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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 5, 1975
The White House
10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: President's First Meeting with
Prime Minister Miki

PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Takeo Miki
Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa
Toshiki Kaifu, House of Representatives and
Deputy Cabinet Secretary
Sadaaki Numata, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)

The President
The Secretary
Ambassador James D. Hodgson
General Brent Scowcroft, NSC
James J. Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)


President: First of all let me say that I am most grateful for the warm reception I and all of my associates received in Tokyo last fall.

Miki: I appreciate the cordial reception I, my wife and the members of my party are receiving here in Washington.

Before I left Tokyo for Washington I had an audience with the Emperor, who asked me to convey to you his warm appreciation for the thoughtful arrangements being made for his visit to the United States this fall, and for the personal consideration you have shown, Mr. President, in several areas including whales. The Emperor also asked that I convey to you his warm personal regards, and to tell you that he is looking forward to meeting you again this fall.

President: When you return to your country, Mr. Prime Minister, please convey my warmest regards to the Emperor. I look forward to his visit early in October, and I am delighted to hear that the arrangements are proceeding smoothly.

EA/P:JJWickel:rd
(Drafting Office and Officer)



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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5, 3.6
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By lit/dac MARA, Date 9/7/01
MR 01-52, #1 at 222 7/10/01

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-2-

KUALA LUMPUR TERRORISTS

Miki: I regret the unfortunate incident that occurred in Kuala Lumpur. I regret it particularly because the guiding principle throughout my political career has been to promote dialogue and cooperation. And I regret it especially because the terrorists who resorted to blatant violence are Japanese.

I was first informed of this unfortunate incident at 2:00 a.m. day before yesterday. I immediately called Tokyo and instructed the Acting Prime Minister to organize a Task Force to deal with it. I instructed him that respect for human life and the safety of the hostages are to be given top priority. I have been informed that a plane carrying five of the seven prisoners whose release was demanded by the terrorists left Japan about 2:00 a.m. (EDT) this morning, and arrived at Kuala Lumpur about 8:30 a.m. (EDT). The other two prisoners refused to go. No one knows yet where these terrorists and released prisoners wish to go, but I fervently hope the hostages in this regrettable incident are released without harm.

President: I know these terrorists acted totally independent. It is unfortunate that they are Japanese, but we recognize that other terrorists from other countries do the same thing. I am grateful, Mr. Prime Minister, that you are personally involved.

Our nation's view is, was, and always will be as long as I am President, that we cannot and should not respond to the demands of terrorists. I know that some may feel our policy does not respond to the lives and safety of hostages, but if it were our policy to respond to terrorist demands, the United States would become the repeated target of terrorists who operate around the world.

Our instructions to our diplomats are not to respond to terrorist demands under any circumstances. That is the only way I know to meet forthrightly those foreign terrorists who want to disrupt the world. I told the Secretary of State, and he has told the Foreign Service not to respond to terrorist demands. I appreciate that this might cause difficulty for others, but I wanted you, Mr. Prime Minister, to know what our policy is.

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PURPOSE OF VISIT

Miki: Mr. President, I hope to have as forthright a discussion as possible with you this morning, within the limits of the time available. Let me say that when I met you last January, when you were Vice President and I was Deputy Prime Minister, I did not expect to meet you again on such an occasion as this, with you as President and I as Prime Minister.

On my first trip abroad in 1929 the United States was the first country I visited. Later I studied for several years in a university in California, although my English has since gotten rusty. As a result of these experiences my whole life and my 38-year career in the Diet have been guided by the ideals of freedom and democracy. We have something in common, Mr. President, our long careers in our nation's legislatures, and I share with you the same strong faith in democracy.

My purpose in this visit is to discuss frankly the whole range of Japan-US relations to affirm the unshakeable friendship between our two countries. I hope you will forgive me if I happen to offend you with some of my questions, but may I ask you about several matters of interest.

President: By all means. If we could not speak frankly with each other, this meeting would not be beneficial.

EUROPE - CSCE

Miki: Turning to Europe, Mr. President, you just returned from there last night. In everyone's eyes the European Security Agreement appears to have resulted from Soviet efforts to realize their original concept of freezing the status quo in Europe. I am aware that the United States and other nations attached conditions to their acceptance of participation in the Helsinki Conference, but what I wish to ask, Mr. President, is what is your foremost diplomatic objective in the United States' Soviet policy?

President: First, let me comment on the CSCE. I believe there is a lack of sufficient background information on what the CSCE really does. In the first place, with respect to borders, it reaffirms the borders agreed to in treaties signed in 1947 and 1948, and nothing further, except in the case of Germany, where the CSCE reaffirms the borders agreed to by West Germany in 1971. Therefore, the CSCE does nothing more than reaffirm borders agreed to in 1947, 1948 and 1971. This point is not well enough understood.



