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U.S. FOREIGN AID
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP*

(\$ in Billions)

| | Fiscal Year | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| | 1975 | | 1976 | | 1977 | |
| | <u>Request</u> | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Request</u> | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Request</u> | <u>Actual</u> |
| <u>Foreign Aid</u> | 7.5 | 5.1 | 8.3 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 6.1 |
| (Percent of GNP) | (0.51) | (0.35) | (0.51) | (0.42) | (0.37) | (0.33) |
| <u>Foreign Aid and Other Interna- tional Programs</u> | 8.3 | 5.8 | 9.1 | 7.4 | 11.1 | 8.9 |
| (Percent of GNP) | (0.57) | (0.40) | (0.57) | (0.46) | (0.60) | (0.49) |

* Gross National Product was \$1.45 trillion in 1975, \$1.61 trillion in 1976, and \$1.84 trillion in 1977.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(Budget Authority in \$ millions)

| | 1975 | | 1976 | | TQ | | 1977 | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | <u>Request</u> | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Request</u> | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Request</u> | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Request</u> | <u>Actual</u> |
| <u>Foreign Aid</u> | | | | | | | | |
| Military assistance | 2,591 | 1,379 | 1,813 | 1,188 | 64 | 173 | 1,207 | 1,012 |
| Foreign economic and financial assistance | <u>4,871</u> | <u>3,704</u> | <u>6,479</u> | <u>5,114</u> | <u>795</u> | <u>690</u> | <u>5,650</u> | <u>5,109</u> |
| Total | 7,462 | 5,083 | 8,292 | 6,302 | 859 | 863 | 6,857 | 6,121 |
| <u>Other International Programs</u> | | | | | | | | |
| Conduct of foreign affairs | 755 | 674 | 842 | 782 | 377 | 363 | 991 | 983 |
| Foreign information and exchange | 374 | 354 | 414 | 420 | 105 | 104 | 386 | 386 |
| International financial programs* (of which Export-Import Bank) | -50 | -50 | -50 | -50 | - | - | 3,298 | 1,966 |
| Offsetting receipts | <u>(2,986)*</u> | <u>(1,443)*</u> | <u>(2,913)*</u> | <u>(1,100)*</u> | <u>(616)*</u> | <u>(232)*</u> | <u>(3,348)*</u> | <u>(1,916)*</u> |
| Total | 811 | 715 | 836 | 690 | 368 | 353 | 4,211 | 2,808 |
| TOTAL | 8,273 | 5,798 | 9,128 | 7,392 | 1,227 | 1,216 | 11,068 | 8,929 |

*Export-Import Bank was off budget prior to 1977. In each year, Congress has enacted the program limitation requested by the Administration. The difference in budget authority between request and actual results from lower activity levels than anticipated.

FACT SHEET

U.S. Official Development Assistance

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a concept used by the OECD which includes all economic aid and excludes military assistance. Disbursements are net of repayments on loan principal. The United States is usually ranked toward the bottom among major donors measured by ODA as a percent of GNP.

| <u>Country</u> | <u>% of 1975 GNP</u> |
|----------------|----------------------|
| U.S. | 0.27 |
| England | 0.38 |
| Germany | 0.40 |
| France | 0.63 |
| Italy | 0.11 |
| Japan | 0.24 |
| Norway | 0.66 |
| Sweeden | 0.82 |
| Austria | 0.17 |

FACT SHEET

Military Personnel Costs

Generals and Admirals

- A total of 1158 General and Flag Officers are currently authorized.
- The direct cost of pay and allowances for these officers is approximately \$50 million per year.
- The total cost to maintain these officers (including all fringe benefits) is approximately \$63 million per year.

All Officers

- A total of 261,854 military officers are currently authorized.
- The direct cost of pay and allowances for these officers is approximately \$5.6 billion per year.
- The total compensation costs of these officers is \$6.9 billion per year.

Enlisted Personnel

- If the salaries of all enlisted personnel were reduced to the poverty level, the Federal Government would save \$8.6 billion.

10/4/76

WHO'S IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN POLICY

The best combination is a strong President and a strong Secretary of State. This is how it was with General Marshall and Dean Acheson under President Truman.

Henry Kissinger is one of the greatest Secretaries of State we have ever had, and I'm proud he is on my team.

Let's take the African policy: The Secretary and I spent two meetings on strategy before he left. He sent me one or two reports every day, and I saw him immediately after he returned.

In the last analysis, the President is accountable. That's how it should be -- whether a President negotiates or participates directly (as I did at Vladivostok, or the Economic Summits, or in my 125 meetings with foreign leaders) or whether a President makes the basic decisions and asks the Secretary of State to carry it out (as in the successful Middle East and African negotiations).

