

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
 Assistant to the President for National Security  
 Affairs  
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to  
 the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Thursday - September 18, 1975  
 3:30 p. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
 The White House



President: I am pleased to see the progress on the [US-Soviet] grain deal.

Kissinger: It is substantially done, if Seidman, Greenspan and Lynn can keep quiet. The Soviets want five million plus an option for three. Robinson prefers six firm -- which is probably better. It gives better leverage.

President: Can I say something in Oklahoma? "Encouraging progress is being made;" "substantial regular sales on a five-year basis."

Kissinger: Another question is whether this year's extra purchase should be part of the five years.

President: I would rather it didn't .

Kissinger: I agree.

We have a real mess in Jordan for which I must assume responsibility. It is a goddamn mess. I thought they had cleared the letter you signed [to Case] with the King, but the King now rejected the letter. It has let the Congress and the Israelis off the hook, and we are on it. The sale is approved now and the King takes the view that you can go ahead despite his rejection. That would jump up to bite you though. I have asked the King if he stands by the one paragraph and would sign a contract with standard conditions.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(3)(b)  
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. To Det.

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/80, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES,  
 BY ldh, NARA, DATE 4/2/04  
 State Review 9/11/04

It is just like Soviet MFN.

Another way would be to withdraw the LOA and resubmit it without the special letter. Maybe that is what we should do.

President: Let us see how the King reacts, but okay if we prepare the Hill carefully.

Kissinger: On Gromyko, I would lay the groundwork. Say our two countries, whatever the problems are, have the responsibility for world peace. There have been ups and downs and some problems here which have hurt and which are essentially unassociated with US-Soviet relations. If we could have a summit with a SALT agreement, a Threshold Test Ban and some other things, we would solidify detente.

President: And the grain deal.

Kissinger: On the oil, I didn't finish. They are proposing 12 million tons. Perhaps it will go to 25 if we will sell them modern drilling equipment.

President: What about the price?

Kissinger: They are refusing a discount now, but Chuck thinks he can get 10-15 percent.

This is the way Gromyko would like to proceed. He is very formal. He said Brezhnev wants to come December 15. On SALT, they have heard 2500 ALCM and 1000 SLCM. I would stick with all that. Don't mention Backfire or the difference between nuclear and conventional.

On Schlesinger's proposal: The Backfire proposal gives us an opening. On the other he has given us something except for nuclear versus conventional. If Jim will move 300 to 600 -- because the Soviets haven't ever heard 300 -- we might try his idea of 100 between 600 and 1500.

The ALCM proposal, by limiting the number of bombers which carry them, we can do it. We can just ignore the nuclear versus conventional and let it surface in Geneva. We may get by with it but it may cause an explosion. I am worried about this issue, because potentially the Soviets could flood us with cruise missiles and we have no defense against them.

President: Where do we stand on when we start the next round?

Kissinger: 1977.

President: Can't we do what we can now and take up what is left in 1977?

Kissinger: I don't want you to get into a brawl with Brezhnev on it. Since they have conventional cruise missiles, they may welcome this ambiguity.

President: If we postpone the conventional cruise missile to 1977, wouldn't Defense be satisfied?

Kissinger: Sure.

President: Then we would have a better idea of where we are going.

Kissinger: Then I will turn Schlesinger's ideas into a specific proposal.

President: Should we reverse on the land mobiles?

Kissinger: I would let that ride for a few weeks.

President: Can we move on MBFR?

Kissinger: Ask him, but don't appear eager.

On the Middle East, he will unload on you, but don't let him nail you. I think we can agree to start a discussion for Geneva.

President: Didn't we keep them generally informed?

Kissinger: No. He will ask for a commitment that we will make no move without them. You can say it will depend on the parties but we will commit ourselves to keep them informed. Tell him we are willing to cooperate and are willing to discuss the Geneva Conference. Say if the two parties come to us, it is tough to refuse.

I would begin with the Brezhnev visit -- after your opening statement.

✓ P/K 18 Sept 75

P I am pleased & a paper is grounded

K It is substantially done, if we can keep Section, Congress & anyone can keep quiet. Less want 5 with plus option for 5. Robinson says 6 firms, which is probably better - gives better leverage.

P Can I say something in Oklahoma.

encouraging prog is being made "substantial regular sales on a 5 yr basis"

K Another question is whether this yr ~~that~~ extra purchase should be part of a 5-yr.

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K I agree.

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Another way would be to allow a LOR and resubmit it w/o a special letter. Maybe that is what we should do.

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K On Gump's I would buy a questionnaire. <sup>50</sup> Over  
2 countries but not over a pub's time a way for  
world plan. There have been eyes & down &  
have jobs here which have been & activities essentially  
unassociated w/ US - Sov relations.

If we could have a summit w/ a Salt agreement  
LTBT and some other thing we would <sup>be</sup> helping  
detente

P And again deal

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tons. Perhaps will go to 25 if we will sell them  
modern drilling equip.


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Backfire or log out here or ever.

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given us something except for more or less.  
If firm will move 600 to 600 - cause Soviets  
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could flood us w/ cruise missiles & we have  
no defense against them.

P Where do we stand on when we start & reposition?

K 1977

P Don't we do what we can now & take ~~up~~ about  
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they have our. car's, they may welcome this ambiguity.

P If we postpone our car in 1978, wouldn't it be  
entire?

K Sure.

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proposal.

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On ME, he will involve you, but don't  
let him involve you. I think we can agree to ~~start~~  
start discussion for Geneva.

P Didn't we keep them gently informed?

K No. He will ask contact to us ~~involvement~~ <sup>involve</sup> w/o them.  
You can say it will depend on parties but  
a - will <sup>not</sup> help them informally. Tell him we

writing to emp + are writing to discuss General  
conf. Say if 2 parties come to us it is tough  
to refuse.

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