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-4-

Second, the CSCE Agreement adds an element of integrity and morality, in terms of the right way of doing things, so that the Soviet Union would not do again what it did in the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The Eastern Europeans, if I may interpret what they said in the meetings and elsewhere, believe the CSCE is a document that will prevent the kinds of action from being taken as in the instances I described. They do not say this is guaranteed, but they seem to feel they have added protection that they didn't have before. In that sense CSCE is constructive. We will have a meeting in Belgrade in 1977, to review what happens in the subsequent two years.

My endorsement of CSCE is based on the good faith of those who agreed to it, including the Soviets. I expect all 35 signatories to live up to the agreement language.


In our relations with the Soviet Union we do not agree with their system (nor do they agree with ours). We do not feel that detente between the Soviets and the United States is a solution to all the world's problems, but it can be used, and has been in some cases, to ease tensions and avoid confrontations. I expect it to continue as a vehicle for those purposes.

Detente is a two-way street; it is not all one-way for the Soviets (and won't be as long as I am President). It is a mechanism for use at a time of rising tensions and confrontation. In some cases it has been disappointing, in other cases helpful. I do not mean that it is one-sided. It is mutually beneficial, and hopefully, can help solve some of the problems facing the world.

Secretary: If I may add a word, Mr. President, the debate about CSCE is totally cynical. It is generated by those who for 20 years advocated the exact opposite of what they now say. As the President has said, there are two realities in Europe, frontiers and political influence. There has been Yalta, and then the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 and 1948, and the German Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. As a result there are no contested frontiers in Europe. To talk about frontiers is to reaffirm Treaties and legal language.

The political influence of the Soviets in Eastern Europe is not related to this conference. The Soviet Union has some 40,000 tanks between the Urals and the Elbe, and no

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-5-

Western nation wants to build that many tanks. Until someone does these critics are only engaging in an exercise of expressing demagogic platitudes.

I'm talking very frankly, but then I didn't have much sleep last night. I'm reading a new novel about Japan ("Shogun") and realize everything I'm doing is totally wrong.

Strategically we wish to weaken Soviet political influence in Eastern Europe, not confirm it. And we believe we can weaken it more effectively by detente than we could by cold war. During the cold war period we could use military force, but under detente we must use diplomacy.

If the President can be welcomed by tens of thousands as he was in Warsaw, Bucharest, Krakow, and Belgrade, this weakens the Soviet Union. This could not have happened without detente.

We are under no illusions about the Soviet Union. If they have the opportunity to use pressure, they will do so. We (and you) must adopt positions that our domestic opponents can't attack if we have to resist. I used the example yesterday of the prize-ring -- is it better for us to fight flat-footed in mid-ring where we can be hit easily, or to move around and make ourselves harder to hit? Then if the Soviets do something, and we can tell our people we have done all we can for peace, we will be in a stronger position to resist.

If we look at the Middle East, detente has not helped the Soviet Union. We do not aim at hegemony, and dividing the world between us, because that would be suicidal. We wish to contain the Soviet Union with modern methods, which are not those of the cold war period but are entirely new.

SALT, MBFR

Miki: Based on the outcome of the CSCE conference what prospects do you see for further progress in SALT and MBFR?

President: I had two meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev, in which we made some headway on SALT. There are some problems which are very technical, and some which are very fundamental. I believe the odds on an agreement are better than 50-50, but not certain. We will continue to negotiate. I believe that SALT is in the interest of the entire world as well as US-Soviet relations. We will

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continue to work at it, but we will insist that whatever materializes must be mutually beneficial.

Regarding MBFR, we recognize that the negotiations have been stalled for some time. We are working with our European allies to try to develop a position that might move the talks forward, but this depends on the reaction the Soviets have.

We believe that a MBFR that reduces military forces on an equitable basis is in the best interest of Europe, but the talks are stalemated. We hope the Soviets will be as flexible as we will. We will continue to work closely with our allies so that our efforts will lead to greater unity and not split us.

When are the MBFR talks scheduled to reconvene Henry?

Secretary: September, Mr. President.

CSCE EFFECT ON ASIA

Miki: Turning to the repercussions generated in Asia by the CSCE, the Soviets extended an invitation on July 30 to (LDP Diet Member) Hirohide Ishida, Chairman of the Japan-Soviet Parliamentarians Friendship Association, to hold a meeting to discuss an Asian Security Conference.

In the long term, although it may not be visible yet except in special circumstances, what the Asians are most sensitive to is Soviet and Chinese influence in Asia. The Chinese, for example, view the Asian Security Conference proposed by the Soviets as an attempt to encircle them...

Secretary: They're right.

Miki: ...and therefore oppose any third nation hegemony. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship Japan is negotiating with China, as you know, has been stalled by opposition to the inclusion of the hegemony clause. It is obvious that the Chinese are vigilant against any increase in Soviet influence in Asia. What do you feel will be the effect of the CSCE on this trend in Asia, in the context of Soviet influence?

