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MEMORANDUM

929

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION
February 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

DBE

FROM:

W. R. SMYSER

SUBJECT:

Air Force Under Secretary Plummer's
Proposed Visit to Taiwan

In accordance with our conversation, I attach a draft telegram for you to ask the Secretary how he feels about having the Under Secretary of the Air Force visit in Taiwan.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached telegram to the Secretary (Tab A).

Concurrence:

Richard H. Solomon

RHS

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - GDS

66 4/20/01



SECRET/SENSITIVE

MESSAGE FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
VIA: HAK CHANNEL


The Air Force has asked us whether we would have any objections to a visit by Under Secretary Plummer of the Air Force to Taiwan.

Mr. Plummer proposes to spend two days in Taiwan during an Asian tour in May of this year. He wishes to check on the drawdown of U. S. forces, dealing mainly with the TDC, Shulinku, and Ambassador Unger. He would be accompanied by his staff aide, a colonel, and by Dennis Doolin. I perceive no major objection, since the Under Secretary of the Air Force is not a political policy position and he will be dealing with administrative matters. However, since you will be traveling to Peking this summer, we will want to be particularly sensitive. We also have to reconcile this with our consistent efforts to cut back on general officer travel.

Please let me know whether you wish us to approve or disapprove Mr. Plummer's stop in Taiwan.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY bb, NARA, DATE 4/20/01



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7570929	
7	13	7	14	13		

1c

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____
 KISSINGER _____
 SCOWCROFT _____
 DAVIS _____

Super
 FROM: KISSINGER, H _____
 COLBY, W _____
 SCHLESINGER, J _____
 ST EX SEC _____

REFERENCE: _____
 CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT _____
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 C EYES ONLY EXDIS _____
 S _____
 TS _____
 CODEWORD _____
 SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Qui Jong Under Secy Plummers
 Proposed Visit to Taiwan*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT		
STAFF SECRETARY		
FAR EAST <i>Super</i>		
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA		
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA		
EUROPE / CANADA		
LATIN AMERICA		
UNITED NATIONS		
ECONOMIC		
SCIENTIFIC		
PROGRAM ANALYSIS		
NSC PLANNING		
CONGRESSIONAL		
OCEANS POLICY		
INTELLIGENCE		

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
ACTION REQUIRED

- MEMO FOR HAK _____ (_____)
- MEMO FOR PRES _____ (_____)
- REPLY FOR _____ (_____)
- APPROPRIATE ACTION _____ (_____)
- MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
- RECOMMENDATIONS _____ (_____)
- JOINT MEMO _____ (_____)
- REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____ (_____)
- CONCURRENCE. _____ (_____)
- DUE DATE: _____

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
2/13				<i>draft x capture telegram 2-21</i>	<i>Salomon</i>
6/4				<i>NSC/BC OBE for Bul</i>	



NSC/S INSTR

DISPATCH _____
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____
 NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____
 CROSS REF W/ _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
 M/F'D _____ BY _____
 CRT ID: _____
 OPEN *GA*
 CLOSE *TA*
 SA SF
 HP NS
 WH EP
 PA DY

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012651

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME W. R. Smyser

RECEIVER'S NAME Henry Kissinger

TITLE U.S. Military Personnel Reductions on
Taiwan: Tainan Air Base

CREATION DATE 02/28/1975

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400115

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/25/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

TRANSMITTED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

26

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

'75 FEB 25 PM 7:42

15 FEB 25 PM 7:40

LDX MESSAGE NO. 893, CLASSIFICATION SECRET/EXDIS, NO. PAGES 2

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. Telegram to Taipei re Reductions at Tainan Air Base

FROM: _____ S/S _____
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number


LDX TO: _____ DELIVER TO: _____ EXTENSION: _____ ROOM NUMBER: _____

NSC Mrs. Davis _____

FOR: CLEARANCE ~~XXXX~~ INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: _____

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: _____
Executive Secretariat Officer



A

~~SECRET~~

EA/ROC: JPLEONARD: BDS
2/24/75 EXT 23055
EA: WHGLEESTEEN, JR.

DOD/ISA - MR. ABRAMOWITZ
PM/ISP - MR. BRECKON

NSC - MR. SMYSER
S/S

ROUTINE

TAIPEI

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MILI, TW

SUBJECT: REDUCTIONS AT TAINAN AIR BASE
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

1. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, HIGHEST LEVEL DECISION WAS MADE EARLY LAST YEAR TO REDUCE US PRESENCE AT TAINAN AIR BASE TO CARETAKER STATUS BY END OF CY 74. THIS WAS CONVEYED TO PREMIER CHIANG IN APRIL ALONG WITH OUR DECISION TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF F-4'S BY END OF MAY 1975. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAINAN REDUCTION HAS BEEN DELAYED FOR VARIOUS REASONS.

2. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT CONTINUED DELAY ON TAINAN MAY CONFUSE THE ROC AND LEAD IT TO UNWARRANTED SPECULATION ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS. WE ALSO WISH TO ASSURE THAT WITHDRAWALS FROM TAIWAN ARE CAREFULLY PHASED TO MINIMIZE ADVERSE IMPACT ON ROC. IN LIGHT OF PLANNED PHASE OUT OF F-4'S AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE FROM CCK BY MAY, FURTHER DELAY ON TAINAN WOULD LEAD TO UNDESIRE BUNCHING UP OF WITHDRAWAL ACTIVITIES..

3. IN VIEW OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, DECISION HAS BEEN REACHED TO IMPLEMENT NOW REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL AT TAINAN TO LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH CARETAKER STATUS. WE ENVISAGE MAXIMUM USE OF LOCAL CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL AT

20
GLEEYSTEEN
LEONARD ✓

ABRAMOWITZ

SMYSER
BRECKON ✓

S/S

SEE
ADDITIONAL
ADDRESSEE



~~SECRET~~

GG 4/20/01

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

SECRET

1 2

TAINAN, AND A RESIDUAL USAF PRESENCE OF 75 US PERSONNEL, INCLUDING CIVILIAN MEMBERS OF AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND CONTRACTOR DETACHMENT. MILITARY ADDRESSEES WILL SHORTLY RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS ACTION.

44

SECRET

ADDITIONAL ADDRESSEES:

INFO: CINCPAC
CINCPACAF HONOLULU
COMUSTDC TAIPEI
CDR 327 AD TAIPEI



2d

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012652

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum

TITLE NSDM 248: Changes in U.S. Force Levels
on Taiwan

CREATION DATE 03/14/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400115

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of (3)


DATE WITHDRAWN 04/25/2001


WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

~~SANITIZED~~ 12/13/01

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

BRENT:

I THINK YOU
ARE NOW MORE
ON TOP OF THIS
THAN MAX, BUT
I HAVE PUT HIS NAME
ON THIS MEMO IN CASE
YOU WANT HIM TO SEE
IT. I DO NOT THINK IT IS
ESSENTIAL, THOUGH AT SOME
POINT HE WILL WANT TO KNOW
ABOUT TAINAN. 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

*USD 1124:2d
(also filed
in KOC)*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - GDS

March 14, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 248

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Changes in U.S. Force Levels on Taiwan

Having reviewed the studies and recommendations developed in response to NSSM 171, the President directs the following changes in deployments and status of US forces based on Taiwan:

- withdraw one of the two F-4 squadrons by July 31, 1974, using PEACE BASKET F-5As to meet the related US obligation to replace 20 of the 48 F-5As borrowed from ROC under ENHANCE PLUS;
- withdraw the second F-4 squadron by May 30, 1975, complying with the related US obligation to provide F-5Es as replacements for 28 of the ENHANCE PLUS F-5As by using diversions of ROC earmarked F-5Es as temporary replacements until ROC co-produced F-5Es are available;
- withdraw our
.....
on alert status on Taiwan;
- place Tainan Air Base on a caretaker basis,
....., and reduce support personnel as appropriate;
- submit for Presidential review plans to reduce MAAG size, staffing; or structure in consonance with the F-5E program, and;
- submit for Presidential review any change in staffing or structure of Taiwan Defense Command.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - GDS

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (4)

MR 01-167 #26, NSC-22 10/18/01

By dal NARA, Date 12/13/01


B

To permit determination of force level changes in the intelligence and regional communications activities, the President directs that:

- The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with other agencies as appropriate, review US communications activities on Taiwan in terms of need and recommend changes in mission, manning and organization deemed necessary for greater efficiency and effectiveness.

- The Director of Central Intelligence review and assess the value of all US intelligence activities.....
..... and recommend changes in mission, requirements, manning and organization considered appropriate to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

These reviews with recommendations are to be submitted by April 15, 1974.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012653

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME W. R. Smyser

RECEIVER'S NAME Henry Kissinger

TITLE U.S. Military Personnel Reductions on
Taiwan: Tainan Air Base

CREATION DATE 02/26/1975

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400115

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/25/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG


1228²⁹

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Feburay 26, 1975

Dick Smyser

I may be missing something but can see no
real need for this to go to Brent. Why don't
you go ahead and clear it off?

Bud



2h

SC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	750/228	
2	26	2	26	19		

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: **Smyser** KISSINGER, H _____ REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ LOU NO FORN NODIS

DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ OTHER _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS

_____ _____ _____ S CODEWORD

_____ _____ _____ TS SENSITIVE


SUBJECT: **U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS ON TAIWAN: TAINAN AIR BASE.**

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO			
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK	(_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES	(_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____	(_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION	(_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____	(_____)
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	(_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	(_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____	(_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?	(_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	(_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:	
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
CONGRESSIONAL				By-PASS	
OCEANS POLICY					
INTELLIGENCE					

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
2/26	Smyser	HAK	X	DECISION (2/28)	
2/27	Smyser		S	Further Action per ACM note (2-28)	
3/01	HAK		CIX	Info	
3/4				Call by HAK	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D: MAR 07 1975

CRT ID: _____ SA SF

OPEN: **GAB** HP NS

CLOSE: **TR** WH EP

PA PA DY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30
1584

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

12 MAR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Transfer of Major Items of U.S. Military
Equipment to the Republic of China (C)

(U) Reference is made to your memorandum of 21 October
1971, same subject.

