The original documents are located in Box 15, folder "Nessen - Reading in Preparation for Press Secretary's Job" of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

White House Report/Dual capacity brings power to Ronald Ziegler

by Dom Bonafede

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3/2/74
NATIONAL
JOURNAL
REPORTS

In his dual capacity as White House press secretary and assistant to the President, Ronald L. Ziegler has become one of the most powerful members of the White House staff. He alone remains of the circle of senior campaign aides who triumphantly entered the White House in 1969 with President Nixon. According to associates, the President sees in Ziegler, 34, a link to early, happier days in the Administration before Watergate became a catch-phrase for high level improprieties.

Hagerty counterpart: Not since James C. Hagerty in the Eisenhower Administration, has a White House press secretary been involved so intimately in Presidential press and policy matters. As assistant to the President and confidant of Mr. Nixon, Ziegler sits in on Oval Office discussions and offers counsel on matters large and small. In addition, he directs the Administration's press and public relations apparatus.



President Nixon with Ronald Ziegler (left) and the press at San Clemente

Not since James C. Hagerty's days on President Eisenhower's staff has a White House press secretary been so deeply involved in policy as well as publicity as is Ronald L. Ziegler. The sole survivor of President Nixon's pre-Watergate inner circle, Ziegler serves not only as an adviser but is responsible for the communications network throughout the executive branch. His goal is to rebuild Mr. Nixon's credibility by documenting Presidential achievements, a process he says he thinks already is beginning to work.

Yet, little is known of Ziegler's true influence in the White House and his impact on Presidential policy.

Background

Ziegler's rise within the White House hierarchy came when criticism of him ran deepest and White House fortunes were at a low ebb.

Following his remark that the deceptions, denials and misinformation which he had voiced concerning Watergate ("a third-rate burglary attempt," he once called it) were "inoperative," it was widely assumed—and publicly predicted—by many members of the Washington press corps last summer that Ziegler would be leaving the White House, as had such Presidential aides as H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman.

Press critique: At about the same time, a thinly veiled call for Ziegler's ouster was issued in a report on the press and the Nixon Administration compiled by a study team from American University and the National Press Club. It said:

"The White House press secretary has been reduced to a totally programmed spokesman without independent authority or comprehensive background knowledge of Administration policies. Rather than opening a window to the White House, the press secretary closes doors. Information about public business is supplied on a selective, self-serving basis. Legitimate questions about public affairs are not answered on a day-to-day basis; even worse, such questions are often not seriously considered.

"Ronald Ziegler as White House press secretary, particularly during the Watergate disclosures of the past year, has misled the public and affronted the professional standards of the Washington press corps.

"We believe there is need for a better public understanding concerning the function of a White House press secretary. . . . If the post of White House press secretary is to serve a function for the press and public, it should be occupied by an individual—not necessarily with news experience—but of stature and broad background." *(For a profile on Ziegler and an account of the White House press operation, see Vol. 5, No. 24, p. 866.)*

Ignoring the criticism, Mr. Nixon showed his faith in Ziegler by promoting him, an action construed as a reward for his loyalty during troubled times.

Assistant to the President

Under his new status, Ziegler is one of two Presidential aides—the other is Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., White House chief of staff—who serve as Mr. Nixon's principal advisers. They enjoy carte blanche access to the Oval Office and confer daily with the President on a wide range of issues. They counsel Mr. Nixon on Watergate and on all major appointments and act as his conduit with the Administration. *(For additional information on Haig, see Vol. 5, No. 34, p. 1239.)*

Dual roles: Referring to his dual role, Ziegler said, "It's not a balancing thing; they kind of overlap. I don't make a conscious attempt to divide the time between them. My specific area is communications. I don't attempt to advise the President on fuel allocations or the Middle East negotiations or on economics. But when the President wants my advice on anything—and quite frankly he often does—I respond within the scope of my competence. It doesn't mean it's in my responsibility; I simply talk to him as many others do.

"Far too much is made out of titles and how many times someone sees the President. That shows a lack of reality on how things are done in this Administration."

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Connie,

Ron requested this article.....

patty

FOREIGN POLICY
FALL 1974
ISSUE #16

Opinion

THE MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY

by Charles W. Bray

Let's begin with Irving Kristol:

> *Someone . . . has observed that the year 1909 was a critical moment in the history of medicine, for that was the year when the medical profession finally began to do, on balance, more good than harm to its patients. The profession of journalism, as it now declares itself to be, seems to me to be in its pre-1909 phase, and it is legitimate to wonder when it will begin to do more good than harm to the body politic.*[1]

If my friends in the media find that statement irritating, my colleagues in the government will certainly derive undue comfort from it.

The discussion, which reflects my experiences as spokesman for the Department of State (but represents a personal point of view), turns on three points. The first addresses the nature of the "adversary relationship" between the government and the fourth estate. The second has to do with an increasingly anachronistic definition of "news." The third has to do with the serious problem of secrecy in government and the urgent need, to borrow a phrase from Norman Cousins, to "demystify" foreign policy.

Since so much else flows from it, we will begin with the relationship between adversaries. To introduce that subject, and indeed all that follows, I ought to note

[1] *Irving Kristol, "Crisis for Journalism: The Missing Elite," in* Press, Politics and Popular Government *(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, March 1972), p. 43.*

Each issue of FOREIGN POLICY *carries a guest editorial by a distinguished contributor. We are pleased to continue this series with Mr. Bray's article.*

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RN wants to get the complete article

on the attached

Bray, Charles W., "The Media and Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, Fall 1974, pp. 109-125. Summarized by Monica Fenrich, SAFAAR. (74-40)

(Note: Mr. Bray, a Foreign Service Officer, was Press Spokesman for the Department of State from 1971 to 1973.)

Reflecting on his experiences as spokesman for the Department of State, Mr. Bray discusses the media and foreign policy in terms of: 1. the "nature of the 'adversary relationship' between the government and the fourth estate"; 2. the "increasingly anachronistic definition of 'news'"; 3. the "serious problem of secrecy in government" and the need to "demystify" foreign policy.

