

The original documents are located in Box 26, folder “State Department - Kissinger Press Conferences (3)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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DE RUDKPNQ #0226/1 0201750
O 201734Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN



TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2110

INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2813

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 0226

DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC AND WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT AND
NESSEN, AND REPEAT SCY'S PARTY,

FOR S/RRS FROM FUNSETH

EO 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP, (KISSINGER, HENARY A.)

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S REMARKS AT COPENHAGEN PRESS CONFERENCE
G'S AND A'S.

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE WITH
SECRETARY AND PRIME MINISTER ANKER JORGENSEN:

PRIME MINISTER: I WILL START THIS LITTLE PRESS BRIEFING
TO SAY IT HAS BEEN A PLEASURE FOR US TO HAVE MR. KISSINGER
HERE IN A TOO SHORT STAY, BUT WE ARE WELL SATISFIED BECAUSE
MR. KISSINGER HAS TIME FOR IT. I THINK THE BEST WE CAN
DO IS TO GIVE THE WORD TO MR. KISSINGER AND HE CAN TELL YOU
SOMETHING (EMPHASIS) ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE DISCUSSED.

SECRETARY: MR. PRIME MINISTER AND MR. FOREIGN MINISTER,
FIRST OF ALL I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION AND
ALSO ON BEHALF OF ALL MY COLLEAGUES FOR THE VERY WARM AND
FRIENDLY RECEPTION WE HAVE HAD HERE. I HAVE READ SOME OF
OF THE SPECULATIONS IN THE DANISH PRESS ABOUT THE REASON FOR
MY VISIT HERE AND I WISH I WERE AS COMPLICATED
AND PROFOUND AS THE NEWSPAPERS GIVE ME CREDIT FOR. THIS
MEETING CAME ABOUT BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER VISITED
US IN WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER. HE SUGGESTED THAT ON MY NEXT
VISIT THROUGH COPENHAGEN, ON THE WAY SOMEWHERE, I SHOULD SPEND
SOME TIME, COME INTO TOWN AND CONTINUE THE VERY GOOD EXCHANGE
THAT HE AND I HAD AND HE AND THE PRESIDENT HVE HAD ON THE
OCCASION OF HIS VISIT. IT IS PURE COINCIDENCE THAT I AM
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EUROPEAN SOCIALIST PARTIES. THE PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN
MINISTER AND OUR GOVERNMENT HAVE HAD THE CLOSEST CONSULTATIONS
ON A WHOLE RANGE OF THE SUBJECTS OF COMMON INTEREST, AND

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, LL

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
*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****S COPY

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Q, (DANISH TELEVISION): MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE SOCIALIST PARTIES' DECISION TO LEAVE IT TO EACH NATO COUNTRY WHETHER OR NOT THEY WANT COMMUNISTS IN THEIR GOVERNMENT?

SECRETARY: THE DOMESTIC EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAS TO BE FOR EACH EUROPEAN COUNTRY ITSELF TO DETERMINE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN WE ARE ASKED FOR OUR OPINION, WE GIVE OUR VIEWS AND WE WILL NOT FALSIFY OUR VIEWS. OUR VIEW IS THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WILL HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO, WILL HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN GENERAL. HAVING SAID THAT, I AGREE THAT IT IS UP TO EACH GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW TO PROCEED.

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O 201734Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2111

INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2814

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 0226

Q. CAN YOU SEE A REASON THAT THE FIRST STEPS FOR PEACE YOU MADE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BE DAMAGED BY THE WAR NOW IN LEBANON?

SECRETARY: THE QUESTION IS, WHETHER I BELIEVE THAT THE STEPS TOWARDS PEACE THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST COULD BE JEOPARDIZED BY THE WAR THAT IS NOW FIGHTING, THE CONFLICT IN LEBANON, OF COURSE, THE CONFLICT IN LEBANON IS A TRAGEDY FOR THE COUNTRY AND FOR THE COMMUNITY THAT LIVES IN LEBANON, SECONDLY, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL OF DRAWING IN OUTSIDE POWERS AND THEREFORE IT COULD JEOPARDIZE ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN RECENT YEARS, THE UNITED STATES HAS WARNED ALL THE INTERESTED PARTIES, AND I WANT TO REPEAT IT HERE, AGAINST ANY UNILATERAL ACT THAT COULD LEAD TO AN EXPANSION OF THE CONFLICT IN LEBANON TO WIDER AREAS, AND THE UNITED STATES WILL OPPOSE ANY UNILATERAL ACT BY ANY COUNTRY THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN EXPANSION OF HOSTILITIES. FURTHER THAN THIS, WE BELIEVE, THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS AN OBLIGATION TO END THE KILLING THAT IS GOING ON IN LEBANON AND TO USE ITS MEDIATING EFFORTS TO PERMIT BOTH COMMUNITIES TO COEXIST IN PEACE AS THEY HAVE FOR SO MANY DECADES AND TO PUT AN END TO THE CIVIL STRIFE THAT NOW GOES ON.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, THERE ARE RUMORS THAT YOU ARE CONTEMPLATING TAKING UP THE STEP-BY-STEP DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGAIN.

SECRETARY: WELL, NOT BEFORE I HAVE RESTORED MY SANITY FROM THE LAST (LAUGHTER,...)

Q. ARE YOU GOING TO DISCUSS THE MIDEAST SITUATION WITH THE RUSSIAN...WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS AS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IN THOSE DAYS?

SECRETARY: WE WILL...NO DOUBT THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST WILL COME UP, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION IN

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCONCROFT, MCFARLANE, LL

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PAGE 01



POLITICAL FIELDS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IS COMPLICATED BY THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, DO YOU HAVE.....

PRIME MINISTER: JUST A MOMENT, JUST A MOMENT.

Q. IN THE LATEST ISSUE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS QUARTERLY, MR. PAUL NITZE IS WRITING THE UNITED STATES IS MOVING TOWARDS THE POSTURE OF THE MINIMUM DETERRENT IN WHICH WE, THAT IS, THE UNITED STATES, WOULD BE CONCEDED TO THE SOVIET UNION THE POTENTIAL FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL VICTORY IF DETERRENCE FAILS. HAVE YOU ANY COMMENTS ON THAT STATEMENT?

SECRETARY: I TOTALLY DISAGREE WITH THIS. THE UNITED STATES HAS MAINTAINED VERY LARGE STRATEGIC FORCES AND WILL NEVER CONCEDE TO THE SOVIET UNION THE POSSIBILITIES OF MILITARY VICTORY, BUT, WHAT HAS TO BE ACCEPTED IS THE FACT THAT WITH THE MULTIPLICATION OF STRATEGIC FORCES ON BOTH SIDES, THE LIMIT OF WHAT CAN BE STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT IS THAT IT WILL INEVITABLY BE REACHED. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT YOU CANNOT DO ADDITIONAL DAMAGE, BUT IT MEANS THAT AT A CERTAIN LEVEL OF CASUALTIES THAT YOU HAVE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES, ADDITIONAL INCREMENTS WILL NOT MAKE A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DIFFERENCE AND THEREFORE IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT WE MUST MAINTAIN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. WE WILL NEVER CONCEDE STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY TO THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WE MUST ALSO ATTEMPT TO LIMIT THE ARMS RACE IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THIS IS NECESSARY NOT ONLY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT FOR THE WORLD AT LARGE. THIS IS THE REASON I AM GOING TO MOSCOW. IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT BECAUSE WE HAVE TO STRENGTHEN OTHER FORCES WITHIN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR (INAUDIBLE)

Q. (INAUDIBLE, ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION POLICIES AND PROTECTIONIST MEASURES OR PRESSURES IN THE UNITED STATES.)

SECRETARY: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS NOT ALWAYS UNANIMOUS BEFORE IT TAKES DECISIONS, BUT THE POLICIES THAT I HAVE OUTLINED ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION IN SEPTEMBER (INAUDIBLE), SECONDLY, IN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WE WILL DO WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE CONSIDERED LIBERAL AND PROGRESSIVE POLICIES BASED ON OUR CONVICTIONS THAT THE GLOBAL ECONOMY HAS BECOME INTERDEPENDENT; THAT NO NATION CAN SURVIVE BY PURSUING ITS OWN NARROW NATIONAL INTERESTS.

Q. (VALERIANI-NBC) MR. SECRETARY, WHEN YOU SAID THAT SINCE YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW WILL BE COMPLICATED BY THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA, WHAT CARDS DO YOU HAVE TO PLAY?

SECRETARY: I POINTED OUT BEFORE I LEFT THAT BOTH SUPER POWERS HAVE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO CONDUCT THEMSELVES WITH RESTRAINT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE GAINS THEY CAN MAKE IN ONE PLACE WILL SURELY BE OFFSET BY GAINS THE OTHER COUNTRY MAKES SOME OTHER PLACE, BUT THAT A POLICY OF OFFSETTING GAINS WILL LEAD TO THE TRADITIONAL CONFLICTS THAT

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Q. MR SECRETARY, WITH ANGOLA AND WITH COMPLAINTS ABOUT CONTINUOUS SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP, WHICH OPTIMISTIC SIGNS BRING YOU TO MOSCOW NOW?

SECRETARY: I AM GOING TO MOSCOW BECAUSE THE NECESSITIES OF WORLD PEACE ARE NOT AFFECTED BY OUR ELECTORAL PROCESS OR BY THE DAY TO DAY CHANGES IN POLITICS. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IS PARTLY A RESULT OF THE GROWTH OF SOVIET INDUSTRY AND THE GROWTH OF SOVIET TECHNOLOGY AND IT IS WELL WITHIN OUR CAPABILITIES TO MATCH IT AND WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO MAKE SURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT GAIN A MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND WE WILL DO OUR UTMOST TO PREVENT IT. I AM GOING TO MOSCOW IN AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP OPEN THE OPTIONS FOR MORE PEACEFUL FUTURE AND THAT IS AN OBLIGATION ANY NATIONAL LEADER HAS AT THIS MOMENT.

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FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2110

INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2813

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 0226

DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC AND WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT AND
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
SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, LL

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
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O 201734Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2111

INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2814

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 0226

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SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, LL

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1292

UNCLAS SECTO 1034

FOR S/PRS
PASS NSC AND WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROWFT AND NESSEN
EO 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: TEXT OF KISSINGER/BREZHNEV PRESS CONFERENCE

1. SHORTLY BEFORE THE ELEVEN A.M. MEETING, SECRETARY KISSINGER MET WITH BREZHNEV AND GROHYKO BEFORE A POOL OF ELEVEN MEMBERS OF THE U.S. PRESS AND OTHER SOVIET REPORTERS. TAPE RECORDERS WERE NOT ALLOWED, AND WHAT FOLLOWS IS THE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT TAKEN BY THE PRESS POOL.
THE POOL IS IN AGREEMENT THAT THE FOLLOWING WAS SAID.

2. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF PRESS POOL REPORT OF SECRETARY AND BREZHNEV PRESS CONFERENCE JANUARY 21.

