

**The original documents are located in Box 26, folder “Sinai Accords” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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August 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT  
THROUGH: DON RUMSFELD  
FROM: JACK MARSH

Attached is a copy of a memo to Secretary of State Kissinger summarizing the responses to Members to the Sinai Surveillance question.

JOM:cb

August 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: HENRY KISSINGER  
FROM: JACK MARSH

In reference to the Sinai Surveillance matter, set out below are short summaries of Members of the House and Senate who were contacted as to their views on Congressional reaction:

Congressman Thomas Morgan: He had no objection to non-military personnel being used, but felt there would be some opposition. He felt most House members would go along with it.

Senator Robert P. Griffin: He raised the question as to why not have the U. N. do it, but said if it was the only way to get an agreement, then it would be worth a try.

Congressman William Broomfield: He felt he could probably go along with a small number of civilian personnel, if it was part of an overall settlement package.

Senator Bob Byrd: He indicated concern about the proposal, and pointed out this is the way we got involved in Vietnam. His first response was "It concerns me".

Congressman John Rhodes: He had a cautious attitude, and is of the opinion that it can be sold ~~as~~ properly presented and must be certain of an overall plan. Rhodes also asked a question about cost.

Congressman Elford Cederberg: He says we cannot let the situation there break down inasmuch as the alternative is not acceptable, and was of the view that the Congress would go along. He asked the question as to whether they would be U. S. employees of a private outfit.

Congressman George Mahon: He had a very cautious attitude. Cited the Vietnam experience, but said we have got to do something. Felt this would not sound too bad, and he wants to be with the President, and was not shocked by such a proposal. He feels it must be part of a total settlement.

See attachments for Senators John McClellan, Clifford Case, Milton Young and Congressman Wayne Hays.

August 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT  
THROUGH: DICK CHENEY  
FROM: JACK MARSH

Attached is a summary of Lee Hamilton's comments on the Sinal Surveillance matter. I was able to speak with Lee personally.

I might add that on the previous list that I sent, Cederberg was contacted personally by me at the Office rather than by phone as the memo indicated.

JOM:cb

cc: BMcFarlane  
L Janka

*Cumies*  
*Assin*

August 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

JACK MARSH

I had an opportunity to see Lee Hamilton on the Hill today, and I brought up the Sinal Surveillance matter to him as to his views, and how he thought the Congress would react.

Lee was very cautious in his response, and indicated reluctant approval. He recognizes the need for an interim agreement. He feels that if this is the linchpin necessary to pull it together, he could probably support it. He has reservations about the introduction of any American personnel onto the ground in this volatile situation.

My own assessment of his attitude is that he will not be an advocate, but neither will he encourage opposition, and probably would vote to support the effort.

cc: BMcFarlane

LJanka

JOM:cb

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 13, 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH

FROM: WILLIAM T. KENDALL *WTK*

SUBJECT: Notifying Senators regarding the Sinai  
Surveillance Arrangements

The following Senators were notified on August 13, 1975:

Senator Clifford Case: Reached in Alaska at 7:30 a.m. their time. Thinks this arrangement is "essential" if we are going to reach agreement between both sides. Was concerned that we could be ordered out by either side or by the U.N. Feels both sides must agree that we cannot be thrown out.

Senator John McClellan: Reached in Alsaka at 7:45 a.m. their time. Senator sees nothing wrong with this arrangement if both sides agree and it is for technical personnel only. His questions were: What is the time frame? Will we man on both sides of the passes? He said he hopes the plan succeeds.

August 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: HENRY KISSINGER  
FROM: JACK MARSH

The attached list shows the location of House and Senate leaders during the present week. With the exception of Senator Sparkman and Congressman Cederberg, all are away from Washington. Cederberg will be leaving the 14th, and if you desire you might be able to meet with him Wednesday.

I would not recommend bringing any of the leaders back to Washington for a meeting because of the speculation that would ensue. However, you may wish to make calls to several of them, in which event I would suggest the following:

Senator Robert Byrd  
Senator Griffin  
Senator Case (he's in Alaska)  
Congressman Rhodes  
Congressman Morgans  
Congressman Broomfield

If your schedule will not permit phoning, I will be glad to call or have contacted any whose views you may wish to obtain.

JOM:cb



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 13, 1975

ADDENDUM REPORT FROM W. T. KENDALL TO J. MARSH RE SINAI PASSES

Senator Milton Young was contacted at 6:00 p.m. Washington time:  
The Senator has no objection to this arrangement. He feels that the plan has merit but thinks there will be some criticism. He asked this question: "Would the information obtained by U.S. personnel be available to the United Nations?" He feels this would be essential to avoid the charge that we might be favoring Israel in a dispute.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK MARSH

FROM:

CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. *CLJ.*

SUBJECT:

Report on Conversation with Rep. Wayne Hays (D-Ohio)

Talked by telephone to Rep. Wayne Hays on the Egyptian - Israeli Agreement on the Sinai. The report is as follows:

Date of Contact:

August 13, 1975

Time:

4:40 p. m.

