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7. Do you have any comment on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech ~~to the UN~~ calling for immediate convening of the Geneva Conference?

9/25/74
Guidance: I would have no specific comment on the Foreign Minister's speech. As you know, Secretary Kissinger is consulting now with representatives of the Middle Eastern countries at the General Assembly on possible next steps in the negotiations and he will also be making a brief trip to the area next month. The President is determined to maintain the momentum toward a peace settlement but I cannot be more specific in light of Secretary Kissinger's continuing consultations.

FYI: Refer any other questions about points in Gromyko's speech to State. End FYI.

9. There have been reports that negotiations with ~~Senator Jackson regarding the trade bill and that a compromise may not be possible.~~ If no compromise is worked out, will the President veto the trade bill?

Guidance: The President is continuing to consult with the Congress to reach a mutually acceptable formula with regard to Title IV and he continues to hope for an acceptable trade bill this session.

10/3/74

FYI: If pushed on whether he would veto a nonacceptable trade bill, you should say that you would not want to speculate on a hypothetical situation but you prefer instead to stress that the President is continuing to work for an acceptable bill. End FYI.

Hopeful

PRESIDENT: "NEGOTIATIONS ARE STILL GOING ON. I AM ~~CONFIDENT~~ THAT WE CAN RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES. THE CONSEQUENCES ARE SO SERIOUS IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE DO."

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: RON NESSEN
FROM: LES JANKA *les*
SUBJECT: U. S. -Soviet Aspects of Grain Sales

Q: Secretary Butz said the U. S. is not pleased with the Soviet purchases of large amounts of U. S. grain. Has the U. S. protested to the Soviets? Does this imply bad faith on the part of the Russians?

A: As has been announced, Secretary Simon will be in Moscow next week and he will take that opportunity to discuss the disposition of this matter with the appropriate Soviet officials. Until he has discussed and clarified this matter, it would not be helpful to comment further from here. In the meantime, the President has requested that the contracts in question be held in obedience.

FYI: We should avoid further comment on U. S. -Soviet contacts on this matter and avoid giving any indication of displeasure or discord in U. S. -Soviet relations over this matter.

- have broken down
10. There have been reports that negotiations with Senator Jackson regarding the trade bill and that a compromise may not be possible. If no compromise is worked out, will the President veto the trade bill?

10/7/74

Guidance: The President is continuing to consult with the Congress to reach a mutually acceptable formula with regard to Title IV and he continues to hope for an acceptable trade bill this session.

FYI: ~~If pushed~~ on whether he would veto a nonacceptable trade bill, you should say that you would not want to speculate on a hypothetical situation but you prefer instead to stress that the President is continuing to work for an acceptable bill. End FYI.



9. Do you have any comment on the Gelb report in the New York Times today that the ~~U.S. is seeking to change the threshold test ban treaty before submission to the Senate for ratification?~~

Guidance: I would prefer that you take your detailed questions on this subject to the Department of State but let me say that the basic thrust of that report is really quite wrong. There has never been any ~~question on the question~~ ^{doubt that there shall be AN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT on} peaceful nuclear explosions and this was explained in the briefings given to the press by Dr. Kissinger following last July's Moscow Summit. It has always been the Administration's position that an ~~additional agreement~~ covering peaceful nuclear explosions would have to be concluded before the completion on the ratification process on the threshold test ban treaty. Negotiations will be starting soon with the Soviet Union on this additional agreement and I suggest you check with State for further details on the status of this matter.

10/7/74



RON: IF ASKED FOR AMPLIFICATION ON G-RF'S REMARK -
THAT HE WILL MEET WITH BREZHNEV "IF THERE
IS A REASON"

10/9/74 RJA

QUESTION: Mr. President: Can you confirm reports that you are planning an early meeting with Soviet leader Brezhnev somewhere in the Pacific this year?

ANSWER: From the outset of my Administration, I have stated my commitment to working for improved relations with the Soviets in the interests of world peace.

We have important issues under negotiation with the Soviets -- foremost among them the strategic arms talks. I have recently met with Foreign Minister Gromyko here at the White House, and Secretary Kissinger will be addressing these important questions when he goes to Moscow later this month. As you know, General Secretary Brezhnev has been invited to visit the United States in 1975. If the substance of our negotiations and the opportunity for further progress in the real interests of the United States indicate that an earlier meeting between the General Secretary and myself would be desirable, I will of course consider that possibility. However, at present, I have no announcement to make concerning the possibilities of such a meeting.

8. ~~Can you give us any further details on the resolution of the trade bill~~
~~-Soviet emigration impasse?~~

Guidance: There is not much I can add to what the two Senators told you this morning. I would simply say that we are pleased with the resolution of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment problem. We, of course, hope that Congress will act speedily to give final passage to the trade bill when it reconvenes on November 18th. (You are not prepared to go into any detailed explanation of the provisions of the amendment compromise because the exact wording of the language must now be worked ~~out by the Congress~~.)

10/18/74



4. Can you comment on Senator Mondale's report that the Soviets have protested the United States for camouflaging missile sites in the United States. Has there been such a protest? Is the U.S. in violation of the SALT agreement?

