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4822

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Solomon
HHK reviewed the
attached and commented
"At this late date,
let's forget the whole
thing."

Bud



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

XGDS (3)

ACTION

July 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*
 JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Reply to the
 Republic of China Premier Chiang Ching-kuo

In a memorandum of May 29 (Tab II) we sent you a draft State cable to Ambassador Unger in Taipei containing a proposed message from the President to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. The message, you will recall, responded to a paper (Tab III) which CCK transmitted to Ambassador Unger on May 3 outlining his strategic views in the wake of Indochina, and a follow-on letter of May 7 in which Premier Chiang thanked the President for his reaffirmation of U.S. commitments to the Republic of China and repeating the Premier's strategic concepts.

You noted on our first memorandum that you wanted to discuss this issue. We believe, however, that we may have removed the cause of your reservations. We have now dropped from the draft message a paragraph (proposed by Smyser and Froebe, and opposed by Solomon, Lord, and Gleysteen) that underscored U.S. intention to go forward with normalization of relations with Peking while at the same time holding steadfast in our commitments to old friends and allies.

The current draft cable (Tab I) expresses appreciation to CCK for his two messages and for his expression of intent to continue close cooperation with the United States. It pledges the United States to reciprocate the spirit of close cooperation and endorses the Premier's suggestion that we continue frank consultations between our two governments. The message also notes the United States' desire to develop and enlarge communication with the PRC in order to seek peaceful solutions to outstanding problems and to reduce the dangers of confrontation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the draft State cable at Tab I as revised.


APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

XGDS (3)

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY *bb*, NARA, DATE *11/20/01*



IMMEDIATE


TO: TAIPEI

FROM: SECSTATE

SUBJECT: Premier Chiang's Message to President Ford

REF: TAIPEI 2415


1. Ambassador Unger is authorized to make a presentation along the following lines to Premier Chiang as a response to his message to President Ford which was subject of ref tel and also to his follow-on letter to the President of May 7.
2. President Ford thanks Premier Chiang for his message conveyed through Ambassador Unger, and also for his subsequent letter of May 7. It is particularly useful at this time to have the pertinent views of the Republic of China. In this connection, the President has also noted the views which the Premier conveyed earlier to Vice President Rockefeller and which are recalled in the Premier's current message.
3. The President has noted with appreciation the declarations of the Republic of China of its commitment to play a positive and constructive role in the new era ahead. The United States also pledges itself to such a role, and to continue in this spirit the close cooperation between the U. S. and the ROC.



4. As Premier Chiang is aware from President Ford's earlier statements, the President firmly believes that the U. S. must remain strong and must be in a position to carry out its obligations if peace is to be maintained in Asia and the Pacific.

5. The Premier is aware of the efforts of the U. S. to reduce tensions in East Asia. In particular, the U. S. desires to develop and enlarge communication with the PRC in order to seek peaceful and equitable solutions to outstanding problems where this is possible, and to reduce the dangers of confrontation and conflict. These policies do not ignore the differences, some of them profound, which lie between the United States and the PRC, but they are based on the belief that peaceful resolution of those differences is in all of our interests.

6. With the foregoing in mind, President Ford endorses the desirability of frank discussions between our two governments and is making this reply to the Premier's message in that spirit. He again wishes to express his profound admiration for the progress that the Republic of China has made, and to express his hope and conviction that this progress will continue under the leadership of the Premier and of the government of the Republic of China.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

XGDS (3)

ACTION

May 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

W. R. SMYSE *WR*
RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS (RHS)*

SUBJECT:

Proposed Presidential Reply to the
Republic of China Premier Chiang Ching-kuo


At Tab A is a draft State cable to Ambassador Unger in Taipei which contains a proposed message from the President to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. The message, which Ambassador Unger would deliver orally to Chiang Ching-kuo, responds to ^{the following} two recent messages from the Premier to the President:

-- A memorandum (Tab B) which Chiang Ching-kuo transmitted to Ambassador Unger on May 3. That memorandum summarizes the views he had expressed to the Vice President on April 16 and to the Ambassador earlier. Essentially, Chiang Ching-kuo seizes on the fall of Indochina to suggest that the U. S. once again incorporate Taiwan into its island defense chain in the Western Pacific, arguing that Taiwan and South Korea are indispensable to the security of Japan, which in turn is the cornerstone of U. S. strategy in Asia. Chiang Ching-kuo also reaffirms the Republic of China's commitment to a cooperative relationship with the U. S., and thanks the President for his statement on the Republic of China made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors last month.