Regarding the first point, Bray observes that the survival of the US is now, as never before, linked with that of the rest of the world. The evidence is clear when considering such matters as world inflation, environment, food and natural resources. However, says Bray, neither the government nor the media is doing its best to prepare Americans to cope with the dilemmas of survival. Here, both must begin by improving their relationship with the goal of serving the whole of society. In the past, the government's "passion for privacy" drove the media to depend on "indiscretions" and "leaked documents" for its information--a situation which developed into the inevitable vicious circle. Currently much of the distortion of the adversary relationship between government and the press is due to the idealism of reporters: their concept of what needs to be done is often far removed from what can actually be accomplished in an increasingly complex world; and their disillusionment is sometimes reported in a powerful, negative way. An entirely fresh start between the government and the media is impossible, says Bray, but both sides would "benefit from a dose of uncertainty and humility and could manage with a good deal less of self-righteousness." Diplomats should learn to regard reporters less as "enemies" and more as "adversaries," while reporters must adjust to the fact that government is just beginning to approach a new series of monumental worldwide social problems which probably cannot be "solved."

Bray sees a basic problem in media coverage of world affairs: quantity vs. quality, or money vs. intellect. While the journalism industry is concerned with, and appears to make, sufficient monetary profit, there is virtual "poverty" in the area of intellect. In the interest of reporting what will profitably "sell," the media neglects coverage of world affairs, ignoring the increased meshing of foreign and domestic matters. The consequences of this neglect, Bray speculates, will be an American public, unwarned and ill-prepared to make the decisions which will ultimately be necessary if we are to survive as a society. It is the essential element of "perspective," says Bray, that is missing from media coverage of foreign affairs; and it is particularly absent in televised journalism. Both the word press and the picture press are afflicted by what Bray calls the "fire engine syndrome," which requires that a story must have "action" before it is regarded as news. Often the status of "news stories" is determined by the wire services' attitudes toward them, and the result of editors' obsessions with covering the "breaking story" is duplication. More importantly, this focus excludes the two important journalistic responsibilities of investigation and reflection. Evidence of the first failing is seen in the fact that one important investigative story in foreign affairs--Seymour Hersh's exposé of the My Lai massacre--was produced by a small news service, having aroused the interest of no major newspaper. With regard to the second problem, Bray believes that news stories often lack any reflection of perspective, failing to address the question of whether the story "makes sense." Illustrative of this fault is much of the

(14)

coverage of the issue of detente with the Soviet Union; here, Bray accuses, the media have "effectively reduced public discussion of a complex problem to gibberish spiced with irrelevancy," while issues on which the public needs to reflect are ignored in the race for the "breaking story."

On the problem of secrecy in government, Bray admits there is too much information "locked up in the government," but cautions that a degree of privacy is necessary. Both the government and the media can take an essential step toward "demystifying" foreign policy by reinstating the forgotten art of "plain talk" in an effort to communicate with the American people, whom both factions are obligated to serve.

In conclusion, Bray suggests that the government and the media try to redefine their adversary relationship. He proposes that the media reevaluate their position in terms of: 1. considering whether their only role is that of challenge; 2. varying the "bill of fare" to better reflect the actual state of public affairs, rather than concentrating on criticism; 3. investigating the popularity of more reflective, analytical stories with an eye toward redefining the concept of "news" as well as reporting the views of the public to those in government; 4. making a systematic effort to report the background of a story as a part of the whole, thereby clarifying the picture before the public; 5. recognizing, in print, when public officials perform their jobs creditably, in an effort to encourage continued good performance as well as good government-media relations.

BOOKS

Fox, J. Ronald, ARMING AMERICA: HOW THE US BUYS WEAPONS, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, 484 pp., $15.00. Summarized by Carol Babcock, SAFAAR. (74-40)

(Note: Dr. Fox, a former Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L), and a former Associate Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, is currently a consultant to government and industry.)

Dr. Fox joins the debate over the defense budget on the side of those who feel that the budget is too high and that significant economies are necessary. However, unlike many Pentagon critics, Dr. Fox does not advocate that the cutbacks necessarily come from a reduction of arms procurements but rather from improving the management of the "confused bureaucracy" in weapons procurement and from redefining government's relationship to the "over-extended" industry. In his study of the weapons acquisition process, Fox draws not only on his personal experience but also on interviews with several hundred military and civilian personnel working in various stages of the process, including government program managers and representatives of defense contractors. Fox seeks to discover what in the relationship between government and private industry makes the management process impervious to reform.

According to Fox, at least 30 percent of defense program costs could be cut by introducing business practices and standards that have been developed for large commercial programs; savings would accrue from $8 to $12 billion a year. In his analysis, Fox notes that in 1971, only two out of 35 major development and production

WITH KENNEDY

PIERRE SALINGER

1966

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ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR.
23D DISTRICT, TEXAS

1314 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Sept. 30, 1974

Dear Ron:

Here's the memo I mentioned Friday, done in the last days of the Johnson administration and untouched since because I know very little of practices in Ron Ziegler's days.

The value may be marginal, though it may serve for rebuttal when someone tells you how something used to be done. I think there was another segment on foreign travel, probably centering around the obvious that you need all the time you can get for preparations and then adequate times for filing while in transit.

Whether this is useful or not --

All good wishes,

Bob Fleming

Don't bother to acknowledge.

November 19, 1968

To you, with falling hands, we fling the torch.
Be yours to hold it high ---

The White House press office is not Flanders Fields, where poppies grow. It's quite another terrain. The attached memoranda recite some of the ways some problems were faced.

There are two important reasons that the Press office function well. The first essential is that the flow of information, as full and fast as possible, must be available to the media. The other, with mutual defenses, is that tired and frustrated reporters use tired and frustrated senses that will perceive a tired and frustrated President. Facilities for news coverage, and operation of the Press office, certainly affect reporting.

These memoranda cover part of the range of the needs. I hope they'll be helpful. Be assured that I am quite willing to advise in any area within my experience.

Bob Fleming

ACCREDITATION

The issuance of White House media accreditation was completely re-done in 1967-68, principally to update the rolls. More than 1800 persons were previously accredited. The goal was to cut this figure in half, but it now stands at approximately 1200. The failure to achieve the goal came from increases in foreign accreditations and stubbornness of major news organizations.

We stressed, in all cases, that accreditation was not issued to individuals but to organizations: the Washington Post could put an editorial writer on its list, but had to cut back on correspondents. And we required, in issuing new and later accreditation, that the organization was responsible for returning an old pass to get a new one. We didn't want the passes to become souvenirs.

We established two major criteria: the holder must have the need for regular and frequent access to the White House press office, and he must be based in Washington.