3. BEGIN TEXT: THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN THE HALL OF MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS BUILDING IN THE KREMLIN AND WAS INTERPRETED BY INTERPRETERS OF BOTH SECRETARY KISSINGER AND BREZHNEV. BREZHNEV ENTERED FIRST, WEARING A BLUE SUIT, BLUE SHIRT, RED PATTERNED TIE, AND ON THE LEFT SIDE, TWO GOLD STARS AND ORDERS OF LENIN. THE SPEAKERS STOOD BEHIND A LONG TABLE ON WHICH STOOD, AMONG OTHER DRINKS, BOTTLED PEPSI. BLACK AND WHITE PORTRAITS OF MARX AND LENIN WERE ON THE WALL.
BREZHNEV: THIS IS A LINK-UP OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, LIKE SOYUZ AND APOLLO. (TO SECRETARY KISSINGER, AS HE ENTERED) YOU LOOK MUCH YOUNGER.
KISSINGER: YOU LOOK VERY WELL.
B: THANKS FOR THE COMPLIMENT.
K: I'M FAT.
GROHYKO: NO, YOU LOST WEIGHT.
B. TO SONNENFELDT: HERE'S AN OLD ACQUAINTANCE, A TRAVELING COMPANION.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, VANDERHYEFOR NESSEN

PSN:028921 PAGE 01 TOR:021/21:17Z DTG:212020Z JAN 76



REPORTER: WHEN WILL YOUR VISIT TO US TAKE PLACE?
B: THAT ALL DEPENDS ON WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER SAYS.
REPORTER: CAN YOU EVALUATE THE CURRENT STATUS OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS?
B: IT'S HARD FOR ME TO EVALUATE, IT'S UP TO WHAT NICE THINGS KISSINGER HAS TO SAY.
K: I HOPE HE'S FRIENDLIER IN RUSSIAN THAN HE IS IN ENGLISH.
(THIS IS IN REFERENCE TO THE REPORTER.)
REPORTER: WHAT ARE THE CHIEF SUBJECTS OF YOUR TALKS?
B: THE PRIMARY SUBJECT IS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEW SALT AGREEMENT. THERE ARE ALSO QUESTIONS OF THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IN EUROPE AND A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE WORLD IS BIG, AND THE SUBJECTS ARE INEXHAUSTIBLE.
REPORTER: WILL ANGOLA BE AMONG THE SUBJECTS?
B: I HAVE NO QUESTIONS ABOUT ANGOLA. ANGOLA IS NOT MY COUNTRY.
K: IT WILL CERTAINLY BE DISCUSSED.
GROMYKO: THE AGENDA IS ALWAYS ADOPTED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT.
K: THEN I WILL DISCUSS IT.
B: YOU'LL DISCUSS IT WITH SONNENFELDT. THAT WILL INSURE COMPLETE AGREEMENT. I'VE NEVER SEEN HIM HAVE A DISAGREEMENT WITH SONNENFELDT.
REPORTER: THE TWO COUNTRIES EACH HAVE A LARGE EVENT COMING UP ON FEBRUARY 24, THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY AND THE PARTY CONGRESS. DO YOU EXPECT--(INTERRUPTED)
B: THE CONGRESS IS A GREAT EVENT FOR ME, FOR OUR PARTY, AND FOR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. IT IS A GREAT EVENT FOR ME AS THE ONE WHO GIVES THE MAJOR REPORT. IT'S A MEMOROUS OCCASION.
REPORTER: WILL YOU REPORT ABOUT A SALT AGREEMENT?
B: IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED, I WILL TALK ABOUT IT. IF AN AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED BY THEN, AND THERE IS SOMETHING TO REPORT ABOUT IT, I WILL DO SO. OUR PEOPLE ARE USED TO BEING TOLD WHAT IS HAPPENING.
REPORTER: DO YOU HOPE TO VISIT WASHINGTON FOR A SUMMIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE?
B: I EXPECT TO. I CAN'T SAY WHEN. IF I CAN RETURN TO THE FIRST PART OF THE QUESTION, LET ME SAY THE BASIC IMPORTANCE OF THAT VISIT IS THAT AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED. AND THEN COMRADE BREZHNEV CAN GO TO WASHINGTON AND SIGN THE AGREEMENT.
REPORTER: DO YOU EXPECT THESE TALKS TO PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT?
B: I CAN'T GIVE A DEFINITE REPLY BEFORE THE TALKS, BUT I CERTAINLY APPRECIATE YOUR CURIOSITY. YOUR QUESTION CONTAINS YOUR ANSWER.
GROMYKO: THIS IS A DIPLOMATIC ANSWER.
B: (TO THE PRESS) I APPRECIATE YOUR INTEREST. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPECT, AND YOU HAVE TO REALIZE THAT I CAN'T GIVE PRECISE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS BEFORE THIS CONFERENCE. END TEXT



4. THE ABOVE IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE ONLY, AND IS

NOT RPT NOT TO BE ISSUED AS A PRESS RELEASE.
KISSINGER
BT



Nessen

QP IMMED
ESC129
DE RUEHMD #1860 #231545
O 231513Z JAN 76 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 873

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9051
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 253

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 1860
E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: SECVISIT - DEPARTURE REMARKS
STATE FOR S/PRS,

PASS NSC AND WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN
FOLLOWING ARE TRANSCRIBED REMARKS MADE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER TO
MEMB S OF PRESS UPON HIS DEPARURE FROM MOSCOW JANUARY 23. NOT
FOR PRESS RELAEASE.

BEGIN TRANCRIBED REMARKS

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AS IT WAS DESCRIBED EARLIER, WAS MADE?

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Q. DO YOU EXECT TO COME BACK HERE FOR ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS, MR.
KISINGER?

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Q. DO YOU THINK THE GENERAL SECRETARY WILL BE GOING TO WASHINGTON
THIS YEAR?

A. IF THERE IS AN AGREEMENT HE WILL GO, AND WE HOPE TO HAVE AN
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*****WHHR COMMENT*****

VANDERHYE

PSN:030996

PAGE 01

TOR:023/16:06Z

DTG:231513Z JAN 76

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JP 12/19/84



(UNINTELLIGIBLE QUESTION POSED CONCERNING TREATMENT OF LOCAL PRESS DURING TRIP.)

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STOESSEL
BT

OP IMMED
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FM USDEL SECRETARY BRUSSELS

TO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1346

CONFIDENTIAL SECTO 10186

FOR EATON FROM BARBIAN

NO. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) ASEC

SUBJECT: SEC VISIT: DEPARTURE PLANS

REF: MADRID 401

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9051
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E.O. 11652 N/A

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STOESSSEL
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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1346

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BT



90 12/19/84

Nessen/Carlson

January 23, 1976

No. 25

PC 84

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
NATO HEADQUARTERS
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
JANUARY 23, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before we start, I would like to say that this is the last time I will be here while Ambassador Bruce is representing the United States. He is one of the great men in American diplomacy. We will miss him enormously here but, even though he periodically threatens to retire, we will press him into service for something or other when we can catch him unaware. Now we will go to your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there are reports that you have come back from Moscow with a Russian suggestion for lowering the Vladivostok ceiling by some amount and I wonder if you could confirm that and expand on it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I cannot go into the details of the negotiations here. The possibility in certain contexts together with other arrangements of lowering the ceiling was discussed, but I would like to stress that this is in the context of agreement on several other issues and I cannot go any further into it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what are the major unresolved issues now holding up agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, as I said at the Moscow airport, a number of issues were resolved and were passed on to Geneva for technical implementation. Progress of some significance was made on other issues and some other issues still remain to be resolved. The general category of problems connected with BACKFIRE and certain aspects of cruise missiles still requires further study, though progress has been made with respect to some aspects of it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the Middle East this time also -- as a whole or in particular because of the Lebanese problem?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was a general discussion of the Middle East primarily as it relates to the peace process in the Middle East. I hope you realize that these discussions are supposed to be confidential. (Laughter)

QUESTION: (inaudible)



SECRETARY KISSINGER: To ask NATO to intervene in Lebanon? That suggestion was **not** made in Moscow. (Laughter)

QUESTION: On the question of a visit by Mr. Brezhnev to Washington or to the United States, in your opinion, if there is a satisfactory agreement on SALT matters and also if Angola is in a very unsatisfactory condition from the United States' point of view, do you still envisage a Brezhnev visit?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a doubly hypothetical question. We do not assume that Angola must remain in an unsatisfactory state as far as the United States is concerned in a general sense. We have always made clear that our relationship with the Soviet Union depends on restraint in other areas and I have stated publicly on a number of occasions that if any country does not exercise restraint in one area it could set off a process of action and reaction that can only undermine international stability and the prospects of a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. As of now, we are planning, if a satisfactory agreement is reached, to invite the General Secretary to the United States. This is the plan on which we have been operating.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you two questions. Are you going to sign or conclude tomorrow in Madrid the Hispano-American Agreement concerning American bases in Spain and how much money is involved? The second question is this one: in the Presidential election in the United States, if the Republicans win, do you plan to resign as Secretary of State?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you think I am going to do if the Democrats win? (Laughter) With respect to the first question, we have been negotiating with Spain an agreement of cooperation which includes the bases, but extends to other areas as well and I am hopeful that we may be able to sign it on the occasion of my visit to Spain tomorrow. The exact amount that is involved I think we should leave for the occasion of my visit to Spain since some details still have to be worked out. With respect to your second question, I am grateful that you give me so much time -- until the end of this year. The usual question I am asked in the United States is what I intend to do next month. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, to follow up on the first part of that question, this agreement with Spain has been described as a defense treaty. Is that an accurate description?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, it is not an accurate description. It is not a defense treaty. It is a treaty of cooperation. We will probably submit it to the Senate in treaty form, but it is not a mutual defense treaty.

QUESTION: Would you give us your appraisal of the current state of U. S. detente relationships -- what you have learned as a result of your meeting and your current assessment?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our impression is that the Soviet leaders are interested in continuing the detente relationship; and to strengthen it. We believe that the negotiations, with respect to strategic arms limitations, made a positive contribution to that end. At the same time we have repeatedly expressed our view that Soviet and Cuban actions in Angola are not helpful to the detente relationship. So, I would have to call attention to both the pluses and the minuses.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, during the course of the meeting this afternoon, sir, did you ask the allies to make any approaches, diplomatic steps or any other actions to affect the course of events in Angola?



SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. Most of the time this afternoon was spent on my giving my evaluation to my colleagues and the Ambassadors here of my meetings in Moscow. I also gave them the American evaluation of the situation in Angola. We made no request for any particular step and the meeting was not in that context. While we are talking about this afternoon's meeting, I would like to express my appreciation that all but two of my colleagues came here and thereby gave us an opportunity to underscore the great importance we attach to political cooperation within the NATO alliance and the close relationship that in fact exists.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation that a SALT agreement could be reached with the Soviet Union this year?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union this year is possible.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it possible that the new Soviet proposal to reduce the Vladivostok ceiling might serve as a way of breaking the deadlock over the CRUISE-BACKFIRE bomber dilemma?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to make clear that the prospect of reduction is in the context of several other elements of the agreement and it may or may not be included in the final agreement. We will now study carefully the specific Soviet proposals to see whether they lend themselves to adaptation or a response that can bridge the remaining differences.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you get a forewarning of the possible Soviet answer to NATO's proposal tabled in Vienna last December for the troop reductions in the center of Europe?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think I got some indication of what the answer is likely to be and I conveyed it to my colleagues who, of course, never reveal what does on inside the NATO Council meeting room.