Guidance: We can not discuss publicly U.S./Soviet exchanges within the initial Standing Consultative Commission which is the bilateral body to discuss questions which arise under the SALT agreements. I will simply tell you that the United States is ~~not~~ **ASIAN**

By ~~in violation of~~ the SALT agreement, as Senator Mondale's ~~state-~~
~~ment implies.~~



EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 7:00 P. M. LOCAL TIME
(4:00 A. M. EST)

NOVEMBER 24, 1974

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(Vladivostok, U. S. S. R.)

JOINT U. S. - SOVIET STATEMENT

During their working meeting in the area of Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974, the President of the USA Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev discussed in detail the question of further limitations of strategic offensive arms.

They reaffirmed the great significance that both the United States and the USSR attach to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. They are convinced that a long-term agreement on this question would be a significant contribution to improving relations between the US and the USSR, to reducing the danger of war and to enhancing world peace. Having noted the value of previous agreements on this question, including the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, they reaffirm the intention to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, to last through 1985.

As a result of the exchange of views on the substance of such a new agreement, the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU concluded that favorable prospects exist for completing the work on this agreement in 1975.

Agreement was reached that further negotiations will be based on the following provisions.

1. The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.

2. The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.

3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations:

a. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles;

b. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).

4. The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985.

5. Negotiations between the delegations of the U. S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.

November 24, 1974

#

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 27, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR RON NESSEN

FROM: KATHLEEN TROIA

SUBJECT: MORNING PRESS ITEMS

ITEMS TO BE VOLUNTEERED OR ANNOUNCED

NONE

ITEMS FOR RESPONSE TO QUERY

1. There are several reports claiming that with the President's new arms control agreement with the Soviet Union will encourage a new MIRV missile boost, and actually accelerate rather than reduce the arms race.

Guidance: Regarding the Soviet Union, the new arms agreement puts their MIRV level significantly below their capabilities and our projections of what they would be in the absence of a new agreement. As far as the United States is concerned, we have no plans to accelerate our program, as this level will accommodate our current program.

Senator Jackson claims that this new agreement sets new platforms from which more arms can be built. Can you confirm this report?

Guidance: As I said yesterday, the level will be somewhat below Soviet levels and slightly above US levels.

Senator Jackson also says that the agreement leaves an advantage in throw weight for the Soviets and does not provide for any reduction in numbers of strategic weapons. Would you comment on this?

Guidance: Within the terms of the new agreement we have the option, if we felt it necessary, to increase the throw weight of our ICBMs. As for reductions, we agreed that there would be negotiations on that no later than 1980 - 1981. The levels or ceilings to which we agreed are well below the capabilities of both the United States and Soviet Union. The Soviets actually will have to reduce their present forces somewhat under the agreement.

2. Several reports are claiming that ~~President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev worked out an agreement in Vladivostok to break the Middle East deadlock.~~ Can you confirm this?

Guidance: The undisclosed source report that President Ford and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev worked out some agreement in Vladivostok to break the deadlock in the Middle East is without foundation.

12/2/74

I would refer you to the Joint U.S.-Soviet Communique, Section III, which states that both Sides "reaffirmed their intention to make every effort to promote a solution of the key issues of a just and lasting peace in that area on the basis of the United Nations Resolution 338, taking into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people and respect of the right to independent existence of all states in the area. The Sides believe that the Geneva Conference should play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and should resume its work as soon as possible."

1. When replying to a question on ~~MIRV~~ in his press conference last night did the President actually mean ~~that the United States has MIRVs in Europe?~~

Guidance: The President said that one of the significant benefits of the Vladivostok agreement is that we did not have to include forward based systems in the agreement. Forward based systems are excluded from all parts of the agreement. I don't think the President meant to imply that there are MIRVs on forward based systems.

12/3/74

Further questions on SALT:

Guidance: I would refer your questions to the President's press conference last night. I would have nothing to add to what the President said.

3. In his speech at the Sheraton Park last night the President spoke of trade disputes jeopardizing international economic cooperation and menacing political and security relationships that the United States has taken a generation to help construct. The President also mentioned that if the trade bill is not passed the US international political, military and economic commitments would be undermined. Exactly what did the President mean by these statements?

12/4/74

Guidance: I think the President and Secretary Kissinger have made clear our position on the Trade Bill. I think that what the President meant was anytime there are major economic disputes they threaten cooperation in areas of security. If countries are embarked on major economic disputes over trade issues it would make more difficult our efforts to cooperate in other areas of dispute.

2. In view of the current debate on the Hill, what does the Administration expect on the Trade Bill?

Guidance: We are looking for prompt enactment of the trade bill which will enable us to move forward quickly in a new round of trade negotiations and to continue our efforts toward reform of the international trading system.

12/4/74

4. The North Vietnamese are apparently launching an offensive against the South. Can you confirm this?

Guidance: We have maintained a close watch on events and are hopeful that the North Vietnamese will recognize the futility of broadening their attacks and will end their actions of violation of the Paris Agreement. In this regard we note the renewed offer of the Saigon Government to reopen the two party talks and think it in the best interests of the North Vietnamese to return to negotiations. We still believe that the best way to settle this conflict is by political negotiations and peaceful means. The South Vietnamese stand ready to do this.

12/9/74

4. There seem to be some problems with the aide memoires exchanged between the United States and Soviet Union. Why did you mislead us last week when you said that you assumed the aide memoire drafts of the US and Soviet Union matched? What is the problem? Is there in fact no agreed upon aide memoire?