(C) Approval is requested for the (FMS) sale of 960 TOW
missiles, 48 TOW launcher sets, 48 jeep adaptation kits,
spare parts, maintenance materiel, training items, and
test equipment to the Republic of China.

(C) Sale of the TOW weapon system to the Republic of China
would strengthen that country's defensive military posture.

(C) The present leadtime for delivery of TOW missiles and
related equipment is thirty-six (36) months.

(U) The Department of State concurs.

SIGNED
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER



Classified by Dir, Security Assistance Operations, DSAA
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 3/26/90

66 4/20/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-0702

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

To This is an ancient file held
Defense
and file to
 DOC REC'D NBR 7501584
 INITIAL ACTION O *Simple*
 39

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____
 KISSINGER _____
 SCOWCROFT _____
 DAVIS _____

FROM: *clear up to* KISSINGER, H _____
 COLBY, W _____
 SCHLESINGER, J _____
 ST EX SEC _____

REFERENCE: S/S _____
 OTHER SECDEF 0702

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 LOU NO FORN NODIS
C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 S CODEWORD
 TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT:

Transfer of Major Items of US Military Equipment to ROC

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT		
STAFF SECRETARY		
FAR EAST	<i>X</i>	
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA		
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA		
EUROPE / CANADA		
LATIN AMERICA		
UNITED NATIONS		
ECONOMIC		
SCIENTIFIC		
PROGRAM ANALYSIS		<i>X</i>
NSC PLANNING		<i>X</i>
CONGRESSIONAL		
OCEANS POLICY		
INTELLIGENCE		

REC CY FOR

ACTION REQUIRED

- MEMO FOR HAK _____
- MEMO FOR PRES _____
- REPLY FOR *for HAK* _____
- APPROPRIATE ACTION _____
- MEMO _____ TO _____
- RECOMMENDATIONS _____
- JOINT MEMO _____
- REFER TO _____ FOR _____
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
- CONCURRENCE _____
- DUE DATE: *3/25*

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
				<i>1/7 Pending, 2250222 per Taylor</i>	
<i>1/20/76</i>	<i>DT</i>	<i>NSC/IS</i>		<i>returned for file</i>	
<i>1/20</i>			<i>C</i>	<i>NFAN per Taylor</i>	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____
 NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____
 CROSS REF W/ _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: *X* FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
 JAN 21 1976 BY *GAR*
 CRT ID: *B* SA SF
 OPEN: *PA* HP NS
 CLOSE: *PA* WH EP
 PA DY

4-10

4
Sen Scowcroft FYI

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS., CHAIRMAN

STUART SYMINGTON, MO.
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV.
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, N.H.
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., VA.
SAM NUNN, GA.
JOHN C. CULVER, IOWA
GARY HART, COLO.
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VT.

STROM THURMOND, S.C.
JOHN TOWER, T.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA.
ROBERT TAFT, JR., OHIO
DEWEY F. BARTLETT, OKLA.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 9, 1975

T. EDWARD BRASWELL, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Re Chiang Kai-shek funeral

The President
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Freedom-loving people throughout the world have suffered a great loss with the death of President Chiang Kai-shek. President Chiang was a dedicated leader in the fight for human rights and personal freedom. It is my view that he should be honored as such.

Not only was President Chiang a constant ally of the United States, he also was a great fighter against oppression and tyranny. Especially was this true during World War II, when China, under his leadership, bore the brunt of the Japanese war machine for such time as was necessary to allow America to build sufficient strength to fight the War on a sound footing.

In honoring his memory, I feel that the United States should send as its emissary to the funeral of President Chiang an individual of the political stature commensurate with the occasion. In the case of the death of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, that person was the Vice President of the United States. Surely, you must agree that the current situation requires no less than the same respect and honor that was accorded the memory of King Faisal.

It is my view, therefore, that the Vice President of the United States is the proper person to represent the United States at President Chiang's funeral.


With kindest personal regards,

Respectfully,

Strom Thurmond

Strom Thurmond

ST/mb



4
JOHN T. MYERS
7TH DISTRICT, INDIANA

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
103 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE: 202-225-5805

HOME ADDRESS:
921 SECOND STREET
COVINGTON, INDIANA 47932

*Re Chiang Kai-shek
Funeral*

Dem. & Capt. FYI

4-10 5
COMMITTEE:
APPROPRIATIONS

7TH DISTRICT OFFICE:
107 FEDERAL BUILDING
TERRE HAUTE, INDIANA 47808
TELEPHONE: 812-238-1619

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

April 9, 1975

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

me
This is to express my deepest shock and disappointment that neither you nor the Vice President will head our delegation attending the funeral of our long time ally, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China.

It is a sad commentary on our times when at least the Vice President can find time to attend the funeral of King Faisal, leader of a country that has shown such contempt for our nation and the principles for which we stand, but cannot attend the tribute to the man and the people who contributed so much to the allied victory in World War II.

I have no quarrel with the announced members of the delegation to President Chiang Kai-shek's funeral. But we owe the people of the Republic of China and its great leader more than that.

