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GUIDANCE FOR RON NESSEN CONCERNING ADMINISTRATION
COOPERATION WITH THE CHURCH INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Question

In light of the negotiations going on between Administration officials and the Church Committee, will the President delay making his own changes in the Intelligence Community?

Answer

No. The President has responsibilities and powers under Article II of the Constitution in the foreign intelligence area, and he will take action pursuant to these powers, notwithstanding the status of legislation. He has authorized his aides to work with the Committee to define the issues and perhaps develop mutually acceptable legislation. The primary focus is on the issue of the relationship between the two branches, particularly the access of Congress to highly classified foreign intelligence information.

Question

Who has been attending these meetings?

Answer

There have been two meetings attended by senior White House officials and members of the Senate Committee and several of their staff. (Chairman Church and Vice Chairman Tower have not attended.)

Question

Why has the House Committee refused to participate?

Answer

At the President's instructions, the Pike Committee was contacted and asked to join these discussions. They have declined to do so. [Any further comment obviously will have to come from the Committee.]



Question

Are the meetings with the Church Committee continuing?

Answer

Yes.

Question

What kind of progress is being made?

Answer

Thus far, there has been just a preliminary discussion of the key issues surrounding how classified information can be given to Congress without the danger of disclosure. The discussions are frank and serious, but no decisions or final conclusions have been reached.

Question

What about the timing -- when will they be completed and joint legislation developed?

Answer

There is no timetable. In fact, there may not be any final product. Although we are seeking common ground, there is benefit derived simply by understanding each other's points of view. In any event, the President will go forward with his decision-making, regardless of the outcome of these discussions with the Committee.



1/12/76
M.D.

Office of the Assistant to the Director
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(Embargoed for Release Until Delivery Expected 10:30 a.m., EST,
Friday, January 23, 1976)

Statement

W. E. Colby

Director of Central Intelligence

Before

Committee on Government Operations

of the

United States Senate

January 23, 1976



Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss congressional oversight of our intelligence activities. Despite all the excitement in recent months over CIA and other intelligence activities, this is one of the most critical issues which must be faced in any serious investigation into our Government's intelligence activities.

Traditionally, intelligence is assumed to operate in total secrecy and outside the law. This is impossible under our Constitution and in our society. As a result, when CIA was established in 1947, a compromise was made under which broad, general statutes were drawn, and carefully limited arrangements for congressional review were developed. It was then believed necessary to sacrifice oversight for secrecy.

Our society has changed, however, and a greater degree of oversight is now considered necessary. U.S. intelligence has already moved out of the atmosphere of total secrecy which previously characterized it. We who are in intelligence are well aware of the need to retain public confidence and congressional support if we are to continue to make our contribution to the safety of our country.

Thus, from the earliest days of the current investigations, I have stressed my hope that they will develop better guidelines for our operations and stronger oversight, to ensure that our activities do remain within the Constitution and the laws of our country.



But I have not swung all the way to the other extreme of the pendulum-- to the position that there can be no secrecy. General Washington once said, "Upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of [intelligence]." We have many secrets in America which are necessary to the functioning of our democracy--the ballot box, the grand jury, and our attorney-client relationships. The secrecy of our sources of intelligence is equally important to the preservation of our democracy, and even of our nation in the turbulent world in which we live.

In 1947 we took a small step away from total secrecy by enacting general statutes and constructing careful oversight arrangements in the Congress. Proposals now under consideration would alter these arrangements to assure more detailed oversight. But it is essential that the pendulum not swing so far as to destroy the necessary secrecy of intelligence, or destroy intelligence itself in the process.

In former comments on this subject, I many times said that it was up to Congress to organize itself to exercise the necessary oversight of our intelligence activities. This is still true, but I believe that recent experience permits me to draw some conclusions on this topic which this Committee has graciously invited.

Too great a stress on secrecy has led to situations in which members of Congress who were fully briefed on intelligence activities pleaded later that they had never heard of them when they came to public attention. One of the chairmen of our committees once indicated on the floor of the Senate that he had no inkling of one of our operations, although he had approved the specific appropriations necessary to continue it. His statement certainly kept

the secrecy of his participation in our operation, but at the sacrifice of implying that our intelligence activities were operating without oversight and control. Indeed he added to public concern that we constituted some independent "invisible government."

On a number of occasions, especially since 1956, proposals have been made to establish a joint committee on intelligence, but the Congress has never seen fit to adopt them. During this past year jurisdictional problems have been highlighted in the Congress as a result of two things:

First, foreign intelligence today is not primarily limited to military intelligence, as it may have been in earlier years. It also is now of interest to those committees concerned with our economy, our foreign relations, our agriculture, space and a wide variety of other activities. As a result, we have had a proliferation of demands for congressional review of sensitive foreign intelligence matters in these fields by other committees to the degree that 59 Senators and 149 Representatives have been briefed on some aspect of our activities this past year alone.

Second, during 1974, there was much congressional interest in our covert action activities, sparked by exposure of testimony I gave to one of our oversight committees on the subject. Both the House and the Senate, by 3 to 1 majorities, turned down proposals that CIA be barred from such activities. But in December 1974, a provision was added to the Foreign Assistance Act which required that any CIA activity abroad other than intelligence gathering could only be conducted if it were found by the President to be important to the national security and reported "in a timely fashion" to the appropriate committees of the Congress. Together with the two Select Committees, these "appropriate committees" now number eight.



The Executive Branch is fully complying with that provision of the law. The President made the appropriate findings, and briefings were given to the committees according to whatever arrangements the committees made. It was stressed and understood on all sides that these matters were sensitive, secret operations whose exposure would cause political damage to our foreign policy as well as frustration to the operations concerned. The result of the year's experience, in my mind, is clear. The system won't work. Every one of the new projects that were subjected to this process has leaked into the public domain. I am prepared to argue the value of each of these projects, but that is not my current point. The fact is that a secret operation conducted precisely according to the procedure set up by the Congress cannot be kept secret. I believe it essential to repeal that procedure and replace it by another which will include provisions for adequate secrecy.

In this Bicentennial year, it is appropriate to note an earlier American experience with this problem. On November 9, 1775, the Continental Congress adopted a "resolution of secrecy" under which any member who disclosed a matter which the majority had determined should be kept secret was to be expelled "and deemed an enemy to the liberties of America." On November 29, 1775, the Congress established the Committee on Secret Correspondence and gave it foreign intelligence responsibilities, managing a network of secret agents in Europe. This Committee took steps to protect the secrecy of its intelligence activities by sharply restricting access to operational matters. On one occasion, the Committee justified the secrecy of its information as follows:

"Considering the nature and importance of it, we agree . . . that it is our indispensable duty to keep it secret, even from Congress . . . We find, by fatal experience, that Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets."

Mr. Chairman, at that time there were 56 representatives in the Congress, compared to the 208 that I reported briefing during 1974.

If the Congress should decide to adopt new oversight arrangements, I believe it should establish a representative group to oversee intelligence activities on Congress' behalf. This representative group could be a joint committee. In any event a representative group should consist of a restricted number of members so that we do not involve the large numbers of Congressmen currently briefed on our sensitive activities.

The representative character of such an oversight body must be respected by us in the Intelligence Community, so that we can make available the information it needs to do its job.

At the same time, arrangements can and should be developed between such a representative body and the Intelligence Community by which reasonable limits are established as to the matters made available even to it. In my present post as Director of Central Intelligence, I do not insist, for example, upon knowing the name of a foreign agent in some dangerous situation. It is not necessary to my duties that I know his specific identity. It is essential that we be able to assure our foreign agents abroad, a number of whom have already expressed their alarm and limited what they tell us, that their names will be totally protected, since their lives or livelihoods are at peril. I would expect that a responsible representative committee of Congress would similarly



not request such specific identification, as our current oversight and Select Committees have not requested such sensitive information. Understandings of this nature between a responsible oversight body and the Intelligence Community would be more productive than adversary debates over either branch's "right" to have or to withhold such information.

A responsible oversight body must not discourage the Intelligence Community from conducting its own investigations and correcting its activities. A great portion of this past year's investigations has consisted only of public repetition of the private reviews by the Intelligence Community of its own activities. Since the full story of American intelligence remains secret, the impression is left with our public that what was revealed is characteristic of the whole. The experience has done little to encourage objective and hard-hitting self-examination in the future. CIA's collation of a list of some questionable activities in the domestic field was used as the basis for sensational charges of a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation. In truth, our misdeeds were few and far between, as the final Rockefeller Commission report reveals. CIA's investigations into possible assassination activity, which led to specific directives in 1972 and 1973 against such activity, have been the basis for sweeping allegations that assassinations are part of our function. We never assassinated anyone. And our own post-mortems of our performance in various intelligence situations have been selectively exposed to give a totally erroneous impression of continued failures of American intelligence. In fact, we have the best intelligence service in the world. But we cannot keep it that way if every one of its corrective efforts is trumpeted to its enemies.

In the consideration of any or altered oversight arrangements, the Congress should, I believe, deal with the problem of proliferation of congressional review of intelligence activities. I strongly urge that oversight be concentrated exclusively in the minimum number of committees necessary to effectively conduct it. Otherwise we are in danger of reverting to the situation of reporting to a myriad of committees and exposing parts of our activities in all directions. It should be possible to concentrate congressional oversight.

The issue of giving prior notice to Congress of sensitive intelligence operations has been raised, Mr. Chairman. I believe this is a thoroughly false issue. The present statute calls for the appropriate committees to be informed "in a timely fashion" with respect to activities abroad other than intelligence gathering. Our regular oversight committees are kept currently informed of major developments, and each year they review our appropriation requests in great detail.

A requirement of prior notice before any intelligence activity could be undertaken would, in my view, conflict with the President's constitutional rights, would be totally impractical during times of congressional recess when crises can arise, and would add nothing to the ability of the Congress to express its views about any of our activities. We currently inform the Congress on any decision immediately, although the actual hearing may be delayed by the committee in question for several weeks. Almost none of our activities are single-step operations which take place on only one occasion. An intelligence or covert action operation is generally a continuing effort running over some time. Informed of such an activity, a committee has every ability to express the concern of its individual members, to vote in committee its opinion with respect to the activity, to appeal to the congressional



leadership, and even to seek an appointment with the President himself. The committee also retains the ultimate legislative or appropriation sanction, if its views are not given due weight.

The unilateral exposure of an operation to public notice is not the solution. In essence, the theory adopted by some is that the right to expose such operations constitutes a super-constitutional individual veto of any secret activity. We cannot run such secret operations, Mr. Chairman, if Congressmen confirm to inquiring newsmen operating on a lead that indeed they were given a secret briefing on a covert operation in a certain country, instead of refusing to comment. Neither can we run secret operations if individual Congressmen announce that there are three other operations which have not yet been disclosed, thereby stimulating every investigative reporter in Washington to determine the specifics thereof by some hypothetical questions. And we cannot conduct covert operations if a committee puts out a report which refers to an activity which leaves out the name of the country or individual concerned, but gives enough evidence for any amateur sleuth to identify it beyond a shadow of a doubt in time for its identification to be carried with the news story of the report.

An essential element of new congressional oversight arrangements is better procedures for protecting sensitive information. Senate Rule 36 (2) and (5) states that confidential communications from the President or head of any department are to be kept secret unless the Senate votes. But the Senate, on November 20th last year, failed to vote on the release by the Select Committee of information which the President specifically requested be kept secret and in the face of my request that certain names of CIA personnel therein be deleted. In the House of Representatives, Rule XI.2. (e) (2) provides that the records of any

committee are open to any member, which on at least one occasion has led to the exposure of certain CIA operations despite the written promise of a Member to keep them secret.

The arrangements for Congress to receive and protect sensitive information are most imperfect. A prior security clearance of staff members and termination of employment for disclosure are hardly adequate sanctions to ensure the protection of sensitive intelligence sources which can produce substantial royalties for its disclosure. The extensive briefings and indoctrination and the secrecy agreements employed in the Executive Branch have even proved inadequate in the state of our present legislation. With respect to staff members, therefore, I believe it essential that a regular procedure of security protection be established. This must be enforceable not only by indoctrination and discipline but also by sanctions. These are contained in legislation which I have proposed and which is currently under consideration in the Executive Branch to cover those who voluntarily undertake the obligation of secrecy as an aspect of their employment. This proposal would apply equally to Executive Branch employees and congressional staff members who obtain privileged access to our intelligence secrets.