12/10/74

Guidance: ~~I think I may have misled you last week. Let me clarify by saying that the original aide memoires exchanged were drafts. We anticipated from the outset that the aide memoires would have to be mutually agreed upon.~~ ^{AS I SAID YESTERDAY} The language of these aide memoires is still under discussion. There are no major problems and we are confident that agreement will be reached ~~on the language.~~

What do you mean by language is still under discussion? What exactly are the differences between the drafts?

Guidance: It would serve no useful purpose for me to get into a further discussion of this matter.

If pressed: My assumption last week that the US and Soviet aide memoire drafts matched was incorrect. There are still discussions ^{going} on the language in the aide memoires.



The private communication from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary Kissinger of October 26 which was published by TASS today does not, in our view, change the understandings referred to in the Secretary's letter to Senator Jackson of October 18. The Administration has always made clear, most recently in Secretary Kissinger's testimony to the Senate Finance Committee on the Trade Bill, that there exists ~~the~~^{no} understanding or agreement either with the Soviet government or with Senator Jackson concerning numbers of emigrants from the Soviet Union.

Released by Amb. Anderson at the State Department
at 4:30 p. m. EST, December 18, 1974.

HOUSE

1. What is the White^h reaction to the Soviet Union's release of an October 26 letter denying that the USSR had given any specific assurances that emigration would be increased in return for MFN?

GUIDANCE: The State Department issued a statement yesterday saying that in the view of the U.S. government, the letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary Kissinger of October 26 does not change the understandings referred to in Secretary Kissinger's letter of October 18 to Senator Jackson.

12/19/74

The Administration has always made clear, as in our statements of October 21, and in Secretary Kissinger's testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on December 3, that there



exists no understanding or agreement with the Soviet government or with Senator Jackson concerning numbers of emigrants from the Soviet Union.

Therefore, we see no inconsistency in the letter released yesterday and the positions taken by the Administration. I simply add that the President hopes the Congress will pass the Trade Bill, which, as you know, he considers to be one of the most important pieces of legislation before this Congress.

Q. Was the Administration surprised by the release of this letter?

A. We were not informed in advance of its release.

Q. Why do you think the Soviets released it now?

A. I would not speculate the motives of the Soviet government.

Q. But, didn't Sec. Kissinger mislead the Senate Finance Committee into saying on December 3 that there would be an increased in emigration, when he already had Gromyko's letter of October 26 predicting a decrease in emigration.

A. I recommend you read carefully Secretary Kissinger's testimony before the Finance Committee, excerpts of which are in the New York Times today. The Secretary said that he could give no assurances about precise emigration rates and said only that we expect that the emigration rate will correspond to the number of applicants. The Secretary was careful to say "If some of the current estimates of potential applicants are correct, this should lead to an increase in emigration."

Q. Senator Jackson said President Ford gave him personal assurances that he would withdraw MFN from the Soviet Union if they do not live up to the provisions of the Administration's understandings with Sen. Jackson on Soviet performance on emigration.

A. I am not going to get into the conversations between the President and Sen. Jackson, but I would simply point out that in Secretary Kissinger's letter to the Senator of October 18 the Secretary said the the understandings of Sen. Jackson's letter would be among the considerations to be applied by the President in *EXERCISING* the authority provided by the Trade Bill.

3. Do you have any comment on the cancellation of Brezhnev's visit to Cairo or any confirmation that he is indeed ill. How does this new development affect U.S. plans for Middle East negotiations?

1/3/75
GUIDANCE: I would have no comment on the subject, except to say that we are studying these developments and we will continue to conduct our policies of quiet diplomacy as we have stated it to you on previous occasions.

2, 475
Q: Can you comment on the Washington Post story this morning that Moscow is prepared to nullify the 1972 Trade Agreement? Have the Soviets told the U.S. they want to reopen discussions on the Trade Agreement?

A: I would have no comment on that story and I am not prepared to discuss the details of our exchanges with the Soviet Union. Let me simply say that the trade bill signed yesterday gives the President the authority he needs to extend MFN to the Soviet Union and we intend to now move forward with the implementation of the 1972 Trade Agreement.

FYI: We are not prepared to discuss today when the President will provide the required report to Congress on Soviet emigration assurances which is required before MFN can be granted.

2. Can you comment on the Washington Post story that Moscow is prepared to nullify the 1972 Trade Agreement? Have the Soviets told the U-S they want to reopen discussions on the Trade Agreement?

1/6/75

GUIDANCE: I would have no comment on that story and I am not prepared to discuss the details of our exchanges with the Soviet Union. Let me simply say that the Trade Bill signed on Friday gives the President the authority he needs to extend MFN to the Soviet Union and we intend to now move forward with the implementation of the 1972 Trade Agreement.

FYI: We are not prepared to discuss today when the President will provide the required report to Congress on Soviet emigration assurances which is required before MFN can be granted.

3. Can you comment on reports that Chairman Brezhnev is seriously ill, possibly with Leukemia?

GUIDANCE: I have seen the same press reports you have, but

I have no information or comment to provide on that subject.

1/6/75

4. Do you have any additional comment or information for us on General Secretary Brezhnev's illness?

1/7/75

Guidance: I believe that it is not appropriate for me to comment from here on the matter of the health of foreign leaders and therefore I am just not able to get into this subject at all.