Place:

St. Clairville, Ohio

Comment:

It's O.K. with me but I can't say what ~~the reaction~~ <sup>Some</sup> ~~will~~ up there will say. I don't think there will be a bad reaction to the use of civilian personnel. If there is any criticism it will be muted on the Hill because of the Israeli involvement. You will not get the same kind of reaction that you got on the Greek-Turkey on Turkish aid situation.

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SUBJECT: SECOND DRAFT STATEMENT FOR SFRS APPEARANCE ON  
SINAI ACCORDS

FOR SECRETARY FROM LEIGH

1. TEXT OF SECOND DRAFT PROMISED IN TOSEC 140085 BEGINS  
AT PARA 3 THIS MESSAGE. SISCO THINKS YOU SHOULD DRAW  
UPON BOTH HIS DRAFT AND ONE WHICH FOLLOWS IN PREPARA-  
TION FOR TESTIMONY TOMORROW, SINCE LATTER CONTAINS SOME  
ARGUMENTATION NOT FOUND IN FORMER.

2. AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE TEXT OF SISCO DRAFT, WE WILL  
CABLE COMMENTS ON LEGAL POINTS.

3. BEGIN TEXT: IN MY PRIOR APPEARANCES BEFORE THIS  
COMMITTEE, I HAVE EMPHASIZED TO THE MEMBERS THE IMPORTANCE  
OF THE RECENTLY SIGNED SINAI ACCORD. THE SIGNING OF THIS  
ACCORD WAS NOT ONLY A SIGNIFICANT ACT OF ITSELF, PROVIDING  
AS IT DOES FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM  
PORTION OF OCCUPIED AREAS AND THE AFFIRMATION OF  
OBLIGATIONS BY BOTH PARTIES REGARDING RENUNCIATION OF  
THE USE OF FORCE, BUT ALSO, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT WAS  
A HARD FIRST STEP IN THE DIRECTION THAT BOTH PARTIES  
MUST MOVE IF LASTING PEACE IS TO BE FOUND IN AN AREA WHICH  
HAS BEEN AFFLICTED WITH WARS AND THREATS OF WARS FOR  
MORE THAN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. INDEED, THE SIGNIFICANCE  
OF THE SINAI ACCORD LIES MORE IN THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH



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By lit NARA, Date 4/21/94

IT OPENS UP FOR FURTHER STEPS IN THE FUTURE THAN IT DOES IN THE HARD FIRST STEP ALREADY TAKEN.

4. THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS STILL PRECARIOUS; IT SHOULD NOT BE ASSUMED THAT BECAUSE THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED EARLY LAST MONTH THE URGENCY OF FINDING A SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS DIMINISHED. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINS EXPLOSIVE.

5. I AM WELL AWARE OF THIS COMMITTEE'S CONCERN ABOUT THE PUBLICATION OF CERTAIN OF THE DOCUMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN FURNISHED TO THE COMMITTEE AND ITS DESIRE TO ASSURE ITSELF THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS CONSIDERED EVERY DOCUMENT TRULY RELEVANT TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM.

6. WE HAVE MADE, I BELIEVE, AN HISTORICALLY UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO MEET THE COMMITTEE'S CONCERNS. WE HAVE SUPPLIED TO THE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS ON A CLASSIFIED BASIS SOME OF THE MOST SENSITIVE MATERIAL KNOWN TO THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS AND, INCIDENTALY AMONG THESE DOCUMENTS, MATERIAL FROM THE RECORD OF THE SINAI NEGOTIATIONS OF THE VERY CATEGORY WHICH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON DECLINED TO FURNISH TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN HIS FAMOUS LETTER OF REFUSAL IN 1794.

7. TO GO FURTHER THAN WE HAVE ALREADY GONE IN MAKING SENSITIVE MATERIALS AVAILABLE TO THE COMMITTEE WOULD RAISE PROBLEMS OF TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCESSES AND THUS THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

8. THE FIRST PROBLEM IS THAT IT WOULD EXPOSE TO THE RISK OF COMPROMISE DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WHICH IF MADE PUBLIC WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY UPSET THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE OF POLITICAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH I REFERRED TO ABOVE. WHILE I AM SECRETARY OF STATE I WILL NOT ADVISE OR RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT RUN THESE RISKS. THE DANGERS TO AMERICAN INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS TOO GREAT. I CANNOT FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT ALL OF THE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTATION WHICH WE FURNISHED TO THIS COMMITTEE AND TO THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL



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RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAS FOUND ITS WAY INTO THE PAGES OF THE LARGE METROPOLITAN DAILIES. THESE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES HAVE HAD A STRONGLY PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ON OUR PROSPECTS FOR CAPITALIZING ON WHAT MAY BE A FLEETING OPPORTUNITY FOR SIGNIFICANT FURTHER STEPS TOWARD A PERMANENT PEACE IN THE AREA.

9. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A SECOND PROBLEM IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEMAND FOR FURTHER SENSITIVE DOCUMENTATION. ACQUIESCENCE IN THIS DEMAND WOULD ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT WHICH WOULD IN MY CONSIDERED OPINION GRAVELY IMPAIR THE ABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. SUCCESS IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY DEPENDS ON THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PRESIDENTIAL EXCHANGES WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS. CONFIDENTIALITY NEED NOT BE MAINTAINED FOREVER; INDEED, NO GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD PUBLISHES THE RECORDS OF ITS DIPLOMATIC HISTORY SOONER AND MORE FULLY THAN THE UNITED STATES. BUT CONFIDENTIALITY MUST BE MAINTAINED, IN SOME CASES FOR A SHORT PERIOD, IN OTHER CASES, FOR A LONGER PERIOD. IF OTHER GOVERNMENTS BECOME AWARE THAT THEIR MOST SENSITIVE DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE PRESIDENT WILL BE SUBJECT TO PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE NARROW CONFINES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE, THOSE GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT BE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES WITH THE UNITED STATES. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE UNABLE TO UTILIZE AN ESSENTIAL INSTRUMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF DIPLOMACY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY: AN INSTRUMENT THAT DEPENDS UPON CONFIDENCE IN THE FIDELITY AND DISCRETION OF THE AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES. ANY DEMAND BY THE CONGRESS FOR SENSITIVE DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WOULD INFRINGE UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES AND OBLIGATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO CONDUCT THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, ON

GROUND OF PRINCIPLE, I WILL NOT AS SECRETARY OF STATE ADVISE THE PRESIDENT TO COMPROMISE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE AND IMPAIR HIS ABILITY TO MEET HIS CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS. ON GROUND OF PRACTICE -- OF THE VIABILITY OF THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES -- I CAN ONLY ADVISE THE PRESIDENT TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THOSE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS WHOSE CONTENT REQUIRES CONFIDENTIALITY. I SAY THAT WITH THE UTMOST RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CONGRESS AND FOR THE DEDICATED MEN AND WOMEN WHO MAKE UP ITS PRESENT MEMBERSHIP.

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10. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE EXECUTIVE DOES NOT HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE THE CONGRESS WITH THE TEXTS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY. THIS OBLIGATION WE RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, WHETHER THE AGREEMENT IS IN THE FORM OF A TREATY OR OF AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO THE SINAI ACCORD WE HAVE FURNISHED THE TEXT OF EVERY DOCUMENT WHICH IN OUR JUDGMENT GIVES RISE TO AN INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT OR CONSTITUTES AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. WE HAVE HELD BACK NOTHING WHICH WOULD FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CASE ACT OR EVEN WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL COMMITMENTS RESOLUTION. INDEED, WE HAVE FURNISHED SOME DOCUMENTS WHICH, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY RELEVANT, HAVE NOT YET BECOME INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS BECAUSE THEY AWAIT SIGNATURE, THAT IS, THE MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL.

11. AMONG THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS WHOSE TEXTS ARE NOW BEING SOUGHT ARE HIGHLY SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS WHICH RELATE TO ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS PARTICULAR MATERIAL IS TOO DELICATE TO DISCLOSE. IF IT WERE TO BE DISCLOSED, ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS COULD GO BACKWARD RATHER THAN FORWARD; THEY EVEN COULD COLLAPSE ALTOGETHER. THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION CONTAIN NOTHING WHICH CONSTITUTES AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT BINDING ON THE CONGRESS OR ON THE UNITED STATES AS A GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THESE ITEMS WOULD GRAVELY PREJUDICE OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF STEP-BY-STEP NEGOTIATION WHICH WE ARE CONVINCED HOLDS THE BEST HOPE FOR SUCCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. DISCLOSURE WOULD DRIVE THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL APART; IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE MEN OF PEACE AND PROMOTE THE RESUMPTION OF WAR.

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12. MY ATTENTION HAS BEEN DRAWN TO ONE OF THE EARLIEST CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS WHICH EXISTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY, NAMELY, THE REQUEST BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1794 THAT PRESIDENT WASHINGTON SUPPLY THE CORRESPONDENCE AND OTHER

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DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THAT (THE JAY) BEGIN UNDERLINE. TREATY EXCEPTING SUCH OF SAID PAPERS AS ANY EXISTING NEGOTIATION MAY RENDER IMPROPER TO BE DISCLOSED." END UNDERLINE. I CALL PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE. EVEN IN MAKING A DEMAND WHICH THE PRESIDENT IN FACT LATER REJECTED, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EXCEPTED FROM THAT DEMAND ITEMS RELATING TO ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS. A NUMBER OF THE DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE NOW BEING DEMANDED BY SOME SENATORS FALL PRECISELY IN THIS CATEGORY. THEIR DISCLOSURE WOULD GRAVELY PREJUDICE OUR OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEGOTIATING FURTHER STE-BY-STEP APPROACH TO GENERAL PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY WOULD EQUALLY PREJUDICE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE OF ARABS AND ISRAELIS.