Mr. Chairman, we also need a procedure to determine the declassification and public release of those secrets that no longer need to be protected. This cannot be left to the individual staff member in the Executive or the Legislative Branch. Under the Constitution, it cannot be assumed by the Legislative Branch alone and any such contention would inevitably restrict the flow of sensitive information from the Executive. This could consist of an agreement that if the committee decides on release, the President has reasonable opportunity to certify that the release would be detrimental to the national security, and



his determination then would govern in the absence of further resolution of the constitutional questions involved. And this must apply to any release of the information, so as not to lead to an absurd situation in which a committee agrees not to release individual reports of secret activities but then proposes to publish them in its final report.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that congressional oversight of our intelligence activities can be strengthened. The degree of oversight can be increased relative to that in the years in which there was a general consensus that these matters were better not known by outsiders. The structure can be improved by focusing responsibility so that a depth of knowledge and expertise about our intelligence operations can be developed. The structure can also be improved by clear assignment of responsibility for exclusive supervision of our intelligence activities to a limited number of members of the Congress, representing the Congress as a whole, who would have full access to all information appropriate to exercise their responsibilities. And congressional oversight can be improved by making arrangements with Congress to protect the sensitive intelligence activities of our Government in the same way as we protect other secrets essential to the survival of American democracy. Executive Branch supervision can also be improved by ensuring the discipline of those in the intelligence profession and of their supervisors as to their respect for these important national secrets, and by giving us the ability to enforce such protection against those who would wantonly destroy them. These improvements, Mr. Chairman, in supervision of our intelligence activities would have truly more long-lasting value as a result of this year of investigation

than any other single action taken by the Congress. They would be a fitting conclusion to this year of investigation of intelligence--so that our intelligence service will be responsible to our Constitution, its legislative oversight will be equally responsible, and we will continue to have the best intelligence in the world.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

*Non-
for Guidance
Mike*

27 January 1976


The Honorable Otis Pike, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Chairman Pike:

As you are undoubtedly aware, the Agency and the intelligence community are deeply disturbed by the pervasive and premature leaking of your Committee's final report. We have already communicated to you our feeling as to the report's bias. What troubles us particularly at this time are items in the news attributed to your staff director, Mr. Field, alleging that the leaks may have come from the Executive Branch.

Let me assure you that as far as this Agency goes, there is no basis whatsoever for Mr. Field's allegation. I feel confident in making this statement since the New York Times story of January 26 quoted from a memorandum concerning a 1973 meeting with Senator Jackson and the draft Mr. Field gave us did not contain any reference to such a memorandum. Consequently, the latter draft--the one Mr. Field refused to supply--was the edition of the report leaked to the New York Times.


Furthermore, even the recipients of these leaks are now indicating quite specifically the sources from which they have received their information. The article in today's New York Times by John Crewdson refers directly to sources within your Committee. In one instance the Crewdson article deals with the purchase of armored limousines for a foreign chief of state. In our largely fruitless sessions with your staff, we had asked that any particular reference to the chief of state or the dates on which the limousines



were purchased should be deleted. Your staff agreed to do this. This agreement was totally academic, for as Mr. Crewdson put it, "...the Agency obtained two armored limousines for a third world leader whom Committee sources identified as South Korean President Park Chung Hee." (Emphasis added) There are two other similar references to Committee sources in the article which make it clear that they supplied either fact or innuendo to Mr. Crewdson. These references are but the latest in a series of leaks. The pattern which they represent has become so clear that I felt it necessary to call the matter to your attention.

One final word regarding the 1973 memorandum concerning the conversation with Senator Jackson. We have checked our files and records and have determined that we have not sent that document to you officially. Ms. J. Hess, your security officer (who we feel, incidentally, has done a very fine job in maintaining her records), acknowledges that she has no record of having received the document officially. To compound the matter, a copy of that memorandum is missing from a set of files to which one of your staffers had access in early December. We suggest that you may wish to determine for yourself how your staff procured the document and how the report was leaked to the press.

Sincerely,



Mitchell Rogovin
Special Counsel to the Director

cc: Vice Chairman McClory
Members of the Committee



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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- F. Speeches of Director Colby
- G. Talking Points prepared by CIA



A



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 28, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: GWEN ANDERSON
VIA: AGNES WALDRON
FROM: TERESA ROSENBERGER *tru*
RE: BUSH SWEARING-IN



The President will travel to the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia on Friday, January 30th at 11:00 a. m. to swear - in George Bush as the new Director of the CIA. The President will be met by Ambassador Bush and then escorted by the Ambassador into the bubble auditorium for the swearing-in. Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters (Deputy Director of the CIA) will open the program. Justice Potter Stewart will administer the oath of office to Ambassador Bush as Mrs. Bush holds the Bible (the bible will not be a Bush family bible). After the swearing-in, the President will deliver about ten minutes of remarks. Ambassador Bush will speak for about three minutes after the President. Lt. Gen. Walters will then close the ceremony.

There will be approximately 500 people attending the ceremony. Among those invited will be the Cabinet, the Vice President, senior members of the Congress, Congressional friends of Ambassador Bush and CIA employees. Sec. Rumsfeld and Sec Kissinger are definitely expected to attend as well as Vice President Rockefeller and the Chairmen of the intelligence committees. There will be no undercover CIA agents in the auditorium as the risk of exposure is too great.

After the swearing-in ceremony, the President and Ambassador Bush will proceed into the main building to greet other CIA employees not attending the ceremony. Undercover agents will be present. The press will not be present. On the left wall of the foyer in the main building is the verse John VIII - XXXII, "And Ye Shall Know The Truth And Truth Shall Make You Free.". This was a favorite scripture reading of Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, 1953- 1961. On the right wall of the foyer are 31 stars which represent the CIA agents killed in the line of duty. Mr. Welch's star has been authorized but has not been actually put up yet. Under the stars is a glass case containing the names of the men killed. Only the names of 18 of the men killed are listed. The other 13 the CIA wish to remain anonymous.

There have been ten Directors of the CIA. (See Attachment). President Ford will be the first President to swear-in a Director of the CIA at the CIA headquarters. Other Presidents have visited the CIA headquarters and given remarks while there.

President Nixon... March 7, 1969... remarks to top personnel
President Kennedy... Nov. 28, 1961... award ceremony for Dulles
President Eisenhower... November 3, 1959... Cornerstone-
laying ceremony for the new headquarters in
Langley, Va.

(see attachment for copies of remarks)

History of the CIA

Foreign intelligence activities have been part of the American way of life since the days of George Washington. Nathan Hale is considered to be the first real "spook" in America. Unfortunately, Hale, known as the "chocolate soldier" by the CIA because of his activities and the chocolate colored statue of him in the CIA courtyard, was caught in the act of being a spy. Only since World War II has foreign intelligence been coordinated on a government-wide basis.

The present day foreign intelligence organization was authorized by President Truman on January 22, 1946 when he designated the Secretaries of the State, War, Navy, and one personal representative as the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). The members of the NIA were instructed to assign facilities and personnel from their departments to form the Central Intelligence Group, which was the operating body of the NIA.

Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (effective September 18, 1947), the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were established. The responsibilities of the CIA as stated in the Act :

"For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interest of national security...."

Contacts:

Pat Taylor..... 351-7676
John Lehman.... 351-5167



Note: President Truman spoke at a Training course for agents on Nov. 21, 1952

Attachments

B



THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Background

The United States has carried on foreign intelligence activities since the days of George Washington, but only since World War II have they been coordinated on a government-wide basis.


The organization first formed for this purpose was authorized by Presidential Directive on 22 January 1946, when President Harry S. Truman designated the Secretary of State (James F. Byrnes), the Secretary of War (Robert P. Patterson), the Secretary of the Navy (James V. Forrestal), and his own personal representative (Admiral William D. Leahy), as the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). The Authority was directed to plan, develop, and coordinate "all Federal foreign intelligence activities" in order "to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security." The members of the NIA were further directed to assign persons and facilities from their departments to form the Central Intelligence Group, which was the operating body for the NIA. The CIG was headed by a Director of Central Intelligence appointed by the President.

Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (which became effective on 18 September 1947), the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were established. The NIA and its operating component, CIG, which had been in existence for 20 months were disestablished, and the personnel, property, and records of CIG were transferred to the new CIA.

Mission and Functions

The principal responsibilities of the CIA derive from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 402, 403). Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act states:

For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the [Central Intelligence] Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—



(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: *Provided*, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: *Provided further*, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence: *And provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

The National Security Act, as amended, specifies that both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. An amendment of 4 April 1953 authorizes such appointments to be made either from individuals in civilian life or from commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in active or retired status, provided that "at no time shall the two positions . . . be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers. . . ."

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 supplements the National Security Act with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency as follows:

(1) exempts the Agency, in the interest of "the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States," from such existing Federal laws as require "the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency";



(2) specifies that the appropriations or other moneys made available to the Agency "may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds"; and that "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified";

(3) permits CIA to transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget) for the performance of the functions and activities authorized by the National Security Act, and other agencies are permitted to receive from or transfer to the Agency such sums;

(4) provides that when the Director, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization determine that the entry of a particular alien into the United States for permanent residence "is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission," the alien and his immediate family shall be given entry into the United States for permanent residence, but not more than one hundred persons may be given entry under this authority annually.

Under these acts of Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence serves as the principal adviser to the President and the National Security Council on all matters of foreign intelligence related to the national security. CIA's responsibilities are carried out subject to various directives and controls by the President and the National Security Council.

Intelligence Coordination

As the Government's principal intelligence officer, the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for coordinating the foreign intelligence activities of the United States. He is Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), which advises and assists him in this coordinating role. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a member of the Board, representing the CIA. The other Board members are the heads of the intelligence organizations of the Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) and the Department of Defense (Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency), plus representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



Acting in consultation with the U.S. Intelligence Board, the Director of Central Intelligence makes recommendations to the National Security Council concerning the intelligence structure of the Government as a whole, to insure that each element is functioning properly in the national intelligence effort.

Similarly, after coordination with that Board, the Director presents to the National Security Council "National Intelligence Estimates," prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in close collaboration with representatives of other Government intelligence organizations and at times with civilian experts. These estimates cover specific foreign situations of national security concern or the world situation generally. They may embody a unanimous opinion or may contain dissenting views.

By means of these coordinated estimates, along with related types of intelligence reports and evaluations, the Director of Central Intelligence exercises the responsibility imposed on him by the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent directives of the National Security Council to insure that the information going to the President and his principal advisers on foreign policy and national defense is complete, accurate, and timely.

The Central Intelligence Agency neither duplicates nor rivals the departmental (e.g. State, Defense) intelligence organizations of the U.S. Government. It draws on the resources of these agencies in producing finished intelligence at the national level in support of senior policymakers. The Agency produces a wide variety of intelligence reports on political, economic, military, scientific, and other subjects. They range from those of predominantly current interest to in-depth analytical studies and basic country data.

Services of Common Concern

In addition to its coordination activities, the CIA provides various "services of common concern" to the U.S. intelligence community generally. It conducts independent research in the fields of economic, geographic, and scientific intelligence, monitors foreign news and propaganda broadcasts, and collects information abroad. It also provides specialized reference and translation services, including mechanized data-processing facilities, to the various elements of the U.S. intelligence community.

Policy on Public Disclosures

Because of the nature of its duties, required by law and by considerations of national security, the Central Intelligence Agency does not confirm or



deny published reports, whether true or false, favorable or unfavorable to the Agency or its personnel. CIA does not publicly discuss its organization, its budget, or its personnel. Nor does it discuss its methods of operation or its sources of information.


Accountability

The Central Intelligence Agency is directly accountable to Presidential authority and control. By law the Agency operates under the direction of the National Security Council, which the President chairs. Accountability on fiscal and management matters is also achieved through the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board reviews for the President the foreign intelligence activities of the Government, including those of CIA.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in its present form was established by President Nixon in 1969. It represents a reorganization and reconstitution of the Board which was originally set up by President Eisenhower in 1956 as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities and was reactivated, with broadened terms of reference, by President Kennedy in 1961 and continued by President Johnson as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The Board's functions, prescribed by Executive Order 11460 of 20 March 1969, are to:

- (1) advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities making up the overall national intelligence effort;
- (2) conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence and related activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies are engaged;
- (3) receive, consider and take appropriate action with respect to matters identified to the Board, by the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies of the intelligence community, in which the support of the Board will further the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort; and
- (4) report to the President concerning the Board's findings and appraisals, and make appropriate recommendations for actions to achieve increased effectiveness of the Government's foreign intelligence effort in meeting national intelligence needs.



The activities of the CIA are also reviewed by the Congress in much the same way as those of other executive departments and agencies. Separate committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives (Armed Services and Appropriations) review CIA's programs and provide for its appropriations. From time to time other committees of the Congress receive information from the Agency on matters within their jurisdiction.

The Director of Central Intelligence is the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser and head of the Central Intelligence Agency and is responsible for the discharge of the functions of the Agency and those of his position, as they are prescribed by the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency Act, other legislation, and by other Presidential directives.

Other Information

The amount of pay of the Director and the Deputy Director, as well as that of the Cabinet and all high-level civilian positions in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government, is established by the Government Employees Salary Reform Act of 1964 and the Federal Salary Act of 1967 and subsequent legislative and executive actions. The 1964 Act lists for pay purposes each Cabinet and other high-level position in the executive branch in one of five categories, Levels I through V. Cabinet positions are placed in Level I; the position of the Director of Central Intelligence is among those placed in Level II and that of the Deputy Director in Level III. Under the procedures established by the 1967 Act for adjusting the pay of top-level positions, the current pay for Levels II and III was established in early 1969 at \$42,500 and \$40,000, respectively.

The CIA Headquarters Building is located at Langley, Virginia, about eight miles from the center of the Nation's Capital. Its post office address is Washington, D.C. 20505.