QUESTION: A positive answer or a negative one?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't think I should discuss it. At any rate it will be given to us in a few days.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary General, (sic) did you have the impression in Moscow --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You are giving me too high a title. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Did you have the impression in Moscow that the countries of the Warsaw Pact are aware of having taken a lead in the field of armaments? If they are aware of this, why do you think that they continue to arm themselves so rapidly? [*Question asked in French*]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is not a subject that was discussed but it is my impression that in the Communist world the level of sophistication has not yet been reached where people believe that an accretion of power is not politically useful, and therefore they continue to increase their arms. And we have an obligation to match it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what is your opinion about the meeting which is going to take place in Paris tomorrow and the day after tomorrow among Socialists in the Mediterranean area and which is going probably to close the links between Communists and Socialists in the Mediterranean area of Europe?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I do not want to be offensive, but I did not realize there was such a meeting going on. They did not ask my opinion before they called the meeting which wounds me deeply. (Laughter) Therefore, I do not know exactly what is planned for the discussion. I have trouble enough dealing with states without getting involved with political parties.


QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you have the occasion today to have any ~~separate~~ talks with the Turkish Foreign Minister?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I had a brief talk with the Turkish Foreign Minister and I emphasized to him again the strong American interest in a rapid and equitable solution of the Cyprus problem and he expressed his own views on the subject. Of course, we shall meet again in Washington on February 11.

QUESTION: What are you planning to do this evening, please? (Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That subject is still under discussion. (Laughter)

* * * *



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 24, 1976

NO. 195

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
AND
AMBASSADOR L. DEAN BROWN
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING
LONDON
April 23, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ambassador Brown and I have had a very good, very helpful talk. As you know, Ambassador Brown was sent to Lebanon four weeks ago taking leave from his position as President of the Middle East Institute and left within something like twenty-four hours notice. At that time, the situation in Lebanon was chaotic, and the danger of outside intervention was very great. In the interval, partly as a result of his extraordinary efforts, we can now talk about the beginning of a restoration of constitutional government in Lebanon. We discussed such things as the creation of a security force and the danger of the situation in Lebanon escalating into a Middle East crisis has been reduced. We've repeatedly pointed out that it remains a delicate process and that it could easily be upset by irresponsible actions of individuals, actions of outside powers, and the US view is that all of the factions, all of the interested outside powers should continue to exhibit the constructive attitude that has brought matters to this point. Ambassador Brown is going to return to the United States to report to the President. He will then return to Lebanon for a few days and then he will have completed his mission with great distinction — and as a great service to peace in the area — a great service to the foreign policy of the United States.

QUESTION: What do you mean by the creation of a security force?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as you know, the security force in the country — the military forces, and the police — disintegrated under the impact of the civil war, and when a new President is elected and the government is reconstituted, one of the obvious problem it will face is how to create a force that is responsive to the government and that can interpose itself between the various factions. And there are some ideas on this subject that are now being explored and with which Ambassador Brown has also been helpful.

QUESTION: Will there be Lebanese forces or outside forces?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are talking about Lebanese forces drawn perhaps from some of the factions or separately recruited. We don't want to go into any of the details, but we are specifically talking about Lebanese security forces to deal with Lebanese problems.

QUESTION: Will there be indigenous Palestinians in that security force?

For further information contact:

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE




June 22, 1976

NO. 317

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
PARIS, FRANCE
JUNE 22, 1976

PC 102



SECRETARY KISSINGER: This was supposed to be a joint conference with the Secretary of the Treasury but because of bureaucratic confusions we hadn't realized about his plane -- he has a fixed departure for Poland and he got delayed at OECD. So I will answer all technical economic questions and produce a major crisis in international finance.

Basically, our attempt at the OECD meeting was to call attention to the fact that the industrial democracies possess the resources to have produced the highest standard of living for their peoples of any group, the resources to advance the growth of the developing countries, and indeed the resources to which even countries of different economic philosophy appeal if they want to accelerate their own advance. Therefore the industrial democracies have the opportunity if they coordinate their efforts, to contribute to the overwhelming problem of our period which is to construct an international order, for the first time in history on a global basis, in which all, or at least most nations, have a sense of participation. And at a time when there is so much talk about who is on the rise and who is on the decline, it is important to take stock of the fact that, in the main element of what makes life worthwhile for people, it is the industrial democracies that have the capacity to help both their own people and all of the rest of mankind if they coordinate their efforts and that this is well within their capabilities. This was the major theme of our approach. This is what we asked OECD to join us in doing, and this is the basis for an optimistic appraisal about the prospects of world order in the next decade or so.

With this I will be glad to answer your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I am sure there will be a lot of questions about OECD, so I don't suppose you'll mind if I ask for your comments on the Italian elections.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You know, I didn't see the final results of the Italian election until this morning and we have not yet had an opportunity

For further information contact:

to analyze all its nuances and to discuss it with our colleagues here and in Washington. I would call attention to the fact that the democratic parties, that is the non-Communist, non-fascist parties, have something over 56 percent of the vote, so that the possibility of forming a majority based on democratic parties exists; but the Italian parties will now have to discuss among themselves about how to proceed.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what practical measures has the Congress of your country provided for the survival of the Cyprus Republic?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has repeatedly stated its views that a settlement of Cyprus must respect the dignity and self-respect of the population, that the dividing lines cannot be the existing dividing lines on Cyprus, and that we are in favor of an independent and united Cyprus. We have attempted to bring the two parties together in negotiations at various forums. I think it is safe to say that the Greek and Turkish negotiators throughout history have not found compromise the easiest road for dealing with each other. But the United States strongly supports a negotiated settlement; urges the parties to return to negotiations as rapidly as possible; and we do not exclude putting forward ideas of our own once the positions of the two sides begin to approach themselves more. But as long as the gap between the two parties is as wide as it is, it is very difficult for the United States to put forward a compromise proposal.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are any closer to a settlement of the Lebanese crisis today than we were three days ago?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't see what has changed in the last three days that would make a settlement of the Lebanese crisis easier. The problem remains substantially what it has been all along. The differences between the warring factions in Lebanon have proved extremely complicated to reconcile. Secondly, even when there is a central government there is the problem of how to supply it with a security force that would enable it to make its writ run in all of Lebanon. We strongly support any initiative that brings the conflicting groups together. We favor a negotiation among these factions and among the various groups, and we strongly support a united Lebanon whose independence and sovereignty is respected and in which the various communities can live in security.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in Nairobi the United States expressed reservations concerning the final agreement. Here the United States has refused stabilization of raw materials. Are you intending to place back into question the matter of the consensus secured at UNCTAD?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know exactly what you're referring to. The United States has supported an approach on a case-by-case basis to commodities. It has agreed at UNCTAD and it continues to agree to a schedule by which these commodities should be negotiated. It has suggested that buffer stocks were the most efficient way of doing this and it has agreed to examine funds for each commodity with which to do it. The United States has expressed reservations about a common

fund for all commodities and has not agreed to proceed with this. But the United States is not putting into question the consensus that was achieved at UNCTAD.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you supply something which may be a footnote or may be more than a footnote, to the Lebanese evacuation? Did the United States Government directly contact the PLO or any agency of the PLO to first arrange for the evacuation and, second, to thank them for their support and cooperation during it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States at no time has been in direct contact with the PLO during the evacuation. The United States, of necessity, had to deal through various intermediaries with the PLO. That is to say, other countries that have relations with the PLO contacted the PLO about the physical arrangements in an area that was controlled by Palestinians. It wasn't only the PLO, there were other Palestinian groups that controlled the area from which the evacuation took place. There has been, to the best of my knowledge, no direct contact between the United States and the PLO on the subject, before or subsequent, at any time during the Lebanese (inaudible). All communications have been through intermediaries. And in all cases, except for a general expression of thanks to all people who helped, there were no messages at all. We left it to the intermediaries to arrange what needed to be arranged.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, coming back to the OECD, does the United States subscribe to the OECD thesis that the strategy for the rest of this decade calls for only moderate growth, which implies continued slack and slow improvement in the unemployment rate?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am sorry that my friend Bill Simon isn't here. But I would suppose that any document that we signed we subscribe to. Most of the time that is true.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, there has been a lot of talk about the CIEC Conference in Paris. What concessions would you like to see from the OPEC countries on energy and do you agree with the OPEC analysis that nuclear power cannot make a considerable contribution to the energy balance of the industrialized world?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are at this moment formulating our detailed positions for the CIEC Conference. We have always believed and continue to believe that the CIEC Conference is a principal instrument through which the dialogue between the developed and the developing countries should take place. And we welcome the initiative that brought it into being and brought it to Paris. We will make serious proposals in all of the categories, in all of the four commissions in which CIEC is operating. We don't want to put it in terms of what concessions do we want from any particular group. We will rather put it in terms of a coherent program in which the concessions of both sides are balanced. With respect to nuclear power, I think it is probably correct that nuclear power by itself cannot replace oil as a principal source

energy. And it is for this reason that in my remarks yesterday I called attention to other substitutes for oil. But the fact is that with or without the energy crisis the reserves of petroleum are limited and the industrialized countries, and indeed the rest of the world, have at most the rest of this century to develop significant alternative sources for energy. And this must be a major part of our energy program.

QUESTION: With regard to your remarks in favor of negotiations on Lebanon, how would you assess the prospects for a negotiation now? And two, is your meeting with American Ambassadors from the Middle East tonight related in any way to any new international initiative on a negotiation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Actually, the meeting with the Ambassadors was arranged before the tragic deaths of the two American diplomats in Beirut. It seemed to me then that it was important to have an opportunity to get a first-hand view of our Ambassadors in those countries in the Middle East that are most concerned with the Lebanon crisis. And also to give us an opportunity how to avoid misconceptions about what role the United States may or may not have played in particular events. Out of this meeting today I do not expect an American peace initiative for Lebanon; but we will continue, as we have in the past, to support any peace initiative in Lebanon that is promising. The tragedy of Lebanon must be ended as rapidly as possible, and our Ambassadors will be instructed to use their maximum influence and to offer their fullest cooperation to the governments in the area in that effort. But the meeting today is confined to Lebanon and is not dealing with Middle East peace in general.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in all your negotiations do you find it more difficult now to negotiate since it is an election year?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My megalomania, of course, reaches levels in which an admission of inadequacy is next to inconceivable. But it is obvious that in an election year other countries are asking themselves as to the continuity of American foreign policy. It is my belief that the main lines of our foreign policy reflect the permanent interests of the United States and will be continued. And I must honestly say I have not found that there is a significant inhibition to the conduct of our diplomacy, despite the excitement that is occurring in the United States.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, regarding Lebanon, can you tell us if there is any promise in either the French proposal for a roundtable or for the French proposal for a French force in Lebanon?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the idea of a roundtable in Paris, the United States does not want to commit itself to any one particular formula. We would certainly think that a roundtable in a place that appears neutral to most of the participants would be an obvious solution. And if all of the parties were to agree to come to Paris, we would think

that was a reasonable venue and we would support it. We have not put forward any particular locale, but we would not only have no objection to Paris, we would think it has something to commend it. With respect to the French force, as I understand the French proposal, it is that if all the parties ask for French participation, as well as the states most concerned, like Syria and Egypt, and if there are conditions of cease-fire, then France would be prepared to send forces to help assure the cease-fire for a limited period of time. If all of these conditions are met, the United States would believe that a French force, especially under the conditions which now exist, might play a useful role. It is not, however, for us to say whether a French force should go to Lebanon. It depends, as President Giscard himself has pointed out, on the wishes of the Arab parties concerned and on a prior achievement of a cease-fire. If all of those conditions are met, the United States would certainly not object to such a force.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how did the OECD meeting contribute to the Puerto Rico summit that is planned for this weekend, and what do you see as the relationship?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The major topics that were raised at OECD will also be raised at the Puerto Rico summit, and the OECD meeting gave an opportunity to exchange in a wider circle some of the issues that will be discussed intensively in Puerto Rico, and they raised the questions which the heads of governments will deal with in greater detail. The basic reason for the summits that have taken place within the last year has been the conviction that the industrial democracies owe it to their people to demonstrate that they are in control of their destinies and that they are willing to coordinate their policies both for growth and for development and perhaps also in other spheres of economic activity. That will be the basic theme of the Puerto Rico summit and in this sense the OECD meeting should be viewed as a preparatory conference, although it was obviously not scheduled for that reason.

