

The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: “NSC Meeting, 6/27/1975” of the National Security Adviser’s NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 09185

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Talking Paper
RECEIVER'S NAME Henry Kissinger
TITLE Talking Points for Sec. Kissinger
National Security Council Meeting on
Angola
CREATION DATE 06/27/1975
VOLUME 4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031200020
COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER 2
FOLDER TITLE NSC Meeting, 6/27/75
DATE WITHDRAWN 02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET

sanitized; NSC ser 6/12/00
dal 2/25/01
sanitized

SECRET-XGDS

TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON ANGOLA

(Friday - June 27, 1975)

1. We have important but by no means vital interests in Angola. American investment there is presently estimated at \$400 million, of which \$300 million represents the Gulf Oil investment in important petroleum reserves in Cabinda, an exclave of Angola. Angola is rich in other minerals and agricultural potential. It has a strategic importance because of its location along the sea and air lines of communication between the United States East Coast and the Indian Ocean. Lack of US access to port and airfield facilities in most of the other nearby countries heightens this strategic importance.
2. In a larger context, instability in Angola would create instability in neighboring states in which we have important interests, such as Zaire. Instability in Angola would also increase the resistance to change by the white southern African states of Rhodesia and South Africa. A Soviet-dominated Angola could be seen as a defeat for US policy.
3. Our principal objectives in Angola then are: to contain the present conflict in Angola and to foster a peaceful transition to an independent Angola that is stable and that follows a policy of cooperation and friendship with the United States.
4. In the current situation we are faced with considerable instability and doubt about the future of Angola. It appears that Neto may have a distinct advantage at the present by his superior position in Luanda and certainly he is getting significant assistance from the Soviets and other communist states.
5. Our current policy is one of observing the situation. Our only active involvement in recent months has been some political support for Holden Roberto and we have pending in the Forty Committee recommendations for similar assistance for non-violent purposes for Jonas Savimbi.

SECRET-XGDS

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
 With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
 E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (C)

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

NSC *ltr* 4/12/00 - mi 98-35 #13By *dal* NARA, Date *2/28/01*

6. I believe, Mr. President, that at a minimum we should engage in a diplomatic effort on all fronts to calm the situation. We would seek to:
 - reduce the flow of Soviet, Yugoslav and other foreign arms to the MPLA and thus strengthen the position of FNLA and UNITA.
 - encourage Portugal to exert authority in Angola firmly and impartially; and
 - improve the chances of the liberation groups reaching an agreement on cooperation,
 - enlist the assistance of, and support efforts by, African states and others to seek a peaceful solution,
 - encourage cooperation between Roberto and Savimbi.
7. We must recognize, of course, that our leverage is limited particularly with regard to the Soviets and Portuguese.
8. Some of the steps we might take under this option could include:
 - an effort in support of, or together with, interested Africans (e.g., Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria), to seek to persuade Portugal to maintain its full troop strength (24, 000) in Angola until or preferably, beyond the scheduled February 1976 withdrawal date. The Portuguese would, of course, be difficult to persuade.
 - concurrently support African efforts to assure Portugal's neutrality towards the three liberation groups and to enlist its cooperation in limiting the arms flow into Angola.
 - encourage interested Africans (e.g., Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Tunisia -- all of whom are FNLA and/or UNITA supporters) to seek Soviet reduction of arms support to MPLA.
 - directly but privately request the USSR to reduce its support of MPLA, noting reduction of Zaire's support of FNLA and possibly offering to seek reduction of PRC support of FNLA. As with Portugal, our ability to bring this off is severely limited.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library