(Tab C)

-- A follow-on letter of May 7, in which Chiang Ching-kuo thanks the President for his reaffirmation of U. S. commitments to the Republic of China and repeats the substance of the May 3 memorandum.

The draft oral message expresses appreciation to Chiang Ching-kuo for his two messages, and for the Premier's expression of intent to continue close cooperation with the U. S. It pledges the U. S. to reciprocate this spirit of close cooperation, and at the same time reaffirms the U. S. intent to continue its normalization of relations with Peking. Finally, it endorses Chiang Ching-kuo's suggestion that we continue the frank consultations between our two governments.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

XGDS (3)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO. 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *bb* NARA, DATE *4/29/01*

The draft at Tab A incorporates several changes that we have made in the State draft. We especially call your attention to the first of these changes, the addition of paragraph 5, which we regard as particularly important and which you may or may not wish to confirm.

-- Paragraph 5 has been added by Smyser and Froebe. They believe that the cumulative effect of the Vice President's visit to Taipei, the President's reaffirmation of our commitment to the ROC in the wake of Indochina, and the Vice President's meeting of May 29 with Ambassador Shen may mislead the ROC leadership to believe that we are pulling back from our normalization process with Peking. This could relax the pressure on the ROC to continue its gradual political and psychological adjustment toward a new relationship with us. Paragraph 5's reference to the search for new modalities, followed by paragraph 6's reaffirmation that U. S. normalization with Peking will go forward, is designed to maintain a steady pressure on the ROC for gradual adjustment toward a new relationship with the U. S. -- at the same that we preserve the ROC's necessary minimum confidence in us by implicitly reaffirming our basic commitment.

Solomon, Lord, and Gleysteen, however, believe that paragraph 5 would not be helpful. They hold that at a time when future developments in our relations with Peking are uncertain it would be unwise to stimulate the ROC with a signal that might provoke them to take defensive action via their friends in Congress or through other means.

-- In paragraph 2, after the phrase "It is particularly useful at this time" we removed the phrase in the State cable "when the situation in East Asia is being carefully assessed, together with consideration of future courses of action, ". We believe this suggestion of an "agonizing reappraisal" of U. S. -Asian policy could have a needlessly unsettling effect and is pointless since we are not making such a reappraisal.

-- In paragraph 6, we dropped a second sentence from the State cable which read "He also notes the smooth transition that has been made to the new leadership in the ROC following upon the sad passing of President Chiang and he wishes the Premier and his government the best of success in their important undertakings. " We believe this carries a slightly patronizing air. Instead, we have substituted a reiteration of our standard compliments for the ROC's economic progress and a reaffirmation of our belief that it will continue in the period following President Chiang's death.



RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the draft State cable at Tab A as revised:

-- To include paragraph 5.


APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

-- To exclude paragraph 5.


APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____



12

A



IMMEDIATE

TO: TAIPEI

FROM: SECSTATE

SUBJECT: Premier Chiang's Message to President Ford

REF: TAIPEI 2415

1. [Upon his return to Taipei,] Ambassador Unger is authorized to make a presentation along the following lines to Premier Chiang as a response to his message to President Ford which was subject of reftel and also to his follow-on letter to the President of May 7.
2. President Ford thanks Premier Chiang for his message conveyed through Ambassador Unger, and also for his subsequent letter of May 7. It is particularly useful at this time to have the pertinent views of the Republic of China. In this connection, the President has also noted the views which the Premier conveyed earlier to Vice President Rockefeller and which are recalled in the Premier's current message.
3. The President has noted with appreciation the declarations of the Republic of China of its commitment to play a positive and constructive role in the new era ahead. The United States also pledges itself to such a role, and to continue in this spirit the close cooperation between the U. S. and the ROC.

66 4/20/01




4. As Premier Chiang is aware from President Ford's earlier statements, the President firmly believes that the U. S. must remain strong and must be in a position to carry out its commitments if peace is to be maintained in Asia and the Pacific.