2

THE DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Rear Admiral Sidney William Souers, USNR
23 January 1946 - 10 June 1946

Lieutenant General (later General, USAF) Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg,
USA (AAF)
10 June 1946 - 1 May 1947

Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) Roscoe Henry Hillenkoetter, USN
1 May 1947 - 7 October 1950 *established Sept. 18, 1947*

General Walter Bedell Smith, USA
7 October 1950 - 9 February 1953

The Honorable Allen Welsh Dulles*
26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961

The Honorable John Alex McCone
29 November 1961 - 28 April 1965

Vice Admiral William Francis Raborn, Jr., USN (Retired)
28 April 1965 - 30 June 1966

The Honorable Richard Helms
30 June 1966 - 2 February 1973

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
2 February 1973 - 2 July 1973

The Honorable William E. Colby
4 September 1973 -

*Mr. Dulles served as Acting DCI from 9 to 26 February 1953.



THE DEPUTY DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The Honorable Kingman Douglass (Acting)
2 March 1946 - 11 July 1946

Brigadier General (later Major General) Edwin Kennedy Wright, USA
20 January 1947 - 9 March 1949

The Honorable William Harding Jackson
7 October 1950 - 3 August 1951

The Honorable Allen Welsh Dulles
23 August 1951 - 26 February 1953

General Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF
23 April 1953 - 31 January 1962

Lieutenant General Marshall Sylvester Carter, USA
3 April 1962 - 28 April 1965

The Honorable Richard Helms
28 April 1965 - 30 June 1966

Vice Admiral Rufus Lackland Taylor, USN
13 October 1966 - 31 January 1969

Lieutenant General Robert Everton Cushman, Jr., USMC
7 May 1969 - 31 December 1971

Lieutenant General Vernon Anthony Walters, USA*
2 May 1972 -

*General Walters served as acting DCI from 3 July through 3 September 1973.



A



PRESIDENTIAL COMMENTS

President Truman in a message he sent 9 June 1964 accompanying his portrait for display at CIA Headquarters, wrote:

To the Central Intelligence Agency, a necessity to the President of the United States, from one who knows.

President Eisenhower, speaking on 3 November 1959 on the occasion of the cornerstone laying at CIA's new Headquarters Building at Langley, Virginia, characterized CIA's work as follows:

In war nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you [members of CIA] are a part.

No task could be more important.


Upon the quality of your work depends in large measure the success of our effort to further the Nation's position in the international scene.

In the work of Intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism—their reward can be little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true.

President Kennedy, speaking to the personnel of CIA at its Headquarters on 28 November 1961, said:

Your successes are unheralded—your failures are trumpeted. . . . But I am sure you realize how important is your work, how essential it is—and how, in the long sweep of history, how significant your efforts will be judged.

So I do want to express my appreciation to you now, and I'm confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past.



President Johnson, at the 28 April 1965 swearing-in ceremonies at the White House for the Director and the Deputy Director, said:

Long ago in the infancy of this Nation Americans were told that their liberty and the price of it was eternal vigilance. In this 20th century that truth is stronger than ever.

We live in a dangerous world, a world which cannot be predicted, a world which moves and is shaped by great forces, forces which we faithfully believe can serve for good as well as for evil.

The purpose of this [Central Intelligence Agency] effort, like the purpose of all that we do, is to strive for an orderly, just, and peaceful world. In this effort more than in many others a high order of selflessness, of dedication, of devotion, is asked of men and women. The compensation of them comes not in fame, certainly not in rewards of salary, but in the reward of the sure knowledge that they have made a contribution to freedom's cause.

On 30 June 1966, when Richard Helms was sworn in as Director, President Johnson said:

I am extremely proud of both of these men [Admiral Raborn and Mr. Helms] and their colleagues. The nature of their work does not often allow public acknowledgement. Praised or damned . . . these men must go about their work without standing up for bows and sometimes are not even permitted to speak out in their own defense. Their role is misunderstood by some of their supporters, and I never read a morning paper without seeing it being distorted by their critics.

In 2½ years of working with these men I have yet to meet a "007." I have met dozens of men who are moved and motivated by the highest and most patriotic and dedicated purposes—men who are specialists in economics, and political science, and history, and geography, and physics, and many other fields where logic and analysis are crucial to the decisions that the President of their country is called upon to make. Through my experience with these men I have learned that their most significant triumphs come not in the secrets passed in the dark but in patient reading, hour after hour, of highly technical periodicals.

In a real sense they are America's professional students; they are unsung, just as they are invaluable.



President Nixon on the occasion of his visit to Headquarters on 7 March 1969 remarked to the assembled personnel:

In any event, in speaking of you and your mission, I have perhaps more familiarity with it than some of you might realize. Going back during the 8 years I was Vice President, I sat on the National Security Council and there learned to respect the organization, its Director, and its reports that were made to the Council, and through the Council to the President of the United States.

I know how vitally important the work of this organization is. I also know that this organization has a mission that, by necessity, runs counter to some of the very deeply held traditions in this country and feelings, high idealistic feelings, about what a free society ought to be.


This is a dilemma. It is one that I wish did not exist. But in the society in which we live, as I am sure you, all of you, are so completely aware, it is necessary that those who make decisions at the highest level have the very best possible intelligence with regard to what the facts really are, so that the margin of error will be, to that extent, reduced.

And in a sense, then, I look upon this organization as not one that is necessary for the conduct of conflict or war, or call it what you may, but in the final analysis is one of the great instruments of our Government for the preservation of peace, for the avoidance of war, and for the development of a society in which this kind of activity would not be as necessary, if necessary at all.

I know, too, that there will be no Purple Hearts, there will be no medals, there will be no recognition of those who have served far beyond the call of duty because by definition where the CIA is concerned your successes must never be publicized and your failures will always be publicized.

So finally, I would simply say that I understand that when President Truman in 1964 sent a message to the CIA, he put an inscription on it which, as I recall, went something like this: To the CIA, an organization which is an absolute necessity to any President of the United States. From one who knows.


I know. And I appreciate what you do.



Preface....

Until World War II, the conduct of foreign intelligence activities by the United States government was sporadic, and most Americans were not aware of them. Presidents of the United States, who have always borne the responsibility for the national security, have made statements, particularly in recent years, that have both acknowledged the existence of intelligence activities and revealed their importance in support of governmental policies and functions.

Selected Presidential statements dealing with U.S. intelligence activities have been extracted for presentation in this pamphlet. Although the statements of George Washington were written while he was the commanding general during the American Revolution, they are significant enough to warrant inclusion here. The terms of both Presidents Lincoln and Wilson were marked by major wars, but neither appears to have made a significant statement on the subject of intelligence.



George Washington

There was no centralized intelligence organization in any modern concept of the word during the American Revolution. The Americans and British both employed agents to secure information on troop deployments and strengths, and there were officers specifically charged with intelligence functions, although almost without exception these functions were added to officers' regular line duties. Thus, Major John Andre handled intelligence matters for Britain's General Clinton in New York and when Andre became Adjutant General of the British Armies in America, he continued to conduct certain special intelligence cases, including the defection of General Benedict Arnold from West Point.

General Forman, an American line officer in New Jersey, was Washington's intelligence chief in that area for a time. In connection with his intelligence activities, General Forman wrote Governor Livingston of New Jersey in February 1782 as follows:



"I presume Your Excellency is not unacquainted that I am at the particular request of General Washington employed in obtaining intelligence respecting the enemies movements at New York &c. By the Generals Letter to me of the 25 Inst. he in a very pointed manner asks my particular exertions as affairs at this time demand the best Intelligence."

General Washington kept closely informed on all intelligence matters and was perhaps the most able American intelligence officer prior to General William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. General Washington often levied intelligence requirements on his intelligence officers and then made his own estimates of the military situation based on the evidence they acquired. He directed what we now call psychological warfare campaigns and had a fine feel for intelligence activities.

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"The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged -- all that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue."

Letter from General Washington
to Colonel Elias Dayton,
then his intelligence chief
in New Jersey, 26 July 1777.

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"I have received your Letter of the 4th, containing an apology for sending an agreeable piece of Intelligence which you have since discover'd to be false; mistakes of this kind are not uncommon and most frequently happen to those whose zeal and sanguineness allow no room for scepticism when anything favourable to their country is plausibly related."

Letter from General Washington
to Daniel Clymer, Deputy Commissary
General of Prisoners,
11 November 1777.

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Three of General Washington's best spies were seized for prosecution by the American authorities in New Jersey under misapprehension that they were British agents. These prisoners could not disclose their true role. However, Washington learned of their capture and wrote the Governor of New Jersey for their release.

"Upon these Considerations I hope you will put a stop to the prosecution, unless other matters appear against them. You must be well convinced, that it is indispensibly necessary to make use of these means to procure intelligence. The persons employed must bear the suspicion of being thought inimical, and it is not in their power to assert their innocence, because that would get abroad and destroy the confidence which the Enemy puts in them."


Letter from General Washington
to Governor William Livingston,
20 January 1778.



"I thank you for the trouble you have taken in forwarding the intelligence which was inclosed in your Letter of the 11th of March. It is by comparing a variety of information, we are frequently enabled to investigate facts, which were so intricate or hidden, that no single clue could have led to the knowledge of them in this point of view, intelligence becomes interesting which but from its connection and collateral circumstances, would not be important."

Letter from General Washington
to James Lovell,
1 April 1782.

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James K. Polk

In 1846, certain members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs raised a furor over the alleged misuse of foreign intercourse funds by Daniel Webster, while he served as Secretary of State. Portions of these funds, known as Secret Service Funds, were available for unvouchered use on the certificate of the President that their expenditure had been for confidential purposes. A resolution of the House of Representatives requested President James K. Polk to furnish the House with all records of expenditures of these confidential Secret Service Funds during Webster's tenure as Secretary of State under Presidents Harrison and Tyler. In denying the request of the House of Representatives, President Polk wrote:


"The experience of every nation on earth has demonstrated that emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary for the public safety or the public good to make expenditures the very object of which would be defeated by publicity. ... In no nation is the application of such sums ever made public. In time of war or impending danger the situation of the country may make it necessary to employ individuals for the purpose of obtaining information or rendering other important services who could never be prevailed upon to act if they entertained the least apprehension that their names or their agency would in any contingency be divulged. So it may often become necessary to incur an expenditure for an object highly useful to the country; ... But this



object might be altogether defeated by the intrigues of other powers if our purposes were to be made known by the exhibition of the original papers and vouchers to the accounting officers of the Treasury. It would be easy to specify other cases which may occur in the history of a great nation, in its intercourse with other nations, wherein it might become absolutely necessary to incur expenditures for objects which could never be accomplished if it were suspected in advance that the items of expenditure and the agencies employed would be made public."

President Polk's message
to the House of Representa-
tives, 20 April 1846.

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


Franklin D. Roosevelt....

"Apropos of your memorandum of November 18, 1944, relative to the establishment of a central intelligence service, I should appreciate your calling together the chiefs of the foreign intelligence and internal security units in the various executive agencies, so that a consensus of opinion can be secured.

"It appears to me that all of the ten executive departments, as well as the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Federal Communications Commission have a direct interest in the proposed venture. They should all be asked to contribute their suggestions to the proposed centralized intelligence service."

Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Major General William J. Donovan, Director of the Strategic Services, 5 April 1945. Written just a week before the President's death, it authorizes Donovan to continue planning for a postwar centralized intelligence service.



Harry S. Truman...



President Truman was conscious of rivalry among U.S. intelligence organizations both during and after World War II. He realized that reorganization was necessary and that a reorganization plan needed to be developed, from competing proposals, which would not exacerbate these rivalries. The following reflects President Truman's thinking on the subject prior to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group in 1946 and ultimately of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947.

"I considered it very important to this country to have a sound, well-organized intelligence system, both in the present and in the future. Properly developed, such a service would require new concepts as well as better-trained and more competent personnel. ... it was imperative that we refrain from rushing into something that would produce harmful and unnecessary rivalries among the various intelligence agencies. I told Smith (Director of the Bureau of the Budget) that one thing was certain--this country wanted no Gestapo under any guise or for any reason."

Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume One: Year of Decisions.



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"A President has to know what is going on all around the world in order to be ready to act when action is needed. The President must have all the facts that may affect the foreign policy or the military policy of the United States. ..."

"Before 1946 such information as the President needed was being collected in several different places in the government. The War Department had an Intelligence Divison--G-2--and the Navy had an intelligence setup of its own--the ONI. The Department of State, on the one hand, got its information through diplomatic channels, while the Treasury and the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture each had channels for gathering information from different parts of the world--on monetary, economic, and agricultural matters.

"During World War II the Federal Bureau of Investigation had some operations abroad, and in addition the Office of Strategic Services, which was set up by President Roosevelt during the war and placed under the direction of General William J. Donovan, operated abroad to gather information.

"This scattered method of getting information for the various departments of the government first struck me as being badly organized when I was in the Senate. Our Senate committees, hearing the witnesses from the executive departments, were often struck by the fact that different agencies of the government came up with different and conflicting facts on similar subjects. It was not at first apparent that this was due to the un-co-ordinated methods of obtaining information. Since then, however, I have often thought that if there had been something like co-ordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and the Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep each other informed as to their plans.

"In other words, there had never been much attention paid to any centralized intelligence organization in our government. Apparently the United States saw no need for a really comprehensive system of foreign intelligence until World War II placed American fighting men on the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa and on the islands of the Atlantic and the Pacific.