QUESTION: You spoke of possible political pressures "in the East" as a result of the rapid expansion of East-West trade, on particular Western countries. Can you provide us with some examples of either where this has taken place in the past, or hypothetical illustrations of how it can happen in the future?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What I attempted to do in my remarks yesterday, was to call attention to a series of problems that can arise over the future. I did not refer to any particular difficulties that have in fact occurred. It seems to me, however, that when the trade between the industrial democracies and the state trading systems is increasing at the rate that it is, it would be foolhardy not to look at the problems that could develop over the future. Obviously state trading systems, being centrally controlled and subject to immediate political direction, can switch their purchases rapidly from one country to another; and they can, therefore, if the trade has reached a certain level, bring about a situation that could have economic consequences.

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They could cut off deliveries of what they have agreed to do, rapidly; and therefore what we would like to do is to review the whole range of problems that could arise and to establish for ourselves some guidelines by which the industrial democracies could cooperate; because many of these difficulties that one foresees could theoretically be dealt with by some of the methods that were tried out in the IEA without any detriment to the overall level of trade, and indeed, to its encouragement.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we might ask you again a little bit more about your reaction to the Italian election. Now you said you have not yet had a chance to study the nuances. However, the bare numbers are there. I wonder if you could categorize your reaction in some way. For example, do the results in any way justify the alarm that you expressed prior to the vote -- the alarm, that is, of a possible Communist participation in the government?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I never expressed unprovoked alarm. And I think it would be important for the European press to understand that almost all of my comments on the subject were elicited with my, I must say, not very excessive reluctance. But nevertheless the essential problem which we confronted in the spring has not been fundamentally changed by the Italian election: namely, whether the necessary reforms in Italy should be carried out by a coalition of democratic parties or whether they should be carried out with a participation of the Communist party. The possibility exists, as I pointed out, on the basis of the election, to form a coalition of democratic parties, since there is something like 56 percent of parties that are neither Communist nor fascist. It is now up to the Italian political parties to decide which way they want to direct Italian politics, and beyond this I am not prepared to go today.

QUESTION: Will the EEC participate in the Puerto Rico summit?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The participation of the EEC is a question that is for the Europeans to resolve and not for the United States, and therefore we will wait to get a European reaction.

QUESTION: Regarding your statements on energy yesterday, do you expect non-IEA countries like France to join the IEA in an attempt to form a common front?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have in fact achieved a high degree of cooperation between France and the IEA, and we are prepared to proceed on a pragmatic basis. That is to say, we are interested in the results and not in the legal structure, and I believe it would be possible to work out a parallel program between the IEA and France within either the framework of the OECD or through bilateral arrangements. We do not

insist that France join the IEA, and we believe that the program we propose is achievable without formal participation of France.

QUESTION: Can you elaborate on your statement on Cyprus with particular reference to the dividing line?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have said before that it seems to us that the present dividing lines should not be the permanent dividing lines on Cyprus. What the exact dividing lines should be is what the negotiation is supposed to accomplish; and we have urged both parties to negotiate these issues as rapidly as possible for the sake of the population of Cyprus, which has suffered enough, and for the sake of peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you give us some idea of the impact of the events in South Africa on your approach to your talks with Prime Minister Vorster?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The purpose of my meeting with Prime Minister Vorster has been to contribute to a peaceful evolution of the problems of South Africa, an evolution which would enable all communities there to live with each other, with recognition of each other's dignity, and which at the same time would avoid outside intervention and move toward a majority rule, respect for the minority rights and negotiations. The meeting with Prime Minister Vorster resulted from the fact that all black African leaders with whom I spoke on my recent trip urged me to bring South Africa into this process. And within the United States I was urged by the Black Caucus to bring South Africa into this process. Last week, after the riots in South Africa, I met with 40 African Ambassadors in Washington, and they unanimously asked me to go ahead despite the riots, because the riots underline the urgency of the situation. As far as the United States is concerned, I expressed our strong opposition to the system of legalized separation of the races that is taking place in South Africa. We joined the United Nations Security Council consensus and made a separate statement expressing our strong opposition to the violence that was used in the face of the demonstrations. And we regret that the meeting with the Prime Minister is taking place in these circumstances. But precisely because South Africa is such an essential part of any attempt to bring about a negotiated solution in southern Africa, because the problems will not be easier four or eight weeks from now, we have decided to go ahead with these meetings -- in full consultation with all interested black African states, with whose leaders we have been in close contact prior to this meeting, and with whom we hope to be in close contact after this meeting. The United States is attempting to move matters to a solution through negotiation rather than through violence. And it will attempt to do what it can to avoid outside intervention and to permit a solution in which African problems are solved by African nations, and we are doing this in the closest cooperation with all the states of Africa. It is in this spirit and not in any sense as an endorsement of anything that is going on in South Africa -- quite the contrary -- that I am meeting the South African Prime Minister tomorrow.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, back to the Middle East for a moment, please. There is a report -- I have not seen the report fully -- out of Israel, that you have told Ambassador Dinitz that for the transitional quarter Israel will have to get along with \$200 million instead of the \$500 million voted by Congress. Now I realize that reports get garbled; and as I say I have not seen the report, so could you clarify this? Has there been such a decision made by the Administration to cut Israel's aid during the transitional quarter, and if so, why?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, it is incorrect to characterize this as cutting Israel's aid. The problem has been how much should be added to aid for Israel during the transitional quarter. The President has been attempting to work out a compromise with interested members of the Congress on the amount of aid for Israel, between the sum of \$500 million that has been requested by Israel as an addition to the sums

that have already been appropriated and what he feels is possible and will still meet his budgetary ceiling. To the best of my information this sum is still under negotiation and therefore any particular figure would be incorrect.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you refer to intermediaries between the United States and the PLO. May I ask if Egypt played a part in this capacity? May I ask you about the prospect for a Geneva meeting?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, "intermediary" between the United States and the PLO is perhaps too sweeping a word. The United States had the practical problem of evacuating citizens from areas that were controlled by Palestinians, and therefore it was necessary to make certain technical arrangements with the Palestinians. In this respect the Government of Egypt played an extremely helpful role for which we are very grateful, and we dealt with it by stating our requirements to the Government of Egypt, which then dealt with whatever group they felt was necessary to achieve it. But they did not pass any messages from us to any other group. It was done by the Government of Egypt on its own authority. There were other Arab governments such as the Governments of Saudi Arabia and of Tunisia that were extremely helpful in arranging the evacuation, and we have thanked them. The President has sent messages to all of them. With respect to the resumption of the Geneva Conference, the United States has expressed its view that an extended stagnation of conditions in the Middle East would be dangerous to the peace of the area. We, therefore, support a peace process which in our view now should proceed on all fronts, either in stages or toward the final settlement, whichever the parties agree to. We are prepared for a resumption of the Geneva Conference; we are prepared to do it in any other forum that indicates progress. We at one point proposed the preparatory conference in order to examine what could be done, but we are open-minded in this matter. The major objective is to make realistic progress, and we are in touch with all of the parties in order to achieve it.

Thank you.

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AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 816

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 MUNICH 1445

SECSTATE FOR S/PRS AND EUR/CE; DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR
MR. SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. NESSEN; USIA
FOR IOP/M; IPS; ISB; IEU; FC/STRICKER, NEW YORK
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: GW, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM REPORT OF PRESS CONFERENCE
HELD BY SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINIS-
TER GENSCHER AT FURSTENFELDBRUCK AIRPORT (NEAR MUNICH)
AT 1500 HOURS JUNE 24, 1976:

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
I PRIMARILY WANT TO TAKE THIS OPORTUNITY TO THANK THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE FOREIGN
MINISTER FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WERE MADE FOR MY
MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA. THE
ARRANGEMENTS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER AND ALL THE
TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS WERE EXTRAORDINARILY EFFICIENT,
AND WITH THE COMPLICATED TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS
WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, TO THE CHANCELLOR AND TO
THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE PERSONAL INTEREST THEY
HAVE TAKEN IN THIS. I HAVE HAD A DISCUSSION WITH THE
FOREIGN MINISTER HERE AND, OF COURSE, AS YOU KNOW, THE
STATE OF OUR CONSULTATION IS NOW SUCH THAT WHEN WE DON'T
SEE EACH OTHER FOR THREE DAYS WE BOTH BECOME VERY
LONELY, AND WE WILL SEE EACH OTHER AGAIN THIS WEEKEND.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT: VANDERHYE FOR NESSEN

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BUT I REPORTED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA AND HIS COLLEAGUES AND WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE PREPARATIONS FOR PUERTO RICO, WHERE WE WILL OF COURSE MEET AGAIN THIS WEEKEND. THAT IS ALL I WANT TO SAY NOW.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU TELL US A BIT MORE ABOUT YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER?
K. I CAN'T REALLY ADD A GREAT DEAL TO WHAT IS ALREADY BEEN SAID. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I REVIEWED IN GREAT DETAIL ALL OF THE ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MOVING MATTERS TOWARDS A SOLUTION AND AVOIDING THE THREATENING CONFLICTS IN THAT AREA, WE LOOKED AT ALL THE POSSIBILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED BY VARIOUS PARTIES. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS TO RETURN TO SOUTH AFRICA TO TALK TO HIS COLLEAGUES AND TO REFLECT ABOUT MATTERS, AND WE WILL FOLLOW UP THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS AND STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MOVE MATTERS FORWARD. THE UNITED STATES STANDS BY THE POLICY WHICH HAS BEEN ANNUNCIATED IN LUSAKA, AND ANY SOLUTION IN WHICH WE PARTICIPATE WILL BE IN THAT FRAMEWORK.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE PRIME MINISTER'S REACTIONS?

K. I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO CHARACTERIZE THE REACTIONS IN ANY OTHER WAY THAN THAT THERE WAS A FULL AND DETAILED EXPLORATION OF ALL THE METHODS THAT MIGHT BE USED TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION, AND I BELIEVE THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AND OF THE NEED FOR - AND OF THE URGENCY - WITH WHICH THE SOLUTION MUST BE SOUGHT.

Q. (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

K. WELL, I THINK IT IS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THIS UNTIL FURTHER DISCUSSIONS CAN HAVE BEEN HELD, AND I WILL ALSO SEND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS TO AFRICA TO REPORT TO THE LEADERS OF THE BLACK AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT ARE MOST CONCERNED WITH THESE MATTERS, AND ASK IF WE HAVE THEIR OPINION. THEN WE CAN BE MORE SPECIFIC.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOUR SPEECH IN LUSAKA PUT AN EMPHASIS ON RHODESIA. WERE YOUR TALKS PRIMARILY ABOUT RHODESIA, OR DID YOU SPEND A GREAT DEAL OF TIME ON SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF?

K. WE SAID THAT ALL THE PROBLEMS - OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHICH INCLUDES RHODESIA, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA, WERE DISCUSSED.

Q. COULD YOU EXPAND ON THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTH AFRICA. I AM NOT SO SURE OF WHAT IT IS (UNINTELLIGIBLE).