5. Developments in East Asia over the past several years, many of which have affected our two countries, have made it clear to all that the political and military relationships and confrontations of the 1950s and 1960s have changed and are continuing to evolve. This fluidity in the international environment has created a situation where we all must re-examine arrangements and policies; but this in no way affects our concern for and commitment to the security and well-being of our old allies and friends.

6. The Premier is aware of the efforts of the U. S. to reduce the tensions in East Asia. In particular, the U. S. desires to develop and enlarge communication with the PRC in order to seek peaceful and equitable solutions to outstanding problems where this is possible, and to reduce the dangers of confrontation and conflict. These policies do not ignore the differences, some of them profound, which lie between the United States and the PRC, but they are based on the belief that peaceful resolution of those differences is in all of our interests.

7. With the foregoing in mind, President Ford endorses the desirability of frank discussions and has made this reply to the Premier's message in that spirit. He again wishes to express his profound




admiration for the progress that the Republic of China has made,
and to express his hope and conviction that this progress will
continue under the leadership of the Premier and of the government
of the Republic of China.



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B





SECRET 2166

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z

62
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 W *JP/VP*

R 030439Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5053

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 2415

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, TW, TH, RP, CH
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEN

REF: TAIPEI 2255

JAF
Let's discuss
8
(D)

- 0202 CLIFT
- HORMATS
- ELLIOTT
- FROED
- HORAN
- KENNEDY
- LODAL
- LOW
- OBER
- RATLIFF
- OAKLEY
- SMYSER
- SOLOMON
- STEARMAN
- FARRAR

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

- Retain Class'n Change to
- Declassify in part and excise as shown
- EO 12958, 25X() () ()
- Declassify After
- With concurrence (not obtained)
- PS by *sl* Date *8/2/00*

Anderson

1. I CALLED ON FONMIN SHEN CHANG-HUAN AT HIS REQUEST, MAY 3. REFERRING TO MY RECENT CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER CHIANG AT TZU HU (REFTEL), SHEN SAID PREMIER HAD ASKED THAT ESSENCE OF VIEWS PREMIER HAD EXPRESSED ON THAT OCCASION AS WELL AS IN TALK WITH VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER ON APRIL 16, BE PRESENTED IN BRIEF PAPER AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE TRANSMITTED BY ME TO PRESIDENT FORD WHEN I RETURNED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS.

2. PAPER WHICH SHEN READ AND HANDED ME COPY IS QUOTED BELOW: BEGIN QUOTE THE TRAUMATIC EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN INDO-CHINA RECENTLY CANNOT BUT HAVE TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION. THE LEADERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AGREE WITH PRESIDENT FORD THAT TO INDULGE IN RECRIMINATION AND IN APPORTIONING BLAMES IS NOT PRODUCTIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY LESSONS MUST BE DRAWN FROM THIS TRAGEDY TO PREVENT HISTORY FROM REPEATING ITSELF.

MILITARILY, THE INDO-CHINA CHAPTER MAY HAVE NOW COME TO A CLOSE. HOWEVER, A "NEW AGENDA" AS APTLY CALLED BY PRESIDENT FORD SHOULD BE METICULOUSLY DISCUSSED, PLANNED

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *stab* *8/2/00*
NARA, DATE *7/31/01*



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SECRET

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z

AND PREPARED TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIES THAT ARE SURELY FORTHCOMING.

IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA, ESPECIALLY THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES, HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY NERVOUS, WHICH MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO PANIC. IN THE VIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD BE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY OF THE U.S. "NEW AGENDA".

WHILE ATTENDING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, EQUAL IMPORTANCE IN OF NORTHEAST ASIA CANNOT BE GAINSAID. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS COGNIZANT THAT THE U.S. ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO JAPAN FOR ITS INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC PROWESS. BUT THE PROTECTION OF JAPAN HINGES ON THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WHICH ARE VITAL AND INDISPENSABLE FLANKS TO JAPAN. SHOULD

EITHER OF THE FLANKS FALL INTO THE HANDS OF AN ADVERBARY OF THE U.S., IT WOULD RENDER JAPAN MILITARILY VULNERABLE AND CREATE UNFATHOMABLE CONFUSION AND STABILITY DIVISION IN ITS DOMESTIC POLITICS. JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY WOULD THEN BECOME ASSETS TO AMERICA'S ENEMIES. CONFIDENTIALLY, A NUMBER OF JAPAN'S LEADING ELDERLY STATESMEN HAVE EXPRESSED THE FEARS OF SUCH A NIGHTMARE.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT A STRONG CHAIN STRETCHING FROM INDOREA, JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PHILIPPINES, INDONESIA DOWN TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD FORM A RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE FOR THE U.S. DIPLOMATICALLY AND MILITARILY.