President: First let me speak about the United States' relations with the People's Republic. Our relations were initiated by Mr. Nixon. I fully support these relations,



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-7-

and believe they are of vital importance. I expect to go to the People's Republic sometime late this fall. I feel that our relations are moving along on schedule. The Shanghai document is the basis for continuing and expanding our relations. I see no serious problem developing in that regard.

We all recognize that there is competition in Asia between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. We believe that our continuing relations with China are important in maintaining stability in Asia, and we will make every effort, in a responsible manner, to broaden our relations with the People's Republic. Secondly, we expect to maintain continued close relations with your government, Mr. Prime Minister. We feel this is vitally important for the stability and security of the Pacific. I have been encouraged by our discussions in Japan, and this morning. Tomorrow we can reaffirm the importance of our relations.

I recognize there are problems in the Pacific area, not in our relations but in peripheral areas. We should be frank in discussing those relations, as they refer to relations between the United States and Japan.

Therefore, we seek to broaden our relations with China, while maintaining and strengthening our relations with Japan. This will have an impact on the influence of the Soviet Union in the Pacific area. Henry, have you anything to add?

Secretary: I was asked in Helsinki about an Asian collective security conference, and said if there is such a meeting, it would take place without the United States. I do not think Asia can be compared with the situation in Europe.

Miki: I agree.

Secretary: We will not participate in an Asian collective security conference, or anything of that kind.

Second, we believe the Soviet Union is trying to encircle China, and in no way do we wish to participate. China has its own aspirations, and in ten years may cause trouble for all of us, including Japan, but at the present time it is not in our interest to weaken China. Therefore, we will not cooperate with the Soviets in any anti-Chinese maneuver in Asia. It was for that reason that we signed the Shanghai Communique, with its hegemony clause. We knew what we were doing, and made it explicit.

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SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN ASIA

Miki: How do you view the present state of the Sino-Soviet conflict in Asia?

President: I might repeat what I heard from a number of sources in Helsinki. The Soviet Union has 44 divisions on the Chinese border. That certainly indicates to me that their relations are not better, and may even be considerably worse than before.

As the Secretary said, we do not adopt a policy of favoring one over the other, but at the same time we will keep our relations with you, Mr. Prime Minister, because of the strong influence of our relations on peace and stability in Asia.

Secretary: If there is a danger it is that Japan might over-analyze our policy, and initiate a leap-frog exercise that would be detrimental to both our interests. We are not following a parallel policy with the Soviets in Asia, but if Japan does something to get ahead of us, we might have to do something. Thus it is very important that we coordinate our policies toward the Soviet Union and China. We should not cooperate in the Soviet efforts to isolate China.


Miki: On my part, I believe we should have a full understanding of your China policy. Therefore, I wish to ask your view of the prospects for improving your relations with China, and how far you might go, Mr. President, in developing your relations during your visit to China?

Also, I would appreciate hearing a frank explanation of your long-term policy views regarding China.

President: As I said just a few minutes ago the Shanghai Communique is the basic document by which we are proceeding to develop our relations with China. We feel, and we believe the People's Republic feels, that our relations are within the context of the Shanghai Communique.

As I said, I will visit China later in the fall. There is no agenda, and no details have been worked out. The Secretary will probably go to the People's Republic before my visit, and at that time the agenda will be finalized.

We have made no commitment at this time with regard to our relations with Peking except in the context of the Shanghai Communique.



Secretary: Peking has told us that we need not complete the process of normalization to have a successful visit. We do not believe it desirable this year, after the tragedy in Indochina. On top of that we would not wish to bring about a political change in our relations with Taiwan, all the more so since if we did not recognize Taiwan, we could not honor our defense treaty with a part of a country. We have told the Chinese we have no desire for a change in the legal status of our relations, but we do wish to improve our relations.

Miki: I have the feeling the PRC wants to see the status quo maintained in Taiwan for the present.

Secretary: That is our impression.

President: That is an interesting observation. They have pressed us, but just enough to say they have pressed us.

Secretary: The biggest problem for us is our newsmen who go to China and plead with the Chinese to say something about Taiwan that they would never volunteer. As you know, Mr. Prime Minister, we have the Jackson Amendment relating emigration. I told Chiao Kuan-hua if China wants MFN treatment, they will have to allow free emigration. Chiao replied that we can have 30 million Chinese any time we want.

Miki: I accept your statements as authoritative, since you know the Chinese psychology best. I myself feel confident that Peking does not desire any abrupt change.

Secretary: I believe that is correct.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Miki: In preparation for these meetings, Mr. President, I sent Saburo Okita, a well-known economist and President of Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, to the ASEAN nations as my Special Envoy to get a feel for the post-Vietnam situation. Also, our Chiefs of Missions from the Southeast Asian countries met in Tokyo in July to discuss the situation.

