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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1.	background on Angola (1 p.) <i>Sanitized 9/29/04</i>	1/19/76	C(A)
2.	<u>Q and A case; Kissinger trip 1/23/76</u>		
<del>2a.</del>	<del>Q and A on Spanish bases agreement <del>XXXXXX</del> (1 p.)</del> <i>opened 7/5/85 WHTM</i>	<del>1/23/76</del>	<del>C(A)</del>
2b.	background on Spain (1 p.) <i>Sanitized 9/29/04</i>	1/23/76	C(A)
<del>2c.</del>	<del>amembassy beirut to seestate washdc (2 pp.)</del> <i>SYS - WHTM 11/30/00</i>	<del>1/31/76</del>	<del>A</del>
3.	draft statement on US abstention on Angola's membership in the UN (3 pp.) <i>SYS. WHTM 11/30/00</i>		A

FILE LOCATION

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ANGOLA

Important facts from State's Briefing yesterday, September 2:

(Questions on the airlift and relief effort should be referred to the State Department).

- A. In response to Portuguese President Costa Gomes' urgent appeal for support on humanitarian grounds for the airlift of Portuguese citizens from Angola to Portugal, the United States Government is providing two U. S. -flag chartered civilian aircraft with civilian crews for an indefinite period of time.
- B. We anticipate that the aircraft will begin flying with <sup>10</sup>48 hours, after logistical and other arrangements have been completed with the Portuguese Government.
- C. The United States Government has already contributed \$200,000 to an appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross for relief assistance to Angolans displaced by the fighting. We are prepared to response to further appeals by international agencies for relief assistance within Angola.
- D. The airlift operation will be carried out by the Military Airlift Command. We have recommended 707's or DC 8's.
- E. There are approximately 270,000 people wishing to leave Angola.
- F. The cost of the airlift, as distinguished from the Red Cross aid, will be about \$5 million and will come out of the AID Disaster Relief funds.
- G. We expect two planes to make a daily flight from Angola to Portugal, bringing out between 180 and 220 people a day.

September 25, 1975

ANGOLA

Background: Les Gelb's article in today's New York Times reveals that the United States, Soviet Union, and PRC have covertly supplied money and arms to the various factions vying for control of Angola. Angola is scheduled to become independent November 11. Gelb's article covers the situation in detail naming Mobutu and several others and the ones through whom CIA money was filtered. Obviously, this is an extremely sensitive issue and you must be very careful in how you answer any questions on it.

Q: Does the CIA funnel millions of dollars and military equipment into Angola as Les Gelb's article today claims?

IN KEEPING WITH OUR STANDARD POLICY

A: I would have no comment on that subject. (Do not under any  
^ MATTERS OF  
circumstances go beyond this.)

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ANGOLA

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Angola drifted leaderless into independence yesterday as the Portuguese left the territory without passing sovereignty to any of the three warring liberation groups. The Portuguese high commissioner left Luanda and merely announced that the territory was being turned over to the "Angolan people."

The Soviet backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which controls Luanda and some other areas of the country proclaimed a unilateral declaration of independence and went ahead with planned activities to celebrate. Meanwhile, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in conjunction with Angola's third liberation group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) announced a rival government. According to an announcement out of Kinshasa, where the National Front and National Union had been conferring, the administrative seat of their new government will be Nova Lisboa, which they have renamed Huambo.

The rival government will be comprised of a president, a prime minister, and a 24-member Council of Revolution. The government leaders were not announced. In a separate news announcement, the National Union called for a cease-fire, a neutralization of Luanda, and the establishment of a government of national unity made up of the three liberation groups.

A number of African governments who have had close ties with the Popular Movement -- Congo, Guinea, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau -- are expected to recognize the Popular Movement government. However, a variety of reports yesterday indicated that a number of African and European countries intend to withhold recognition from either rival claimant. Ugandan President Amin, speaking as head of the Organization of African Unity, called on OAU members to be neutral toward the Angolan situation.

Q. Do we intend to recognize Angolan independence?

A. We are following the situation in Angola closely and with concern for its people, but we are not prepared to make any decisions on recognition at this time.

As Secretary Kissinger said yesterday "the U. S. has no other interest except the territorial integrity and independence of Angola. We strongly support the case of the Organization of African Unity for a cease-fire and for negotiation among the three factions that are involved there to form a coalition government. . . . ."

KISSINGER SPEECH - ANGOLA

Q. Secretary Kissinger's warning on Angola and on outside intervention by the Soviet Union and Cuba implied that those countries' actions in Angola would determine our policies toward them. What are we prepared to do, and what would we like to see happen in Angola?

A. As the Secretary said in his speech, the U. S. has no higher goal than to ease the conflicts that have torn the globe for nearly a generation, but we will never permit detente to turn into a subterfuge of unilateral advantage. As we have said before, the OAU Conciliation Commission on Angola has recommended a Government of National Unity be formed by all three movements, that a cease-fire be established, and that recognition not be extended to any single movement that might declare itself sovereign at the outset. We agree with these recommendations and will not take any steps on recognition pending a clarification of the situation in the country.

Q. Are we providing assistance to Angola through Zaire?

A. Sec. Kissinger has addressed this question in his public statements and on the Hill (Senate Appropriations Committee, November 20) and I see no need to add to his remarks.



January 2, 1976

ANGOLA UPDATE

For Your Information:

Three African nations have declared their support for a national unity government.

The leaders of Uganda, Zaire and the Central African Republic, meeting in Bangui, issued a joint declaration January 1, stating that their governments:

- Will continue to work for a government of national unity in Angola, as recommended by the OAU;
- Will intercept any third-country forces destined for Angola, should they have to pass through the signatory nations' territories;
- Condemn all foreign interference in Angola and call upon all peace-loving countries to use their influence to stop the internationalization of the Angolan problem.

ANGOLA - UPDATE

FOR YOUR BACKGROUND:

Assistant Secretary Schaufele is now in Europe briefing Western European leaders on the progress of his meetings with African heads of state on the Angolan situation.

In Washington, recent statements by the President and Secretary Kissinger underscore our simultaneous policies of:

- (1) calling for an end to all foreign intervention in Angola while seeking an African solution to an African problem.
- (2) continuing to pursue diplomatic alternatives to armed conflict through contacts with African and interested European states, the Soviet Union, and the OAU, and at the same time continuing to provide some assistance to offset the massive influx of Soviet material and Cuban manpower.
- (3) warning the Soviet Union that its policies of providing military assistance to one faction of a country 8,000 miles from its borders cannot be construed as either helpful or conducive to the process of detente, and that further involvement could have implications for the future of U. S. -Soviet relations.

\* \* \*

If questioned about the State of our relations or our involvement in the Angolan situation you may wish to refer to the President's remarks yesterday or to his clearly defined policy statements in the NSC interview:

"What we really want and what we are seeking to do in Angola is to get an African solution to an African problem and through bilateral negotiations, through working with the Organization of African Unity, through relations with the Soviet Union and others, we are trying to achieve that African solution to an African problem."

