

The original documents are located in Box 14, folder “Carter Staff” of the Michael Raoul-Duval Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Michael Raoul-Duval donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

9/30/76

Mr. Cheney:

I have just left Plains for good, having served as a close advisor and assistant to Gov. Carter for some time, and after a final very unpleasant, personally upsetting ten days spent trying to persuade him and other advisors



to forego certain desperate new campaign initiatives which I strongly believe would be demeaning to the present campaign dialogue, divisive to the country and harmful to our generally civilized campaign tradition. I do not plan to publicize my resignation from the Governor's staff, but it and my identity will probably be made public in about ten

days.

Please do not discount the Governor's inclinations to be ruthlessly and viciously aggressive in the campaign from here on. And please consider the positions suggested in the attached article as a serious possibility.

Good luck.

ZIP CODE



Mr. Richard Cheney
Office of the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Personal

BA

100-1000

100-1000

Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted materials. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to these materials.

that he is not invincible against the many interviews.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Hard-Line Carter?

Before he lurched into that notorious monologue on sex and Lyndon Johnson in his interview with Playboy magazine, Jimmy Carter delivered an unusually tough denunciation of detente as practiced by Henry Kissinger—a stand that raises the possibility of an unexpected course for the second debate.

"I feel the policy of detente has given up too much to the Russians and gotten too little in return," Carter said in the interview that will appear in November's Playboy. When the interviewer

This would demolish the smug conventional wisdom at the White House regarding the second debate. Assuming the President can overpower an opponent who has only limited knowledge about national security, Ford operatives have looked to certain victory at San Francisco after surviving the first debate on the economy, the Democrats' home turf.

Specifically, the White House looks forward to a stumbling justification by Carter of his \$5-\$7 billion in defense

New York Times 7/11/76

Carter's Devoted Campaign Chief

William Hamilton McWhorter Jordan

By CHRISTOPHER LYDON

Hamilton Jordan, Jimmy Carter's 31-year-old campaign manager, was drafting segments of "The Making of the President 1976" before Theodore H. White, the

political chronicler, was well begun in writing "The Making of the President 1972."

"Perhaps the strongest feeling in this country today," Mr. Jordan wrote his boss, then Governor of Georgia, almost four years ago, "is the general distrust and disillusionment of government and politicians at all levels."

Outlining "Your National Effort" for a man that most of the country had never

subconscious desire to see the South move beyond George Wallace and assert itself as a region and as a people in the political mainstream of this country."

Advice to Mr. Carter from

his drawing, chuckling, blue- denim Machiavelli got more detailed and more devious as time went on. It was important, Mr. Jordan suggested in August 1974, before Mr. Carter went traveling for Democratic candidates around the country, to focus on "campaigns where you are appreciated and likely to be the focal point of the campaign and its media efforts."

Hugh L. Carey, running for the Governor's office in New York that year, would not

More importantly typical, and more bothersome to some, he seems exclusively and dependently a Carter man.

"My commitment to politics is a commitment to Jimmy Carter," Mr. Jordan said not long ago. He does not expect to be active in politics 10 years from now. If Jimmy Carter were not running this year, he says, "I'd like to go back to school and write or

teach. That's more my orientation. I could never do this for somebody else."

He gives the impression that his real life began in his mid-20's when he met Jimmy Carter. Mr. Jordan, second son of a prosperous Albany, Ga., insurance man, drifted in and out of the Uni-

Back in Georgia at the end of 1968, he remembered Mr. Carter, a loser in the 1966 Governor's race, as "by far the most exciting candidate," and quickly plunged into the early Carter operations for 1970.

It was not part of any plan or agreement that Mr. Jordan soon became the campaign manager, but it was not quite an accident, either.

"Jimmy keeps piling it on you," he said in an interview, warming to the real satisfaction of his work, "until you disappoint him or say you can't handle it."

Mr. Jordan also took a wife in 1970, the former Nancy Konigsmark of Atlanta. They have no children.

In the Georgia Governor's office he was Mr. Carter's

executive secretary, the "no" man with favor seekers and a much bruised buffer between the Governor and the Legislature. He was also the first and boldest of the Car-

WHO'LL BE WITH CARTER IF HE GETS TO THE WHITE HOUSE...

file -
Carter

It may be premature, but—
A Carter Administration is already being molded. People now largely unknown could soon be powerful figures.

New faces, new personalities and new Southern-accented voices will be showing up in Washington if Jimmy Carter is elected President.

There will be two main groupings around Carter—

• A White House staff—an inner circle of advisers—will be made up largely of Georgians. It will be drawn from the high command of the team that brought Carter from obscurity to the Democratic nomination.

• In the Cabinet and high Government posts, Carter will blend names of past Democratic Administrations with some "brain trust" advisers from academic circles.

In both groups are people who will be playing a major role in Carter's campaign—either in day-to-day management or in pondering ideas and issues.

Important official roles are seen for women, blacks and other minorities to give a Carter Administration diversity and broad representation. Labor, too, is bound to have some influence, but Carter aides point out that he will have won the nomination without significant labor backing in the primaries.

A large number of young people will be included on a Carter team, many of them in their 30s. As one insider put it: "Look at all the success youth had in his winning campaign. Jimmy loves all the energy they bring in."

The White House. As listed by the former Georgia Governor's closest associates, here are people considered most likely to play prominent roles if the Democrat wins in November:

Hamilton Jordan, 31, Carter's campaign manager. Jordan, a native of Albany, Ga., worked for Carter in the Statehouse and was the principal architect of Carter's game plan to win the Presidency. His organizational skill and closeness to Carter will probably make him White House chief of staff or top administrative assistant.

Jody Powell, 32, another Georgian, will be either a counselor or press secretary, or perhaps a combination of the

two. Powell has been Carter's spokesman for so long that he can anticipate his boss's stands and his language to explain them.

Charles Kirbo, 59, a member of a prominent Atlanta law firm who has been extremely close to Carter for the last 14 years. Kirbo may resist a call as a White House counselor, but he would be as close as the telephone if he remains outside. Kirbo, considered one of Carter's more conservative advisers, was in charge of Carter's screening process for vice-presidential prospects. His advice carries a lot of weight with Carter.

Stuart Eizenstat, 33, an Atlanta lawyer, is in charge of the brain trust involved in drafting stands on campaign issues. He did similar work for Hubert

Humphrey in 1968 and spent some time in the Johnson White House. Intense and thorough, Eizenstat will most probably have a counselor's role in a Carter Administration.

In charge of planning for transition is **Jack H. Watson, 37,** an Arkansas-born lawyer who works in Kirbo's Atlanta law firm. He is a candidate for a White House post.

Frank Moore, 40, is another Georgian who has been a successful fund raiser for Carter. More recently, he has been assigned as a liaison man with Congress. He is a good bet to do the same kind of work with members of Congress if there is a Carter victory.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, 48, is a foreign policy expert who helps on Carter's


speeches in that area. Now at Columbia University, Brzezinski is a top candidate to be Carter's national-security adviser.

Dr. Peter Bourne, 36, a Washington psychiatrist who once headed an anti-drug-abuse program for Carter in Georgia, is a personal friend who could be offered a White House post.