K. WELL, WE HAVE STATED, I STATED, IN LUSAKA THAT THE UNITED STATES IS AGAINST THE INSTITUTIONALIZED AND

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LEGALIZED SEPARATION OF THE RACES, AND WE, I REPEAT, DISCUSSED ALL THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU SAID BEFORE THE MEETING BEGAN THAT YOU BELIEVE THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S PARTICIPATION WAS NECESSARY TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF (UNINTELLIGIBLE) IT IS YOUR IMPRESSION THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN (UNINTELLIGIBLE) ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION?

K. WELL, I THINK THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA WILL HAVE TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF, BUT THE DISCUSSIONS STARTED FROM THAT ASSUMPTION, AND WERE CARRIED OUT IN THAT FRAMEWORK. WHAT IN FACT CAN BE DONE AND WHAT WILL BE DONE WILL BE DETERMINED IN THE NEXT WEEKS AND MONTHS, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS THAT WE HAVE STARTED IN APRIL IS STILL UNDER WAY AFTER THESE DISCUSSIONS.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DID THE PRIME MINISTER GIVE MUCH INSPIRATION ABOUT... WHITES (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

K. WE HAVE ALWAYS STATED THAT A SOLUTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY THE CLAIMS OF THE MAJORITY BUT THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY, AND A SOLUTION MUST BE SOUGHT IN THE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH ALL COMMUNITIES CAN EXIST WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF DIGNITY AND SELF-RESPECT.

Q. (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

K. THE UNITED STATES HAS STATED ITS VIEWS ON THAT SUBJECT IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE LAST SATURDAY, AND THESE VIEWS ARE UNCHANGED.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU MENTIONED YOU WILL TALK WITH CALLAGHAN TOMORROW... (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

K. OF COURSE, I CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. I PLAN TO SEE MR. CROSSLAND AND MR. CALLAGHAN TOMORROW, AND THEN OVER THE WEEKEND IN PUERTO RICO WE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO OUR OTHER COLLEAGUES FROM OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. I WOULD THINK THAT BRITAIN HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO RHODESIA, AND I WOULD HOPE THAT BRITAIN WILL PARTICIPATE AND PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE RHODESIAN QUESTION. BUT I WOULD FIRST LIKE TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.

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 AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 817

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 MUNICH 1445

SECSTAE FOR S/PRS AND EUR/CE; DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR
 MR. SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. NESSEN; USIA
 FOR IOP/M; IPS; IBS; IEU; FC/STRICKER, NEW YORK
 Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOUR SOUTH AFRICAN... (UNINTELLIGIBLE)
 K. WELL, I DON'T THINK MATTERS HAVE REACHED A POINT
 WHERE ANY SPECIFIC DECISIONS CAN BE COMMUNICATED TO
 ANYBODY, AND OF COURSE YOU WILL HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND
 THAT IN THIS WHOLE PROCESS WE HAVE TO STAY IN TOUCH,
 BOTH WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA AS WELL AS
 WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF BLACK AFRICA. WE ALSO HAVE TO
 BE, WE INTEND TO BE, IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH AND CONSULTA-
 TION WITH WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE AN INTER-
 EST IN THIS SUBJECT, AND IT IS QUITE PREMATURE TO TALK
 OF ANY INTERMEDIARIES.
 Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU SAID BEFORE YOU SET OUT THAT
 ONE OF THE THINGS YOU WANTED TO FIND OUT WAS (UNINTEL-
 LIGIBLE) SEPARATE RHODESIA FROM SOUTH-WEST AFRICA. DO
 YOU HAVE A BETTER IDEA WHAT THAT IS NOW?
 K. WELL, I HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF THE VIEWS OF THE
 SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES, BUT OF
 COURSE HE WILL HAVE TO SPEAK FOR HIMSELF. I THINK WE
 HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE FRAMEWORK, THAT THE PROCESS,
 IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED, IS CONTINUING, AND THAT THE
 FRAMEWORK FOR IT IS UNCHANGED, AND YOU MAY BE ABLE TO
 DRAW SOME CONCLUSIONS FROM THAT.
 Q. MR. SECRETARY, AS A RESULT OF THESE MEETINGS HAVE
 YOU DECIDED WHEN YOU WILL ASK FOR... (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

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K.: WELL, THIS IS A QUESTION FOR THE PREVIOUS PRESIDENT TO DECIDE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ASSESSMENT OF HIS LEGISLATIVE ADVISERS AS TO THE SITUATION IN THE CONGRESS. I HAVE NOT SO DISTINGUISHED MYSELF IN MY UNDERSTANDING OF CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT THAT MY RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE DECISIVE, BUT WE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ASK FOR IT, AND...

Q.: THERE IS INDEED, BUT THE POINT IS THAT DO THE DISCUSSIONS DO ANYTHING ABOUT ACCELERATING OR DEALYING YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS?

K.: THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE ARE ESSENTIALLY NOT RELEVANT TO THE DECISION THAT WE WILL MAKE WITH RESPECT TO THE BYRD AMENDMENT.

Q.: (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

K.: WELL, I REALLY THINK THAT IS A QUESTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA HAS TO ANSWER, WHICH PERHAPS IS PUT THIS WAY IN A SLIGHTLY EXTREME FORM. THE PROBLEM IS WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO START AN EVOLUTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IN WHICH THERE IS SUFFICIENT GUARANTEES FOR MINORITIES, SO THAT THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE WANT IS BEARABLE FOR THE MINORITIES. THIS IS THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM, AND IT SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED IN TERMS OF SEPARATING ONESELF FROM ANY PARTICULAR GROUP.

Q.: AND DID YOU GET AN ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION?

K.: WELL, AS WE HAVE ANNOUNCED, WE DISCUSSED ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

Q.: MR. SECRETARY, YOU SPOKE BEFORE OF SETTING UP A PROCESS AS A RESULT OF THESE MEETINGS. DID YOU GET ANY FINAL ANSWER? DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED THIS PROCESS... (UNINTELLIGIBLE)?

K.: I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY SOLUTION, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS IS IN MOTION, AND WE HOPE, AS WE HAVE HOPED FROM THE BEGINNING, TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD A RESOLUTION THAT IS ACHIEVED BY NEGOTIATION AND NOT BY VIOLENCE, AND WHICH RESPECTS THE DIGNITY OF ALL THE PEOPLES IN THE AREA, AND I BELIEVE THAT THIS PROCESS IS IN MOTION.

GENSCHER (TRANSLATED BY HEINZ WEBER): I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY LIKE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS UNDERTAKING EFFORTS TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS BESETTING SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND WE ARE UNDERTAKING THESE EFFORTS TOGETHER WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. AND THAT IS WHY THE INFORMATION WE RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR US, SINCE THE CHANCELLOR IS SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA TOMORROW TO EXPRESS AND PUT BEFORE HIM THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AS

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I DID LAST TUESDAY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, THEREFORE I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY AGAIN TO THANK THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE INFORMATION HE HAS BEEN MAKING AVAILABLE TO ME. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

FOLLOWING THE PRESS CONFERENCE THERE WAS A SHORT INTERVIEW IN GERMAN CONDUCTED BY A CORRESPONDENT OF THE GERMAN SECOND TELEVISION CHANNEL. A TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

Q.: DR. KISSINGER, DOES NOT THE DANGER EXIST THAT, DUE TO THE HARD ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS, THE PROBLEMS OF THIS REGION CANNOT BE SOLVED PEACEFULLY?

K.: I DO NOT WANT TO EVALUATE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS NOW, AND I DO NOT REGARD IT AS INEVITABLE THAT THE ATTITUDE WILL REMAIN HARD. WE THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE PROBLEMS BE SOLVED PEACEFULLY, AND WE WILL USE OUR INFLUENCE IN THIS DIRECTION.

Q.: WHICH POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCES? HOW CAN THIS THEN BE CONCRETE?

K.: THIS WILL BECOME APPARENT DURING THE NEXT MONTHS. PERHAPS IT IS POSSIBLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS PEACEFULLY, BUT WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION, NOT ONLY TOWARD OUR PEOPLE, BUT ALSO TO WORLD PEACE, TO DO EVERYTHING TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS IN A PEACEFUL WAY. AND THIS WE ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO DO.

Q.: DR. KISSINGER, YOU STATED ONCE THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE A SECOND ANGOLA. DOES THIS MEAN THAT AMERICA INCLUDES IN THIS OPERATION A REAL MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THIS REGION?

K.: I BELIEVE THAT THESE PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF A MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, AND THIS POSSIBILITY WAS IN NO WAY DISCUSSED.

QMS MR. GENSCHER, IN WHAT WAY CAN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, CAN THE EUROPEANS, SUPPORT HIS POLICY?

GENSCHER: FIRST, OUR INTERESTS ARE THE SAME. WE WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE INTEREST OF THE HUMAN BEINGS, BLACK AND WHITE, WHO LIVE THERE, BUT WE HAVE NO REASON THAT DISPUTES THERE BE USED BY OTHERS TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE. AND THAT IS WHY WE, EXPLOITING THE POSSIBILITIES AT OUR DISPOSAL - OUR RELATIONS, THE POSSIBILITY TO CONDUCT TALKS - AS THEY EXIST THIS WEEK BECAUSE OF MY TALKS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND TOMORROW BECAUSE OF THE TALK BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR AND THE PRIME MINISTER, TO REALLY APPLY THEM IN ORDER TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS AND THEREBY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMATION OF OPINION.

Q.: DR. KISSINGER, DID YOUR TALKS OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT PERHAPS THE PROBLEM OF NAMIBIA WILL BE RESOLVED? WAS PERHAPS, ALSO THE PROBLEM OF RACE SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA MENTIONED?

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
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K.1 WE SAID THAT ALL PROBLEMS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, AND, OF COURSE, THERE PROBLEMS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED.

Q.1 IN THIS REGARD ARE YOU MORE OPTIMISTIC OR PESSIMISTIC?

K.1 IT IS TOO EARLY TO GIVE AN EVALUATION. I WANT TO ADD THAT WE WILL COOPERATE MOST CLOSELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AND THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, THAT WHITES AS WELL AS BLACKS CAN LIVE TOGETHER AND WE WILL STRIVE FOR THIS IN ALL PARTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGION.

Q.1 THANK YOU VERY MUCH. BETTS
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SECSTATE FOR S/PRS AND EUR/CE; DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR
MR. SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. NESSER; USIA
FOR IOP/M; IPS; IBS; IEU; FC/STRICKER, NEW YORK
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: GW, QVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: TEXT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S REMARKS ON
ARRIVAL AT HOTEL SONNENHOF, GRAFENAU, FOLLOWING TALKS
WITH PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, JUNE 23, 1976.
QUESTION: HOW DID THE TALKS GO TODAY?
SECRETARY: WE'VE HAD A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE
SITUATION AND WE'RE GOING TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW, SO
IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO CHARACTERIZE THEM, ONE WAY OR
THE OTHER.
QUESTION: IN GENERAL TERMS DID YOU LAY OUT YOUR
FEELINGS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA AS WE'VE HEARD THEM
EXPRESSED IN VARIOUS PUBLIC FORUMS?
SECRETARY: WE LAID OUT THE WHOLE SITUATION WITH
RESPECT TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND SO DID THE PRIME
MINISTER AND WE INDICATED THE DIRECTION WHICH WE THINK
THINGS SHOULD MOVE, AND WE'LL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW.
QUESTION: AND THERE ARE NO REAL DEPARTURES FROM OUR
BASIC ATTITUDE?
SECRETARY: NO, OUR ATTITUDE REMAINS UNCHANGED.
QUESTION: WERE THE TALKS FRIENDLY?
SECRETARY: IT'S A VERY VERY BUSINESSLIKE CONSTRUCTIVE
MEETING? BUT YOU KNOW OBVIOUSLY NO CONCLUSIONS COULD



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BE REACHED.