This man symbolized the struggle against Communist tyranny, which even now we see sweeping yet another Asian country. This man stood beside us during a world conflict and helped us defeat the imperialist forces that threatened to engulf the entire free world. This man and his people have never waivered in their determination to some day free the oppressed peoples of their homeland.


With all due respect to you, Mr. President, I feel it is a shame that neither you nor the Vice President decided in favor of leading our delegation to the funeral. I urge you to reconsider that decision in the name of our indebtedness to Chiang Kai-shek and the cause of freedom.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

John
John Myers

JTM:rs



MEMORANDUM

2278-X

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: W. R. SMYSE
 RICHARD H. SOLOMON


SUBJECT: Again, on the Leadership of the
 Chiang Kai-shek Funeral Delegation

We understand that Chief Justice Berger is unable to accept the responsibility of heading up the delegation to Chiang Kai-shek's funeral. We feel very strongly that we will be making a mistake of the most serious proportions if Secretary Butz heads up the delegation. We now have ample indication in reporting from Taipei that if the Secretary of Agriculture were the leading figure it would generate a major outcry from Americans friendly to the ROC and engender great bitterness in Taiwan.

Let us emphasize the following arguments (which lead us to the conclusion that the Vice President remains the best choice to head up the delegation):

- Having repeatedly reassured Peking on the direction of our China policy (most recently in the President's speech of last evening), if the PRC domestic political situation will turn against us on the symbolic matter of the Vice President attending the funeral, an argument can be made that our relationship with Peking is so fragile that it is no relationship at all. PRC leaders are in the political big-leagues, and they should be able to put their priorities in proper perspective. Moreover, they are more likely to respect us if we behave with dignity and a sense of self-confidence in difficult times; and to humiliate an old ally by sending an obviously insulting funeral delegation will not engender respect in Peking. It will be seen as a sign of weakness.
- The outcry we will get from Americans friendly to the ROC, and the press, if Secretary Butz heads the delegation, will significantly complicate our domestic political problems later this year if we wish to fully normalize relations with Peking. As Barry Goldwater's letter to the Secretary indicates, our decision on this issue could mobilize the ROC's supporters in a serious way.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY , NARA, DATE 4/20/01




-- We will engender great bitterness in Taiwan if Butz heads the delegation, which also will make it much more difficult to elicit compliance from ROC officials if we wish to alter our status with them later this year. We have clear indications that Taipei is already disturbed about the aloof quality of the official condolence messages that have been sent to them on behalf of the President.

RECOMMENDATION:

For these reasons, we (including Win Lord), strongly urge you to choose one of the following options--which are in decreasing order of desirability:

- (1) Have the Vice President head the delegation.
- (2) Reclame on the Chief Justice.
- (3) Have Secretary Morton head the delegation.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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HAK has talked w/VP. B

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

XGDS (3)

ACTION

April 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT:

Proposed Briefing by You for U. S. Delegation to Chiang Kai-shek's Funeral

I recommend that you meet briefly on April 12, 1975 with our delegation, which must leave Washington the morning of April 12³, to brief them on current U. S. policy toward Taipei and on our normalization process with the PRC.

I believe such a meeting could have the following important results:

-- Reduce Senator Goldwater's ire that the Vice President will not head the delegation, particularly if the Chief Justice also will not be able to head the delegation. This would reduce the likelihood that Senator Goldwater would feel compelled to reassure ROC leaders in terms that would create difficulties for us, and would subsequently be moved -- as he intimated in his letter of April 10 to you -- to impede our normalization of relations with the PRC.

-- Sensitize the delegation to the delicate balance that they must strike in their public and private statements in Taipei.

-- In particular, reassure the delegation that we have within recent months privately reaffirmed our security commitment to the ROC leadership, and that the delegation therefore need not make a special point of doing this in Taipei either publicly or privately. As you will recall, the President in a letter to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo last January assured him we would stand by our security commitment; the letter did not specifically mention the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.


You may wish to confine your briefing to the head of the delegation, Senator Goldwater, the member of the House who is yet to be chosen, and our former Ambassador to Taipei, Walter P. McConaughy.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 711, NARA, DATE 4/20/01



This would exclude former Congressman Walter Judd, Mrs. Anna Chanault, and the two or three Republican Party supporters who are to be in the delegation. On the other hand, including these last several personages would enable you to have some constraining effect on their behavior in Taipei, although your briefing them carries the risk that they could misconstrue and distort some of the points that you would make to them.

Attached at Tab A are the briefing papers by the delegation which State has prepared in coordination with us. We have no objection to the papers as they stand, but you may wish to review them.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree to brief the full delegation on April 12, 1975.


APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

That you agree to brief only the head of the delegation, Senator Goldwater, the member of the House, and Ambassador McConaughy.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Concurrence:

Mr. Solomon (in substance) *RAM/ JAK*
Mr. Smyser (in substance) *WES/ JAK*



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 10, 1975

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Materials for U.S. Delegation
to Chiang Kai-shek's Funeral

Attached are copies of the briefing materials prepared for the U.S. delegation to the funeral of the late President of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek, for clearance by your office. They have been fully cleared by appropriate offices within this Department and informally by the appropriate member of the National Security Council staff. Please advise as soon as possible of your comments or concurrence.