On the basis of Okita's report and the discussions in the Chiefs of Mission Conference I have concluded that the real intent of the SEA nations is to develop a greater degree of stability. If they have learned one lesson from the Vietnam experience, it is that they must concentrate on



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-10-

stabilizing their own political situations and improving the livelihood of their peoples. The leaders of these nations currently are making many public statements that create a certain superficial impression, but I believe they are doing this for reasons of domestic politics. I believe what they really want is a continued American presence.

President: Do you mean the Philippines?

Miki: Yes, and Thailand too. They realize that the United States can continue to be a great force in assisting their own efforts, and as the emotions of the Vietnam War cool they are making a post-war assessment that they need the great power of the United States. Therefore, I feel that whatever the Thais say about opposing U.S. military bases, or the Philippines say about ending American extraterritoriality on military bases does not alter what they have in the back of their minds. The Prime Ministers of Thailand and the Philippines have both recently visited Peking, following which one may detect a subtle change in their statements. I believe that Peking also wants the United States to maintain its presence, or course, in the context of the Soviet threat.

I wish to make the point that it would be a mistake to argue that the SEA nations are drifting away from the United States. They believe there is a role for the United States to play, and I believe it important for the United States to maintain its interest in Asia.

Japan, of course, also has a crucial interest, and should cooperate with the United States in this area. Indeed, Japan-US cooperation is the basic premise underlying the peace and security of Asia and the Pacific. What is needed at this time is an understanding of the needs of these small, powerless countries in Asia, and the dynamics by which they function.

President: I appreciate your frank views. I respect the way you have assimilated the reports of your Special Envoy and your Ambassadors. It offers us a good insight into the problems of this area. But let me say frankly that American public opinion, rightly or wrongly, is affected by what the leaders of other countries say. All Americans are not sufficiently sophisticated to detect what is happening behind the scenes. In some cases American citizens have been dismayed

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by the words of one leader of another country or another around the world, not just in SEA, and this has an impact on the Congress. I and the Secretary of State and you, Mr. Prime Minister, understand there is a difference between words and actions. However, leaders in other countries should understand that the support I wish to give our friends in Europe, Asia and elsewhere depends on public opinion. I hope therefore they moderate their language as we try to continue working with them. Otherwise the Congress that I must work with won't give me the kind of support I need.

I firmly believe the United States should play a global role, in Europe and the Pacific, but to achieve this I need the backing of the Congress, and this can be affected by the words of foreign leaders, especially if Americans don't see behind the scenes. We wish to work with you, and will, but we won't be able to do our best without the support of the American people, who have been deeply traumatized by Vietnam.

That was a great disappointment, especially for me. I believe the American people want us to be strong in the Pacific -- I do -- but that requires the understanding of the leaders of those countries.

Miki: As a fellow, life-long parliamentarian I can appreciate how difficult your problems are. However, Mr. President, I hope you understand that the end of the war in Vietnam is a turning point in Asia. Freed of the emotional complexities of the war the leaders there can now think of the future of their own countries. They want to stake their fate on a non-Communist future, but if they are to realize their aspirations, it will be necessary to give them some basis for confidence in the future. If not, they may become confused about their destiny. We should extend them support, otherwise if their determination wavers, they face an uncertain future. Therefore, it devolves on us, the democracies, to help them strengthen their own nations. We should try to prevent any uncertainty, by which I mean their coming under the influence of a Communist country. I hope you understand that this is a great turning point. Japan will do its part, and will keep in close touch with the United States.

President: I assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we will keep close contact, liaison, and working relations. I recognize the problems these nations face, and we want, and will help, because it is important for the preservation of the values and the kind of government we believe in.



Close working relations will be necessary if we are to meet the challenges presented in that part of the world.

Miki: It is in this spirit that I intend to call on the leaders of the industrial democracies of the Pacific -- Canada, Australia, New Zealand -- to step up their cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally.

KOREA

Miki: Do we have time this morning to talk about Korea?

President: We could talk about it tonight, or tomorrow.

Secretary: With respect to Korea in the UN, the United States absolutely cannot vote for the admission of North and South Vietnam to the UN in the same year as the defeat in Indochina.

Miki: Foreign Minister Miyazawa will convey our views to you in detail.

Secretary: We can discuss this matter at lunch. We are not asking Japan's support on Vietnam, but we do have Japan's support for South Korea. If South Korea is admitted to the UN, we could vote for both Vietnams.

President: We would wage a vigorous fight against the admission of North and South Vietnam into the UN in 1975 without the admission of South Korea. We feel extremely strongly about this.

Secretary: We could understand if you were to vote differently on Vietnam, but we do ask your strong support on South Korea.

Miki: I understand your position, Mr. President; Miyazawa will elaborate our views at lunch.

President: I appreciate our candid, friendly exchange this morning. It has been most constructive. It is a great pleasure to see you again, Mr. Prime Minister.