FYI: We have no direct information to support the many rumors of various illnesses inflicting the General Secretary. End FYI.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: RON NESSEN
FROM: LES JANKA
SUBJECT: Morning Press Items

1. Can you comment on reports that the U.S. is moving some warships near South Vietnam in the face of a Communist attack on a provincial capital? What will the U.S. do if the Communist launch a new offensive in South Vietnam?

1/7/75 Guidance: I have seen reports that the Pentagon and the U.S. Embassy in Saigon have already denied the reports of ship movements toward South Vietnam. Any comments on ship movements or details will come from the Pentagon.

I will not speculate from here on what the United States would do in the event of a massive North Vietnamese offensive against South Vietnam. ~~Any U.S. action would, of course, be fully in accordance with our constitutional process.~~

2. Is the United States concerned about the increased levels of fighting in South Vietnam?

1/7/75 Guidance: We are watching with concern the increased levels of Communist violations of the Vietnam peace agreements. As the State Department noted in a statement issued last Friday these increased actions contradict Hanoi's claims that it is the U.S. and South Vietnam who are violating the agreements and standing in the way of peace.

The State Department also noted that the United States deplores Hanoi's turning from the path of negotiations to that of war because its actions not only violate the peace agreements but also impose suffering on the civilian population in South Vietnam.

3. Ambassador Moynihan has criticized the U.S. decision to build a naval support base on Diego Garcia and was even more critical in the way the U.S. justified this decision and explained it to the Indian Ocean countries.

1/9/75
5. There seems to be some dispute on whether aircraft-launched cruise missiles are included in the Vladivostok agreement. Is there in fact a disagreement over interpretation of the agreement? Are aircraft-launched cruise missiles included in the Vladivostok agreement?

GUIDANCE: I would refer you to Secretary Kissinger's statements regarding the Vladivostok agreement. *There of course remain some problems to be negotiated at Geneva, and as you know, we don't discuss the details of these agreements. As you know, we don't discuss the details of our SALT agreements.*
(You are not confirming nor denying the Reuters report.)

1/9/75
FYI: If asked about whether the Aide Memoire will be made public, you can say that you know of no plans to make it public. However, the Aide Memoire has been given to Congress. *last week,*

If asked to whom in Congress has the Aid Memoire been given, you can say it was sent to the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.

DETENTE

Q. Mr. President, in light of the complicated trade questions and the allegations that the United States is interfering in Soviet internal affairs, some say that detente has been set back, and that U. S. Soviet relations may now enter a cooling period -- would you comment?

A. At the Vladivostok summit, General Secretary Brezhnev and I reaffirmed the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to further develop our relations and to continue the search for peace. And, with the Vladivostok agreement on offensive strategic arms we took another important step toward greater peace and stability. We will continue to approach our contacts and negotiations with the USSR with utmost seriousness and determination to achieve concrete and lasting results -- results in the best interests of the United States and in the interests of improved international stability.

I believe that the prospects for further improvements in US-USSR relations -- the prospects for detente -- are good insofar as they depend on our actions. It is my firm impression that the Soviet leadership shares in the desire for further progress. Nevertheless we must recognize that the process of detente is based upon mutual benefit and mutual confidence. Attempts to extract unilateral advantage or to condition cooperation on actions within the domestic province of the other party call into question the purposes and good faith of the other side and erode the confidence that must be present for the relationship to survive.

1/9/75

4. Do you have any reaction to Senator Jackson's comment blaming the Russians for the breakdown in the Trade Agreement and the fact that Senator Jackson feels that President Ford and Secretary Kissinger should share the blame for this breakdown?

11/14/75
GUIDANCE: I have nothing to add on the subject of U. S. -Soviet Trade Agreement beyond what Secretary Kissinger said in his press conference Tuesday evening and to what the President said in his State of the Union address yesterday.

FYI: The Administration should maintain a low profile and not pick any fights on this subject.

3. In his PBS interview last night, Secretary Kissinger said that he thinks that ~~detente~~ has had a set back because of the Soviet rejection of the trade agreement. This appears to differ with the implication of the White House statement yesterday which seemed to indicate that the White House saw no setback to detente. How do you square the differences in these statements?

1/17/75

Guidance: I think if you read these various statements in their full context you will see that there is no inconsistency. As Secretary Kissinger said in his press conference Tuesday evening, we see no evidence that this action of the Soviet Union represents an interruption in our broader policy of detente. Nevertheless, we do see it as a set back in terms of opportunities lost for broadening and extending that relationship. We have no reason to believe that the rejection of the trade bill has implications beyond those communicated to us. We regret this turn of events but as far as the U.S. is concerned, we will continue to pursue our policy of improved relations. I would remind you that both Secretary Kissinger and the President have reiterated the determination of this country to pursue our policy of relaxation of tension with the Soviet Union and that we expect to move forward again in expanding and broadening our relationship with the Soviet Union and we will begin consultations with the Congress on how the Legislative and Executive Branches can cooperate in implementing this.

FYI: Refer to State any questions about the decision of Czechoslovakia to reject the trade agreement restrictions and the necessity for renegotiating the U.S. -Czechoslovakia claim agreement. End FYI.

January 17, 1975

Main Points of Kennedy-Mathias-Mondale Resolution

- Welcomes the agreement in principle reached at Vladivostok.
- Expresses its support for the broad purposes of that agreement as a major substantial step forward.
- Expresses hope it will lead to further agreement, and that both sides will exercise mutual restraint in deployments beyond currently deployed levels.
- That any new US deployments be based on national security needs.