The first requirement, which produced the stubbornness reaction, aimed to reduce the number accredited to any one organization, on the theory that a wire service, a Washington newspaper or a network news bureau had no need for 100% accreditation. We asked the newspapers and wires to cut to 20 correspondents apiece, and pressed them to eliminate such infrequent users as editorial writers, lesser executives, desk men, etc. We asked the major networks to cut to 12 correspondents. We did not ask cuts in photographers, broadcast technicians, etc., because the rotation of assignments on personnel or the emergency need might make fast access necessary for such workers.

Status Seekers

The requirement for local employment was a device to deny passes to scores of persons on minor newspapers, magazines and radio stations who had no need but simply sought status. Similarly, we cut off editors, columnists and others who seemed to have similar purposes.

We did not accept applications from individuals in their own behalf, but instead required letters from bureau managers, managing editors, etc. Again, this stressed that we accredited organizations, who were asked to emphasize their publication's or network's need.

Foreigners came under another system. We required that they apply to their embassies, which in turn asked State for approval, and in turn State endorsed these requests to us. We did not make political discriminations, on the basis that we wanted access to American personnel elsewhere.

The foreign list would sometimes grow when foreign heads of state came to the White House. We generally did not issue permanent accreditation, but accepted the press badges issued by State, and this occasionally gave us problems.

Unwelcome Guests

Some lesser nations hired New York or Washington public relations firms, which wanted their representatives present as reporters or photographers. Occasionally, one of these people would show on our "Do not admit" list--a Protective Research collection of people who had threatened the President, denied their true identity, etc. We sought to solve this by requiring that special admission lists come 48 hours ahead of an official visitor, but sometimes smaller nations did not co-operate. In a few cases, we asked the Secret Service to escort individuals while they attended ceremonies involving the President.

To return to the normal routine: applications came to the press office; both Moyers and Christian delegated this area to me. After a judgment that the organization needed the person accredited, a letter was sent saying that the application was being considered. At first, we said it had been approved and was being processed, but we found some problems at the second stage.

That stage came when the application was sent to Protective Research, a unit of the Secret Service. There a check was made for any police record or other information casting doubt on the wisdom of approval. We insisted that the decision on approval was a Press office function, and if PRS felt a man should not get a card, that view was to be expressed to me.

Criteria for Saying "No"

The reasons often varied. I rejected several complaints that men had frequent Communist associations, when inquiry showed that they saw east European diplomats socially. Other complaints on moral character required individual consideration, but I leaned to the view that an individual erratic in his personal habits might misbehave in a manner to embarrass the President. As an example, one woman had called one night to threaten the President's life. Her explanation was that she was

drunk. I ordered her card picked up on the theory that she wasn't a smart drunk. Another, who was Jewish, asked a visiting Arab head of state why he was "trying to push my people into the sea." She said she was an objective reporter; I said she was objectionable.

We discussed at times whether we should pull the cards of reporters who made serious factual errors; we never went beyond strong warnings to them and their superiors that we did not have to tolerate fools. We always assumed we had to tolerate enemies.

We had few occasions to involve accreditation and credit ratings. We refused to consider that we had any part in men failing to pay bills, unless they were bills to us. Sometimes, after major trips, we'd have trouble collecting travel payments, but usually a second warning contained advice that we might have to pick up a White House pass, and we received the money.

Private Enterprising

I was never quite satisfied that we met the problem of free-lance photographers. Writers doing one story were given temporary access, but Washington has a dozen or so good photographers who left regular employment to operate on their own. To encourage such private enterprise, I generally lowered the access requirement slightly if I knew the individual, but there were times when I may have been unfair because I didn't know the man.

We also maintained--at a lower level of efficiency than we claimed--what we called the Access List. We had a number of applicants whose letters generally said they'd had White House cards for 20 years and still needed them, in working on the Monthly Drug Review or the Motor Boat World or some such publication. We'd reply that we were sending their letter to Protective Research, which would place their names on the Access List. Thereafter, if they'd telephone when they wanted to come in, we'd have them cleared at the gate by the time they arrived. The system wasn't quite that good, and if they were delayed at the gate, they sometimes complained.

The Press office also retained the right to clear individuals at the gates. Other government offices, sending material to us, or a magazine picking up a photograph, to cite examples, would give us the name of the person coming. We'd ask the police desk in the lobby to clear the messenger, and in turn the word would go to the officers at the gate concerned. Similar methods were used to clear individual callers--and you'll find that old friends of your mother want to come by to pay their respects (and get a look inside).

A final note: I think the accreditation list is too large, but I don't know that it can be cut. I know also that we were never actually overwhelmed by numbers of press, either in normal handling of crises or attendance at the President's news conferences.

BRIEFINGS

Through the curse of past practices, White House briefings were scheduled twice daily, Mondays through Fridays, with reporters expecting them at 11 a.m. and 4 p.m. The briefings were often late, to complete pre-briefing conferences with the President; the press came to believe that delays meant important announcements forthcoming. The only external factors that sometimes delayed briefings were agreement on simultaneous release with other governments (on such matters as official visits) or the rare need to delay announcements until stock markets closed.

The Press Secretary's office can hold up to 50 newsmen (photographers and sometimes broadcast technicians attend to make advance plans). We found it more satisfactory, once the newness of the administration wore off and the crowd diminished, to use the Fish room, in which the usher's staff could place about 35 chairs. One factor was that Christian liked use of the podium to mask his own notes and papers; if he was at his desk, reporters sometimes read them ahead of him.

No recording of briefings was permitted; occasionally, we'd let networks shoot a few minutes of silent film.

Guest Stars

The content of the briefings was about what would be expected, with one useful addition by Christian. He chose to bring in others--special assistants, cabinet officers, the budget director, etc.--to background on major matters. Similarly, in the case of major speeches by the President, ranging from State of the Union to important formal statements, he often had White House briefings by staff personnel directly concerned (i.e. Rostow on foreign affairs, Califano on legislation, etc.) These usually served to put reporting emphasis where the President wanted it. On such occasions, the texts were generally available 30 to 45 minutes ahead of the briefing, but no texts could be carried from the White House before such a briefing ended. Reporters pleading deadline problems, foreign correspondents, even couriers were told of the restriction in advance, and White House police barred premature departures.

Because President Johnson often used his lunch hour for work sessions, there were many days with a long mid-day news lull. It was therefore practice to provide lids to specified times--as from 12:30 to 3:30. Some reporters complained when lunch hours were less than two hours, but if no news was imminent, it was useful to let them go away. Afternoon lids generally came at 5 or 5:30.