Miki: I also appreciate your candor, Mr. President, and look forward to seeing you again this evening.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 5, 1975
The White House
7:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: President's Tete-a-Tete with
Prime Minister

PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Takeo Miki
Masao Kunihiro, Advisor to Prime Minister (Interpreter)

The President
James J. Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)

Miki: Thank you for taking the time to receive me this evening.
I know you must be tired after your trip.

President: I feel good.

Miki: You're still in good shape because of your training as
an athlete.

President: No, I'm a has been. But I do sleep well on a plane.
I got 5 or 6 hours sleep on the plane and 4 more here last
night, I feel good.

Miki: I find it easy to talk to Parliamentarians who are
elected to office, like you, Mr. President.

President: I feel the same way, Mr. Prime Minister.

POLITICAL PROSPECTS: JAPAN

Miki: You and I, Mr. President, also came to our present
offices under similar conditions, you after Watergate and I
after Tanaka's financial scandal. However, I have led a long
life as a Parliamentarian and feel that the circumstances which
brought me to power were not limited to Tanaka's financial
scandal. I believe it involved a deeper problem that we face,
that is, that popular support for "conservative democracy" in
Japan is weakening, and if the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
wishes to remain in power, it must practice "liberal democracy."

EA/P:JJWickel:rd 8/6/75

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5, 3.6

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By lx/dae, NARA, Date 9/7/01
MR 01-52, #2; et. al. 7110101

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The LDP has become increasingly a "conservative democratic" party. In each of the three elections conducted since 1967, when its share of the vote first fell below 50 percent, the LDP vote declined, to 46.9 percent in the most recent General Election in 1972. In the Upper House election last July its vote was 39.8 percent. But I believe strongly that the LDP is the only force for stability in government.

However, I have also been telling the Japan Socialist Party, the largest of the four opposition parties, that it should act more responsibly like a "shadow government." As you know the JSP and the other opposition parties differ sharply from the LDP in defense and foreign policies. The JSP is changing a bit, but we will have to wait and see how much. In the meantime, though, I can appreciate the fact that you, Mr. President, might view this situation in Japan with some uneasiness.

Like you, Mr. President, my accession to power was unexpected, and I have not yet been "baptized" by the people; and late this year, or next year I will have to seek the approval of the people for my government in an election. I believe I came to power because of the consistency of the positions I have advocated throughout my 38 years as an LDP Dietman, and I am confident that the election results will lead to a more stable government supported by the people. I am also confident that I will serve a full three-year term.

For these reasons, therefore, I wish to maintain a dialog with you in the spirit of full candor. I might add there may be some things you ask of me that I can do, and some that I cannot. If I say I can do something, I will do it, and if I can't, I will say so for I believe we can only continue to cooperate on a basis of mutual trust.

President: That is the only way to do things.

Miki: Therefore, I hope to keep in close touch with you.

President: Mr. Prime Minister, first of all let me thank you on a personal basis for the frankness and candor with which you have reviewed the Japanese situation. Your leadership is of the kind that could perpetuate strong support for the leadership in Japan. In my Congressional experience I have come to know those who can do this, and those who can't. Based on our discussions today and several months ago you seem to me to be the kind of leader we want as a working partner.



May I ask, Mr. Prime Minister, in your system do you have the capability of deciding the timing of an election?

Miki: Yes. That is my biggest prerogative -- I can call an election any time it is to my advantage.

President: In our system we have no choice.

Miki: Mr. President, I wish you every success next year.

President: Thank you very much. You seem to share the views I have.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS


President: Japan is a good ally, West Germany is a good ally, France is a very good ally which is a good development and Britain is a good ally, as are other countries. If we are to combat some of the trends that will come if we have bad economic conditions, we must try to work together. My impression of what Giscard, Wilson and Schmidt said is that if we don't improve the economic climate, the political climate could have an adverse effect on the developed industrial nations of the world. Japan has a big stake in this. Therefore we talked in general about the problem without any commitment, but we all felt that it could be disastrous for democratic government if we were to have adverse economic conditions develop in the future.

Our economic picture is improving, but we can't do it alone -- we have to coordinate how we can work together to achieve a coordinated plan. We wish to work with you because your re-election is vital to Japan and the industrial nations we represent.

COALITION POLITICS

President: I apologize for not knowing much about the JSP, but I am always apprehensive about compromising with the wrong people (based on my own experience in Congress). Is the JSP responsibly led? Does it have good ideology? Would you feel confident, and do you feel I would feel confident with the JSP in a coalition?

Miki: I have no intention of forming a coalition. The LDP must continue to hold the government for a considerable period, but not permanently. Our views differ greatly from those of the JSP, but I feel we need the JSP to understand our position; in other words, to put the JSP in the position of agreeing to disagree.



The opposition parties all criticized my visit to the United States, in the public press, to spare Japan becoming subservient or overburdened. But privately the chairmen of all the opposition parties, except the Japan Communist Party (JCP) telephoned to wish me well. They are in the process of changing, and I will continue my policy of avoiding confrontation, and seeking dialog and cooperation.