"The war taught us this lesson--that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form. If it is not intelligent and understandable, it is useless.

"On becoming President, I found that the needed intelligence information was not co-ordinated at any one place. Reports came across my desk on the same subject at different times from the various departments, and these reports often conflicted. Consequently I asked Admiral Leahy if anything was being done to improve the system. Leahy told me that in 1944, at President Roosevelt's direction, he had referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a plan for centralized intelligence work prepared by General Donovan. This plan, so Leahy told me, provided for an organization directly under the President and responsible only to him. The Navy, however, had worked out a counterproposal under which there would be a central agency to serve as an over-all intelligence organization, but with each of the departments responsible for national security having a stake in it. Much of the original work on this project was done by Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence.

"Sometime later I asked Secretary of State Byrnes to submit his recommendations for a way to co-ordinate intelligence services among the departments, explaining that I had already asked Leahy to look into the subject but that I wanted the State Department's recommendations since the State Department would need to play an important role in the operation.

"Secretary Byrnes took the position that such an organization should be responsible to the Secretary of State and advised me that he should be in control of all intelligence. The Army and the Navy, on the other hand, strongly objected. They maintained that every department required its own intelligence but that there was a great need for a central organization to gather together all information that had to do with over-all national policy. Under such an organization there would



be a pool of information, and each agency would contribute to it. This pool would make it possible for those who were responsible for establishing policies in foreign political and military fields to draw on authoritative intelligence for their guidance.

"In January 1946 I held a series of meetings in my office to examine the various plans suggested for a centralized intelligence authority."

Memoirs by Harry S. Truman,
Volume Two: Years of Trial
and Hope.

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"Whether it be treason or not, it does the United States just as much harm for military secrets to be made known to potential enemies through open publication, as it does for military secrets to be given to an enemy through the clandestine operations of spies. ...

"...I do not believe that the best solution can be reached by adopting an approach based on the theory that everyone has a right to know our military secrets and related information affecting the national security."

Statement read by President Truman at a news conference, referring to an executive order on the handling of classified information, 4 October 1951.

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"When I became President--if you don't mind me reminiscing a little bit--there was no concentration of information for the benefit of the President. Each department and each organization had its own information service, and that information service was walled off from every other service in such a manner that



whenever it was necessary for the President to have information, he had to send to two or three departments to get it, and then he would have to have somebody do a little digging to get it. ...

"...And finally one morning I had a conversation with Admiral Leahy, and suggested to him that there should be a Central Intelligence Agency, for the benefit of the whole government as well as for the benefit of the President, so he could be informed.

"And the Admiral and I proceeded to try to work out a program. It has worked very successfully. We have an intelligence information service now that I think is not inferior to any in the world.

"We have the Central Intelligence Agency, and all the intelligence information agencies in all the rest of the departments of the government, coordinated by that Central Intelligence Agency. This agency puts the information of vital importance to the President in his hands. He has to know what is going on everywhere at home and abroad, so that he can intelligently make the decisions that are necessary to keep the government running. ...

"...You are the organization, you are the intelligence arm that keeps the Executive informed so that he can make decisions that always will be in the public interest for his own country, hoping always that it will save the free world from involvement with the totalitarian countries in an all-out war--a terrible thing to contemplate.

"Those of you who are deep in the Central Intelligence Agency know what goes on around the world--know what is necessary for the President to know every morning. I am briefed every day on all the world, on everything that takes place from one end of the world to the other, all the way around--by both the poles and the other way. It is necessary that you make that contribution for the welfare and benefit of your government.



"I came over here to tell you how appreciative I am of the service which I received as the Chief Executive of the greatest nation in the history of the world."

Remarks of President Truman
to a CIA Orientation Course,
21 November 1952.


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Inscription on the photograph of President Truman, which he presented to CIA:

"To the Central Intelligence Agency, a necessity to the President of the United States, from one who knows."

*Harry S. Truman
June 9, 1964"*

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Dwight D. Eisenhower...

"America's fundamental aspiration is the preservation of peace. To this end we seek to develop policies and arrangements to make the peace both permanent and just. This can be done only on the basis of comprehensive and appropriate information.

"In war nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you are a part.

"No task could be more important.

"Upon the quality of your work depends in large measure the success of our effort to further the nation's position in the international scene.

"By its very nature the work of this agency demands of its members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthiness, and selflessness--to say nothing of the finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot be advertised: failure cannot be explained. In the work of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often



even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism--their reward can be little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true.

"The reputation of your organization for quality and excellence of performance, ... is a proud one.

"Because I deeply believe these things, I deem it a great privilege to participate in this ceremony of cornerstone laying for the national headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency. On this spot will rise a beautiful and useful structure. May it long endure, to serve the cause of America and of peace."

Remarks of President Eisenhower
at the cornerstone-laying ceremony
for the CIA building,
3 November 1959.

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"I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident. ...

"The first point is this: the need for intelligence-gathering activities.

"No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attacks.

"Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. ...

"...ever since the beginning of my administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.



"My second point: the nature of intelligence-gathering activities.

"These have a special and secret character. They are, so to speak, 'below the surface' activities.

"They are secret because they must circumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military preparations.

"They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities.

"These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of force--with operations supervised by responsible officials within this area of secret activities. ...

"These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment which seek to mislead and obscure-- ...

"Third point: how should we view all of this activity?

"It is a distasteful but vital necessity.

"We prefer and work for a different kind of world--and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer. ...

"My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues of the day by what is an incident or a symptom of the world situation today."

Statement by President Eisenhower at his news conference of 11 May 1960, following the shooting down of a U-2 by the Soviet Union.



"...Accordingly, at this morning's private session, despite the violence and inaccuracy of Mr. Khrushchev's statements, I replied to him on the following terms: ...

"In my statement of May 11th and in the statement of Secretary Herter of May 9th, the position of the United States was made clear with respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities in a world where nations distrust each other's intentions. We pointed out that these activities had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads. As is well known, not only the United States but most other countries are constantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of the Soviet Union."

Statement by President Eisenhower concerning the positions taken by Chairman Khrushchev at the opening of the Paris summit conference, 16 May 1960.

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"During the period leading up to World War II we learned from bitter experience the imperative necessity of a continuous gathering of intelligence information, ...

"Moreover, as President, charged by the Constitution with the conduct of America's foreign relations, and as Commander-in-Chief, charged with the direction of the operations and activities of our Armed Forces and their supporting services, I take full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by our government to secure and evaluate military intelligence.

"It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programs that the widely publicized U-2 incident occurred.



"Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work has been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it. ...

"The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack. ...

"...It must be remembered that over a long period, these flights had given us information of the greatest importance to the nation's security. In fact, their success has been nothing short of remarkable. ...

"I then made two facts clear to the public: first, our program of aerial reconnaissance had been undertaken with my approval; second, this government is compelled to keep abreast, by one means or another, of military activities of the Soviets, just as their government has for years engaged in espionage activities in our country and throughout the world."

President Eisenhower's radio
and television report to the
American people, following
the Paris summit conference,
25 May 1960.

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"As I think you know, I wish you and your associates in the Central Intelligence Agency well in the tremendously important job you do for our country. Upon the work of your organization there is an almost frightening responsibility; I know all members of the CIA will continue to do the best they can for all of us."

Letter from President Eisenhower to Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, 18 January 1961, at the conclusion of the Eisenhower Administration.

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"For: The Central Intelligence Agency

An indispensable organization to our country.

Dwight D. Eisenhower"

Inscription on the photograph of President Eisenhower, which he presented to CIA.





John F. Kennedy...

"I want, first of all, to express my appreciation to you all for the opportunity that this ceremony gives to tell you how grateful we are in the government and in the country for the services that the personnel of this Agency render to the country.

"It is not always easy. Your successes are unheralded-- your failures are trumpeted. I sometimes have that feeling myself. But I am sure you realize how important is your work, how essential it is--and how, in the long sweep of history, how significant your efforts will be judged.

"So I do want to express my appreciation to you now, and I'm confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past."

Remarks of President Kennedy
at the CIA Headquarters,
28 November 1961, on present-
ing the National Security
Medal to Allen W. Dulles, the
retiring Director of Central
Intelligence.

☆☆☆

*"...it is my wish that you serve as the govern-
ment's principal foreign intelligence officer, and
as such that you undertake, as an integral part of
your responsibilities, the coordination and effec-
tive guidance of the total United States foreign*



intelligence effort. As the government's principal intelligence officer, you will assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelligence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recipients as appropriate. In fulfillment of these tasks I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of all departments and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field. ...

"As directed by the President and the National Security Council, you will establish with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board the necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels."

Memorandum from President Kennedy
to the Director of Central
Intelligence, 16 January 1962.

☆☆☆

"I wish to express to you, the members of the United States Intelligence Board, and to the individual members of the intelligence agencies my deep and sincere appreciation for your outstanding service to our Nation--and the Free World--during the recent international crisis.

"In the course of the past few months I have had occasion to again observe the extraordinary accomplishments of our intelligence community, and I have been singularly impressed with the overall professional excellence, selfless devotion to duty, resourcefulness and initiative manifested in the work of this group. The fact that we had timely and accurate information, skillfully analyzed and clearly presented, to guide us in our judgments during this crisis is, I believe, the greatest tribute to the effectiveness of these individuals and agencies. The magnitude of their contribution can be measured, in part, by the fact that the peace was sustained during a most critical time.



"It is, of course, a great source of strength to me to know that we have such dedicated and skilled men and women in the service of our Nation in these times of peril. Although I cannot personally commend each member of the intelligence community for their individual efforts, I would like you to convey to them, through the members of the United States Intelligence Board, my personal word of commendation, my deep admiration for their achievements, and the appreciation of a grateful Nation."

Letter of commendation from President Kennedy to John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, in the latter's capacity as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, 9 January 1963, after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

☆☆☆

"... We have worked very closely together in the National Security Council in the last two months attempting to meet the problems we faced in South Viet-Nam. I can find nothing, and I have looked through the record very carefully over the last nine months, and I could go back further, to indicate that the CIA has done anything but support policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and responsibility. ... I can just assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence, operating with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions.


"So I think that while the CIA may have made mistakes, as we all do, on different occasions, and has had many successes which may go unheralded, in my opinion in this case it is unfair to charge



them as they have been charged. I think they have done a good job."

Statement by President Kennedy
at a news conference in response
to a question on whether CIA
was conducting unauthorized
activities in South Vietnam,
9 October 1963.

☆☆☆



Lyndon B. Johnson

"...we have committed our lives, our property, our resources, and our sacred honor to the freedom and peace of other men, indeed to the freedom and peace of all mankind. We would dishonor that commitment, we would disgrace all the sacrifices that Americans have made if we were not every hour of every day vigilant against every threat to peace and freedom. That is why we have the Central Intelligence Agency in this country.



"The purpose of this effort, like the purpose of all that we do, is to strive for an orderly, just, and peaceful world. In this effort more than in many others a high order of selflessness, of dedication, of devotion, is asked of men and women. The compensation of them comes not in fame, certainly not in rewards of salary, but the reward of the sure knowledge that they have made a contribution to freedom's cause.

"For the leadership of this vital agency this nation has been very fortunate to have the services of outstanding Americans: Allen Dulles, John McCone, now today Admiral William F. Raborn."

Remarks of President Johnson
at the swearing-in ceremony of
Vice Admiral Raborn as Director
of Central Intelligence and
Mr. Richard M. Helms as Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence,
28 April 1965.

☆☆☆



"You know it is my hope that we can continue to build and strengthen the effectiveness of the Agency, making full utilization of the imaginative talent assembled in the organization. I hope ... to assure and encourage all your employees to realize that their personal abilities and superior performance do not go unnoticed or unrecognized.

"Our intelligence must be unquestionably the best in the world. You have my full support in our effort to make it so."

Letter from President Johnson to Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence, regarding the appointment of Mrs. Penelope Thunberg, CIA, to the U.S. Tariff Commission, 29 July 1965.

★ ★ ★

"The interests of national defense and security require sustained effort on the part of the Intelligence Community to support me and other officials having policy and command responsibilities. ... Efficient management and direction of the complex activities which make up the total foreign intelligence effort are essential to meet day-to-day national requirements and to ensure the development and application of advanced means for the collection, processing, analysis, estimating and reporting of intelligence information."

Memorandum from President Johnson to the Director of Central Intelligence, 19 October 1965, on the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.

★ ★ ★



"In 2-1/2 years of working with these men I have yet to meet a '007.' I have met dozens of men who are moved and motivated by the highest and most patriotic and dedicated purposes--men who are specialists in economics, and political science, and history, and geography, and physics, and many other fields where logic and analysis are crucial to the decisions that the President of their country is called upon to make. Through my experience with these men I have learned that their most significant triumphs come not in the secrets passed in the dark but in patient reading, hour after hour, of highly technical periodicals.

"In a real sense they are America's professional students; they are unsung, just as they are invaluable."

Remarks of President Johnson
at the swearing-in ceremony
of Mr. Richard M. Helms as
Director of Central Intelligence,
30 June 1966.