- urge Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria and other interested African states to take the lead in developing an OAU consensus to seek an end to foreign arms aid to the Angolan liberation movements, including seeking to persuade Congo to discourage transshipment of arms through Brazzaville.
9. If these diplomatic efforts fail where do we go? Do we fall back on a posture of neutrality, or become more actively involved, perhaps, as President Mobutu has suggested to Sheldon Vance, through a third party.
10. The implications of neutrality are a possible Neto victory, increased chances for heavy Soviet influence in independent Angola, continued instability in Angola beyond independence, an unstable Zaire, and a general destabilization of the area. We would probably see another country added to the list of those that deny us access to ports and airfields for our Navy and Air Force. In addition to enjoying such access, the Soviets might be given military facilities.
11. Neutrality would:
- enable us to avoid a potentially risky and expensive involvement in a situation whose outcome may well be beyond our control.
 - protect us from some international criticism.
 - be more palatable to Congress and the US public than an activist approach.
 - avoid tying us to either FNLA or UNITA, groups whose chances of success and future policies are in doubt.
 - avoid further antagonizing the MPLA in the event that it should play an important role in a future Angolan government.
12. Instead of adopting a policy of neutrality, we could actively support the FNLA and/or UNITA. At this juncture, we could not realistically consider any direct, overt military support, such as arms shipments or commitment of US personnel. Any assistance would have to be covert, and military assistance would have to be channeled through third parties.
13. If chosen, this option could be carried out by the following courses of action:

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library



- Provide covert financial support to Roberto.
- Urge Zaire, Zambia and Tanzania to press Roberto and Savimbi to resolve their differences and work together to avoid being vanquished separately by the MPLA.
- Adopt a deliberate policy of bringing UNITA up to comparable strength with FNLA and MPLA, while encouraging Savimbi to develop a close working relationship with Roberto and the FNLA.
- Specifically, extend financial support to Savimbi in amounts necessary to improve: (a) his mobility (e.g., purchase of vehicles or aircraft); (b) his military strength (e.g., purchase of weapons, transport, and equipment); and (c) his political and propaganda capability (e.g., purchase of a newspaper and/or radio station).
- Encourage Zambia, and perhaps Zaire also, to support a policy of building up UNITA.
- Facilitate availability of non-US and (preferably African, e.g. Zambian, Zairian) cadres to train recruits for Savimbi's military forces.

14. The Soviet reaction could be an acceleration of its commitments, and while our support would make the Soviet task harder, we do not enjoy the same freedom to raise levels of support as do the Soviets and still keep it covert.
15. Of course, as our support increased in scope, the chances of exposure would increase. In such event, US support could become a significant political issue with widespread negative domestic and international repercussions.
16. One of the most viable options at this juncture, in my opinion, would be to extend aid to President Mobutu as an offset to enable him to provide military and other support to Holden and Savimbi. From his conversations with Sheldon Vance, Mobutu appears prepared to cooperate with us. An important side benefit would be improved US-Zaire relations.
17. We would not necessarily want to funnel all our efforts through Mobutu. Particularly we might want to establish a direct relationship with Savimbi, as is currently pending before the Forty Committee.



Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET/XGDS

WASHINGTON

2999

MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Friday, June 27, 1975
2:30 p.m. (60 minutes)
The Cabinet Room

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To review options for United States policy toward Angola, particularly for the period between now and November 11, 1975, when Angola is due to become independent.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. BACKGROUND

The approaching independence of Angola and the struggle for power among competing groups make it important to determine with precision U. S. interests and objectives, Angola's political movements, external influences, and options and issues.

US interests and objectives. The United States has important but not vital interests in Angola. American investment there is presently estimated at \$400 million, of which \$300 million is in the Gulf Oil investment in important petroleum reserves in Cabinda, an exclave of Angola. Angola is rich in other minerals and agricultural potential. It has a strategic importance because of its location along the sea and air lines of communication between the United States East Coast and the Indian Ocean. Lack of U. S. access to port and airfield facilities in most of the other nearby countries heightens this strategic importance.

Instability in Angola could endanger stability in neighboring states in which we have important interests, such as Zaire. Instability in Angola would also increase the resistance to change by the white southern African states of Rhodesia and South Africa. A Soviet dominated Angola could be a definite threat to its neighbors.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

SECRET-XGDS

CLASS. AUTH. BY: General Scowcroft

MR 98-35, #12 NSC, 4/13/99

By KBH NARA, Date 7/11/00



ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

Our principal objectives in Angola then are: to contain the present conflict in Angola and to foster a peaceful transition to an independent Angola which is stable and which follows a policy of cooperation and friendship with the United States.