"We are working with all powers, including the Soviet Union, to try and permit the Angolan people, the three different groups there at the present time, to get a decision or solution that will reflect a majority view of the Angolan people, and we are doing it, as I indicated, with a number of major powers, including the Soviet Union, as well as the many, many African countries that are a part of the Organization of African Unity."

"The United States is not training foreign mercenaries in Angola. We do expend some Federal funds -- or United States funds -- in trying to be helpful, but we are not training foreign mercenaries." (Bar)

"We are working with other countries that feel they have an interest in giving the Angolans an opportunity to make the decision for themselves and I think this is a proper responsibility of the Federal Government."

Q. Despite the Soviet call for an end to foreign intervention in Angola, reports of the Kissinger-Dobrynin meeting indicate that little progress, if any, was made diplomatically. Why is the President optimistic about the Soviet statements intentions in Angola?

A. The meeting between Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin was simply another in a continuing series of meetings on matters of current interest to our two countries. The President is continuing his diplomatic efforts on the Angolan situation bilaterally with the Soviet Union and others <sup>and</sup> multilaterally through the OAU.

ANGOLA - UPDATE

Q. Can you comment on the Tunney allegations of yesterday stating that American pilots are flying C-130's into Angola loaded with equipment?

A. <sup>totally</sup> That allegation is ~~false~~. There are no American pilots <sup>or ground maintenance crew.</sup> flying support missions into Angola. No government agency <sup>No American involved in</sup> has recruited or is paying Americans to fly such missions. <sup>support mission.</sup>

They haven't in the past, and they are not doing so presently. Irresponsible allegations of this type certainly do not <sup>serve the country's interests</sup>

Q. Well maybe the American government has not done so, but what about American "sponsored" private organizations or "front" organizations?

A. To our knowledge, none are involved in support missions for Angola.

Q. Can you be sure that no Americans are fighting in, or for Angola?

A. We can be sure that no Americans have been recruited, trained, paid or encouraged by the USG to fight in or for Angola, but obviously we cannot keep track of every American everywhere in the world. We cannot possibly know what individual Americans may be doing in any given place by their own choice, but we have no personal knowledge of Americans in Angola.

Q. Have we provided countries neighboring Angola with C-130's and other military equipment?

A. We have security and supporting assistance programs with countries bordering Angola; the material provided over the years in these programs has in fact included C-130's, among other forms of assistance.

Q. Are we providing the means indirectly to <sup>?</sup>serve Angola with support missions?

A. The President and the Secretary of State have stated that we are provided some assistance ~~to counter Soviet and Cuban assistance~~ in attempt; to counter Soviet and Cuban assistance, but we have not specified (nor do I intend to now) what kind of help we are providing.

Q. What about Zaire and Zambia? Are they flying support missions or sending men and materiel into Angola?

A. We would not comment on what other countries may or may not be doing in Angola.

Q. Can you comment on whether a Soviet Kotlin class destroyer and a landing ship for tanks are steaming toward Angola as the Washington Post reports today?

A. As you know, we have been aware of the movement of Soviet equipment and materiel for some time and have publicly indicated

our dismay at this Soviet infusion on numerous occasions.

~~We have no reason to doubt the veracity of the reports.~~ *The reports*  
*are consistent with information available to the*  
*Administration*

Q. Can you tell us whether the presence of these ships indicates that the Soviets are stepping up their presence in Angola?

A. Other than to indicate that the ships are further evidence of continuing Soviet ~~intervention~~ *involvement*, I would not want to analyze what their presence may indicate.

ITALY

Q. Can you confirm the Post and Times stories today stating that the CIA is giving \$6 million to Italian non-Communist parties?

A. I am not going to be able to comment on those stories.

Q. Are you responding this way because you were ordered to?

A. Everything I say from this podium is said on behalf of the President.

Q. Can you give us a U. S. reaction to recent developments in Italian politics in which the Italian socialists have withdrawn their support for the Moro government?

A. We wouldn't want to comment on the internal political situation of political parties in another country.

ANGOLA -- UPDATE

A. SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL

Q. Has the Administration been informed by South Africa that they intend to pull their troops out of Angola within 48 hours?

A. We have no official word from the South Africans to that effect.

Q. Whether we have had word or not, would we encourage a unilateral South African pull out, and have we, in fact, been in touch with the South Africans on this?

A. The U. S. position has been, and continues to be, that we favor the withdrawal of all foreign elements from Angola and have communicated that position to heads of state. ~~It makes the most sense for all external forces to leave there, at the same time, but.~~ We will continue to call for an end to all foreign intervention regardless of what one country may or may not do.

B. NIGERIA

Q. Do we have any reaction to the official Nigerian press attack on the U. S. position on Angola as expressed in a letter from President Ford to Nigerian head of state Murtala Mohammed?



I  
A. ~~We~~ would not want to comment on or characterize the Nigerian remarks. (As the State Department said yesterday), the President's letter to Mohammed was a simple statement of our U. S.- Angola policy. *I understand the DC 5 may have more to say.*

Q. Is the text of the letter accurate?

A. I have not seen the official Nigerian release on it, but from all accounts, it appears to be accurate.

FYI ONLY: When asked yesterday whether the letter was "insulting", State Department spokesmen dismissed the charge by saying "No, I don't think so."

C. LANDING RIGHTS FOR CUBANS

Q. The New York Times reports today that Portugal has refused to allow the Azores Islands to be used as a transit point for arms or materiel to any of the warring factions in Angola. Is the U. S. pleased at this development?

A. The State Department commented on our position on this issue the other day, (January 2), when we stated our general policy of objecting to the Cubans sending forces to Angola. At that time, the State Department stated that we object to all countries allowing Cuban planes to use their airfields or space

for flights connected with the Angola operation, so in that respect, we are pleased with the Portuguese decision.

Q. But what about our role in Angola and our base in the Azores? Will we still be allowed to land in the Azores enroute to Southern Africa?

A. U. S. has and will continue to carry out its activities at its base in the Azores in accordance with base right agreements with the Portuguese government.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DPC 1

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION NEWS BRIEFING  
FRIDAY, JANUARY 2, 1976, 12:59 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED)

MR. FUNSETH: Good afternoon.

The first question of the New Year?

Q Is there any response from Guyana yet to the U. S.'s expression of concern that that country might be a staging post of the Cubans on the way to Angola?

A On this general question of the support of the Cuban expeditionary force in Angola, I would like to make several points.

First, as we have stated, we strongly object to Cuba sending an expeditionary force of over 5,000 soldiers to Angola.

The second point: It follows, therefore, that we equally object to all countries which allow Cuban planes to use their airfields or airspace for flights connected with this armed foreign intervention.

Finally: We reiterate that Cuba should withdraw

its expeditionary force from Angola.

Q In what way do we make --

A I would like to make one further point.

Now, as for any diplomatic communications we may have had on this subject with countries, I do not want to get into any details at the present time.

Q Well, just on that point there have additionally been reports that some of the Cuban planes have been passing through the Azores. We haven't raised that question here, so I'd like to ask that question specifically -- whether there's any information to support that report; and, also, if that's the case, whether any protestations have been made to the Portuguese Government.

A Let me check into that.

