

The original documents are located in Box 13, folder “Campaign Strategy - Truncated Campaign Strategy: Notes and Outlines” of the Michael Raoul-Duval Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 12, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM: MIKE DUVAL *Mike*
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER STRATEGY BOOK

Our Strategy Book is very candid and specific. I believe -- very strongly -- that the absolutely minimum number of people should see it. There should be two criteria for determining who has access:

- 1) Only those who can contribute to strategy development by virtue of their specific knowledge and experience; and
- 2) Only those who can be expected to respect its confidentiality -- even among fellow staff and friends.

Accordingly, I recommend that only the following be given access -- and no one be given copies unless indicated with an asterisk:

<u>White House</u>	<u>Campaign</u>	<u>Other</u>
* President	Morton	*Teeter
* Cheney	Spencer	Harlow
* Marsh		Timmons
* Duval		Bailey
* Jones		
* Chanock		
Gergen		

Others can be given access to a summary version after the President approves the strategy.





OVERRULES

- November Strategy
- "Normal" Campaign can't win ∴ must adopt high risk strategy
- Describe strategy (dynamic)
 - NES
 - Debates
- Discipline in execution is key
 - keep very close




Problem

- ~~Reverse of R N in '68 + '72~~
- P vs. Carter in August
VP?
 - Reverse of R N in '68 + '72
 - "Normal" GOP tactics can't work
 - \$
 - South
 - Social Issue / war

but normal weakness still here

2-1 Demo majority

Party of big business etc

GF Rubble - growth 

Themes + Message
GRF
Carter

Outline 2

Alternatives

overall

① "Normal Campaign" - w/ GRF
weaknesses (organ, speeches, etc)

② TCS - issues / solutions

③ NCS

STRATEGY

- concept
- ~~issues~~ summary of "campaign" + issues / solution ideas (debates)
- Impact on Carter
- vice president

SYNOPSIS of IMPLEMENTATION



IMPACT ON CONVENTION



RISKS AND CARTER REACTIONS



TABS

I - A Implementation

II - A


Background



add new section

Use of Vice President

- 2 way + analyze
 - RR
 - NE
 - Southern
- 2 Vice Presidents theory
- Way to neutralize RR as V.P. — have
Rovley appear w/ him at
4 or 5 key events.
- P should MAKE NO commitment
to V.P. candidate (especially if
RR or SBC) re: Funds + staff
+ etc. must retain control



New Sections in Memo

① CARTER Resession

• minutes

Errors

• Counter-strategy

- ✓ Force Carter to campaign for all support (States - South and groups).
(use V.P. for this?)
- ✓ take offensive

② Campaign Targets

States

Groups



Part of Issues Attack

- Develop a major substantive issue per week once campaign underway.

Take a different subject per week

- Announce news maker
- follow w/ lesser positions in related areas.

- Analyze Carter's ~~major~~ key interest groups. We force Carter to react to issues important to these groups.



Notes

Overview - state problem more forcefully
check w/ JOM - should we
tip hand at beginning or
lead P into "trap" ?
(also plug in J.F. items)

PROBLEM - Plug in Jerry's 2-7
plus "structural problems"

Essential weakness

Center - Arrogance

Ford - duplicity (opportunistic)



STRATEGY MEMO

Options

- use Federal campaign rebate idea ~~to~~ only if it helps intans of campaign by
 - ① appealing to voters (see polling data)
 - ② acting as "trigger" which results in formation of a ~~set~~ ^{national} wave of independent ~~of~~ Ford campaign groups.
 - ③ making press criticism of unfair advantage in GF ~~to~~ NCS ploy i. press will characterize all Presidential activities as being political.

Why

in NCS memo: RN sound high i. a "holding" strategy - see L.H. notes

Implementation

- One key word to success of NCS will be absolute discipline over P's TV exposure

Preconscious little
 must be Presidential
 must be effective
 need top TV Advisor

* link P's truncated
 travel to debate (w/ or w/o Carter)
 - do in 4/5 regions of country



Strategy

Key difference from old
politicians - can't go
after one objective - must
balance many. Every
move ~~requires~~ has a
price. For every benefit
you pay a cost.