It is the Advice of the Senate that the President should make every possible effort:

(a) to complete the negotiations resulting from the Vladivostok agreements in principle;

(b) in addition, to reach further agreements, including but not limited, to the following:

(1) mutual restraint on the pace and character of development and deployments;

(2) a commitment to negotiate mutual reductions to lower levels of strategic delivery vehicles and of MIRVs;

(3) mutual commitment to continue negotiations to achieve further limitations with regard to military forces and armaments not presently limited.

Negotiations to achieve these objectives should begin as soon as possible.

Agreement to be submitted to the Senate.

5. FYI: See attached guidance on Kennedy/Mathias/Mondale SALT resolution.

1/17/75

BASIC GUIDANCE FOR ANDERSON AND NESSON IF ASKED

1. We view the resolution as supporting the Vladivostok accord.

2. To the extent that it calls for negotiations on matters not part of the Vladivostok accord, the Administration will be prepared to make an effort to undertake such negotiations as quickly as possible after the agreements flowing from Vladivostok have been completed.

3. It should be clear that we are already ~~is~~ committed to negotiate on reductions below the Vladivostok levels. This is part of the Vladivostok accord and we expect such negotiations to be referred to in the final agreements and have them commence at the earliest possible time after the final Vladivostok agreements are completed.

4. We are already committed to negotiate limitations on forces and armaments not limited by Vladivostok and of course will carry through with such negotiations. (e.g. MBFR, nuclear testing, environmental modification techniques, chemical warfare.)

5. We view this resolution and the work of the three Senators as an excellent example of how the Congress and the Executive can cooperate to advance the national interest.

- 1/17/75
3. In his PBS interview last night, Secretary Kissinger said that he thinks that detente has had a set back because of the Soviet rejection of the trade agreement. This appears to differ with the implication of the White House statement yesterday which seemed to indicate that the White House saw no setback to detente. How do you square the differences in these statements?

Guidance: I think if you read these various statements in their full context you will see that there is no inconsistency. As Secretary Kissinger said in his press conference Tuesday evening, we see no evidence that this action of the Soviet Union represents an interruption in our broader policy of detente. Nevertheless, we do see it as a set back in terms of opportunities lost for broadening and extending that relationship. We have no reason to believe that the rejection of the trade bill has implications beyond those communicated to us. We regret this turn of events but as far as the U.S. is concerned, we will continue to pursue our policy of improved relations. I would remind you that both Secretary Kissinger and the President have reiterated the determination of this country to pursue our policy of relaxation of tension with the Soviet Union and that we expect to move forward again in expanding and broadening our relationship with the Soviet Union and we will begin consultations with the Congress on how the Legislative and Executive Branches can cooperate in implementing this.

FYI: Refer to State any questions about the decision of Czechoslovakia to reject the trade agreement restrictions and the necessity for renegotiating the U.S. -Czechoslovakia claim agreement. End FYI.

2. Can you comment on the return of Ambassador Dobrynin to Moscow?

1/17/75 Does this indicate serious problems in U.S. -Soviet relations and a possible Soviet reassessment of detente?

Guidance: I would have no comment on the travel plans of another country's Ambassador. I suggest you check with the Soviet Embassy for any details on Ambassador Dobrynin's plans.

5. Can you tell us where the President plans to go next with regard to the trade bill problem with the Soviet Union? When is he going to ask the Congress to correct the problems that lead to the Soviet rejection of the current trade agreement?

1/22/75
Guidance: Bot the President and Secretary Kissinger have said that we will discuss possible next steps with the Congress. I have nothing further to give you on this subject at this time.

FYI Only: Secretary Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday that we are not in a big hurry to rush a new trade bill or Ex-Im Bank bill at this time. We do not want to appear too eager to rush back to the Soviets nor do we want to appear to be jamming new U.S. legislation through the Congress.

1/28/75
5. Do you have any comment on a UPI report that the U. S. is asking the Soviet Union to explain possible violations of the 1972 SALT agreements? Can you confirm that the Soviets have complained to the U. S. about canvas covers placed over American missile silos in possible violation of the 1972 agreements?

GUIDANCE: I can confirm that the standing consultative commission created in the 1972 SALT agreement did hold a meeting in Geneva today, but I am not going to discuss the details of the work of the SCC. I think you will recall that in early December there were a number of stories about possible violations and the President said at that time that he had the responsibility to clear up any ambiguities that had arisen under the SALT agreement, and such clarifications are the work of the SCC.

If pushed on whether the U. S. has violated the agreement you should simply say that the U. S. is not in violation of the SALT agreements, but you are not discussing the details of the various reports on these matters.

QUART SYMINGTON, MO.
CLAUDE PELL, R.I.
GALE W. MC GEE, WYO.
GEORGE MC GOVERN, S. DAK.
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
DICK CLARK, IOWA
JOSEPH R. BIDEEN, JR., DEL.

JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, MICH.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

PAT M. HOLT, CHIEF OF STAFF
ARTHUR M. KUHL, CHIEF CLERK

5:50 P.M. - MARCH 19, 1975

MESSAGE FROM EMBASSY MOSCOW -- just telephoned to me:

"MOSCOW 3722

At March 19 meeting in the Kremlin between Embassy and representatives of Soviet Intl. Relations Department to discuss arrangements for CODEL visit was interrupted by urgent call to Chief of Department, V.G. Vysotin, from V.P. Rubin, Chairman of Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities who had just gotten word from Soviet Embassy Washington that CODEL wished to delay visit for a week. (Vysotin did not know of CODEL's request for delay before meeting with him).

After several hurried phone calls and meetings with Rubin, Vysotin returned to room to tell us that Supreme Soviet is instructing Soviet Embassy Washington to inform CODEL that March 30 arrival date is unacceptable and that visit cannot take place earlier than mid-May after celebration 30th anniversary of World War II.

Vysotin gave his reason for postponement the fact that there would be no high-ranking Soviet officials in Moscow to receive CODEL. Rubin is scheduled for IPU meetings, A.P. Shitikov, Chairman of Council of Union is sick and in hospital. BN. Ponomarev, Chairman of Council of Nationalities, Foreign Affairs Commission, is on leave. M.A. Susloy, Chairman of Council of Union, Foreign Affairs Commission, is also on leave and will be busy with other matters during proposed period.

We stated that mid-May might be difficult time for CODEL to break away from Senate work and asked Vysotin if decision to ask for postponement was firm. He said it was unless CODEL found it possible to come on original dates as planned. STOESSEL."

Mary McLaughlin

CC: Senators Humphrey, Scott
Ken Davis, Norvill Jones, Art Kuhl

March 21, 1975

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO THE SOVIET UNION

Q. Is there any connection between the delay in the Congressional delegation trip to the Soviet Union and the reports that the CIA tried to salvage a Russian submarine?

A. GUIDANCE: No. The Congressional delegation was supposed to leave today for the Soviet Union, but pressing legislative business forced them to request a delay for several days. However, the delay would cause scheduling problems for the Soviet Union and they suggested alternative dates in May. For details of the travel, I suggest you check with members of the Congressional delegation.

Newman F. Y. I

MEMORANDUM

2119

USSR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 7, 1975
INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Hal Horan *HH*

JK AD

SUBJECT: Soviet Cruise Missiles in Somalia

The New York Times, Monday, April 7, has a story on this subject to the effect that Defense Department officials say the Soviet Union is stockpiling long-range guided missiles in a newly built naval support installation at Berbera, Somalia. We have known of this facility for some time and the Department of State has prepared the following guideline on an if-asked basis for its press spokesman:

"Q: Today's New York Times, quoting a DOD official, reports that the Soviets are stockpiling cruise missiles in a large, recently built naval support installation at Berbera, Somalia. Would you care to comment?"

"A: The Soviets have been building a naval support facility at Berbera for several years, including capabilities for naval communications and ships maintenance. We now have information that they are also installing a storage facility for cruise missiles as well, but we have no exact information as to the type and numbers of missiles there, or whether any missiles are there yet."

In view of the larger than African context to this subject, I wanted to flag it to your attention. I might add that we have increasing evidence of a split within the Somali Government over the extent of Soviet presence in Somalia as it impacts on Somalia's foreign relations, and, in particular, with the neighboring Arab states.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date *11/30/00*

→ cc: Margie Vanderhye

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/21/75

DETENTE

Q: Mr. President, in light of recent events on the international scene, notably in Vietnam, Portugal and the Middle East, how do you see our relations with the Soviet Union developing? Are US-Soviet relations entering a cooling period?

A: From the outset of my Administration, I have stressed my commitment to working for improved relations with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace. The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the USSR expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for easing international tensions and reducing the chances of war while at the same time safeguarding our vital interests and our security. Such an improved relationship is in our real national interest.

On April 10, I observed that during this process, we have had no illusions. We know that we are dealing with a nation that reflects different principles and is our competitor in many parts of the globe. We will never permit detente to become a license to fish in troubled waters. Through a combination of firmness and flexibility, however, the United States has in recent years laid the basis of a more reliable relationship based on mutual interest and mutual restraint. Only last November, at Vladivostok, General Secretary Brezhnev and I reaffirmed the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to further develop our relations and to continue the search for peace.

I believe the prospects for further improvements in US-USSR relations -- taking into account recent international developments -- remain good insofar as they depend on our actions. It is my impression that the Soviet leadership continues to share in this desire for further progress based on mutual interest and mutual restraint.

4/21/73

DETENTE AND INDOCHINA

Q: If detente has any meaning at all, why isn't the President using his supposedly closer relations with the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China to help and end the fighting in Indochina?

A: The Principal purpose of detente has been, and remains to lessen the danger of nuclear conflict and to reduce the tensions among the superpowers, tensions that carried the potential seeds of world war. Detente has achieved that objective. We have achieved settlement in some areas, like Berlin. We have dampened crises in other areas. It has also developed a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.

It has never been a condition of detente that either we, the Soviet Union or the Peoples' Republic of China would end our support of our allies.

April 28, 1975

BREZHNEV VISIT

Q. Is the postponement of Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the United States an indication of a chill in detente? Do events in the Middle East or Indochina have anything to do with the postponement?

A. The visit between President Ford and the Secretary has not been set so there is, in fact, no postponement.

Two U.S. arms demands threaten talks, detente

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington—United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear weapons have frozen on two demands by the U.S. that the Ford administration regards as fundamental, informed officials reported yesterday.