Q Do we similarly object to the trans-shipment of Soviet supplies into Angola?

A Yes.

Q Well, have the Guyanese rejected our direct representations to them, without getting into the language of it?

A Jerry, I am just really going to have to stick with my final point: that at the present time I do not want

to get into any details of any diplomatic communications we have had with any countries.

Q They say they have.

Q Aside from diplomatic negotiations, have there been any flights that have landed since, say, Christmas at either Guyana or Ghana or the Azores?

A I would have to check into that.

Q Well, to go back to the other point concerning the reports of mercenaries being trained for use in Angola, what is your response to that?

A I just recall what we said yesterday, and I believe what the White House as well as Defense spokesmen said. They all said that that report was not true.

Q Now, the report breaks down into several specifics here. What parts of it are you denying?

A I am not going to go through that whole report line by line, but the main thrust of the accusation, I believe, was that we were training or sending U. S. mercenaries to Angola, and that is the accusation that was denied by the White House, by the State Department, by the Defense Department; I just referred you to those

COVERT OPERATIONS IN ITALY

Q. Is the downfall of the Italian government yesterday related to the disclosure of CIA assistance to Italy?

A. I would not want to speculate or comment on the internal politics of the Italian government, but on the other hand, the disclosures of allegations of CIA activity in July could not have been helpful.

RESUMPTION OF SALT

The State Department will announce today that "it has been mutually agreed that the U. S. and USSR delegations will resume their meetings at Geneva on Wednesday, January 28."

Since the simultaneous Soviet announcement may actually precede the State announcement -- because of the timing of their briefing, you could conceivably be asked questions about it.

Q. Can you confirm that the SALT delegations will reconvene January 28 in Geneva?

A. That is my understanding, but you may wish to check with the State Department. I think they will have an announcement on that.

Q. Wasn't the meeting originally supposed to resume January 12?

A. That is correct. Some routine procedural matters occasioned the delay, but no substantive reasons are involved.

FYI: (You may say on background if asked, that the Soviets suggested the new date). END FYI.

Q. Can you comment on the Reuter reports in the Post today saying that the Soviets would not agree to a pact equating the Backfire with American cruise missiles? What about the Townsend Hoopes assertions that the U. S. position constitutes a dishonest proposal?

A. As you know, we are continuing to work with the Soviet Union to complete a Strategic Arms Agreement acceptable to both sides. Two or three issues remain and while negotiations proceed on these issues, I am not going to discuss them or comment on specific remarks by individuals about these issues.



January 9, 1976

DIPLOMATIC SITUATION ON ANGOLA

Q. Do you have any progress to report today on any diplomatic initiatives or exchanges on Angola?

A. I have nothing specific to report except to say that the OAU is now meeting in Addis Ababa. We are encouraged that the OAU has convened a meeting and a summit on the Angolan conflict in an effort to find an African solution to an African problem. We would hope that the OAU Summit facilitates an early end to the fighting and a resolution of the political problems there.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

Q. The Soviets deny they have ships steaming toward Angola and have called the U. S. charges "provocative." Do you have a response?

A. I can only say that our indications are to the contrary.

Q. Can you be more specific?

A. I think the Pentagon addressed this issue in its briefing yesterday, and I would refer you to them for details.

Q. What about South Africa? Do we have any new indications that they are pulling out of Angola?

A. I have nothing new to give you on a South African withdrawal.

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January 19, 1976

ANGOLA

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola apparently is losing little time shifting its military operations southward following the collapse of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola in the north.

25X1

[redacted] heavy fighting is taking place in central Angola between the Popular Movement, supported by Cuban troops and artillery, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which has been weakened by the withdrawal of South African troops from combat areas.

The National Union's position is reported to be rapidly deteriorating and a retreat similar to that of the National Front in the north is "imminent," [redacted]

25X1

25X1

There is no evidence, however, that either side can claim a major victory at this time. The Popular Movement is attempting to capture Luso, but the National Union is putting up stiff resistance at Bucaco, a key point in the outward defenses of Luso in central eastern Angola.


The Popular Movement is also advancing on Novo Redondo and Cela in the western part of the country. Until recently, Cela was the major base of operations for South African forces that were withdrawn to Bie "Silva Porto" in an attempt to lower the visibility of South Africa's role in Angola during the Organization of African Unity summit on Angola earlier this month.

25X1

National Union President Jonas Savimbi recently [redacted] he would not allow his troops to develop a retreat mentality despite the withdrawal of the South Africans. The fate of the National Front in the north has probably stiffened his resolve. Nevertheless, without sizable South African assistance--and the South Africans seem reluctant to become involved again--the National Union could well be forced into a slow but steady retreat.

The National Union, however, may also be in a tenuous position in the south. For the past few weeks it has been weakened by clashes with a contingent of National Front forces assigned to assist in operations there. The forces are under the command of Daniel Chipenda, who defected from the Popular Movement a year ago. Chipenda's alliance with the National Front has been nominal at best and he has operated largely as a free agent, obtaining supplies from South Africa and assistance in the field from Portuguese deserters.

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ANGOLA

- Q. What can you tell us today about the situation in Angola?
- A. The situation remains that the President will continue to seek a resolution to the Angolan conflict through diplomatic means, and through the funds available to us to provide assistance to countries sharing our goals for Angola. (See attached analysis of military situation.)
- Q. Would we support Zaire's call for Security Council action on Cuban and MPLA incursions into its territory?
- A. We would hope that restraint could be exercised on all sides in an effort to prevent the general situation in the Angolan conflict from deteriorating further. Any proposal that Zaire makes to the Security Council would, of course, be examined on its merits.

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SECRETARY DEPARTS FOR MOSCOW

The Wall Street Journal has an excellent squib in its "World Wide" summary today on the upcoming U. S. -Soviet meetings on SALT. The article highlights a Pravda story that says that Russia "is resolved to do all it can" to obtain a new arms limitation agreement, while citing the implications of a negotiation failure. As Secretary Kissinger said in his press conference January 14, he would not be going to Moscow if the President were not convinced that some progress were possible. He emphasized that at best all we can achieve during this current round is an agreement in principle, after which the technicians would have to hammer out the details, a process that would take at least two to three months.

Q. What is the President's reaction to the Pravda article indicating the importance Russia apparently places on the upcoming talks on SALT?

A. The President, in sending the Secretary to Moscow, is hopeful that more progress can be made on an agreement to limit strategic arms. We have always said that a good agreement, carefully negotiated and mutually beneficial, is in our interest and in the interest of the world.

January 19, 1976

KARAMI RESIGNATION

In what observers characterize as a direct challenge by Lebanon's Moslem leaders to Christian President Frangie, Prime Minister Karami announced his resignation January 18. Karami said he had decided to resign because of the failure of his many attempts to end the Lebanese fighting. In fact, Karami may perceive himself to be on the fringes of the political processes in Lebanon since much of the strategy for resolving the conflict has been conducted between Frangie and Asad. (See Attached cable).

Q. Did the President have any comment on Prime Minister Karami's resignation Sunday? How does he feel about its effect on the situation in Lebanon?

