

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

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By det. NADA Date 12/16/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, January 29, 1975
9:28 - 10:25 a.m.

PLACE:

The President: The Speaker asked if he and John Rhodes could go to China over the spring vacation.

Kissinger: Probably.

The Greeks and Turks have agreed to meet me in Paris. Do you agree?

The President: Yes. Could we announce it? It would help the vote.

Kissinger: We can announce it next week. It is clear the Greeks are relying totally on us. Things are going slowly because of the Turkish Government situation. We will have Famagusta open, some refugees, and maybe the airport. We moved on the Aegean issue -- we told the Greeks we would oppose any use of force and they should propose the International Court of Justice. That defuses it for now.

The President: I notice Makarios is playing with the Soviets.

Kissinger: Yes, he is trying to utilize it. But the Congress put Ecevit out. The government is paralyzed.



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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

The President: Did you see the American Greek ad in the paper today?

Kissinger: [Reads it] It says 40,000 Turkish troops. They tell us there have not been more than 27,000. Maybe we can use that. If we don't get February 5 lifted, I think Turkey will completely stonewall.

The Portuguese thing is completely confused -- Socialist and Communist rallies.

The French sent someone here to talk about nuclear cooperation. If we do it, I have to talk to Schlesinger about pacing it carefully. There is no way to guarantee in this climate that it won't get out. Some we can do; warhead guidance is difficult. We could save that to last. You will have to deal with the Brits. The French don't want the British to know. Since it is not finalized, you are right for the Wilson visit, but at the same time you must decide what to tell them.

The President: How long will this take?

Kissinger: It depends on how well we can control Schlesinger. But we want to get something for it.

The President: Absolutely. We want help on energy cooperation.

Kissinger: They want help on MRV guidance. They are not going MIRV. They gave us a 5-page list.

The President: As long as we stay away from warheads we are okay with the British?

Kissinger: You can tell them we have talked to them about hardening and command and control security.

The President: It is okay if we do it slowly.

Kissinger: On Pakistani aid, even State is coming around to Pak aid, on the grounds of equity. It will help with the Chinese and do not too much damage with India, and if we concentrate on defensive arms, it is bearable.

Byroade has made soundings, very unsubtly. But he has no negatives. Mansfield and McGovern reserve judgment. Lee Hamilton is for it; Scott also. I will send you a study.



The President: I am for it, but we will get some flak. Like Fraser.

Kissinger: I don't know. I met Fraser yesterday. He read a statement on cutting aid if there are violations of human rights. I gave him a tough line.

We will have trouble with the Indians.

The President: I don't care. India doesn't have a great reservoir here.

Kissinger: About the Wilson visit -- he will try to get a close relationship with you. That costs nothing. But he will try to maneuver himself into a go-between between us and the Soviet Union.

The President: How will he bring it up?

Kissinger: He will say he is going to the Soviet Union and can he carry your views? You can say you will give Wilson your views, but you think we should convey our views directly to the Soviet Union.

He's bugging us to have five at the meeting.

The President: Isn't a smaller group better? At least for the first meeting?

Kissinger: I think so. We can decide the numbers at the second meeting later.

On SALT, if you can say we want it to succeed and maintain flexibility. Brezhnev has said he is committed to a SALT agreement next summer.

The President: I feel strongly on that.

There was supposed to be a Pastore meeting yesterday. Schlesinger came over yesterday to talk about it. [More on nuclear weapons.]

Kissinger: Schlesinger is to the left of us on everything but SALT.

The President: Brown was terrible and Schlesinger wasn't much better.



Kissinger: If the NSC system is to work, Defense has to do the papers. There's no DPRC.

The President: Let's revitalize that organization.

[Discussed budget.]

Kissinger: There is still trouble with Nat Davis. I feel strongly about it.

The President: If he is qualified, go with it.

Kissinger: The NAC and Luns. On NAC, I would like to wait a couple of weeks. We may have to hold the Spring Ministerial here.

✓ P/R 29 Jan 75

Wednesday
9:28 - 10:25 AM

P Speaker asked if he + Rhoda could go to China over
spring vacation

K Probably

Greek + Turks have a good & meet some in Paris.

As you say?

P Yes. Could we announce? It would help a lot.

K Next week. It is clear + Greeks are relying
totally on us. Things are going slowly because
of T govt site. We will have Farnaguetto
after French refugees, & maybe airport. We
need a ^{united} ~~French~~ & English issue - told G the world of free
press + they should press I.C.T. That depends it
for now.

P I notice Makarios is playing w/ S U

K Yes, he trying to utilize it. But Cong - put E civil
ant. Goutis ^{US Galt} ~~paraphrase~~

P Did you see ad in paper today.

K (Reads) It says 40,000 T troops. They say
not more than 27,000. Maybe we can react.
If we don't get ~~see~~ Feb 5 lifted, I think T will
completely stall.

The Portuguese thing is completely exposed - Soviet/
Const rallies

French want someone here to talk about new
crop. If we do it, I have to talk to Schlo about
passing it carefully. No way to guarantee
in this climate it won't get out. Some we can
do, ~~no~~ ^{no} ~~unilateral~~ ^{unilateral} ~~guidance~~ ^{guidance} is difficult. We
could - one that to best. You will have to deal
w/ Brits (Zindlerhard). French don't want ~~to~~
to know. Since it's not finalized, you are
right for Wilson visit, but sometimes you



Break w/ Schles

...
must decide what to tell them.

P How long will this take

K Depends on how well we can control Schles.
But we want to get something fast

P Absolutely. We want help on energy copy.

K They want help on MRC (they not going M/R) guidance, - - - a 5 page list

P As long as we stay away from workbooks we are OK w/ Brits?

Handing
out

K You can tell them we have talked to them about handing + controls + control security

P It is OK if we do it slowly.

K On Pak side, even State is moving around to Pak aid, on grounds of equity, help w/ PRC, not too much damage w/ India, + if we concentrate on defensive course it bearable.

Byrond has much ^{unreliability} ~~touching~~, very ^{unreliability} ~~unreliability~~.
But he has no negatives. Mansfield + McGovern reserve judgement. See Hamilton for it, Scott also.
I will send a study.

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K Wilson visit. He will try to get a close relationship w/ you. That costs nothing. But he will try to maneuver into a go - but not + S U.

P How will he bring it up?

K He will say he going to SCU + can be energy



* Berg letter been sched
... PRC trip proposed

your mins. you can say you will give
where you miss but you think we should
convey our mins directly to SC.

Rivins his buying for 5 at mtg

P Don't smaller group better. at least for 1st mtg?

* K I think so. We can decide that at some mtg
later.

On Salt, if you don't say we want it to
succeed + extra flexibility. Berg has said he
consent to Salt agreement next summer.

P I feel strongly on that.

* There was supposed to be a Postwar mtg yesterday
Schles came over yesterday to talk about it.
(more or less agenda)

K Schles is to report on everything but SALT.

P Brown was terrible. Schles wasn't much better

K If the NSC system ^{is to} ~~will~~ work, Defense has to
~~do~~ do a program. No DPRC

P Let's minimize that argument.
(Budget)

K Still trouble w/ Nat Davis. I feel strongly about it.

P If he is qualified, go w/ it.

* K NAC / Lens. On NAC second what we want
P at a couple of weeks. We may have to start
hold Spring Unstructured here.