George S. Springssteen
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Briefing papers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
BRIEFING PAPER

Memorandum for Chief of U.S. Delegation

President Chiang Kai-shek died on April 5 of a heart attack at the age of 87. Funeral services will be held on April 16 at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in Taipei.


Chiang Kai-shek was the last of the "Big Four" allied leaders of World War II, a man of international stature who long personified the cause of the Chinese Nationalist government. His death comes at a time when the Republic of China is already unsettled by growing international isolation, changing U.S. policy, developments in Indochina and economic problems. This mood of apprehension will be intensified by fears that the People's Republic of China will seek to exploit the situation or that the United States will view Chiang's passing as an opportunity for further changes in its China policy.

Chiang's death, however, is unlikely to trigger political instability or immediate changes in basic policies on Taiwan. He had been inactive for almost three years because of advanced age, and the transfer of real power to the President's son, Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, took place in 1972. In addition, Taiwan remains relatively prosperous, and there is a widespread appreciation of the importance of unity and political stability at this time.

While deeply concerned over the future of its relationship with the United States, the Republic of China government continues to follow a policy of close cooperation with and reliance on us. For our part, we are confronted with the difficulties inherent in advancing normalization with the People's Republic of China while avoiding serious damage to Taiwan's interests. We have assured the Republic of China that we continue to value our long friendship and of our continued interest

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in Taiwan's security. However, in dealings with the Republic of China we have been mindful of the requirements of our overall China policy and of the delicacy required in handling a situation where our objectives toward the two Chinese parties are not complementary. Our delegation to President Chiang's funeral will thus have the sensitive task of showing our esteem for the Republic of China's former leader and long-time associate of the United States while avoiding giving the impression of any change in our policy of seeking further normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China.

Department of State
April 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

The Prevailing Mood and Current Political Situation


Chiang Kai-shek's death at 87 will have come as no surprise to anyone on Taiwan, for the Generalissimo has not been seen publicly in over two years, and his death was considered only a matter of time. Nevertheless, as a leader of international stature and virtual embodiment of the Republic of China's cause for almost half a century, Chiang's death will come as an emotional and psychological blow to the population on Taiwan. It is unlikely, however, that the former President's death will lead to political unrest on Taiwan. The transfer of power from Chiang to his son, Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, took place three years ago when the elder Chiang suffered a debilitating illness. With the mantle of his father's prestige and with close supporters in key positions throughout the government bureaucracy, the Kuomintang (or Nationalist party) and the military, Premier Chiang has emerged as the unchallenged leader of the nation. In accordance with constitutional procedures, Vice President C.K. Yen was sworn in as President on April 6. His role as President will be largely ceremonial.

Under Premier Chiang, the fundamental policies of the government have remained unchanged. There has been no moderation of the adamant unwillingness to deal in any way with the People's Republic of China. Any speculation fueled by President Chiang's death about a possible change in this attitude to the contrary, this unwillingness to deal with the People's Republic of China is likely to persist for the foreseeable future because of the requirement of fidelity to the departed leader's policy and, most importantly, because of deep seated distrust and fear of Peking. Lip service continues to be paid to the Republic of China's claim to be the only legal government of all China, and to the reconquest of the mainland, although with far less frequency and conviction. In reality, Premier Chiang has continued his father's policy of concentrating on Taiwan's development and has demonstrated considerable political skills in dealing with the island's problems. His

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policies have accelerated the improvement in communal relations between the native Taiwanese who comprise 85% of the population and the mainlander refugees who continue to monopolize political and military power. As a result, what was once a potential threat to internal stability has been defused.

Despite his accomplishments and popularity on Taiwan, Premier Chiang has none of his father's international stature as a historical figure. Thus the government and populace may well worry over foreign perceptions of the effect of the Generalissimo's death on Taiwan's future. Many on Taiwan will be concerned that the People's Republic of China will attempt to take advantage of the passing of this major figure by initiating military or other forms of pressure against the island, or that the United States might view the occasion of his death as an opportunity to make further changes in our China policy. These concerns stemming from Chiang Kai-shek's death come at a time when the Republic of China government and population are already disheartened by recent developments:

-- Relations with the United States are the government's overriding concern. Recent developments in Indochina form a gloomy background against which the ROC attempts to gauge future US moves on China. President Ford's planned trip to the mainland has deepened fears that the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and break them with Taipei. This issue is treated gingerly in public in order to avoid alarming the population, although the prevalent feeling on Taiwan is that US recognition of the People's Republic and a break in its diplomatic relations with the Republic of China is inevitable at some point, though not necessarily during the President's trip to the People's Republic of China. Most believe that the island could successfully weather such a development, provided that the United States retains some form of presence on Taiwan, maintains its trade and economic ties and that there is some feeling of assurance about the future security of the island.