Others who will have a crack at White House positions include—

Patrick Anderson, an author, as top speechwriter; **Greg Schneiders,** as appointments secretary and personal aide; **Rick Hutcheson,** Carter's top delegate-counter and a former Democratic National Committee official as political helper; and **Orin Kramer,** who helps Eizenstat co-ordinate Carter's brain trust, as White House link with outside intellectuals.

Another Carter adviser of particular note is **Robert Lipshutz, 54,** a genial Atlanta lawyer and campaign treasurer.



In Search of Bench Strength



NEW YORK CITY—On the first day of the Democratic National Convention, Jimmy Carter's chagrined campaign staff belatedly discovered that it did not possess a reliable "hard count" of how delegates planned to vote in the balloting for the party's presidential nominee two days later.

A "hard count," in political jargon, is a firm tally of committed support or opposition—it usually excludes undecided or uncommitted participants—compiled for the internal use of a political organization prior to any major vote in a convention or similar situation.

Carter had no particular need for a "hard count" because, according to everyone's unofficial tally, he had no serious opposition at the convention in his bid for the presidential nomination. Nevertheless, such amenities are considered de rigueur for about-to-be presidential nominees, if for no other reason than to prove to all concerned that the candidate for the presidency does indeed command a high-powered political organization.

Creating a problem: To remedy the situation, Carter's political apparatus set out the following day to identify his and other candidates' support at the convention—but they went about the task in the clumsiest possible manner, creating a big problem where only a small one originally had existed.

Instead of asking their political contacts in each delegation to conduct a quiet, low-key survey, Carter's lieutenants printed and distributed to each state delegation a registration form on which all delegates were asked to identify themselves by name and preferred presidential nominee.

Not unexpectedly, that scheme antagonized a goodly number of diehard supporters of Gov. George C. Wallace of Alabama, Gov. Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr. of California, Rep. Morris K. Udall of Arizona and assorted other minor contenders.

Apology: As a result, Carter's staff spent a good deal of time on Tuesday and Wednesday of convention week assuring scores of suspicious delegates that the inept operation was not an effort to intimidate or identify holdouts and that the forms—later withdrawn—were not a tool for future retribution or retaliation.

That episode, confirmed in discussions with three sources within the Carter campaign, typifies one of the most serious problems facing the new Democratic presidential nominee: His political organization is badly understaffed, generally inexperienced and sometimes incompetent.

"They're lucky—damned lucky—that they didn't have a contest for the nomination at the convention," said one source familiar with Carter's organization. "Their people have never been through it. They don't know what to do."

A veteran Washington political operative bitterly characterized Carter's political staff as a group of "mediocre people and hangers-on who don't return phone calls and don't know the players."

A great deal of such talk should be immediately discounted as the product of jealousy and hostility on the part of Washington politicians who remain uneasy, if not antagonistic, to-

ward a Georgia-based group of political upstarts who not only overwhelmed all the supposedly knowledgeable and popular opposition but even now are serving notice that they remain generally unimpressed with Washington politics and politicians.

In fact, the top level of Carter's political operation is composed of exceptionally savvy, sophisticated young men who have demonstrated convincingly that a lack of both Washington background and prior political experience are not impediments to running an amazingly successful campaign for a major party's presidential nomination.

Leaders: Included in that group are W. Hamilton Jordan, Carter's campaign manager; Landon Butler, political director; and Tim Kraft, field director. Jordan and Butler have been among Carter's leading political advisers for many years, while Kraft is the year's outstanding political "whiz kid," having orchestrated seemingly implausible and impossible Carter primary victories in state after state.

One major difficulty, however, is that until now Carter has purposely operated with a "lean and hungry" staff. Suddenly, he is forced to expand that organization to the requisite size for a national political campaign.

Throughout the primaries, for instance, he had a staff of only three "advance men" to organize political events prior to the candidate's appearance. Almost overnight, that advance staff must be expanded to approximately 70 people.

"Landon Butler is first rate, but the political operation below him is atrocious," said one knowledgeable politician, referring to another area where Carter has what is known in the world of sports as "no bench."

Delay: Moreover, Carter did virtually nothing to build up his political organization in the month between the date of the last primaries, when he knew the nomination was assured, and the opening of the convention. And those interested in joining the political staff are being told that hiring decisions will not be made until early August.

That will be followed by a rural "retreat" some time in the first two weeks of August, and Carter's state and regional field staff will not be in place until mid-August—approximately a month after the Democratic National Convention came to a close.

Butler is unimpressed with the criticism. Responding to allegations of unnecessary and possibly damaging delays, he says "I've made a number of decisions in recent weeks—only to discover that many of them are premature even now."

In an interview on the convention floor, Butler said he would prefer to be cautious now rather than make a hasty and ill-advised move that later would require the mid-campaign replacement of key personnel.

In addition, he emphasized that the relatively new federal statute establishing unprecedented spending limitations in presidential campaigns means that Carter must carefully husband his financial resources. Butler may well be correct in his approach, but the clock already is running against Carter and his staff. □



I. The Advantages of the Carter-Caddell Combination

The movement of Patrick Caddell to a close advisory position to Carter and the decision by Carter to invest heavily in Caddell's polling during the campaign (at perhaps 5% of the total 20 million budget) gives the Carter campaign an impressive degree of campaign savvy and flexibility. At the same time it provides a measure of strategic predictability in the Carter campaign, as the Caddell firm has a number of trademarks that dovetail almost perfectly with Carter's own intuitive inclinations. Under the pressures of the campaign Caddell's polls are likely to make systematic and predictable Carter's own responses, while Carter himself is freed for the tightly scheduled, "zero-defect" campaigning that he enjoys.

Background

Though Caddell is only 26 years old, he has nearly ten years of polling experience, having begun as a high school student working for a polling firm in the Panhandle of Florida (his home) and in Southern Ohio. By 1970, he and two Harvard undergraduate friends began an informal political polling group, with the two other members of the trio providing the conceptual and statistical skills, while Caddell provided extraordinarily precocious political judgments and the ability of a well-seasoned veteran to work unruffled with candidates under the stress of a campaign. During his junior and senior years at college, almost all of Caddell's intellectual energies went into a study of the Wallace voter, North and South, a subject which he pursued intensively in individual tutorial for two hours each week on essays and discussions with a Harvard graduate student, J.L. Auspitz. Under this supervision, he investigated the importance of religion among Wallace voters, prepared a short history of the Southern Baptist Conference, an analysis of class and religiously linked-differences between Baptists and Methodists in a few selected Southern towns, and a close study of all the statewide races in the South in 1970, as well as a diagnosis of the failure of the Agnew campaign style to bring the expected GOP victories that year.

27
41
17
10
7
45
147

147
66
213

W



He reached an analysis: namely, that Wallace and Wallace-leaning voters could be reached on terms which were neither ethnically and racially based (as were the analyses of Kevin Phillips, on which Agnew heavily relied) nor replays of New Deal economic cleavages (as the Scamon-Wattenberg antidote to Agnew was) nor tied to ticket-splitting analysis (as was the then most sophisticated work of DeVries, Tarrance, Teeter and others), nor to "conservative", "liberal" categories after the manner of mainly day-to-day practitioners.