A. I would have no specific comment on the Prime Minister's resignation, except to say that our position on the situation in Lebanon is well known. Our policy is one of clear support for Lebanon's independence, territorial integrity and national unity and we hope that harmonious relations can be restored among different religious and ethnic groups. Amb. Godley is following the situation closely and remains in touch with the Lebanese government.



WEAPONRY TO ANGOLA UNDERVALUED?

Q. Can you confirm the reports that the U. S. Government has seriously undervalued the worth of military weapons supplied to anti-Soviet factions in Angola?

A. I am not going to comment on speculative  
accounts of an, as yet, unpublished report.

ON DEEP BACKGROUND TO INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS:

You may say that we have not seen the draft report and do not know whether it contains these allegations or not, but if it does then it is inaccurate. We are actually paying a dear price for whatever limited assistance we are able to provide.

Q- Davies? Cyprus?

A- DOS will comment.

January 23, 1976

Spanish Bases Agreement

Q. News reports today indicate that the U. S. and Spain are ready to sign a defense treaty. Do we expect that Secretary Kissinger will conclude the agreement in Madrid tomorrow?

A. The State Department was asked about this agreement yesterday. What they said then, still holds: the negotiations are still in progress. We are hoping that the agreement can be signed while the Secretary is in Madrid. As for the exact form the agreement will take -- treaty or otherwise -- <sup>and the provisions</sup> I understand State may be able to fill you in on that.

FYI: For an assessment of Spain's developing relations with the E. C., see attached classified analysis.

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January 23, 1976

EC-SPAIN

Spanish Foreign Minister Areilza's visits to Bonn, Luxembourg, and Paris earlier this month launched Spain's drive for eventual full membership in the EC. He plans to tour the remaining EC capitals by the end of March, visiting Brussels in mid-February.



Areilza singled out EC membership as Madrid's number one priority in Europe and gave assurances that Spain will follow a definite timetable toward democratization. In a television interview in Madrid last weekend, he affirmed that negotiations could lead to membership by 1980, if not before.

Although the French and Germans were receptive, they made it clear that Madrid would first have to prove that it is liberalizing before the Nine would act favorably on an application. In the meantime, they agreed to recommend to the Council that trade talks—broken off by the EC last fall—be resumed.

Subsequently, however, Spain asked the EC not to announce its readiness to reopen trade negotiations. The Spanish spokesman cited the uneasy domestic labor situation and the continuing reserve of Spanish industrial circles as the reasons for requesting the delay. It is also probable, however, that Spain may have decided to evaluate the results of Areilza's tour before pushing ahead, particularly since the remaining capitals he intends to visit include those coolest toward Madrid. Another factor explaining Spain's reluctance to resume trade talks is its view that, as it is now looking toward EC membership, the basis for negotiations has changed.

The Council, at its meeting this week, accordingly announced only that the situation in Spain "no longer precluded the resumption of contacts on trade." The matter will be taken up again at next month's Council, but further movement is unlikely until after Areilza's tour is completed.

A formal Spanish request to begin negotiations for membership would probably prove premature anytime soon. EC External Affairs Commissioner Soames, for example, thinks that Madrid may be over-optimistic on its timing, and that even after Spain has demonstrated that it has initiated democratic reforms, there are other issues to be settled before Madrid could apply.



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DELIVER TO NEA/ARN/DRAPER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS, ALSO  
PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR DAY,  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINS, PINT, LE  
SUBJECT: 0900 LEBANL REPORT

1. CEASEFIRE BEGUN LAST NIGHT IS STILL HOLDING, THERE IS  
OF COURSE ISOLATED SHOOTING BUT IT HAS NOT SET OFF ANY  
FIREFIGHT IN OR AROUND THE CITY. ARMY UNITS WERE  
HARD PRESSED IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY YESTERDAY  
AS PALESTINIAN AND OTHER LEFTIST TROOPS ENGAGED. DATT  
REPORTS THAT ARMY IS BOTTLED UP IN CAMPS AND BARRACKS  
AROUND THE COUNTRY, HAVING LOST SOME (BAALBECK IS AN  
EXAMPLE) YESTERDAY, BY SAME TOKEN NEITHER ARMY NOR  
PALESTINIANS HAVE GONE ALL OUT IN RECENT FIGHTING,  
LEBANESE AIR FORCE MADE ITS SECOND AIR STRIKE IN THIS  
CRISIS WHEN IT HIT ARTILLERY BATTERIES SHELLING  
REFUGEES IN CHAMOUN'S HOME TOWN OF SAADIYAT YESTERDAY.

2. KHADDAM IS CONTINUING HIS CONSULTATIONS HERE, AND  
WE UNDERSTAND HW WILL MEET WITH GEMAYEL TODAY. CHAMOUN'S  
NPL PARTY HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT WHICH APPEARS TO RAISE  
NEW ISSUES, SUCH AS NO DISCUSSION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF  
POLITICAL CHANGES UNTIL CEASEFIRE HAS HELD FOR AT LEAST  
FORTY-FIVE DAYS, WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS ONLY  
ANOTHER STAGE IN THE BARGAINING WHICH WE CAN EXPECT TO  
CONTINUE. SEVERAL GOOD SOURCES INDICATE THAT AN AGREE-  
MENT HAS BEEN SIGNED AND FRANGIE IS GOING TO ANNOUNCE  
IT TO THE NATION TODAY. IT CONTAINS ALL THE POINTS WE  
HAVE BEEN LED TO EXPECT.

\*\*\*\*\*WHHR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, LL

PSN:030787      RECALLED      TOR:023/11:44Z      DTG:231040Z JAN 76  
PAGE 01

~~\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*~~ COPY  
WTTM 11/30/00

3. HELPFUL SISCO INTERVIEW ON WEDNESDAY WHICH REITERATED U.S. SUPPORT FOR SYRIAN EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT HERE AND STATED USG WILL NOT INTERVENE IN LEBANON WAS CARRIED BY ARABIC AND FRENCH LANGUAGE PRESS THIS MORNING. FRENCH LANGUAGE PAPER HEADLINED STORY, HOWEVER, AS STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION TO GUARANTEE PEACE IN LEBANON. THIS AGAIN POINTS OUT CHRISTIAN TENDENCY TO GRASP AT STRAWS. I THINK IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT WE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID ENCOURAGING CHAMOUNISTS AND OTHERS IN THEIR MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION WILL PERMIT SOLUTION OF CRISIS WITHOUT EVEN MINIMAL CHRISTIAN CONCESSIONS INVOLVED IN AGREEMENT UNDER SYRIAN AUSPICES. FOR FIRST TIME IN MONTHS WE ARE IN A POSITION TO APPLAUD A RAYMOND EDDE STATEMENT: HE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE WORLD IS SICK AND TIRED OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE CHRISTIANS IN LEBANON AND POINTS OUT THAT AGREEMENT REACHED UNDER SYRIAN AUSPICES TODAY CONTAINS EXACTLY SAME POINTS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AGREED TO SEVERAL MONTHS AGO IN INTRA-LEBANESE NEGOTIATING FORUMS.