President: By way of analogy, we feel very strongly that the problem in Europe is that some governments among our allies will accept the Communist Party into a coalition. We are totally opposed to such a coalition. NATO cannot be strong with a communist party in the government in Italy or elsewhere. We can't have a strong NATO on that basis. I have told the Italians this, and I believe it is equally true elsewhere.

Miki: Last year we had local elections in April, after I became Prime Minister, and while the LDP couldn't recapture the Governorships of Tokyo and Osaka held by opposition party incumbents, we won all the other governorships. The LDP also gained over 100 seats in local assemblies, while the JCP lost some. I don't believe the JCP will continue to grow, and I won't let them.

President: May I ask a question. You are the best authority, but is the JCP internationally oriented, or domestically?

Miki: The JCP has some contact with the Soviet Union, but it is generally domestically oriented.

President: Is it oriented more to Moscow than Peking?

Miki: The JCP is at loggerheads with Peking; their relations are very bad.

President: That's very interesting.

GISCARD PROPOSAL

Miki: I agree with your remarks, Mr. President, on Giscard's proposal for a five-power economic conference, and did so publicly in the press, that is that a preliminary conference would be required to establish an agenda. I would hope that this would come as a U.S. initiative. I believe Giscard's



proposal to discuss only monetary problems is too "narrow", and the five advanced industrial powers should discuss the full spectrum of economic matters.

President: I think we should proceed on an informal basis, rather than formal. I don't know your situation, but I think an informal arrangement -- for discussions by a person you would name, and persons named by Giscard, Wilson and Schmidt -- would be a better way to lay the groundwork. We have a great mutual interest in doing something, but the minute this becomes formal, it complicates my problems at home. What we want is results, not public acclaim. We want success, and economic success would be of the greatest importance economically and politically from the standpoint of the developed industrial nations.

Our situation looks good, but we can't go it alone. All the nations should improve their economic circumstances if we are to be successful as nations in the free world.

Miki: May I infer that you would agree to convene a five-power conference as long as preparations are made in informal talks?

President: Generally, yes, but that depends on how well the representatives of the five powers lay the foundation. It would be disastrous if we entered negotiations at the Summit with disagreements among us. We should agree in advance to coordinate our views.

Miki: I agree.

President: We would agree to hold the conference if there are adequate preparations, but if there are disagreements, we could not hold it.

U.S.-JAPAN COOPERATION

President: Mr. Prime Minister, I believe our talks this morning, and this evening man-to-man, have been constructive. It is important that the United States and Japan cooperate. You and I will do so. I wish you the best and know you will enjoy success in your election. We expect to succeed in our election, 14 months from now. All I can see for you is pluses, not minuses.

Miki: I believe mutual trust between the top leaders is the most important key to successful diplomatic relations. The



leaders must know each other as human beings. With your understanding and assistance I know Japan and the United States can have that kind of successful relations. As I said earlier, I will tell you "no" in all frankness when there is something I can't do for you.

President: And the reverse of that is if I disagree, I hope we can keep the level of our rhetoric low, because a public display is not good.

Miki: Of course.

President: We should minimize any disagreement.

Miki: It is not good taste in a friendly relationship to accentuate differences publicly.

President: In the Congress (and I am a product of the Congress) there is an old saying "We can disagree without being disagreeable."

Miki: Like yourself, Mr. President, I am a product of the Diet. My government is dedicated to clean politics and reform, which meets some resistance from some sectors of the LDP, but not as much as the press reports.

President: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. This talk has been very constructive. May I escort you downstairs to dinner.





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Ed 26.

August 12, 1975

UNCLASSIFIED
(with ~~Secret~~ attachments)
(and Confidential Exdis attachments)

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memoranda of Conversation
The President's Meetings with Prime
Minister Miki

The Department of State hereby transmits the attached Memoranda of Conversation of the President's meetings with Prime Minister Miki of Japan on August 5 and 6.

The Department is withholding distribution within the Department of State and to the American Embassy, Tokyo, pending your approval.

C. Arthur Borg
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. The President's Tete-a-tete with Prime Minister Miki
2. The President's First Meeting with Prime Minister Miki
3. The President's Second Meeting with Prime Minister Miki

UNCLASSIFIED
(with ~~Secret~~ attachments)
(and Confidential Exdis attachments)



✓

P/ Wichi / Mujazana / K

5 Aug 75 10:00 am

No need to transcribe - (Wicket did Mem con)

(Present)
~~(Present)~~

P You were longer minutes at one time

M Yes (what time was it)

(Present)

K I had dinner w/ the Wichi in '72. I met all the ^{ambassadors}

1 of 'em at a time when the Govt was changing

P but one day how grateful I am for a reception I saw & enjoyed real in Japan last fall.