13. THE LATEST MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL ARE SIMILAR TO EARLIER MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL WHICH HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE CONGRESS UNDER THE CASE ACT. THUS, IN JANUARY 1974 FOLLOWING THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, WE TRANSMITTED UNDER THE CASE ACT A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL WHICH WAS DATED JANUARY 18, 1974. LIKE THE LATEST MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT, THE JANUARY 18, 1974 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONTAINED PROVISIONS RELATING TO AID; TO ASSURANCES FROM EGYPT THROUGH THE UNITED STATES TO ISRAEL; TO DIRECT U.S. ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT WITH RESPECT TO SUCH MATTERS AS THE STRAITS OF BAB-EL-MANDEB; TO U.S. DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS IN THE EVENT OF VIOLATIONS OF THE CONTEMPORANEOUS AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL; TO U.S. POLICY OR INTENTION WITH RESPECT TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE; TO THE U.S. POSITION ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE. IN PARTICULAR, PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE JANUARY 18, 1974 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING PROVIDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE FULLY RESPONSIVE ON A CONTINUING AND LONG-TERM BASIS TO ISRAEL'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. INDEED THE LANGUAGE OF THE JANUARY 1974 UNDERSTANDING IS CLOSELY PARALLEL TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE LATEST MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT EXCEPT THAT THE LATTER IS, IF ANYTHING, MORE GUARDED. THE SAME MAY BE SAID OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL CONCLUDED ON SEPTEMBER 16, 1974, FOLLOWING THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, COPIES OF WHICH WERE TRANSMITTED UNDER THE CASE ACT ON A CLASSIFIED BASIS.

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14. BUT THIS LANGUAGE DOES NOT LEGALLY COMMIT THE CONGRESS OR THE UNITED STATES UNDER EITHER AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY MILITARY AID -- ONLY TO CONSIDER IT. CONGRESS IN PARTICULAR IS PERFECTLY FREE TO WORK ITS WILL ON ANY AID PROPOSAL WHICH THE EXECUTIVE MAY SUBMIT FOR AID TO ISRAEL.

15. THE LANGUAGE CALLING FOR THE UNITED STATES TO USE BEST EFFORTS TO BE FULLY RESPONSIVE TO ISRAEL'S NEEDS FOR MILITARY AID IS NO MORE THAN A CONFIRMATION OF THE POLICY WHICH WE HAVE FOLLOWED FOR YEARS. THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE EACH PARTICIPATED IN THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT POLICY.

IT DOES NOT SEEM TO ME THAT ANYTHING IN THE MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT CHANGES WHAT HAS BEEN OUR LONG-STANDING POLICY. LOOKING BACK, I DO NOT SEE THAT PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE EARLIER UNDERSTANDING OF JANUARY 18, 1974 CAN BE SAID TO HAVE CAUSED ANY CHANGE IN OUR POLICY ON AID DURING THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF. NOR WOULD I EXPECT THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS OF THE LATEST AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL TO CHANGE OUR ONGOING POLICY IN THIS RESPECT.

16. IN ANY EVENT, IF ANY SUCH REQUEST REQUIRES EITHER AUTHORIZATION OR APPROPRIATION, THEN THE AGREEMENT BY ITS SPECIFIC TERMS REQUIRES SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT ACTION BY CONGRESS. THERE IS NO LEGAL COMMITMENT IN THE AGREEMENT OR IN ANY OF THE OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH REQUIRES CONGRESS TO ACT. TO PUT THE MATTER BLUNTLY, ISRAEL HAS TAKEN THE RISK OF CONGRESSIONAL INACTION, ALBEIT WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THERE IS LONG-STANDING SYMPATHY IN CONGRESS FOR ITS CAUSE.

17. THE UNDERTAKINGS IN THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO MAKING OIL AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE BY ISRAEL ON A CASH AND CARRY BASIS IN THE EVENT OF EMBARGO ARE ADMITTEDLY OF A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT CHARACTER. THEIR PERFORMANCE WILL NOT UNDER PRESENT LAW REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, AND THE UNITED STATES IS AUTHORIZED UNDER CURRENT LAW TO MAKE AND IF NEEDS BE IMPLEMENT THESE UNDERTAKINGS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, IN ANY EVENT,

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ISRAELI DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION IS RELATIVELY SMALL COMPARED TO TOTAL SUPPLIES AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES. ASSURANCE TO ISRAEL ON THIS VITAL ISSUE OBVIOUSLY HAD AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE BASIC AGREEMENT.

18. APART FROM THE FOREGOING, ALL THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FALL IN THE CATEGORY OF ACTIONS WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THESE FALL IN THE CATEGORY OF STATEMENTS OF POLICY OR INTENTION NOT NORMALLY CONSIDERED INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. IN ANY EVENT THEY ARE WELL WITHIN THE PRESIDENT'S INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY.