AS PREMIER CHIANG CHING-~~WU~~ PRESIDENT NELSON ROCKEFELLER, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS UNEQUIVOCALLY DEDICATED TO THE FOLLOWING POLICY DECISIONS:

1. UNRELENTING STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND COMMUNIST REGIMES NO MATTER WHERE THEY ARE AND DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN, PESCADORES, QUEMOY AND MATSU;
2. FIRM ALIGNMENT WITH THE FREE WORLD, PARTICULARLY



UNRELENTING STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND COMMUNIST REGIMES NO MATTER WHERE THEY ARE AND DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN, PESCADORES, QUEMOY AND MATSU;

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Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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TO U.S.:

3. FURTHER PROMOTION OF INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLIDARITY;
AND

4. REDOUBLED EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE.
BY SO DOING, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY
A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE NEW ERA.

IT IS THE FERVENT HOPE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
THAT PRESIDENT FORD WILL EXERCISE HIS FARSIGHTED AND
STEADFAST STATESMANSHIP WHICH WILL HELP OVERCOME ANY
DIFFICULTIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN THE LIGHT
OF PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO'S BASIC POLICY DIRECTION,
PRESIDENT FORD AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN ALWAYS COUNT
UPON THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A LOYAL ALLY AND PARTNER.

PRESIDENT FORD HAS REPEATEDLY OFFERED HIS ASSURANCES
THAT WHAT TRANSPIRED IN INDU-CHINA SHOULD NOT IMPAIR THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. IN ITS FULFILLMENT OF COMMITMENTS
TO THE OTHER ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS GRATIFIED BY THE WARM SENTIMENTS
EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT FORD TOWARDS THIS COUNTRY IN HIS
RECENT APPEARANCE AT THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER EDITORS'
ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WOULD
APPRECIATE IT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD REPEAT SUCH
REASSURANCES WHENEVER THE SAME ARE PUBLICLY GIVEN TO
OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

FREQUENT AND FRANK CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

FOR THE TASK OF STABILIZING THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES
AND OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES THE STRENGTHENING OF

THE TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA
IN GENERAL AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN PARTICULAR



~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z

COULD ALSO SERVE AS A CREDIBLE TOKEN OF THE U.S. INTENTION AND DETERMINATION, SO THAT THE WAVERING AND NERVOUS COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE ORBIT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. END QUOTE


3. I TOLD SHEN THAT EXPRESSION OF ROC VIEWS AS PRESENTED IN PAPER WOULD BE HELPFUL IN CURRENT WASHINGTON REASSESSMENT OF OUR POLICIES AND THAT I WOULD MAKE A PARTICULAR POINT OF BRINGING TO ATTENTION OF OUR POLICY MAKERS. I EXPECTED THIS REASSESSMENT WOULD RESULT IN POLICY FOUNDED ON BASIC, LONG-TERM INTERESTS, AND THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, I FELT SURE THAT OUR PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE MEANS OF WHICH A MODUS VIVENDI COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH MAINLAND CHINA IN ORDER TO BETTER ASSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN EAST ASIA AND ALSO TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO SOME WORLD PROBLEMS IN WHICH MAINLAND CHINA MUST PLAY A ROLE. I TOLD SHEN THAT WE WERE VERY WELL AWARE OF ROC VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT AND ITS ESSENTIAL INTEREST IN OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. SHEN INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING, BUT WONDERED IF THE HIGH PRICE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR FURTHERING DETENTE WITH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE WORTH THE CLEAR DISADVANTAGES. HE POINTED UP THE "NONTRUSTWORTHINESS" OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, E.G., INDOCHINA, CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES, ETC., AS CONTRASTED WITH THE CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS POLICIES OF THE ROC WHICH WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE U.S.