Some Democratic Presidents who thought they could be "their own Secretary of State" have gotten us into some of the worst disasters.



REBUTTAL ON SECRECY

My record in foreign policy is there for all to see.

After the Sinai Agreement, every single document was turned over to the foreign affairs committees of the Congress. There was fuller disclosure of that negotiation to the Congress than ever before.

There have been more White House meetings with Congressmen, more speeches and testimony by a Secretary of State, than at any time in the recent past.

Diplomacy can't be conducted without confidentiality during negotiations and Mr. Carter knows it. Who would negotiate on the delicate question of arms control, or the Middle East in the glare of TV cameras?

After all, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was not held in public and its proceedings weren't published for 30 years. Because that's the only way you can have free and candid discussion and negotiation.



Unilateral

-- I have ordered maximum security at US airports. This led to a marked reduction in hijacking attempts in US.

-- (The hijacking of the TWA plane did not in fact carry weapons onto the aircraft and this certainly was a major factor in the successful conclusion of that hijacking.)

-- I have established a special Task Force combining FBI, FAA, State, Defense and others to deal with:

- crises management, and
- promoting firm controls internationally.

-- I have increased the security of our missions overseas.

Charge:

When I become President, one of my first actions will be to open up Government and to stop excessive governmental secrecy. In particular, we must limit the classification of information within the Executive branch. Classification is not only anathema to our democratic principles, but is costly in terms of personnel and physical security systems.

Response:

These are admirable goals, and are ones upon which my Administration has already been working. But such generalities miss the point. There is obviously certain information of importance to our national security that must be protected. Classification of documents for other than actual national security reasons is already forbidden by Executive Order.

We have since 1972 reduced the number of officials authorized to classify information by some 75%, from nearly 60,000 individuals to less than 15,000.

Since 1972, nearly 190 million pages of official records have been declassified by the National Archives and millions more by the agencies and departments on their own.

In 1975, there were 228,507 fewer classification actions than in the year before.

We are actively seeking to prevent abuse not only in the classification system, but in our governmental intelligence programs as well. By Executive Order, I provided for the first comprehensive overhaul of our intelligence agencies since 19___. I have insured that past abuses cannot again take place while I am President.

My Administration has taken the actions which are needed here, and we will continue to do so.



10/2/76

FORD RECORD

I took office in a constitutional crisis at home. The world was watching to see if America could recover our self-confidence and remain the world's leader. We have done it.

- For the first time since Eisenhower, an American President can come before the people and say we are at peace; my goal is to keep it that way.
- I have reversed the dangerous trend of shrinking defense budgets.
- Our economy has led the world's economic recovery.
- We have strengthened our alliances -- in my NATO and Economic Summit meetings.
- We achieved a breakthrough in strategic arms limits at my meetings with Brezhnev in Vladivostok.
- I visited China and confirmed the durability of our new relationship.
- We reached a milestone Sinai agreement in the Middle East.
- We have undertaken a crucial role of mediation in southern Africa, to end crisis and racial war.
- We have a new relationship with the developing countries began in my Administration.
- At the UN we have spoken out forcefully for fairness and justice in that Organization.



FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

I think it is important for the American people to understand clearly what my foreign and defense policies are, what I propose for America over the next four years and the major differences between me and my opponent in this field. There is one basic overriding issue: Can we keep America at peace and make the world a safer and a better place?

My answer to that critical question is a ringing "yes." Now let me tell you in straight terms just what I mean and what I intend to do. The world of the next four years will be characterized by such developments as:

-- the continued dependence of mankind on effective nuclear deterrence to keep the peace and prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war between the east and west.

-- intensified competition among all nations for scarce resources -- particularly energy resources -- and the consequent increased necessity of dealing constructively with the countries controlling those resources.

-- massive increases in population -- particularly in the developing world -- unmatched by sufficient economic growth to provide for the increases.

-- expanded possibilities for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This is not a comforting prospect; many things could happen:



-- a miscalculation as to our strength and resolve by the Soviet Union could result in nuclear holocaust.

-- questioning of our strength and resolve by our allies could fragment the unity of the industrialized democracies which is critical to any hope of assuring deterrence and dealing constructively with the energy, economic and development problems before us.

-- failure among the industrialized countries to find workable solutions to the urgent problems of development in the third world could lead to massive upheaval, enormous suffering and even war.

In the past two years we have shown that we can deal with these challenges if we act responsibly and adhere to proven principles:

-- maintaining unquestioned military strength.

-- maintain and strengthen our alliance relationships.

-- from this position of national and allied strength, negotiate with adversaries to reduce tensions in the world and the threat of nuclear war.