M I like to say a few words at cocktail. Also have a message from Eugene. I thank you for a warm reception for me, my wife & family. I want to convey the message from Eugene to you. I had dinner just before I left. He asked me to convey his thanks for prep for his visit. He looking forward to seeing you in Oct & he sends his warmest personal regards.

P Please get him my warm regards & a warm pleased response regarding something.

M would like to refer next to ^{the} ~~unfortunate~~ incident in Q. L. I so sorry it took place, because I have made a special point to promote changes in all fields. I further regret this breaking flow & out of order by ~~not~~ ^{not} of my country. Since I heard first that I asked Q. L. to ~~ask~~ ^{ask} take care & to pay particular attention to ~~the~~ ^{the} hostages. Today 5 of 7 ~~are~~ ^{are} prisoners detained ~~detained~~ in Q. L. at 8:00 am Wash time. I hope hostages will now be released & their lives saved.

P I know terrorists were a thing today, subject -

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

MR 01-52 #3: de. 111 71101

By del NARA, Date 9/7/01



important that these treaties are signed, but we know
there are others from other countries. Our policy, as long
as I know, is that we can't respond to a number of
treaties. Some say this must show, however, for a
lot of victims, but if we respond, arms
become a target of terrorists world wide. So our
policy are make other victims not to respond
to demands of terrorists. We surely will not respond
I appreciate your efforts but want you to know how
we feel.

M I would like know as far as partnership discussion
as possible in limited time period. When we last
met, you as VP & me as Dy. PM, with did I think
we would meet together like this. I first came to
US in 29, at So. Cal. My E. my more empty but
a lot of others. I would then have been my young
principles since then. I have been in biggest
years - like you. I have increasing interest
to know. I want to be very frank in helping our
relationship. If I blurt, please excuse me.

P By all means, we certainly should speak w/
total frankness.

M First, a question of E. You just returned from CSCE.
Everyone thinks CSCE was result of attempt of SU to
freeze status quo in E. US, try w/ other countries,
accepted this conf. I know you attached # of countries
to accepting to those Sov. intentions. What is basic
objective of US starting toward SU

P First let my comment on CSCE. I think there



using info about C.S.C.E. On borders, it simply
reaffirms borders fixed by treaty in 1947-48, except
Germany. There it was agreed by W. Germany in 1970-71.
~~2nd~~ Nothing else radical & I don't think that will
be understood. 2nd = agreement ^{mainly} ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
doing again what they did in Hungary, Poland, &
Czech. ~~It~~ The E.E.C. may think this is a document
which will give added protection against repetition
of these agreements - protection which not present before.
As you know will be a follow-up long in Belgium
in 1972. ^{negotiations of} ~~the~~ agreement ~~to~~ based on faith they
would live up to it. We will wait & see. Obviously
we don't agree to their system & even more - But
detente can ease tensions & reduce importations.
We hope to continue to use it for that. It is a 2 way
street & will continue to be used for that. Sometimes
we will be disappointed; sometimes it can be
exceedingly useful.

K If I could add a word. Much of debate about C.S.C.E.
is totally cynical. Many of the people now are arguing
a position opposite of what they previously said. A Polish
position done all these kind down in legal documents.
~~will~~ ~~issue~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~matter~~ ~~of~~ ~~Sov~~ ~~expansion~~ ~~in~~ ~~E.E.C.~~ ~~on~~
That nothing to do w/ C.S.C.E. Fact is SU has 4000
tanks w/ 4000. No one in west is ready to counter
that. An attempt is to weaken Sov influence. We
think that can best be done thru detente, when they can
only use dip, not mil means of ~~control~~.
When can visit 3 E.E.C. countries & get



welcome by thousands, that makes our influence
We want to be in a position that if SU moves on
aggressive course, we can persuade our people
we have done everything possible.

We are not aiming at hegemony & leading by word
but no. We want to contain SU - not w/ cold war
but w/ new methods.

M How do you see, in light of CSCE, & future of
SALT & MBFR

P I had 2 notes w/ Berg. We make some prog. Some
you raise are tech & some fundamental. We will
continue to negotiate - I think changes are somewhat
broad than SU - so. It has to be mutual give & take.
We will insist it is mutually beneficial agreement.
On MBFR, we get some stalled for some time. We
working w/ an attitude of hope & see things forward.
We think nuclear as a general basis is in
interest of E. We think both about 1 we flex
and will work w/ our allies to delay ~~flex~~
unilateral approach.

M Next question is what in your mind is a
effect of climate of CSCE on Asian scene. On
30 July, SU issued invitation to Jap - SU
parliamentary session to come to Moscow to talk
Asian security. What Asian people are most
concerned about is influence of PRC & SU on Asian
countries. That ^{SU} influence may not be very
with us & they may be ~~concerned~~
we are concerned w/ PRC & NUK, too



can long run course is PRC + S.V. PRC is
united and long enriched. What in your view
is effect, is relationship of results of CSE in Asian
zone.