Angola's political movements. There are three political movements in Angola -- the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

- The FNLA, whose leader is Holden Roberto, has the backing of Zaire, and its stronghold is in the north of the country. The strength of the FNLA continues to suffer from Holden's refusal to move from Zaire to Angola to take direct control of FNLA activities.
- The MPLA, whose leader is Agostinho Neto, has a strong Marxist strain, is provided arms by the Soviet Union and other communist countries, and enjoys some support from Portugal. It has had some success in building an image as a national multi-racial, rather than tribal, organization, and its stronghold is in Angola's capital of Luanda and its environs.
- UNITA is the least powerful of the three movements but its leader, Jonas Savimbi, has emerged as the most active and politically skillful of Angola's nationalist leaders. He is supported by neighboring Zambia, Tanzania and Zaire, as a compromise candidate to assume leadership of an independent Angola. So far, UNITA has made an effort to stay above the military clashes between the other two parties.

Internally, Savimbi enjoys wide popularity, based on tribal affiliation, in the prosperous central highlands and the south, an area constituting about one-third of Angola's population.

In recent fighting, the MPLA has bested its rival, the FNLA, in numerous clashes in Luanda, northern Angola, and Cabinda. The result has been a tendency for all three movements to entrench themselves in the territories where they have majority support.



The leaders of the three movements met last week in Kenya in an effort to halt the fighting and prepare for elections and independence. The communique from that meeting closely parallels the original agreement of January 1975 establishing a transitional government. Initial intelligence reports make it doubtful whether the peaceful, orderly thrust of the most recent communique will be implemented. The communique itself implicitly recognizes there will be continuing problems. There is a proviso that in case there are difficulties in implementing steps of the agreement designed to lead to elections, there will be a new summit meeting in Angola to adopt another means of transferring power. Since the meeting adjourned, there have been renewed incidents of violence between the MPLA and the FNLA forces.

External influences.

- Zaire has major interests in the future of Angola. It has a 1500 mile frontier with Angola and there are some 750,000 refugees of the Angolan tribe of Bakongo in Zaire. Zaire's important copper ore exports are transported by rail to sea through Angola. President Mobutu has backed the FNLA since the latter's formation, and he regards an Angola dominated by the MPLA's Agostinho Neto as intolerable.

Currently in Kinshasa for discussions of the problems regarding our bilateral relations, our former Ambassador to Zaire, Sheldon Vance, has, at my instructions discussed Angola with Mobutu, seeking his analysis and plans.

President Mobutu said he had reached an understanding with Portugal on mutual restraints with regard to assistance to the Movements. But he said that the Soviets continue to pour arms and other assistance into Angola for Neto. His own ability to continue to aid Holden is restricted by his own low stock of weapons and a scarcity of money. He explained it would be very grave for Zaire if the Soviets controlled Angola, as they would if Neto became master of the country.

Mobutu does not have any confidence that compromise agreements among the three Movements will work. In his judgment what is needed is to bring up Holden's and Savimbi's military strength to balance off Neto's. Holden and Savimbi are now working well



well together behind the scenes, but it is unfortunate that Holden continues to refuse to return to Angola. Savimbi might prove to be the person to back for the presidency.

Mobutu said it was obvious the US could not help with direct assistance to Holden and Savimbi, but it might be able to do so through Zaire. Also, the Angolan refugees in Zaire (who are Holden's supporters) should return to Angola. This would not be a difficult operation if Holden could get the kind of assistance he needs to effect such an operation.

- Zambia, which has interests in Angola equal to those of Zaire, and Tanzania can be expected to continue to work for a peaceful settlement in Angola. Both recently have become disenchanted with Neto and have switched support to Savimbi.
- The Peoples Republic of the Congo has focused its assistance on the MPLA. It sees the MPLA, with which it shares a Marxist orientation, as the most sympathetic of the Angolan groups.
- Portugal. The more moderate leaders in Portugal favor Savimbi; the more radical ones favor the MPLA. The FNLA has virtually no support among Portuguese leaders. Despite covert backing of the MPLA in the past, in so far as Lisbon now has a policy, it is one of impartiality between the factions. This attitude reflects Lisbon's awareness of its diminishing ability to affect events and its desire to be on good terms with independent Angola no matter who is in charge.
- The Soviet Union has backed the MPLA since it was founded. While we do not know the exact quantity of military assistance the Soviets are providing the MPLA, this assistance is of major significance, and the Soviets could be expected to play a major role in an MPLA-dominated Angola.
- The Chinese, partly in response to a request from President Mobutu, began aiding the FNLA in 1974. This assistance has been relatively small and while the PRC is undoubtedly concerned about the Soviet presence, it may wish to avoid being drawn deeper into an uncertain situation where its interests are limited.