"Your countrymen ... cannot know of your accomplishments in the equally crucial business of the Central Intelligence Agency. For it is the lot of those in our intelligence agencies that they should work in silence--sometimes fail in silence, but more often succeed in silence.

"Unhappily, also, it is sometimes their lot that they must suffer in silence. For, like all in high public position, they are occasionally subject to criticism which they must not answer.

"Secrecy in this work is essential. Achievements and triumphs can seldom be advertised. Shortcomings and failures often are advertised. The rewards can never come in public acclaim, only in the quiet satisfaction of getting on with the job and trying to do well the work that needs to be done in the interests of your Nation.



"The best intelligence is essential to the best policy. So I am delighted that you have undertaken, as far as security permits, to tell the public that it is well served by the Central Intelligence Agency.

"I am glad that there are occasions from time to time when I, like my predecessors in this office, can also express my deep confidence in the expert and the dedicated service of the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency."

Remarks of President at the presentation of the National Security Medal to Vice Admiral William F. Raborn for his services as Director of Central Intelligence, 17 August 1966.

☆ ☆ ☆

"This is a day when you should all be proud-- especially those among you who have been a part of the Agency since its founding.

"Twenty years ago, this country had no broad-scale professional intelligence service worthy of the name. Today, it has a strong and vital one-- the best in the world.

"Twenty years ago, you began with a vague assortment of functions and a varied assortment of people. Your purposes were not well understood inside the Government, and barely understood at all outside. Since that time, you have become a dedicated and disciplined core of professionals, with clearly defined responsibilities.

"Those responsibilities are vast and demanding. You give us information on which decisions affecting the course of history are made. Your product must be as perfect as is humanly possible-- though the material you must work with is far from perfect.




"You must keep pace with developments in a tremendously complex society, a society which, as Mr. Helms has said, 'grope for answers to challenges its founding fathers could never have conceived.'"

"You have built a solid foundation in these past twenty years. America relies on your constant dedication to the truth--on your commitment to our democratic ideal. I believe our trust is well placed."

Message from President Johnson
on the occasion of the 20th
anniversary of the founding
of CIA, 18 September 1967.





Richard M. Nixon ...

"...Going back during the eight years I was Vice President, I sat on the National Security Council and there I learned to respect the organization, its Director and its reports that were made to the Council, and through the Council to the President of the United States.

...

"And in a sense, then, I look upon this organization as not one that is necessary for the conduct of conflict or war, but in the final analysis as one of the great instruments of our government for the preservation of peace, for the avoidance of war, and for the development of a society in which this kind of activity would not be as necessary, if necessary at all.

"It is that that I think the American people need to understand, that this is a necessary adjunct to the conduct of the Presidency. And I am keenly aware of that. I am keenly aware of the fact that many of you at times must have had doubts, perhaps you have not, but perhaps there may have been times that you have had doubts about your mission, the popularity of what you do in the country, and I want to reassure you on that score.

...

"I realize that in this organization the great majority of you are not in the kind of covert activities which involve great danger, but I also know that some of your colleagues have been involved in such activities and are involved in such activities.



"I know, too, that there will be no Purple Hearts, there will be no medals, there will be no recognition of those who have served far beyond the call of duty because by definition where the CIA is concerned your successes must never be publicized and your failures will always be publicized.

"So that makes your mission a particularly difficult one. It makes it difficult from the standpoint of those who must render service beyond the call of duty. And I recognize that and I am deeply grateful for those who are willing to make that kind of sacrifice.

...

"So, finally, I would simply say that I understand that when President Truman in 1964 sent a message to the CIA, he put an inscription on it which, as I recall, went something like this: To the CIA, an organization which is an absolute necessity to any President of the United States. From one who knows.

"I know. And I appreciate what you do."

Remarks of President Nixon at
CIA Headquarters, 7 March 1969.

☆ ☆ ☆

"This organization, the CIA, has a distinguished record of being bipartisan in character. It is a highly professional group. It will remain that in this Administration"

Remarks of President Nixon
at the swearing-in ceremony
of General Cushman as Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence,
7 May 1969.

☆ ☆ ☆



"... I have ordered the Central Intelligence Agency, early in this Administration, to mobilize its full resources to fight the international drug trade, a task, incidentally, in which it has performed superbly.

"Let me interject here a word for that much maligned agency. As I have often said, in the field of intelligence we always find that the failures are those that are publicized. Its successes, by definition, must always be secret, and in this area there are many successes and particularly ones for which this agency can be very proud."

Remarks of President Nixon to Senior U.S. Narcotics Control Officials attending the International Narcotics Control Conference at the Department of State, Washington, D.C., 18 September 1972.



"To the Central Intelligence Agency, a necessity to the President of the United States, from one who knows."

Harry S. Truman
June 9, 1964

"To Central Intelligence Agency
an indispensable organization to our country."

Dwight D. Eisenhower

"For: The Central Intelligence Agency
with esteem."

John F. Kennedy

"To: The Central Intelligence Agency
with appreciation"

Lyndon B. Johnson

"To: The Central Intelligence Agency,
a vital aid in the defense of freedom"

Richard Nixon



"Our defenses, however, are only as good as our intelligence services. History tells how the city of Savannah, how it fell during the American Revolution because of the superiority of British intelligence. Courage alone could not save Savannah when the brave Georgians were taken by surprise."

"Intelligence operations today are much more sophisticated. We must protect the rights of American citizens to cherished liberties, but we must also guard against foreign espionage."

President Gerald R. Ford
Dinner in Atlanta, Ga.
November 14, 1975



"...you are never going to have the intelligence community where it will have the opportunity to brag about its accomplishments because it is so important that we not involve sources..."

President Gerald R. Ford
Interview with KNBC TV
Los Angeles
September 20, 1975



"I know -- and you know -- that what we need is
an American intelligence capacity second to none."

President Gerald R. Ford
New England Council
Boston, November 7, 1975



"I will not stand idly by while our essential intelligence services are unilaterally dismantled in a world where the agencies of other nations work totally in secrecy and with unlimited resources."

President Gerald R. Ford
Dinner in Atlanta, Ga.
November 14, 1975



"Under no circumstances -- and I want to be very clear on this -- will I permit the dismantling or the destruction of an intelligence agency or community because that does involve our national security."

President Gerald R. Ford
Interview in Omaha, Nebraska
October 1, 1975



"I am disturbed about the actions that are being taken by some to expose some of the past operations of the Central Intelligence Agency and our intelligence gathering capability generally."

President Gerald R. Ford
Interview in Omaha, Nebraska
October 1, 1975



"Our potential adversaries and even some of our friends operate in all intelligence fields with secrecy, skill and substantial resources. I know -- and you know -- that what we need is an American intelligence capacity second to none."

President Gerald R. Ford
to the American Legion
Minneapolis, Minnesota
19 August 1975



"...Thus, another essential element to any real arms limitation, whether of strategic systems or conventional forces, is our own intelligence capability. Sweeping attacks, overly generalized, against our intelligence activities, jeopardize vital functions necessary to our national security. Today's sensations must not be the prelude to tomorrow's Pearl Harbor."

President Gerald R. Ford
to the American Legion
Minneapolis, Minnesota
19 August 1975



"Any reckless Congressional action to cripple the effectiveness of our intelligence services in legitimate operations would be catastrophic."

President Gerald R. Ford
to the American Legion
Minneapolis, Minnesota
19 August 1975



"Intelligence in today's world is absolutely essential to our Nation's security -- even our survival. It may be even more important in peace than in war."

President Gerald R. Ford
to the American Legion
Minneapolis, Minnesota
19 August 1975



"I believe that we have to have an outstanding intelligence gathering group, such as the CIA, or in the other intelligence collection organizations in our Government."

President Gerald R. Ford
An Interview with Walter
Cronkite, Eric Sevareid
and Bob Schieffer
21 April 1975



"It remains my deep personal conviction that the CIA
and other units of the Intelligence Community are vital
to the survival of this country."

President Gerald R. Ford
Press Conference No. 15
9 June 1975



"A good intelligence covert activity, you don't
go around talking about."

President Gerald R. Ford
An Interview with Walter
Cronkite, Eric Sevareid
and Bob Schieffer
21 April 1975



"In the world in which we live, beset by continuing threats to our national security, it is vital that we maintain an effective intelligence and counterintelligence capability."

President Gerald R. Ford
The White House
4 January 1975



"In a world where information is power, a vital element of our national security lies in our intelligence services. They are essential to our Nation's security in peace as in war."

President Gerald R. Ford
to the Joint Session of
Congress
10 April 1975



"Americans can be grateful for the important,
but largely unsung contributions and achievement of
the intelligence services of the Nation."

President Gerald R. Ford
to the Joint Session of
Congress
10 April 1975



"...a sensationalized public debate over legitimate intelligence activities is a disservice to this Nation and a threat to our intelligence system."

President Gerald R. Ford
to the Joint Session of
Congress
10 April 1975



"The Central Intelligence Agency has been of maximum importance to Presidents before me. The Central Intelligence Agency has been of maximum importance to me."

President Gerald R. Ford
to the Joint Session of
Congress
10 April 1975





11

them back. We are wondering what the precedent was there for his taking them, or of the Army taking them back—

THE PRESIDENT. Those files belong to the Government. He did not take any files. There was just the matter of their storage was what the difficulty was.

Q. Did he consent?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't know. I didn't ask him. [Laughter]

[16.] Q. Mr. President, can you say whether you discussed the Iranian problem with General Eisenhower?

THE PRESIDENT. It was discussed.

[17.] Q. Senator Taft said something yesterday to the effect that he thought that the Republicans would look forward to balancing the budget this year, with prospects of a tax reduction in the spring of 1954—fiscal 1954-55. What do you think of that timetable?

THE PRESIDENT. I will let Taft study the budget, then make up his mind. He hasn't seen it yet. [Laughter]

Q. Senator Taft said in New York that he thought you had submitted a budget much smaller than 85 billion.

THE PRESIDENT. Senator Taft doesn't know anything about what is going to be in the budget, and when it comes time to submit that budget, I am going to have a budget

seminar as usual,⁶ and all you boys will know all about it, if you want to find out about it—as you usually do.

[18.] Q. Mr. President, would you tell us what you and Senator Connally discussed recently during his visit?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I won't. [Laughter]

[19.] Q. Mr. President, do you anticipate, as a result of your meeting with General Eisenhower, that he will appoint additional people to come to Washington.

THE PRESIDENT. I hope he will.

Q. Will they be of Cabinet rank?

THE PRESIDENT. I hope they will. I can only express a hope. I don't know what he is going to do. You ask him. He will answer for himself, I am sure.

Q. Have we overlooked anything, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, if you have, I don't know what it could be.

Reporter: Thank you, sir.

THE PRESIDENT. It's all right. [Laughter]

NOTE: President Truman's three hundred and eighteenth news conference was held in the Indian Treaty Room (Room 474) in the Executive Office Building at 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, November 20, 1952.

⁶The President's news conference on the budget, held January 8, 1953, was not transcribed and is therefore not included in this volume.

335 Remarks at a Meeting of an Orientation Course Conducted by the CIA. November 21, 1952

I AM appreciative of the privilege that General Smith has offered me, to come over here and make a few remarks to this organization. I am, naturally, very much interested in it.

When I became President—if you don't mind me reminiscing a little bit—there was no concentration of information for the benefit of the President. Each department and each organization had its own information service, and that information service was walled off from every other service in such a manner that whenever it was necessary for the President to have information, he had to

send to two or three departments to get it, and then he would have to have somebody do a little digging to get it.

The affairs of the Presidential Office, so far as information was concerned, were in such shape that it was necessary for me, when I took over the Office, to read a stack of documents that high, and it took me 3 months to get caught up.

Only two people around the White House really knew what was going on in the military affairs department, and they were Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown. I



would talk to them every morning and try to get all the information I could. And finally one morning I had a conversation with Admiral Leahy, and suggested to him that there should be a Central Intelligence Agency, for the benefit of the whole Government as well as for the benefit of the President, so he could be informed.

And the Admiral and I proceeded to try to work out a program. It has worked very successfully. We have an intelligence information service now that I think is not inferior to any in the world.

We have the Central Intelligence Agency, and all the intelligence information agencies in all the rest of the departments of the Government, coordinated by that Central Intelligence Agency. This agency puts the information of vital importance to the President in his hands. He has to know what is going on everywhere at home and abroad, so that he can intelligently make the decisions that are necessary to keep the Government running.

I don't think anyone realizes the immensity of the problems that face a President of the United States.

It was my privilege a few days ago to brief the General who is going to take over the Office on the 20th day of January, and he was rather appalled at all that the President needs to know in order to reach decisions—even domestic decisions.

He must know exactly what is implied by what he does. The President makes a decision every day that can affect anywhere from 100 million to a billion and a half people. It is a tremendous responsibility.

And I don't think many of you realize the position in which this great country is, in this day and age.

We are at the top, and the leader of the free world—something that we did not anticipate, something that we did not want, but something that has been forced on us. It is a responsibility which we should have assumed in 1920. We did not assume it then. We have to assume it now, because it has again been thrust on us. It is our duty, under

Heaven, to continue that leadership in the manner that will prevent a third world war—which would mean the end of civilization. The weapons of destruction have become so powerful and so terrible that we can't even think of another all-out war. It would then bring into the war not only the fighting men—the people who are trained as fighters—but the whole civilian population of every country involved would be more thoroughly exposed to death and destruction than would the men at the front.