East Side Story

Briefings never touched on social activities of the President. One basic guide-line was that Mrs. Carpenter's staff handled "daughters, damasks and dogs," or anything about the Johnson family, the official and social functions in the House, and pets. We struggled at times to handle news from the major social affairs, because when we persuaded the President to include some press as non-working guests, we found those men welcomed the recognition but found the situation competitive from the news standpoint. Mrs. Carpenter's office would escort formally gowned girl reporters to the House for the post-dinner entertainment--time and again the President would chat with them--and occasionally he'd reveal plans for travel prior to any Press Office announcement.

On Saturdays, there were no formal briefings unless circumstances were most unusual. Christian usually advised on Friday that the Press Office would be operating and would handle queries, but he foresaw no important announcements. A hard core of reporters usually appeared about 11 a.m. to sit and wait word that nothing was in sight. (When we wanted Sunday newsbreaks on major stories, we usually leaned on matters backgrounded on Fridays with embargo for Sunday ayem papers. But there were enough early editions of ayems so they weren't closed out.)

When the President travelled, as to Texas, briefings were held once a day, usually at 11 a.m., with none on Saturday. One of the petty practices on the road is that correspondents take their notes on typewriters, so press rooms on the road need public address systems.

Western Union usually had a competent man travelling with us to move copy. ATT had a Washington man who usually arranged for installation of toll phones at travel sites.



CREATURE COMFORTS

We found that Press secretaries did well to protect their people on some White House privileges.

Past practice has been that certain designated White House personnel have use of the White House cars to travel to and from work and on official duties. On a personal note: when I came, I felt this was a bit ostentatious, but for a time I had to be in at 7:45 a.m., having already read five newspapers. Only the Washington Post was delivered to my home by 7:20, so I'd have read it thoroughly by the time the driver came, bringing the other papers. I could skim through them by the time I reached the House for the morning conference with the President.

There are reading lights in the cars, so that the trips home provided opportunity to check through magazines or other reports. And the energy saved by not driving was important.

The White House mess privileges are also graded--Class 1 people are supposed to eat between 12 and 1, and Class 2 people anytime between 1 and 2:45. We had to negotiate to get all Press Officers in Class 2, because work often kept them from getting away from their desks before 1 p.m.

Secretaries (except one in the President's office) did not have mess privileges, but could order by phone from the kitchen and take trays to their desks. Most did so--food was inexpensive and time was saved.

The mess, operated by the Navy, called for $25 deposits on joining, refundable on departure. Slips are signed each day; bills are issued monthly. No media guests were permitted; others were acceptable.

We periodically had complaints from the press that they needed food facilities when developments prevented lids. We never felt long-term arrangements necessary. At one time, a government cafeteria on the ground floor of EOB was open to them, but that access was closed off because it complicated building security.

A number of the bureaus co-operate to hire a courier, Bill Davis, who's become a White House fixture since the Hagerty period. If starvation gets rampant, he's usually available to go for sandwiches, or the network people use their film couriers. Their occasional plight isn't as bad as they claim, but is only noted because you may get pleas to make other arrangements.

There is one more area of White House privilege that's almost not worth attention. Media representatives, especially the regulars, have long handled requests for tours of the mansion. At one time, we required that a man approve these, with a view to establishing some gratitude. It proved too time-consuming, so we simply had any of the girls take the request, call the tour office in the east wing, and arrange to put names on the "early VIP tour" list. This saved certain guests waiting in tourist lines, and gave them access to the tours with guides that were created years ago to meet congressional requests.

TELEPHONE TRAFFIC

The Press office telephones never quit ringing. Many of the calls can be handled by the secretarial staff--these range from requests for releases to the most inane suggestions on public policy. During business hours in other White House offices, the wise switchboard operators route such calls well, but if the Press office operates later, the operators know it. And the normal quotation of the Press secretary or briefing officer gives "nuts" a name to call.

This last factor is one reason why Press officers found they needed unlisted phones at home. West coast bars close after normal Washingtonians are asleep, so every Press officer has had to cope with mush-mouthed queries that begin "I gotta great idea for the President." WHCA can install residence phones tied to the White House switchboard, and the night operators will ask callers for identification before waking staff men at home.

Established practice was that the Press secretary was wakened only for known correspondents who emphasized their need to talk to him. Other calls went to aides. Experience showed that most such calls were useless: a wire service desk asking at 2 a.m. for reaction to an event in Saigon, feeling he had to try even though he knew policy-makers were probably getting deserved sleep.

But no Press secretary is able to keep up with all his calls daily. Other obligations intervened. We coached secretaries to say "I'll ask him to call back," rather than promising a return call. Throughout the day, the Press secretary used spare moments, saying "What's on the call list?" Christian found he had to repeat, though, that certain callers had top priority. If the Secretary of State or Defense called and he was with the President, George wanted to be told as soon as he was back at his desk. The same rule applied to selected top White House aides.

As a day went on and the list grew, he'd ask his people to return some calls, especially those from people unknown to him. We'd explain he was busy, and wanted us to see if we could help. Often the call was trivial: an editor wanting a White House tour, or a radio station wanting comment on a local controversy.

The media uses returns of calls as a major measuring stick of press office efficiency. It's considered a blanket indictment when a bureau chief or columnist tells his friends "They don't return calls." Jim Hagerty

once admitted a device: if he was working late, he'd tell the girl placing calls to "Just leave word" and then he considered he'd done enough. He did not feel that he had to pursue a caller to a party or his home. And for newsmen known to be less than friendly, he sometimes made the least of efforts: he'd tell the girl "Once the phone rings twice, hang up."

BROADCAST POOL

The networks' pool was created years ago as a loose, informal method of equal communication for ABC, CBS, Mutual and NBC. When the Kennedy administration introduced live coverage of news conferences, the pool became more important, and also made Mutual less important. It served the Press secretary by establishing simpler communications--he told the pool chairman of proposals or plans, the chairman handled the industry responses, and reported back to the Press office. The broadcasters were served by an orderly rotation of opportunity and obligation to cover Presidential activities.

That basic system remains, though revision might be wise. As it operated for some time, the Press secretary would confidentially advise the pool chairman (a post that rotates each three months, in alphabetical order) that the President was considering a speech or news conference available for television and/or radio. The chairman would then ask each network for its preference of hours. In past times, these would occasionally be identical, but as television began use of movies in prime time, the networks often had conflicts in their wishes.