- Any OAU or UN interference in Angola are strongly opposed, at present, by the MPLA and the FNLA. The OAU is divided in its support of the liberation movements and will be extremely reluctant to intervene directly. It is also unlikely that the UN would seek an expanded political role without explicit approval from the three Angolan parties, and at least tacit approval of the OAU. Increased UN humanitarian and economic assistance to Angola always remains a possibility.

The options and issues

- The US might promote a peaceful solution through diplomatic measures. There is general consensus that at least as a beginning the US needs to make an effort to promote a peaceful solution through diplomatic measures. The objectives would be to reduce the flow of foreign arms to the MPLA, encourage Portugal to exert authority in Angola firmly and impartially, enlist the cooperation of African states, and others, to seek a peaceful solution and encourage cooperation between Holden and Savimbi.
- If this diplomatic effort were to fail, we would then be faced with a question of whether we should adopt a neutral attitude toward the flow of events or step up our involvement by active support of the FNLA and/or UNITA, perhaps through third parties.
- Neutrality would enable us to avoid a potentially risky and expensive involvement in a situation whose outcome may well be beyond our control; would protect us from some international criticism; and would be least controversial domestically.

Active support of the FNLA and/or UNITA could enable us to check the momentum of leftist forces and to facilitate assertion of control by pro-Western moderates but would involve considerable risks. Assistance would have to be covert or channeled through third parties. We would be involving ourselves in a match with the Soviets, yet we do not enjoy the same freedom to raise the level of support as do the Soviets.

In addition to our substantive interest in the outcome, playing an active role would demonstrate that events in Southeast Asia have not lessened our determination to protect our interests. In sum, we face an opportunity -- albeit with substantial risks --



to preempt the probable loss to Communism of a key developing country at a time of great uncertainty over our will and determination to remain the preeminent leader and defender of freedom in the West.


Attached at Tab B is a memorandum prepared by an inter-agency group amplifying the options and issues. At Tab C is a memorandum from CIA on Portugal's role in Angola. Tab D presents an analytic summary of the interagency response to NSSM 224 on United States Policy Toward Angola.

B. Participants: - List is at Tab A.

C. Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject, will be announced. There will be a White House photographer.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. The purpose of this meeting is to review the situation on Angola and the options for US policy, particularly for the period until independence in November of this year, and immediately thereafter.
2. I want to be sure we are clear how the situation in Angola affects United States interests and objectives there and in the area as a whole.
3. I would like to start by having Bill Colby lay out the situation for us.
4. Henry, would you give us a rundown of the principal issues and options for US policy.
5. The situation in Angola is complex and our ability to control or even influence the outcome is obviously limited.
6. We certainly should make every effort diplomatically to bring about a peaceful outcome which would be in the US national interest.
7. The outcome in Angola is of importance to us. I will seriously consider the options we have discussed today and, as the situation and our ongoing efforts proceed, will be making decisions as to other actions we may wish to pursue.



Attachments

- Tab A - List of Participants
- Tab B - Interagency Group memo on options and issues
- Tab C - CIA's memo on Portugal's role in Angola
- Tab D - Analytical summary of interagency response to NSSM 224,
"US Policy Toward Angola"
- Tab E - Kinshasa Telegram (5605) reporting conversation with
President Mobutu on Angola
- Tab F - Kinshasa Telegram (5644) reporting a followup conversation
with President Mobutu on this subject.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 09186

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Minute
CREATOR'S NAME Harold Horan?
RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft
TITLE Minutes, NSC Meeting, 6/27/75
CREATION DATE 06/27/1975
VOLUME 8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031200020
COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER 2
FOLDER TITLE NSC Meeting, 6/27/75
DATE WITHDRAWN 02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET

*sanitized MR 98-37 - NSC Ltr 6/12/00
dal 3/28/01*

sanitized - 10/22/03

09186

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (2999)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MINUTES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: Friday, June 27, 1975
TIME: 2:30 p.m. to 3:20 p.m.
PLACE: Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT: Angola.

Principals

The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby.