-- continue to act as a peacemaker and to deal with the new agenda of world issues -- such as nuclear proliferation, economic interdependence, food, energy, pollution, population.

Mr. Carter and I have clear differences with respect to these principles -- he proposes that we launch out in new and historically harmful directions. I think this is dangerous: we have right now a very



successful foreign policy. We are strong and respected. We play a key role in the world and we are a force for justice. The choice is between experience and very positive results and experiments threatening dangerous consequences.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The foundation of our security and our ability to play a constructive role in the world is American military strength. Throughout my career I have been a champion of a strong defense. It deters war, builds confidence among our allies and underwrites our diplomacy. It is essential to international stability. Without it we can achieve nothing. Largely because of our strength, today we are at peace. No American soldier is fighting on any battlefield anywhere in the world.

I reversed the slide in defense expenditures; I am proud of this record. I want an Army, a Navy, and Air Force and a Marine Corps that are second to none. It is costly. It will require sacrifice. But we can do it. We must do it.

In sharp contrast to my record and my position, Mr. Carter proposes heavy cuts in our defense programs. His party states in its platform that they will cut our defense by \$5-7 billion. Those are simple facts.

-- That would return us to the lowest defense budget as a share of the national budget since before the Korean War.

-- He states that he will cut waste. That is what we were told just before the Korean War and you know what shape we were in when that war started. The fact is that with cuts of the size being proposed, it simply is impossible not to cut into the muscle, and I think that is dangerous.

So the differences are clear:

-- He wants to go in one direction, and I want to go in the other direction. That is all there is to it.

AMERICAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES

The second principle of peace is the strength of our partnerships with our major allies, the industrial democracies of Europe and Asia, because if America became lost in self-doubt then the peace of the world would be in jeopardy.

I am proud of my record in this period of testing.

-- Our friends and allies know that we can be trusted, that we are reliable;

-- We led the world out of the most dangerous recession since the 1930's and at two summit meetings -- in France and Puerto Rico -- achieved a degree of policy coordination to promote steady, sustained recovery unprecedented in modern history.

-- That's leadership and we are respected for it.

In the Middle East, we have stood by Israel:

-- I would simply cite Prime Minister Rabin's statement that our relations are at a peak;

-- And we have done so while gaining the confidence of the Arab states;

-- That is an historic success in our foreign policy that cannot be denied.

We cannot afford to tinker with our alliances and our friends. In our efforts to control the diffusion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons, we cannot issue ultimatums to our friends. We cannot afford to announce new military doctrines that may undermine our reliability. We cannot afford to undermine mutual security suggesting unilateral withdrawal of American forces. We are not going to strengthen freedom by opening the door to the Communist parties to participate in the Governments of our European allies.

The two fundamentals of American policy must be: a strong national defense and strong alliances. Only from this firm foundation can we expect to solve the major issues confronting us in the next four years.

RELAXING TENSIONS

America is at peace. That sums up the whole foreign policy debate. But it is not good enough to rest where we are. We are going to have to work to keep the peace.

1. The Soviet Union

First, we have to face the fact that the shadow of nuclear war hangs over us.

-- The Soviet Union and the United States have to build a relationship that allows us to live together, and to reduce the danger of confrontation and nuclear war;

This is an overriding concern, and the first step is to put a cap on the nuclear arms pact. That is what we are working on right now.

In our relations with the Soviet Union, we must always be aware that there are basic differences between us; differences that we cannot expect to go away.

-- That means our relations will have ups and downs;

-- We will stand up for our beliefs. From a position of strength, we will compete peacefully.

-- We will stand firm when challenged;

-- We can negotiate from strength to reduce tensions; to increase trade and other exchanges between east and west; and to relieve the severity of oppression through careful diplomacy rather than by bombast.

-- Mr. Carter says he would be tougher with the Soviet Union. Yet he would reduce our strength and take actions which would shake the confidence of our allies. Those are incompatible policies -- Mr. Carter just can't have it both ways.

2. China

We have made a major breakthrough in ending our isolation from China. We will continue that process, working for a moral normal, peaceful relationship.

-- This is essential if we want an international system that works for peace and stability.

3. Regional Conflicts PEACEMAKING

Even if America remains at peace, the world will remain troubled and dangerous unless we attack the roots of conflict in the key regions:

In the Middle East we have achieved a position of trust with all the parties and now have the opportunity which has eluded us for decades; I will not let that opportunity pass.

-- Mr. Carter's position of hostility toward the Arabs would return us to our helplessness of 1968, destroying our ability to work with both sides for a permanent just settlement.

In Southern Africa, another great conflict threatens.