QUESTION: DID HE INDICATE ANY DIRECTIONS IN WHICH THINGS OUGHT TO BE LAID OUT?

SECRETARY: NO, I TOLD YOU BEFORE I CAME HERE THAT THIS IS NOT DESIGNED TO COME TO ANY FINAL CONCLUSIONS, BUT IT WAS A VERY FULL REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA BASED ON OUR KNOWN POSITIONS, AND HOW TO MOVE TOWARD THE OBJECTIVES WE'VE PUBLICLY STATED, WHICH WE ARE NOT MODIFYING.

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6429

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 LAHORE 1892/1

USIA FOR IBS, IPS, IOP, INA
E.O. 11652/N/A

TAGS: OYIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: DR. KISSINGER'S AUGUST 9 LAHORE PRESS CONFERENCE TEXT
FOLLOWING IS TEXT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT
LAHORE AIRPORT UPON DEPARTURE AUGUST 9:

QUOTE I WOULD LIKE, BEFORE I TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS, TO MAKE TWO
POINTS, FIRST, ON BEHALF OF MY COLLEAGUES AND MY FAMILY AND
MYSELF, I WOULD ONCE AGAIN WANT TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. BHUTTO
FOR THE EXTRAORDINARILY WARM RECEPTION THAT WE HAVE HAD HERE.
OUR TALKS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED WITH A CORDIALITY THAT HAS MARKED
OUR RELATIONSHIP AND I CONSIDER THEM BOTH WIDE-RANGING AND VERY
CONSTRUCTIVE. SECONDLY, ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT, I WANT TO
EXPRESS THE SYMPATHY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THE DISASTER
THAT HAS BEFALLEN PAKISTAN IN THE FLOOD, AND WE ARE MAKING
AVAILABLE 250,000 TONS OF WHEAT UNDER PL-480 TO ASSIST IN THE
RECOVERY. THOSE ARE THE TWO THINGS THAT I WANTED TO SAY
AND NOW I WILL BE GLAD TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS. PERHAPS WE CAN
START WITH QUESTIONS FROM PAKISTANI JOURNALISTS BEFORE ORDER
BREAKS DOWN WHEN AMERICAN JOURNALISTS ARE ASKING QUESTIONS.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, HAS YOUR VISIT IN ANY WAY CHANGED
PAKISTAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REPROCESSING PLANT?
A. ARE YOU PAKISTANI?
REPORTER: PAKISTANI-BASED.
A. WELL, THE ISSUE OF REPROCESSING, AS YOU KNOW, IS AN
EXTREMELY COMPLICATED ISSUE. PAKISTAN HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH

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FRANCE ON A REPROCESSING PLANT FOR MANY YEARS AND HAS CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO IT, THAT AGREEMENT HAS ALL THE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS THAT WERE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE AT THE TIME THAT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE, AS WE HAVE STUDIED THE PROBLEM, DEVELOPED INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT THE SPREAD OF REPROCESSING PLANTS, EVEN WITH THE SAFEGUARDS THAT WERE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE SEVERAL YEARS AGO, OUR CONCERN IS NOT DIRECTED TOWARDS THE INTENTIONS OF PAKISTAN, BUT TOWARDS THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH CAN HAVE, IN OUR VIEW, DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE OF MANKIND, THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE TALKS ABOUT THESE TWO, ABOUT THE PROBLEMS THAT ARE PRODUCED BY THESE TWO ATTITUDES, WE HAVE AGREED TO CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD, BUT WE ARE GOING TO CONDUCT THESE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DETERMINATION ON BOTH SIDES THAT THERE WILL BE NO CONFRONTATION ON THAT ISSUE.

Q, SIR, THERE APPEARS TO BE A DICHOTOMY IN THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO THE NUCLEAR EFFORTS IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA, HOW DO YOU RESOLVE THAT?

A, NO, THERE IS NO DICHOTOMY IN THE APPROACH TOWARDS INDIA AND PAKISTAN, WE HAVE DEPLORED, WE HAVE GREATLY DEPLORED, THE INDIAN EFFORT IN SETTING OFF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, AND WE BELIEVE THAT WHAT INDIA HAS DONE IS VERY INIRRICABLE TO THE PROCESS OF PROLIFERATION AND THEREFORE TO THE PROBLEMS OF WORLD PEACE, WE NEVERTHELESS -- AND WE ALSO CAN UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS OF PAKISTAN WITH RESPECT TO THAT -- NEVERTHELESS WE BELIEVE THAT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TECHNOLOGY IS OF SUCH LONG-RANGE DANGER TO THE SURVIVAL OF MANKIND THAT AT SOME POINT THE LINE MUST BE DRAWN, AND THE PROBLEM WE NOW FACE IN THE DISCUSSIONS THAT WE STARTED THIS MORNING IS HOW TO RECONCILE THE PARTICULAR CONCERNS OF ONE COUNTRY WITH THE GENERAL CONCERNS, AND WHILE I DO NOT SAY WE HAVE REACHED A CONCLUSION, IN FACT WE HAVE NOT REACHED A CONCLUSION, WE WILL AS I SAID CONDUCT THESE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ATTITUDE THAT WE WILL AVOID A CONFRONTATION.

Q, SIR, DO YOU GENERALLY BELIEVE THAT DESPITE THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO, THE RATE OF SUPPLY OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN IS RATHER SLOW?

A, WELL, THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY COMPLICATED AS ITS NUMBERS MULTIPLY, AND EVEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS TROUBLE GETTING ANSWERS TO HIS QUESTIONS FROM THE BUREAUCRACY, UNRELATED TO PAKISTAN, I BELIEVE THAT THE REQUESTS THAT HAVE BEEN BEFORE US HAVE BEEN, ARE NOW ALL EITHER ANSWERED OR IN THE PROCESS OF BEING ANSWERED, EXCEPT FOR ONE ITEM, AND I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD NOW.

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Q. SR, DID YOU DISCUSS THE PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE SUBCONTINENT AND THE PROPOSAL PUTTED BY THE SHAHANSRAH OF IRAN ABOUT THE COMMON MARKET COMPRISING PAKISTAN, INDIA AND BANGLADESH, AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THIS REGION? (QUESTION VERY FAINTLY HEARD.) DID YOU DISCUSS THAT?

A. WELL, THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS AT NORMALIZATION IN THIS AREA, AND WE HAVE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE FAR-SIGHTED EFFORTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE BY ALL OF THE PARTIES, BUT WE WOULD LIKE TO PAY PARTICULAR TRIBUTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HIS EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION, AS FOR ANY PARTICULAR SCHEME, SUCH AS THE COMMON MARKET, OF THESE COUNTRIES, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT OPPOSE IT AND IF IT COMMENDS ITSELF TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED, THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME TO BE A MATTER THAT THE PARTIES INVOLVED HAVE TO DECIDE IN NEGOTIATION AMONG EACH OTHER AND IT IS NOT ONE THAT SHOULD APPEAR AS AN AMERICAN SCHEME.

Q. SIR, YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED WHAT OTHER DISPUTES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE BEEN SETTLED, ONLY ONE REMAINS, AS ONE OF THE PARTIES WHO SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION IN THE UN, WILL AMERICA BE PLAYING A HELPFUL ROLE IN THE SOLUTION OF THE KASHMIR? (QUESTION VERY FAINT.)

A. WELL, AS I HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, THIS IS AN ISSUE THAT WILL BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS IN A PRINCIPLED BUT PATIENT MANNER AND TRAY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN HAS NOT ASKED ANY OUTSIDE COUNTRY TO INJECT ITSELF

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IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WELCOME ANY EFFORTS AT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION AND WE ALSO COMMEND THE BASIC ATTITUDE OF NEGOTIATING THIS ISSUE WITH PATIENCE AND ON THE BASIS OF PRINCIPLE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHAT CONNECTION IF ANY IS THERE BETWEEN THE PURCHASE OF A REPROCESSING PLANT AND THE SALE OF AMERICAN WEAPONS TO PAKISTAN?

A. I DO NOT WANT TO SAY MORE ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF REPROCESSING THAN WHAT I HAVE ALREADY STATED. THESE ARE COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS AMONG FRIENDS AND THEY WILL BE DISCUSSED ON THEIR MERITS WITHOUT BLACKMAIL OR PRESSURE BY EITHER SIDE. WE HAVE TO RECONCILE THESE TWO PRINCIPLES THAT I HAVE ENUNCIATED AT THE BEGINNING, THE CONCERN OF PAKISTAN WITH AGREEMENTS IT HAS MADE IN GOOD FAITH ON THE BASIS OF THE KNOWLEDGE IT HAD AT THE TIME OF MAKING IT, AND THE CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NONPROLIFERATION, AND THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL CONTINUE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WILL THE UNITED STATES NOW SELL AIRCRAFT TO PAKISTAN?

A. WELL, I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO ANY PARTICULAR SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. WE WILL LOOK AT PAKISTAN'S REQUESTS WITH A BASIC ATTITUDE OF INTEREST IN THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN AND WE WILL DISCUSS THEM AS THEY COME AND ON THEIR MERITS.

Q. SR, DO YOU REQUIRE SOME FURTHER SAFEGUARDS ON THIS REPROCESSING PLANT? OR IS IT YOUR POSITION THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD NOT HAVE IT AT ALL UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES?

A. WELL, THE PROBLEM OF REPROCESSING IS NOT ONE THAT IS DIRECTED AGAINST ANY ONE COUNTRY. WE HAVE FOR EXAMPLE WORKED OUT SOME ARRANGEMENTS ON REPROCESSING WITH IRAN THAT MAY OR MAY NOT COMMEND ITSELF TO OTHER NATIONS AS THEY STUDY THE PROBLEM OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. WE BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE SHOULD LOOK FOR -- I AM SPEAKING NOW FOR THE UNITED STATES, NOT FOR PAKISTAN -- THE UNITED STATES WILL TRY TO ELABORATE GENERAL PRINCIPLES WITH RESPECT TO REPROCESSING THAT WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL COUNTRIES AND THAT DO NOT INVOLVE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ANY ONE PARTICULAR COUNTRY. AND IT'S WITH THIS ATTITUDE THAT WE CONDUCT OUR CONVERSATIONS ALSO WITH OUR FRIENDS HERE.

Q. (PAKISTANI JOURNALIST -- QUESTION INAUDIBLE)

A. I HAVE NOT SAID THAT ANY CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN REACHED. AND I AM SURE THAT THE PAKISTANI PRESS KNOWS THE PRIME MINISTER IS A MAN OF PRINCIPLE AND OF SPIRIT. ALL I DESCRIBED WAS THE ISSUE AS WE DEFINED IT AND THE ATTITUDE WITH WHICH WE WILL SEEK TO SOLVE IT. AND WE HAVE SOLVED OTHER PROBLEMS BETWEEN US, IN FACT WE HAVE ALWAYS SOLVED PROBLEMS BETWEEN US, AND WE WILL APPROACH IT IN THIS SPIRIT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU SAID THAT THERE WILL BE NO CONFRONTATION, BUT THE U.S. CONGRESS APPEARS TO BE BERT ON CONFRONTATION OVER THIS ISSUE? ON THE BASIS OF YOUR CONVERSATIONS HERE, ARE YOU



CONFIDENT THAT YOU CAN HANDLE THE CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE?