Mere protest, emptied of racial, economic, and issue-oriented content would do the trick. It was the pose of the fresh face who was also an outsider that, all things being equal, would attract Wallacites. This Caddell called the Alienation Issue. And he saw that by giving it content that appealed to more issue-oriented voters one could make the Wallace vote accessible on the same terms as the ticket-splitting good government middle-class vote. He first got the chance to try this analysis in, of all unlikely places, the blue collar wards of Manchester, N.H. where he convinced McGovern to campaign actively in the 1972 primary. The "conservative" nature of these voters did not, he argued, make them inaccessible to McGovern, provided McGovern projected a forceful image that his opposition to the Vietnam war was part of a larger notion of being a fresh outsider who was fed up with the way things were done in Washington. The movement towards McGovern in Manchester was one of the factors that led Muskie to try to shore up his base there with (among other things) the Union-Leader crying scene.

Though Caddell was national campaign pollster to McGovern, his advice was only one of many inputs going into McGovern after the convention. He did, however, have somewhat greater influence in three Senatorial races that year in which fresh faces beat respected Republican incumbents in Maine, Delaware and Iowa. He took a particularly close personal role in the Biden race in Delaware (Biden was the first Democratic Senator to endorse Carter), where Caleb Boggs was defeated by a 30-year-old newcomer.

Since 1972, he has become the hottest Democratic pollster around, doing work all over the country in races at all levels. Most notable for study



is his work in the Carey campaign in New York State and his nearly successful work in getting Joseph Timilty, a virtually unknown right-wing state legislator to mount a "Kennedy style liberal" challenge to Mayor Kevin White in Boston (Timilty is now the head of Carter's Massachusetts campaign).

He also continued his interest in the Wallace vote, following very closely the rise in the Alabama Governor's popularity after his injury. He compiled, with the help of his former Harvard tutor, a detailed study of the "Wallace threat" and spent considerable energy convincing many opinion leaders of the need for action to counter Wallace. His briefings were probably influential in shaping the Democratic rules for proportionality and any cross-over voting and in setting a climate in which the editors of Time magazine were persuaded of the need for a New Southern antidote to Wallace.

In all this, it should be emphasized, there is more than a merely Machiavellian phenomenon. Caddell was imbued, like so many intelligent Southerners, with a vision of a South which might get beyond the racial issue to its more pressing economic opportunities and problems. Because of family background (his parents are Massachusetts Catholics who were stationed in the South) he also had a feel for putting Southern reform rhetoric in terms that also would have a Northern constituency. The result is a kind of white collar populism, vague on specifics but effective in appealing to both genteel middle class and Wallaceite "alienation" stripped of divisive overtones.

II. Specific Techniques:

Three of Caddell's trademarks are worthy of note, as they are not in the repertoire of competing firms (many of which have, of course, other strengths that Caddell lacks). Caddell, who is a first rate intuitive strategist, understands that the techniques work, though he is a bit weaker on why they work, and has not yet come against a systematic attempt to outmaneuver them.

1. Broad thematic emphasis (the Myrdal Principle)-- Caddell's candidates are always aggressive and on the attack, but they never attack anybody in particular, and rarely stoop to any tack that could be called divisive by anybody but their aggrieved opponents.



Broad vague themes tapping voter 'alienation' is the trademark of the Caddell campaign, and it is particularly useful in those offices from which voters expect dignity and impartiality. The reason this high road approach works was seen most clearly by the Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal in his classic study of American racial attitudes. What distinguishes Americans from Europeans, Myrdal saw, is that they defer to principle in politics. Lacking a common racial or religious tradition, their political order is something which is based more than any other on an ideal. When confronted with a particular judgment versus a general principle American's will, uniquely, choose the general principle if the choice is put baldly in these terms. (Martin Luther King was, of course, the first conscious practitioner of this principle when he stage-managed his early protests to put specific Southern prejudices against the general principle of equality (e.g., the clean-cut black student at the segregated soda fountain) in a way that did not flagrantly disobey the law. The demise of the civil rights movement has occurred whenever civil rights leaders have tried to use disruption of civil order as a bargaining tool, for here another and even more general principle (order) is pitted against the general principle of equality.)

2. Double Profile Targetting--In Caddell's use, general themes are not, it should be emphasized, made up intuitively. They are shrewdly calculated to draw out the harder realities of political struggle. By intensive questioning, panelbacks and use of thermometer questions (Caddell is not sophisticated enough to use multiple regression and Guttman scale techniques) a profile of one's own candidate, one's opponent, and the electorate is compiled. No great stock is put in horse-race polls or in party alignment factors. But particular emphasis is put on the weak points of the incumbent. Which voters are hard-core in favor of him, which are soft core. What do they dislike about him. What do they dislike about AMERICAN SOCIETY. One then feeds into the general 'alienation' and 'distrust of government' theme a substance based on the dissatisfactions of targetted voters. For example, if soft-core Boggs voters saw him as too much part of the Washington atmosphere and if these same voters thought that taxes were too high, Biden would not criticize Boggs or high taxes. Instead he would set a general theme of the struggling taxpayer bled white by an unresponsive Federal government. No mention of specifics, and hence



a strong ability to adapt this line with any new developments that may arise in voter opinion. Note that this technique is highly effective with a fresh face dealing with an established incumbent. Note, too, that this is a whole world more advanced over the "People are upset about taxes, so I will be upset about taxes" approach. One is interested only in targeted voters, themes salient to them, and in reaching them not in terms of their description of their views but in terms of vaguer undefined hopes and fears.

3. Latent Attitudes--Caddell's firm is still small, young and homogenous enough so that the four or five best people still sit on the groups sessions in which the polls are studied for deeper meanings. The Caddell firm has never dealt at a purely verbal level but has attempted to find the more persistent attitudes that underlie that are often very changeable verbal responses. In this they are helped by having started a second polling operation for large corporations which, in its first sample, asked five hundred questions on political, economic and social issues, including intentions to purchase home appliances and other consumer durables. It can therefore plot volatile political attitudes against more stable and traditionalist ones regarding household management. Institutionally this is done in small brainstorming sessions which some of their best people attend, though the quality of their analysis has tended to decline as the firm has grown.

III. The Caddell-Carter Connections

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that for Caddell Carter is more than just another candidate and that for Carter Caddell is more than just another pollster. Despite their wide difference in age and experience, both have been disciplined by common realities of Southern politics. Caddell has been looking for several years for a Baptist who could use turn the South around and neutralize Wallace on terms acceptable in the North. He has developed an approach to polling specifically and uniquely tailored to the fresh face running against the well-known incumbent. He is not cowed by horserace figures showing his candidate with little or no name recognition or support. Carter, on the other hand, intuitively added what has been missing in Caddell's approach. Caddell's emphasis on "alienation" and



'distrust of government' lacked a positive element. Carter has now supplied this with an emphasis on spiritual renewal, a restoration of American values and integrity in government. It is not merely the post-Watergate climate that makes this timely. It is also the climate following the Vietnam war and the Supreme Court abortion decision. Different American constituencies have been told in different ways that their government is cynical and immoral. And though a European response would be, so what else is new, Americans are, on the Myrdal principle, uniquely the people who are not willing to accept such thoroughgoing cynicism. If they cannot think well of their government they cannot think well of themselves. Hence Carter's effective slogan: "I want a government that will be as good as the American people." Hence the effectiveness of a vague and broadly thematic campaign which gives no public signs of pandering to coalition or patronage politics, to personal invective, or to divisive ethnic, religious, racial and class rhetoric. A politician often falls away from such a high road, but the point of the Caddell-Carter connection is that there is now an institutionalized reminder for Carter to stay on it.