That is what we have to think about carefully. You are the organization, you are the intelligence arm that keeps the Executive informed so he can make decisions that always will be in the public interest for his own country, hoping always that it will save the free world from involvement with the totalitarian countries in an all-out war—a terrible thing to contemplate.

Those of you who are deep in the Central Intelligence Agency know what goes on around the world—know what is necessary for the President to know every morning. I am briefed every day on all the world, on everything that takes place from one end of the world to the other, all the way around—by both the poles and the other way. It is necessary that you make that contribution for the welfare and benefit of your Government.

I came over here to tell you how appreciative I am of the service which I received as the Chief Executive of the greatest nation in the history of the world. You may not know it, but the Presidential Office is the most powerful office that has ever existed in the history of this great world of ours. Genghis Khan, Augustus Caesar, great Napoleon Bonaparte, or Louis XIV—or any other of the great leaders and executives of the world—can't even compare with what the President of the United States himself is responsible for, when he makes a decision. It is an office that is without parallel in the history of the world.

That is the principal reason why I am so anxious that it be a continuing proposition,

and that the successor to me, and the successor to him, can carry on as if no election had ever taken place.

That is the prospect that we are faced with now. I am giving this President—this new President—more information than any other President ever had when he went into office.

You gentlemen—and ladies—are contributing to that ability of mine to be able to do that. I am extremely thankful to you. I think it is good that some of you have found out just exactly what a tremendous organization intelligence has to be in this day and age. You can't run the Government without it.

Keep up the good work. And when my

successor takes over, I want you to give him just the same loyal service that you have given me, and then the country will go forward as it should.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 12:27 p.m. in the Department of Agriculture Auditorium in Washington, to the final session of the Central Intelligence Agency's eighth training orientation course for representatives of various Government agencies. In his opening words he referred to Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Later he referred to Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, former Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy, and Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, former Naval Aide to the President.

336 Statement by the President on the Death of William Green.

November 21, 1952

WILLIAM GREEN, for more than half a century, held a place of responsible leadership in American life. For nearly 28 of those years he was president of the American Federation of Labor and as such helped to improve the working, living, and economic conditions of millions of American wage earners. His success is a monument to his labor statesmanship.

He visualized trade unions as making a great and growing contribution to the Nation and saw them playing a vital, constructive, and responsible part in the growth of our country. He long had fought to prevent employment discrimination against minorities because of race, creed, or national origin.

He recognized the relation of American workers to those in other countries and had supported the international labor movement. He encouraged trade unions everywhere in their struggles for political democracy, economic progress, and world peace.

Along the way he had served his State and his Nation. He cheerfully represented labor on various Government boards and committees. He was a fine American patriot who dedicated his life to the service of those who work. He was a friend to me and to thousands of others, to whom his wise counsel and understanding were helpful always. He will be missed by Americans in all walks of life.

337 Remarks in Alexandria, Va., at the Cornerstone Laying of the Westminster Presbyterian Church. *November 23, 1952*

Reverend Dr. Johnson, Reverend Clergy and distinguished guests, and members of the Westminster Presbyterian Church:

I am glad you have invited me to come here and take part in laying the cornerstone of your new church. You are a young church, but your growth has been rapid and

vigorous. In many ways this ceremony has more significance for me than it would have if you were a large and long established congregation, with a lengthy history.

For one thing, you symbolize the growth of this great country of ours. In the 12 years since the founding of this church our country



276 ¶ Remarks at the Cornerstone-Laying Ceremony for the Central Intelligence Agency Building, Langley, Virginia. November 3, 1959

Mr. Dulles, Secretary McElroy, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Central Intelligence Agency:

America's fundamental aspiration is the preservation of peace. To this end we seek to develop policies and arrangements to make the peace both permanent and just. This can be done only on the basis of comprehensive and appropriate information.

In war nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you are a part.

No task could be more important.

Upon the quality of your work depends in large measure the success of our effort to further the Nation's position in the international scene.

By its very nature the work of this agency demands of its members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthiness, and selflessness—to say nothing of the finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot be advertised: failure cannot be explained. In the work of Intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism—their reward can be little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true.

The reputation of your organization for quality and excellence of performance, under the leadership of your Director, Mr. Allen Dulles, is a proud one.

Because I deeply believe these things, I deem it a great privilege to participate in this ceremony of cornerstone laying for the national headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency. On this spot will rise a



beautiful and a useful structure. May it long endure, to serve the cause of America and of peace.

Thank you.

277 ¶ The President's News Conference of *November 4, 1959.*

THE PRESIDENT. In order to confirm some of the things that you have been reading in the papers, I want to give you an announcement, which may be of some interest.

I am planning to leave Washington on December 4th on a 2½ weeks' trip which will take me to nine countries.

In response to friendly invitations from the heads of state concerned, I plan to make brief informal visits to Rome, where I hope also to call on His Holiness the Pope, to Ankara, Karachi, Kabul, and to be in New Delhi for the inauguration of the American Exhibit at the World Agricultural Fair which opens on December 11th.

From India, I plan to visit Tehran and Athens en route to Paris to the Western summit meeting scheduled for December 19th. On my way home from Paris, I shall stop briefly in Rabat.

When the detailed schedule of this trip is fixed in consultation with the several governments concerned, I shall, of course, make it known to you.

There are three critical dates. December 3d, I think, or 4th is the very earliest date I could possibly go because there is all of the great work of developing the legislative program and the budget for the coming year.

December 11 is critical because that is the day when the Agricultural Fair will open.

December 19 is a critical one because that is the day I am to be in Paris. So this doesn't leave a great deal of time for dallying along the way.

That is all I have to say.¹

¹ On November 5 the White House released a statement concerning the composition of the party to accompany the President on his trip. Noting that Secretary Herter would be unable to go because of duties connected with the NATO Ministerial Council Meeting in Paris on December 15, the statement announced that the ranking State Department representative would be Robert Murphy, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Other members of the party would include White House administrative Staff assistants and confidential secretaries.



John F. Kennedy, 1961

Nov. 28 [485]

484 Letter to the Secretary of the Treasury Concerning Monetary Silver. *November 28, 1961*

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On the basis of your recommendations and the studies conducted by the Treasury and other Departments, I have reached the decision that silver metal should gradually be withdrawn from our monetary reserves.

Simultaneously with the publication of this letter, you are directed to suspend further sales of free silver, and to suspend use of free silver held by the Treasury for coinage. In this way, the remaining stock and any subsequently acquired can be used, at your discretion, to contribute to the maintenance of an orderly market in silver and for such other special purposes as you may determine. In order to meet coinage needs, the amount of silver required for this purpose should be obtained by retirement from circulation of a sufficient number of five-dollar and ten-dollar silver certificates.

Pursuant to this general determination, I intend to recommend to Congress, when it reconvenes, that it repeal the acts relating to silver of June 19, 1934, July 6, 1939, and July 31, 1946. The existing tax on transfers of interest in silver bullion has been necessary only to provide reinforcement for this legislation. I will therefore simultaneously propose that the relevant portion of the In-

ternal Revenue Code also be repealed.

These actions will permit the establishment of a broad market for trading in silver on a current and forward basis comparable to the markets in which other commodities are traded. Our new policy will in effect provide for the eventual demonetization of silver except for its use in subsidiary coinage.

Although the potential supply of silver now embodied in the outstanding five-dollar and ten-dollar certificates will be sufficient to cover coinage requirements for a number of years, I believe this is an appropriate time to provide for the gradual release of the silver now required as backing for one-dollar and two-dollar silver certificates. I shall therefore also recommend that legislation be enacted to accomplish this purpose and authorize the Federal Reserve Banks to include these denominations in the range of notes they are permitted to issue.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

NOTE: A letter from Secretary Dillon, dated November 27, was also released. The Secretary summarized the changes that had taken place in the world position of silver, and proposed measures to deal with the problems created by the large and growing industrial demand.

485 Remarks Upon Presenting an Award to Allen W. Dulles. *November 28, 1961*

Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone, General Cabell, members of the Central Intelligence Agency:

I want, first of all, to express my appreciation to you all for the opportunity that this ceremony gives to tell you how grateful we are in the government and in the country

for the services that the personnel of this Agency render to the country.

It is not always easy. Your successes are unheralded—your failures are trumpeted. I sometimes have that feeling myself. But I am sure you realize how important is your



work, how essential it is—and how, in the long sweep of history, how significant your efforts will be judged.

So I do want to express my appreciation to you now, and I'm confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past.

I'm also particularly grateful because this ceremony gives us all an opportunity to pay tribute to an outstanding public servant. Allen Dulles' career as a citizen of this country—and as one who has made his vast personal resources available to the country—stretches all the way back to the administration of President Woodrow Wilson. I know of no other American in the history of this country who has served in seven administrations of seven Presidents—varying from party to party, from point of view to point of view, from problem to problem, and yet at the end of each administration each President of the United States has paid tribute to his service—and also has counted Allen Dulles as their friend.

This is an extraordinary record, and I know that all of you who have worked with him understand why this record has been made. I regard Allen Dulles as an almost unique figure in our country. I know of no man who brings a greater sense of personal commitment to his work—who has less pride in office—than he has. And therefore I was most gratified when we were

permitted today to come out to the Agency to present this award to him in your presence.

I'd like to read the citation.

"Allen Welsh Dulles is hereby awarded the National Security Medal.

"As principal intelligence adviser to the President of the United States, Mr. Dulles has fulfilled the responsibilities of his office with unswerving purpose and high dedication. His ten years of service in the Central Intelligence Agency have been the climax of a lifetime of unprecedented and devoted public service beginning in the First World War, and stretching through the administrations of seven Presidents.

"The outstanding contributions Mr. Dulles has made to the security of the United States have been based upon a profound knowledge of the role of the intelligence office, a broad understanding of international relations, and a naturally keen judgment of men and affairs. The zestful energy and undaunted integrity of his service to his country will be an enduring example to the profession he has done so much to create."

NOTE: The President presented the National Security Medal to Mr. Dulles at the CIA Building in Langley, Va. In his opening words the President referred to John A. McCone, successor to Mr. Dulles, and Gen. C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of CIA.

Mr. Dulles served as Director of CIA from February 23, 1953, to November 29, 1961. His letter of resignation was released by the White House on November 29.

486 Remarks Upon Presenting the Harmon Trophy to Three Test Pilots of the X-15 Rocket Plane. *November 28, 1961*

I WANT to express my great pleasure at having an opportunity, as President, to participate in this ceremony which presents this very famous and celebrated award, which is held by some of our most distinguished

aviators, to these three fliers who I think in the year 1960 have done what earlier winners of this award have done in their time and generation.

Among the winners of this award are I



102 Remarks to Top Personnel at the Central Intelligence Agency. March 7, 1969

Mr. Director, and ladies and gentlemen:

As I stand before you today, this is the first visit I have made to one of the departments that is not represented officially in the Cabinet.

But I must say that after the very warm welcome I received outside and the opportunity, too, to see this really beautiful facility, I am very glad that I came. I want to use the opportunity to express just a few thoughts about this organization, about its Director, and about the people who work in it.

It has been truly said that the CIA is a professional organization. That is one of the reasons that when the new administration came in and many changes were made, as they should be made in our American political system after an election, and a change of parties, as far as the executive branch is concerned, I did not make a change.

I surveyed the field. I checked the qualifications of all of the men, or, for that matter, any women who might possibly be Director of the CIA. That could happen.

I saw the number of women outside of this organization. You have plenty of competition.

But I concluded that Dick Helms was the best man in the country to be Director of the CIA and that is why we have him here.

Now, I am sure that all of you must get a little tired of the jokes about the CIA being an undercover organization, its building being difficult to find, and all that. But I simply can't resist making an allusion to stories that I checked with the Director as we rode in from the helicopter

and which I understand have some degree of truth to them.

The first time President Eisenhower came out here to lay the cornerstone, he couldn't find the CIA or the building. So he ordered that a sign be put up, "The Central Intelligence Agency."

Then when President Kennedy came out in 1961 he saw the sign and he ordered it taken down, because, after all, if it is the CIA, the intelligence agency, it should not be so well advertised.

So that leaves me with somewhat of a dilemma to choose.

I usually have said as I have gone to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, and all the others of the 12, "It is a pleasure to be here."

But the CIA is not supposed to be here. So I suppose that what I am supposed to say now is, it is a pleasure not to be here.

In any event, in speaking of you and your mission, I have perhaps more familiarity with it than some of you might realize. Going back during the 8 years I was Vice President, I sat on the National Security Council and there learned to respect the organization, its Director, and its reports that were made to the Council, and through the Council to the President of the United States.

I know how vitally important the work of this organization is. I also know that this organization has a mission that, by necessity, runs counter to some of the very deeply held traditions in this country and feelings, high idealistic feelings, about what a free society ought to be.

Americans don't like war, of course.



Americans also do not like secrecy. They don't like cold war and consequently, whenever it is necessary in the conduct of our foreign policy, whether in a cold war or whether, as is the situation now, in a hot war, or whether in international tensions, call it a cold war or simply a period of confrontation or even of negotiation, whatever you want to call it, that whenever it becomes necessary to obtain intelligence information by an intelligence organization, many Americans are deeply concerned about this. And they express their concerns. They express them quite violently sometimes, quite directly, as you all know from the experience that this organization has had over the years.