4. OUR CONVERSATION CONTINUED OVER A RATHER BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS.

5. REGARDING PREMIER'S REQUEST THAT PAPER QUOTED PARA 2, ABOVE BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT FORD, I WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THIS DURING MY CONSULTATION WASHINGTON.
LINGER

~~SECRET~~

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OFFICE OF THE PREMIER
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

May 7, 1975


Dear Mr. President:

In consequence of the traumatic events in Indo-China, many countries in this area, especially Thailand and the Philippines, have become increasingly wavering. It is most gratifying and assuring that you made a timely statement at the press conference on May 6, that it is your aim to tie more closely together South Korea with the U.S., to reaffirm your commitments to the Republic of China, to work more closely with Indonesia, with the Philippines and with other Pacific nations.

In order to deal with the probable and possible international crises that are surely forthcoming, a 'new agenda' as you aptly called should be meticulously planned and prepared.

In my view, Thailand and the Philippines should be given top priority in the agenda. However, while attending to Southeast Asia, equal importance of Northeast Asia cannot be gainsaid. We are cognizant that the U.S. attaches great importance to Japan. But the protection of Japan hinges on the security and stability of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China which are vital and indispensable flanks to Japan. Should either of the flanks fall into the hands of an adversary of the U.S., it would render Japan militarily vulnerable and create unfathomable confusion and division in its domestic politics. Japan's industrial capability would then become assets to America's enemies. A number of Japan's leading elder statesmen have expressed to me their fears of such a nightmare.

I believe that the strengthening of the ties between the U.S. and nations in Northeast Asia in general and the Republic of China in particular could well serve as a credible token of the U.S. intention and determination. A strong chain stretching



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5:

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY 65, NARA, DATE 4/20/01

state visit 8/2/00

from Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Indonesia down to Australia and New Zealand would form a reliable and credible first line of defense for the U.S. diplomatically and militarily.

As I have mentioned to Vice President Rockefeller during his recent trip to Taipei that the Republic of China is dedicated to the following policy:

- (1) Unrelenting struggle against communism and communist regimes and determined to defend the security of Taiwan, Pescadores, Quemoy and Matsu;
- (2) Firm alignment with the free world, particularly the U.S.;
- (3) Further promotion of internal political solidarity; and
- (4) Redoubled efforts for the continuing development of the economic well-being of the people.


By so doing, we shall continue to play a positive and constructive role in the new era.

In view of the above, Mr. President, the U.S. Government can always count on the Republic of China as a loyal ally and partner.

I shall be grateful for your consideration of my views which are presented with all sincerity and frankness that I command.


With best wishes for your continued success and personal well-being,

Sincerely yours,



Chiang Ching-kuo

His Excellency
President Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C.



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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 2166

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z

62
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

R 030439Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5053

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 2415

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, TW, TH, RP, CH
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEN

REF: TAIPEI 2255

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

Retain Class'n Change to 2
 Declassify in part and excise as shown
EQ 12958, 25X() () ()
 Declassify After _____
 With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)
IPS by DL Date 2/3/01

JAF
Let's discuss (P)

- 020288
- CLIFT _____
- HORMATS _____
- ELLIOTT _____
- FROEDE _____
- HORAN _____
- KENNEDY _____
- LODGE _____
- LOW _____
- OBER _____
- RATLIFF _____
- OAKLEY _____
- SMYSER _____
- SOLOMON _____
- STEARMAN _____
- FARRAR _____

Anderson

1. I CALLED ON FONMIN SHEN CHANG-HUAN AT HIS REQUEST, MAY 3, REFERRING TO MY RECENT CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER CHIANG AT TZU HU (REFTEL), SHEN SAID PREMIER HAD ASKED THAT ESSENCE OF VIEWS PREMIER HAD EXPRESSED ON THAT OCCASION AS WELL AS IN TALK WITH VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER ON APRIL 16, BE PRESENTED IN BRIEF PAPER AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE TRANSMITTED BY ME TO PRESIDENT FORD WHEN I RETURNED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS.