-- Americans can be proud that this country was the key to breaking the stalemate and opening up a new prospect for peace.

-- Elsewhere we can preempt the threat of massive hunger and starvation and bring the producers of primary products into a rewarding participation in the world's marketplace.

-- We can build effective safeguards with our allies against the spread of nuclear weapons.

This is no time for experiments. We have tried and proven foreign policy. It has brought us peace and the respect of allies and adversaries; it has enabled us to be a peacemaker and to lead the world toward solutions to the pressing problems of our time. These relationships have been restored to a basis of strong mutual trust after a difficult period. It is dangerous now to raise new questions as to our reliability by threats of withdrawal, suggestions of rethinking allied strategy, peremptory statements on nuclear policy, or alarming threats of counter-embargo toward countries holding the very lifeline of Europe and Japan.

It is a time for steadiness, good faith, constancy and quiet diplomacy. We have an enormous challenge before us. The free world is looking to us for the leadership so essential to a future of hope and an end to despair. We are ready; let's get on with it.

Redraft 10/19/76

Carter Debate Strategy: Foreign/Defense Policy

Carter will probably stick with the basic foreign and defense policy theme he used in the second debate, on the assumption that he "won" that debate. His general strategy therefore will be to remain vague on specifics and to issue mainly theoretical or philosophical broadsides against the Administration's foreign policy.

General

His main points are likely to be: (1) there is a lack of leadership in foreign policy; (2) our policies do not reflect the "character" of our country; and (3) we have no vision of the future.

-- He has a new twist on our national strength. In New York on October 14 he said: "Ours is a strong nation and must remain strong," but national security is more than weapons.

The most appropriate response would be to note that:

-- His attacks on style and abstract principle reflect the impregnability of the substance of President Ford's policies. Carter avoids discussion of the substance.

-- Resort to attacks on strength, morality and respect are a subterfuge to conceal that Carter has no substantive objections to our foreign policy and no alternatives of his own to offer.



-- His comments about strength are belied by every indicator by which one can measure -- both material strength and moral strength.

-- To buttress his claims of lack of leadership and morality, he may again raise Chile and our support for a dictatorship or the Arab boycott (we have permitted a foreign nation "to subvert the basic tenets of our Constitution and Bill of Rights."

-- He may also again raise the charge that the Administration has no energy policy as witnessed by the increase in oil imports since 1973. This can be answered by reference to the irresponsible inaction of the Congress in allowing most of the essential legislation to die on the Hill.

-- He may hit the Administration's failure to address the problem of non-proliferation. Your new nuclear policy statement should adequately refute any charges here.

-- He is likely again to attack our arms sale policy, saying that we are becoming the merchants of death and should negotiate a multilateral freeze on arms sales. You here could ask how we can defend the free world if we are not to be the world's policeman -- as we should not be -- and cannot sell arms to let our friends defend themselves.

-- He may repeat that we will sell \$7 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia, that 60 percent of arms sales in the Middle East went to Israel under Kennedy/Johnson and that has been reversed (60 percent now goes to Arab countries and 40 percent to Israel). The correct statistics are as follows:

| | <u>64 - 68</u> | <u>74 - 76</u> |
|----------|----------------|----------------|
| Israel | 58 | 61 |
| All Arab | 42 | 39 |

-- Finally he may cite General Brown's remarks as evidence of the Administration's disarray, conflicting viewpoints and insensitive judgment -- or to prove his points about arms sales (Iran) and US inner strength. This is best answered by reference to the flagrant distortion of the General's actual comments and a strong reaffirmation of your support for Israel.

Eastern Europe

This subject is likely to come up -- Carter himself might try to raise it.

-- Carter has in general not spelled out what policies he would pursue other than to say he would not intervene if there were Polish resistance to Soviet domination. In that case, he came very close to

saying that was an "internal affair" of the Soviet bloc, which, of course, is conceding Eastern Europe to Soviet hegemony. Also, he said he would not send US troops to Yugoslavia, even if there were a Soviet invasion -- reminiscent of the statement about Korea early in 1950.

-- His most likely line will be simply to reiterate what he has been claiming--that it took you six days to clarify your original statement and he therefore thinks you actually believe what you said, that the Soviets do not dominate Eastern Europe.

Defense

His basic technique is to obfuscate his position by claiming that you misrepresented him; if pressed he will do what Mondale did: in effect, to claim there is a substantial amount of waste.

-- He may say that Schlesinger claims you distorted his recommendations because he was addressing a \$10 billion cut that you in fact wanted to make. He might go on to say that he (Carter) only proposed cuts of about the same size the Congress usually makes, and that there is about this amount of "cut insurance" in the defense budget anyway.

