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January 25, 1975.

National Security Decision Memorandum 283

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The U. S. Commissioner, Standing Consultative
Commission

SUBJECT: Instructions for U. S. Commissioner, SALT
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), for
SCC Session on Compliance Issues

The President has approved the following instructions for the SCC
Session on SALT Compliance Issues.

The U. S. Commissioner should raise the following issues along the
lines set forth below.

Launch Control Facilities

There are certain new large silos under construction in the Western
USSR [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The construction of additional silos capable of
launching ICBMs is prohibited by the Interim Agreement. The number
of such silos could eventually be very large.

The Soviet Union has informed the United States that these silos are
intended to be used as launch control facilities. However, there are
already launch control facilities in existence at the sites where these
new silos are being constructed.

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Classified by Henry A. [REDACTED]

NSC [REDACTED] 6/12/00 F98-437

By dal, NARA, Date 4/3/01

[REDACTED] In particular, we note that these silos are large enough to hold an ICBM, have headworks, and have a rapidly opening door large enough to permit the launching of an ICBM.

The U.S. is seriously concerned over the eventual number and capabilities of these new large silos. We believe this issue could be resolved in a mutually acceptable fashion by (1) dismantling or destroying existing launch control facilities at each site within six months after the completion of each new silo launch control facility, and (2) in the future, equipping any such silos with doors or coverings of a type which would preclude the launch of missiles.

Concealment Measures

U.S. national technical means of verification have revealed numerous examples within the USSR of concealment in connection with several of its strategic weapons programs. Activities of this nature have been observed at a variety of locations. Examples of these activities are:

(1) Vehicles, sections of roads, launch pads, and various structures in the vicinity of ballistic missile test areas have been covered to conceal or obscure activities in such areas.

(2) Extensive tent-like structures have been observed at a ballistic missile test site covering a revetment and concealing equipment.

(3) A large structure has been constructed over a missile holding area at an ABM test center.

(4) Ballistic missile submarine hull sections have been covered, impeding monitoring by national technical means.

The U.S. is concerned about the expanding pattern of concealment measures being undertaken in the USSR. Such activities undermine the viability of existing arms control agreements and could create a major impediment to the verification by national technical means of present and future arms control agreements. Thus, the U.S. believes that the Soviet side should cease these concealment activities.

Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs)

The U. S. Commissioner should emphasize the importance the U. S. attaches to the distinction made in the Interim Agreement between light and heavy ICBMs. In particular, he should note the following:

(1) We have observed that the volume of the SS-X-19 is "significantly greater" than the volume of the SS-11 within the meaning of the United States statement of May 26, 1972.

(2) The distinction between light and heavy ICBMs will continue to be important for the agreement the two sides have undertaken to conclude in 1975.

(3) It is our view that any missile of volume or throw weight greater than the SS-X-19 must be considered a "heavy" ICBM.

The U. S. Commissioner should seek Soviet reaction or agreement to the foregoing definition of a "heavy" ICBM.

Other Instructions

The U. S. Commissioner should inform his counterpart that the U. S. Government is not accusing or implying that the USSR is in violation with existing SALT agreements. The issues being raised by the U. S. in the SCC involve questions concerning compliance and related situations which we consider ambiguous. The purpose of raising these issues is to resolve these questions, and, as necessary, to bring about corrective action.

With regard to the environmental shelters being used in conjunction with the Minuteman Silo Upgrade Program, the President has decided that in the context of Soviet cooperation in reducing the ambiguity of the situations described above, the U. S. will eliminate the use of shelters which impede Soviet verification by national technical means. Therefore, in response to Soviet statements on this issue, the U. S. Commissioner should state that the U. S. program for silo hardening involves the use of eight portable aluminum shelters which are strictly for environmental purposes, and that these shelters were not intended to provide concealment. (U. S. Commissioner may

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provide additional specific information regarding the nature, purpose, and use of these shelters.) If the Soviets propose that the U.S. take any action in regard to these MM shelters, the U.S. Commissioner may state that in the context of arrangements to eliminate other compliance ambiguities, the U.S. will be prepared to modify its use of these shelters; the Soviet proposal will be promptly reported to the U.S. Government; and that he will respond either later in the current SCC session or early in the SCC session scheduled to begin March 11, 1975.

If the Soviets raise any other U.S. activities, the U.S. Commissioner should listen to their concern, request additional clarification if appropriate, and state that the Soviet concern will be promptly reported to the U.S. Government and that a U.S. response will be provided later in the current SCC session or in the SCC session scheduled to begin March 11, 1975. (U.S. Commissioner should not engage in any discussion of such Soviet concerns, beyond seeking additional clarifications, prior to receipt of additional instructions.)

This session should last approximately two weeks. In the event that these compliance issues are not resolved during this session, the U.S. Commissioner should state that the U.S. will return to the unresolved issues no later than at the SCC session scheduled to begin March 11, 1975.

The President wishes to emphasize that, because of the sensitivity of these issues, every effort must be made to avoid unauthorized disclosures. Distribution of the NSDM should be limited to those with a clear need to know.


Henry A. Kissinger *pos*

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

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