A. WELL, AS I POINTED OUT HE WILL HAVE FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OVER THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD AND HE ARE VERY HOPEFUL TO AVOID CONFRONTATION FROM ANY SOURCE.

Q. SIR, IF PAKISTAN GOES AHEAD WITH THE REPROCESSING PLAN, WILL THIS MEAN A CUT IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID?

A. WELL I THINK THAT IT IS TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO SPECULATE NOW ABOUT EVENTS THAT MAY HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE. I HAVE COME HERE AS A FRIEND AND WE ARE DISCUSSING THESE ISSUE AS FRIENDS SO THERE IS NO POINT IN SPECULATING ABOUT HOW PROVISIONS IN OUR LAW WILL APPLY TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT AT THIS MOMENT DO NOT EXIST.

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Q. SIR, IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY THAT FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANTS WILL BE USED AS SORT OF A REGIONAL CENTER SUCH AS YOU WERE DISCUSSING WITH IRAN? (REMAINDER OF QUESTION UNINTELLIGIBLE.)

A. I JUST DON'T WANT TO GO INTO THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES THAT MAY EMERGE FROM DISCUSSIONS. I HAVE EXPLAINED THE SPIRIT WITH WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED AND THE ATTITUDES THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE, AND FROM THAT IT SHOULD BE APPARENT THAT WE WILL LOOK FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTIONS.

Q. SIR, IS IT TRUE THAT YOUR ATTITUDE, THE US ATTITUDE ABOUT THE REPROCESSING PLANT REMAINS THE SAME THAT IT WAS BEFORE YOUR ARRIVAL IN LAHORE?

A. THE BASIC U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROBLEM OF REPROCESSING AND ITS IMPACT ON NONPROLIFERATION IS AS I HAVE STATED AT THE BEGINNING, IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY UNCHANGED, BUT THAT IS NOT, BUT THIS IS A BASIC ATTITUDE, IT IS NOT TO BE APPLIED TO CONCRETE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THAT IS WHAT WE WILL TRY TO DISCUSS IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.

Q. SIR, THE INDIAN ATOMIC ENERGY CHIEF HAS SAID THAT WITHIN FIVE YEARS INDIA WILL BE SELF-SUFFICIENT IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS. MEANWHILE THE AMERICANS ARE PROVIDING INDIA WITH NUCLEAR FUELS. (PAKISTANI JOURNALIST -- INAUDIBLE)

A. NO THE AMERICAN SUPPLY TO INDIA REFERS TO ONE PARTICULAR CONTRACT THAT HAS BEEN MADE MANY YEARS AGO, CERTAINLY WITH RESPECT TO ANY NEW CONTRACTS THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPACT OF INDIAN ATTITUDES ON THE

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PROBLEM OF NONPROLIFERATION AND WOULD INSIST ON SAFEGUARDS THAT WOULD GIVE US ASSURANCE WITH RESPECT TO THIS. THE ONLY IMMEDIATE ISSUE IS WHETHER A CONTRACT THAT WAS MADE MANY YEARS AGO SHOULD BE FULFILLED WITH RESPECT TO ONE PARTICULAR REACOTH, AND THAT RAISES QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE GENERAL RELIABILITY OF AMERICAN CONTRACTS ONCE THEY ARE MADE. THIS IS THE ISSUE THAT ARISES, BUT IN ANY NEW CONTRACT THAT INDIA WOULD ATTEMPT TO MAKE WITH US, THE BASIC PRINCIPLE I HAVE STATED WITH NONRROLIFERATION WOULD BE STRINGENTLY APPLIED.

Q. SIR, TALKING ABOUT CONTRACTS, IS IT POSSIBLE THAT PAKISTAN CAN NOW BACK OUT OF THE FRENCH DEAL IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT IT HAS ALREADY SIGNED A CONTRACT?

A. I SIMPLY DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO GO INTO ALL THE COMPLEXITIES. THIS IS ONE OF THE ASPECTS OF THE PAKISTAN PROBLEM THAT EXISTS AND OF COURSE, AS THE PRIME MINISTER SAID YESTERDAY, PAKISTAN CONDUCTS A PRINCIPLED POLICY. WE HAVE TO LOOK AT ALL OF THESE ASPECTS IN OUR DISCUSSIONS. AND I WILL NOT NOW PREJUDGE WHAT THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME COULD BE, WHAT SOLUTIONS COULD BE FOUND, IF ANY SOLUTIONS CAN BE FOUND. BUT THE SPIRIT IN WHICH WE HAVE ALWAYS CONDUCTED OUR DISCUSSIONS, AND THE ATTITUDE WHICH WE HAVE DECIDED TO ADOPT, AT LEAST MAKES ME BELIEVE THAT WE WILL GIVE IT A VERY GOOD TRY. I THINK I BETTER GET MY PLANE.

THANK YOU, UNQUOTE

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The Secretary of State



Press Conference

September 11, 1976
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

MAJOR TOPICS: Southern Africa and Lebanon

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before I take questions I wanted to make a few points about the trip to Africa that I am undertaking, starting on Monday.

First, the American diplomatic effort is being undertaken with the support and with the encouragement of all of the parties involved.

Secondly, there is no "American plan." The solutions have to be found in Africa and have to be found by negotiations among the parties.

Third, the United States has agreed to offer its good offices because no other country was available to perform this role and because the risks to world peace of an escalating violence in southern Africa were very severe.

Fourth, war had already started in southern Africa. The danger of its expansion, the danger of foreign intervention, the impact on the national security of the United States and on world peace dictated that we make an effort to find a peaceful solution. The worst that can happen, if this effort fails, is what was certain to happen if the effort is not made.

We are dealing with three problems: Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa—each having different aspects and each having different timetables.

On this trip we will deal primarily with the issues of Namibia and Rhodesia. It is not a negotiation that will lend itself to dramatic final conclusions, because there are, in the case of Rhodesia, four states, four liberation movements, the Rho-

desian settlers in South Africa involved. In the case of Namibia, several African states—again South Africa—the national movement recognized by the Organization of African Unity namely, SWAPO [South-West Africa People's Organization], and several internal groups assembled in a constitutional conference.

We are pursuing this policy, which will not support violence and which stands opposed to foreign intervention, in the interest of world peace, in the national interest of the United States, and above all for the interests of the peoples of Africa.

Now I will be glad to take questions.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, do you think any arrangements you can help to make to resolve the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia can have any lasting relevance and stability in a region where the strongest nation, South Africa, is saying through Prime Minister [John] Vorster that they intend to preserve their system of white rule?

A: The solutions to Rhodesia and Namibia, if they can be achieved, can have a lasting character.

The purpose is to enable a transition to independence in Namibia and to majority rule and protection of minority rights in Rhodesia under conditions that will enable all the communities to live together and in which the bloodshed is put to an end.

The conditions in South Africa are more complicated and require a much longer timespan for their evolution.

Q: Can you go into some detail on the apparent American-British incentive plan to help bring about a transition to black rule in Rhodesia?

There has been a lot of speculation about it. I know you have spoken to people on the Hill about it. Could you provide us with some details?

A: Obviously, any solution in Rhodesia will have to have political components and economic components. It should not be seen as an effort to buy out the white settlers. Rather, Rhodesia is a rich country that can have a substantial economic rate of progress after full independence is achieved.

What we have been discussing with the United Kingdom and with other interested parties is a scheme that can be used either for investment in Rhodesia to spur economic progress or as a safety net for those settlers who want to leave—or for both.

Some of the funds can come from private sources that have economic interests there. Some can come from governments.

The leadership in this effort will have to be taken by the United Kingdom, which has the legal responsibilities for Rhodesia, with our support. We have talked to other countries, and the Government of France has already announced its support. So this plan is going to have a wide basis, but its exact features cannot be discussed until it has evolved further. But its basic philosophy is what I have outlined here.

Q: I would like to ask two questions based on your statement. You say that this is not a negotiation which lends itself to final conclusions; therefore, what would you expect to achieve on this, and when might you get a final conclusion?

And then you also said that the worst that can happen, if the effort fails, is that what was certain to happen, will happen, if the effort was not made. What is that?

A: With respect to the second question: We are facing a situation now in which a so-called "armed struggle" is already taking place in Rhodesia and is beginning in Namibia. The history of these struggles is that they lead to escalating violence, drawing in more and more countries, and have the danger of foreign intervention and the probability of the radicalization of the whole continent of Africa, in which moderate governments will find it less and less possible to concentrate on the aspirations of their people and becoming more

and more focused on events in southern Africa. For this reason, we want to provide a nonviolent alternative to this prospect.

Now this prospect is before us. This prospect has a short time limit, and, therefore, it cannot wait for our own electoral processes and this is what will almost certainly happen if efforts of negotiation fail.

Now I have forgotten your first question.

Q: The first question was that in your statement you said: This is not a negotiation that will lend itself to dramatic conclusions—

A: That's right.

Q: What do you expect to achieve, and when might you expect a final conclusion?

A: As I pointed out, we are dealing with about eight parties on the side of black Africa. In Rhodesia we are dealing with the white settlers, and we are dealing with South Africa. And in Namibia also we are dealing with many different groups.

Therefore, in both cases, an objective is to establish a framework for negotiations in which, then, the details will have to be worked out by the various parties concerned. We cannot supply the details by which transitions to independence are achieved. What we can do is to bring the parties sufficiently close so that they think a negotiating effort—they believe in a negotiating effort—and perhaps establish some of the basic conditions for the negotiations.

Whether this can be achieved in both cases in one trip, I would question; but progress toward these objectives can be made.

Q: How important is it to end the guerrilla struggle that is already taking place on Rhodesia's borders, and beginning in Namibia? And will you seek any commitments from the front-line nations to diminish their support of the guerrilla struggle, if you succeed in creating the conditions for a majority rule in Rhodesia?

A: I think everybody agrees that if a peaceful solution can be found, that then there is no purpose in a guerrilla struggle. So the problem is: Can one find conditions in which all parties can agree to this?

But as I pointed out, the United States does not support violent solutions when peaceful alternatives are available.

Q: Why do you feel that you, yourself, should engage in a shuttle diplomacy? Why cannot this be done through more orthodox diplomatic channels? While there has been widespread support on the Hill, one Congressman yesterday characterized this mission as "Lone Ranger" diplomacy, and I wonder if you would address yourself to why you feel you, yourself, must be involved.

A: That Congressman was not very original, it seems to me. He plagiarized a Southern Governor. [Laughter]

We have had three missions in Africa. The British have had two. And a point has clearly been reached where, since the presidents of so many black African states are involved as well as the leaders of southern Africa, that matters cannot be brought beyond this point by the exchanges of notes, by referring documents back for detailed instructions, and that what is needed now is an impetus in which the negotiations can be conducted somewhat more flexibly.

This is true especially in South Africa, as well, where some difficult decisions have to be taken.

So this is what led all of the parties concerned to believe that this was the best way to proceed.

Q: There are reports that you will be seeing some black African leaders within South Africa itself. Now you mentioned earlier that you didn't expect to accomplish anything on the South African question on this particular trip. What would be the purpose of your meeting with black Africans within South Africa?

A: I expect to meet representatives of all communities in South Africa, and not only of the white community, primarily to inform myself on conditions there so that I can form a better judgment of what the right American policy might be.