4. AIRPORT REMAINS CLOSED, BUT WE ARE TOLD OPENING OF AIRPORT IS A PART OF THE AGREEMENT AND THERE IS GOOD CHANCE IT WILL REOPEN SOON, PROVIDED AGREEMENT STICKS. WE SHALL BE EVACUATING LARGE NUMBER OF EMBASSY STAFF ON ONE OF THE FIRST PLANES OUT TO ATHENS.  
LAMBRAKIS

BT

RECALLED

PSN1030787

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:023/11144Z

DTG:1231040Z JAN 76

January 23, 1976

KISSINGER TRIP: INDICATIONS OF PROGRESS?

Q. What can you tell us about the progress of Secretary Kissinger's trip? Is the President disappointed by the apparent failure to obtain an agreement in principle on SALT or to make headway on Angola?

A. I would not want to say anything beyond what the Secretary has already stated on the progress of the SALT negotiations, which he characterized as "significant." As far as other issues which may have been discussed, I think the Secretary will want to brief the President fully, and I will not have anything to say at this time. The Secretary is expected to return Sunday around noon, and at this point we are uncertain as to when he will meet with the President.

FYI: A transcript of the Secretary's remarks is attached.

It includes a denial that he will resign over the Angola issue.

OP IMMED  
DE RUEADWW #0019 0231200  
O 231200Z JAN 76  
F USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT

TO SECSTATE WASH D C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRG 2/28/75

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTO 01082  
E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)  
SUBJECT: SECVISIT - QUESTION SESSION JANUARY 23, 1976  
ACTION: SECSTATE WASH D C IMMEDIATE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE/SECTO 01082  
FOR S/PRS

PLEASE PASS TO NSC AND WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN  
S/S-15 FOR YOUR INFORMATION, NOT REPEAT NOT FOR RELEASE, IS  
THE TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S RESPONSE TO  
NEWSMEN'S QUESTIONS PRIOR TO THE MORNING SESSION WITH  
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, JANUARY 23:

Q. THERE WAS A STORY PUBLISHED THIS MORNING STATING YOU  
PLAN TO RESIGN.

A. I'VE NEVER SEEN THAT STORY.

Q. JOHN SCALI ON THE EVENING NEWS LAST NIGHT.

A. NEVER HEARD OF IT, IT'S RIDICULOUS.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE TALKS TO THIS POINT?

A. (GARBLED)...VERY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AND SOME VERY  
INTERESTING NEW SOVIET IDEAS HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED. I THINK

T. / GOOD PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE.

Q. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE MISSION?

A. YES I AM.

Q. MR SECRETARY, WHAT EFFECT DO YOU THINK THESE RESULTS  
YOU'VE ACHIEVED IN MOSCOW - THE FACT THAT BOTH SIDES WERE  
NOT ABLE TO REACH A BREAKTHROUGH - WILL HAVE ON DETENTE?

A. (EMPHASIS) SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE - TOWARDS  
A SALT AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, I THINK THAT ON ONE OF THE  
KEY ELEMENTS WE HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT.

Q. ARE YOU DISAPPOINTED ON ANGOLA?

A. WE'RE DISCUSSING THAT NOW...

KISSINGER

BT

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, VANDERHYE FOR NESSEN

RECALLED

PSN:030840

PAGE 01

OF 01

TOR:023/12:21Z

DTG:231200Z JAN 76



GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

This form marks the file location of item number 2abc  
as listed on the pink form (GSA form 7122, Withdrawal  
Sheet) at the front of the folder.

January 12, 1970

CONGRESSMAN DIGGS ON THE U. S. ROLE IN ANGOLA

Q. Would you comment on Congressman Diggs' characterization of U. S. policy on Angola as "the biggest blunder in the history of its relations with Africa."

A. The President and Secretary Kissinger have stated our position on Angola and have explained fully the reasons for our position. I see no need to comment on the Congressmen's remarks beyond that.

ON BACKGROUND:

Certainly the remarks were not helpful, particularly in the forum in which they were made.

February 2, 1976

MERCENARIES FOR ANGOLA

Q. Are we, either directly or indirectly providing funds for the recruitment training or hiring of mercenaries in Great Britain - for instance?

A. We have stated before and I will state again that no agency of the US government is being used for the recruitment hiring or training of American mercenaries. We have stated further that we have provided limited assistance to countries which share our goals in Angola. But cannot account abviously for every penny of these funds when they are transmitted to the recipient government. I would refer you to Secretary Kissinger's testimony of January 29 when he discussed the question of mercenaries with the State Foreign Relations Committee.

Q. Well are we providing the British with Funds for use in mercenary recruitment?

A. We are not giving the British funds for recruitment of mercenaries in Angola.

February 2, 1976

NIXON PLEDGE OF 3 BILLION  
TO NORTH VIETNAM

- Q. The New York Times has an article today that asserts that President Nixon pledged over 3 billion in aid to the North Vietnamese after the signing of the Paris agreement. What is our aid policy toward Vietnam and was there in fact a Nixon memorandum?
- A. The article correctly points out that Secretary Kissinger in a January 1973 press conference stated that no specific sums in post war reconstruction aid had been promised to North Vietnam. Discussions were begun in early 1973 with a Joint Economic Commission, the purpose of which was to implement the Paris agreement. The Commission did not come to any conclusions, nor were any decisions reached on specific figures largely because Hanoi's behavior was so clearly in violation of the Paris agreement.
- Q. What about the Vietnamese that information on our statement missing in action brings on our "responsibility" to provide aid to Vietnam?
- A. Our previously stated policy still holds: we believe that Vietnam has a unilateral obligation to provide information on our missing in action. This obligation is in keeping with the Paris agreement and is untied to any other provisions or conditions.
- Q. What is our general policy with regard to Vietnam?
- A. Our general policy is as stated in the President's East-West Center address in Hawaii, December 7:

"In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required. Our policies toward the new regimes of the Peninsula will be determined

by their conduct toward us. We are prepared to reciprocate gestures of good will -- particularly the return of remains of Americans killed or missing in action or information about them.

If they exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and constructive approaches to international problems, we will look to the future rather than to the past!

Q. Did Nixon Actually send a memorandum to the Vietnamese?

A. We never discuss correspondence between heads of State.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 2, 1976

FOR MARGIE VANDERHYE

Margie,

Totals for following years per the attached chart:

- 1973 -- <sup>close to a</sup> ~~roughly~~ half billion (472 million)
- 1974 -- \$2.6 billion (<sup>following</sup> special situation in ~~attempt~~ <sup>& October war</sup>)
- 1975 -- close to three-quarters of a billion (\$734 million)
- 1976 -- \$2.3 billion (now before the Congress) (<sup>special situation following Sinai II agreement</sup>)
- 1977 -- figures not announced except for \$1 billion in FMS. Figures for full Israeli aid will become known when overall assistance package for FY-77 goes to the Congress. [However, on FYI basis only you will see from attached chart figure will be \$1.8 billion.] How-package will be "substantial" in line with our continuing commitment to Israel's security."