The implications are both military and political. Unless the disagreements are resolved, one source said, the whole process of U.S.-Soviet detente could suffer dramatically.

When the strategic arms limitation talks at Geneva recessed this week, they had stalled on the nature of Soviet weapons to be included under previously agreed ceilings.

For one thing, the U.S. insist-

ed that the Soviet Union's so-called Backfire strategic bomber must be included under previously agreed ceilings. For another, the U.S. holds that every Soviet missile of a class successfully tested with multiple warheads must be assumed within the ceilings, to carry such warheads.

The issues are fundamental to the agreement struck by President Ford and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, at Vladivostok last November. During that meeting they agreed to negotiate for agreement this year on a 10-year treaty that would limit each side to 2,400 strategic launchers, of which 1,320 could carry multiple warheads,

each of which may be directed at a separate target.

It was understood at Vladivostok that the U.S. B-52 bomber and the older Soviet Bear bomber would be included within the ceilings. The Backfire, a new supersonic bomber, was not even discussed, informed officials said, since the Russians had agreed to exclude the comparable U.S. F-111 bomber. Now, however, U.S. officials say inclusion of the Backfire is essential.

As for strategic missiles, Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, said publicly at Vladivostok that the U.S. would insist on including within the ceilings all rockets capable of

See WEAPONS, A4, Col. 1

A 4

THE SUN, Friday, May 9, 1975

2 U.S. arms demands froze talks, peril detente

WEAPONS, from A1
carrying multiple warheads—the so-called MIRV's. The MIRV assumption, he explained, was necessary because the Soviet government will not permit on-the-spot verification of missiles.

But what Mr. Kissinger said publicly was not incorporated in any of the official documents at Vladivostok. Since then, Soviet officials have argued that the U.S. is trying to tighten the terms of the Vladivostok meeting—which Mr. Kissinger called a "breakthrough"—after the event.

A whole series of new Soviet

missiles, the SS-16, SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, is believed to be capable of carrying MIRV's. Whether the U.S. has claimed that all of these must be included within the MIRV ceiling is uncertain, however. One official mentioned only the SS-17 and SS-19 yesterday as being specifically in dispute.

In fact, U.S. officials have reported that the first SS-19's deployed recently in the Soviet Union were equipped only with single warheads. They must be covered by the MIRV ceiling anyway, these sources said, because it is not always possible to determine the number of warheads with spy satellites.

By this week the disagreement was total. Negotiators recessed the talks until June 2 while their governments review their positions. The talks will be a primary topic, along with the Middle East, when Mr. Kissinger meets the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, in Geneva May 19.

One U.S. official insisted yesterday that "reports of a breakdown in the SALT talks are inaccurate, quite exaggerated."

However, others acknowledged that the points are fundamental—especially the one relating to MIRV verification—to the strategic weapons balance. The political implications of failure could be even greater.

For the short term it would be difficult for Mr. Ford and Mr. Brezhnev to hold their already-delayed summit meeting this year unless the issues are resolved. For the longer term, failure would reduce the momentum, at least, of the detente process started in 1972.

There has been controversy over the Vladivostok accord since it was announced. After the meeting, each side drafted an aide-memoire about its understanding of what had been agreed.

June 12, 1975

OTHER ISSUES

1. You have guidance on the Diego Garcia facilities and on the Soviet presence in Somalia. Despite Somalian denials of a Soviet base (denials they have apparently been making for a long time) the State Department plans to refer to the Schlesinger testimony; I suggest we do the same.

2. Attached is guidance used by the Department of State yesterday in response to questions of alleged U.S. military sales to Egypt. In response to questions, you should refer to State Department remarks of yesterday.

In response to questions on the Jack Anderson article on Soviet ICBM's hitting an American ship, you should refer to Schlesinger's public press conference of June 20 in which he said that on the 3rd of June one of the Soviet reentry bodies fell within 100 feet of the US observation ship in the area at the time.

Ron:

I'm not sure who cleared this guidance, but Joe Laitin said that some small pieces actually did impact on the ship and were recovered by the crew. He said the debris totalled about 9 pounds. This information is not being released to the press, however. Laitin said he would neither confirm or deny the Jack Anderson report, but you should know what the facts are for your protection.

JWH 6-30-75

June 30, 1975

SOVIET BASE AT BERBERA

If asked about the conflicting reports of a Soviet base at Berbera, Somalia, the State Department will refer to Schlesinger's frequent comments on the subject and stand by his remarks. We are advised to follow suit. [The following excerpt is taken from Secretary Schlesinger's interview with newsmen following an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee June 10. He is talking about the necessity for a U. S. facility at Diego Garcia:

"The U. S. wishes to have a logistical capability in the Indian Ocean which is at relatively small cost, so that we do not have to support any task forces that we send into the Indian Ocean, 4,500 miles out of Subic Bay. It is necessary because of the Soviet buildup of naval forces that have taken place since 1968 and in addition, the present activities going on to build their logistical and support capabilities that we be in a position to match them in terms of naval strength should that be necessary and that is the reason for the base."

"Question: Can you tell us how seriously you regard the creation of this Soviet missile supply base at Berbera?"

"Answer: I think that is an indication of the degree of interest of the Soviets and their belief that they require a reload capability in the Indian Ocean."