IV. Tactical Advantages:

The close connection between the candidate and his pollster has already had important tactical results. Caddell has polls always in the field on a basis sufficient to disaggregate key states and constituencies from a national sample. Hence there is the possibility of a quick response to any new shifts in opinion and their immediate communication to the candidate. The Ford operation by contrast, as befits a presidential staff operation, has double or triple the reaction time to new voter moods -- a real disadvantage in a short campaign.

For example, in Pennsylvania, Carter began to suffer from his faceless issue-less campaign. Jackson decided to make this a basis of an attack. But Caddell's polling having already picked up the weakness led to a crash TV ad campaign entitled "Carter on the Issues." The result: while Jackson was charging Carter with vagueness, his listeners had contrary and convincing evidence before them on the TV screens. It was, in fact, Jackson who (as they saw it) had no issues other than Carter's alleged wishy-washiness. Carter's stands were there for all to see.

A more recent example. The selection of Mondale created a potential weakness with urban Catholic voters and those suspicious of Mondale's liberalism. While Republicans were formulating their first clumsy responses to this, Carter was busy preparing a speech on the family, delivered on August 3 in New Hampshire. An issue plucked from the blue? Not at all. Catholic voters are disturbed about the integrity of the family, Mondale's liberalism has been most pronounced on the family-oriented issue of day care, which the callous Ford has vetoed, like Nixon before him. Hence a major address on the family lays the base for protecting in advance Carter's regular Democratic base. Any attack on Mondale's liberalism will henceforth be billed as an attack on his family planks.

V. Conclusion on the Strengths of the Likely Carter Campaign:

1. He is well positioned not to be clumsy and not to lose his cool in the campaign.
2. The Caddell techniques tend to neutralize in advance any proposed attack on him on personal, ideological, coalition or issue grounds, since even if you beat him on these and fail on the larger themes he will win.
3. He will have quick reaction time to any new initiatives by Ford.
4. He will not waste words or gestures on anything not likely to win a specific target, e.g., the Family speech.
5. He will have a thoroughly professional campaign and programmed down to the minute as he is very insistent on sticking to his schedule.
6. On an institutional basis he is a generation ahead of most other techniques. No one has yet devised a system for protecting a GOP incumbent from the Caddell style alienation attack.

7. His candidacy taps a real and genuine national desire to be prouder of their government, to have a spirtual and moral renewal.
8. He has already performed a real service to the country in eliminating George Wallace as a national threat.
9. His style will be studiously presidential.
10. The coalition basics favor him. He is a Democrat who is strong where Democrats are weak, and weak where Republicans have not lately thought to challenge.
11. He is personally intelligent and has a staff who believe in him and what he is doing. Their moral aspirations -- for a New South, for a moral renewal in America -- lead them to instinctively recommend actions that drill home a unified picture of Carter on everything but issues.

But none of these advantages are insurmountable.

PART II. THE FORED RESPONSE



Organization: Loyal Aides and Party Regulars



As Carter takes the leap from the primaries to the general election, he will be followed by a group of loyal aides and true believers who have been with him from the start of his improbable pursuit of the presidency. Carter will have to add personnel to his political organization, but they—his early disciples—will form the nucleus of his team, which will work closely during the campaign with the regular party organization.

THE CARTER TEAM

Unknown less than a year ago, their names are only now becoming recognizable to newspaper and magazine readers.

For the most part, Carter's inner circle of aides enjoy a camaraderie and closeness that has been forged under fire.

"We sitting on top of the world today," remarked a young Carter aide. "But it was only a few months ago that we were eating hamburgers in second-rate motels."

Not unnaturally, most of them come from the South and few have had Washington experience—considered a blessing among them. (See p. 1046.)

Kirbo: While several of Carter's lieutenants are becoming political celebrities, such as Hamilton Jordan, his national campaign director, and Joseph L. (Jody) Powell, his press secretary, the most influential member of the clique is still virtually unknown outside of Atlanta, Ga. He is Charles Hughes Kirbo, a highly successful trial lawyer who, despite his wealth, prefers to drive a 1967 pickup truck.

Kirbo, at 59, is one of the elders of the group and has been serving as an ex officio counselor to Carter for more than 14 years. It was Kirbo who was entrusted with directing Carter's search for a vice presidential candidate.

Kirbo maintains that if Carter is elected President, he will not be persuaded to take a White House job. Mutual friends, however, believe that if Carter insists, Kirbo will probably surrender out of a sense of loyalty and friendship.

Jordan: Ruddy-faced and partial to shiny boots, Jordan, 31, has been with Carter since 1966, when he joined him as youth coordinator in his first unsuccessful campaign for governor. He later

managed Carter's victorious gubernatorial campaign in 1970 and became his executive secretary. He is likely to continue as Carter's chief political strategist in the general election.

Powell: Jody Powell, 32, the press secretary who began his climb in the Carter organization as a driver in the 1970 gubernatorial campaign, exhibits an even temper in dealing with the press and prefers not to become too friendly with any of the reporters. Dismissed from the Air Force Academy in 1964 for cribbing, he later went to Georgia State University, where he was working on a doctorate in political science when he joined the Carter staff.

Rafshoon: The curly-haired Atlanta advertising executive, 42, who serves as Carter's media adviser and who has handled Carter's political advertising since 1966, plans to use short television



spots to project Carter's human qualities and promote his policy views. Despite the avalanche of publicity Carter has been receiving, his aides still feel he has an "image problem."

Dees: Morris Dees, 39, a well known civil rights activist and liberal lawyer, serves as Carter's finance chairman. In 1972, he helped raise \$20 million for the McGovern campaign. Dees's specific role in the general campaign is uncertain, but he is expected to serve in some capacity.

Bourne: Peter Bourne, 36, a British-born psychiatrist, has been in charge of Carter's Washington office. Bourne worked in the White House's Special Action Office for Drug Abuse during the Nixon Administration, during which time he became acquainted with members of the Washington establishment.

Recently, Bourne has come under criticism from anonymous members of

Carter's Atlanta-based staff, who say that he and his wife, Mary E. King, who serves as Carter's health adviser, have been getting too much self-generated publicity.

Referring to the press jibes, Bourne told *National Journal* that "power has escalated tremendously" in the Carter camp and that, as a result, "you suddenly get articles showing petty jealousies."

He said, "One spectacular thing about our campaign is how few conflicts there have been until now. But what's happening is that little trivial things of no consequence are being blown up."

Other aides: Additional aides in responsible positions include: Jack H. Watson Jr., an Atlanta lawyer in charge of transition plans; pollster Caddell; Robert Lipshutz, national campaign treasurer; Frank Moore, campaign liaison with Congress; Ben Brown, liaison with the black community; and Eizenstat, the issues specialist.

Except for King and Mary Mize Anderson, Carter's adviser on women's activities, there are no women in top positions in his campaign organization so far.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Carter's campaign will be far more closely tied to the Democratic National Committee than has been the case traditionally. Carter's Washington headquarters will move from its present location to the building now occupied by the DNC. Bourne said that he would try to link his and the DNC's telephone lines, if possible.