Variety Isn't Bad

When proposals were received, the Press secretary would reach a decision on White House preference, so advise the chairman, who in turn would consult other members on whether they wished to accept the preferred time. It was Jim Hagerty's view that two networks "live" and a third delayed provided better coverage, and we agreed, but the competitive influence on the networks usually brought all of them to "live" coverage.

I noted that advance information was confidential. We particularly stressed that the networks' White House correspondents were not the channel of communication, and preferably should not be told of confidential discussions. They felt offended at times, but we found the practice wise because lobby conversation sometimes came back to us as hard facts that we were hiding from other media. Once a time for a broadcast was set, the networks always wanted to know when they could announce, an attitude produced by their competitive desires to build big audiences. Usually, once the time was set, we told them to hold announcement until it was made at a press briefing, and thus we made use of the information equally available to all media.

Time Never "Requested"

This, as noted, was the basic system for some years. In the Johnson administration, the White House often decided timing, and the word to the

pool chairman often was "The President will speak at blank p.m. Tuesday night; coverage will be allowed." We knew they'd want to carry, but we avoided asking for air time. It was President Johnson's boast that he never asked the networks for prime time; technically the statement was correct.

Occasionally, about midway in his term, he aimed news announcements for 6:35 p.m. or thereabouts, knowing that two major network news shows would break for his statements. Later, he preferred other times. It was his view, too, that an important statement might well be about 22 minutes long, providing the networks six or seven minutes of time in the half-hour segment that they'd fill with analysis and comment. I was often doubtful that the impact of a Presidential speech was increased by commentators who sometimes went to analysis of motives and prospects with strange varieties of conclusions.

Don't Forget Radio

Another influence of the emphasis on television was that radio became secondary. The network pool continued to consult with Mutual most times, but the Press office undertook to offer advance planning time for Westinghouse, Metromedia and Mutual when TV planning overlooked that network. The correspondents for those organizations were diligent and persistent, so we helped them.

A long-time basic practice is worth citing here. The White House has always contended that no broadcaster could be excluded from carrying the President, so the networks arranged that independent stations could pick up TV or radio feeds at the nearest toll test board. Thus the networks incurred no added expense--the costs were paid by the independent--but a station in San Francisco could get its feed at the San Francisco toll test board, rather than paying line charges from Washington.

Facilities in the House

In recent years, the networks were anxious to have better facilities at the White House, and various press secretaries agreed there'd be benefits. Hence at network expense the film theater was used as a TV studio, with a control room and permanent cameras. The room was too small to use for major events; its greater utility was for possible emergency statements. Equipment of the theater, however, was completed at about the time that the networks went to full color. The black-and-white cameras and control room were almost obsolescent. Modernization was considered.

The networks reported that they'd have to spend over a million dollars to provide good facilities. We could not foresee that President Johnson would make sufficient use of the theater to justify that expense.

The alternatives were considered with the basic assumption that color was quite desirable, both to be compatible with viewers' habits and for the secondary purposes of future documentaries that would be produced in color.

Three methods were possible:

1. The President could appear on film. This was the simplest, if "live" delivery was not significantly important. But when President Johnson wanted to announce the Viet-nam bombing halt, he wanted the news held so tightly that WHCA film crews were used, and the quality was poor. On lesser statements, film coverage by all film crews, in the Fish room, saw consistent quality and observance of release times.

2. The President could go to a network studio, which would feed other TV networks and radio simultaneously. This was done once by President Johnson, when he went to CBS to announce a major labor settlement. There was virtually no advance notice, even to CBS, and while the effort went well, those involved were relieved that it did not become regular practice.

3. A pool-selected network could come to the White House. This method is used for televised news conferences, and involves moving two large trucks, much cable and gear, so that eight hours' set-up time is about the minimum.

Mobile Unit Studied

The third point needs more explanation. In discussions with the TV pool (composed of the Washington bureau chiefs) we had asked their chief engineers to join in considering an alternative to installation of color facilities in the theater. They agreed to study the possibility of putting such facilities in a single van. Its mobility would allow the pool to use it at the White House, but also include congressional coverage, inaugurations, etc., to get more return on their investment. The study slowed a bit because certain miniaturization of equipment loomed; if successful, it would cut the van size appreciably.

Whenever networks wanted to move vans to the White House, co-ordination with several elements was needed. The White House police had to provide parking areas. Protective Research provided watch officers and escorts. The White House electrician had to help with power lines. The usher's office and carpenter shop provided men to move furniture and install platforms.

Trucks in Abundance

And if an event was not pooled--an event such as a major international crisis or the wedding in the President's family--each network wanted its own trucks at the House.

We found at times that our girls would get calls saying "This is CBS; we have a truck at the southwest gate, and so please clear these engineers ---." We directed the girls that all such requests had to be handled by a Press officer, and we did not take kindly to dispatch of trucks without our approval. We could show escalation of crisis conditions in an interesting fashion:

An important decision, in foreign or domestic areas, is obviously pending. The networks, wanting the President if available, also want to show their viewers that they're on top of the news, decide they'd like to send in their mobile units. Once those trucks appear in West Executive av., the print reporters think the Press office had told broadcasters something that they've not heard. They'd come in with probing questions, as is their right. But then we would get leads such as "An air of tension hung over the White House today...." On occasion, we'd even see Wall Street reactions, for rumors spread there rapidly. Therefore we sometimes had a responsibility to fight rumors with no real bases in fact.

Parking Can Be Problem

At the other end of the balance in the scheme of things is the parking location of the vans. Sometimes it was an esthetic question--we didn't like them at the North portico because of their bulk--and other times the more practical point that they liked the sunken driveway on the east side, so they could park adjacent to the East room, but the truck size blocked fire lanes and closed the route for the morning waste collection.

The pool engineers reluctantly agreed to a plan that provided stanchions on East and West Executive avs. These provided cable lines into the grounds: they'd tie in their truck at a stanchion for power, and tie in to cable runs inside the grounds. In mid-year these stanchions had facilities for two color trucks, and the networks needed three. The question raised by GSA, which did the work, was whether the networks would pay the added costs. The question is still unsettled.

(A related subject: the four radio networks with booths off the west lobby paid the costs of creating those small studios. Similarly, there are more such booths in the "dog house." If and when other outfits want space, the Press office can properly reply that there is none available, and that if more were developed, the costs would be high.