This is a dilemma. It is one that I wish did not exist. But in the society in which we live, as I am sure you, all of you, are so completely aware, it is necessary that those who make decisions at the highest level have the very best possible intelligence with regard to what the facts really are, so that the margin of error will be, to that extent, reduced.

And in a sense, then, I look upon this organization as not one that is necessary for the conduct of conflict or war, or call it what you may, but in the final analysis is one of the great instruments of our Government for the preservation of peace, for the avoidance of war, and for the development of a society in which this kind of activity would not be as necessary, if necessary at all.

It is that that I think the American people need to understand—that this is a necessary adjunct to the conduct of the Presidency. And I am keenly aware of that. I am keenly aware of the fact that many of you at times must have had doubts, perhaps you have not, but perhaps there may have been times when you

have had doubts about your mission, the popularity of what you do in the country, and I want to reassure you on that score.

Let me put it another way: This morning I had the greatest honor which has come to me since assuming the Presidency. That honor was to present three Congressional Medals of Honor to three young men who had served in Vietnam.


They had, of course, rendered service far beyond the call of duty. As the citations were read, I realized how fortunate this country was to have produced young men of the idealism—idealism which we saw in their actions in Vietnam.

I realize that in this organization the great majority of you are not in the kind of covert activities which involve great danger, but I also know that some of your colleagues have been involved in such activities and are involved in such activities.

I know, too, that there will be no Purple Hearts, there will be no medals, there will be no recognition of those who have served far beyond the call of duty because by definition where the CIA is concerned your successes must never be publicized and your failures will always be publicized.

So that makes your mission a particularly difficult one. It makes it difficult from the standpoint of those who must render service beyond the call of duty. And I recognize that and I am deeply grateful for those who are willing to make that kind of sacrifice.

In another sense, too, I want to pay proper recognition to great numbers of people that I see in this room and that I saw outside who do not get down to the Cabinet Room to brief me, as does Mr. Helms and his colleagues, who are not in the positions where even private recogni-



tion comes too often, but whose work is so absolutely essential to the quality of those little morning briefing papers that I get every morning and read so carefully and that are so important because the decisions I make will be based subconsciously sometimes, other times consciously, on the accuracy of those reports and their findings from around the world.

I think sometimes that all of us know that one of the ironies of life is that it takes more heroism to render outstanding service in positions that are not heroic in character than it does the other way around. What I mean to say is that in an organization like this, gathering facts and information and intelligence, there are literally hundreds and thousands of positions here and around the world that must at times be very boring and certainly frustrating and sometimes without recognition.

I do want you to know that I appreciate that work.

I know how essential it is and I would

ask that you as the leaders, you who necessarily and very properly do get more recognition than those down the ranks, that you would convey to them my appreciation for their heroism, heroism in the sense that they have done an outstanding job and are doing an outstanding job to make it possible that the Director is able to do a better job than he otherwise could do in briefing the President of the United States and his colleagues in the National Security Council.

So finally, I would simply say that I understand that when President Truman in 1967 sent a message to the CIA, he put an inscription on it which, as I recall, went something like this: To the CIA, an organization which is an absolute necessity to any President of the United States. From one who knows.

I know. And I appreciate what you do.

Thank you.

NOTE: The President spoke at 3:42 p.m. in the auditorium at the Central Intelligence Agency, McLean, Va.

103 Remarks Launching the Easter Seal Campaign. *March 11, 1969*

I AM DELIGHTED to have this opportunity to join with Carol Burnett in kicking off the Easter Seal Campaign. I think we are very fortunate to have this little girl from Florida here, Donna Kay Howell. I think as you look at Donna and also as you listen to her, you can really see what your Easter Seal contribution will mean.

Through Easter Seals 250,000 children and others are helped each year by volunteers. The \$32 million that we raise in this campaign between now and April 6 will help them.

Donna is an example. She suffered a very severe stroke at the age of 4 years. She was paralyzed on one side and her speech was affected by it. Her speech is completely cured, as you have heard already. Beyond that, she still is receiving therapy, but here is a very happy and a very healthy child who might not have been this way had it not been for the Easter Seal programs.

So, I join with Carol Burnett in asking all of the American people to support this volunteer program that gives help to children across the country and lets little girls





Office of the Assistant to the Director
(703) 351-7676
(703) 687-6931 (night)

(Hold for release on delivery at 9:30 a.m. EST,
Thursday, December 4, 1975)

Remarks

by

W. E. Colby

Director of Central Intelligence

before

Pacem in Terris IV

December 4, 1975



Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to talk to you about what intelligence does for peace. The revelations of the past few weeks have probably led many of you to question what intelligence has to do with peace. Those revelations reflect things past, things that a new intelligence itself rooted out and corrected. We are now engaged in developing a new role for intelligence, one that reflects modern American precepts and values. We ask your cooperation and support in articulating this new role.

Dr. Schlesinger once said that one of the primary social services expected from government is security. This can be gained, in the old Biblical phrase, by "a strong man armed in his camp." I think we have developed other ways to achieve security over the centuries, particularly in the past 28 years during which American intelligence has matured and become the best in the world.

Intelligence now enables us to anticipate as well as to know. Anticipation allows us to arm ourselves, if such be necessary, with the right weapon. We need not face the light and accurate slingshot with an unwieldy broadsword. Anticipation also allows us to deter aggressors, demonstrating by our protective shield the futility of attacking us.



But anticipation these days also presents us with an opportunity, beyond anything known in the past, to negotiate. When we have knowledge of a foreign weapons system in the research phase, we can then discuss a mutual agreement to forgo its development and deployment. This can save millions of dollars on both sides -- which can then be spent on plowshares rather than on swords. Such, of course, was the result of our negotiations with the Soviet Union about anti-ballistic missile systems. Intelligence made a significant contribution to the negotiating process, but its ability to monitor actual compliance was crucial to concluding the agreement. Vast sums, estimated between 50 and 100 billion dollars, were saved because neither side had to build extensive ABM systems.

The anticipation made possible by good intelligence offers a greater contribution to peace than merely limiting weapons expenditures. Anticipating future disputes can permit their resolution while they are still only problems. Predicting crises and confrontations can permit conciliation and compromise before they occur. Suspicions and misunderstandings can be replaced by accurate perceptions that there are real problems on both sides. Men of good will can then work to resolve these problems through international conferences, through joint studies into the facts, or through recognition of mutual rights and interests.



I therefore believe it highly appropriate for intelligence to be invited to a discussion of how we obtain peace on earth. Intelligence has contributed to this end and will contribute even more in the future.

The problems of the future can result in conflict or cooperation. Consider:

- overpopulation and underproduction;
- nuclear proliferation;
- extremism and terrorism;
- the economic imbalances between rich and poor countries;
- the exploitation of hitherto inaccessible riches in the sea or in space;
- the interdependence of economies and even cultures;
- the acceleration of events by exponential improvements in transportation and communication.

We must have systematic knowledge of these complex subjects, full awareness of all our capabilities to deal with them, and an understanding of the intentions of the actors on the scene. Intelligence provides these. It is a tool to help America move toward peace with our fellow partners on this globe.

There are those, however, who contend that our intelligence has in the past and can in the future create the very problems that limit our hopes for peace. To them I say that their concept



The capability of intelligence quietly to influence foreign situations can -- and has -- contributed to peace. I do not contest that many of these operations in our history were more narrowly justified by their contribution to what was then seen as America's interest.

But in a number of instances, some quiet assistance to democratic and friendly elements enabled them to resist hostile and authoritarian groups in an internal competition over the future direction of their countries. Postwar Western Europe resisted Communist political subversion and Latin America rejected Cuban-stimulated insurgency. They thereby thwarted at the local level challenges that could have escalated to the international level.

That there can be debate as to the wisdom of any individual activity of this nature is agreed. That such a potential must be available for use in situations truly important to our country and the cause of peace is equally obvious.

Many of our citizens would express agreement with what I have said, but still express concern that there is an inherent contradiction between the need of intelligence for secrecy and our Constitutional structure of openness. They reject a hypocrisy that allows intelligence to operate while professing that it does not.



of intelligence is outmoded. When it looks at open societies, today's intelligence collects what is publicly available; uses technology to gather and process information that can be seen, heard, or sensed; and then carefully analyzes the bits and pieces of the jigsaw puzzles to provide an answer to the problems we face.

There are societies and political systems, however, that cling tenaciously to secrecy as a basis for power. Against these societies, which can threaten our peace, it is indeed necessary to employ the older techniques of secret intelligence developed for a world in which openness and free exchange were unobtainable. It is the very thought processes and procedures that create such secret plans that threaten our long-term hopes for peace among nations and peoples in the new open world we look toward.

We must avoid a repetition of our ingenuous belief in the 1920's that the world had been made safe for democracy and that gentlemen, in consequence, should not read other gentlemen's mail. If we can indeed achieve a world of gentlemen through the process of negotiation and resolution of the passions and ambitions of the past, then truly we can turn away also from the use of secret intelligence. But until that day, we hazard peace if we blind ourselves to realities, as the great democracies did during the 1930's.



It is true that the old concept of intelligence did conflict with our ideal of openness. This contradiction was dealt with by a cautious averting of responsible supervision from what were viewed as the necessary unpleasanties of the world of intelligence. The Members of Congress who said they did not want to know of our activities, the careful circumlocutions used in the directives developed for intelligence -- these reflected a consensus that while intelligence was needed to protect America, America was unwilling to admit its use of intelligence.

As a result, intelligence made some mistakes and did some misdeeds. That these were truly few and far between over the years of its history is a credit to the patriotism and integrity of the men and women of intelligence, rather than to controls upon them. But that they did occur forced attention to the need to articulate the proper role of intelligence in America.

After Vietnam and Watergate, exposures of improper intelligence activities aroused concern and launched the current exhaustive investigations. Intelligence has cooperated with these reviews because we in intelligence believe the future of intelligence is important to our country. We also believe that intelligence must find its fully understood and accepted position in our constitutional structure.



We Americans recognize the need for secrets when our institutions cannot operate without them, witness our ballot box, our grand jury proceedings, and our protection of commercial secrets. Intelligence needs secrets or its agents are exposed; patriotic Americans contributing to their country are pilloried as fronts; and chinks in an adversary's armor are rapidly closed when we obligingly make them public.

We -- all of us -- must develop out of our current investigations a new concept of responsible American intelligence. It will be a further innovation that America can bring to the intelligence profession. We will do it in essentially three steps.

-- We will articulate better guidelines for intelligence, spelling out what it properly can do and what it will not do. We will ensure that it is focused on foreign intelligence, and does not infringe the rights of our citizens.

-- We will develop better supervision of intelligence by the Executive, by the Congress, and even, where necessary, by the Judiciary. Better external supervision of intelligence will certainly generate intensive internal supervision, ensuring that American intelligence complies with America's constitutional concepts.



-- And we will develop better secrecy for those aspects of intelligence that really need it, while at the same time ending the old tradition of total secrecy of everything about intelligence. The stream, even flood, of intelligence secrets that have been exposed this past year has brought home to every American the fact that we must have better protection for those secrets we need to keep.

The hostile groups exposing our intelligence personnel, the hasty headlining of important technical intelligence projects, or the arrogance of those revealing our country's proper and important secrets in the cause of a self-proclaimed "higher morality," all these have demonstrated the weakness of our current procedures for protecting our necessary secrets. We need no Official Secrets Act muzzling our press or frightening our citizens, and we in intelligence do not ask for one. We do need to be able to discipline those who freely assume the obligation of secrecy as members of our profession and then willfully repudiate it. We are sure that we can obtain the same recognition of our intelligence profession's need for confidentiality that we extend to our doctors, our lawyers, and our journalists.

Taking these three essential steps will not be easy. But I believe that we are now turning to a debate of the real issues that face American intelligence rather than agonizing



over the missteps of the past. It is my sincere hope that this debate will lead to the kind of changes that I have outlined for American intelligence. It is vitally important to America that our citizens regain their respect and trust in our intelligence service. There must be a national consensus that American intelligence serves America and honors the Constitution. There must be a consensus that American intelligence is properly guided, properly supervised, and capable of protecting its own secrets so it can protect America.

I believe that a strong and free America is essential if we are to move toward peace on earth. I believe that a truly American intelligence service is equally essential to keeping America strong, free, and in peace.



351-7676
Angus

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20 October 1975

(The following remarks by William E. Colby are prepared for delivery before the 71st Anniversary Dinner of the New York Council of The Navy League of the United States scheduled to convene at 6:00 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, October 20, 1975, at the Grand Ballroom of the New York Hilton. Mr. Colby will begin speaking at about 9:00 P.M.)



Remarks
by
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
before
New York Council,
Navy League of the United States
October 20, 1975



Secretary Middendorf, Admiral Moorer, Admiral Anderson, Mr. Shepley, Admiral Bergen, Mr. Mulcahy, ladies and gentlemen.

Not a person in this room doubts the need for a strong United States Navy.

Not a person in this room doubts the need for a strong United States intelligence service.

I am here to tell you we have both--and both are the best in the world. You do not need to be told about the excellence of the U. S. Navy. I would like to tell you about the excellence of our intelligence service. Its technical geniuses, its dedicated clandestine operators, its objective analysts have brought whole new dimensions in precision, in scope, and in forward projections to American intelligence.

Years ago we looked to intelligence to tell us where an enemy fleet was. Today, we know not only where it is, but what it can do. And we know more--we know what kind of fleet to expect in the future. We have followed the progress of the new Russian carrier presently on sea trials since its keel was laid five years ago. We will not be startled by its appearance as part of the operational fleet as we might have been in years past.

But will we destroy this great intelligence capability? Will we have an investigation in 1980 as to why in 1975 we deprived our nation of its technical and foreign sources that provide information about the threats we will face in the years ahead.

Those threats are there:

- in the ballistic missiles cocked and aimed at us;
- in the nuclear weapons which can fall into the hands of reckless despots or paranoiac terrorists;
- in the desperate and authoritarian reactions of poor and overpopulated nations to the increasing gap they see between themselves and the affluence of the developed world;
- and in the temptation of some nations to look to racist or radical rather than democratic and moderate formulas for a better life.

Good intelligence can warn us of these problems. It is not a crystal ball or an advance edition of the World Almanac of 1977. But it can identify coming problems and permit our national leaders to face them, informed and warned of the forces and factors involved.

Most important, with good intelligence we can not only defend against or deter such threats, we can negotiate them away or resolve them before they become critical.

But is our intelligence to become mere theater? Will it be exposed in successive sensational re-runs for the amusement, or even amazement, of our people rather than being preserved and protected for the benefit of us all?

Will we have publicity or protection? Will we have sensation or safety?



Our intelligence missteps and misdeeds are indeed small in number and in substance. Against the service our intelligence has rendered the nation over the past 28 years, they are truly few and far between.

But when an operation that involved three agents is proclaimed as "massive;" when the normal detail of CIA employees to other Government agencies is called "infiltration;" when an Army vulnerability study of the New York subway is ascribed to CIA plotting because one of our officers read the report; or when conspiracy theorists mouth CIA complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy despite flat denials, then the American people are understandably troubled. They can wonder whether their intelligence service is more a peril than a protector.

We are about to have our fifth rerun of the great mail-reading story. It first appeared in my testimony before CIA's oversight committees last January and February. I said we had reviewed and terminated this activity in 1973. Its second playing was in the Rockefeller Commission report. This was followed by a TV spectacular featuring Representative Abzug's indignation. The Post Office and Civil Service Committee of the House of Representatives then reviewed it. And this week, the Senate Select Committee will repeat the performance in greater detail on live TV.


I hope our citizens will derive the real message of this mail-reading affair:

- that intelligence looked at mail to and from Communist countries during the threatening days of the Cold War;
- that intelligence reviewed the activity and determined that it was improper in 1973;
- that intelligence in 1973 set out clear directives that any activities not in full compliance with the laws of the United States would stop;
- and that intelligence itself reported this matter to the bodies now investigating it.

I hope our citizens will not be misled into perceiving intelligence as a menace to our nation. I hope rather that they will see its important role as an essential--and effective--protector of our safety and democracy against the threats in the real world outside our borders.

Intelligence is not theater. It is a serious--a deadly serious business. The dedicated men and women of CIA, who serve their country in an anonymous and demanding craft, must not be made national scapegoats for the revision of our national values and consensus of the past 20 years.

We do not oppose investigation. We welcome it. But investigation must be responsible, as intelligence must be responsible.



No one in this room thinks that there should be public revelation of the Navy's war plans. The American people don't think so either. Neither do they think there should be a public revelation of the names of people who serve American intelligence in confidential, and often risky, dealings. We Americans, and we intelligence professionals, are not going to let this happen.

But damage has already been done by irresponsible exposure of true intelligence secrets. Intelligence high in the sky and deep in the ocean can be lost. Such exposures have concerned our foreign friends and caused some who wish to help us to think that the risk is too great.

Thus we Americans must call for full responsibility in our investigations of intelligence, as we do for intelligence itself. We must insist that intelligence not become theater, so that today's comedy does not become tomorrow's tragedy. We cannot stand blind and deaf in the world of the 1980s because we were hypnotized by our review of the 1950s and 60s.

Everyone in this room knows America has the best Navy in the world. We all want to keep it that way.

I want you to know that America also has the best intelligence service in the world. We must keep it that way.



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Ms. ROSENBERGER



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

28 January 1976

Dear Ms. Rosenberger:

Herewith some ideas. I have underlined those we believe would do the most good. You will recognize we are putting ideas in the President's mouth he may not agree with, but how else to find out? Point six is drawn from the "Vail Book" and probably should be cleared with Mike Duval. The most useful thing the President can say is that the Agency is not going to be put out of business.

One general suggestion. This audience has heard all the old chestnuts (Nathan Hale, "your failures are trumpeted--", etc.) a hundred times. Stress instead things that are closer to the professional's real world. The themes we suggest would be meaningful to such an audience. But, as I said on the phone, it is essential to get the terminology right or the impact is lost.

If you need advice or help, you can call me (Office x7111, home 356-4095) or Ms. Pat Taylor (Office x7676, home 437-7609) at any time.

Rich L

Richard Lehman

Enclosure:
As Stated

P.S. The last underlined sentence was added by Mr. Bush. The President has given him this assurance. He believes it important the President say this, although this may not be the right place or the right time.

RL



1. The Nation's professional intelligence officers, particularly those in CIA, have taken a hell of a beating in the past year. I am not here to beat on you some more. Rather, I depend on you as our nation's first line of defense.

2. Over the past thirty years intelligence has become increasingly important in national policy-making. (See attachment).

3. In the face of great difficulties, you have met these standards (pp 6-7 of attachment). You deliver to my desk each morning intelligence which is objective, responsible, and relevant. You have served the nation better than it has served you of late.

4. We place great weight on the objectivity of your reporting. We pay too little attention, however, to another kind of objectivity--the Community's willingness to undertake candid self-assessment. Little note has been taken than you investigated yourselves and set your own houses in order before any external investigation began. Little note has been taken that the criticisms of your performance are based selectively on your own self-criticism. And no note is taken that the purpose of these assessments is to correct short-comings.



5. I have no intention to see you put out of business. Rather, I believe the principles upon which CIA was founded are as valid today as they were in 1947. In the next few weeks we will be making some changes, but they will be aimed at strengthening the concept of central intelligence, not of weakening it.

6. The following principles were suggested to me by my staff as a basis for reexamination of the Intelligence Community.

- There needs to be a strong and independent head of the Intelligence Community who is not so committed to one bureaucracy as to lose his objectivity.
- The Community leader should have enough of an institutional "base" to maintain his independence.
- There should be "competition" in the production of intelligence, with good coordination among the agencies.
- *The President*
~~You~~ should have direct access to an intelligence official who does not have major foreign affairs or defense policy responsibilities.



- Any organizational changes should be designed to promote technological creativity, such as that which led to development of the U-2's and later technological successes.

~~7. I endorse these principles, and would add two more. We must maintain our capabilities for clandestine collection and for covert action.~~

7. I endorse these principles, and would add two more. We must maintain our capabilities for clandestine collection and for covert action.

8. For those of you who have responsibilities in this field, let me say that I know of no more dedicated and skillful group of professionals in the federal service. I want to assure you that I am taking a personal interest in ensuring that you are adequately protected overseas. And I am determined that this government will stand behind the pledges you have given to your sources that their confidentiality will be maintained.

9. You have had a bad period. I want to assure you that it is not endless. In fact, the end is in sight, and with it a chance for you to give full attention to intelligence. You have stood up to your problems well, as befits professionals with a sense of duty and esprit ~~de~~ ^{de} corps. I congratulate you for it. And I want to state again my admiration for Bill Colby's leadership in this most trying of times.



10. George Bush has said that he sees his first task as restoration of public confidence in CIA. I never lost my confidence in it, and I will back him to the hilt in his efforts. In order to help accomplish this, I have assured the new Director that he has direct access to me whenever he needs
it.



~~--Second, one important aspect of this task is prevent the policy-maker from being taken by surprise by an event to which our interests require that he immediately respond. Please note that this is quite different from the prediction of such an event. Here our record is far from perfect, but still very good indeed.~~

The traditional--or pre-1939--view of intelligence was one of the spy seeking the enemy's war plans, of the single nugget of information which, if placed in the hands of the national leadership, could make the difference between peace and war. This concept is totally out of date. In today's complex world intelligence plays a continuous, major, and essential role in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy and in the foreign aspects of national economic policy, as well as in the equipping and deployment of our military forces.

Few would argue that there have been no fundamental changes in the world over the past three decades. So much has been written about these changes that many of the descriptive phrases have become cliches--the fragmentation of Stalin's monolithic communism, nuclear parity, an era of negotiation replacing an era of confrontation, the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world, increased consciousness of the third world, the growth of the nuclear club,



international economic competition replacing the threat of nuclear war, the food-population problem, the growing power of the oil-rich nations, and international terrorism. Hackneyed as these expressions may be, they evoke the images of change that have occurred in the last quarter century.

Against this backdrop of a changing world, this nation needs the best information and judgments about what is going on abroad so that it can survive and prosper--and its intelligence structure should be in a position to satisfy this need. This nation needs a basic understanding of the factors and trends that affect developments in the world abroad. This must be based on research and analysis of information from all sources, not just from secret and official sources of information but also from the cornucopia of open literature and academic research available on much of the developed world. Much of this information is highly fragmentary and much of the academic research is highly specialized. The task for intelligence is to analyze and integrate this material into assessments and judgments relevant to our nation's concerns abroad.

Let me digress for a moment to illustrate the complexity of this process by tracing one thread through it. The potential effectiveness of Soviet ICBM forces against our defense installations is obviously a matter of vital national interest. The most important single



factor in assessing effectiveness is the accuracy of each type of ICBM. One factor in accuracy is the quality of the guidance system, one factor in that is the quality of the accelerometers used, and one factor in that is the method by which accelerometers are suspended.

Answering the effectiveness question involves tracing a myriad of similar threads. It requires coordinating the work of hundreds, even thousands, of specialists in subjects as narrow as the method of suspending Soviet accelerometers. It requires aggregating their work into ever broader assessments, until finally a coherent answer to a crucial national question can be given.

From such assessments of the past and present must flow projections as far into the future as may be needed to permit policy formulation and planning for negotiation and action. And, a continuous flow of timely information and analyses is needed to update these assessments and projections and to alert our policy makers to new opportunities or potential crises so that they can plan accordingly.

Who are these policy makers? In the first instance they are the President and the other members of the National Security Council--the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. They include the



members of the Staff of the National Security Council and the appropriate staffs of the various members of the Council itself. They include the Secretary of the Treasury and other senior economic officers. Members of certain committees of the Congress are now being informed of foreign developments on a regular basis. These committees include Subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House, and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the International Affairs Committee of the House. Other Committees and Members of the Congress are provided with intelligence on foreign developments in response to their specific requests.

The subject matter of intelligence has expanded from its older focus on foreign military capabilities to include foreign political dynamics, economic trends, scientific capabilities, and sociological pressures. Today's intelligence deals with foreign policy problems ranging from the law of the seas to the oil boycott, from defense policy to arms control.

Along with this expansion of the scope and role of intelligence has come an increase in reliance on information acquired by sophisticated technical devices on the one hand and on open literature on the other, there has thus been a relative decrease in reliance on traditional clandestine collection. Clandestine collection or espionage



nevertheless remains essential, but it is now reserved for the most important information which cannot be acquired by other means. It is focused largely on the major closed societies that could threaten our security, that do not have a free press, and that screen their military capabilities and much of their government process even from their own citizens.

The forms intelligence may take in giving the policy-maker the information he needs to do his job will vary. They range from the dissemination of single raw intelligence reports to complex analytical memoranda or national intelligence reports. They may include oral briefings or daily publications on world-wide developments. In fast-moving situations intelligence seeks to distill from the mass of fragmentary information that pours into Washington. From the process come coherent situation reports that enable the policy maker to keep track of and to anticipate events.

In meeting these needs the Intelligence Community must measure up to a number of demanding standards:

--If intelligence is to provide meaningful and timely support, its reporting and analysis must cover and integrate all facets of foreign developments--military, political, economic, scientific, and sociological.



--Intelligence must also be responsible--clear cut; sharp; neither alarmist nor complacent-- if it is to serve as a reliable basis for decision.

--Effective intelligence must also avoid the bureaucratic penchant for ambiguities or delphic generalities which by anticipating all possible eventualities frustrate meaningful retrospective examination.

--Intelligence must be relevant. It must be responsive to the policy-maker's concerns, and it must go beyond and answer the questions he perhaps should have asked and did not.

--Finally, and most important, intelligence must be ~~responsible~~. It must be independent of partisan preference or loyalty to preconceived judgments. It must never be distorted to support of budgetary desires.

~~Mr. Chairman, I would now like to illustrate in some detail the kinds of problems that we consider important and the kinds of substantive services that national intelligence provides. I hope these examples will make clear the breadth and complexity of our work and the close relationship it bears to the making of national policy. For convenience I will discuss these topics by~~