Coordination: An organization chart displayed at a meeting of the Democratic National Committee on July 16 shows Carter's intention to coordinate the activities of the DNC and his own campaign committee through a series of steering committees. The main incentive for this coordination comes from the campaign finance law. Under the law, which puts a strict \$21.8 million limit on the amount of money a presidential candidate may spend, party committees are permitted to spend an additional \$3.2 million on behalf of the presidential ticket and, in addition, to spend unlimited funds on party-building efforts not directed toward a clearly identified candidate, such as voter registration or get-out-the-vote drives.

Carter's Team: Young, Southern and Loyal...

The campaign strategy used by Carter to win the Democratic nomination relied heavily on smooth and orderly operations, with Carter wielding ultimate control. His strategy to secure the presidency appears to follow the same organizational lines.

The people that make up Carter's organization chart are for the most part southerners, and most of them are young. Many worked with Carter in his previous campaigns for public office. Several have worked with other liberal Democratic presidential contenders.

Carter's emphasis on efficiency in government is reflected in the clear-cut lines of responsibility for his own staff. Personality conflicts have been minimal, and the organizational structure has remained intact.

Following is a list of the people that form the Carter hierarchy:

Rosalynn Carter

The candidate's wife for more than 30 years, Rosalynn Carter is probably her husband's most influential adviser. As indefatigable a campaigner as her husband, she crossed the primary and caucus states, preaching the virtues of a Carter administration. Although she reportedly found campaigning painful when Carter first ran for the Georgia Senate in 1962, today she appears confident in her role.

Like her husband, Mrs. Carter has a soft southern drawl and a smile that masks a great deal of discipline, self-confidence and ambition. She would be an active first lady if Carter wins the presidency—as Georgia's first lady she supervised mental health centers. This campaign year she has already spoken of her support for community day-care centers and the Equal Rights Amendment.

Mrs. Carter attended junior college in Americus, Ga., nine miles from Plains. Before reaching her nineteenth birthday, she married Carter, who was three years older and had been at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis. The Navy was her first chance to see the world and she argued against returning to Plains and the peanut business when Carter's father died in 1953. She lost and the couple expanded the business to its estimated current market value of more than \$500,000.

Joseph L. (Jody) Powell, Jr.

As Carter's press secretary, Powell, 32, is also one of his closest advisers. He plays a key role in speechwriting and strategy planning for the campaign.

Powell comes from southern Georgia Baptist roots, the same as Carter. He was expelled from the Air Force Academy for cheating on a history exam, and later began work on his doctorate in political science at Atlanta's Emory University. In 1969 Powell wrote Carter a long letter outlining his political thinking and offering his help. Just three months before his graduation from Emory, Powell joined Carter's 1970 gubernatorial campaign as his driver.

In the Carter administration in Atlanta, Powell not only served as press spokesman but also ran the legal office, drafting and keeping progress of legislation, lobby-

ing and working on appointments as Carter's right-hand man.

Powell has proven himself adroit at media manipulation. When *Harper's* magazine prepared a highly critical piece on Carter earlier this year, Powell managed to get a copy beforehand. He immediately issued an effective rebuttal, which received about as much attention as the story itself.

Powell brings a light personal touch and considerable humor to the Carter camp. But unlike the man he serves with great loyalty, Powell is outgoing and irreverent. His sense of humor has made him a favorite of reporters.

Hamilton Jordan

An easy-going southerner, Jordan (he uses the southern pronunciation JER-dun) is Carter's national campaign director. He mainly confines himself to administrative details, leaving issues and political strategy to Carter and other aides.

A native of Albany, near Carter's home in Plains, Jordan first met Carter in 1966 while still a student at the University of Georgia. Impressed with Carter, he joined the campaign as state youth coordinator. When Carter lost the race, Jordan left for a two-year tour in Vietnam with the International Voluntary Service.

In 1970 Jordan returned home to manage Carter's second gubernatorial attempt, this one successful. He served as Carter's executive secretary in 1971-1972, and drafted a master plan for a national Carter campaign. In 1973-74, he became Carter's aide at the Democratic National Committee when Carter headed the congressional election campaign effort.

Despite Jordan's casual appearance, he is a sharp political operative and analyst. At 31, he has worked almost full-time in one Carter effort or another since he left college.

Gerald Rafshoon

One of the non-Georgia natives among Carter's upper echelons, Rafshoon, born in New York City, is the campaign's advertising director. He is a member of Carter's inner circle of advisers.


The only mod dresser on the Carter team, Rafshoon, 42, went to the University of Texas where he majored in journalism. After graduation he did a three-month stint for a TV station owned by former President Lyndon B. Johnson, then spent three years in the Navy.

Upon leaving the Navy, Rafshoon joined 20th Century Fox pictures and later became its national advertising manager in New York. In 1963 he resigned and moved to Atlanta to open his own advertising agency, now the fifth largest in Atlanta.

Rafshoon has handled Carter's political advertising since 1966.

Stuart Eizenstat

An intense Atlanta lawyer, Eizenstat, 33, serves as Carter's issues coordinator. He played a major role



York and Wisconsin primaries as a standoff among Carter, Udall and Jackson. Nevertheless, Carter's fund-raising in April completely outstripped his opponents', giving him an enormous advantage in the Pennsylvania primary. His success was in no small measure due

Federal Matching Funds

Total funds received,
Jan. 1-March 22

Fund requests
submitted,
March 22-March 27

Verified by election
commission staff,
March 22-March 27

Staff Salaries

The Boys on the Carter Bus



Virtually unnoticed in the turmoil of the contest for this year's Democratic presidential nomination has been the animosity evidenced by former Georgia Gov. Jimmy Carter, the leader in that race, toward the news media.

Carter and his staff have become increasingly testy with

New York Times: Carter and his press staff have been particularly hostile toward investigative reporters, including Nicholas Horrock, a member of *The New York Times* Washington bureau who has been probing Carter's past, and freelance magazine writers Phil Stanford and Steven Brill.

Carter's Cool Professional Aide

48.25 Staff Joseph Lester Powell Jr. NYT 7-21-76

By B. DRUMMOND AYRES

Ten years ago, Jody Powell was walking through a south Georgia shopping center when a smiling man thrust a hand toward him and said, "Hi! I'm Jimmy Carter and I'm running for Governor." Mr. Powell took the hand and thereby began a political and personal friendship that has propelled him into the national limelight as official spokesman—some say alter ego—for the Democratic Party's nominee for President of the United States.

In the estimation of many reporters, Mr. Powell, a 32-year-old former Georgia farm boy, is easily up to his job, capable of handling either a Presidential candidate or a President.

He handled himself—and Mr. Carter—with particular cool professionalism throughout the recent New York nominating convention. Despite the frenetic atmosphere surrounding Mr. Carter and the secrecy surrounding the Carter choice for Vice President, there were no major difficulties with the press.

Few Press Problems

For that matter, Mr. Powell has managed to keep press difficulties to a minimum throughout the long Carter campaign. He is still on drinking terms with most reporters, a notable achievement in a job in which familiarity too often breeds undying contempt.

One reason for Mr. Powell's smooth accommodation with the press is his vast knowledge of what makes Jimmy Carter run, knowledge piled up in six years of continued close contact with Mr. Carter, first as his driver, later as his Man Friday and, finally, as his press secretary. There is something of a father-son relationship between the two men.

"Jody Powell probably knows me better than anyone else except my wife," Mr. Carter once said.