Other Attendees

State: Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll
Defense: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
White House: Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
NSC: Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Harold E. Horan.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)



ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

me 98-37 # 14; NSC etc 6/12/00

By *dal* NARA, Date *3/28/01*

The President: Bill [to Colby], will you brief us on Angola and related problems.

Mr. Colby: Yes, sir. [Briefed - as attached.]

The President: Cabinda was a part of the Portuguese territories? [This was in reference to a point in Mr. Colby's brief as he described Cabinda.]

Mr. Colby: Yes, sir.

The President: What are the white areas within the borders of Angola?

Mr. Colby: These are essentially tribal, not military areas. These are additional tribes and I just chose [pointing on the chart] to mention those three. They have different languages and are different socially.

The President: Did the Portuguese do much in combatting illiteracy? Are there many educated blacks?

Mr. Colby: The Portuguese were not forceful in this area. The literacy rate is between 10-15 percent.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, until the coup, the Portuguese had no intention of leaving their territories in Africa and didn't organize them for independence.

Secretary Schlesinger: Most of the educated classes are in Luanda and support the MPLA.

The President: What is the white population?

Mr. Colby: Three to four hundred thousand.

The President: Out of a total population of how many?

Mr. Colby: About 5.7 million.



The President: Are these mostly white Portuguese?

Mr. Colby: Yes.

The President: Now, Henry, can you give us the options?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I will be reasonably brief. This is an area where no one can be sure of the judgments. I do question the judgment that control of the capital is not of importance. The history of Africa has shown that a nation's only focal point is the capital, and whoever has the capital has a claim on international support. In the Congo civil war, the reason we came out on top is because we never lost Leopoldville. If Neto can get Luanda, and drive the others out, he will have a power base, and gradually gain support of other Africans.

Mr. Colby: I agree, except to note the importance of the (Benguella) railway and Zaire and Zambia's need for it.

The President: What is the name of the city at the end of the railway?

Mr. Colby: Lobito. There is, of course, always the possibility for fragmentation.

Secretary Kissinger: Soviet arms shipments have reversed the situation. Sheldon Vance has just come back from talking with Mobutu, who has stressed the change in the balance of power. Portugal is tilting toward Neto, and the Soviets are putting important equipment, such as armed personnel carriers, into Neto's hands.

Our understanding from Vance is that this is one reason Mobutu is moving away from Roberto and wants a coalition.


An interagency effort has developed options, none of which I am in wild agreement with. The first is neutrality -- stay out and let nature take its course. This would enable us to avoid a costly involvement in a situation that may be beyond our control; protect us from some international criticism; avoid tying us to any group; and avoid further antagonizing the MPLA. The probable outcome would be that Neto would establish a dominant position. Mobutu might try to go with Savimbi, or adjust to reality; Angola would go in a leftward direction;



The President: Is there a specific proposal from the group on grants in the arms area? I don't want to make a decision now, but I didn't see any proposals in the briefing papers.

Secretary Kissinger: The Forty Committee has met twice to discuss the situation. The first meeting involved only money, but the second included some arms package. I recommend a working group make a more systematic study of this option and return to you.

.....



.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

The President: At dinner he was very forceful on this. He said that it was important to get his man in first, and then he will win the election. I asked him if there were not going to be elections, and he said yes, and that was why it was important to put Savimbi in first and then he would win.

Secretary Kissinger: Kaunda was giving the President a lesson in political science. [Laughter.]

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....


.....

.....

.....

Secretary Kissinger: But the reverse of that is that if we don't do something they would be suppressed.

The President: Once the Popular Movement takes over you can write it off.



Secretary Schlesinger: We might wish to encourage the distintegration of Angola. Cabinda in the clutches of Mobutu would mean far greater security of the petroleum resources.

Mr. President, may I follow up -- if we do something, we must have some confidence that we can win, or we should stay neutral. Roberto is not a strong horse. The fact that he stays in the Congo suggests he doesn't have the tenacity to win.

The President: It seems to me that doing nothing is unacceptable. As for diplomatic efforts, it is naive to think that's going to happen, and the proposals on Portugal sound amateurish.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Mr. Clements: I agree with this. Doing something now and keeping the two parties afloat may well be encouraging Mobutu. Whatever happens in November is not final, and it's important to keep Roberto and Savimbi viable and keep the options open. Give Mobutu some help and let him channel it.