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
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-- Thus, closely related to the question of diplomatic relations is that of Taiwan's security. While the Republic of China's armed forces are large and well equipped, the sheer size of Peking's forces is such that the backing of the United States, formalized by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, is seen as crucial to Taiwan's security. Although the Republic of China appreciates that tension in the Taiwan Strait area has diminished considerably, and that the American relationship with the People's Republic of China contributes significantly to the unlikelihood of an attack against Taiwan, it continues to regard our formal commitment to Taiwan's security as the primary deterrent to attack by Peking. Its worries are centered on the durability of this commitment, despite recent assurances that the U.S. remains committed to the security of Taiwan.

-- The Republic of China's international position has eroded seriously since its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, and today only 30 countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei. So far this has had little practical effect on Taiwan or its economy. Trade continues to grow even with those countries with which diplomatic relations have been broken. Nevertheless, growing isolation is having a psychological effect and there is particular concern over the prospect that such Asian neighbors as the Philippines and Thailand are on the verge of breaking relations and establishing them with Peking.

-- Finally, the economic situation on Taiwan continues to cause the government concern. 1974 was a poor year for the Republic of China; after almost twenty years of spectacular economic growth, the economy grew not at all in 1974, and the country ran a balance of payments deficit for the first time in years. The setback was attributable to a large increase in the cost of oil imports and to sluggish exports resulting from the economic downturn in the major Japanese and U.S. markets. Nevertheless, the island remains relatively prosperous, with inflation securely under control and unemployment eased by the absorptive capabilities of the still highly rural society.

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The government realizes that a strong economy is essential for domestic stability and as a psychological cushion against further foreign policy reverses. In the long run, the Republic of China's economic prospects seem good, but in light of the overwhelming importance of trade to its economy, Taiwan's economic health depends on recovery in the United States and Japan.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

U.S. Relations with the Republic of China

Issues and Talking Points

Talking Points

In discussions with ROC leaders we suggest you:

-- express the sadness of the American people upon the death of this great historical figure and longstanding friend and ally of the United States;

-- affirm that the longstanding interest of the United States in the well-being and prosperity of the people of Taiwan continues. We will continue to work with it in the spirit of friendship which has long characterized relations between our two countries;

-- note that our policy seeks to achieve a desirable and equitable peace in the region, an accomplishment which would obviously benefit the Republic of China;

-- express satisfaction with the continued growth of the economic and trade ties which have been so mutually beneficial;

If concern is expressed about the Indochina situation we suggest you:

-- express confidence that the strength and will of the Republic of China, along with our continued involvement in the region, are strong bulwarks against any impact of Indochina developments on stability in the Taiwan area.

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If asked about our policy toward the People's Republic of China we suggest you:

-- note that the President and Secretary of State have spoken on this subject on several occasions and you cannot add anything to what they have said.

Background

The formerly intimate relationship between the United States and Republic of China has been altered by our policy of normalization with the People's Republic of China. On our part, we no longer pay lip service to Republic of China claims to constitute the sole, legal government of all China and while we remain sensitive to Taiwan's basic interests, we seek to satisfy them in a manner which permits continued progress in normalization with the People's Republic. In keeping with this approach, in recent years we have lowered our profile on Taiwan, as symbolized by the reduction of our military presence on the island from a high of almost 10,000 in 1972 to 4,500 today.

The Republic of China's obvious and deep concern about the direction of our China policy is somewhat tempered by an appreciation that an attack by Peking is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future and by continued hope that regardless of any change in the formalities of the relationship, the United States will continue to play an active role in assuring Taiwan's security. This hope along with the overriding importance of economic and trade ties with the United States results in a continued policy of cooperation and friendship with the United States.

Our basic policy on the Taiwan issue is contained in the Shanghai Communique which was signed at the conclusion of President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. The relevant section states:

"The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The

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The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER


Arrival Statement

I arrive here today as personal representative of President Ford and on behalf of the American people to pay respects to the memory of an old and respected friend. President Chiang Kai-shek will be long remembered by the American people for his determination, courage and patriotism and for his contribution to the Allied cause as a comrad-in-arms during the Second World War. His achievements and leadership have secured him an enduring place in the history of our times.

In spite of this grievous loss, I know the people of the Republic of China have full confidence in those who have now been called upon to take up the burden of leadership. My Government looks forward to working with them in the spirit of friendship which has long characterized relations between our two countries.

On behalf of the entire delegation I would like to express the deepest sympathies of the President and the people of the United States on the passing of a great leader and friend.

Department of State
April 1975



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Departure Statement

This sad mission is now ending. Our sorrow is tempered by the knowledge that the memory of the Republic of China's great leader, President Chiang Kai-shek, will live on and that his qualities of leadership and devotion to his country will continue to inspire and guide the Republic of China. To President Chiang's family, and to the leaders and people of the Republic of China, we offer our sincerest condolences and the hand of continued friendship.

We are deeply grateful for the warm hospitality extended to us on this solemn mission.