19. I RECOGNIZE THAT SPECIAL ATTENTION HAS BEEN FOCUSED BY SOME MEMBERS ON PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. FRANKLY, I HAVE BEEN SURPRISED THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THIS PARAGRAPH, WHICH IN ITS OPERATIVE SECTION DOES NO MORE THAN SAY THE PRESIDENT WILL CONSULT WITH ISRAEL IN THE EVENT ITS SECURITY IS THREATENED BY A WORLD POWER, SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY SOME TO BE APPROPRIATE ONLY FOR A SECURITY TREATY. IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY NATIONS AGREE TO CONSULT ON HUNDREDS OF SUBJECTS. MOREOVER, IRRESPECTIVE OF PARAGRAPH 18, HE WOULD SURELY CONSULT WITH ISRAEL IF SHE WERE THREATENED. BUT I GATHER THE CONCERN WITH PARAGRAPH 18 RESTS AS WELL ON THE PRECEDING SENTENCE, WHICH SPEAKS OF "THE LONG-STANDING UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO THE SURVIVAL AND SECURITY OF ISRAEL" AND THEN SAYS THE U.S. WOULD TAKE A GRAVE VIEW OF ANY THREAT TO ISRAEL FROM A WORLD POWER. BOTH PARTS OF THAT SENTENCE IN MY VIEW ARE NO MORE THAN A RESTATEMENT OF EXISTING UNITED STATES POLICY AS DEVELOPED JOINTLY BY PRESIDENTS AND CONGRESSES SINCE 1948 IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, SUCH AS IN THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION OF 1957, WHICH IS A PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. ANOTHER STATEMENT IS FOUND IN PUBLIC LAW 91-411 AS FOLLOWS:

"THE CONGRESS VIEWS WITH GRAVE CONCERN THE DEEPENING INVOLVEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO WORLD PEACE RESULTING FROM SUCH INVOLVEMENT WHICH CANNOT BE IGNORED BY THE UNITED STATES."

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IF I WERE IN AN ARGUMENTATIVE MOOD, I MIGHT CONTEND THAT THE LANGUAGE I HAVE JUST QUOTED IS MORE FAR REACHING IN ITS TERMS THAN ANYTHING IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.

20. FINALLY, I SINCERELY BELIEVE, WITH ALL RESPECT TO THOSE OF YOU WHO MAY DISAGREE, THAT AN UNDERTAKING MERELY TO CONSULT IS FAR, FAR DIFFERENT FROM ANY SECURITY TREATY THE UNITED STATES IS PARTY TO.

21. I TURN NOW TO A QUESTION WHICH I RECOGNIZE HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN AMONG THE MEMBERS. WHETHER, IF THE CONGRESS APPROVES THE PROPOSAL, IT WILL THEREAFTER HAVE NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO APPROVE WITHOUT FURTHER ADO AND IRRESPECTIVE OF CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE REQUESTS FOR AID WHEN REQUESTS ARE MADE FOR AID UNDER THE MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT. I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT WHY THIS IS NOT TRUE UNDER THE LANGUAGE OF THE MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT. THE ISRAELIS UNDER THE MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT HAVE TAKEN THE RISK OF CONGRESSIONAL INACTION. BUT THEN IT IS FURTHER ARGUED THAT IF CONGRESS FAILS TO ACT ON AID REQUESTS, ISRAEL WILL BE ENTITLED TO REPUDIATE ITS UNDERTAKINGS UNDER THE BASIC AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT. THIS ARGUMENT IS TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. NEITHER AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, NOR AS A LEGAL MATTER WILL ISRAEL BE JUSTIFIED IN REPUDIATING ITS UNDERTAKING TO WITHDRAW IF CONGRESS IN ITS WISDOM SHOULD IN THE FUTURE PROVIDE LESS AID THAN ISRAEL HAD REQUESTED OR EXPECTED.

22. IN THE FIRST PLACE, WITHDRAWAL WOULD ALREADY HAVE OCCURRED FROM THE DESIGNATED SINAI TERRITORIES. THUS AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE REPUDIATION WOULD BE WITHOUT PRACTICAL EFFECT.

23. IN THE SECOND PLACE, AS A POLITICAL MATTER, ISRAEL RECOGNIZES THAT ITS CASE FOR AID MUST BE MADE AND JUSTIFIED ON AN ANNUAL, YEAR-BY-YEAR BASIS WITH THE CONGRESS.

24. IN THE THIRD PLACE, THERE IS NO LEGAL RIGHT OF REPUDIATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT A PARTY TO THE SINAI AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THAT AGREEMENT RUNS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT ONLY; THEY ARE THE ONLY SIGNATORIES TO THAT AGREEMENT.

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THEY ARE THE ONLY STATES THAT ARE BOUND BY IT. THE AGREEMENT REPEATEDLY SPEAKS OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES; AND IT IS BEYOND DISPUTE THAT THE PARTIES ARE EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND NO THIRD STATE. THE AGREEMENT DOES PROVIDE, IN AN ANNEX, THAT, IN THE BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTIONS, THERE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ENTRUSTED TO UNITED STATES CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. A SEPARATE PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR WHICH APPROVAL OF THE CONGRESS IS BEING SOUGHT, PROVIDES DETAILS OF THAT EARLY WARNING SYSTEM. THAT PROPOSAL IS DESCRIBED AS A PART OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL; BUT THAT IN NO SENSE SAYS OR MEANS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY TO THE

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IT IS AS IF FORD MOTOR COMPANY AGREES WITH THE CITY OF DETROIT TO PROVIDE BUSES FOR MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION CONTAINING GLASS BUILT TO ITS SPECIFICATIONS BY PITTSBURGH PLATE GLASS COMPANY. THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT ARE JUST FORD AND DETROIT -- EVEN THOUGH THEY BOTH WANT PITTSBURGH PLATE GLASS AND PITTSBURGH PLATE GLASS COMPANY WISHES TO PROVIDE IT.