(The networks also have each retained desk space in the press room, justified because they paid for the booth space and actually represent two media each. In times of major news developments, they need the press room facility for camera crews, radio planning, etc. Some press room

space should open up with a change in administrations, since the Texas newspapers probably will no longer feel the same need for desk areas, but it may take urgings to get bureau chiefs to relinquish space. One solution: if told they must share a desk, they sometimes give it up.)

Speeches at the Capitol

On major Presidential broadcasts at the capitol, such as State of the Union, the Press officer worked closely with the Speaker, Parliamentarian, House gallery, and capitol architect. Operational methods are now established: the Speaker likes to be asked if past privileges can be granted again, and is co-operative.

For State of the Union and such speeches, the Press officer controls the timing. For illustration, assume the address is to be delivered at 8 p.m. The President and his guests arrive at the Capitol at 7:45 and go to the Speaker's office to greet the escort committees. At 7:55, the designated House official leads the Cabinet out, at 7:57 the Speaker goes to his dais position, and at 7:59 the escort committee moves out. With senior senators as members, a two-minute interval is needed so that the President reaches the back door of the House at 8:01 p.m. The networks have used the minute from 8 p.m. to announce the special broadcast, and announcement of the President by Doorkeeper Miller begins the live broadcast.

The Press officer needs to be in the Speaker's room. He has a network timekeeper outside the door, and their co-ordination of clock-times provides a smooth operation. The radio broadcasters, speaking from the House cloakrooms, operate on the premise that the Press officer will have the President in the doorway at 8:01 p.m.

Once he's started the procession on its way, his effort is in the hands of fate. He has checked the lights and the Teleprompter, has consulted the network producer on moving one camera down the center aisle after the President has entered, and he can thereafter do no more than pray. It's perhaps the most important single Presidential broadcast appearance; co-operation of all hands can make it go well.

(Presidents may think the Inaugural appearance is more important, but that one seems to have built-in distractions accepted by all concerned.)

PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES

President Johnson held almost all news conferences at the White House. The Indian treaty room in EOB, used by President Eisenhower, was too small. The State Department auditorium, used by President Kennedy, was too large, both in general seating and because the abundant space argued automatically for live television coverage. President Johnson often did not want that; he was more comfortable and therefore more responsive off-camera.

Press comments that he resented comparison with President Kennedy's platform poise were only partially correct. After one TV news conference, he pointed to a still picture in the New York Times which showed him standing, head bowed, over the podium. He recalled that he'd been asked a question about Gen. deGaulle, and had looked down as he planned his answer. Then he explained, in effect:

I could do that, with reporters there, and they'd realize I was pondering what to say. But TV viewers, not sensing my caution, would think I'd buckled. And we don't want anyone thinking that the President of the United States was scared to talk about deGaulle.

Freedom of Movement

President Johnson was, in a way, the captive of the big podium. It took time to persuade him that he did not have to stand behind it, that he could use it for notes when he desired, but could move away from it. When he agreed to wear a lavaliere microphone, he had the freedom to move and to gesture. He was most effective. Incidentally, we'd place the mike inside his coat before he came into the room and an anonymous WHCA technician would plug in the mike line once he reached the podium.

On the technical side, we usually asked the President to be in his living quarters prior to an East room news conference. This site made him easily accessible, and avoided last-minute delays in the office. It was practice that I'd go upstairs five minutes before air time, and escort him down via the elevator so that he was in the west end of the main corridor at the announced hour (as 11 a.m. or 4 p.m.) In a few moments, he'd be advised to move into the East room. The walk used 45 seconds, which gave the networks the needed time for the usual introductory announcements. He'd arrive at the podium one minute after the hour, as the air introductions ended.

When the East room was used for news conferences, one network was designated by the pool to provide the TV feed. (See memorandum on this topic.) They usually asked eight hours' time to move in, and when we could we allowed that much.

Photo Restrictions

The Usher's office was told to provide 225 chairs, as well as the required camera platforms, which are WHCA property stored at the White House. We roped off an area for photographers. At the President's direction, we sought to enforce a rule that no photographs would be shot while he was talking, though this was sometimes modified to permit shots once he had removed his glasses. He also preferred that no one get pictures from his right.

We tried to discourage major formal statements at news conferences, because President Johnson always wanted them on Teleprompter equipment that was big and ugly.

Detailed charts exist on the placement of cameras, chairs, platforms and lights in our use of the East room; these can be made available to you.

As explained in the Pool segment, we tried to allot the networks and their union employes a fair measure of the technical equipment. For example, we never allowed individual microphones to clutter the President's podium, but WHCA had four microphones in each podium. Two fed the PA system, and the other two went to the "mults" that fed all electronic needs. Live TV, sound films, radio and our tape recordings all fed lines into the "mults." And in normal circumstances, at the White House, we used the network "mults." Ours, operated by WHCA, were back-up equipment.

The Great White Way

We also maintained control over lighting. For many months, TV technicians and cameramen claimed they had to provide the lights or they could not get good pictures. Cleve Ryan, employed by the film companies for some years, was a major help in destroying this illusion. Press office control of the lighting was essential to keep excessive light from blinding the President to any vision beyond the podium. Requests generally sought 300 foot candles of light on the President's face. We allowed 225 when we could get enough audience light to wash out the intensity of the principal lights, but we cut to 200 or even 175 at times.

We got loud moans from film crews, but they got adequate color pictures. This was an area in which firm, assertive statement of the President's right to see produced good results.

When all else failed, I've suggested they tell their bosses they simply couldn't cover. No one ever did that.

Earphones to the "mults" were provided for the stenotypists, and we also arranged courier service from their positions during each major news conference. Usually they worked in pairs, and as one finished six to eight minutes of tape, this would be passed on to their transcribers. Stencils were often cut on the first 15 minutes before the half-hour news conference would end. These were not sent to the mimeograph room, however, until the Press Secretary (and sometimes the President) read them. Even the best stenotypists sometimes made errors, and we never liked to issue corrections on released texts.

Reserved Seats for Some

In the East room, we had about 35 seats in four rows directly in front of the President. We marked these with the names of organizations, as AP, NBC, NY Times, etc., and let the organizations decide who used the reserved seats. Almost without exception these seats went to the "regulars," to the President faced people he knew whose questions seldom strayed from the anticipated areas. Without reserved seats, we found "first come, first served" usually meant persons of more eagerness than skill, and sometimes that eagerness was to get TV attention rather than news.