Mr. Powell is more than Mr. Carter's press secretary. He is a genuine Carter insider, an aide who helps work out policy, then announces it to the world, often with a measure of humor that offsets the dour Carter intensity and single-mindedness.

Offers Ideas and Words

Asked recently to speculate why Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. of California had stayed in the nominating race long after Mr. Carter had victory all but in hand, Mr. Powell replied, "Perhaps the Governor thinks more is less."

Mr. Powell spent much of the week of the New York convention contributing both ideas and words to the Carter acceptance speech. During the primary season, he worked at various activities, from scheduling to fund-raising.

Once, upon learning that Harper's magazine was preparing a stinging critique of Mr. Carter, Mr. Powell somehow obtained an advance copy, speedily cranked out a 22-page memorandum of rebuttal, released it to the press and thereby took the edge off the article. The magazine's infuriated editors conceded that they had been outmaneuvered.

Mr. Powell confesses in



The New York Times/D. Gorton

Knowledge of what makes Jimmy Carter run is infinite

I would work for more open government and more access to the President," he said recently while discussing his work. Then he added, "I would never tell a lie."

That is Jimmy Carter's line, of course, but Mr. Powell is paid to echo his chief. He goes about his assignment with Carter loyalty so intense that he willingly waived his \$325-a-week paycheck for several months when campaign funds fell short back in the early primary days.

So far as is known by the reporters in daily contact with him, Mr. Powell has lived by his promise never to tell a lie while speaking for Mr. Carter. But he has not always been so honest.

In 1964, when he was a senior cadet at the Air Force Academy, he was dismissed for cheating on a history examination.

"I looked at a course notebook while on a rest break," he explained. "They asked me later if I had. I said, yes. They sent me home."

"It was a vivid object lesson. If cadets at military schools today won't live under honor systems, I'm afraid that says more about our society than the systems."

Said to Forget It

What did Mr. Carter, a graduate of the Naval Academy, say when he learned of Mr. Powell's dismissal from the Air Force Academy?

"I told him when I first signed on," Mr. Powell said. "He told me it was over, to forget about it."

That was perhaps a typical Carter reaction to Mr. Powell. Mr. Carter is not notably tolerant of lapses in personal behavior. But he permits Mr. Powell what undoubtedly must seem to him to be excesses.

"good old boy," and he has the requisite fondness for citizens' band radios, pickup trucks, shotguns, bird dogs and cold beer.

He is almost always amiable. But beneath lies a Carteresque toughness and a temper. He once wrote a critique of Mr. Carter's performance as Governor: "Among the many burdens that fall upon a governor, one of them is having to read barely legible letters from morons. I respectfully suggest that you take two running jumps and go straight to hell."

Mr. Powell's father took his own life several years ago. His mother still lives at Vienna and teaches political science at the local high school.

She influenced Mr. Powell to consider a life of public service, perhaps as a military man. She also taught her son an eclectic love for books, and each night he reads himself to sleep.

After dismissal from the Air Force Academy, Mr. Powell moved to Atlanta and studied political science at Georgia State University. He was seeking a doctorate when he decided to go to work for Mr. Carter, whose career he had followed—"he was from my home region"—after the 1966 handshake in the shopping center.

Began as Driver

"My part of the state had turned out a lot of bombastic, racist politicians," Mr. Powell said, "and I felt Jimmy Carter might be able to change that. So I signed up to work as his driver when he ran for governor a second time in 1970."

The two men spent six months together traveling the highways and byways of Georgia. By the time Mr. Carter won the governorship—he lost the 1966 race—they



Chief speech writer

48.25 NYT

7-19-76

Staff

By Patrick Anderson

Denied: The existence of an 'Atlanta wall,' 'order-followers,' and 'snap-to' men.

William Safire began a recent attack on Jimmy Carter by conceding the obvious—that Safire's own "motives are rightly suspect." Indeed they are. As best I can make out, Safire is trying, in some convoluted way, to purge himself of the taint of Nixonism by the repeated assertion that politicians in general, and Carter in particular, are all just as bad as Nixon was.

That argument is not worth rebutting, since the public has seen enough of Governor Carter in recent months to know that he is as different from Richard Nixon as, let us say, William Safire is from Tom Wicker or Anthony Lewis.

But Safire goes further and makes a personal attack on Carter's staff, notably press secretary Jody Powell and campaign manager Hamilton Jordan, charging that Carter's youthful inner circle is made up of "order-followers," "snap-to" men of Carter's "own creation," yes-men who somehow form an "Atlanta wall" that controls what people and ideas get to Carter and what statements issue from him.

The point that Safire so "proudly" makes is that Carter's aides are newer versions of Safire's old colleagues in the Nixon White House, several of whom are now, unfortunately, convicted felons. That seems to me to be a remarkably cheap shot.

The fact is that Safire doesn't know the people he's writing about, and his various assertions are the very opposite of the truth.

I say that as one who has since mid-May helped with Governor Carter's speechwriting and dealt at close range with him and his top aides.

To anyone familiar with the Carter campaign, including the reporters who travel with us, the idea of Jody Powell or Hamilton Jordan as yes-men is laughable. They have both served Carter so long and so well that they are free to disagree with him whenever they think it necessary.

As far back as the 1970 campaign for Governor, Powell began giving Carter daily summaries of the things he thought the candidate had done wrong that day, in his speeches, his press relations, his positions, and every other aspect of the campaign. That kind of constant advice and criticism goes on to this day, on the choice of issues, on the Vice-Presidential selection (on which the staff was sharp-

ly split), on the tone of the acceptance speech, and everything else.

In my own case, within days of joining the campaign, I began giving Carter unsolicited advice—that I thought his stump speech had gotten too long and rambling, that I thought his claim of having abolished precisely 278 of 300 state agencies in Georgia was misleading and harmful to his credibility, that I thought part of his cherished call for an America "as filled with love as the American people" was getting stale with repetition—and I am unaware that the criticisms harmed my standing with him.

Obviously the final decisions are Carter's, and obviously we do not rashly criticize a man whose political instincts are demonstrably among the best in America, but he would not be where he is today if he was surrounded by the yes-men of Safire's invention.

It is important to understand that Carter is an extremely secure man (unlike Nixon) and therefore does not feel threatened by criticism. It also helps to understand that he is a perfectionist. That fact can make him impatient with people who offer him sloppy or incomplete work. But the other side of his perfectionism is that he welcomes valid criticism, because he is absolutely determined to be as nearly perfect as possible a candidate and political leader.

There has been no "Atlanta wall" apparent while I've worked on Carter's speeches. He and I agreed at the outset that part of my job would be to get as many ideas before him as possible, preferably conflicting ideas.

His June 23 foreign policy speech, for example, went through three distinct drafts. One of Carter's foreign policy advisers wrote a first draft, in consultation with other members of our foreign-affairs task force. I wrote a second draft, drawing upon lengthy conversations with a half-dozen foreign-policy experts and written comments from a half-dozen more.

I gave my draft to Carter with a memo outlining the points on which the experts disagreed. He then spent a weekend in Plains, Ga., working on the third and final draft, consulting

by phone with various experts and staff advisers of his own choosing.

The speech that emerged reflected the ideas of at least a dozen people, many of whom hold most dissimilar views, and yet the speech was very much Carter's own—he controlled the process, not vice versa. Typically, the speech's most-quoted line, which characterized the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy as a "Lone Ranger" operation, was Carter's own idea, and reflects his talent for popularizing his ideas.