25. IN MY VIEW, THE ASSURANCES AND UNDERTAKINGS GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES ON ITS OWN BEHALF IN THE MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL FALL ESSENTIALLY INTO TWO CATEGORIES. ONE IS ASSURANCES BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS POLITICAL INTENTIONS. THE OTHER IS COMMITMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES WHICH ARE CONDITIONED ON EXISTING OR PRIOR AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. TAKEN TOGETHER, MIXED TOGETHER, THESE VARIOUS STATEMENTS OF POLITICAL INTENTION AND CONDITIONAL LEGAL COMMITMENTS COMPRISE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS. BUT THE CONTENT AND THE LEGALLY BINDING CHARACTER -- IF ANY -- OF THE DISPARATE ELEMENTS ON THOSE AGREEMENTS CAN ONLY BE UNDERSTOOD BY CONSIDERATION OF EACH, PARTICULAR ELEMENT. WHEN THOSE ELEMENTS ARE ANALYZED, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THEY CONSTITUTE POLICY STATEMENTS, EXPRESSIONS OF POLITICAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES, AND COMMITMENTS WHICH, HOWEVER, WILL BE DEFINITELY UNDERTAKEN ONLY WHEN THE CONGRESS SO AGREES OR HAS ALREADY AGREED.

26. IN SHORT, MANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION DO NOT BY ANY STANDARD RISE TO THE LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS. THEY ARE NO MORE THAN STATE-

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MENTS OF INTENTION TYPICAL OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE INTENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE STATEMENTS OF THOSE INTENTIONS, ARE NOT IMPORTANT. THEY ARE VERY IMPORTANT. LET US ENDEAVOR TO ENSURE THAT THEY CONTINUE TO BE, BUT THEY DO NOT BIND, AND ARE NOT UNDERSTOOD TO BIND, THE UNITED STATES.

27. THE TWO MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL WILL BE TRANSMITTED, AFTER SIGNATURE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CASE ACT. THEY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THIS COMMITTEE AND TO THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PURSUANCE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CASE ACT GOVERNING AGREEMENTS THE IMMEDIATE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD, IN THE OPINION OF THE PRESIDENT, BE PREJUDICIAL

TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY -- AND, I MAY ADD, THE DIPLOMATIC CAPACITY -- OF THE UNITED STATES.

28. I THINK IT IS BEYOND QUESTION THAT, IN THIS CASE, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS GIVEN THE CONGRESS EXTRAORDINARY ACCESS TO THE CONTENT OF THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS THE TERMS OF THE ASSURANCES AND UNDERTAKINGS OF THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING, NOT LEAST BECAUSE WE WANT YOU TO BE FORTHCOMING. IT IS TIME -- IT IS PAST TIME -- FOR THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF THIS GOVERNMENT TO ACT TOGETHER IN SUPPORT OF AN EARLY WARNING PROPOSAL WHICH PROMISES TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE IN WHAT HERETOFORE HAS BEEN THE COCKPIT OF WAR. THE STAKES ARE ENORMOUS: PEACE OR WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES; AND THE INVIGORATION OR THE CASTRATION OF THE DIPLOMATIC POTENTIAL OF THE UNITED STATES. THE TIME FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS NOW.

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GAZA STRIP

Beersheba

ISRAEL

Dimona

Nahal Sinai

Al Arish

RISAN 'ANEIZA  
1207  
(368)

GEBEL LIBNĪ

JABAL LIBNĪ  
519  
(463)

JABAL HILĀL  
297  
(892)

Abū 'Uwayjīlah  
(Abu Aweigila)

RUWEIFA DAM

Nizzana

Ayn al Quṣaymah

Bi'r Hasanah

1083  
(507)

Bi'r Hamzah

YU'ALLIQ  
3566  
(1087)

Wādī al Burūk

Thamādah

2310  
(704)

Wādī al Aḡabab

An Nakhl

EL NAKHL

Al Kuntillah

KUNTILLA  
(Abandoned)

Al Thamad

EL THAMAD

GAEN NAQB

Elat

3514  
(1071)

1007  
(307)

80

85

30°30'

31°00'

95 0000m E.

90  
2006  
(612)

35°00'

34°30'

34°00'

30'

Sea

# Mediterranean Sea



33°00' 85 33°30' 90 34°00'

Bahij at Tina (Bay of Tina)

Sabkhat al Bardawil

Nahal Sinai

AL ARISH

Bir Lahfan

RISAN ANEIZA  
1207  
(368)

GEBEL LIBNI

JABAL LIBNI  
1519  
(463)

JABAL HILAL  
2337  
(704)

Bir Hamamah

Bir Jifjafah

BIR JIFJAFAH

Bir Hasannah

JABAL YU'ALLIQ  
3566  
(1087)

Little Bitter Lake

JABAL UMM KHISHEIB  
2546  
(776)

GIDDI PASS

BIR HASANAH (New)

Bir ath Thamadah

Wadi al Buruk

MITLA PASS

MITLA PASS (MAMARR MITLAH)

MITLA EL SHARQI  
2211  
(674)