-- He may say that we have to remain strong, that we have rough equivalence in strategic nuclear weapons, and we ought to freeze missiles, warheads and throw weight. It is doubtful he will allow himself to be drawn into any greater detail on SALT. He may repeat that little was accomplished at Vladivostok and nothing has been done since, then come out with his recent recommendation to freeze weapons while we negotiate a reduction.

VULNERABILITIES

Some of Carter's major weaknesses are the following:

1. Defense -- the fact that the Democratic Party is on the record in favor of a \$5-7 billion cut in the current FY 77 budget (and he did mention \$15 billion himself).

2. Communism in Europe -- the fact that Carter in a Playboy interview did say he would not close the door to consultation, communication and friendship with the communist leaders in Italy, France and Portugal.

3. National Strength -- Carter has been very vague about what he means. He says we are not strong, but says we are second to none. In New York he said "ours is a strong country."

4. Respect -- His comment we are not respected is an unsupported assertion. He has not tried to deal with the fact of contrary comments from major world statesmen. Of considerable interest in this regard is the fact that some national commentators have been distinctly put off by his claim that we are not respected.

5. Middle East-South Africa: In addition to his erroneous charges on arms sales, Carter is vulnerable to rebuttal on his ill-conceived counter-embargo scheme.

6. Korea -- Carter has repeated twice that we should withdraw our troops over a 4-5 year period and withdraw all our tactical nuclear weapons, thus practically inviting aggression.

* * *



A major vulnerability that is emerging in both Carter and Mondale's position is that they are painting a picture of this country domestically and in our foreign policy that simply does not ring true to the general public. A number of columnists and commentators are beginning to rebel at Carter's excessively gloomy rhetoric. Hugh Sidey, for example, made a very telling point that Mondale's description of the US created a totally false impression. Eric Sevareid has several times taken Carter to task for claiming we are not respected abroad. So Carter may be vulnerable to the charge that he is deliberately exaggerating the problems of this country and misleading the people to convince them that we are in some kind of horrible crisis.

Finally, it may be a clue to his approach that he said in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, when asked what he wanted to see come out of the final debate, that he hoped it would focus almost entirely on certain domestic issues such as "housing, crime, employment, government management, inflation, government secrecy, environment and national health."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mike:

This is very rough
but a start.

Bill Hyland

BASIC REBUTTAL OF CARTER

Governor Carter's position is contradictory and confusing.

First, he says that he favors a \$7 billion dollar cut in the defense budget, holding back the new B-1 bomber, withdrawal of American troops from Korea, reviewing NATO strategy, and reassessing our strategic forces.

On the other hand, while cutting defense he says we should be tougher on the Russians, While withdrawing from Korea, he wants closer relations with Japan. While announcing he would never use nuclear weapons except in our own defense, he wants closer relations with our European allies who rely on our nuclear deterrent.

My view is that if we want to achieve fair bargains with the Soviets, if we want solid alliances^s, then first of all, we have to show them that we have the national will to keep up a strong defense.

- Our alliances have never been closer. I won't disrupt them them by promising another so-called "review."
- I know Brezhnev, and he is not a man who respects weakness.

Governor Carter says we are neglecting the developing countries.

The United States grants more in providing development assistance than any single country. The bulk of it goes to the poorest countries.

Governor Carter says that we aren't facing the new challenges, food, environment, what he calls the "global agenda."

Yet on each major new issue, it is precisely the United States that has taken the lead -- in the UN Special Session (September 1975), in the Conference on Trade and Development (April 1976), in the Food Conference () and many other forums.

Governor Carter says the arms trade is "unsavory."

- But who are we supplying: our Allies and friends, Israel and Iran, for example.
- We are committed to the support of Israel,



- Military assistance to Iran began under President Truman. We are an ally of Iran, which is bordered by the Soviet Union and Iraq which the Soviets supply with modern equipment.

Finally, Governor Carter complains about the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- But it was the United States that took the lead in arranging quiet discussion with the major nuclear suppliers, including the USSR.
- We are the leader in supporting the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- We negotiated a new treaty limiting the size of underground nuclear tests, and a second treaty with on-site inspection of peaceful nuclear explosions with the USSR.

The Governor complains about morality and secrecy and so forth, but what is more moral than peace? What is more moral than being faithful to allies? What is more moral about helping the poorer countries?

Every agreement I have concluded or approved has been completely in the open, submitted to Congress as the law requires.

I believe the American people, through the press, the TV and the Congress, have been well aware of our foreign policy. I believe that they support it.



FLASH
PRECEDENCE

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CARTER'S BASIC ATTACK

General

There are substantial differences between my concept of foreign policy and the Kissinger-Nixon-Ford approach.