Secretary Kissinger: In the first instance we could activate Mobutu and inform Kaunda.

The President: He [Kaunda] was talking at dinner about getting together with someone. Who was that?

Secretary Kissinger: With Savimbi and Mobutu.

The President: Let's get some options prepared, Bill [to Colby]. When can you have them?


Mr. Colby: By mid-week.



Secretary Schlesinger:
 The FNLA has a weak capacity to enforce discipline
 and we should look to see whether the Congolese (Zairians) can
 be used for instilling discipline. And then there's the question
 of the degree to which we can bring Roberto and Savimbi together.

The President: Those are some of the things that have to be
 in the study. I think we need something for a week from Monday,
 so let's set something up.

#



27 June 1975

DCI BRIEFING FOR
27 JUNE NSC MEETING

ANGOLA

I. The current situation in Angola is highly unstable. Rivalry between contending nationalist groups has featured increasing violence, with each group trying to stake out territory and gain military superiority before independence on November 11 and final Portuguese withdrawal by next February.

A. The fighting over the past few months has been between the two largest groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola led by Holden Roberto. A third group in the picture is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi.

1. In action early this month Neto's Popular Movement pushed the National Front

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

MR03-12 #3: CIA-44 6/18/03
dal NARA Date 10/22/03

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION



out of some areas north and east of Luanda, thus blocking the Front's supply lines into the capital.

2. Although there were some clashes in Luanda this month, the two remain essentially in a standoff there.

a. Military control of Luanda by either group would necessarily not determine control of or influence over the rest of Angola, particularly in the rich agricultural areas or along all the main transportation routes.

3. Roberto's National Front still remains strongly entrenched in large areas of northern Angola where it has substantial tribal support.

B. New fighting can erupt at any time:

-- There is a continuing buildup of the military forces of all three nationalist groups;

-- Heavier weapons -- mortars and bazookas -- are being introduced into Angola by the USSR and Zaire;

-- Armed and undisciplined civilians are in Luanda on behalf of the Popular Movement;



- Neither major group is able or willing to exercise effective control over its own forces;
 - All three groups are initiating military operations in parts of Angola yet untouched by the fighting where no single group has an edge; and
 - Politicking for the October elections for a constituent assembly will increase tensions.
- C. The oil-rich enclave of Cabinda remains a tinderbox. The Popular Movement has a slight military edge there, but both other groups also have forces active.
1. All three want the enclave to remain a part of an independent Angola.
 2. The picture is complicated by the presence of a factionalized separatist movement supported by both Zaire and Congo.
 3. Both countries have endorsed Cabindan independence, and any intensification of the fighting there could bring outside intervention either directly or in support of the separatists.

II. The transitional government installed last January has proved unworkable.

A. It is constructed on a system of checks and balances, but in the current climate members of the three liberation groups, as government officials, concentrate on the competition between them.

1. Portuguese officials are not effective -- they are caught in the middle.
2. The liberation groups have not honored their commitment to establish an integrated national army as called for in the independence accord.

B. The 24,000 Portuguese troops are mostly kept in Luanda. They will intervene in the fighting only to protect the whites.

1. The Portuguese have in effect abandoned most of the countryside to the nationalists, and are already crating some of their heavy equipment for shipment to Lisbon.
2. Portuguese forces are scheduled to begin withdrawal in October and are to be totally removed by next February.



3. There is nothing in the independence accord to prevent the Portuguese from withdrawing as fast as possible after October.
- C. Lisbon's policy insofar as it has one, is neutrality among the factions.
1. Portugal wants to protect its important agricultural and mining interests.
 2. The Portuguese also want to be on good terms with whoever ends up in charge after independence, but their ability to affect events is diminishing.
 3. At this point, the Portuguese leaders' major concern is to prevent civil war, which could have serious political repercussions in Lisbon. They hope to avoid, for example, an increase in the number of white refugees returning to Portugal who would add to the turbulence there.
 4. Thus, Lisbon can be expected to expend considerable diplomatic effort to reduce tension in Angola, and would certainly welcome similar efforts by interested third countries.