We found that a TV news conference was considered a great show by staff personnel outside the Press office, and even that some staff people brought personal guests. We had to be tough: top-ranking staff could come but could not use the chairs; lesser people were advised about the immediacy of TV viewing elsewhere.

On occasions when the President had guests whom he wished to introduce, we sought advance guidance for the networks so they could provide "super cards." In fact, we looked for ways to be co-operative to give the network audience all possible benefits.

Oval Room Conferences

When the President chose to have a news conference in his office, there were many modifications. Usually there was almost no advance announcement. When critics said the President dodged the tough questions,

of specialists by unannounced sessions, his answer was that he felt the "regulars" were competent to cover. And we knew that the big news conferences usually produced columnists and bureau chiefs as spectators, but not as news gatherers. It may have been useful to them to see and hear the President, but actually it was principally more convenient.

If we were using the Oval room for a news conference, the "regulars" generally anticipated us. The usual briefing would be late. Press officers would be busy outside their own offices. And when the announcement was made "Correspondents in the corridor, please," we'd usually find most of the regulars at the head of the line.

Because reporters stood in the office, we asked the President to stand, so that he could be heard better. We'd take photographers in first, give them 30-45 seconds of shots and then usher them out through the Rose Garden doors to permit more reporters' access. The stenotypists' chairs were pre-positioned, so they could hear. And when the news conference neared its end, sophisticated White House personnel stayed out of the traffic pattern, since the rush to the press room telephones was often riotous.

Warning Signals

Sometimes, when news conferences were not pre-announced, we'd have our secretaries call the wires, networks and Washington Post or Star after reporters went into the office. They were able to have dictationists ready when the news dam broke.

When we had a morning news conference, we usually cancelled the afternoon briefing. And George Christian, almost as an act of faith, had a firm rule that he stood on the President's answer to any question. He did not explain it, or discuss its meaning, and only rarely would he give background explanations to certain reliable correspondents.

Transcripts of the news conference were made by the stenotypist firm which collected approved fees from the media and handled some of the delivery. The firm also has collating racks which are temporarily placed in the west lobby after each news conference. The Press Office always had a supply of the transcripts, but avoided handling the bulk of the rapid distribution.

Preparing the President

There's an even more important area on Press Office participation in preparation of the President for news conferences. We usually sought

advance guidance from him several days ahead, and then asked the departments and agencies to help. We wanted questions to be anticipated, and their experts' suggested answers.

Briefing books from State usually went to Walt Rostow. Sometimes Defense did, too. All the others came to the Press Secretary. They were culled over carefully--some departments seemed to use the device to brag of their achievements or to duck the hot shots, forgetting the purpose of the preparations.

Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy used regular meetings, prior to news conferences, to shape answers to expected questions. For a time President Johnson used a number of staff assistants; later he worked with the Press Secretary, Rostow, and one or two others.

By tradition, the senior correspondents of the two wire services alternate the first question. We'd let them keep track of whose turn was up, advising the President which way to turn when he was ready for the first question. Jim Hagerty and Pierre Salinger worked with them quite closely, often seeing them in advance to drop hints about possible first questions that would get productive answers. Later press secretaries followed this pattern at times.

Occasionally, a question would be planted, but the device was seldom devious. If a Press officer knew that the President was ready to discuss a topic, that officer generally knew which reporters had shown interest in the topic. It certainly was not improper to tell a correspondent that it might be a good day to renew his interest in grain for India or selection of a new officer of the government.

WATCHING THE STORE

It was President Johnson's practice to have all major aides report on all contacts with the media each day. All special assistants were expected to prepare daily memoranda. These were sent to the Press secretary, who in turn sent them on to the President. The purpose was not to check on leaks, but rather to keep posted on what topics were getting intensive scrutiny by reporters, columnists and commentators.

The system operated in various ways. At times, instructions would go out that daily reports must be made, even if there were no contacts. Then the press office girl compiling reports would make calls around 6 p.m. to advise other secretaries that we needed the reports promptly. In other periods, attention would diminish, and receipt of no report was taken to mean no contacts.

The system admittedly had the value of sometimes learning where leaks occurred, since second-level staffers sometimes liked to show how much they knew. Correspondents liked to use the three-hour lunch lids for conversation with guests from the staff. But it's a fact of life that a man who leaks inside information seldom will report on his contact. It's another fact that he may not think he was leaking, while another view is taken by irritated superiors.

SPEECHES OF THE PRESIDENT--LOCAL

In the Johnson administration, it was the usual practice of the Appointments office to decline all speaking requests, with the ever-present view that any audience would welcome a later reconsideration that would make the President available. The Press office agreed since it was constantly hearing that the President had been invited hither and yon. We simply used the stock answer that "We have nothing on his schedule; if an appearance is planned, you will be advised."

Experience indicates that there is value in the Press Secretary participating in acceptance decisions. Obviously, hundreds of invitations will come in. Less obviously, to some staff members, counsel from the Press office can be useful in alloting the President's time for appearances. George Christian avoided writing speeches, but always argued that he should see the drafts for his comments. Often they were critical, and texts were revised accordingly.

No Room at the Inn

Even the appearance schedule needed attention. Example: President Johnson agreed to talk to a Washington conference of Junior Chamber of Commerce representatives. The Press office discovered the hotel dining room was so crowded by luncheon guests that there'd be no room for film cameras and almost none for press. But that discovery wasn't made till the room was set; we had trouble getting JCC staff personnel to agree to eat elsewhere so cameras could be provided.

And the problems occurred at all levels: the President was going to the Shoreham hotel to address 1600 business executives on jobs for poverty-level people. Henry Ford's top aide, himself a corporation executive, firmly objected to moving chairs aside to provide camera positions. He said reporting of the President's speech was far secondary to enlisting the audience help to the program. He could not be told that the President had decided to base that plea for help on Viet-nam developments, with a personal note that a President, with many worries, needed to share his burdens with businessmen. Camera positions were cleared after the President left the White House for the drive to the hotel; we held the President off-stage till coverage facilities were provided.

The "Drop-In" Problem

President Johnson sometimes decided on "drop-ins" at Washington dinners when he was satisfied with his evening progress on other duties.