-- I favor an open evolution of foreign policy, with the American people and Congress more involved in the decisions.

-- Too often decisions are made behind closed doors, and then Kissinger speaks without the knowledge or support of the American people.


-- I would follow the example of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshal Plan. Truman appointed strong advisers, listened closely and then took the issue to the American people.

-- We must take this more open approach, because major international decisions greatly affect the daily lives of the American people -- energy, commodity shortages, as well as foreign crises.

The Nixon-Kissinger-Ford policy is covert, manipulative, and deceptive in style. It runs against the basic principles of this country, because Kissinger is obsessed with power blocs, with spheres of influence. This is a policy without focus. It is not understood by the people or the Congress.

The President is not really in charge. Our policies are Kissinger's ideas and his goals, which are often derived in secret.

The results have been disastrous. Our allies see no consistency or reliability in the United States. Our neighbors in Latin America feel neglected. Our policy toward the developing countries is peripheral and



unplanned. The world's richest country ranks 12th in foreign assistance, and most of this goes to countries that are fairly well off. We can no longer tax the poor people of America to aid the rich people of foreign countries.

What we need are clear and consistent goals, that are understood and supported by the American people. We must strengthen our bilateral relations with friendly countries and stop treating them as power blocs. We must reorient our foreign assistance to help the world's poor. In accordance with our own principles we must be tolerant of diversity in the world.

I would have these priorities:

First, to restore stability and cooperation in our relations with our European Allies and Japan. We must be more predictable, and consult them before making decisions. Increased cooperation can help avoid a repetition of the disastrous world recession of 1972-1973.

Second, I would work for a reform in the international system which would emphasize greater cooperation between North and South, and try to enlist the new nations in a cooperative effort. In doing so, we would have to be responsive to their concerns, both economically and politically. Failure to do this resulting in the damaging handling of the Angolan conflict, and created openings for the Soviet Union.

We are increasingly dependent on raw materials from developing nations. Unless we cooperate with the developing nations, we face a



disaster by the end of the century.

Third, I would be a tougher bargainer with the USSR.

-- We want detente, nuclear arms control, but we also have to stand up for human rights and freer emigration.

-- Each time we give something to the Soviets we should get a commensurate return.

-- They need our machinery, our technology, and our grain. In return I would ask for such things as: (1) help in solving the Middle East, rather than stoking the fires of war; (2) help in avoiding oil embargoes, (3) help in restraining North Korea, and work for peace in that area; (4) concessions on controversial issues in strategic arms limitation; (5) reducing nuclear testing.

Detente was oversold:

-- At Helsinki we endorsed Soviet domination of East Europe; also in the Sonnenfeldt doctrine we conceded Eastern European freedoms to the Soviets.

-- We should either not have gone at all to Helsinki, or drove a harder bargain. The Soviets have not lived up to the promises on free movement of people.

I favor maximum exchanges of tourists, students, professors.

ON CHINA: Recognition is inevitable, but we should not be in any hurry; we must have assurances that Taiwan will be settled peacefully, and that people on Taiwan are assured of relative independence; I would repeat

our commitments to them.

ON THE MIDDLE EAST: Step-by-step diplomacy was right at the time, but it is no longer adequate; we need to be more active in permitting peaceful settlements.

ON NATO: It is time for an in-depth review of military forces strategy; the Allies can take a greater burden. We cannot allow the Alliance to become anachronistic.

ON TRADE: We can work to lower trade barriers and make a major effort to provide increased support for international agencies that make capital available to the Third World. Support the International Fund for Agricultural Development; under the World Bank, we might seek a "World Development Budget"; it is also time for the Soviet Union to act more generously toward global economic development.

ON ARMS SALES: This is a unsavory business. How can we be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war. I will work with our allies and the Soviet Union to increase the emphasis on peace and reduce the commerce in weapons of war.

ON AFRICA: I agree with Secretary Kissinger's efforts but this is a long-delayed interest. We may have waited too late.

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I believe the American people do not understand our foreign policy and they do not support it. Some in-depth public opinion polls point out the grounds for considerable public apprehension. The American people have a negative evaluation of our handling of relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, almost 7 out of 10 Americans believe these relations will get worse. Almost half of the public believes we have stood still or even lost ground in reducing international tensions. There is rising public concern about the danger of the US becoming involved in a major war within the next few years. It is little wonder that more than 6 out of 10 Americans feel the overall situation we face today in the world leaves much to be desired. Only one percent believe the situation is excellent. And over 60 percent believe it is poor or only fair.

I believe all of this indicates we must reexamine our foreign policy. We must bring it into line with the aspirations of our people. Every major mistake we have made has been because the American people have been excluded from the decision. When I am President the American people will understand our goals because these goals will reflect what is good and decent in the American people and therefore they will support our foreign policy.