Safire's "Atlanta wall" broke down again in the preparation of Carter's acceptance speech. When I gave Carter my initial draft, he said that before he began his own draft he wanted me to seek additional ideas from as many people as possible. He suggested a few names and left the rest up to me—"Get ideas from some 'bright young people,'" he urged.

And so it was that on the weekend of July 3-4 a number of people (all bright, some young) were summoned from their picnics and fireworks to give me their ideas on the acceptance speech that Jimmy Carter would deliver a dozen days later. The process continued after we arrived in New York, and in all perhaps twenty people contributed ideas to me. And the process worked. We got good ideas, and a better speech.

Finally, there is the question of the motivation of the people closest to Carter. Safire and a few other writers have characterized them as ambitious young technicians lusting for political power. But I sense in Carter's inner circle an ambition, a motivation, quite different from that, one that it perhaps helps to be a Southerner to understand.

Those of us who came of age in the South in the last ten or twenty years, and happened to be political liberals, often felt as if we were destined to spend our lives losing elections and being "represented" by the Wallaces and Maddoxes and Thurmonds and Eastlands of the world.

Then a new generation of Southern leaders began to emerge, notably Jimmy Carter, a man who shares many of our views, a man who feels vast

compassion
ciety, both
with the pol
elected Gove
possibly, Pres

Perhaps yo
to understa
some of us.
of personal p
tion involved
for a long, lo
going to win
and blacks
when one of
shot at the

The emotio
are hard to
they must b
who wants t
Southerners
Hamilton Jor
are driving t
on Governor
motivated, I
personal amb
but by perso
didate, by pe
tain goals, an
has its roots
past.

But I doubt
understand t
wants to.

Patrick Ande
"The Preside
to Kings," a
tress," is Jim
writer.



L.H.I. 1/14/76

Carter Advisers: Young, Tough

Tightly Knit 'Palace Guard' Mostly Under 40; All Are Georgians

BY GEORGE SKELTON

Times Political Writer

NEW YORK—Pat Caddell, looking successful and serene, was escorting actor Warren Beatty through Jimmy Carter's portable-trailer complex just off the convention floor in Madison Square Garden.

Beatty was a delegate pledged to California Gov. Brown. But Caddell, Carter's "Boy Wonder" pollster, said he was moving to recruit the handsome movie star for the fall election.



When the time came for the presidential election, they dominated his campaign organization. Four men stand out:

● Charles Kirbo. In 1962, Carter failed in his run for the state senate because he was the victim of blatant ballot-box stuffing. He enlisted the services of Charles Kirbo, who likes to maintain an image as one of the state's sharpest attorneys. Kirbo won a reversal of the primary vote and Carter won his seat. Since then, Kirbo has been a



Charles Kirbo
...access and influence



Newsday
July 12, 1976

The Man Who Sold Jimmy Carter

Gerald Rafshoon's marketing blitz made Carter a household name.

Duns Review

8-76



What distinguishes Jimmy Carter's media campaign from anyone else's? "Brilliance," says Gerald Rafshoon, with no false modesty. The man behind Carter's every media move is a 42-year-old Atlanta advertising executive who believes that his commercials depicting Carter as an honest, decent, can-do administrator helped put the peanut farmer over the top.

If Rafshoon sounds like a lobbyist for his own talents, he has a point. It is easy to forget now that the Democratic candidate for President of the United States was a virtual unknown less than a year ago. Carter's trip from nowhere has been one of the most extraordinary events in American politics, and a principal reason for it lies in the marketing program fashioned by Rafshoon. He picked the right medium for Carter—television—and he was as responsible as anyone for encouraging Carter to focus on the twin issues of post-Watergate ethics and government competence, which were fundamental to his appeal.

The ascent of Carter and Rafshoon go hand in hand. Rafshoon's political universe was no larger than metropolitan Atlanta when, as a struggling adman who had just opened his own agency, he took on Carter's first—and unsuccessful—campaign for governor of Georgia in 1966. He has been selling the man ever since, yet even today Rafshoon is like a man with a quiet obsession when he talks about Carter. It is virtually impossible to get a critical word out of him. "My ex-wife says I'm in love with Carter," Rafshoon laughs. "But if I tried to do false advertising, to paint Jimmy as other than the honest, earnest, sincere guy he is, it wouldn't have worked. We couldn't have phoned those qualities up. He had them, and he came along at a time when the country was looking for him. He fit the mood of the country."

And television fit Carter. TV is the most efficient way of marketing a new product to the widest possible audience in the shortest amount of time, and when Carter decided to make a run for the

Presidency, Rafshoon had an unknown product who had to be made familiar instantaneously. In Carter's two gubernatorial races—he won in 1970—Rafshoon had concentrated heavily on television commercials, and he decided to follow the same strategy for the Presidential primaries—budgeting 85% of Carter's \$2.3 million media budget for TV. Carter's good looks and easy manner made him an ideal candidate for electronic selling, and the new small TV cameras, versatile and unobtrusive, were well-suited to his informal style.

A New Concept

The question, though, was how to spend those TV dollars. Rafshoon came up with the answer at a party fund-raiser in Manchester, New Hampshire, one night last September. Half a dozen Democratic contenders spoke in turn, and in Rafshoon's not altogether unbiased view only Carter could maintain audience interest to the end. Rafshoon says: "As I listened to Birch Bayh, Fred Harris and the rest—it was one of those scintillating political evenings when the food wasn't even good—it dawned on me that after thirty seconds most of these guys palled on you. Jimmy, on the other hand, had a slow charisma. The longer you listened to him, the more involved you got, and the more apt you were to have a good feeling about him."

Rafshoon decided to press this advantage—what he calls Carter's depth—through a device that has been largely ignored by political aspirants and is abhorred by TV station managers: the five-minute commercial. Charisma notwithstanding, it was a gamble. No one actually knew if Carter could continually project in what is a sustained amount of time for TV, or whether Rafshoon could come up with the right format to keep audiences interested. Rafshoon decided to make four five-minute commercials, and to keep viewers from tuning out the ads geared to the issues—traditionally the duller on TV—he had Carter spend forty or fifty seconds each on five or six

topics instead of playing one long theme.

Rafshoon's plan was to start each primary campaign early with two weeks of five-minute commercials—before the other candidates started choking the airwaves. He would then stop the ads for about ten days to cut back on the heavy costs—figuring that if the ads worked, no one would notice the gap—and bring the fives back on again a week or two before the primary, supplemented with thirty-second spots.

But many TV stations balked. They feared the ads would disrupt their programming schedules and that they would lose their viewing audience during such long political pitches. Sometime in September, Charlene Carl, Rafshoon's media director, had met with representatives of WBZ, a Westinghouse-owned station in Boston, about buying five-minute slots in January for the February New Hampshire primary. Kept waiting months for an answer, she was finally informed in early January that WBZ would only offer two five-minute slots to every candidate in the week immediately preceding the primary. Rafshoon filed a complaint with the FCC, and by the time the Pennsylvania primary came around in late April, the Westinghouse stations in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia were accepting the commercials.

But there would be other battles in other states over the five-minute ads, so on a tip from a sympathetic TV sales representative in Atlanta, Rafshoon investigated the two-minute units that stations were selling to record companies that peddle repackaged pop records on late-night TV. They could not turn Rafshoon down, and so the two-minute political commercial was born.