Usually the Press office knew an event was "possible," so that WHCA personnel, stenotypists and a minimal press pool could be on stand-by alert. That pool coverage was usually a "riding pool," with the main function of protecting against unforeseen possibilities such as traffic accidents. We cleared approval of the pool with the Appointments secretary, then had the garage provide a nine-passenger station wagon, and used it in four-car motorcades.

The President did not like escorts, so there was usually his car, the Secret Service car, a staff car (for the doctor, one or more aides and the White House photographer) and then the pool car. In it we'd put the wire service reporters, one network man, one "special" responsible for a pool report to dailies, the wire service still photographers, one network silent reel and one press officer (as a shepherd).

The networks constantly contended that one sound engineer should be included, that silent film was not enough if there was a news development, but our answer was that the car required a driver. It would be useful to use two cars, thereby expanding the space, but President Johnson did not agree.

On arrival at a site, a press office advance man would meet the motorcade and escort the pool to its location. In most Washington cases, this involved an alternate route to that used by the President. Again, the need for an advance look at the site was needed.

Local Advancing

When that advance was done locally, it was usually done by an Appointments office representative, a press officer, a Secret Service agent and a WHCA representative. We'd find the person in charge of the event (a dinner chairman, or an organization executive vice-president, etc.) to discuss arrangements. The Press officer concerned himself with press space, camera positions, podium position and lighting. Often on "quickies" we did not ask for press tables, though we'd recommend that some provision be made to feed camera crews if we were giving them enough advance notice to set up before guests arrived in a room.

On such events, we often did not provide advance texts. President Johnson usually expanded on prepared material. Rather than have releases labelled "texts," we sometimes used "Excerpts of remarks prepared for delivery at --." Then we backed up his appearance with "As delivered" texts, assembled by the stenotypists.

On other local events involving government departments (as a ceremony at Agriculture, HUD, etc.) the Press office made the coverage plans,

telling the department information officers what we wanted rather than leaving the problems to them.

The basic practice: whenever possible, we made the plans to fit the President's desires and needs.

SPEECHES--ON THE ROAD

The basic planning follows the lines cited above, plus those familiar to anyone who has worked on campaign advancing. Again, the Press office contended it had essential need to be represented on advance surveys. It was usually accepted that there'd be a basic four-man team for the Appointments office, Press office, Secret Service and WHCA.

At a stop, usually an airport, decisions were usually made on arrival on where Air Force One should be parked, where VIPs and press would be placed when the President appeared, whether there'd be a podium for airport remarks, where and how the motorcade would move.

Early stress on Press office participation in details is important. In motorcades, especially if a warm crowd response is expected, the pool car needs to be close to the President. We never asked the Secret Service to yield its follow-up position, but we steadily argued about other intervening vehicles. We usually lost to the staff car, which provided personal support for the President, and constantly fought off local VIP vehicles. At one time we had an order that senators and congressmen must be placed ahead of the Press car; that was changed by appeal to the President.

Photographers in Action

In major motorcades, we used convertibles or open trucks for photographers. They sometimes had breezy rides on expressways from airports to downtown areas, but accepted this because they knew we'd move them ahead of and slightly flanking the President's car when picture possibilities developed. We'd arrange for the Secret Service to stop the President's car (to put on bubble-top, or place flags on fenders, or other unobtrusive causes.)

Few press office operations roused more complaint than inability of the press to cover motorcades, so we developed good back-up facilities. We'd put a press officer in the pool car, plus others in the press busses that generally were back 10 to 15 vehicles. By walkie-talkie, he'd report on crowd reactions or get one of the pool press to do so. If there were several press busses, we used transportation office people to supplement press office personnel in this relay.

Expect the Unexpected

If the President does the unusual--from having his car surrounded by well-wishers to him leaving his car to greet school kids--there is usually

a rush from the vehicles to the President. Getting press and photographers re-assembled in any series of unexpected stops needs patience.

One warning on local transportation: try for inter-city busses. Too many local bus companies have governors on motors; maximum speed of 40 MPH while the President races away on an expressway produces reporters who pout and sulk--after they quit screaming.

Checking the site of speeches is probably familiar--it's quite similar to the Washington appearances. The Press office in recent years has avoided participating in discussions of who's to sit on the platform, preferring to concentrate its fire on locals who want their families in the best audience seats, regardless of press needs.

One essential in planning, however, is filing time. Just as in campaigns some advance men believe the best schedule should use every minute. They'll whisk the President away and on to another stop with no regard for coverage problems. We found the White House press would tolerate this if the President was going home, but would abandon filing on a major speech rather than risk unforeseen developments for a President still in transit.

Wires and Phones

As noted elsewhere, we relied on Western Union's representative to provide telex facilities at sites or, if these were remote and lead-time was scarce, to arrange shuttling of copy. The ATT Washington representative generally promised more than he delivered; we found better results by consulting local telephone companies. Late in the President's administration we came to one useful innovation: we had phone lines terminate near the speakers' platform where the broadcast "mults" were placed, and hence permitted radio engineers to feed full speeches into their network home offices. Use of actual excerpts multiplied when the networks needed time to edit at each site and then establish feeds.

The obvious statements on advance texts apply on trips. If a President's text can be given prior to appearances, coverage improves. Often we provided these in flight, having carried the mimeographed packages from the White House. Reporters could write in the planes, and we asked Western Union to meet us on arrival--as I say, these are obvious statements.

Similarly, on overnight stops, the arrangements are familiar: we'd post sign-up lists in the press room, arrange planes and hotel reservations, handle luggage, etc. You'll find a few people who ask to go because they think they'll be guests of the President, but when it's explained that they

share travel costs (at something above first class rates) and pay their own hotel bills, they lose interest. On the rates, the Transportation office billings were on "trip" basis, rather than "flight," because we added bus charters, etc.

Travel, Family Style

We had an unpublicized fare system we inherited from Jim Hagerty that applied to some trips, such as Texas stays of a week or more. We'd permit correspondents to take their wives at $50 and their children at no charge, if there was space available. It might be well to provide some graduated scale, because occasionally a wife and three or four children would appear.

We found Andrews AFB the best terminal for our purposes, because it had unlimited parking for travellers who wanted to drive to and from the airport. It would be well, however, to keep an eye on Andrews people; we had occasions when a new CO or PIO decided to make rules. We made a general rule that cameras and local press could have the same access as the public, so that we had no one on the ramps. We had complaints, but the rule was accepted. But we had to step on an Andrews PIO who decided that he'd control moving of press and luggage from returning planes, and chose to start it on a night with hard rain and long delays.