CARTER'S BASIC ATTACK

General

There are substantial differences between my concept of foreign policy and the Kissinger-Nixon-Ford approach.

-- I favor an open evolution of foreign policy, with the American people and Congress more involved in the decisions.

-- Too often decisions are made behind closed doors, and then Kissinger speaks without the knowledge or support of the American people.

-- I would follow the example of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshal Plan. Truman appointed strong advisers, listened closely and then took the issue to the American people.

-- We must take this more open approach, because major international decisions greatly affect the daily lives of the American people -- energy, commodity shortages, as well as foreign crises.

The Nixon-Kissinger-Ford policy is covert, manipulative, and deceptive in style. It runs against the basic principles of this country, because Kissinger is obsessed with power blocs, with spheres of influence. This is a policy without focus. It is not understood by the people or the Congress.

The President is not really in charge. Our policies are Kissinger's ideas and his goals, which are often derived in secret.

The results have been disastrous. Our allies see no consistency or reliability in the United States. Our neighbors in Latin America feel neglected. Our policy toward the developing countries is peripheral and

unplanned. The world's richest country ranks 12th in foreign assistance, and most of this goes to countries that are fairly well off. We can no longer tax the poor people of America to aid the rich people of foreign countries.

What we need are clear and consistent goals, that are understood and supported by the American people. We must strengthen our bilateral relations with friendly countries and stop treating them as power blocs. We must reorient our foreign assistance to help the world's poor. In accordance with our own principles we must be tolerant of diversity in the world.

I would have these priorities:

First, to restore stability and cooperation in our relations with our European Allies and Japan. We must be more predictable, and consult them before making decisions. Increased cooperation can help avoid a repetition of the disastrous world recession of 1972-1973.

Second, I would work for a reform in the international system which would emphasize greater cooperation between North and South, and try to enlist the new nations in a cooperative effort. In doing so, we would have to be responsive to their concerns, both economically and politically. Failure to do this resulting in the damaging handling of the Angolan conflict, and created openings for the Soviet Union.

We are increasingly dependent on raw materials from developing nations. Unless we cooperate with the developing nations, we face a



disaster by the end of the century.

Third, I would be a tougher bargainer with the USSR.

-- We want detente, nuclear arms control, but we also have to stand up for human rights and freer emigration.

-- Each time we give something to the Soviets we should get a commensurate return.

-- They need our machinery, our technology, and our grain. In return I would ask for such things as: (1) help in solving the Middle East, rather than stoking the fires of war; (2) help in avoiding oil embargoes, (3) help in restraining North Korea, and work for peace in that area; (4) concessions on controversial issues in strategic arms limitation; (5) reducing nuclear testing.

Detente was oversold:

-- At Helsinki we endorsed Soviet domination of East Europe; also in the Sonnenfeldt doctrine we conceded Eastern European freedoms to the Soviets.

-- We should either not have gone at all to Helsinki, or drove a harder bargain. The Soviets have not lived up to the promises on free movement of people.

I favor maximum exchanges of tourists, students, professors.

ON CHINA: Recognition is inevitable, but we should not be in any hurry; we must have assurances that Taiwan will be settled peacefully, and that people on Taiwan are assured of relative independence; I would repeat



our commitments to them.

ON THE MIDDLE EAST: Step-by-step diplomacy was right at the time, but it is no longer adequate; we need to be more active in permitting peaceful settlements.

ON NATO: It is time for an in-depth review of military forces strategy; the Allies can take a greater burden. We cannot allow the Alliance to become anachronistic.

ON TRADE: We can work to lower trade barriers and make a major effort to provide increased support for international agencies that make capital available to the Third World. Support the International Fund for Agricultural Development; under the World Bank, we might seek a "World Development Budget"; it is also time for the Soviet Union to act more generously toward global economic development.

ON ARMS SALES: This is a unsavory business. How can we be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war. I will work with our allies and the Soviet Union to increase the emphasis on peace and reduce the commerce in weapons of war.

ON AFRICA: I agree with Secretary Kissinger's efforts but this is a long-delayed interest. We may have waited too late.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date sept. 29

To Mike Duval

From Jim Reichley



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For Elliot Richardson, et al

CARTER ON FOREIGN POLICY

The President's single most important responsibility is the conduct of foreign affairs. Under modern conditions, we rely on the President to maintain peace and to protect our national interest in our relations with other nations.

President Ford is well prepared, by both experience and temperament, to carry out this responsibility. During the two years that he has been in office, President Ford has made real progress at relaxing international tensions, strengthening our security, improving relations with our allies, and advancing the cause of human rights.