J into one 1st speak of our relationship w/ PRC. Upon
started it; I suggested it; I think it tremendously
important. I expect to go there later this year. Our
relationship is proceeding on school on lines
of Shanghai Commission. We will be serious
pursuing. We will be competitors but PRC - S.V.
in Asia. We think our relationship w/ PRC
is important & we will work to expand it. We
also seek continuing good relationship w/ Japan.
That is vitally important to security of Asia & Pac.
Our talks I think can re-affirm the centrality
of that relationship. Soe breaking from relations
w/ Japan PRC & strengthening relations w/ Japan
essential to ~~the~~ Asian developments. Henry?

K I said in Europe if there was Asian unity
system it will be w/o us. But is entirely
diff. We think S.V. is trying to encircle PRC. Soe
we think PRC has its own imperatives which
in 10 years will give us trouble - with Japan. But
right now it not in our interest to weaken PRC.

M How do you see future of Sino Sov conflict in
Asia?

P I repeatedly heard in Helsinki that S.V. probably
crosses out PRC borders. This probably
submits to our China relationship with others.



individual it could be worse. Our policy doesn't favor one
over another, but we want a strengthening in relations
w/you.

K There is a point that Jay, looking at me, will try to
get ahead & we will play long-play. We will not play
forward policy w/ SU, but if Jay gets ahead we
may be forced into it. We should understand
policy. We will not even w/ SU against PRC.

M I feel we should be in perfect understanding w/ each
other w/ respect to PRC. That why I'm interested in
how far you understand w/ PRC might drag
on your trip - a long term picture of Taiwan
Shanghai C. is our guideline. We feel & I think
PRC does, but our other policies are w/ in guid-
lines of that Commission. We have no specific
agenda. K will probably go ahead of me & finalize
agendas there.

K Peking has told us it not necessary for us to
complete our authorization for them to be normal
visit. We think would not be desirable in a
year of Indochina to do this thing about a change
on Taiwan. Also we have security treaty w/ Taiwan
& it impossible to have security treaty w/ part of a
country.

M I understand I feel PRC wants status of Taiwan
to be preserved.

K That are impressions.

M I do think Peking right now does not favor
drift change.



If I may, I have a few observations on SEA. Since July our efforts in SEA have been in conf. I also sent an emissary there to assess & follow up on it. On basis of those reports, I have come to following conclusions as to real situation of these countries. It is clear that they may say anything in public for surface thing may appear diff; they do still want continued US presence. They do, but they have found as result of VN experience that they want concentration on stabilizing their internal sit & organizing a lot of their people. They realize a US is a major factor in helping them to realize these goals. E reaction has not been as high as during VN and they now primarily appreciate a power for help of US. So what they say in public doesn't reflect what they feel about continued US presence. Of course there is a spec. prob of US presence in Thailand. Thain + Phil encouraged them relative to PRC. I felt there were some ^{subtle} changes in statements before after their talks went to Beijing. I also think Beijing may desire continued US presence.


The point is that it is ~~not~~ to argue that these SEA countries are trying away or trying to chase from a US. It is important that US play strong role & take active interest in these countries. It is important that these 2 countries work & play a constructive joint role. It is important to understand pay & by business operating in these small countries.



P I appreciate your views. ^{& your Ambassadorial} You have given us a valuable insight. But US public opinion is affected by what psychology. They not only think & look behind a screen. So some people are sometimes deceived by what being said & this was impact on Cong. It I know by that words & things but if we must be heard fully, I would hope they would understand this & understand their language. Otherwise is by your A message w/c Cong. We want to reach w/ you & we will but we can't do that if we don't have support of Cong. people we can't then transcribe ~~say~~ in UN. Cong. people I think do want us still to be strong in Pac, but it has degraded in ~~a~~ words of the people in these countries.

M As a fellow parliamentarian, we know how parties play words & what def. it presents. My point is this. There is strong point in view. These countries are thinking seriously about fate of their countries & they hoping their part on man - man. It is important that these countries can feel confident about their future. They need our help to know how you confidence about their future & reduce their uncertainty which will lead to least confidence. Japan will do anything it can & will stay in close contact w/ US.

P We want to remain in close contact w/ you on this. It is very important that we meet this challenge & we can do so only if you



work closely together

W 9 - in this period I intend to call on
several countries for cover - Canada, NZ, Aus -
to stop any other bilateral aid.

H One thing ^{within} ~~Korea~~ which is urgent. We must
work for declassification of NKS VN to UK in some
years [?] exp'd from Indochina.

W We will have our views on that.

K We are not asking you help, but want you to know
our views. We would like your help on S. Korea.
US/S. Korea we can write for a VN's. We have
had you and write in UK, but ask you support
S. Korea

P We are full way strongly about a decision
of 2 VN's

