALS' WIVES AND CHILDREN NOW IN TAIPEI.

5. REQUEST DEPARTMENT PROVIDE GUIDANCE ASAP ON HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND TO HIEN'S APPROACH. IN THE EVENT THE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZES US TO RE-ISSUE PAROLE DOCUMENTS, WE WOULD NEED DETAILED GUIDANCE ON THE APPROPRIATE FORMAT AND ANY SUBSTANTIATING DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED. SPECIFICALLY, SHOULD THE FORMAT BE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE PRESENT PAROLE DOCUMENTS (SEE BELOW), MUST DEPENDENTS' NAMES BE INCLUDED, AND WHAT IS THE LENGTH OF TIME FOR WHICH THE DOCUMENT IS VALID? (WE NOTE THAT THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTLY HELD BY THOSE MENTIONED IN REF C DO NOT REPEAT NOT HAVE ANY DATE UPON WHICH THE DOCUMENTS WOULD BECOME INVALID.)

6. FYI: THE DOCUMENTS NOW HELD BY ALL THOSE NAMED IN REF C ARE APPARENTLY XEROXED ON EMBASSY LETTERHEAD, WITH RAISED SEAL AND STAMPED CONSULAR OFFICER SIGNATURE, AND IS ADDRESSED "TO THE EXAMINING IMMIGRATION OFFICER AT THE PORT OF ENTRY". FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT:

A. "THE BELOW LISTED ALIENS HAVE BEEN GRANTED PAROLE STATUS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT IMMIGRANT VISA.


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B. "ALL ALIENS LISTED ABOVE WERE VERIFIED AS BELONGING TO AUTHORIZED PAROLE CATEGORIES SPECIFIED IN STATE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 91723 OF APRIL 22, 1975.

C. "EACH ALIEN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRING WITH HIM ALL OF THE CIVIL DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION AND HAS BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO PRESENT TO THE CAPTAIN OF THE AIRCRAFT TRANSPORTING HIM AND HIS FAMILY.

D. "THE NAMES OF THE ALIENS LISTED ABOVE ARE BEING CABLED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-



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
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IZATION SERVICE CENTRAL OFFICE IN WASHINGTON.

E. "IMPORTANT NOTICE: THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT VALID FOR
ADMISSION INTO THE UNITED STATES AFTER

AMERICAN VICE CONSUL"

7. IN THE EVENT ANY OF THOSE WHO HOLD THE DOCUMENT DESCRIBED
ABOVE PLAN TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S., CAN THE DOCUMENT BE
CONSIDERED VALID FOR ENTRY INTO THE US?
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4970
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE

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