Rosemary Niehuss

Margie - note 70-72 figures which we just got.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL (IN \$MILLION)

1977 figure  
not annual  
except for  
\$1 billion in  
1977 Fms

	FISCAL YEAR				1977 Fms
	1973	1974	1975	1976	
<u>Grants</u>					
Supporting Assistance	50	50	324.5	510	523.3
Immigration Assistance	49	36.5	40	20	—
American Schools Abroad	4.4	3.3	2.4	—	—
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>93.4</b>	<b>89.8</b>	<b>366.9</b>	<b>530</b>	<b>523.3</b>
<u>Loans</u>					
Supporting Assistance	0	6	0	245	261.7
PL 480	47.9	0	9	15	9
EXIMBANK	21.3	35	39.9	50 (est)	50
AID Housing Investment Guarantee	0 (was 50 in FY 72)	25	25	25	25
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>69.2</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>68.9</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>345.7</b>
<u>Military Assistance</u>					
MS Credits	300	982.7	200	750	500
Grant Assistance	0	1,500	100	750	500
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>2,482.7</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>1500</b>	<b>1000</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>472.6</b>	<b>2,632.5</b>	<b>734.8</b>	<b>2365</b>	<b>1869</b>
--Grants	103.7	1,589.8	466.9	1280	1023.3
--Loans	368.9	1,042.7	268.9	1085	845.7

FY 77  
67.6

Congressional approval of Administration's FY 76 request is still pending

Planning figures which will be affected by a variety of factors. Immigration Assistance figure will be provided by Congress; PL-480, EXIMBANK and AID Housing Guarantee figures are estimates.

1970 - Total of \$93.9 mil  
(included \$30 mil Fms)

1971 - total of \$634 mil  
(included \$545 Fms)

1972 - total of \$483 mil  
(included \$300 Fms)

Margie VanLithge

January 27, 1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT VISIT SCHEDULE

Announced

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel	Official Visit January 27 10:30 AM Arrival ceremony, 90-minute Office meeting 8 PM Black tie dinner  January 28 11 AM 60-minute Office meeting  January 29 7 PM Attend Israeli Reception	Yes
Prime Minister Cosgrave of Ireland	Official Visit March 17 10:30 AM Arrival ceremony, <i>Feb: 5</i> 60-minute Office meeting <i>announcement</i> 8 PM Black tie dinner	NO
King Hussein of Jordan	Private Visit March 30 11 AM 60-minute Office Meeting 7:30 PM Black Tie Working Dinner	NO
King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden	Private Visit April 5 11 AM 30-minute Office meeting	NO
President Giscard d'Estaing of France	State Visit May 17-20	Yes
Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain	State Visit July 7-11	Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)

White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983

By DND NARS, Date 2/28/85



March 1, 1976

After Angola, More Soviet/Cuban Involvement?

Now that the Cubans and Soviets have successfully ensured the MPLA a diplomatic and military victory in Angola, speculation is increasing on where they will turn their attention next. Namibia and Rhodesia are considered likely targets for "liberation" assistance. The Caribbean is considered another possibility.

Q. In view of the President's and Secretary Kissinger's admonitions to Cuban should they continue their policies of intervention elsewhere, what would the U. S. do if the Cubans should move into Rhodesia or Namibia?

A. While I would not want to hypothesize about what we might do under any given circumstance, I would point out, however, that it is precisely consequences such as those you mention that the President was speaking about last December in his remarks on the Congressional aid cut-off. That cut-off must be a source of encouragement to our opponents and discouragement to our friends as to our intentions and our willingness to tolerate such external intervention.

CUBAN ACTIVITY IN ANGOLA

Q: Are the reports of new Cuban Military activity in Angola correct? What about Cuba's claim that its forces in Angola are being withdrawn?

A: We are aware of these reports but cannot confirm them.

Our concern for the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola is well known. In view of the Cuban government's letter asserting that it would be withdrawing its forces from Angola, we will be watching this situation with particular interest.

Additional questions should be referred to State.

US VETO OF ANGOLAN MEMBERSHIP

Q: Why did the US veto Angola's application for UN membership, and how does this square with our policy of trying to improve our relations with African nations?

A: Our veto of Angola's membership application for which we sought to defer consideration until August, is totally consistent with our publicly stated position and was in fact restated by Amb. Scherer yesterday: The U.S. remains convinced that Angola does not yet meet the requirements for membership set forth in article *Apparent influence of Cuban troops, exercise in member in* of the Charter. The continuing presence and the Angolan context, is the basis for our view. There is now no justification for such a large and armed foreign presence in a truly independent African State.

IF PRESSED:

Furthermore Secretary Kissinger said in Dakar May 1 that "We are ready to open discussions with the Angolan Authorities regarding normalizing relations, including eventual economic cooperation. But our commitment to African self-determination and unity compels us first to determine the intentions of the Angolan authorities toward the massive presence of non-African troops on their soil long after all other non-Angolan forces have been withdrawn."

*Ita on mercenaries should be refused to 8/2/76*

PRESS BRIEFING PAPER  
June 29, 1976

*Mercenary Recruitment*

SUBJECT: Mercenary Recruitment in U. S.

Q. The Washington Post said today that two black lawyers who attended the mercenary trial in Luanda insist that Congress should investigate whether the Administration breached U. S. neutrality laws by permitting mercenary recruitment in this country?

A. On March 10, in testimony before the Diggs Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Robert L. Keuch, Acting Deputy Attorney General of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, said:

"... I wish to assure the Subcommittee that the Criminal Division, which has enforcement responsibility for the statutes we will discuss, has been aware of numerous allegations regarding recruitment efforts and is conducting appropriate investigations."

He said it "would not be fair... to discuss the identity of any individuals or groups currently under investigation" and that it would be "inappropriate and contrary to longstanding Justice Department policy to comment specifically on any current investigative efforts."

I refer you to the Justice Department for comment on the Post story, but I again will emphasize that the U. S. Government was not involved in any way in the recruitment or deployment of American mercenaries in Angola. The same is true for allegations regarding recruitment of Americans for service in Rhodesia.

PRESS BRIEFING PAPER  
June 29, 1976

SUBJECT: American Mercenaries in Angola

Q. What is the U. S. Government doing to help Daniel Gearhart?

A. We are actively engaged in efforts to have what we consider an excessive and unjustified sentence reconsidered. *(Full. Red Cross. other countries req.)*

Q. Has the Department heard from the defense lawyers in Luanda?

A. Not directly. We have talked with the office in Columbus, Ohio, of defense attorney Robert Cesner. The trial was discussed and also ways in which the U. S. Government might be of assistance. The office in Columbus had been in touch with Mr. Cesner.

Q. The New York Times said today that British Prime Minister James

Callaghan reportedly was sending a message to President Neto asking clemency for the three Britons sentenced to death. Are the President and the Secretary sending similar messages to Neto?

