

Scowcroftable  
(sensitive)

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
XGDS

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**PARTICIPANTS:** The President  
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs

**DATE & TIME:** Thursday - June 12, 1975  
10:00 a.m.

**PLACE:** The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: I think they are cracking.

President: I went to bed last night thinking there was no give at all.

Kissinger: These guys are the world's worst shits. His performance last night was a disgrace.

President: He shouldn't have been encouraged by the questions -- they didn't indicate that the Congress considers that there is an open treasury for Israeli benefit.

Kissinger: [Shows map] We are okay on the oil fields. He is prepared to let Egypt station forces in the mouths of the passes forward of the Egyptian line. He mentioned one company in each position, but privately he said we could go to two companies. I saw him alone and floated the idea of the two warning stations with U.S. manning. I thought it was essential that we be covered if the whole negotiation should blow up. His first reaction was very positive but then he asked what it would cost. That means he thinks it is a favor to them and that is the way we should keep it. You should raise it with him alone at the end of the meeting and don't appear too eager.

President: What do they do beyond letting Egypt into the western end of the passes?

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/19/04  
BY John NARA DATE 5/18/04

Kissinger: They would move their own forces to the eastern end of the passes. I think personally Sadat will refuse the offer. If he does, then there is a 50-50 chance that Rabin will use Sadat's refusal to prove that he has been forthcoming and his offer was refused. Or he may agree to some bulges in the line. That would cause him problems at home. The Israeli Cabinet would die trying to agree to something like that.

He also said they have to have assurances that no further reassessments would take place. They cannot be in a position where they would be faced in a short time with further demands perhaps followed by further reassessments.

President: How about movement with respect to Syria and the comprehensive approach, including Geneva?

Kissinger: I said that the urgency would be somewhat reduced.

Nessen wants to know about the briefings.

President: My reaction is that with all these complications...

Kissinger: We could have Sisco, or me, do it for 10 minutes. I would propose saying that we had constructive meetings, that Rabin has to report to the Cabinet and we will be in touch. Perhaps we should not say anything about the Cabinet -- that is his problem. We can agree with Rabin what I will say.


[General Scowcroft leaves for map.]

He has offered a few hundred yards in Syria and to give Asad a part of the demilitarized zone.

We could give Sadat these proposals and ask for an answer by 5 July. Then I would go to meet with Gromyko on the 7th and 8th and from there on to the Middle East to finalize the agreement.

On Iranian oil -- if we could make a deal at the current market value fixed prices, with a 20 percent discount, it would almost kill a price increase -- maybe even crack OPEC. Robinson is negotiating two deals ad ref -- one at the fixed prices and one at market prices.

President: Greenspan is terribly worried about an OPEC price increase. If this will stop that, I think he would favor it.



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Kissinger: If the interim settlement works, I would write to Khalid that we can't be working with the Arabs for settlement when they are increasing prices.

President: Why don't you talk just to Alan alone?

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P/K 12 June 75

K I think they are cracking

P I want to be last night thinking there was no  
give at all

K These guys are the world's worst shots. This performance  
last night was a disgrace.

P He talked but have been encouraged by a position. They  
didn't indicate any open treason.

K (Shows maps) We are etc on out fields. He prepared  
to let E station focus in a number of a passes  
forward of <sup>the E</sup> this line. I saw him alone & plotted a  
warning station w/c's morning. We have to be careful  
if a whole negotiable basis. He first was positive but  
hesitated about it would cost. That means he thinks  
it a favor to them & that's a way we should keep it.  
Don't alone etc end & don't look ugly.

P What do they do beyond letting E into western end.

K They would move to E end of passes. I think primarily  
Scalet will refuse. Then 50-50 chance he will see  
Scalet refusal to proceed he been factoring & refusal.  
Or he may agree to bridge in a line. But I  
Cabinet will die agreeing to that.

He said <sup>they</sup> we have to have assurances no further movement  
would happen.

P How about Syria & Congo. plan with Comm.

K I said nothing would be somewhat advised.  
Wishes come to know about bridge

P My reaction is that w/all these complications...

K We could have Sizer - or me - do it for 10 minutes

We had instruction notes, he has to get & contact



& we will be in touch. We can agree w/ Robert  
what I will say.

(I left for work)

He has offered a few hundred yards in  
Seymour and ~~used~~ give a deal to the devil  
you.

We could give Sedat the proposals & demand an  
answer by 5 July. Then I would meet w/ George  
& go right on to ME & settle it.

On Iran oil - if we could make a deal at current  
market value fixed prices, <sup>w/ 2.5% discount</sup> it would almost billa  
price increase - maybe even crack OPEC. Robinson  
is reqd. 2 deals at ref - one at fixed prices & one at  
market prices.

P. Gwynne is terribly worried about an OPEC price  
increase. If this will stop that, I think he would  
favor it.

K. If a interim settlement works, I would write to  
Khalid that we can't be working w/c Arabs for  
settlement when they are increasing prices.

P. Why don't you talk just to Alan about it.