With the Carter campaign's limited funds, Rafshoon figured he could get the most out of TV time by targeting in on particular markets rather than taking the buckshot approach. Senior citizens watching *The Lawrence Welk Show* got the "bio," the "Meet Jimmy Carter" commercial that comes in five-minute, two-minute and thirty-second versions.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JULY 19, 1976

Advertising

Atlanta Agency's Busiest Year

By PHILIP H. DOUGHERTY

The advertising agency growth formula is to make each client a success and grow with it. That's certainly the case with Gerald Rafshoon Advertising of Atlanta. It got a client in 1966 with insignificant billings, but during the rest of this year it will probably bill between \$8 million and \$10 million.

That client is Jimmy Carter. The Rafshoon organization first worked for him in 1966 during his unsuccessful gubernatorial race.



STAFF (general)

"I hope my staff is a reflection of me. Then he describes his staff as "young, aggressive, intelligent, idealistic, hard-working and competent."

"I wouldn't want my Cabinet going through staff members for important decisions. I don't like to administer through top staff people."

The Carter camp takes vehement exception to suggestions that the candidate is surrounded by "yes men." "I would be very disconcerted if I thought that was the case. I would start changing things." Jody Powell says the Nixon analogy is inappropriate because the Carter people have much higher moral values. "The problem with the Nixon people wasn't so much their loyalty, but their own personal standards."

Wall Street Journal
May 25, 1976



ANNOYED AT OBJECTIONS L.A. Times
7/13/76

Carter Aide Backs Down on Reporter Applications

BY GEORGE SKELTON
Times Political Writer

NEW YORK—Jody Powell is a cool, good-humored former Georgia farm boy who projects an image of not taking himself too seriously.

That personality changed abruptly



WJ 7/4/76

Carter's Political Unknowns To Keep Reins for Fall Drive

By Jules Witcover

Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA—The political unknowns who have brought Jimmy Carter to the brink of the 1976 Democratic presidential nomination will remain squarely in the driver's seat in the fall campaign.

That is the clear message that comes through in conversations with key staff leaders here now busily planning Carter's post-convention strategy, schedule and campaign machinery.

"We're not going to turn our campaign over to anybody in any state," says Hamilton Jordan, Carter's 31-year-old national campaign manager and former chief gubernatorial aide. "We're going to run our campaign from Atlanta."

Prominent local, state and national Democratic leaders will be asked to participate in an advisory capacity through a national steering committee and counterparts in each of the states, Jordan says.

There is not likely, either, to be any influx of political "heavies" from past campaigns moving into top staff jobs, he says. They, too, will be invited to take advisory roles.

Carter is known to be sensitive to the idea that a Carter administration would simply turn the reins of government over to old Democratic hands long on the scene. A recent news magazine article mentioning Clark Clifford, Secretary of Defense under President Lyndon B. Johnson, and Joseph Colifano, a key Johnson White House aide, as central figures in Carter task force studies reportedly upset the Georgian.

All this means that Jordan and a few other key aides based in Atlanta will continue to call the shots, as they did throughout Carter's successful run in the primaries. The others include Jody Powell, the press secretary; Landon Butler, the political director; Gerald Rafshoon, the media director; Robert Lipschutz, the campaign treasurer; Morris Dees, the chief fundraiser; Patrick Caddell, the pollster from Cambridge, and Charles Kirbo, the unofficial senior adviser and close Carter friend.

Tim Kraft, the young New Mexico party organizer who was instrumental in Carter's earliest 1976 victory in the Iowa precomet caucuses and who ran the successful Pennsylvania primary for Carter, has been named national field coordinator for the fall campaign.

Kraft is holding meetings here now pointing toward the appointment of 50 state campaign managers and probably eight regional coordinators. Jordan says that in the larger, most critical states at least, Carter men from Atlanta will be placed in charge.

Also, Richard Harden, an Atlanta accountant who was Carter's first director of the controversial reorganized Department of Human Resources in the Georgia state government, has been named head of the budget committee. Its prime task will be allocating and overseeing dispersal of \$22 million the campaign will receive from the federal Treasury after the nomination.

The fall campaign, as was the primary competition, will be geared to Carter's political strengths and his personal campaign style and preferences.

For example Jordan says, an attempt will be made to keep to a four or five-day-a-week campaign schedule, with the candidate returning to his home in Plains, Ga., on weekends.

Such a schedule would be a distinct precedent for presidential campaigning,

which traditionally has been nonstop from Labor Day to Election Day in November. But Carter has insisted throughout his long pre-convention campaigning on returning home each weekend. Only in the heat of several contested primaries this spring was the rule broken, and Carter let his aides know he didn't like it.

As he did well in advance of the primaries, Jordan has written a staff memorandum that rates each of the 50 states on a priority-of-effort basis, with size, Democratic "orientation" and Carter's past performance all factored in.

Both Jordan and Powell observe that Carter is operating from a base of the 11 states of the Old Confederacy plus four border states that must be held. "We can't afford to jeopardize our base in the South," Jordan says. "We can't afford to take the South for granted."

Powell notes that this base, if swept, would put Carter only 71 electoral votes short of a national majority, "but it's certainly an area that we ought to make sure we don't lose."

Jordan's memo targets as priority states for the fall Northern industrial states in which Carter did not fare particularly well in the primaries. These include New York, where he ran fourth behind Sen. Henry M. Jackson; California, where he ran second to Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr.; and New Jersey, where a slate informally backing Brown and Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey beat him.

In some of the traditionally tough swing states, like Ohio and Pennsylvania, Carter won the primaries and is believed by the Carter staff to be in good shape going

INTO THE GENERAL ELECTION

The Carter strategy is going forward without any contingency planning based on whether the Republican nominee is President Ford or Ronald Reagan. "The basic assumption," Powell says, "is that we don't change it a hell of a lot whichever one it is. If you plan for Ford and it turns out to be Reagan, it's easier to make alterations than if it's the other way."

Jordan agrees. "I don't see 5 per cent difference," he says. "If it's Reagan, California is tough; if it's Ford, Michigan is tough. Reagan may be a little stronger in the South; Ford's probably a little stronger in the Northeast. It doesn't change our efforts at all."

It seems clear, however, that the Carter strategists believe Reagan would be easier to beat. "Reagan has to come to us," Powell says. "If he doesn't beat us in the South, he's in real trouble. The South is our home."

Although Carter may not visit every state, Powell says, "We really don't have to give the Republicans the comfort of writing off any state. We can subject them to a sufficient amount of harassment by keeping before them the constant threat of raids into their base camp area."

Running everywhere, or almost everywhere, should be an easy trick for Carter, who campaigned and sought delegates in 49 of the 50 states, bypassing only West Virginia.

Although the polls indicate that if the election were held today Carter would beat either Mr. Ford or Reagan, the Carter strategists insist they will not be lulled into complacency or a cautious and "safe" full campaign.

"It would be a mistake for us to become a cautious, pick-and-choose-every-word, don't-step-on-anybody's-toes sort of candidate," Powell says. "It wouldn't be real; it wouldn't sell; it wouldn't be Jimmy Carter."

Carter himself, back on the campaign trail last week, took note of Thomas E. Dewey's cautious campaigning of 1948 and vowed not to repeat the mistakes that cost Dewey that elec-