A. All I can say now is that we are considering all possibilities that might be useful.

June 29, 1976

STATE PRESS GUIDANCE

MERCENARIES IN ANGOLA (JUNE 28, 1976)

Q. What is your comment on the sentences delivered against the Americans for mercenary activities in Angola?

A. We have only seen the brief wire service item on the results of the trial. It appears that Mr. Gearhart was sentenced to death and the two others, Gary Acker and Gustavo Grillo, were given 16 to 30 year sentences for mercenary activities. The only apparent distinction the Angolans drew between Gearhart and the other two was that he advertised himself as a mercenary soldier in a U. S. publication and sent \$10 to the "Wild Geese Club" in South Africa. We still do not know under what law the Angolan authorities arrived at this verdict. Whatever one thinks of mercenaries, neither the death sentence, nor any other severe penalty is in any way warranted by the charges against these three Americans, or the facts presented during the trial, or applicable international law. Mr. Gearhart, and the other Americans, are entitled to humane treatment, without any adverse distinction under the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims. There is no justification for executing them or subjecting

them to any other harsh treatment or penalty simply because of their status as members of a defeated armed force.

Furthermore, as far as we know, no convincing evidence was presented during the trial to indicate that Mr. Gearhart or the other Americans, committed any offenses warranting the death penalty or other severe penalty under any applicable provisions of domestic or international law. On the contrary, it appears they were in Angola less than one week and may never have fired their weapons.

We understand the sentences will be automatically appealed to the President of Angola, Agostinho Neto, who has final responsibility for their implementation. We have already been in touch with the International Red Cross and will make our views known through other governments and international organizations which have representatives in Luanda.

US POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

Q: What is the US policy toward Angola?

A: We announced our willingness, some time ago, to normalize relations with Angola provide that the substantial force of Cubans present in that country is removed. Since then there has been no evidence of ~~withdrawal of Cuban troops.~~ *any significant change in the Cuban presence.* Moreover, the Angolan Government has exhibited *unwarranted* a hostile attitude toward the US exemplified by the execution of Daniel Gearhart ~~for alleged mercenary activities~~ in spite worldwide appeals for clemency. In short, we have seen no evidence of an Angolan desire to improve relations with us.



ANGOLA: MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN

Will the United States abstain, as reported, on the vote in the UN Security Council today in respect to Angola's membership in the United Nations.

Ambassador Scranton will make the United States' position clear at the time of the vote in the Security Council which I understand will take place this afternoon. I would not wish to preempt Ambassador Scranton's statement by making any further comment at this time.

[FYI: The United States will abstain in this vote. A copy of the draft US statement to be made at that time is attached]

November 23, 1976

ANGOLAN UN MEMBERSHIP

Why did the United States decide to abstain in the United Nations Security Council vote on Angola's membership?

I think Ambassador Scranton made the United States' position quite clear in his statement in conjunction with the vote yesterday. That is, the U. S. decided to abstain, rather than to oppose this application, out of respect for the sentiments expressed by many of our African friends. At the same time, as the Ambassador indicated, the United States continues to have serious doubts about the true independence of the current Angolan Government given the presence of a massive contingent of Cuban troops which remain in that country. We believe there is absolutely no justification for such a large foreign armed presence in an African state.

Nevertheless the United States has followed a consistent policy of support for African solutions to African problems and respect for the role of the Organization of African Unity. The OAS formally recommended UN membership for Angola. While the United States could not vote in favor of the Angolan application given our great concern over the continued foreign presence in that country, we decided not to oppose the application out of deference to African views.

## ANGOLA

### For Your Background Only

According to intelligence reports, Forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) are continuing to make gains in central and eastern Angola against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

In other developments, the Nigerian government has publicly announced its decision to give some \$20 million to the Popular Movement which Lagos recognized as Angola's government last month in reaction to South Africa's intervention in Angola on behalf of Popular Movement rivals. The announcement capped a visit to Lagos by the Luanda "government's" Prime Minister Lopo de Nascimento.

\* \* \* \* \*

Q: What can you tell us about Angola today. Didn't the President, in fact, confirm the fact that we are actively involved in aiding Angola factions?

A: I think the President described the U.S. relationship to the Angola situation as he wished to and I will not amplify his remarks. The important elements to note in the President's press conference are:

1. Our fundamental purpose in Angola was to ~~make sure that~~ <sup>enable</sup> the people of Angola decide their own fate, establish their own government, and proceed as an independent nation.
2. To the extent the Soviet Union and Cuba have impeded this process in Angola they have imposed a setback on the people of Angola and have ~~created a situation in which progress on detente suffers as well.~~ <sup>which is inconsistent with</sup> Furthermore, the Cuban Government by sending combat troops to the area effectively destroys any opportunity for improvement in relations with the United States.
3. Although we have tried <sup>and will continue</sup> to seek solutions to the Angola situation through diplomatic efforts and have tried to be helpful in providing "some assistance" to neighboring countries, ~~our hands are clearly tied and our efforts~~ <sup>have been</sup> seriously undermined by the action of the U.S. Senate on Friday. The President certainly

plans to work with the House of Representatives to reverse this regrettable, irresponsible action. As he said Friday, "failure to do so will . . . seriously damage the national interests of the United States."

ANGOLA

Q: Mr. President, the Senate recently voted to cut off funds for use in the Angolan conflict. You have said that your hands are tied and have called the Senate action a serious mistake, What can you realistically do now and what would you have us do in Angola barring any restrictions?

A: First, let me say that we have no exploitative interests in Angola nor do we seek any privileged status there. Our hope for Angola is to allow the Angolan people an opportunity to decide their own fate and establish their own government unimpeded by efforts from outside the continent to subvert that freedom of choice. We have consistently supported the efforts of the Organization of African Unity calling for a ceasefire and seeking an African solution to an African problem.

In the wake of the Senate action the Soviet Union and Cuba continue to send men and materiel to Angola with fewer incentives, I might add, to discuss alternative diplomatic solutions to the conflict there. Clearly these aggressive actions are destabilizing in Africa and have serious implications for overall US-Soviet relations as well.

In my State of the Union message I expressed the strong view that "We must not have a future in which we can no longer help our friends, such as in Angola -- even in limited and carefully controlled ways. We must not lose all capacity to respond

short of military intervention. Some hasty actions of the Congress during the past year -- most recently in respect to Angola -- were in my view very short-sighted. Unfortunately, they are still very much on the minds of our allies and our adversaries."

For our part, we have and we will continue to pursue diplomatic alternatives both with the Soviets and with OAU member nations, but our ability to influence the situation has been gravely weakened by the misguided actions of the *Carpenter* Senate on assistance to Angola.

To the extent we can, we will pursue the objective of a peaceful solution to this African conflict. We do not want to see the African continent subjected to externally sponsored subversion, and, as President, I will resist such efforts as strongly as I can.

US-USSR RELATIONS -- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANGOLA

Q: Mr. President, how can you suggest that your policy toward the Soviet Union is successful in light of the aggressive and expansionist character of Soviet actions in Angola?

A: The success of our relations with the Soviet Union depends very much on ~~what we do~~ *how strong and determined we are.* If we unilaterally cut our defenses; if we deprive ourselves of economic tools as instruments of our diplomacy; if we weaken ourselves in SALT negotiations and leave Soviet programs unconstrained; if -- as has been the case ~~through~~ through the actions of the Congress ~~we fail to block Soviet moves in~~ *we fail to block Soviet moves in* local conflicts such as Angola, we are ~~tearing down both sides~~ *tearing down both sides* ~~the~~ *losing our own hands. We are denying ourselves* incentives for ~~restraint~~ *restraint* and the penalties for aggressive behavior.