2559  
(780)

JABAL HAMRA

JABAL RAHAN  
2559  
(780)

JABAL RAHAN  
2448  
(748)

RAS ALLAH

'Uyun Musa

Sidr

RAS SUOR

RAS AS SIDR

2041  
(622)

2530  
(1076)

2620  
(799)

EL THAMAD




# Sinai Peninsula

United Nations Emergency Force buffer area

Eastern line of limited Egyptian forces      Western line of limited Israeli forces  
 Eastern line of Egyptian forces      Western line of Israeli forces

Primary road      Airfield      Oilfield  
 All-weather secondary road      Built-up area      POL offshore loading buoy  
 Unsurfaced road or vehicle track      Town or village      Port  
 Road under construction      Israeli settlement      Reef  
 Railroad      Resort area      Dam

Bathymetry in fathoms




(Bathymetry in the Gulf of Aqaba is approximate)

Lambert Conformal Conic Projection—Standard Parallels 28°15'N and 30°50'N

RED NUMBERED TICKS AT THE EDGE OF MAP INDICATE THE 10,000 METER EGYPT RED BELT GRID, HELMERT SPHEROID

Spot elevations in feet and (meters)

SCALE 1:500,000



## GAZETTEER

(All latitudes are North, all longitudes are East)

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS									
Dahab	28°30' 34°30'	Giddi Pass	30°13' 33°08'	Ra's Muḥammad	27°44' 34°15'	'Atāqah	29°54' 32°27'		
Dikla	31°12' 34°08'	Great Bitter Lake	30°20' 32°23'	Ra's Naṣrānī	27°58' 34°25'	Aṭ Ṭūr	28°14' 33°37'		
Na'ama (Ne'ot Ophira)	27°52' 34°18'	Gulf of Aqaba	29°00' 34°40'	Risan 'Aneiza	30°54' 33°44'	Ayn al Quṣaymah	30°40' 34°22'		
Nahal Sinai	31°08' 33°48'	Gulf of Suez	28°10' 33°27'	Sabkhat al Bardawīl	31°10' 33°10'	Beersheba	31°14' 34°47'		
Netiv Asara	31°13' 34°13'	Jabal al Jiddī	30°10' 33°09'	Sharira Pass	28°22' 34°22'	Bi'r Abu Rudays	28°53' 33°11'		
Neviot	29°10' 34°40'	Jabal ar Rāḥyah	29°53' 32°57'	Sharm al Mayyah	27°51' 34°17'	Bi'r al 'Abd	31°01' 33°00'		
Ophira	27°51' 34°17'	Jabal at Tih	29°30' 34°00'	Sharm ash Shaykh	27°51' 34°17'	Bi'r al 'Udayd	28°59' 34°05'		
Sadot	31°12' 34°12'	Jabal al Ḥama	29°58' 32°55'	Suez Canal	29°55' 32°33'	Bi'r ar Rummānah	31°01' 32°40'		
Yam	31°02' 33°10'	Jabal Hilāl	30°37' 34°01'	Sweet Water Canal	30°34' 32°14'	Bi'r ath Thamādah	30°10' 33°28'		
		Jabal Katrīnah	28°31' 33°57'	Wādī Abū al Jayn	29°25' 33°36'	Bi'r Ḥammah	30°37' 33°32'		
		Jabal Libnī	30°44' 33°50'	Wādī al 'Aqabah	30°14' 33°53'	Bi'r Ḥasanah	30°28' 33°47'		
		Jabal Maghārah	30°42' 33°23'	Wādī al 'Arīsh	31°09' 33°49'	Bi'r Jifāfah	30°27' 33°11'		
		Jabal Mūsā	28°32' 33°59'	Wādī al Burūk	30°15' 33°52'	Bi'r Lahfān	31°01' 33°52'		
		Jabal Qābiliyyāt	28°27' 33°28'	Wādī al Gha'ib	28°34' 34°28'	Bi'r Tābah	29°30' 34°53'		
		Jabal Ṣabbāgh	28°12' 34°04'	Wādī al Jurf	29°06' 33°27'	Būr Fu'ād	31°15' 32°19'		
		Jabal Ṣaḥrā	28°00' 34°08'	Wādī al 'Udayd	29°01' 34°11'	Būr Tawfiq	29°57' 32°34'		
		Jabal Tāsā	30°34' 32°37'	Wādī ash Shaykh	28°42' 33°41'	Dhahab	28°29' 34°32'		
		Jabal Umm Khisheib	30°17' 32°58'	Wādī Fayrān	28°40' 33°12'	Dimona	31°04' 35°02'		
		Jabal Umm Shomer	28°22' 33°55'	Wādī Gharandal	29°15' 32°55'	Dumyat (Damietta)	31°25' 31°48'		
		Jabal Yu'alliq	30°22' 33°31'	Wādī Jirā'	29°34' 33°59'	Elat	29°33' 34°57'		
		Jazīrat Tīrān	27°56' 34°34'	Wādī Naṣb	28°35' 34°28'	Fā'id	30°19' 32°19'		
		Khaliq at Ṭinah (Bay of Tīn)	31°08' 32°40'	Wādī Ṣamghī	29°01' 34°35'	Fāqūs	30°44' 31°48'		
		Little Bitter Lake	30°13' 32°33'	Wādī Wardān	29°30' 32°43'	Ismailia	30°35' 32°16'		
		Maḍīq Jūbāl (Strait of Gubal)	27°40' 33°55'	Wādī Zaghrāh	28°40' 34°20'	Jubayl	28°12' 33°38'		
		Maḍīq Tīrān (Strait of Tiran)	27°55' 34°28'	Watīya Pass	28°36' 33°59'	Khān Yūnus	31°21' 34°19'		
		Marsā Bareika	27°47' 34°13'			Kilometer 101	30°05' 32°15'		
		Mitla Pass	30°01' 32°54'	POPULATED PLACES		Maḥajjah Thalāthah	30°35' 32°20'		
		Nasib Pass	28°36' 34°26'	Abū Darbah	28°29' 33°20'	Nabq	28°04' 34°25'		
		Plain of Ṭinah	31°01' 32°34'	Abū Zanīmāh	29°03' 33°06'	Nizzana	30°52' 34°27'		
		Ra's abu Suweira	28°18' 33°33'	'Adabiyah	29°53' 32°28'	Nuweiba'	28°58' 34°39'		
		Ra's as Sidr	29°36' 32°40'	Al 'Aqabah	29°31' 35°00'	Port Said	31°16' 32°18'		
		Ra's Ghārib	28°21' 33°07'	Al 'Arīsh	31°08' 33°48'	Rafaḥ	31°16' 34°14'		
		Ra's Jarrah	28°02' 33°46'	Al Kuntillāh	30°00' 34°41'	Sharm ash Shaykh	27°51' 34°17'		
		Ra's Mal'ab	29°12' 32°55'	Al Manzilah	31°10' 31°56'	Sidr	29°43' 32°39'		
		Ra's Matarimah	29°27' 32°43'	Al Maṭariyah	31°11' 32°02'	Suez	29°58' 32°33'		
		Ra's Misallah	29°49' 32°36'	Al Qanṭarah	30°51' 32°19'	Umm Bugma	28°59' 33°21'		
				Al Ṭamad	29°41' 34°18'	'Uyūn Mūsā	29°52' 32°39'		
				An Nakhl	29°55' 33°45'	Za'farānah	27°54' 30°49'		