Q: Many Americans believe that there is no U.S. interest in southern Africa and that our national security is not concerned there. You, however, have a contrary view, and I wonder if you can elaborate on that a bit more.

A: As I pointed out, at issue is not only the future of two states in southern Africa but the potential evolution of all of Africa with its profound impact on Europe and on the Middle East.

It is the fixed American policy that solutions to complicated international issues should not be sought by violence. And conversely, if the principle

of violent solutions is established, it will have an impact on other areas of the world.

Secondly, all European countries recognize the interests that they have in a moderate evolution of events in Africa, and this is why we have received public support from the United Kingdom, with which we have been cooperating most closely; from the President of France; and from the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, together with diplomatic support from all our other allies.

Therefore, the consequences of the radicalization of Africa would be serious in many other parts of the world.

We are now at a moment when we can still, with relatively small effort, at least attempt to arrest this.

We have been urged, not only by the states of southern Africa but by all the moderate leaders in Africa, to engage in this enterprise, because they understand what is at stake for the future of their countries. And, therefore, we believe that the national interest of the United States is involved.

Success is not guaranteed, but an effort must be made.

Q: Do you expect the current situation to result possibly in any further currency devaluation, such as in the South African rand and the British pound?

A: I don't think I should be asked economic questions, since there are so many people here who will tell you that I am an argument against universal suffrage on these issues.

I have not even thought about this. I don't expect that it will have any impact on devaluation.

Q: What role do you think the West German Federal Republic can play being helpful in this African settlement.

A: As Chancellor [Helmut] Schmidt said at a press conference in Hamburg, the Federal Republic has a historic relationship to some of the population in Namibia. I understand there are about 30,000 people of German origin that live in Namibia, and so the Federal Republic can be helpful—especially helpful—in any efforts that may be made there, but it has indicated that it will give its general support to efforts in southern Africa generally.

Q: If this matter is so important to U.S. national security, why wasn't a great deal more done

long ago when the positions were not so fixed, and when it was more possible to make progress in the area?

A: Because the conditions for making progress did not exist previously. Until the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, the conditions did not exist.

Secondly, the United States did not feel that it had a primary responsibility in an area that had been traditionally governed by European countries and where many European countries had a longer historical interest, and, therefore, we wanted to give every opportunity to Great Britain, which was engaged in a diplomatic effort with respect to Rhodesia, for this effort to succeed.

It was the combination of a number of factors which made it clear that these methods would not work and that underlined the urgency of the situation.

Q: Is there any evidence that black Rhodesian unity is possible, and will you meet with any black Rhodesians on this trip?

A: The meeting in Dar [es Salaam, Tanzania], which was supposed to—which brought together the so-called front-line presidents and the various liberation movements, was more successful in bringing about unity among the front-line presidents than among liberation movements. I would say that at this moment there is little evidence of unity among these movements.

With respect to whether I should meet them or not, I will be guided by the recommendations of the African presidents.

I have taken the position that in order to avoid foreign intervention on the model of Angola that the United States would not deal directly with the liberation movements, provided no other country would do this.

If any of the presidents think—or if the presidents think that it would be desirable for me to meet with them, then I would be prepared to do it.

But I must stress that the solution of these problems is primarily an African matter and of the parties concerned. The United States can act as an intermediary. The United States can offer suggestions. The United States cannot bring about unity. The United States cannot by itself bring about moderation, and the final outcome depends on the wisdom and the capacity to work together of the African parties.

Q: How critical is unity among the liberation groups to your current effort?

A: It is not for me to determine how a solution is to be achieved. If the African presidents and the various liberation movements feel that they can negotiate by having individual teams, then it is not for me to decide that they should use another method.

So I would say that the organization of the negotiations on the black African side depends on the African presidents, and it is not going to be prescribed by the United States.

Q: To change the subject to another area—does the United States intend to block the admission of Viet-Nam to the United Nations? And, if so, does this have any domestic political implications here or reasons for doing so?

A: The President stated publicly this week that we considered the gesture of releasing the names of 12 missing-in-action as insufficient. And what we are considering is whether a government that is not fulfilling one of its basic obligations under an international agreement would be able to fulfill its obligations under the U.N. Charter, and this is—we will make our decision when the case actually comes before the Security Council.

Q: Does President Ford feel that there is any political gain in your embarking on this diplomatic shuttle? And, secondly, you are talking about the complexity of this issue. Is it possible for you to complete the beginnings of success in this issue, assuming you make progress, prior to the election or in the period prior to inauguration? Aren't you against some sort of political deadline?

A: I think first of all, with respect to political benefits, it was accepted wisdom that the trip to Africa in April was not a spectacular success in many of the primary elections that were then taking place.

It was undertaken, and it was supported by the President at the time, because he concluded that we could not, in the national interests of the United States, delay any longer.

Whether progress is possible before the election, I cannot say. But that progress needs to be made during this year if the situation is not to get dangerously out of control on at least some of the issues, I believe all the students of the subject agree to.

Therefore, I have found that there is substantial understanding on the part of the black African presidents for the steps we have been taking.

Q: During the period that you will be in Africa, Lebanon faces an important date in the transition of power from President Franjijah to President Sarkis—President-elect Sarkis. And at the same time, there are reports that Syria is making intensive efforts to produce some sort of negotiated solution that will allow Sarkis to take power in normal conditions. What are your expectations for Lebanon in the next two weeks, and what is your view of the Syrian efforts? Is the United States in favor of them?

A: I had an opportunity yesterday to talk to two Foreign Service officers who just returned from the Christian part of Lebanon and who have had an opportunity to talk to President Sarkis.

Also, I will be taking with me on this trip an expert on the Middle East, so that I can be in close touch with developments in Lebanon.

We favor a negotiated solution on the basis of the formula that was worked out in Damascus earlier this year, and we have generally supported the political efforts based on that formula.

Whether the advent of a new President would lead to a rapid solution is not yet clear.

We support the independence and territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon. We will use our influence in this direction. We have invited President Sarkis to send a representative to the United States for further talks soon after his installation, and we will use our influence in the direction of the unity and integrity of Lebanon.

Q: I have a two-part question. One, what is your evaluation of the aftermath of the Panmunjom incident? And, two, there have been conflicting reports about the role of the influence of the Soviet Union and China toward Kim Il Sung's role in this case. Will you become a fair judge over this important issue (sic)?

A: I believe that North Korea realized that the United States and its allies in the Korean Peninsula would not tolerate such brutal behavior. They, in effect, apologized for the incident. As a result of the discussions, the guard posts that they had on our side of the line in the Panmunjom area have been removed, and I believe that conditions have been created in which a repetition of such incidents are relatively less likely.

The impact of this negotiation on the election is impossible to determine. It should have no impact whatsoever. I was on the Hill yesterday meeting with 47 Senators, and I found that there was an essentially nonpartisan support.

What we are doing in the pursuit of peace in Africa is not a party matter. It is a matter for all the American people, and it will not be handled as a party issue, and I believe it will not be handled as a partisan issue by either side.

Q: When you talk about a framework of negotiations, does that mean that you need a commitment from Rhodesia to transfer power to the black majority within two years, and can you get that on this trip? Can you get it without having someone to whom to transfer power?

A: I do not want to predict what is possible within any particular timeframe.

What we are trying to do on this trip is to move matters forward toward the point where negotiations can start and where some specific proposals may emerge. I would not expect that this can be achieved with respect to Rhodesia on one trip.

With respect to Namibia, the issue is whether a framework of participants in possible negotiations can emerge. I am somewhat more hopeful on this. But even that issue involving so many parties, I would not want to predict until I had talked to them.

Q: To follow up Don Oberdorfer's question: It has been alleged not only that U.S. policy before last April was indifferent to Africa, but that it actively aided the white minority regimes; particularly as a token of this is the Byrd amendment. Last April you promised that the Administration would take steps to repeal that amendment. That was almost five months ago. No steps have been made.

Are you going to be able to explain this to the African heads of state?

A: I believe that the African heads of state understand that if a negotiation can be arranged over Rhodesia, the issue of sanctions will then be substantially irrelevant. The issue of sanctions arises only under conditions when there is no progress in the negotiations and no prospect for a transition in the governmental structure.

We have also shown our capacity to reinforce Korea very rapidly and our determination not to permit any transgressions in Korea.

As for the role of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, we are not familiar with any diplomatic initiatives that they may have taken. We did not ask them to pass any messages. We noticed that their press was not particularly vocal in support of North Korea, and we consider this positive, since it was a brutal act of murder.

Q: Will you or the President or any senior member of the Administration be talking with former Defense Secretary [James] Schlesinger when he returns from China?

A: Well, I had an extensive talk with former Secretary Schlesinger before he went to China. I expect to have an extensive talk with him after he returns, and we have had reports of his—we've had some fragmentary reports of his conversations there, and he's behaved himself with a great sense of responsibility.

Q: You're an old hand at being a trouble-shooter in many parts of the world. I'm wondering now, as you're about to leave, how would you rate your own chances of succeeding?

A: I was afraid you meant as I'm about to leave office and I thought 1981 wasn't that imminent. [Laughter]

This is the most complex negotiation procedurally in which I've been engaged, and the chances of success are very difficult to evaluate, because it depends on so many intangibles and because there isn't any one interlocutor on each side.

Senator [Dick] Clark estimated my chances at success at 1 in 20. I rate my chances higher than that, but I don't want to give an exact percentage.

Q: Twice this morning you've mentioned that your mission has the support of all the parties concerned in the area. By saying that, do you mean the black liberation movements? Do you have any word from them that they welcome the mission which you are about to undertake?

A: I have made clear that we have not dealt directly with the black liberation movements. So, when I speak of the parties I speak of the states in the area, and the relationship of the liberation movements to this process is being worked out by

the so-called front-line presidents. We have not had any direct discussion with the liberation movements.

Q: If I can follow that up, you said, as I understood it, that you would not deal with them—

A: Excuse me. We've had a discussion with SWAPO with respect to Namibia, and I would apply my statement to them.

Q: Well, that perhaps is the point I was making. Some of these movements, as I understand it, have had relations or have had contacts with other governments in the past. Where you said you would not deal with them as long as other governments did not, I wondered how you took that into account.

A: Well, clearly, if outside powers become very active in southern Africa, then the danger of Africa becoming an arena for superpower conflict is very great, and I have said that the United States stands opposed to outside intervention in African affairs.

Up to now we have the impression that in the last months the Rhodesian liberation movements have dealt with the outside world substantially through the various front-line presidents, which is the understanding that I have of the situation. Should that change, then the United States would also have to reexamine its position.

Q: Back to Rhodesia again on the financial aspects: What was the reaction of the people on the Hill to the dimensions of the plan? And could you be clearer—is it a case of the United States being asked to spend several hundred million dollars in allocations, or is it a kind of possibility; is it an insurance plan?

A: We are talking primarily of an insurance plan—nor are we saying that the American part of this insurance plan has to come entirely from governmental sources. There are other sources that may also be available.

So we have not worked out a figure; we have not yet worked out a governmental participation. But we are talking of something that is essentially an insurance plan rather than a direct commitment, and we're talking of a consortium in which the United Kingdom will be the convoking country with our support and which will have the support, we expect, of most industrial democracies.

Q: Do you anticipate being able to present this package to Prime Minister Smith during this trip?

A: I have not yet decided whether I will meet with Prime Minister Smith [Ian Smith of Rho-

desia] on this trip. This depends on the evolution of the discussions and on our estimate of his basic attitude.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

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