Good point

Jimmy Carter, in contrast, has little in his background or experience that would prepare him for this awesome responsibility. As a result, he has been driven to rely on the familiar Democratic foreign policy establishment -- the very same people who got us heavily involved in Vietnam in the 1960s, and who formulated the series of foreign policy blunders that helped lead to the series of foreign and domestic crises in which the United States seemed trapped in 1968.

Our Presidents since World War II have all been men with broad foreign policy experience before they reached the White House. Indeed, one must go back to the time of Grover Cleveland and Benjamin Harrison to find Presidents with no exposure to the problems and responsibilities of foreign policy before their election to the nation's highest office.



In the nineteenth century, the United States was primarily a continental power. It did not matter too much if a new President had no experience beyond dealing with the problems faced by the Governor of a single state. But now we have responsibilities all over the world. The President must respond quickly and expertly to emergencies that arise in distant reaches of the globe. He must understand the thought processes of foreign leaders who have grown up under political and social systems that are far different from ours. He must have a reputation for strength, wisdom, and coolness under fire, so that when he speaks, both our enemies and our friends know that he means business.

Beyond that, our President must have the kind of background and knowledge that give him confidence in his own judgment. I can tell you that when a major international problem arises, the man who sits in the Oval Office at the White House receives all kinds of conflicting pleas and advice from high-ranking individuals and groups -- most of whom see the problem from their particular vantage point, be it military, diplomatic, or economic. In the end, the President must decide. If the President cannot draw on personal knowledge and experience with similar problems, he is likely to base his decision on irrelevant factors such as his personal relationships with particular advisors, or who makes the most belligerent argument, or even who talks to him last.



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The President cannot be an expert in all phases of defense or foreign policy. But he must have the experience and knowledge that enable him to judge and choose among the experts.

Jimmy Carter simply does not meet that description. Is it safe -- under today's conditions -- to take a man in one jump from the political backwoods to the pinnacles of world diplomacy? Jimmy Carter may know how to raise a campaign warchest in Georgia -- but does he understand the intricate details of diplomatic relations in Eastern Europe -- in Africa -- in the Middle East? When confronted with a crisis, would he know where to fix with precision the exact level of response that was neither too little nor too much?

Carter's behavior and pronouncements during the course of this year's campaign suggest sobering answers to these questions.

At the beginning of the campaign, Carter said that he would cut the defense budget by \$15 billion. More recently, he has been saying that he would make cuts of from five to seven billion. But he does not say where or how these cuts would be made. If he does not know where he would make cuts, how does he know how much he would make? The answer seems to be that he begins with a figure that meets his political needs, rather than one that will meet the nation's defense needs.

Trust C
-Sidney A. Carter

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When he has said that he would withdraw American troops from South Korea. Of course we would all like to bring our troops home from Korea. But the small force that we maintain there is a vital link in maintaining the overall peace and balance of influence in the Far East. If we leave Korea now, we will undermine our relations with Japan, reduce our credibility with China, and provide a tempting target for intervention by the Soviet Union. We are in Korea to help keep the peace in Asia. When an American leader suggests pulling out, we run the risk of a repetition of the mistake made by Dean Acheson when he said in 1950 that South Korea was outside our defense perimeter - thereby bringing on the attack by North Korea on South Korea later that year.

Just one more example -- Carter has indicated that we should be prepared to work with Communist parties if they come to power in the countries of Western Europe. Here again, he is intervening -- no doubt inadvertently -- in the internal politics of our allies. What he does not seem to realize that if a candidate for President of the United States says that he will work with Communist parties in friendly countries, this has a disturbing impact on the entire political balance in these nations. The nations of Southern Europe, in particular, are going through periods of sensitive political development. We do not aim to become involved in our allies' internal politics. But we certainly do not want to lend encouragement or comfort to the anti-freedom parties in those countries.

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W Carter has at least had the sense, as the campaign has gone on, to realize that he is not personally equipped to deal with the problems of foreign policy. But who has he turned to? The same old crowd of foreign policy experts who staffed the State Department and the National Security Council during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. These are the people who brought us Vietnam, who led us to an all-time low in our relations with our European allies, who consistently ignored Africa and most other parts of the developing world. I am afraid that it must be said of these members of the Democratic foreign policy establishment that, like the Bourbons of France, they never forgot anything and they never learned anything. They are all set to refight the battles of the 1960s -- with the additional burden that they would now be trying to prove that they were not wrong from the start.

I say: Don't let them do it again. They had their chance. Their policies failed. We don't want them back.

President Ford is charting a steady, confident, progressive course in foreign policy. We need to keep his experienced hand at the helm.

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