# JABAL AT TĪH [El Tih (El Egma) Plateau]



Atāqah	29°54' 32°27'
At Tūr	28°14' 33°37'
Bayn al Quṣaymah	30°40' 34°22'
Baysheba	31°14' 34°47'
Bi'r Abū Rudays	28°53' 33°11'
Bi'r al 'Abd	31°01' 33°00'
Bi'r al 'Udayd	28°59' 34°05'
Bi'r ar Rummānah	31°01' 32°40'
Bi'r ath Thamādah	30°10' 33°28'
Bi'r Ḥammah	30°37' 33°32'
Bi'r Ḥasanah	30°28' 33°47'
Bi'r Jifāfah	30°27' 33°11'
Bi'r Lahfān	31°01' 33°52'
Bi'r Tābah	29°30' 34°53'
Bi'r Fu'ād	31°15' 32°19'
Bi'r Tawfīq	29°57' 32°34'
Bi'r hahab	28°29' 34°32'
Bi'r imona	31°04' 35°02'
Bi'r umyaṭ (Damietta)	31°25' 31°48'
Bi'r lat	29°33' 34°57'
Bi'r 'ā'id	30°19' 32°19'
Bi'r āqūs	30°44' 31°48'
Bi'r mailla	30°35' 32°16'
Bi'r jbayl	28°12' 33°38'
Bi'r hān Yūnus	31°21' 34°19'
Bi'r ilometer 101	30°05' 32°15'
Bi'r Ḥaḥḥaḥ Thalāthah	30°35' 32°20'
Bi'r labāq	28°04' 34°25'
Bi'r lizzana	30°52' 34°27'
Bi'r ḥweiḥba'	28°58' 34°39'
Bi'r ort Sa'id	31°16' 32°18'
Bi'r afah	31°16' 34°14'
Bi'r harm ash Shaykh	27°51' 34°17'
Bi'r idr	29°43' 32°39'
Bi'r uez	29°58' 32°33'
Bi'r mm Bugma	28°59' 33°21'
Bi'r jyūn Mūsā	29°52' 32°39'
Bi'r a'farānah	27°54' 30°49'

NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATIONS ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORIZED

# JABAL AT TĪH [El Tih (El Egma) Plateau]



JORDAN

SAUDI ARABIA

Gulf of Aqaba

Madīq (Strait of Gubal)

Red Sea

### GLOSSARY

- Bi'r.....well
- Buḥayraf.....lake, marsh
- Būr.....port
- Jabal.....mountain, hill
- Jazīrat.....island
- Khalīj.....bay, gulf
- Madīq.....strait
- Mamarr.....pass
- Marsá.....cove, anchorage
- Sabkhat.....salt marsh, salt flat
- Sharm.....inlet, cove
- Ra's.....point, cape
- Wādī.....intermittent stream

NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITY