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STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH THE SENATE
FOREIGN COMMITTEE RE MAVERICK MISSILES SEPTEMBER 28

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I had a very cordial and good meeting with the Committee discussing exclusively the issue of arms sales to Saudi Arabia, explaining the Administration position. The Committee is now discussing this in Executive Session.

I want to express my appreciation for manner in which the meeting was conducted and the [inaudible]

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you summarize the Administration's position?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Administration's position is that to jinx (?) the sale of Mavericks to Saudi Arabia would have foreign policy consequences that are out of proportion to the technical military issues [inaudible]

QUESTION: [inaudible]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Saudi Arabia has been a good friend of the United States. It has played a stabilizing role in the [inaudible] It has been helpful in peace efforts, and it's in our interest to retain the friendship and the possibility of moderation Saudi Arabia has [inaudible]

QUESTION: [inaudible]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I doubt that it would lead to an oil embargo by Saudi Arabia, but [inaudible] Saudi Arabia's decision of using its influence in many other ways with respect to oil and with respect to the peace process in the Middle East. [inaudible] has been made by Saudi Arabia. I do not believe that this particular decision would lead to an oil embargo

QUESTION: [Inaudible] -- to raise that embargo threat?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: [inaudible] That is not the issue, so I will not [inaudible]. The issue is one of [inaudible] relationships with Saudi Arabia and the prospect of stability and moderation in the Middle East.

QUESTION: [Inaudible]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know what specific decisions could be taken because there is a big gamut of decisions that can be taken between an embargo and the continuation of existing [inaudible]

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, [inaudible] does it make any difference what you said to the Committee [inaudible]?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was asked by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee to come up here and to give the Senators an opportunity to question me. And I responded to the urgent request of the Chairman.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could I just ask about Rhodesian [inaudible] Do you believe that [inaudible]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I believe that the negotiations will go forward, that right after these negotiations each party will state their conditions in a manner to give itself the greatest room for maneuver. We have been in touch with all of the parties repeatedly. And, in fact, I believe that progress toward negotiations has been made rather than the opposite. We believe that a breakthrough has been achieved, and the problem now is to settle (?) the negotiations. And all parties have expressed their willingness, and indeed their eagerness, to get the negotiations [inaudible] soon.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you ask Vice President Rockefeller to call Senator Sparkman about the sale yesterday?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Vice President, as you know, is a very independent man. I did not know all of his activities before he engaged in in them, but I approved them (?)

QUESTION: When do you think the Rhodesian negotiations [inaudible]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is a British Minister of State in Africa now. We have our Assistant Secretary of State for Africa also in Africa. Those two gentlemen are going to meet the African leaders; they are going to be at independence day celebrations in Botswana. There is a possibility of contact in Pretoria. We are really very hopeful that progress towards the negotiations is going to be made rapidly. By the end of the week I would think that -- within a week or so I would think that this would become evident.

File

Jan. 1975?

PRESIDENT RE ~~KISSINGER~~ INTERVIEW

THE PRESIDENT HAS READ THE INTERVIEW. HE READS THE SECRETARY'S ANSWER AS A HIGHLY QUALIFIED ANSWER ON A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION INVOLVING ONLY THE GRAVEST KIND OF EMERGENCY FOR THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOTHING TO ADD ON THE SUBJECT.



L. Thompson

HAK
1/3
Bele [1975]

Q: Secretary Kissinger said in a Business Week interview that he could not say there was no circumstance where the US would not use force against the Middle East oil producing countries to "prevent strangulation of the industrialized world."

- 1) Does President Ford agree with Dr. Kissinger's views on this?
- 2) Have any instructions been given from the White House to the Pentagon to prepare contingency plans for use of military force against the Arab oil producing nations?
- 3) Last month when we asked you if the President would rule out using military force against the Arab oil countries, you said the question was irresponsible. Does the President consider Kissinger's statement in Business Week irresponsible?
- 4) When you called out line of questioning irresponsible on this subject, were you aware that Dr. Kissinger was holding open the using option of/military force under extreme circumstances?
- 5) Weren't we being misled on this?
- 6) Can you categorically state that there are no US military contingency plans for use of force in the Middle East in response to extreme actions by the Arab oil producing nations against the industrialized countries?



Q: Secretary Kissinger has renewed his criticism of the European allies for their "enormous feeling of insecurity and impotence" and appears to have taken a harder line against the Arab oil countries. Does the President share Dr. Kissinger's views or is he firing his final shots before leaving the Cabinet?



FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20461

*General
Scowcroft*

FEB 13 1975

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Kissenger's Statement on Price Floor

FROM: Eric Zausner

TO: Ron Nessen

Attached is a brief statement which Frank Zarb agrees to with respect to our position on the price floor. Frank asked that you circulate and get signoff by Brent Scowcroft and Bill Seidman.


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PRESS STATEMENT ON KISSINGER'S PRICE FLOOR PROPOSAL

As part of the President's overall energy program it was decided that a substantial uncertainty with respect to world oil prices could jeopardize our drive for domestic energy independence. Therefore, as part of the President's omnibus energy bill specific authorities were requested ^{which} ~~to~~ ^{would require} ~~allow~~ the President to provide domestic price stability in the event of a major world oil price disruption. These authorities provided for the use of either tariffs, quotas, or price floors to protect the domestic energy industries. Before the President will make a final decision with respect to the mechanisms, timing or level of such a program he requested that two tasks be undertaken:

1. The Secretary of State would discuss the price ^{stability} ~~floor~~ ^{concept} with the consuming nations and develop a further understanding of their receptivity to the proposal.
2. FEA would undertake additional analyses with respect to the mechanisms and level of such a price floor and its domestic energy impact.

~~The current activities by the Secretary of State are fully consonant with the President's decisions to fully explore this important concept with the consuming nations prior to his final decision.~~



In this regard, the speech which the President requested ^{the Secretary of State} to make before the Washington Press Club fully represents the Administration's Policy Position on this subject.

HAK




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nullified unless they are complemented by other consumers. This is why the United States has proposed to its IEA partners that they match our respective conservation targets. Together we can save 2 million barrels a day this year; and at least 4 million barrels in 1977.

If these goals are reached, under current economic conditions OPEC will have to reduce its production further; even when full employment returns, OPEC will have surplus capacity. More reductions will be hard to distribute on top of the existing cutbacks of 9 million barrels a day. As a result, pressures to increase production or to lower prices will build up as ambitious defense and development programs get under way. By 1977 some oil producers will have a payments deficit; competition between them for the available market will intensify. The cartel's power to impose an embargo and to use price as a weapon will be greatly diminished.

"In short, the massive development of alternative sources by the industrial countries will confront OPEC with a choice: they can accept a significant price reduction now in return for stability over a longer period; or they can run the risk of a dramatic break in prices when the program of alternative sources begins to pay off."

But if America—the least vulnerable and most profligate consumer—will not act, neither will anyone else. Just as our action will have a multiplier effect, so will our inaction stifle the efforts of others. Instead of reducing our collective imports, we will have increased them by 2-4 million barrels a day. OPEC's ability to raise prices, which is now in question, will be restored. In exchange for a brief respite of a year or two, we will have increased the industrialized world's vulnerability to a new and crippling blow from the producers. And when that vulnerability is exposed to public view through a new embargo or further price rises, the American people will be entitled to ask why their leaders failed to take the measures they could have when they should have.

One embargo—and one economic crisis—should be enough to underline the implications of dependency.

The Importance of New Supplies

Conservation measures alone, crucial as they are, cannot permanently reduce our dependence on imported oil. To eliminate dependence over the long term we must accelerate the development of alternative sources of energy. This will involve a massive and complex task. But for the country which broke the secret of fission in 5 years and landed men on the moon in 8 years, the challenge should be exciting. The Administration is prepared to invest in this enterprise on a scale commensurate with those previous pioneering efforts; we are ready as well to share the results with our IEA partners on an equitable basis.

Many of the industrialized countries are blessed with major energy reserves which have not yet been developed—North Sea oil, German coal, coal and oil deposits in the United States, and nuclear power in all countries. We have the technical skill and resources to create synthetic fuels from shale oil, tar sands, coal gasification and liquefaction. And much work has already been done on such advanced energy sources as breeder reactors, fusion, and solar power.

The cumulative effort will of necessity be gigantic. The United States alone shall seek to generate capital investments in energy of \$500 billion over the next 10 years. The Federal Government will by itself invest \$10 billion in research into alternative energy sources over the next 5 years, a figure likely to be doubled when private investment in research is included.

But if this effort is to succeed, we must act now to deal with two major problems—the expense of new energy sources and the varying capacities of the industrialized countries.

New energy sources will cost considerably more than we paid for energy in 1973 and can never compete with the production costs of Middle Eastern oil.

This disparity in cost poses a dilemma. If the industrial countries succeed in developing alternative sources on a large scale, the demand for OPEC oil will fall, and international prices may be sharply reduced. Inexpensive imported oil could then jeopardize the investment made in the alternative sources; the lower oil prices would also restimulate demand, starting again the cycle of rising imports, increased dependence, and vulnerability.

Thus paradoxically, in order to protect the major investments in the industrialized countries that are needed to bring the international oil prices down, we must insure that the price for

oil on the domestic market does not fall below a certain level.

The United States will therefore make the following proposal to the International Energy Agency this Wednesday:

In order to bring about adequate investment in the development of conventional nuclear and fossil energy sources, the major oil importing nations should agree that they will not allow imported oil to be sold domestically at prices which would make those new sources noncompetitive.

This objective could be achieved in either of two ways. The consumer nations could agree to establish a common floor price for imports, to be implemented by each country through methods of its own choosing such as import tariffs, variable levies, or quotas. Each country would thus be free to obtain balance-of-payments and tax benefits, without restimulating consumption, if the international price falls below agreed levels. Alternatively, IEA nations could establish a common IEA tariff on oil imports. Such a tariff could be set at moderate levels and phased in gradually as the need arises.

“Collective actions to restore balance to the international economic structure... will contribute enormously to the likelihood of the success of the projected consumer-producer dialogue.”

President Ford is seeking legislation requiring the executive branch to use a floor price or other appropriate measures to achieve price levels necessary for our national self-sufficiency goals.

Intensive technical study would be needed to determine the appropriate level at which prices should be protected. We expect that they will be considerably below the current world oil prices. They must, however, be high enough to encourage the long-range development of alternative energy sources.

These protected prices would in turn be a point of reference for an eventual consumer-producer agreement. To the extent that OPEC's current high prices are caused by fear of precipitate later declines, the consuming countries, in return for an assured supply, should be prepared to offer producers an assured price for some definite period so long as this price is substan-

tially lower than the current price.

In short, the massive development of alternative sources by the industrial countries will confront OPEC with a choice: they can accept a significant price reduction now in return for stability over a longer period; or they can run the risk of a dramatic break in prices when the program of alternative sources begins to pay off. The longer OPEC waits, the stronger our bargaining position becomes.

The second problem is that the capacities of the industrialized countries to develop new energy sources vary widely. Some have rich untapped deposits of fossil fuels. Some have industrial skills and advanced technology. Some have capital. Few have all three.

Each of these elements will be in great demand, and ways must be found to pool them effectively. The consumers, therefore, have an interest in participating in each other's energy development programs.

Therefore, the United States will propose to the IEA this Wednesday the creation of a synthetic fuels consortium within IEA. Such a body would enable countries willing to provide technology and capital to participate in each other's synthetic energy projects. The United States is committed to develop a national synthetic fuel capacity of one million barrels a day by 1985; other countries will establish their own programs. These programs should be coordinated, and IEA members should have an opportunity to share in the results by participating in the investment. Qualifying participants would have access to the production of the synthetics program in proportion to their investment.

In addition, the United States will propose the creation of an energy research and development consortium within IEA. Its primary task will be to encourage, coordinate, and pool large-scale national research efforts in fields—like fusion and solar power—where the costs in capital equipment and skilled manpower are very great, the lead times very long, but the ultimate payoff in low-cost energy potentially enormous.

The consortium also would intensify the comprehensive program of information exchange which—with respect to coal, nuclear technology, solar energy, and fusion—has already begun within the IEA. We are prepared to earmark a substantial proportion of our own research and development resources for cooperative efforts with other IEA countries which are willing to contribute. Pooling the intellectual effort of the great indus-

[Feb. 1975?]

Rich/Ross (Exclusive)

By Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

Washington--On the eve of his swearing in as ambassador to Britain Elliot L. Richardson let it be known Monday that he believes there is an even chance Sec. of State Henry A. Kissinger will resign by next year and ~~that~~ that he will probably replace him.

Richardson, former undersecretary of state, secretary of health, education and welfare, secretary of defense and attorney general, made ~~his~~ his predictions in a meeting with five British reporters.

The fact that Richardson spoke freely on a potentially explosive subject ~~and~~ suggests that he may have personal assurances from President Ford or Kissinger or both.

Kissinger is scheduled to administer the ambassadorial oath of office to Richardson at a special ceremony Tuesday afternoon. Richardson will take up his post in ~~London~~ London next Monday.

Ford nominated Richardson last month with ~~praise~~ exceptional praise for his "extraordinary achievement".

"I have the highest regard for him," the President declared, "for his intelligence, and for his total commitment to public service."

Richardson reportedly told the ~~British~~ British journalists that he still had presidential ambitions but ~~that~~ believed the odds were 20-1 against him being nominated by the Republican party.

He was said to have predicted Ford's reelection -- probably over Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) -- provided there is a reasonable economic recovery by the time of the ~~election~~ election next year.

Richardson reportedly declared that there was an even chance that Kissinger would not stay on as secretary of state until the end of Ford's current term in January of 1976.





Add 1 Rich/Ross x x x 1976.

Richardson was said to have calculated that he had a 2-1 chance of succeeding Kissinger, if he does resign.

Kissinger's decision, Richardson reportedly commented, would be determined by whether he becomes too tired for the job or ~~his~~ his usefulness undercut by his current declining fortunes in Congress.

Richardson was said to declared that if Kissinger succeeds in negotiating another Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai next month, confidence will be restored. ~~in it.~~

~~Richardson~~ Kissinger has been suffering from a taint-by-association with former President Richard M. Nixon throughout the Watergate scandal.

Richardson, on the other hand, emerged unscathed from ~~his~~ his extended ~~in~~ service in the ~~Nixon~~ Nixon administration as a result of his refusal ~~to~~ to obey a presidential order to fire Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox two years ago.

~~Richardson~~ Instead, Richardson resigned as attorney general during the so-called Saturday Night Massacre that provided the first major break in Nixon's power.

Richardson, 54, is a member of an old Boston brahmin family. He received his undergraduate and law degrees from Harvard, serving as president of the Law Review.

He was a clerk on the Supreme Court to the late Justice ~~Frankfurter~~ Felix ~~Frankfurter~~ Frankfurter and later served as attorney general and ~~lieutenant~~ lieutenant ~~governor~~ governor of Massachusetts.

During the first two years of the Nixon administration, he was the principal operating officer of the state department as under secretary, ~~working~~ working closely

Mexico puts out flags to welcome the Queen

From Peter Strafford
Mexico City, Feb 24

Mexico City gave the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh an enthusiastic reception when they arrived today for their state visit. Hundreds of thousands of people turned out in a holiday atmosphere to greet Queen Isabel, as she is known here.

Crowds lined the route from the airport with flags, banners and bands. Flowers were thrown over the car and clouds of confetti were released from the rooftops as she made her way through the city.

The highlight of her arrival was a ceremony in the Zocalo, the central square dominated by the cathedral and built over the centre of the old capital of the Aztecs. The huge space was filled with students waving red, white and green coloured whisks, while one side of the square was filled with a bank of people holding coloured cards.

At a signal, the whole bank turned into an elaborate design, with portraits of the Queen and President Luis Echeverria of Mexico. In between was an heraldic device which said Amistad, or friendship.

The Queen began her visit



A shower of confetti welcomes the Queen to Mexico City. President Echeverria is standing beside the Du

when she arrived in the royal yacht Britannia this morning at the island of Cozumel, off the coast of Yucatan, from the Bahamas. There were strong winds and rough waves, which meant that she had to land at a yachting harbour some miles to the north of the planned point of arrival.

Further delays were caused when the helicopter carrying the royal party's luggage broke

down, and the luggage had to be carried by the royal barge.

It was, however, a bright, sunny day when the royal party arrived at the airport in Mexico City. In the distance, as the aircraft taxied in, showing faintly through the haze, were Popocatepetl and Ixtaccihuatl, the two snow-covered volcanoes which dominate the valley of Mexico.

At the airport was a crowd

of students carrying huge clusters of balloons which they released into the sky as the Queen went the rounds of the people who had come to receive her. A 21-gun salute was fired and rattles were waved.

Today is Flag Day in Mexico, when ceremonies are held in honour of the national flag—green, white and red, with the Aztec symbol of an eagle sitting on a cactus with a snake in his

Mr Richardson hints at entering the presidential stakes

From Fred Emery
Washington, Feb 24

Mr Elliot Richardson, who arrives in London next Monday to take up his post as American ambassador, hinted today that he was ready, if necessary, to serve as Secretary of State or emerge as a presidential candidate.

As the informal luncheon guest of several British correspondents here, Mr Richardson laughingly set the odds on his running for President as 20-1 against—"an outsider but not a long shot". He would not state for publication the odds of his becoming Secretary of State,

but clearly considers himself the favourite should Dr Henry Kissinger step down.

Mr Richardson said the only things that could force out Dr Kissinger would be that he was too tired, and there was no sign of that, or that "his effectiveness might be undercut".

Mr Richardson immediately suggested that the tendency among Democrats in Congress to erode Dr Kissinger's effectiveness could be ended promptly if there were another Sinai disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt. Such a step would restore confidence in him.

Dr Kissinger had achieved so

much and had such international stature, he added, that "any successor is going to be diminished".

Mr Richardson discussed his own—and Britain's—prospects with the confident candour that comes from his own stature here as a Cabinet member for three times.

He had ready odds for the presidential race in 1976; he was presuming a recovery by then from economic recession and Mr Ford's election. But if there were no recovery—and he described the prospect of one as a "reasonably lucky trend"—he predicted that Senator

Henry Jackson would be elected President.

He gave 3-2 odds against Mr Jackson being the Democratic candidate. He also sharply criticized Mr Jackson for the "damage" he had inflicted on détente. He blamed the senator squarely for the recent breakdown over Soviet trade and the Jewish emigration issue and said he had acted from "political reasons".

However Mr Richardson suggested that détente would survive the possible disappearance from the scene of both Mr Brezhnev and Dr Kissinger.

EXCERPTS FROM INTERVIEW WITH
ELLIOT RICHARDSON
BY BILL BUTELL AND STEVE BELL ON
ABC's "AM AMERICA"
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1975, 7:45 A.M.A

BUTELL: Elliot Richardson is in Washington with Steve Bell, our White House Correspondent. Mr. Richardson, in accordance with yesterday's CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, you said that you think Secretary of State Kissinger is going to resign within a year. And, beyond that, according at least to the SUN-TIMES interview, you let it be known that you think you are going to be appointed to take Mr. Kissinger's job as Secretary of State. Wonder if you could tell us on what you base those predictions?

RICHARDSON: Well, that is not a very accurate account of what I said. The story was based really on a conversation with British correspondents about the possibilities of the future and I said in effect. . . They asked me what were the prospects that I might eventually be appointed Secretary of State. I don't know of any reason to believe at all Secretary Kissinger is about to resign. I think that he is doing a very critical and important job and I think he is needed where he is. What I was saying, in effect, is that if you suppose sometime between now and January, 1977, he might decide to resign and you put the odds at, say 50-50, and you put the odds on my being appointed at 2 to 1 against and then you multiply these, you have some sense of whatever my chances may be. . .

BELL: Yesterday, during your swearing in ceremonies, Secretary Kissinger actually joked about the report that had come out of the British press, saying you can imagine how concerned I was when I got a note here saying I was invited to the swearing in of Elliot Richardson, insinuating that he wondered what swearing in it really was. Have you heard from the White House or the Secretary about that news report?

RICHARDSON: No, I haven't Steve. I think they. . . I hope and believe that they have it in perspective.



BELL: Press Secretary Ron Nessen said when asked about it last night that there was no validity to such speculation, but then asked does that mean Mr. Richardson will not ever be named Secretary of State, the answer was, "I really don't want to narrow it down that fine." Is it the kind of position where you think you could well serve the United States?

RICHARDSON: Well, of course, this is a Presidential appointment. I think we have already carried what was essentially a speculative discussion which was really focused on dealing with the question of... What I was really doing, essentially, was indulging in a little amateur odds-making and not making anything that could be called a prediction and I think it's really out of scale by this time.

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13. Oil Import Program

Q. Mr. President, as you know, Florida boasts some of the highest electrical power bills in the nation. Won't the people who pay those bills be hurt substantially by your foreign oil import program since most, if not all of the oil that Florida power companies burn, comes from Venezuela?

A. The energy program that I have recommended would not result in Florida paying a disproportionate share of any cost increase. As a matter of fact, under the administrative action that I have taken, we have, under the first dollar, exempted heating oil as far as Florida is concerned, as far as New England is concerned, as far as Hawaii, the areas that are, as you indicate, in the same circumstance as Florida.

And under the permanent program that I have recommended, the added energy costs to a family or to business or to government would be rebated to the individual, to the business, and to the governments so there would be a neutral impact. Therefore, it seems to me, that my proposal is extremely equitable and would not result in any disproportionate burden being placed on Florida or any state in a comparable situation.

14. Arab Embargo of Jews

Q. Mr. President, your Opening Statement seemed to imply that the United States was planning some sort of action against the Arab nations that have embargoed Jewish-owned banks. Could you be more specific? What sort of thing might we do in this case if the embargoes continue?

A. All we have so far are some allegations. I have asked the Departments of Justice, Commerce and State to investigate any allegations. The actual action that would be taken will be forthcoming from recommendations by those departments. They have not been placed on my desk at the present time.

15. Aid and Credibility

Q. Mr. President, you have referred to the question of aid to Cambodia as a moral one, relating to the credibility of the United States. But is the issue of credibility really at stake when so many of those with whom we would want to maintain it criticized our involvement in that area to begin with and long urged us to get out before we did? A. Are you referring, sir, to other nations?

Q. Other nations, yes. A. I don't think we can conduct American foreign policy on the basis of what other nations think is in our best interest. The United States has to predicate its foreign policy on what it thinks is in America's best interest.

Now, we respect the right of other nations to be critical of what we do. But it's my responsibility and, I think, the responsibility of people in authority in the United States to make decisions that are based on what we think is good for America. And that's the way it'll be decided as long as I'm President.

16. Kissinger Stay in Post

Q. Mr. President, there's been a new

crop of reports in recent days about the possibility of Secretary Kissinger leaving office this year, to be succeeded by Ambassador Elliot Richardson. Could you comment on these reports? And specifically, do you expect Dr. Kissinger to remain in office at least until November of next year?

A. I happen to feel very strongly that Secretary Henry Kissinger is an outstanding Secretary of State. And he and I have never discussed any change in his responsibilities. And I know of no plans of any kind whatsoever, on my part or his part, to change the responsibilities, the very heavy and important responsibilities, that he has.

On the other hand, I recently submitted the name of Elliot Richardson to be Ambassador to Great Britain. I picked him because I think he'll do a first class job there. And he has been recently confirmed, and I'm confident when he goes to London he will carry out those responsibilities in that job in a very exemplary way.

17. Illegal Immigrants

Q. Mr. President, it's estimated by immigration officials here in South Florida that there are up to 90,000 illegal aliens gainfully employed in Southeast Florida alone. It's also estimated that our unemployment figure runs close to that amount. What is your office doing to address itself to this particular problem?

A. We have been trying to strengthen the arm of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Justice, in order to handle in an appropriate way the illegal alien problem. Florida has a serious problem. California has an equally serious problem. We are trying to work with the Mexican Government, for example, primarily in the western states.

We are fully cognizant of the adverse impact that illegal aliens have on employment opportunities of American citizens. But we're trying to stop the flow in; we are seeking to send back illegal aliens as quickly and as possibly under the laws of the United States. Q. Thank you, sir.

18. Vice-Presidential Election

Q. Mr. President, Senator Pastore is proposing that there be a special election any time an appointed Vice President succeeds to the Presidency, that is, if there's more than one year of the term remaining. Since you're the only such person, what is your feeling about it? Would you recommend or endorse a change in the 25th Amendment?

A. I'm not sure that I ought to pass judgment on the validity of the 25th Amendment. I guess I could say it worked pretty well this time. But I think it's appropriate that the Congress take another look at the 25th Amendment. It was passed, as I think most of us know, not to meet the unique circumstances that developed in 1973 and 1974.

Perhaps this experience does require the Congress to take a look to see whether there's a better way or a different way where a Vice President might be selected.

Q. Well, do you feel any handicap for

Nessen

REMARKS OF ISRAELI AMBASSADOR DINITZ FOLLOWING HIS MEETING
WITH THE SECRETARY AUGUST 5, 1975

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: Well, we had a meeting with the Secretary of about an hour and a half, something like this; and I received the comments, observations and remarks of the Egyptians to our latest proposal. And I will transfer it now to my Government.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, obviously you can't tell us what the message was precisely but can you give us an indication of whether you are satisfied, positively inclined, negatively inclined?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: Well, I wouldn't want to go into adjectives. What I can say is that the course of negotiations is going on and this very fact is a good sign.

QUESTION: Would you foresee a Kissinger trip to the Middle East shortly as a result of what you know now about the negotiations?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: That would have to depend, of course, on decisions, and therefore I cannot predict it. But the Secretary himself has mentioned this possibility and I don't rule it out.

QUESTION: Do you plan to take these thoughts, these ideas, personally back to Israel now, or will you --

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: No, I will communicate them to Israel.

QUESTION: Did you agree on the visit of an Israeli team to discuss in the United States economic and military aid in this conversation with the Secretary?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: The agreement on the technical discussions between us and the United States on the aid question has been going on already between the Embassy and the American Government. At the time it was agreed that it would be extended and further explored by some experts who will come from Israel, and this would take place in the very near future.

QUESTION: Did you agree on a date today?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: We didn't agree on a date; there was no need to agree on a date. The date will be a mutually convenient date between our two governments and that will be done in the normal course of events. And I think very soon.

QUESTION: Are you satisfied with the flow of military equipment to Israel from this country?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: Well, you know, Bernie, that we are never satisfied. But I don't think that one can describe it on the one hand either as an embargo or a stoppage, and on the other hand one cannot say that we are satisfied with the rate of delivery of every item or every request. And I hope that these things will be resolved.

QUESTION: When you say you are not satisfied with the rate of delivery, are you talking about the F-15 and the LANCE, or something less than that?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: I would not go into details of items -- we are never doing it. But I am saying there are some things, as the Spokesman of the State Department said this morning, that are not being supplied at the rate at which we expect and we hope that it will be taken care of.

QUESTION: Are you satisfied with the explanation that the Spokesman gave this morning? He attributed that to procedural breakdowns.

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: I would imagine that some items are a question of availability and production, and other items, as he himself said, are a question of high technology and questions that fall within the category of reassessment -- if I remember correctly what he said. And I think that's a correct description of the situation. Naturally we would like to see an openness and a greater flow.

QUESTION: In the last four months the rate of delivery, according to the spokesman, has been approximately \$25 million worth for each month -- that's \$100 million since the beginning of April. Is that a satisfactory rate?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: I would rather not go into comment on the rate or the types or the volume -- I haven't checked the volume; I have not made this calculation. That is not the

yardstick with which we are working. It is those things that we put on order because we need them, and we expect and hope for their delivery.

QUESTION: Sir, has there been a delay in technology that is not new technology but previously contracted, older technology of a conventional type?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: That would force me to go into certain specific items, and as I said before we do not do this. But as I said there are different categories, some of them of new technology and some of them not of new technology. And we expect that everything would be resolved.

QUESTION: Would you describe your position as far apart from the Egyptians?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: I would not go into a description.

QUESTION: When do you see Dr. Kissinger again?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: We haven't fixed any meeting, but I probably will be in touch with the Department soon and naturally I will expect to see the Secretary again when I get the comments from Israel. When it will be exactly now I cannot say.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1975

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have given much thought to the Select Committee's October 2 request that I provide it with a copy of a dissent memorandum, on the Cyprus crisis, sent me by a Foreign Service Officer in August 1974. After careful consideration I have decided that I cannot comply with that request. I respectfully request the Committee to ~~work with me on alternate methods of putting before it~~ the information relevant to its inquiry.

The "Dissent Channel," through which this memorandum was submitted, provides those officers of the Department of State who disagree with established policy, or who have new policies to recommend, a means for communicating their views to the highest levels of the Department. "Dissent Channel" messages and memoranda are forwarded to the Secretary of State, and are normally given restricted distribution within the Department. They cannot be stopped by any intermediate office.

Mr. Chairman, I take this position reluctantly, and only because I have concluded that the circumstances are compelling. I am convinced that I would be remiss in my duty as Secretary of State were I to follow a different course.

The challenges that face our nation in the field of foreign affairs have never been more difficult; the pace of events has never been so rapid; the revolutionary character of the changes taking place around us has seldom been more pronounced. If we are to prosper -- indeed, if we are to survive -- it will require the confidence of the American people and of the nations of the world in the wisdom of our foreign policy and the effectiveness of our foreign policy establishment. Basic to this sense of confidence, of course, is the quality and professionalism of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. And the strength of those institutions depends, to a critical

The Honorable
Otis G. Pike, Chairman,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives.

degree, upon the judgment and strength of purpose of the men and women who serve in them. It is my view that to turn over the dissent memorandum as requested would inevitably be destructive of the decision-making process of the Department, and hence do great damage to the conduct of our foreign relations and the national security of the United States.

Since the founding of the Republic, every Secretary of State has been regarded as the principal adviser to the President in the formulation of foreign policy and in the conduct of foreign relations. If the Secretary of State is to discharge his obligations and duties to the President and the national interest, he must have the benefit of the best available advice and criticism from his subordinates; they in turn, if they are to give their best, must enjoy a guarantee that their advice or criticism, candidly given, will remain privileged.

As the Supreme Court has said: "the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decision-making process."

As the Cyprus crisis evolved, I received many recommendations for various courses of action from my subordinates. Their views were freely offered and fully considered in the policy-making process. But the final choices of what policies to recommend to the President were mine, and they sometimes differed from the courses of action proposed to me by some of my associates. My decisions occasionally led to vigorous dissent, both during meetings with those of my colleagues who disagreed, and in written memoranda, as in the case presently before us. Should the Select Committee so desire, I am prepared personally to come before the Committee to describe in detail the dissenting views put to me, and my reasons for rejecting them.

But were I to agree to release the document requested, even on a classified basis, I would be party to the destruction of the privacy of communication which the Secretary of State must have with his subordinates regarding their opinions. Once the confidentiality of internal communications had been breached, it would be but a short step to public exploitation of the subordinate's views. The result would be to place Department officers in an intolerable position -- at times praised, at times criticized for their views; at times praised, at times criticized for dissenting; at times praised, at times criticized for not dissenting.

Thus, my decision to withhold the document is not based on a desire to keep anything from the Select Committee with regard to the Cyprus crisis or any other subject. On the contrary, the Department and I are both prepared to cooperate with the Committee in the pursuit of its legislatively established purposes. The issue is not what information the Committee should receive; we agree on that question. Rather, the issue is from whom the information should be sought, and the form in which it should be delivered.

It is my strong belief that the Committee should look to the policy levels of the Department, and not to junior and middle-level officers, for the policy information they seek. It is my principal advisers and I who are responsible for policy, and it is we who should be held accountable before the Congress and the American people for the manner in which we exercise the authority and responsibility vested in us by the President and Congress of the United States.

In keeping with this principle I am prepared now, as I have been from the beginning, to do the following:

- Authorize any officer of the Department or the Foreign Service, regardless of rank, to testify before the Select Committee on all facts known by that

officer about the collection and use of intelligence information in foreign relations crises.

- Authorize any policy level officer of the Department or the Foreign Service to testify before the Select Committee on recommendations received by him from his subordinates, but without identification of authorship, and any recommendations he forwarded to his superiors.
- Supply the Committee with a summary from all sources, but without identification of authorship, of views and recommendations on the Cyprus crisis, and criticisms of our handling of it.
- Appear personally before the Committee to testify as to the policy of the United States with regard to the Cyprus crisis, as well as the policy of this Department with regard to the accountability of junior and middle-level officers for their views and recommendations.

The issue raised by the request for the dissent memorandum runs to the fundamental question of whether the Secretary of State should be asked to disclose the advice, recommendations, or dissents to policy that come to him from subordinate officers.

That the nation must have the most competent and professional Foreign Service possible is surely beyond question. It must be the repository for the lessons learned over more than three decades of world involvement; the institution to which each new Administration looks for the wisdom garnered from the past and the initiatives so necessary to cope with the future. It must be loyal to the President, no matter what his political persuasion; it must inspire confidence in its judgment from the Congress, no matter what party is in power there. The Foreign Service, in a word, should be America's guarantee of continuity in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

We now have an outstanding, disciplined, and dedicated Foreign Service -- perhaps the best in the world. It is the continued strength and utility of this institution that will be undermined by revealing the opinions and judgments of junior and middle-level officers.

While I know that the Select Committee has no intention of embarrassing or exploiting junior and middle-grade officers of the Department, there have been other times and other committees -- and there may be again -- where positions taken by Foreign Service Officers were exposed to ex post facto public examination and recrimination. The results are too well known to need elaboration here: gross injustice to loyal public servants, a sapping of the morale and abilities of the Foreign Service; and serious damage to the ability of the Department and the President to formulate and conduct the foreign affairs of the nation. Mr. Chairman, I cannot, in good conscience, by my own failure to raise the issue of principle, be responsible for contributing to a situation in which similar excesses could occur again.

The considerations I have outlined relate to the broad question of testimony from, and documents authored by junior and middle-level officers. The request for a specific dissent memorandum raises a particular issue within that broader framework. The "Dissent Channel," established by my predecessor, had its origin in the recommendations of special Task Forces made up of career professionals from the Department of State, the Foreign Service and other foreign affairs agencies. Two of these Task Forces recommended that improved means be found to transmit new ideas to the Department's decision-makers, to subject policy to the challenge of an adversary review, and to encourage the expression of dissenting views.

The very purposes of the "Dissent Channel" -- to promote an atmosphere of openness in the formulation of foreign policy, to stimulate fresh, creative ideas, and to encourage a questioning of established policies -- are inconsistent with disclosure of such reports to an

investigative committee of the Congress, and perhaps ultimately to the public. Dissent memoranda are, by their very nature, statements of the author's opinions. If their confidentiality cannot be assured, if they are to be held up to subsequent Congressional or public autopsy, the whole purpose of the "Dissent Channel" will have been corrupted and the Channel itself will soon cease to be a viable instrument. Those whose legitimate purpose is to argue with a policy because they sincerely believe it to be ill-conceived, or because they have new but unorthodox ideas, will recognize the Channel for what it has become and cease to use it; those who care little about what the policy is, and even less about seeking to change that policy through the institutional processes open to them, will be encouraged to use the Channel as a tool for their own ends.


For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I cannot agree to the release of "Dissent Channel" messages -- irrespective of their contents. I am, however, ready to supply a summary of all contrary advice I received on the Cyprus crisis, so long as it is not necessary to disclose the source of this advice.

Every Secretary of State has an obligation to his country and to his successor to build a professional, effective, dedicated, and disciplined Foreign Service. Were I to comply with the request before me I would have failed in that obligation. I would have been partly responsible for a process that would almost inevitably have politicized the Foreign Service, discouraged courageous advice and the free expression of dissenting opinion, and encouraged timidity and caution.

On another occasion when the State Department was under investigation my great predecessor, Dean Acheson, wrote that there is a right way and a wrong way to deal with the Department of State. "The right way," he said, "met the evil and preserved the institution; the wrong way did not meet the evil and destroyed the institution. More than that, it destroyed the faith of the country in its Government, and of our allies in us."

I am prepared to work with the House Select Committee on Intelligence in a cooperative spirit so that, for the sake of our country, we may jointly, on the basis of the proposals contained in this letter, find the "right" way to accommodate our mutual concerns. I am prepared to meet with the Committee at its convenience to search for a reasonable solution -- a solution which will meet the needs of the Committee, protect the integrity of the Department of State, and promote the effective conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.

Sincerely,



Henry A. Kissinger

On the other hand, we are going to pursue as much as we can and maintain our own position of strength because I think it is in the national interest to put a cap on the strategic arms race, but I can't forecast at this time if and when any such meetings will be held.

QUESTION: Well, do you think it would be helpful to have a Ford-Brezhnev meeting to perhaps break the SALT deadlock or are we still insisting on an agreement in SALT as a prerequisite for any Ford-Brezhnev meeting?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe that Mr. Brezhnev and I should not meet until we make additional progress.

QUESTION: Mr. President, in the past the American Bar Association has had great input on the selection of Judicial appointees, and I was wondering how you feel about this, whether the ABA's Judicial Committee should have a veto on your Judicial appointments?

THE PRESIDENT: The ABA, the American Bar Association, has done a fine, fine job under very tough circumstances in analyzing the legal qualifications of some 15 or more names that have been submitted to them, and I thank the American Bar Association for their very, very great cooperation but I don't think in the final analysis they should have a veto over the person that I select.

QUESTION: Mr. President, has Secretary Kissinger talked to you recently or to any top officials in your Administration about the possibility of resigning? Has he complained to you or others in the White House that he felt he was not receiving sufficient support from the White House, particularly on the House contempt citation move and, if he has, are you in a position to say whether you -- to repeat your earlier promise, or your earlier statement, that you wanted him to stay on through the completion of this term?

* THE PRESIDENT: Secretary Kissinger has not spoken to me about resigning. I continue to give him full and complete support because I think he is one of the finest Secretaries of State this country has ever had. I know of no criticism within the White House Staff of his performance of duty and I strongly -- and I want to emphasize and re-emphasize that I think he has done a superb job under most difficult circumstances. I certainly want him to stay as long as Secretary Kissinger will stay.

QUESTION: Mr. President, in view of the Congressional report on the CIA and the recent testimony about FBI activities and continuing doubt in the country, don't you think it would be in the national interest to re-open the assassination investigation of President Kennedy and now Martin Luther King as well?

MORE

*Press Conference #23
November 26, 1975
East Room*

Number two, I think we have to convince these people who have disassociated themselves with both Democratic and Republican Parties that they can achieve far more success working within the two parties. I have always found that it is better to be playing the game than sitting on the sidelines and I think that is what these people--well-intentioned, dedicated individuals--have to realize; they can do more constructively for their country if they are working within the framework of the two-party system.

There is enough breadth in the political philosophy of both major parties, I think, to permit most Americans to be a participant, either as a Democrat or a Republican, and I know they can get more done and contribute more significantly.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you mentioned at the beginning your team -- how proud you are of it. What if, during this year, some members of your Administration become an issue themselves and make it more difficult for you to get things through Congress? How would you assess their value to your Administration?

THE PRESIDENT: Bonnie, I don't anticipate that. I think all of the Cabinet members have done an excellent job in their relations with the Congress, considering particularly the fact that the Congress was controlled by a better than two to one margin by the opposition party. It is a thought that never entered my mind.

QUESTION: You don't see Secretary Kissinger's problems on the Hill as being substantive?

* THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't. I think his formulation of foreign policy as Secretary of State, his execution on my behalf of foreign policy has been good and I do believe that the Congress, as we move into 1976, will appreciate the constructive efforts and I don't foresee any problem in that regard or any of the other Cabinet people.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have repeatedly asked us to look at your record and asked the voters to look at your record. I think on the Hill you generally earned the reputation of a man who thought that the less government there was perhaps the better it was. You have a State of the Union coming up in two or three weeks. Can we expect any new programs in that State of the Union or do you believe that we are at a time in history where a Presidential candidate can run on his feeling that the less government, the better government? We are not going to offer new programs; we are going to offer less programs?

MORE

*Year End Review
Conversation with newsmen
December 31, 1975
Oval Office*

*Nessen
(two copies)*

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AMEMBASSY LONDON 5992
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 1098
AMEMBASSY OSLO 3236
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 657
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3121
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 1510
AMEMBASSY ROME 1542
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1563
USMISSION NATO 1731
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2819
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 693
US MISSION EC BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 0249

DEPT PASS NSC AND WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT
AND NESSEN
FOR S/PRS
MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
EO 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENARY A.)
SUBJ: MEDIA REACTION KISSINGER VISIT

1. SUMMARY: DANISH TV, RADIO AND PRINCIPAL NEWSPAPERS
GAVE PROMINENT AND BALANCED COVERAGE OF KISSINGER VISIT
YESTERDAY IN COPENHAGEN, BUT WITHOUT IMMEDIATE EDITORIAL
COMMENTS. MOST MEDIA CONCENTRATED ON HIS DENIAL OF ANY
CONNECTION BETWEEN VISIT AND RECENTLY CONCLUDED SOCIAL DEMO-
CRATIC SUMMIT MEETING IN DENMARK, AND ON HIS VIEW OF
COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.
END SUMMARY.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, VANDERHYE FOR NESSEN

RECALLED
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2. TV AND RADIO MAIN NEWSCASTS LAST NIGHT CARRIED FULL TEXT IN ENGLISH WITH DANISH TRANSLATION OF SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT ON COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.

3. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF COMPLETE ARTICLE REPRESENTATIVE DANISH PRESS COVERAGE:

POLITIKEN (INDEPENDENT LEFT OF CENTER) HEADLINES:

(A) "WORLD PROBLEMS DURING STOPOVER.

KISSINGER VISITED COPENHAGEN 4 HOURS AND 25 MINUTES.

TEXT: "THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS LANDED IN COPENHAGEN YESTERDAY WHEN THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER MADE STOPOVER OF FOUR HOURS AND 25 MINUTES ON HIS WAY TO MOSCOW.

"IN STATEMENTS BEFORE DEPARTURE AND DURING HIS STAY IN COPENHAGEN DR. KISSINGER STRESSED US POLICY IN A NUMBER OF FIELDS.

"ANGOLA: A CONTINUATION OF RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WILL LEAD TO A DETERIORATION OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

"LEBANON: THE CIVIL WAR IS A TRAGEDY WHICH CAN DESTROY MIDDLE EAST PROGRESS MADE TO DATE. THE US WILL OPPOSE THE UNILATERAL ATTEMPT OF ANY COUNTRY TO INTERFERE IN THE STRUGGLE.

"EC AND US: RELATIONS ARE EXTREMELY GOOD, AND THE US WILL AS IN THE PAST DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO WHICH CAN PROMOTE EUROPEAN UNITY. DENMARK PLAYS A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE REGARDING EFFORTS TOWARDS THIS UNITY AND IN THE DIALOGUE WITH THE US.

"NATO: WE DO NOT WISH WITH TO FALSIFY OUR VIEWS. IF COMMUNISTS JOIN NATO COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS, THIS WILL HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THAT COUNTRY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, FOR NATO COOPERATION, AND GENERALLY FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. BUT OBVIOUSLY THIS IS A MATTER FOR EACH GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE.

(BL "15 MINUTES WITH MARGRETHE.

"KISSINGER'S TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER ANKER JORGENSEN AND FOREIGN MINISTER K B ANDERSEN INVOLVED THESE AND SOME OTHER ISSUES - AND KISSINGER ALSO HAD TIME FOR A 15 MINUTE VISIT TO QUEEN MARGRETHE.

"KISSINGER AS WELL AS THE DANISH GOVERNMENT STRESSED THAT IT WAS A COINCIDENCE THAT THE VISIT TOOK PLACE THE DAY AFTER THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC SUMMIT IN HELSINGOR. THE DANISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY ISSUED THE SUMMIT MEETING INVITATIONS ON OCTOBER 31; ANKER JORGENSEN WHILE VISITING WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 13 ASKED KISSINGER TO 'DROP IN, IF YOU PASS THIS WAY'. WHICH HE (KISSINGER) DID, YESTERDAY."

"THE CONVERSATIONS ALSO CONCERNED THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC SUMMIT, (WHERE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE A MAIN ISSUE ON THE AGENDA) WITHOUT (ANKER JORGENSEN'S) ACTUALLY REPORTING TO KISSINGER ON THE SUMMIT.

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PAGE 02

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"WHEN TALKS IN MOSCOW ARE ENDED, KISSINGER FLIES TO BRUSSELS WHERE HE GIVES THE NATO COUNCIL A REPORT ON THE ATTEMPT TO REACH A RUSSIAN-AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. A NUMBER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, INCLUDING K B ANDERSEN, WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS MEETING.

(C) "DEMONSTRATIONS

"WHILE PRIME MINISTER ANKER JORGENSEN TALKED WITH HENRY KISSINGER AT CHRISTIANSBORG WHICH WAS STRONGLY GUARDED BY THE POLICE, 2-300 OF THE DANISH LEFT WING DEMONSTRATED OUTSIDE. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS QUIET, AND EVERYONE WENT HOME AFTER SINGING THE 'INTERNATIONALE'." POLITIKEN/PAGE 5, JANUARY 21, 1976.

4. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE (INDEPENDENT CONSERVATIVE) HAD EIGHT-COLUMNS FRONT PAGE, HEADLINED, "POLICE FEARED ATTEMPT ON KISSINGER'S LIFE," AND TWO-COLUMN ON PAGE FIVE, HEADLINED, "KISSINGER: U.S.A. WILL NEVER ALLOW SOVIET UNION TO OBTAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY," WITH THREE-COLUMN PIX OF KISSINGER TOGETHER WITH DANISH PRIME MINISTER AT CHRISTIANSBORG. THE PAPER TOOK NOTE THAT KISSINGER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES P. WADE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND THAT WADE'S PRESENCE MAY BE INTERPRETED AS PENTAGON CONCERN THAT KISSINGER MIGHT MAKE "TOO MANY" CONCESSIONS TO THE RUSSIANS, PARTICULARLY ON THE LOW-FLYING "CRUISE" MISSILES WHICH MIGHT BECOME THE OBJECT OF A "TRADE-OFF" WITH THE LONG-RANGE SOVIET "BACKFIRE" BOMBER.

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INFO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 658
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 494
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 539
AMEMBASSY BONN 2313
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2207
AMEMBASSY LISBON 523
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5993
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 1099
AMEMBASSY OSLO 3237
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3122
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 1511
AMEMBASSY ROME 1543
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1564
USMISSION NATO 1732
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2820
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 694
US MISSION EC BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 0249

5. THE PAPER FINDS KISSINGER'S "SHARP STATEMENT" ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD CONTRASTING WITH THE "LET'S BE NICE TO THE AMERICANS" TONE OF THE SOVIET PRESS PRIOR TO KISSINGER'S VISIT. THE PAPER NOTES THEIR PRAVDA COMMENTATOR, VITALIJ KORIONOV, ASSURED HIS READERS A FEW DAYS AGO THAT THE SOVIET UNION "IS FILLED WITH A DEEP DETERMINATION TO DO ITS UTMOST TO FIND A SOLUTION TO A LIMITATION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE" AND THAT "THE SOVIET PEOPLE CONSIDER AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT GOAL FOR THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE".

6. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE ALSO FOUND THE SECRETARY'S COMMENT ON THE CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO OF POSSIBLE COMMUNIST ADMISSION TO GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE AS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, VANDERHYE FOR NESSEN

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AT THE JA, 17-19 SOCIALIST SUMMIT MEETING "EVEN THOUGH (KISSINGER) CAREFULLY POINTD OUT THAT HIS VISIT TO COPENHAGEN ON THE FACE OF IT HAD NO CONNECTION WITH THE HELSINGOR SUMMIT."

7. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE WAS THE ONLY PAPER DISCLOSING THAT THE EXTREMELY TIGHT SECURITY SURROUNDING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT WAS BASED ON POLICE INFORMATION ALLEGING THAT COPENHAGEN (AND THE SECRETARY) WOULD BE THE TARGET OF TERRORIST ACTION BY "ONE OF THE MORE DANGEROUS GROUPS".

8. INFORMATION (INDEPENDENT LEFT WING) CARRIED THREE COLUMNS ON PAGE 3, HEADLINED, "KISSINGER: COOPERATION WITH COMMUNISTS WILL HAVE CONSEQUENCES" AND TWO COLUMNS SAME PAGE, HEADLINED, "ANKER J AND DR K AGREE ON COMMUNISTS." THE PAPER BELIEVES THAT KISSINGER WANTED TO BE INFORMED ON THE SOCIALIST SUMMIT MEETING "AND THIS CAN BE SEEN AS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF HIS LATEST STATEMENTS REGARDING THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE AND THE POSSIBLE AMERICAN REACTION TO COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF EUROPEAN CABINETS." THE PAPER ADDS: "KISSINGER RECENTLY HAD TALKS WITH THE FRENCH SOCIALIST LEADER FRANCOIS MITTERAND, WHO, AT THE SUMMIT MEETING, MADE REFERENCES TO A SOMEWHAT CONCERNED DR. KISSINGER, AND THE HELSINGOR SUMMIT CONFIRMED DR. KISSINGER'S CONCERN (REGARDING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE)." THE PAPER ALSO SAYS THAT PRIMIN ANKER JORGENSEN IN A BRIEFING FOLLOWING HIS TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY'S VIEW ON COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION: "MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATO ALLIANCE IMPLIES A GOVERNMENT THAT ALSO SUPPORTS THE ALLIANCE AND THAT WOULD NORMALLY EXCLUDE COMMUNISTS FROM GOVERNMENT FORMATIONS."

9. INFORMATION FURTHER CITES JORGENSEN'S STATEMENT THAT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE NATO COUNTRIES, AND THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS DECLARED ITSELF IN SUPPORT OF CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMON MARKET AND IN NATO, HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS DECLARATION WITHOUT A LOT OF RESERVATIONS "BASED ON MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE COMMUNISTS". INFORMATION ALSO REPORTS THAT ANKER JORGENSEN (IN THE SAME BRIEFING) SAID THAT HE HAD NOT GIVEN THE SECRETARY AN ACTUAL REPORT ON THE SOCIALIST SUMMIT, BUT ONLY SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE MEETING. ANKER JORGENSEN SHARPLY DENIED THAT HE HAD CONSULTED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON THE FORM AND TIMING OF THE MEETING. SIMILARLY, THE PAPER SAYS FONMIN K B ANDERSEN REJECTED RUMORS OF AMERICAN CRITICISM OF PREVIOUS DANISH SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA, "WE WERE QUITE IN LINE WITH KISSINGER IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA", HE SAID.



10. AKTUELT (SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT), CARRIED ONE COLUMN ON FRONT PAGE, HEADLINES, "KISSINGER THREATENS: SAY NO TO COMMUNISTS", PLUS FIVE COLUMNS PAGE NINE, HEADLINES, "STRONG WARNING FROM KISSINGER TO U.S. ALLIES IN EUROPE". THE PAPER ADDS UNDER THIS HEADLINE THAT DR. KISSINGER DID NOT EXPECT A NEW ROUND IN THE STEP-BY-STEP DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST SOON, AS FIRST THE RESULT OF THE RECENT ROUND MUST BE IMPLEMENTED. HE SAID THAT DETENTE WILL BE THE MAIN SUBJECT TO BE DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW, STATING THAT IN THE END IT WOULD LEAD TO CONFLICT IF THE GREAT POWERS, REGARDLESS OF EFFORTS AT DEENTE, PURSUE A POLICY FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING ADVANTAGES IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE WORLD. AKTUELT ALSO STRESSES THE EXTENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES.

11. BORSER (BUSINESS AND FINANCE PAPER) HAD A FOUR-PAGE COLUMN ON PAGE SIX, HEADLINED, "KISSINGER SAYS UNEQUIVOCAL" NO TO PROTECTIONISM". THE PAPER SAYS THAT PRESIDENT FORD OPPOSES PROTECTIONISM BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD, A POINT OF VIEW WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER NOW CONFIRMS IN COPENHAGEN. "THE QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER IT WILL BE FORD KISSINGER OR THE PROTECTIONISTS WHO WILL SUCCEED WHEN THE MATTER OF LIMITATIONS ON THE IMPORT OF STEEL IS DEBATED BY CONGRESS."

12. JYLLANDS POSTEN (INDEPENDENT CONSERVATIVE), LARGEST REGIONAL PAPER, CARRIED THREE-COLUMN STORY PAGE THREE, HEADLINED, "KISSINGER WARNS AGAINST COMMUNIST IN EUROPE'S GOVERNMENTS." EKSTRA BLADET (SENSATIONALIST TABLOID) REPORTED PRIME MINISTER JORGENSEN'S EVENING BRIEFING FOR DANISH PRESS. TWO COLUMN HEADLINE, PAGE 12: "ANKER J ANNOYED WITH PRESS: (KISSINGER DID NOT ASK ME TO MOBILIZE A UNITED EUROPEAN FRONT AGAINST COMMUNISM)". ACCORDING TO PAPER, MR JORGENSEN ASKED DANISH JOURNALISTS: "YOU ARE COMPLETELY OUT OF YOUR MINDS IF YOU BELIEVE THAT I PHONED KISSINGER TO ASK WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO GATHER SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LEADERS FROM ALL OVER EUROPE TO MEET IN DENMARK?"

13. LAND AND FOLK (COMMUNIST) WAS FAIRLY STRAIGHT-FORWARD IN ITS BRIEF, PAGE-THREE COVERAGE OF THE VISIT ITSELF. A SEPARATE STORY, HOWEVER, ON THE PAPER'S BACK PAGE CONCERNED THE DEMONSTRATION SPONSORED BY THE RADICAL LEFT AGAINST THE SECRETARY'S VISIT.
DEAN
BT



Ron: f. y. i

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FOR FUNSETH FROM TRATTNER
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: CHICAGO TRIBUNE CORRESPONDENT IN MOSCOW

NO. 12

NESSEN TELEPHONED ME THURSDAY AFTERNOON TO RELAY COMPLAINT FROM CHICAGO TRIBUNE BUREAU CHIEF JIM SQUIRES THAT TRIBUNE MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT JAMES JACKSON HAD BEEN "EXCLUDED" FROM BRIEFING APPARENTLY GIVEN BY SONNENFELDT AT END OF DAY THURSDAY. SAME COMPLAINT MADE BY TRIBUNE COLUMNIST FRANK STARR TO BILL SHINN. STARR SAID THAT JACKSON'S EXCLUSION WAS BY SONNENFELDT PERSONALLY. STARR TOLD SHINN HE IS PLANNING TO INCLUDE THIS IN HIS TRIBUNE COLUMN UNLESS HE COULD HEAR SONNENFELDT'S EXPLANATION.

I TALKED TO STARR, WHO AGREES TO HOLD OFF PENDING RESPONSE FROM US UP TO NOON FRIDAY, WASHINGTON TIME.

ADVISE SOONEST.

ROBINSON
BT

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SDD, VANDERHYE

PSN:030262 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:023/01:02Z DTG:230033Z JAN 76

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Op 12/18/84



— Washington Post
Sunday, March 7 [1970]

How Kissinger

Met the Arabs

(And Vice Versa)

By Edward R. F. Sheehan

NEW YORK TIMES
Monday - April 12

31M

Mr. Ford's Cover-Up

EXCERPTS FROM THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE
DAILY BRIEFING, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 12, 1976

Q: Do you have any statement on the movement by the Secretary from the White House of files, private files --

A: Yes, Henry. I'd like to make two or three points on that. You're asking a question in reference to the article by Mr. Safire this morning?

Q: Right.

A: First, all memoranda of conversation or other diplomatic exchanges in which Sec. Kissinger was involved as Asst. to the President are now and have always been in the White House files. There are no other memoranda of conversation or diplomatic exchanges.

Secondly, this applies as well, of course, to memoranda of conversation with the Soviets. Specifically, copies of all memoranda of conversation with Amb. Dobrynin or other senior Soviet officials were sent to the President before being put into the White House files. There are no other notes or documents on exchanges with the Soviets or indeed any other diplomatic exchanges with other governments.

Q: John, that doesn't entirely address the issue of the distribution of these things. The memcons are kept, according to the statement, in the White House files and were shown to the President. Was there any limited distribution of relevant discussions with Soviet officials, for example, to the Intelligence community, or to statutory members of the NSC, which would include the Secretary of Defense?

A: I'm not able to go beyond what I've stated on this subject.

Q: Could you take the question?

A: I can take the question.

Q: Is that statement cleared by the Secretary?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Could I add to that: including also the Secretary of State before September, 1973? (Added to taken question)

A: Noted.

Q: Does your reference to memcons and documents also cover tape recordings?

A: I'm really not able to go beyond what I've said.

After the briefing the spokesman responded to the following question:

Q: Does the statement cover tape recordings?

A: Yes it does. There are no tapes of telephone conversations in existence. Any conversation of substance with Amb. Dobrynin or any other senior diplomatic official was the subject of a memorandum to the President and would therefore be in the White House files.

After the briefing the spokesman was also asked the following question:

Q: Did the Secretary move any of his files or records to Governor Rockefeller's estate at Pocantico Hills?

A: Yes. When the Secretary was considering resigning from the Government, he moved his Harvard files and personal papers covering the years before 1969 -- which he had brought down to Washington from Boston during the student riots in 1969 -- plus some other personal papers, to a vault at Governor Rockefeller's estate. No documents, memoranda or other records were removed from the White House

files. When the Secretary later in the year decided he would stay in the Government, he moved all of those papers back to the White House. Everything taken up to Governor Rockefeller's estate was returned in the spring of 1973 when the documents were brought back to the White House.

April 12, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DPC 90

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION NEWS BRIEFING
THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1976, 1:15 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FUNSETH: I have the following announcements:

The Statement by the Secretary before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning at 10:30 on the United States and Africa, which I think most of us have heard, is available in the office.

We also have a press release entitled "The United States and United Kingdom Reach Understanding on the Acceptance of Air Charters".

We have an address by Dr. Ikle, Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the Conference on Nuclear Energy and World Order. The title of his address is "Illusions and Realities about International Approaches to Nuclear Energy."

And finally, I would like to announce that the Secretary regrets very much that he is going to be unable to hold his news conference tomorrow as he had hoped. His schedule just doesn't permit its being scheduled tomorrow. He has a very crowded day. He is preparing for the visit

of President Giscard d'Estaing and his visit to Europe next week, and he has appointments including Ambassadors Dobrynin and Saito.

Q Will there be a news conference before he goes to Europe?

A He still hopes so, but I must say, with President Giscard here, it is not a likely possibility.

Q Do you have the times with the ambassadors, when he is meeting with them?

A I do not have the times of the two ambassadorial appointments, no.

Any questions?

Q I see two Americans have left South Viet-Nam and are arriving in Bangkok. Have they said anything publicly about this?

A There was an American citizen and his wife, named Randolph, who arrived in Bangkok yesterday. I do not have anything more on it than that. He is an American who apparently had lived in Viet-Nam for some time -- several years -- and the Vietnamese have allowed him to leave.

I do not have any home town on him, though;

I think he had been overseas for over ten years.

Q Have they said anything about their general policy towards --

A No, they have not said anything. I think the Red Cross was helpful in getting through.

I think his first name is Charles -- no, I'm sorry -- it is Clifford W. Randolph -- and he and his wife and daughter arrived in Bangkok aboard a French aircraft on May 12th.

That is all I have.

Anything else?

Q Will you give us the itinerary of the Secretary's visit to Europe?

A We have announced that and posted it, I believe.

He is leaving Wednesday morning for the NATO Ministerial Meeting. His present plans are to go from Oslo to Stockholm on the weekend and then visit Luxembourg for a day, and then on to London for two days, for the CENTO Meeting -- then returning here a week from --

Q When will he be back here?

A A week from Wednesday.

We will give you the exact dates in the
announcement.

Q Thank you.

[The briefing was concluded at 1:17 p.m.]

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STATE FOR S/PRS AND EUR/CE; DEPT PASS NSC FOR MR
SNOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. NE EN; USIA FOR IOP/M;
IPB; ISS; IEU; FS/STRICKER, NEW YORK
EO 11652; NA
TAGS: GW OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: FUNSETH PRESS BRIEFING, HOTEL SONNENHOF,
GRAFENAU, JUNE 24, 1976, 12110 HRS

1. THIS MORNING THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA,
MR VORSTER, AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE
UNITED STATES, DR KISSINGER, HAD DISCUSSIONS IN
DETAIL ON ALL ASPECTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE PRIME
MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY MET FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF AT
THE SAME TIME THE TWO DELEGATIONS MET, THEN THE TWO
DELEGATIONS JOINED THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY
AND WE MET FOR ANOTHER HOUR. THESE TALKS WILL CONTINUE
FOR AN HOUR AT A WORKING LUNCH. THE PRIME MINISTER
ON HIS PART WILL GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO WHAT WAS
DISCUSSED IN THESE TWO DAYS AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WILL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. THEY WILL KEEP
IN TOUCH AND FOLLOW UP ON THESE MATTERS. THAT'S ALL.
I HAVE, MR FOURIE, DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING?
FOURIE: I THINK THAT COVERS IT.
QUESTION: ARE THERE ANY FURTHER MEETINGS PLANNED?
FUNSETH: AT THIS POINT WE ARE GOING TO KEEP IN TOUCH
AND FOLLOW UP ON THESE MATTERS.
QUESTION: AT WHAT LEVEL WILL THE FOLLOW-UP BE?

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, VANDERHUYE FOR NESSEN

RECALLED
P8N1024716 PAGE 01 TOR:176/14:19Z DTG:241330Z JUN 76

FUNSETH: IT WILL BE AT THE LEVEL OF THESE TALKS.
QUESTION: IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER MEETING?
FUNSETH: WHAT WE ARE SAYING TODAY IS THAT THE SECRETARY
FIRST HAS TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER
IS RETURNING TO HIS COUNTRY TO STUDY THESE MATTERS, AND
WE WILL KEEP IN TOUCH.
FOURIE: AND FOLLOW UP THE MATTER.
FUNSETH: AND FOLLOW UP ON THESE MATTERS AS I SAID.
QUESTION: WILL THERE BE A COMMUNIQUE?
FUNSETH: NO, THIS IS ALL WE WILL HAVE TO SAY.
QUESTION: WHEN YOU SAY THAT THE TALKS WILL BE CONTINUED
AT THIS LEVEL DOES THAT MEAN THE PRIME MINISTER - (INAUDIBLE) -
FUNSETH: I SAID THEY WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ONE
ANOTHER AND FOLLOW UP ON THESE MATTERS.
QUESTION: I THOUGHT YOU SAID KEEP IN TOUCH "AT THIS LEVEL"?
FUNSETH: NO, THEY WILL KEEP IN TOUCH AND FOLLOW UP
THESE MATTERS.
QUESTION: WILL THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAKE ANY PRESS
CONFERENCE IN FUERSTENFELDBRUCK? AND GIVE MORE DETAILS
ABOUT THE TALKS?
FUNSETH: WELL, I AM NOT GOING TO ANTICIPATE DR.
KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCES, WHICH WILL FOLLOW HIS
MEETING WITH MR GENSCHER, IT WILL BE AT THREE O'CLOCK.
QUESTION: WILL HE BE ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS ON THESE TALKS?
FUNSETH: AT THE NEWS CONFERENCE, ANYONE CAN ASK HIM
ANY QUESTION THEY WISH TO ASK, BUT I THINK THIS IS IN
GENERAL WHAT WE WANT TO SAY, THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
BT

RECALLED

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PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:170/14:19Z

DTG:1241330Z JUN 76

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

RON NESSEN

Ron Nessen

→ NESSEN

Ron - good reading!
Les

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E.O. 116521 N/A

TAGS: MASS, IR

SUBJECT: F-16 HEARINGS

1. UNDER SECRETARY HABIB WILL APPEAR BEFORE THE SFRC SUBCOMMITTEE SEPTEMBER 16 ON F-16 SALE. TEXT OF STATEMENT PREPARED FOR HIM FOLLOWS IN PARA TWO. SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPTEMBER 14 VOTED DOWN ALL PROXHIRE AND NELSON RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL EXCEPT FOR IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. ATHERTON WILL TESTIFY NEXT WEEK ON SAUDI ARABIA BEFORE SAME SUBCOMMITTEE AND HABIB WILL APPEAR BEFORE HIRC SUBCOMMITTEE ON ALL LOAS.

2. MR. CHAIRMAN:

MEMBERS OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE:

I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY BECAUSE THE MANNER IN WHICH WE RESPOND TO THE QUESTION BEFORE US--THE SALE OF THE F-16S TO IRAN--HAS VERY SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM IMPORTANCE. MY STATEMENT IS LONGER THAN I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED, BUT THIS SALE HAS TO BE PLACED NOT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH

IRAN AND OF OUR PERSIAN GULF POLICY, BUT ALSO IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF HOW THIS GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO DEAL WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE WORLD IN THE FUTURE.

THE FIRST POINT I WISH TO EMPHASIZE, MR. CHAIRMAN, IS THAT OUR ARMS SALE POLICY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN IS FULLY CONSIS-

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HYLAND, MCFARLANE, JANKA

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TENT WITH--IS A LOGICAL PART OF--THE PARTICULARLY CLOSE TIES WE HAVE HAD WITH IRAN FOR THREE DECADES. THESE TIES HAVE BEEN SUPPORTED AND FOSTERED BY THREE DEMOCRATIC AND THREE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTS, REFLECTING A BROAD, NON-PARTISAN CONSENSUS WHICH THIS ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY BELIEVES SHOULD NOT BE UNDERMINED.

THE REASONS FOR THIS CONSENSUS OF THIRTY YEARS' DURATION ARE CLEAR. IRAN HAS A UNIQUE GEO-POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE, AND ITS LEADERSHIP HAS PURSUED POLICIES WHICH HAVE GENERALLY BEEN COMPATIBLE WITH OUR OWN. IRAN IS THE LAND BRIDGE BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE EAST, CONTROLLING IMPORTANT AIRLINES AND OVERLAND CONNECTIONS. IT ALSO HAS A LONG COAST ON THE PERSIAN GULF, THE NATIONS OF WHICH PRODUCE 46.5 PERCENT OF THE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS CONSUMED IN THE FREE WORLD AND SOME 58 PERCENT OF THE OIL IMPORTS OF THE MAJOR FREE WORLD INDUSTRIALIZED STATES. IRAN HAS A BORDER OF ABOUT 1,200 MILES WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAS TWICE OCCUPIED LARGE PARTS OF NORTHERN IRAN SINCE WORLD WAR I. IRAN'S OTHER LONG BORDERS ARE WITH IRAQ, TURKEY, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN EACH OF WHICH IS OF SPECIAL GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND WITH TWO OF WHICH--TURKEY AND PAKISTAN--WE HAVE A SPECIAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AS, INDEED, WE DO ALSO WITH IRAN. THIS RARE COMBINATION OF FACTORS MAKES IT EASY TO COMPREHEND THE ENORMOUS BENEFIT TO THE FREE WORLD IN HAVING A RELIABLE ALLY IN THIS STRATEGIC LOCATION.

LET ME RECAPITULATE BRIEFLY A FEW OF THE HIGH SPOTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. IN 1946, PRESIDENT TRUMAN CONSIDERED IRAN SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT FOR US TO USE OUR FULL INFLUENCE TO SECURE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREAS IT WAS OCCUPYING IN NORTHERN IRAN. AT THAT TIME THE SOVIETS WERE ENCOURAGING SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS AND WERE DIRECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDIGENOUS COMMUNIST PARTY THROUGHOUT IRAN. IN 1949, PRESIDENT TRUMAN AGAIN TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO INCLUDE IRAN IN OUR POINT FOUR PROGRAM. IN 1950 WE CONCLUDED A SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT. FROM THAT TIME THROUGH THE LATE 1960S, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE WERE MAJOR ELEMENTS IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN AND DEVELOP IRAN. FOR TWO FULL DECADES, CONGRESS SUPPORTED

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAN TOTALING 2 BILLION DOLLARS, AND OUR MILITARY AID PROGRAM REACHED A FIGURE OF 1.4 BILLION DOLLARS. BOTH TOTALS INCLUDE GRANT AID AND LOANS, OF WHICH OVER ONE BILLION DOLLARS HAS BEEN REPAID.

IN 1959, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER CONCLUDED WITH IRAN AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT IN WHICH HE PLEDGED THAT THE UNITED STATES



WILL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, "TAKE SUCH APPROPRIATE ACTION, INCLUDING THE USE OF ARMED FORCES, AS MAY BE AGREED UPON" TO COUNTER DIRECT OR INDIRECT COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAN. FOR THE PAST 20 YEARS, WE HAVE WORKED SUCCESSFULLY TOGETHER WITH IRAN IN CENTO. THESE LINKS ARE IMPRESSIVE AND WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS ARE UNEQUALLED BY OUR TIES WITH ANY OTHER COUNTRY LOCATED BETWEEN NATO ON ONE SIDE AND OUR CLOSEST FRIENDS IN THE FAR EAST ON THE OTHER.

PRESIDENTS KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ESSENTIALLY CONTINUED OUR ESTABLISHED POLICIES OF CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH IRAN THROUGHOUT THEIR ADMINISTRATIONS. THE GROWING STRENGTH AND VITALITY OF IRAN--ITS ABILITY TO STAND ON ITS OWN FEET--BECAME EVIDENT IN THE MID-1960S, AND ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE WERE PHASED OUT BY THE END OF THE DECADE. THE OBJECTIVE OF HELPING A KEY COUNTRY ACHIEVE SELF-RELIANCE, WHICH FOUR PRESIDENTS HAD SHARED, HAD LARGELY BEEN ACHIEVED.

MR. CHAIRMAN, MUCH HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT THE DECISION OF 1972 TO RECOGNIZE THAT IRAN IN GENERAL WOULD MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS ON WHAT MILITARY HARDWARE IT WOULD PURCHASE FROM US. BRIEF COMMENT ON THIS DECISION MAY BE HELPFUL. BY THAT TIME (1972), IRAN, FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES, WAS ABLE TO START A PROGRAM OF MILITARY MODERNIZATION--TO BUILD ON THE FOUNDATION WHICH WE HAD HELPED ESTABLISH IN THE PURSUIT OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. YOU WILL RECALL THAT AT GUAM IN 1969 THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT HENCEFORTH THE UNITED STATES WOULD EXPECT KEY REGIONAL COUNTRIES TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR AREA DEFENSE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH SUCH COUNTRIES. ALSO, IN THE LATE '60S, IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF AND THEREBY END ITS SECURITY AND STABILIZING ROLE THERE. THE UNITED STATES CERTAINLY WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO REPLACE BRITISH MILITARY FORCES IN THIS VITAL AREA. WE CONCLUDED THAT ONLY THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES--WITH IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA SHOWING THE WAY--COULD TAKE ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY, AND THAT THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT THEY FACED, AND THEIR JUDGMENT OF WHAT THEY

NEEDED TO DO THE JOB, MUST BE GIVEN SERIOUS WEIGHT IN RESPONDING TO THEIR ARMS REQUESTS. BOTH IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA HAVE ACCEPTED THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

THIS WAS THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT OF THE 1972 DECISION, BUT, AS I HAVE EMPHASIZED, THE RELATIONSHIP IS AN OLD ONE WHICH TOOK ON NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIGHT OF THE POLITICAL,



MILITARY AND STRATEGIC REALITIES OF THE EARLY PART OF THIS DECADE. THE 1972 DECISION AND OUR SALES ACTIONS SINCE THEN HAVE BEEN A CONTINUATION OF POLICY, NOT A DIVERGENCE FROM IT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, HISTORICAL TIES AND GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES, WHICH I HAVE SO FAR TOUCHED UPON BRIEFLY, ARE ONLY PART OF THE RELATIONSHIP WE AND IRAN HAVE FORGED TOGETHER. IRANIAN AND AMERICAN LEADERS HAVE GENERALLY SEEN OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS AS PARALLEL, AT TIMES CONGRUENT, AND WE SHARE MANY OBJECTIVES. IN PARTICULAR, WE BOTH ASPIRE FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE VITAL MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF AREAS SO THAT THE LEADERS CAN CONCENTRATE ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BETTERMENT OF THEIR PEOPLES, AND SO THAT LESS FRIENDLY POWERS AND FORCES WILL HAVE LESS OPPORTUNITY TO MEDDLE TO THE DETRIMENT OF OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

IRAN HAS BEEN PLAYING A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, AND I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION JUST A FEW EXAMPLES OF ITS ACTIONS.

-- BORDER PROBLEMS WERE RESOLVED WITH IRAQ IN 1975-76 AFTER MANY YEARS OF FRICTION AND NUMEROUS CLASHES.

-- IRAN GAVE UP ITS HISTORICAL CLAIM TO BAHRAIN IN THE MID-1960S.

-- VARIOUS MEDIAN LINE CONTROVERSIES WITH OTHER STATES HAVE BEEN SETTLED PEACEFULLY.

-- AT THE REQUEST OF OMAN, IRAN GAVE ARMED ASSISTANCE TO PUT DOWN A REBELLION IN OMAN'S WESTERN PROVINCES WHICH WAS DIRECTLY AIDED BY THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN, WHICH IN TURN WAS RECEIVING LARGE SOVIET, EAST GERMAN AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE. IRAN TOOK THIS ACTION BECAUSE UNFRIENDLY OR IRRESPONSIBLE FORCES LOCATED ON THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ COULD INTERDICT VITAL OIL SUPPLIES.

-- IRAN HAS BEEN ASSIDUOUSLY WORKING TO SETTLE AN OLD PROBLEM WITH AFGHANISTAN OVER DISTRIBUTION OF THE WATERS OF THE HELMAND RIVER AND HAS COMMITTED SUBSTANTIAL SUMS TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN.

-- IRAN HAS EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL AID FROM IRAN.

-- EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS THE SOLID COOPERATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA--THE TWO PILLARS



OF OUR POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF. NO ARMS RACE, NO DANGEROUS COMPETITION HAS DEVELOPED FOR THEY ALSO SHARE THE SAME BASIC OBJECTIVES OF PEACE, STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

ON THE BASIS OF ITS GROWING STRENGTH AND ITS SOLID RECORD OF RESPONSIBILITY, IRAN HAS ASSUMED AN INCREASINGLY KEY ROLE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS BEYOND ITS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS AND HAS BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE OF OUR OBJECTIVES. IRAN HAS EXCELLENT TIES WITH SYRIA, JORDAN AND EGYPT. IT HAS HELPED EGYPT IN PARTICULAR COPE WITH ITS SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. IT HAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED OUR EFFORTS IN PURSUIT OF A NEGOTIATED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND HAS SUPPORTED MODERATE ARAB LEADERS WHO HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO THAT GOAL. AT THE SAME TIME, IRAN MAINTAINS CLOSE TIES WITH ISRAEL AND DID NOT JOIN THE OIL EMBARGO IMPOSED DURING THE 1973 WAR. TO ITS EAST, IRAN HAS QUIETLY ENCOURAGED THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA.

THUS, MR. CHAIRMAN, IRAN TODAY IS AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF A MAJOR ALLY BOTH ABLE AND WILLING TO STAND ON ITS OWN FEET, PAY ITS OWN WAY, AND USE ITS INFLUENCE IN A HIGHLY RESPONSIBLE MANNER.

THE REASONS, THEN, FOR OUR APPRECIATION OF THE IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE CLEAR. I WOULD LIKE ALSO TO CITE SEVERAL HIGHLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS RECENTLY MADE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER:

"THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ASSUME ALL THE RESPONSIBILITIES. UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS WE ESPECIALLY VALUE THOSE FRIENDS WHO ARE PREPARED TO MAKE THEIR OWN EFFORTS FOR THEIR ECONOMIC ADVANCE AND WHO ARE PREPARED TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR OWN DEFENSE. AS THE RECENT PERIOD

HAS MADE AMPLY CLEAR, THE MIDDLE EAST, ALWAYS A PIVOT OF WORLD AFFAIRS, HAS BECOME ONE OF THE POTENTIALLY MOST TENSE AREAS OF THE GLOBE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE STABILITY OF IRAN, THE COMMITMENT OF IRAN TO ITS SECURITY, IS A MAJOR FACTOR FOR GLOBAL PEACE AND A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE STABILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST."

SPEAKING DIRECTLY TO THE QUESTION OF REGIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY HAS SAID: "ON ALL MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLICIES OF IRAN HAVE BEEN PARALLEL AND THEREFORE MUTUALLY REINFORCING. THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE REPRESENTED THE GREATEST THREAT



TO THE SECURITY OF IRAN ARE ALSO THOSE COUNTRIES WHOSE DOMINATION OF IRAN WOULD HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER OR ON THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER, AND WOULD THEREFORE HAVE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES. IN ALL THE YEARS OF OUR COOPERATION, IRAN HAS NEVER GONE TO WAR OR THREATENED TO GO TO WAR FOR ANY PURPOSE WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PARALLEL TO OUR OWN, AND THIS COOPERATION HAS BEEN ALL THE MORE SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT GREW OUT OF A LEADERSHIP THAT IS CLEARLY INDEPENDENT, THAT PURSUES ITS CONCEPTION OF ITS OWN NATIONAL INTEREST BASED ON A HISTORY OF 2500 YEARS OF IRANIAN POLICY, AND THIS IS WHAT HAS MADE THE COOPERATION ALL THE MORE EFFECTIVE."

FINALLY, THE SECRETARY HAS POINTED OUT "NOT OUT OF SENTIMENTALITY...BUT OUT OF A CALCULATION OF OUR OWN NATIONAL AND GLOBAL INTERESTS--JUST AS IRANIAN POLICY IS BASED ON ITS CALCULATION OF ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS--THERE HAS DEVELOPED A PARALLELISM OF VIEWS ON MANY KEY PROBLEMS THAT HAS MADE OUR COOPERATION A MATTER THAT IS IN THE PROFOUND NATIONAL INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES."

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN FOCUSING ON MILITARY SALES TODAY, LET US NOT LOSE SIGHT OF SOME OTHER KEY CONSIDERATIONS:

-- PETROLEUM FROM IRAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE ECONOMIES OF OUR ALLIES AND GREATLY IMPORTANT TO OUR OWN. IRAN PROVIDES OVER 8 PERCENT OF OUR PETROLEUM IMPORTS, OVER 16 PERCENT OF THAT FOR WESTERN EUROPE AND ALMOST 24 PERCENT FOR JAPAN. WHEN THAT FIGURE IS ADDED TO ALL OF THE PERSIAN GULF PRODUCTION, THE TOTALS BECOME MORE THAN 64 PERCENT OF ALL PETROLEUM IMPORTS FOR WESTERN EUROPE, OVER 72 PERCENT FOR JAPAN, AND NEARLY 26 PERCENT FOR THE UNITED STATES. THESE SIMPLE FIGURES TELL PRECISELY THE REGION'S CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO US. THEY CANNOT BE IGNORED.

-- LET ME STRESS AGAIN THAT IRAN DID NOT JOIN THE OIL EMBARGO IN 1973-74. MOREOVER, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THAT IT WILL NOT JOIN EMBARGOES IN THE FUTURE FOR POLITICAL REASONS. AT A TIME WHEN OUR OIL IMPORTS CONSTITUTE OVER 40 PERCENT OF OUR CONSUMPTION OF OIL, THIS INDEED IS SIGNIFICANT.

-- IRAN IS NOW IN THE MIDST OF AN UNPRECEDENTED PERIOD OF ECONOMIC GROWTH. ITS GOAL IS NO LESS THAN TO EQUAL THE ECONOMIC POWER OF AN EQUIVALENT WESTERN EUROPEAN NATION WITHIN APPROXIMATELY THE NEXT 25 YEARS. IRAN'S GNP HAS GROWN FROM 6.9 BILLION DOLLARS IN 1966 TO 53.2 BILLION DOL-



LARS IN 1976. ITS PER CAPITA INCOME HAS JUMPED FROM 272 DOLLARS IN 1966 TO 1600 DOLLARS THIS YEAR.

-- THE LONG-STANDING ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN ARE ESSENTIAL TO THIS PROCESS, WITH AMERICAN COMPANIES PLAYING A KEY ROLE. IRAN'S NON-MILITARY--I REPEAT, NON-MILITARY--PURCHASES FROM THE UNITED STATES DURING THE PERIOD 1975-80 ARE PROJECTED TO BE 22-23 BILLION DOLLARS, GIVING US A BALANCE-OF-TRADE SURPLUS OF 6-7 BILLION DOLLARS.

-- ALONG WITH LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC GROWTH, IRAN'S POLITICAL STABILITY HAS INCREASED MANYFOLD. ONE PRODUCT OF THIS COMBINATION OF GREATER WEALTH AND POLITICAL STABILITY HAS BEEN A VAST INCREASE IN DOMESTIC PROGRAMS TO BETTER THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS OF ALL IRANIANS

THUS, AS COMPARED WITH THE COUNTRY OF 1948 WITH WHICH OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BEGAN, THE IRAN OF 1976 IS NO LONGER PRECARIOUS AND WEAK. IT IS INSTEAD UNQUESTIONABLY A COUNTRY WELL ALONG THE ROAD TOWARD A PLACE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE WORLD'S MEDIUM SIZED NATIONS. THIS HAS BEEN OUR OBJECTIVE--A POLICY SHARED BY BOTH OUR POLITICAL PARTIES. LOOKING AHEAD, IRAN HAS EVERY INTENTION TO DEVELOP THE FULL POTENTIAL REQUIRED TO DEFEND ITSELF AND TO BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF ITS REGION.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE NOW TO ADDRESS MYSELF TO THE SPECIFIC MATTER BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE. THE LETTER OF OFFER IS FOR 160 F-16S, WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED TO IRAN COMMENCING IN THE EARLY 1980S AND CONCLUDING ABOUT 4 YEARS LATER. A KEY REASON, MR. CHAIRMAN, FOR OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THIS SALE IS THAT WHAT WE ARE CONSIDERING IS A CONTINUATION INTO THE NEXT TWO DECADES OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN THAT WE HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST THREE DECADES. THE F-16 IS THE AIRCRAFT OF THE 1980S AND 1990S.

LEAD TIME ON MODERN EQUIPMENT IS LENGTHY AND IRAN'S DECISION TO ORDER NOW IS A PRUDENT STEP IN ITS LONG-TERM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY A FEW OF THE CONCERNS OF THE COMMITTEE AS REFLECTED IN THE RECENT STAFF STUDY:

-- IN REGARD TO THE REVIEW PROCESS, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAVE THOROUGHLY AND INTENSIVELY REVIEWED THIS MATTER AND THAT THE APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICIALS OF OUR GOVERNMENT HAVE APPROVED.



-- TO ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WAS THOROUGHLY INFORMED, A BRIEFING TEAM FROM THE U.S. AIR FORCE HAS BEEN TO IRAN TO LAY BEFORE THE RELEVANT IRANIAN OFFICIALS EXTENSIVE DETAILS ABOUT THE COSTS OF THE PLANES, INCLUDING TRAINING, SUPPORT, LOGISTICS, FACILITIES, ET CETERA, THE DELIVERY SCHEDULE, AND THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN PURCHASING THE PLANE AT THIS EARLY STAGE OF PRODUCTION.

INTERNAL U.S. GOVERNMENT DELIBERATIONS AND OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE IRANIANS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS ADD UP TO A CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF THIS PROPOSED SALE. THEY ARE NOT THE ACTIONS OF A TRAVELING SALESMAN. THEY ARE INSTEAD THE STUDIED RESPONSES OF A NATION INTERESTED IN ITS OWN WELFARE AND IN SUPPORTING AN ALLY WHO ADDS TO THAT WELFARE.

-- MR. CHAIRMAN, CONCERNING THE NUMBERS OF AMERICANS IN IRAN, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT AS IN THE CASE OF THE F-16 ITSELF, THE PRESENCE OF A RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBER THERE MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ITS CONTEXT. WE HAVE A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN IRAN BECAUSE WE HAVE IMPORTANT NATIONAL INTERESTS THERE.

WE REVIEW WITH THE PRIVATE AMERICAN CONCERNS THEIR CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN. WE ENSURE THAT CONTRACTOR OR OFFICIAL AMERICAN PERSONNEL ARE KEPT OUT OF POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AREAS OR PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SITUATIONS. WE AGREE WITH THE SHAH'S RECENT COMMENT THAT IF IRAN SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES, THE AMERICANS IN IRAN WOULD BE COMPLETELY FREE NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED. RATHER THAN BEING HOSTAGES, AS SOME HAVE SUGGESTED, THESE AMERICANS IN IRAN, IN CONNECTION WITH THE F-16S OR ANY OTHER U.S. PROGRAMS, WOULD BE THERE IN PURSUIT OF A CAREFULLY CONSIDERED U.S. POLICY. THAT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE THAT I CAN IMAGINE.

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ONE MORE POINT IN CONNECTION WITH THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS PROPOSED SALE. THE SALE OF 160 F-16S TO IRAN IS GOING TO REQUIRE REGULAR AND HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION OVER THE NEXT THREE TO FOUR YEARS AS WE APPROACH THE TIME WHEN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF THE AIRCRAFT WOULD ACTUALLY BE DELIVERED TO IRAN. ALONG WITH THE RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS IN THE PENTAGON, WE WILL GIVE THAT ATTENTION IN FULL RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. WE WILL, AT ANY TIME THAT YOU OR WE THINK NECESSARY, BE PREPARED TO REVIEW WITH THIS COMMITTEE THE DEVELOPING STATUS OF THIS PROJECT.



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MR. CHAIRMAN, WHAT I HAVE SUMMARIZED FOR YOU ARE THE BROAD OUTLINES OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH A COUNTRY WHICH HAS INCREASING WORLD IMPORTANCE AND SOME OF THE MORE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS IN A PROPOSED MILITARY SALE.

OUR MILITARY SALES TO IRAN FIT INTO THE BROAD FRAMEWORK WHICH I HAVE SKETCHED AND THE VALUABLE RELATIONSHIP WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS DESCRIBED SO WELL. THOSE SALES ADD TO THE STRENGTH OF A VALUED ALLY AND TO THAT NATION'S ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT A POLICY ON WHICH WE AND THE IRANIANS AGREE. THEY ALSO PROVIDE THE ESSENTIAL ASSURANCES THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT CHANGED ITS MIND ABOUT IRAN, THAT WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP IN ALL FIELDS AND THAT CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE U.S. ON THE PART OF THE IRANIANS IS STILL JUSTIFIED. FOR WE ARE NOT ONLY TALKING ABOUT PAST AND PRESENT POLICIES, INCLUDING RELEVANT MILITARY SALES, BUT ALSO ABOUT THE FUTURE.

I HAVE TRIED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS OUR FIRM BELIEF THAT IRAN'S SIGNIFICANCE IN ITS REGION AND IN THE WORLD IS GROWING. WHERE OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE DURING THE PAST 30 YEARS IT WILL BE EVEN MORE SO DURING THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE YEARS. IT IS, THEREFORE, OUR FIRMLY HELD VIEW THAT IRAN'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT ITS POLICIES AND CONTINUE ITS EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH US ARE OF HIGH NATIONAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS COUNTRY. OUR MUTUAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE F-16 SALE, IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN OUR CLOSE COLLABORATION.

THANK YOU, HABIB
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 BRASILIA 8194
E. O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, SHUN, BR
SUBJECT: STRONG REACTION TO CARTER'S CRITICISM OF BRAZILIAN
DICTATORSHIP

REF: BRASILIA 8007 NOTAL

SUMMARY: PRESS AND GOVERNMENT POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE SCORED
JIMMY CARTER'S REBUKE OF BRAZIL'S DICTATORSHIP AS INTRUSION IN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, HYPOCRISY, OR EXPRESSION OF JEALOUSY OVER
BRAZIL'S RECENT INTERNATIONAL SUCCESSES. OPPOSITION LEADERS,
HOWEVER, HAVE NOTED THAT CARTER'S CLAIMS HAVE SOME BASIS, WHILE
CHARACTERIZING COMMENTS AS "RECKLESS AND UNETHICAL PROVOCATION,"
FOREIGN MINISTER STATED HE WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO US ELECTION
CAMPAING AND REITERATED THAT BRAZIL WOULD GET ALONG WITH
NEXT US ADMINISTRATION, WHOEVER MAY BE ELECTED. CARTER'S
CRITICISM CAME AT MOMENT WHEN BRAZILIANS ALREADY UNEASY OVER
PROSPECTS FOR RETURN TO FULL DEMOCRATIC RULE AND WHEN GOVERNMENT
SEEKING TO PLAY UP PRESIDENT GEISEL'S VISIT TO JAPAN AS
FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF BRAZIL'S ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL
ACCEPTANCE. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE SEND FULL TEXT OF
CARTER'S REMARKS ON BRAZIL. END SUMMARYM

1. MAJOR BRAZILIAN NEWSPAPERS HAVE GIVEN FRONT-PAGE
COVERAGE AND, IN SEVERAL CASES, SHARP EDITORIAL REBUTTALS
TO CRITICISMS OF BRAZIL LEVELED BY JIMMY CARTER IN RECENT
"PLAYBOY" INTERVIEW.

2. QUESTIONED BY JORNAL DE BRASILIA REPORTERS IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING RETURN FROM JAPAN SEPTEMBER 21, FOREIGN MINISTER

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, JANKA

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SILVEIRA QUOTED AS COMMENTING THAT BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT GOING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE US ELECTORAL CAMPAING BY MAKING COMMENTS OF ANY SORT ABOUT WHAT A CANDIDATE SAYS. ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CARTER WERE ELECTED, SILVEIRA SAID, "WE WOULD GET ALONG WITH HIS GOVERNMENT. THERE WILL BE AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WHOEVER MAY BE THE CANDIDATE ELECTED." SILVEIRA ALSO QUOTED AS CHARACTERIZING CARTER'S COMMENTS AS "RECKLESS AND UNETHICAL PROVOCATIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE REFERENCES TO THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY."

3. PRESS HAS FOLLOWED UP WITH SELECTION OF COMMENTS ON CARTER'S STATEMENTS GIVEN BY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION CONGRESSMEN. ARENA LEADER FRANCELINO PEREIRO REAFFIRMED BRAZIL'S "SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM TO DECIDE ITS OWN DESTINY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OWN NEEDS." SOME ARENA CONGRESSMEN SUGGESTED CARTER CRITICISMS SPRANG FROM RESENTMENT OVER BRAZIL'S RECENT SUCCESSES IN EXPANDING INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS. SEVERAL OPPOSITION MDB CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, HOWEVER, COMMENTED THAT CARTER'S CLAIMS THAT BRAZIL IS UNDEMOCRATIC HAD SOME BASIS AND THEY LAMENTED UNFORTUNATE IMAGE BRAZIL HAS ABROAD BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO DEMOCRATIZE.

4. THE INITIAL EDITORIAL REACTION HAS BEEN UNIFORMLY CONDEMNATORY OF CARTER, THOUGH SOME MAJOR PAPERS HAVE STILL TO BE HEARD FROM. JORNAL DO BRASIL'S POLITICAL COLUMN, "JB", WONDERS IF CARTER HAD THESE IDEAS ABOUT BRAZIL WHY HE DIDN'T MENTION THEM WHEN HE WAS HERE ON A VISIT FOUR YEARS AGO AND WHY HE WENT SO FAR AS TO SEEK THE OPENING OF A BRAZILIAN TRADE CENTER IN ATLANTA. "JB" ALSO NOTES THAT CARTER'S DISTASTE FOR AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES WOULD AFFECT THE RELATIONS WITH MOST OF SINGLE-PARTY STATES OF AFRICA, MUCH OF LATIN AMERICA AND ALL THE COMMUNIST WORLD. THE LEAD EDITORIAL IN JORNAL DE BRASILIA CHARGED THAT MANY OF DICTATORSHIPS IN LATIN AMERICA DISTASTEFUL TO CARTER WERE BROUGHT ABOUT IN PART BY EFFORTS OF US AGENCIES OR US BUSINESSES. THE EDITORIALIST TAKES NOTE OF THE US' OWN FAILURES OF DEMOCRACY AND FAIR PLAY IN RECENT YEARS AND CONCLUDES BY DOUBTING THAT CARTER WOULD REALLY CHANGE THE POSITION OF THE US TOWARD COUNTRIES THAT DON'T EXERCISE AMERICAN-STYLE DEMOCRACY SINCE THIS WOULD MEAN THE WEAKENING OF THE US POSITION AMONG AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERCA, WITH THE US THE BIG LOSER.

5. COMMENT: COMING IN WAKE OF GOVERNOR CARTER'S CRITICISM LAST SPRING OF THE US-BRAZIL BILATERAL MECHANISM AND AMBASSADOR LINCOLN GORDON'S CRITICISMS LAST WEEK OF THE REVOLUTION (REFTEL), THIS LATEST REBUKE HAS CONFIRMED SUSPICIONS AMONG

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NATIONALISTIC BRAZILIANS THAT THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE HAS STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE RECENT COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN BRAZIL. (NOTWITHSTANDING GORDON'S STATUS AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN AND HIS PUBLIC ASSURANCES THAT HE HAD NO CONNECTION WITH THE CARTER CAMPAIGN, GOOD PART OF BRAZILIAN PRESS AND SOME ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN MINISTRY PERSIST IN BELIEVING THAT, IN HIS CRITICISMS OF BRAZILIAN INTERNAL POLITICS, GORDON WAS CONVEYING TO BRAZIL SPECIAL PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM JIMMY CARTER.) AS SILVEIRA'S COMMENT INDICATES, TO AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO PUBLIC POLEMIC ITAMARATY'S TACTIC WILL BE TO REFUSE TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF STATEMENTS THAT DO NOT COME FROM OFFICIAL US SPOKESMAN.
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AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5900
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6. CARTER'S CRITICISMS HIT HERE AT TIME OF ALREADY KEEN SENSITIVITY AND UNEASINESS, SINCE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL CLASS EITHER CONFUSED OR DISAPPOINTED BY PRESIDENT GEISEL'S PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT EARLIER THIS WEEK FOR PROSPECTS FOR FULL, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY FOR BRAZIL. (IN INTERVIEWS IN JAPAN, GEISEL SAW LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, INCLUDING THE END OF EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES, AMNESTY FOR THOSE IMPRISONED OR PROSCRIBED FOR POLITICAL REASON, OR THE ADVENT OF REAL DEMOCRACY UNTIL THE COUNTRY'S SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND INEQUITIES HAD BEEN DEALT WITH.) FOR MANY POLITICALLY-MINDED BRAZILIANS, IT'S HARD ENOUGH TO FACE UP TO THE KIKELIHOOD THAT THE PRESENT AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE WITHOUT THE ADDED IRRITATION OF BEING REINDED OF THAT SYSTEM'S DEFICIENCIES BY OUTSIDERS.

7. AN ADDED ANNOYANCE TO THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT IS FACT THAT CARTER'S CRITICISM'S SOUNDED NEGATIVE INTERNATIONAL NOTE AT MOMENT WHEN PRESIDENT GEISEL'S TRIP TO JAPAN WAS BEING FEATURED AS ANOTHER TRIUMPH IN BUILDING BRAZIL'S PRESTIGE AND ACCEPTANCE ABROAD. EDITORIAL COUNTERATTACKS HERE SUGGESTING ULTERIOR MOTIVES OR JEALOUSY ON PART OF THE US CANDIDATE ARE BEST UNDERSTOOD IN THAT CONTEXT.

8. EMBASSY HAS SEEN ONLY BRAZILIAN PRESS VERSION OF EXCERPTS FROM CARTER INTERVIEW AND WOULD APPRECIATE FULL TEXT. END COMMENT.
CRIMMINS

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, JANKA

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)

White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983

By gp NARS, Date 12/18/84

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FM BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO DICK CHENEY
RON NESSEN
ZEM

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SEPTEMBER 26, 1976

TO: CHENEY/NESSEN
FROM: SCOWCROFT

1. THE STATEMENT OF THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS ON RHODESIA CONSTITUTES IN FACT AN ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSALS. ATTACHED IS THE STATEMENT WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL ISSUE. I SUGGEST YOU SAY SOMETHING LIKE "WE CONSIDER THAT THE STATEMENT OF THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS CONSTITUTES AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE BASIC SCHEME THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER NEGOTIATED IN AFRICA. THE ONLY POINT OF DIFFERENCE WHICH THEY RAISED IS THAT THE DETAILED COMPOSITION OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNEMENT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WILL CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS PROBLEM."

2. WHAT WE HAVE IN FACT IS SIMPLY A TACTICAL DIFFERENCE. SMITH, IN HIS STATEMENT, OUTLINED THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DID NOT REFER TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH THE BRITISH WILL HAVE TO CALL TO GET THE WHOLE PROCESS MOVING. WHILE THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN WORKED OUT WITH ALL PARTIES, THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS' STATEMENT REJECTED SMITH'S OUTLINING THAT STRUCTURE AND SAID THAT THE COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE CONFERENCE.

3. ALSO ATTACHED IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS STATEMENT.

STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WE HAVE SEEN THE STATEMENT OF THE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS IN LUSAKA AND WELCOME IT. THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE BASIC PROPOSAL WHICH WILL LEAD TO MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA WITHIN A FIXED TERM. THEY HAVE ALSO ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE TO ESTABLISH THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDEPENDENCE. THE US IS NOW CONSULTING WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH RESPECT TO THE CALL FOR THE MEETING TO ORGANIZE THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, AT WHICH THE STRUCTURE AND

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DETAIL OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT CAN BE FINALLY DETERMINED.
THE ROAD TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IS NOW OPEN.

SUBJ: STATEMENT OF THE FIVE FRONTLINE HEADS OF STATE ON THE
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN ZIMBABWE, LUSAKA SEPTEMBER 26, 1976
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING
IN LUSAKA AT 1535 HRS LOCAL TIME:

ON THE 25TH AND 26TH SEPTEMBER, 1976 IN LUSAKA,
CAPITAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA, PRESIDENTS JULIUS K.
NYERERE OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, SIR SERETSE
KHAMA OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA, SAMORA MOISES MACHEL OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE, AGOSTINHO NETO OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND KENNETH D. KAUNDA OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA MET TO REVIEW THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE
AGAINST BRITISH COLONIALISM AND THE RACIST AND ILLEGAL
MINORITY REGIME.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE, THE AFRICAN
AND INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SANCTIONS AND CO-ORDINATED ACTION OF ALL ANTI-COLONIALIST
FORCES AND STATES HAVE TOGETHER BROUGHT THE ISOLATION AND
COLLAPSE OF THE ILLEGAL RACIST MINORITY REGIME IN THE
BRITISH COLONY OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA.

THE PRESIDENTS HAILED AND CONGRATULATED THE PEOPLE
AND FIGHTERS OF ZIMBABWE WHOSE HARD AND HEROIC ARMED STRUGGLE
FORCED THE REBEL REGIME AND THE ENEMY IN GENERAL TO RECOGNISE
AND ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF MAJORITY RULE; THE NEED
TO ESTABLISH IMMEDIATELY A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT TO
IMPLEMENT THIS PRINCIPLE. THUS THE VICTORIES ACHIEVED BY
THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE IN THEIR ARMED STRUGGLE CREATED THE
PRESENT FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE CONVENING OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

THIS IS A VICTORY FOR ALL AFRICA AND MANKIND AND
PARTICULARLY FOR ALL THOSE COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES WHO MADE
SACRIFICES SO THAT THE BROTHERLY PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE CAN BE
FREE.

NOW THAT THE PRESSURES OF ARMED STRUGGLE HAVE FORCED
THE ENEMY TO ACCEPT MAJORITY RULE AS A CONDITION
FOR IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE,

THE FIVE PRESIDENTS CALL UPON THE COLONIAL
AUTHORITY, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CONVENE AT ONCE A
CONFERENCE OUTSIDE ZIMBABWE WITH THE AUTHENTIC AND LEGITIMATE
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE:

(A) TO DISCUSS THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT;

(B) TO ESTABLISH THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT;

(C) TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES FOR CONVENING A FULL CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE TO WORK OUT THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION;

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(D) TO ESTABLISH THE BASIS UPON WHICH PEACE AND NORMALCY CAN BE RESTORED IN THE TERRITORY.

TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS TWO PHASES ARE ENVISAGED. THE FIRST PHASE WILL DEAL WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AFRICAN MAJORITY TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. THE SECOND PHASE WILL BE CONCERNED WITH WORKING OUT THE DETAILS OF THE ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION.

THE PRESIDENTS HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE PROPOSALS AS OUTLINED BY THE ILLEGAL AND RACIST REGIME WHICH IF ACCEPTED WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO LEGALISING THE COLONIALIST AND RACIST STRUCTURES OF POWER. ANY DETAILS RELATING TO THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE CONFERENCE.

THE FIVE PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF LIBERATION IN ZIMBABWE AND THE ARMED STRUGGLE. A LUTA CONTINUA.

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---REPEATING---

BY JIM ANDERSON

NEW YORK (UPI) -- THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON RHODESIA WILL INCLUDE BOTH WHITE AND BLACK RHODESIAN LEADERS BUT THE FIVE "FRONTLINE" NEIGHBORING BLACK NATIONS WILL BE REPRESENTED ONLY BY OBSERVERS, A SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL WITH SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER SAID SATURDAY.

THE OFFICIAL ALSO SAID THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE AN OBSERVER AT THE CONFERENCE WHICH WILL HAMMER OUT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WITH "BLACK PREDOMINANCE." THE RHODESIAN CONFERENCE IS EXPECTED TO FINISH ITS WORK BY THE END OF THE YEAR AND COULD LEAD TO A SIMILAR CONFERENCE ON INDEPENDENCE FOR SOUTH WEST AFRICA.

THE OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE BASIC AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA, INCLUDING DETAILS OF AN "INSURANCE FUND" OF UP TO \$2 BILLION TO COMPENSATE WHITE RHODESIAN PROPERTY OWNERS, HAS BEEN SETTLED AND KISSINGER DISCOUNTS PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM BLACK LEADERS TO THE CONTRARY AS "RHETORIC MEANT FOR THEIR OWN SUPPORTERS."

DETAILS OF THE FUND WERE NEGOTIATED IN WASHINGTON DURING THE PAST WEEK AND WILL BE DISCLOSED DURING THE CONFERENCE. BETWEEN 30 AND 40 PER CENT WILL BE UNDERWRITTEN BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DOING BUSINESS IN RHODESIA.

THE PARTICIPANTS TO THE CONFERENCE, WHICH WILL BE CHAIRED BY BRITAIN'S AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, IVOR RICHARD, AND OPEN OCT. 25 IN GENEVA, WILL "PROBABLY" INCLUDE PREMIER IAN SMITH, THE OFFICIAL SAID.

THE LEADERS OF THE BLACK NATIONALIST RHODESIAN GROUPS ALSO WILL ATTEND, INCLUDING THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNITY WHICH IS THE MOST MILITANT AND MARXIST OF THE GUERRILLA GROUPS STATIONED IN MOZAMBIQUE.

THE UNITED STATES WILL BE REPRESENTED BY AN OBSERVER, PROBABLY FRANK WISNER, A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO KISSINGER WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM ON THE RECENT AFRICAN SHUTTLE. KISSINGER DOES NOT PLAN TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH HE WILL PROBABLY BE IN EUROPE IN DECEMBER TO ATTEND A NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING.

THE OFFICIAL SAID THE "FRONTLINE" BLACK AFRICAN STATES BORDERING ON WHITE RULED SOUTHERN AFRICA--TANZANIA, ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA, MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA--WILL NOT BE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE ALTHOUGH THEY WILL BE REPRESENTED BY OBSERVERS.

THE OFFICIAL SAID THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WILL PUT DOWN ON PAPER WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ESSENTIALLY AGREED--A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WITH A "BLACK PREDOMINANCE" WHICH WILL RULE UNTIL A PERMANENT BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT, TO BE DEFINED IN A LATER CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, IS SET UP.

THE OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL EMERGE FROM IT WILL CALL FOR AN END TO THE GUERRILLA WAR. THAT WILL BE THE FIRST, AND MOST CRUCIAL, TEST OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARRANGEMENT, THE OFFICIAL SAID.

RHODESIA WILL NOT FORMALLY BE GRANTED ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM BRITAIN UNTIL THE PERMANENT GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE IS FORMED WITHIN TWO YEARS.

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