2. PAPER WHICH SHEN READ AND HANDED ME COPY IS QUOTED BELOW: BEGIN QUOTE THE TRAUMATIC EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN INDO-CHINA RECENTLY CANNOT BUT HAVE TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION. THE LEADERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AGREE WITH PRESIDENT FORD THAT TO INDULGE IN RECRIMINATION AND IN APPORTIONING BLAMES IS NOT PRODUCTIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY LESSONS MUST BE DRAWN FROM THIS TRAGEDY TO PREVENT HISTORY FROM REPEATING ITSELF.

MILITARILY, THE INDO-CHINA CHAPTER MAY HAVE NOW COME TO A CLOSE. HOWEVER, A "NEW AGENDA" AS APTLY CALLED BY PRESIDENT FORD SHOULD BE METICULOUSLY DISCUSSED, PLANNED



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STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *state next 4/3/00*
NARA, DATE 4/20/01

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AND PREPARED TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIES THAT ARE SURELY FORTHCOMING.


IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA, ESPECIALLY THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES, HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY NERVOUS, WHICH MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO PANIC. IN THE VIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD BE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY OF THE U.S. "NEW AGENDA".

IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA, ESPECIALLY THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES, HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY NERVOUS, WHICH MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO PANIC. IN THE VIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD BE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY OF THE U.S. "NEW AGENDA". WHILE ATTENDING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, EQUAL IMPORTANCE IN THE VIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA CANNOT BE GAINSAID. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS COGNIZANT THAT THE U.S. ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO JAPAN FOR ITS INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC PROWESS. BUT THE PROTECTION OF JAPAN HINGES ON THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WHICH ARE VITAL AND INDISPENSABLE FLANKS TO JAPAN. SHOULD EITHER OF THE FLANKS FALL INTO THE HANDS OF AN ADVERSARY OF THE U.S., IT WOULD RENDER JAPAN MILITARILY VULNERABLE AND CREATE UNFATHOMABLE CONFUSION AND DIVISION IN ITS DOMESTIC POLITICS. JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY WOULD THEN BECOME ASSETS TO AMERICA'S ENEMIES. CONFIDENTIALLY, A NUMBER OF JAPAN'S LEADING ELDERLY STATESMEN HAVE EXPRESSED THE FEARS OF SUCH A NIGHTMARE.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT A STRONG CHAIN STRETCHING FROM INDONESIA, JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PHILIPPINES, INDONESIA DOWN TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD FORM A RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE FOR THE U.S. DIPLOMATICALLY AND MILITARILY.

AS PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KAI AND PRESIDENT NELSON ROCKEFELLER, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS UNEQUIVOCALLY DEDICATED TO THE FOLLOWING POLICY DECISIONS:

1. UNRELENTING STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND COMMUNIST REGIMES NO MATTER WHERE THEY ARE AND DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN, PESCADORES, QUEMOY AND MATSU;
2. FIRM ALIGNMENT WITH THE FREE WORLD, PARTICULARLY



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TO U.S.:

3. FURTHER PROMOTION OF INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLIDARITY;
AND

4. REDOUBLED EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE.
BY SO DOING, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY
A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE NEW ERA.

IT IS THE FERVENT HOPE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
THAT PRESIDENT FORD WILL EXERCISE HIS FARSIGHTED AND
STEADFAST STATESMANSHIP WHICH WILL HELP OVERCOME ANY
DIFFICULTIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN THE LIGHT
OF PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO'S BASIC POLICY DIRECTION,
PRESIDENT FORD AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN ALWAYS COUNT
UPON THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A LOYAL ALLY AND PARTNER.


PRESIDENT FORD HAS REPEATEDLY OFFERED HIS ASSURANCES
THAT WHAT TRANSPIRED IN INDU-CHINA SHOULD NOT IMPAIR THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. IN ITS FULFILLMENT OF COMMITMENTS
TO THE OTHER ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS GRATIFIED BY THE WARM SENTIMENTS
EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT FORD TOWARDS THIS COUNTRY IN HIS
RECENT APPEARANCE AT THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER EDITORS'
ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WOULD
APPRECIATE IT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD REPEAT SUCH
REASSURANCES WHENEVER THE SAME ARE PUBLICLY GIVEN TO
OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

FREQUENT AND FRANK CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

FOR THE TASK OF STABILIZING THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES
AND OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES THE STRENGTHENING OF

THE TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA
IN GENERAL AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN PARTICULAR



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
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COULD ALSO SERVE AS A CREDIBLE TOKEN OF THE U.S. INTENTION AND DETERMINATION, SO THAT THE WAVERING AND NERVOUS COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE ORBIT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. END QUOTE

3. I TOLD SHEN THAT EXPRESSION OF ROC VIEWS AS PRESENTED IN PAPER WOULD BE HELPFUL IN CURRENT WASHINGTON REASSESSMENT OF OUR POLICIES AND THAT I WOULD MAKE A PARTICULAR POINT OF BRINGING TO ATTENTION OF OUR POLICY MAKERS. I EXPECTED THIS REASSESSMENT WOULD RESULT IN POLICY FOUNDED ON BASIC, LONG-TERM INTERESTS, AND THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, I FELT SURE THAT OUR PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE MEANS OF WHICH A MODUS VIVENDI COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH MAINLAND CHINA IN ORDER TO BETTER ASSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN EAST ASIA AND ALSO TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO SOME WORLD PROBLEMS IN WHICH MAINLAND CHINA MUST PLAY A ROLE. I TOLD SHEN THAT WE WERE VERY WELL AWARE OF ROC VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT AND ITS ESSENTIAL INTEREST IN OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. SHEN INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING, BUT WONDERED IF THE HIGH PRICE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR FURTHERING DETENTE WITH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE WORTH THE CLEAR DISADVANTAGES. HE POINTED UP THE "NONTRUSTWORTHINESS" OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, E.G., INDOCHINA, CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES, ETC., AS CONTRASTED WITH THE CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS POLICIES OF THE ROC WHICH WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE U.S.

4. OUR CONVERSATION CONTINUED OVER A RATHER BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS.

5. REGARDING PREMIER'S REQUEST THAT PAPER QUOTED PARA 2, ABOVE BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT FORD, I WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THIS DURING MY CONSULTATION WASHINGTON.
LINGER



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EA/ROC:AMB. L UNGER
5/19/75 EXT 22012
EA:WHGLEYSTEN

S/S
S/P - MR. LORD
NSC - MR. SMYSER

NSC - MR. SOLOMON

ROUTINE TAIPEI

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR CH

SUBJECT: PREMIER CHIANG'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FORD

REF: TAIPEI 2415

GLEYSTE
UNGE
LORD
S/S
SOLOMON
SMYSER
WH

1. UPON HIS RETURN TO TAIPEI, AMBASSADOR UNGER IS AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES TO PREMIER CHIANG AS A RESPONSE TO HIS MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT FORD WHICH WAS SUBJECT OF REFTEL:

2. PRES. FORD THANKS PREMIER CHIANG FOR HIS MESSAGE CONVEYED THROUGH AMB. UNGER. IT IS PARTICULARLY USEFUL AT THIS TIME WHEN THE SITUATION IN EAST ASIA IS BEING CAREFULLY ASSESSED, TOGETHER WITH CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION, TO HAVE THE PERTINENT VIEWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO NOTED THE VIEWS WHICH THE PREMIER EARLIER CONVEYED TO VP ROCKEFELLER AND WHICH ARE RECALLED IN THE PREMIER'S CURRENT MESSAGE.

3. IN PARTICULAR THE PRESIDENT HAS NOTED THE DECLARATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF ITS COMMITMENT TO PLAY A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE NEW ERA AHEAD. THE UNITED STATES ALSO PLEDGES ITSELF



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BY 167 NARA, DATE 4/20/01

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TO CONTINUING IN THIS SPIRIT THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND THE ROC.

4. AS PREMIER CHIANG IS AWARE FROM PRESIDENT FORD'S EARLIER STATEMENTS, THE PRESIDENT FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT THE US MUST REMAIN STRONG AND MUST BE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT ITS COMMITMENTS IF PEACE IS TO BE MAINTAINED IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

5. AT THE SAME TIME THE PREMIER IS AWARE OF THE EFFORTS OF THE US TO REDUCE THE TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA. IN PARTICULAR THE US DESIRES TO DEVELOP AND ENLARGE COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRC IN ORDER TO SEEK PEACEFUL AND EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WHERE THIS IS POSSIBLE AND REDUCE THE DANGERS OF CONFRONTATION AND CONFLICT. THE US DOES NOT HIDE THE DIFFERENCES, SOME OF THEM PROFOUND, WHICH LIE BETWEEN US AND THE PRC BUT IT IS PERSUADED THAT THE PEACE OF THE WORLD AND OF EAST ASIA DEMANDS THAT CONTINUING EFFORTS BE MADE BY THE US TO FIND PEACEFUL RESOLUTIONS FOR SUCH DIFFERENCES.