Refer to your guidance of June 11 for background information on Diego Garcia.

Q - Are there really Russian missiles.
A - Tends to confirm Schlesinger's views.

July 1, 1975

SOLZHENITSYN ON DETENTE

In an emotional speech to the AFL-CIO, the first he has delivered to a Western audience since his exile last year, Alexander Solzhenitsyn scolded the United States for its concessions to Soviet communism in the name of detente. His condemnation of Kissinger's Nobel prize for peace and of the United States concessions toward communism may provoke questions on the President's attitude toward Solzhenitsyn and detente.

Q: What is the President's reaction to Nobel laureate Solzhenitsyn's criticism of the U. S. concessions to the Soviets on detente and to Secretary Kissinger's acceptance of the Nobel prize for peace in 1973?

A: The President's views on detente are well known. From the outset of his Administration, the President has stressed his commitment to working for improved relations with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace. He believes that such an improved relationship based on strict reciprocity is in our real national interest. In his April 10 speech to the Congress, he observed that during this process, we have had no illusions and that we are dealing with a nation that reflects different principles and is our competitor in many parts of the globe. (FYI: We would have no direct comment on Secretary Kissinger's Nobel peace prize.)

July 7, 1975

U. S. - SOVIET SUBMARINES COLLIDE

The New York Times has reported that a U. S. submarine collided with a Soviet sub in Russian waters in 1969 and that the U. S. sub commander was ordered to prepared a falsified report in addition to a truthful one.

In response to questions about the alleged collision of U. S. and Soviet submarines, the Defense Department has no comment. The State Department has followed suit and we are advised to do the same.

August 7, 1975

VIETNAM, SOUTH KOREA UN MEMBERSHIP

Q. Can you comment on the State Department announcement that we will veto UN membership applications of the two Vietnams if South Korea is not admitted?

A. As the State Department said yesterday, we are prepared to support the membership of all three of these states; however, we will not be a party to attempts to admit one state while excluding another. To do otherwise would be in direct violation of the principle of universality upon which the UN was founded.

FYI: Yesterday in a meeting to consider applications for membership South Korea failed by two votes to get the nine required for consideration. The applications for Vietnamese membership passed overwhelmingly (US abstained); when the membership committee votes later this week to send the Vietnamese applications forward, the US will veto.

IF PRESSED: The United States will continue to support the candidacy of South Korea and will vote against any proposal that does not include them.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS FOR RON NESSEN BRIEFING SEPT. 10, 1975

+ BREZHNEV VISIT SET BACK

Secretary Kissinger indicates ~~Report~~ that the visit of Soviet leader Brezhnev has been set back until the middle of December. Is this correct? Why the delay? Aren't the SALT talks going well? Is the trip to China still planned? What ~~is~~ is the likely time for the China trip?

GRAIN AGREEMENT

The National Farmers Organization has criticized the grain agreement as bowing to Meany's blackmail. Any White House reaction? Why has the Administration ~~gone along with~~ Meany's ideas on grain trade with the Soviets?

SINAI AGREEMENT

The N. Y. Times claims the agreements with Israel are not as solid as first reports indicate, especially because of hedges about the need for Congressional approval. Is this account accurate?

SSCHOOL BUSING

Does the President have any comment on the school busing successes in Boston and Louisville? Will he order the US government to pay the costs of policing the Louisville busing situation as the Kentucky Governor demands?

BREZHNEV VISIT

Q. It would seem that the Brezhnev visit has been postponed once more. Can you tell us why? Are the SALT negotiations going badly? Has the new Middle East interim agreement caused a setback in our relations?

A. As you know, no specific date for General Secretary

Brezhnev's visit has ever been ~~fixed~~ ^{set so its inaccurate} down, but we have ~~said that he would visit the U.S. subsequent to signing a SALT II Agreement.~~ ^{to talk about postponements.}

I would refer you to Secretary's Kissinger's remarks of yesterday on this question.

IF PRESSED:

He made the following points:

1. The basic issues on SALT were settled at Vladivostok.
2. There are two or three issues of great importance on which agreement has not yet been reached, but on which if agreement were reached, the negotiation could be concluded within six to eight weeks after that.

3. We will discuss the major issues with Gromyko and we still expect to receive the General Secretary in Washington by the end of the year.
4. There is no essential delay; we are on course.

FYI ONLY: See Page 16, transcript of the Secretary's briefing.

September 10, 1975

DIEGO GARCIA

The Washington Post reports 9/9 that more than 1,000 inhabitants of the Island of Diego Garcia were forcibly removed before 1972 to make way for a U. S. Naval Base there. The Pentagon told the Congress in 1972 that the Island was virtually uninhabited. The U. S. Government (State Department) has said that the fate of the islanders now living in poverty on Mauritius is the responsibility of the United Kingdom and Mauritius.

Q. Would you comment on the Post story on the inhabitants of Diego Garcia? Will the U. S. do anything to help them or to repay them for their losses and displacement?

A. I would refer you to the Department of State and also the Department of Defense. I understand they are prepared to address this issue.

Q. Is the Island of Diego Garcia independent territory?

A. The island is British.

FYI ONLY: We want to keep this issue away from the White House and the President since it would involve putting the British out front on this. The State Department will refer to the British jurisdiction on Diego Garcia and to their responsibility for administration of the island. They will probably direct most queries to the British government.