Balance between need
to keep overall ~~public~~
public perception of
NOT arrogant and
need to appeal to
specific constituent
groups.

Bigness is Arrogance

32 24

Wash.
32 R
6 F

ADDITIONS TO STRATEGY BOOK

- Develop strategy for maintaining underdog role. Check with Teeter.
- Develop major strategy theme along the lines of "Americans Together". This would be directed at taking on the Democrats' underlying assumption that America has not come together after the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate. This theme would build on the 4th of July phenonema. (See attached.)

This theme has to have two objectives:

First, to create a mind-set among our swing voters that America has come together, and the divisiveness and fears of the past are abating.

Second, the President is responsible for this remarkable two-year healing period.

- This theme will deal with the Nixon pardon issue. We need to plug in some near-term items, including the need to put together our advertising team immediately. We should seek to establish the advertising decision process first, then identify key people.

Also, we need to establish a near-term advocate schedule between now and the Convention. This should be part of the near-term chapter.



- One of the specific items in the area of foreign policy must be an extremely active plan to combat terrorism.
- We need to plug in a specific plan to deal with government regulation. We have some specific near-term actions which can be taken (this is now being developed and should be available by the middle of next week), and this needs to be a part of our near-term plan. Also, we need the longer-term solutions. This gets into the basic reform of the Civil Service, etc.
- Also, plug into the foreign policy the idea of a 15-minute film making the point that the President has saved the Western economies. This should be highly oriented towards ethnic voters (particularly Italians) with films from Italy and Italians praising the President's world leadership in saving the economies of particularly the industrialized nations.
- Add to our family theme items which will attempt to identify the President with Grand Rapids (and away from his real centers of friends, which ^{are} ~~is~~ Vail and D.C. lobbyists).
- Possibly add to "attack Carter section" the idea of developing extremely active anti-Carter cells among specific groups, such as Italians, Jews, Catholics, etc. Also, ensure that key liberals continually challenge Carter on such things as Humphrey-Hawkins, abortion, gun control, and the like.



- Develop budget -- one possibility in terms of cuts would be:

40% - advertising (production and buys)

25% - Carter/Mondale attack

15% - Presidential events

15% - PFC activities

5% - Vice President

- near-term plan: conversation - revision P
as moderate - not party; not
extreme; oppose platform
plank?



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM: MIKE DUVAL
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN GROUPS

I recommend that the following be considered to staff these campaign groups:

Review Group - Personal staff for the President. Reports to Dick Cheney everyday, to the President twice a week. Responsible for (1) providing a "net assessment" of every proposed Presidential activity/decision in terms of its impact on The Campaign Strategy; (2) continually assess the effectiveness of The Strategy; and, (3) synchronize advertising, media and Presidential activity and Issue Cycle Plan.

Staff: Duval
Teeter
Spencer (if available)
Jones (if other duties permit)
Chanock

Issues Groups

PFC Director of Issues - Marty Anderson

1) Issues Steering Group

Cannon
Duval
Greenspan
Marsh
Spencer
Teeter
Anderson



2) Domestic Issues Group

Cannon, Chairman
Lynn
Cavanaugh
O'Neill

3) Economic Issues Group

Greenspan, Chairman
Simon
Seidman

4) Foreign/Defense Issues Group

Marsh, Chairman
Scowcroft
Hyland
Ellsworth (?)
Eagleburger (?)