6. WITH ALL OF THE FOREGOING IN MIND, PRES. FORD ENDORSES THE DESIRABILITY OF FRANK DISCUSSIONS AND HAS MADE THIS REPLY TO THE PREMIER'S MESSAGE IN THAT SPIRIT. HE ALSO NOTES THE SMOOTH TRANSITION THAT HAS BEEN MADE TO THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN THE ROC FOLLOWING UPON THE SAD PASSING OF PRESIDENT CHIANG AND HE WISHES THE PREMIER AND HIS GOVERNMENT THE BEST OF SUCCESS IN THEIR IMPORTANT UNDERTAKINGS.

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR				
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Salomon Goebe

TO: PRES _____ FROM: KISSINGER, H _____ S/S _____ REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

KISSINGER *+* _____ COLBY, W _____ OTHER _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS

DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ S) CODEWORD

TS) SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Suppose has reply to Republic of China Premier Chiang Ching-kuo*

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES ()
FAR EAST <i>Salomon</i>			<i>X</i>	REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				
<i>Goebe</i>				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
7/16		<i>Hak</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Revision (7-23)</i>	
8/13		<i>NSC/5</i>		<i>Salomon - see RCM note</i>	
8/13				<i>C Close Out per Hak</i>	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: *1* FOLDER: _____

REPRODUCTION & FILE RQMTS:

AUG 27 1975

M/F'D _____ BY _____

CRT ID:	SA	SF
OPEN <i>PA</i>	HP	NS
CLOSE <i>PA</i>	WH	EP
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*Send for staffing 2a
by sep 5638*



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

18 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Brent:

By a memorandum dated 21 October 1971, the NSC Staff requested that White House approval be obtained for any transfer of major items of U.S. military equipment to the Republic of China.

Listed below are types and quantities of major items requested by ROC which have been approved by DOD and State since 1 January 1975 and submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for final approval, and the date on which each action was forwarded to NSC:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Date Forwarded to NSC</u>
Ocean-going Minesweepers	2	18 February 1975
T-28C Trainer Aircraft	3	4 March 1975
TOW Missiles	960	10 March 1975
TOW Launchers	48	10 March 1975
S2E ASW Aircraft	4	28 March 1975
Self-propelled Vulcan anti-aircraft guns	6	9 July 1975

The NSC has not yet responded to any of the above requests.

It is requested that guidance be provided to the DOD in order to respond to these requests by the ROC.

As a separate matter, perhaps the NSC memorandum of 21 October 1971 should be reviewed to determine its current relevancy.

(W)

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
Major General, USA
Military Assistant



Classified by MIL ASST TO SEC DEF
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 3/25/83

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X-2393

66 4/20/01

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

WICKHAM

TO: PRES _____ FROM: **WICKHAM** _____

KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____

SCOWCROFT ~~_____~~ SCHLESINGER, J _____

DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____

REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT _____

OTHER **DOD 2323** LOU _____ NO FORN NODIS _____

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TS _____ SENSITIVE _____


SUBJECT: *Queries Reason For Delay in Staffing Requests For Transfer of Military Comps to ROC*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			MEMO FOR HAK (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY			MEMO FOR PRES (_____)
FAR EAST TAYLOR	X		REPLY FOR _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			APPROPRIATE ACTION _____ (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			MEMO <i>Sent to Wickham</i> _____ (X)
EUROPE / CANADA			RECOMMENDATIONS _____ (_____)
LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO _____ (_____)
UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____ (_____)
SCIENTIFIC			CONCURRENCE _____ (_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			DUE DATE: 8/26
NSC PLANNING		X	COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			
INTELLIGENCE			

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
1/20			C	NFAN per Taylor	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: **X** FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:	
M/F'D _____	BY _____
CRT ID: D	SA SF
OPEN D	HP NS
CLOSE D	WH EP
	PA DY