Department of State
April 1975



Current Economic Situation


The Republic of China's economy is heavily dependent on trade, particularly with the US and Japan, and thus is extremely vulnerable to adverse international economic trends. Higher raw materials prices and declining demand for Taiwan's exports have had a substantial impact on the economy. Real GNP grew only 0.6% in 1974, after averaging 11% since 1969. This sharp decline was caused primarily by a 1.4% decrease in industrial production, the result of falling demand for Taiwan's products abroad. Production cutbacks were severe, particularly in textiles, plywood, plastics and electronics. Unemployment reached the level of perhaps 5% of the labor force. Reduced economic activity world-wide was also reflected in a 24% decline in approved foreign investment applications.

Trade performance for the year showed a vast shift in the Republic of China's balance of trade position, moving from a US\$690 million surplus in 1973 to a US\$1.4 billion deficit in 1974. Although total trade grew 52%, imports grew much more rapidly than exports, by 84% and 25% respectively. However, as a result of short term trade financing and capital inflows, the Republic of China's foreign exchange holdings (US\$1,853 million) decreased only 1.3% below the amount held at the end of 1973.

An Economic Stabilization Program introduced on January 27, 1974, was remarkably effective in combating inflation. It featured once-for-all large price increases for energy and transportation services. Following its introduction, the price structure stabilized on a higher plateau; and by year end the wholesale price index was down 8% from the peak level and the consumer price index increased a modest 4%. In the absence of cost-of-living increases and in the presence of growing unemployment, wages have remained stable.

Adapting its policies to the changing economic conditions, while continuing its emphasis on stability, the government has gradually dismantled price and export controls, loosened up on the money supply, and undertaken a number of measures to stimulate the economy, particularly

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
Current Agricultural Situation

The Republic of China's principle agricultural products are rice, sweet potatoes, vegetables, sugar cane, peanuts, soybeans, tea, citrus fruits, bananas, asparagus and livestock. The rate of agricultural growth was a negligible 0.3% in 1974. Crop output, however, registered its first significant gains in recent years, up an estimated 6.7% as compared to gains of less than 1% since 1971. This was due principally to a 10% increase in rice production resulting from government price incentives and favorable growing conditions. The offsetting factor was a decline in livestock production, which suffered serious setbacks last year as a result of rising feed costs and government controls on retail meat prices.

Taiwan's major agricultural imports are corn, wheat, soybeans, and raw cotton. The United States is a major supplier of agricultural commodities to Taiwan with total exports estimated at \$450 million in 1974 compared with \$406 million the previous year. The Republic of China exports sugar, canned asparagus and mushrooms, citrus fruits, tea, bananas and vegetables, of which the United States market absorbed an estimated \$100 million in 1974, an increase of \$30 million over the level of the previous year. Exports of sugar and sugar products accounted for two-thirds of this increase, largely due to price rises.

While the relative importance of agriculture in Taiwan's economy has declined drastically over the past two decades, decreasing from 36% of net domestic product in 1952 to 16% in 1973, the government continues to assign high priority to improvements in productivity in this sector in line with achieving maximum self-sufficiency in food production.

Department of State
April 1975




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the export sector. Government economists are predicting an upturn beginning in the second half of this year, based partly on the expectation of a revival of demand in the Republic of China's principal markets, especially the United States. Real GNP is forecast to grow 3-3.5% in 1975 with a reduction in the trade deficit to US\$300 million.

Sustained high economic performance as a means of ensuring domestic confidence has been the underpinning of internal political stability on Taiwan and of the Republic of China's resilience in the face of increasing diplomatic isolation. Factors which could threaten this performance are restrictions imposed by foreign countries against important exports; loss of major sources of supply of raw materials; a sharp reduction in foreign investment on Taiwan; and severe inflationary pressures. Thus far, the government has not been blamed for the current economic downturn. We expect domestic confidence in present economic policy and management to continue.

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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

General Information for Visitors to Taiwan

Relations between the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan are set against the background of many years of close association. We were allies against Japan during the Second World War, and after the flight of the Nationalist government to Taiwan in 1949, the United States provided it with large amounts of both military and economic assistance. Despite our new relationship with the People's Republic of China, the United States continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, and the Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in 1954, remains in force. As a result of Taiwan's increasing prosperity, grant military assistance to the Republic of China ended in June, 1973, but the United States continues to provide credits for purchases of military equipment under the Foreign Military Sales Act.

American economic assistance to the Republic of China ended in 1965, by which time the United States had provided economic support of over \$1.5 billion since 1949. This assistance was a key factor in the exceptional economic progress achieved on Taiwan, which has resulted in the Republic of China becoming one of the United States' major trading partners. In 1974, 2-way trade totalled \$3.5 billion, mostly in farm products and machinery (US exports) and textile products and appliances (US imports). In addition, American investment on Taiwan is in excess of \$300 million.

While maintaining ties with the Republic of China, the United States has since 1969 undertaken a series of initiatives to improve its relations with the People's Republic of China. This policy led to President Nixon's visit to that country in February, 1972. In the Shanghai Communique issued at the conclusion of that visit, the two sides stated their belief that "the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world." Various steps have been taken



to further this process, including expanded trade, people-to-people contact and regularized communication between the two governments as signified by the establishment of Liaison Offices in Washington and Peking.