RANK ORDER - PRIORITY STATES

<u>I</u>		<u>II</u>		<u>III</u>		<u>IV</u>	
<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral</u>
Michigan	21	Maryland	10	Indiana	13	Nebraska	5
Ohio	25 (46)	Wisconsin	11 (21)	Iowa	8 (21)	Kansas	7 (12)
Illinois	26 (72)	Minnesota	10 (31)	North Dakota	3 (24)	Vermont	3 (15)
New Jersey	17 (89)	Washington	9 (40)	South Dakota	4 (28)	Idaho	4 (19)
California	45 (134)	Kentucky	9 (49)	Oklahoma	8 (36)	Utah	4 (23)
Pennsylvania	27 (161)	Florida	17 (66)	Colorado	7 (43)	Wyoming	3 (26)
Texas	26 (187)	Missouri	12 (78)	Oregon	5 (48)	Arizona	6 (32)
New York	41	Tennessee	10	Alaska	3 (51)	New Hampshire	4 (36)
	—		—	Delaware	3 (54)	Maine	4
				Connecticut	8 (62)		—
Total	228	Total	88	Nevada	4 (66)	Total	40
				Montana	4 (70)		
				New Mexico	3 (73)		
				Virginia	11		

<u>V</u>	
<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral</u>
Georgia	12
D. C.	3 (15)
Alabama	9 (24)
Arkansas	6 (30)
Lousiana	10 (40)
Mississippi	7 (47)
North Carolina	13 (60)
South Carolina	8 (68)
West Virginia	6 (74)
Massachusetts	14 (88)
Rhode Island	4 (92)
Hawaii	4
	—
Total	96

Total 84



ANNOUNCEMENT - "NO CAMPAIGN" STRATEGY

[One scenario for making this announcement would be for the President to go to Grand Rapids for a very brief rest with Mrs. Ford. After a day or two in Grand Rapids, he could appear before the press in relatively humble surroundings for his announcement. It is essential that the announcement be characterized as the President's personal decision, against the advice of his campaign managers. In fact, his campaign people probably should not be given advance notice.]

When I took office on August 9, 1974, I promised you, the American people, straight talk.

I have kept that promise and will continue to do so.

I am proud and gratified that the Republican Party chose me as their nominee as President. As I said in Kansas City, I accept the challenge and will do everything in my power to win in November and serve this country as best as I can until the end of my term.

I want to continue as President for the next four years. I believe I can win and will win in November. And I believe that the continuation of my Presidency best serves the interest of this Nation.

I have decided that the best way for me to fulfil my current obligations as President, and at the same time present to the American people the best possible case for them to support me in November, is by refraining from active campaigning.

Accordingly, I will not partake in active campaigning between now and the November elections.



Instead, the American people can judge my candidacy on the basis of my performance as President. They can judge the actions I have taken over the past months and the coming weeks between now and the election.

I have reached this decision because I believe Americans want performance from their elected leaders. As President, I have an obligation and an opportunity to act, and not simply speak. I would prefer to be judged on the basis of my actions and proven leadership rather than on the empty rhetoric of promise.

I have found in the campaigning I did for the nomination that the national press, and indeed most Americans, have a hard time distinguishing between the actions I take as President and as a campaigner. The business of this Nation cannot be neglected. Nor can it be so intermingled with politics as to dilute the effectiveness of Presidential actions.

I have seen the national polls which suggested that issues are not important this year among the electorate. I will not compete with my opponent on the basis of personality alone. I understand that he should and must take his message to the American people by traveling down the campaign trail.

But my message is one of proven performance. It is my past and current record as President... [insert]



It is not too surprising that after two hundred successful years of building the most powerful and ^{most} freest nation on earth, we find ourselves today at a crossroads. We face a simple, but excruciatingly difficult choice:

- We can adopt a national policy which permits America to continue growing strong as a Nation, while each individual citizen remains free and independent. This is a policy which recognizes that we do not have to abrogate our right to be left alone in order to find strength through unity.
- The alternative is a policy which emphasizes the need to turn towards institutions to solve our national problems. This policy would accentuate the growth of government, and other institutions, as we seek to resolve social, economic and international problems.

back
to
margin

The Nation is making this choice. The ability and integrity of our President for the next four years will be a crucial factor in determining the course of action we choose and our ability to accomplish results. Each voter must not only know what the Presidential candidates want to accomplish but, most importantly, how they will do it. It makes no sense to plot a brilliant course across the ocean, if there is no boat in which to make the trip. Just like an individual, a nation needs two things in order to reach an objective: the right direction and the means to get there.