If we deprive ourselves of the tools of our own policy, we cannot then be surprised at the unsatisfactory results. Better US-Soviet relations do not depend on American conciliation but rather upon ~~American~~ *strength and American* willingness to meet our ~~responsibilities~~ responsibilities. I hope

*Angola has taught the Democratic Congress that lesson.*

ANGOLA DEVELOPMENTS - THE CONGRESS' FAULT

Q: Mr. President, the fall of Huambo to the MPLA is devastating for the UNITA/FNLA forces both militarily and psychologically. Some would say that this spells the beginning of the end for the National Union as a conventional military force. To what do you attribute these developments and to what extent are the limitations imposed by this Congress a factor?

A: I think that the rapidly military deteriorating situation in Angola is a result of the massive influx of materiel and men from the Soviet Union and Cuba and the inability of the U. S. to provide assistance to those trying so valiantly to resist this onslaught. By its action in cutting off all aid, the Congress has stated to the world that the U. S. will tolerate a clear act of Soviet-Cuban expansion by military force into areas thousands of miles from either country. The consequences of this unilateral renunciation by the U. S. of a role in resisting this blatant military aggression could be profound, not only in southern Africa but to our friends and allies -- yes, and to our opponents -- everywhere. Were it to become a practice, a radical shift in the world political and military alignment would be almost inevitable. We must all work together to insure that this does not occur.



PROPOSED ANSWERS BY NESSEN TO ANGOLA QUESTIONS

Q: Do you have any comment on the Christian Science Monitor story reporting that American mercenaries are fighting in Angola?

A: No U.S. Government agency is recruiting, hiring, or training American mercenaries.

Q: Well, you don't say anything about the U.S. paying American mercenaries.

A: (To our knowledge) no American mercenaries are being paid by the U.S. Government to fight in Angola.

Q: Have any Americans been hired by others not in the U.S. Government to fight as U.S. mercenaries in Angola?

A: Not that we know of.

Q: Is the President aware of everything the U.S. is doing in Angola?

A: Yes.

Q: Is Congress aware?

A: We are abiding by all the requirements of keeping Congress informed.

(MORE)

Q: Where is the money coming from to finance American activities in Angola?

A: It is money already in the pipeline.

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In response to all other questions on Angola, Nessen will say, "I don't have anything to add". Nessen will refer reporters to the most recent statements on Angola by the President and by Secretary Kissinger.

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Q: Where is the money coming from to finance American activities in Angola?

A: It is money already in the pipeline.

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In response to all other questions on Angola, Nessen will say, "I don't have anything to add". Nessen will refer reporters to the most recent statements on Angola by the President and by Secretary Kissinger.

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ANGOLA/USSR

Q. What are we going to do about Soviet intervention in Angola? are we intervening?

A. We have expressed our strong feelings about Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola. We support the OAU effort to arrange a peaceful solution for Angola and an end to Soviet and Cuban intervention. It is the African countries most of all who resent this outside intervention. The Soviet Union should know that if its action continues, it will inevitably do harm to our relationship.

Q. How is this Soviet action consistent with detente?

A. Detente was never a substitute for our own action to defend our own interests. Indeed, a reliable lessening of tension depends on our continuing to act in our own interest.

11:25 a.m.

FOR GUIDANCE:

Margie called & said we could say the following if asked about South Africa pulling out of the Angola border area:

This is of course a step to reduce tensions in the area and we welcome it.

- Q. What is your comment on the sentences delivered against the Americans for mercenary activities in Angola?
- A. We have only seen the brief wire service item on the results of the trial. It appears that Mr. Coardari was sentenced to death and the two others, Gary Acker and Gustavo Grillo, were given 16 to 30 year sentences for mercenary activities. The only apparent distinction the Angolans drew between Coardari and the other two was that he advertised himself as a mercenary soldier in a U.S. publication and sent \$10 to the "Wild Cattle Club" in South Africa. We still do not know under what law the Angolan authorities arrived at this verdict. Whatever one thinks of mercenaries, neither the death sentence nor any other severe penalty is in any way warranted by the charges against these three Americans, or the facts presented during the trial, or applicable international law. Mr. Coardari, and the other Americans, are entitled to humane treatment without any adverse distinction under the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims. There is no justification for executing them or subjecting them to any other harsh treatment or penalty simply because of their status as members of a

educated armed force. Furthermore, as far as we know, no convincing evidence was presented during the trial to indicate that Mr. (Saxhart, or the other Americans, committed any offenses warranting the death penalty or other severe penalty under any applicable provisions of domestic or international law. On the contrary, it appears they were in Angola less than one week and may never have fixed their weapons.

We understand the sentences will be automatically appealed to the President of Angola, Agostinho Neto, who has final responsibility for their implementation. We have already been in touch with the International Red Cross and will make our views known through other governments and international organizations which have representatives in Luanda.





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Draft Statement on US Abstention on  
Angola's Membership in the UN

The United States will abstain on Angola's application for membership in the United Nations. Our decision to abstain, rather than to oppose this application, was made out of respect for the sentiments expressed by our many African friends.

We still have serious doubts about the true independence of the current Angolan Government. It is hard to reconcile the presence of a massive contingent of Cuban troops with the claim that Angola enjoys truly independent status. The Angolan Government exercises only tenuous control over the two-thirds of Angola that still resists domination by the regime in Luanda. The fact that it depends heavily on Cuban forces for the maintenance of its security casts doubt on the degree of popular support which it can command within the country.

It is clear that the Cuban army, a foreign, non-African force, is waging a bloody and difficult guerrilla war in three separate areas of Angola. We have heard disturbing reports that these Cuban occupation forces have been carrying out military assaults upon undefended

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By W.H.M., NARA, Date 4/20/00

villages and towns in Angola. These reported attacks include the execution of men and boys, the burning of villages and the slaughter of the people's main source of food and livelihood, their cattle. Reportedly up to 5000 Angolans have fled from this recent onslaught across the border into Namibia.

We continue to believe that there is absolutely no justification for such a large foreign armed presence in an African state.

The real victims of this policy, of course, are the people of Angola, who have borne the weight of 14 years of colonial war and now almost two years of civil war, with no end in sight. Even now there are an estimated 700,000 refugees and displaced persons in Angola.

Nevertheless the United States has followed a consistent policy of support for African solutions to African problems and respect for the role of the Organization of African Unity. The Organization of African Unity has formally recommended UN membership for Angola, and OAU members have asked us to facilitate Angola's entry. For the reasons I have enumerated earlier we cannot, in good conscience, vote in favor of the Angolan application



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for membership in this organization. In this case, however, out of deference to African views, we will not oppose the application.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am saying two things: I am saying that Soviet actions in Angola, if continued, are bound to affect the general relationship with the United States; that a substantial deterioration of that relationship can also over time affect the strategic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also maintain that the limitation of strategic arms is not a concession we make to the Soviet Union, but it is an objective that is in our interest, and it is in the world interest, and it is in the interest of world peace. So we will pursue the negotiations in the present framework.