US policy with respect to the relationship of Taiwan to the mainland of China is also stated in the Shanghai Communique. In it the United States "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." With this prospect in mind, the United States affirmed as an ultimate objective the withdrawal of all American military forces and installations from Taiwan, and stated that in the meantime we would progressively reduce these forces and installations as tension in the area diminished. Significant US military reductions have taken place since that time; further reductions will be made as security requirements in the area permit.

For the American visitor to Taiwan, it is well to bear in mind a number of distinctive features of life on the island:

-- Although its control extends only over the island of Taiwan, the Pescadore Islands in the Taiwan Strait and the so-called "offshore islands" of Quemoy and Matsu, the Republic of China continues to assert its claim to be the only legal government of all China. In addition, the government still officially proclaims its determination to regain control over the mainland of China. An uncompromising anti-communism is a prominent feature of government policy, and the Republic of China has no contacts whatever with the government in Peking, or with any other communist country.




-- The Republic of China is extremely proud of the economic progress which has been achieved over the last 20 years, and it is quickly apparent to the visitor that Taiwan has become a modern and rapidly prospering Asian country. This economic progress has resulted in significant improvements in the standard of living on the island and has been a significant factor in achieving the political stability which has been characteristic of the Republic of China over the past 20 years.

-- "Taiwanese" make up approximately 85% of the population of the Republic of China, the remainder consisting of "mainlanders" who fled to Taiwan in 1949 after the fall of the mainland to the Communist government of Mao Tse-tung. The Taiwanese are descendents of Chinese who emigrated to Taiwan beginning in the 16th century. Their language and historical experience are quite different from those of the mainlanders who came 25 years ago, and communal tension between the two groups was in the past a serious problem. Growing prosperity and greater attention by the Government to Taiwanese sensitivities have brought about great improvement in communal relations in recent years and the issue is no longer an important problem.

-- The Chinese are rightfully proud of their long history and great culture, and expect that foreigners should behave with courtesy and respect toward China's achievements. There are no particular "do's" and "dont's", which visitors to Taiwan must bear in mind. The normal rules of politeness and proper behavior will stand one in good stead. The Chinese themselves normally show unfailing courtesy and warmth to foreign guests.

-- Finally, a visit to Taiwan can provide an opportunity to see at first hand the rich cultural legacy of China's ancient civilization. While the old China is quickly passing on Taiwan today the traditional values of scholarship, creative talent, and proper social behavior are still honored by the society. In particular, a visit to the National Palace Museum in Taipei will afford the visitor a matchless opportunity to see many of China's artistic works.




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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

The Mechanics of Succession

With Chiang Kai-shek's death on April 5, Vice President Yen Chia-kan succeeded to the office of President. Yen was sworn in on April 6, and will serve for the remainder of the current six-year term, which expires in 1978.

The Republic of China Constitution contains no specific provision for the selection of a new Vice President under these circumstances. Both the President and Vice President are selected by the National Assembly, a large body elected by universal suffrage which also has powers to recall the President or Vice President and to amend the Constitution. (The members of the National Assembly who were originally elected in 1947 and 1948 for all of China have been indefinitely extended in office during the "period of communist rebellion.") Meetings of the National Assembly are normally held at the end of a Presidential term of office, to elect a new President and Vice President. In this case, an extraordinary session of the Assembly might be summoned to elect a new Vice President.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Funeral Arrangements

The following is a preliminary list of activities involving foreign delegations to the funeral of Chiang Kai-shek. Further details will be provided by the American Embassy in Taipei upon arrival of the American delegation.

Tuesday, April 15


9:00 p.m.	Visit to the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall to pay respects at the bier of the late President Sun Yat-sen
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Wednesday, April 16

9:00 a.m.	Christian Memorial Service at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall
10:00 a.m.	Traditional Chinese Service at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall
11:00 a.m.	Foreign Delegations follow cortege on foot for short distance along route to burial site.
afternoon	Reception by President Yen Chia-kan at the Sun Yat-sen building, Presidential Residence

Thursday, April 17

morning	Reception by Premier Chiang Ching-kuo for heads of delegations
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SC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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TO: PRES _____ FROM: KISSINGER, H _____
 KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____
 SCOWCROFT X _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____
 DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____

REFERENCE: S/S 750 7149 OTHER _____

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 LOU NO FORN NODIS
 (C) EYES ONLY EXDIS
 S CODEWORD
 TS SENSITIVE


SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for US delegation to funeral of Chiang Ksi-shih of China

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>		MEMO FOR HAK <u>Scowcroft</u> (<u>X</u>)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES ()
FAR EAST <u>Smuper</u>	<u>X</u>		<u>✓</u>	REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR: ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS <u>Solomon</u>			<u>✓</u>	DUE DATE: <u>4/18</u>
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE			<u>✓</u>	

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<u>4/11</u>		<u>HAK</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>Decision (S/15)</u>	
<u>4/15</u>				<u>HAK discussed w/ US delegation</u>	
<u>4/15</u>			<u>C</u>	<u>Noted by HAK</u>	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
 M/F'D 4/15/75 BY _____
 CRT ID: _____ SA SF
 OPEN 6AB HP NS
 CLOSE _____ WH EP
 (C) PA DY