In order to assist each American in making a decision between my candidacy and that of my opponent, I have decided to present my views, subject to the questioning by the national press, on the four major issues facing this Nation. I will agree to a series of four discussions on the subjects of foreign affairs, national defense, economic and domestic policy. I invite Jimmy Carter to appear with me at these sessions to explain his position in these crucial areas.

If Mr. Carter does not wish to join me in explaining his position to the American people, I will nevertheless fulfil my obligation as a candidate for the President of the United States, by stating my position and answering questions on these subjects.

I believe deeply that the election of the President must be done in a scrupulously fair and balanced way. No one candidate should be given an unfair advantage over the other. In a campaign which is balanced and fair, I am confident I will win.

I recognize that in focusing this campaign on the issues, I have an inherent advantage over my opponent because of the fact that I am President, and in this capacity must make decisions on the issues everyday which are reported to the American people by the press. Obviously, my challenger must present his views on the campaign trail.



In order to avoid any possibility of unfairness, I have decided to return to the Treasury of the United States a portion of the Federal funds which have been given to my campaign committee. I will turn back \$ million which represents the money I would have spent on campaign traveling throughout the country.

[insert conclusion]

Strength

Competence
knowledge of govt.
incumbency
personal credits
economy
advocates

Weaknesses

aparties
minority party
split party
weak leader

In order to avoid any possibility of unfairness, I decided to return to the President the portion of the Federal funds which have been given to my campaign committee. I will turn back \$1 million which represents the money I would have spent on campaign traveling throughout the country.
(insert conclusion)

CAMPAIGN PLAN

1. Overview
2. Electoral Strategy
3. Theme and Message

1. Overview
2. Problem
3. Alternatives
4. Strategy
5. Theme + message

TABS

- ~~A. Announcement~~
- A. B Command and Control
- V.P.
- G. Budget
- D. Calendar
- E. Organization
 - a. schedule
 - b. advertising
 - c. research
 - d. vote mechanics
 - e. advocates
 - f. White House

- chase / personality etc
- F. Advertising Plan
 - ~~G. Announcement~~
 - ~~H. Announcement~~
 - G - Media Plan
 - H - Carter impact
 - I -
 - J - Speech Announcing

TABS

- Announcement
- ① Speech
- ②

I

8. Tabs
 - a. History of Presidential Campaigns
 - b. Analysis of Primary Campaigns
 - c. ~~Image of President~~
 - d. ~~Carter~~

II

c. CONSTITUENCY ANALYSIS

9

d.



JJ

OUTLINE OF STRATEGY PAPER

I. Introduction - set out the problem.

. Campaign Facts - to change will be difficult because givens are against us.

- ✓ -Registration differential
- ✓ -73 days
- ✓ -Lack of funds to bury problem.
- Electorate is in a strange mood; he seems to have tapped it well; makes him very strong.
- Southern problem; hard to win for GOP without it.

II. Mood of electorate.

III. Carter's perception and why.

IV. Ford's perception and why.

downside of how we conducted the primary

V. Carter's apparent strategy.

VI. Carter's actual strengths and weaknesses vs. perceived.

VII. Ford's actual strengths and weaknesses vs. perceived.

VIII. Defining the swing states and swing votes.

- Who do we have to convince?
- What will it take to convince them.
- Must get close enough so that swing groups can be sought.

Plug into "TARGETS" section

IX. Elements necessary to solve the perception gap problem.

X. Ford's strategy options:

- Go after who.
- How do you go after them.
- Criteria: What is most likely to close gap given mood of country and his vs. our strengths and weaknesses.
- What are the major things Ford has to do to close the perception gap.
- How does he accomplish them.
- Organization and staffing.
- Budget.
- Timing

JJ

*Ford's
Carter*