III. The role of outside powers in supplying military assistance to the nationalist groups remains a key factor.

- A. The Soviet Union has been a long time supporter of Neto's Popular Movement, providing both arms and cash during the years of the insurgency against the Portuguese.
1. We are unable to determine how much Soviet military aid is now reaching the Movement, but it helped the Movement score some of its recent gains.
 2. Most of the aid is being channeled through Congo.
 3. Soviet long-range goals in Angola are unclear, but in the short run Moscow supports the Popular Movement in a situation where all three nationalist groups are viable contenders for power.
- B. Peking has had some association with all of the liberation movements in the past, but the Chinese are most closely associated with Roberto's National Front.
1. They have supplied military equipment as well as some training. Some 100



Chinese advisers may now be in Zaire working with the Front.

2. Chinese assistance has helped the Front to establish its forces firmly in northern Angola.
- C. Roberto has had little success in finding assistance elsewhere.
1. Zaire's President Mobutu has loose family ties with Roberto and has long supported him and the Front with funds, arms, and training. He has also allowed Roberto to maintain his headquarters in Zaire.
 - a. Recently, however, Mobutu has cut back his assistance to the Front, in part because of his government's serious financial problems and because he is cooling toward Roberto.
 - b. Mobutu is alarmed over the Front's recent setbacks and feels Roberto's position has been damaged because he refuses to leave Zaire and go to Luanda.



- c. Mobutu now believes Jonas Savimbi of the National Union should be the primary figure in an independent Angolan government.
 - 2. Mobutu, of course, has some serious concerns of his own.
 - a. Zaire is experiencing a severe foreign exchange shortage because of the low price of copper on the international market.
 - b. He has now privately acknowledged that the US was not involved in a recent coup plot, as he alleged, but may remain suspicious for some time.
- IV. The prospects for Angola between now and November are poor. Further violence could take place and edge the territory closer to civil war. At best, Angola will lurch along and become independent without a strong leader.
 - A. The constituent assembly scheduled to be elected in October is supposed to select a head of government of an independent Angola, but new violence could force a postponement.



B. At a meeting in Kenya last week Savimbi, Roberto, and Neto reached what amounts to an uncertain truce that merely postpones a confrontation.

1. They "agreed" to a number of measures, such as disarming civilians, designed to prevent new fighting. Similar agreements in the past have failed, however.
2. All three contenders seem to recognize the inconclusiveness of the pact. They state that they will meet again to try another form for the transfer of power if the elections are not held.

V. After independence, it now appears that no single liberation group in Angola will have the power to impose its own ideology as national policy.

A. If civil war is averted and the three liberation groups establish some kind of coalition, the government's policies probably will be a delicate mix of the philosophies of the two major groups.

B. Both major groups want a non-aligned foreign policy and will seek to maintain some balance between East and West.




1. The Popular Movement, if dominant, would establish a high-centralized and authoritarian one-party regime with a pronounced socialist orientation and close ties to the communist world, with US ties kept to a minimum.
 2. The National Front would probably seek to establish a highly nationalistic and personalized regime. Because of the Front's rather narrow political base, an FNLA state might be highly coercive. The Front would likely accept development and/or military aid from the West as well as the East.
- C. Both groups can be expected to nationalize Angola's major productive enterprises, but the Front probably would be more hospitable toward selective Western investment than the Popular Movement.
- D. As long as an independent Angola does not restrict access to its transportation facilities, good relations with its neighbors Zaire and Zambia probably can be maintained.
1. An independent Angola will give moral and political support to black nationalists in



Rhodesia and South Africa. It would probably not become immediately involved in supporting insurgencies there, however, because of distance and the dominant role now being played by Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique in seeking a settlement with the Smith regime.

- VI. If, on the other hand, protracted civil war develops, Congo and Zaire could be brought into the conflict.
- A. Civil war could also convince either one, or both to move into Cabinda in an attempt to annex or neutralize the enclave.
 - B. Continued fighting in Angola would exacerbate the confrontation between black and white Africa. It would intensify the fears of Rhodesia and South Africa concerning black majority rule.
 - 1. South Africa is particularly concerned that a communist or unfriendly regime in Angola might support guerrilla activity in Namibia.
 - 2. A hostile or unstable Angola would increase South African pressure on us to support its domestic and international policies. This



would complicate our efforts to promote peaceful solutions to Southern Africa's racial problems.

3. South Africa does not seem to be planning any action to counter this threat.

