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*Ron Nessen*

M E E T   T H E   P R E S S

Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1975

HOLD FOR RELEASE  
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GUEST:

HENRY A. KISSINGER - The Secretary of State

MODERATOR:

Lawrence E. Spivak

PANEL:

Clifton Daniel - The New York Times

Peter Lisagor - Chicago Daily News

Robert Keatley - Wall Street Journal

Richard Valeriani - NBC News

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MEET THE PRESS

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MR. SPIVAK: Our quest today on MEET THE PRESS is the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, who recently completed his second year in office.

He serves concurrently as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a position he has held since 1969. Secretary Kissinger was born in Germany in 1923 and came to the United States in 1938. He received his undergraduate and graduate degrees from Harvard and was a member of the faculty from 1954 until 1971.

Among his many awards is the Nobel Peace Prize, which he won in 1973.

We will have the first questions now from Richard Valeriani of NBC News.

MR. VALERIANI: Mr. Secretary, Egyptian President Sadat has said that he will ask for American military aid when he comes to Washington later this month. What will be the Administration's response?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: President Sadat has indicated to many visitors that he would ask for military aid, having interrupted his relationship with the Soviet Union.

We don't know whether in fact he will have a specific shopping list or will ask for it in general.

I don't think we will be prepared at this moment to make any specific commitments of military aid, but we will be prepared to discuss the problem with him in general terms.

MR. VALERIANI: Have you given him any assurances that you will give such a request sympathetic consideration or

serious consideration?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are prepared to discuss it with him but at this time not in terms of specific shopping lists.

MR. VALERJANI: On the other side of the equation, Mr. Secretary, by making so many promises to Israel, in order to get Israel in the right mood to make certain concessions in the Sinai Agreement, haven't you really given up most of your leverage for getting Israel to make tougher concessions down the road in negotiations on the Golan Heights, or the Palestinians?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first of all, the so-called concessions to Israel, or assurances to Israel, have to be seen in the historical context and the assurances that were given in connection with its most recent agreement were not substantially different from assurances that have been given in connection with other agreements.

When you are dealing with a country which has only one steady ally, assurances are of very great consequence.

Secondly, the relationship with Israel should not be conceived in terms of a pressure operation in which we must be able to pressure Israel before every negotiation, and, finally, our basic relationship with Israel depends on a continuing need for close consultation and close cooperation between us and Israel. And that fact is going to weigh heavily in Israeli considerations, whatever decisions may have been made on this or that item.

So I believe the nature of our relationship with Israel

gives us sufficient opportunity to have our views heard sympathetically.

MR. VALERIANI: Why was it necessary to put all this in writing in specific terms now, so that Israel can avoid pressure in the future?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is the sort of understandings that have been published, have been characteristic of America's Israeli relations through the whole history of American-Israeli relations.

The only difference is that in the past these documents, at least in recent years, these documents have been submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a classified basis. This time they were published and their being published gave them a formality and subjected them to a kind of textual analysis that was never intended and which, if one had brought them into the context of the overall and long-term relationships, would have made it clear that it was not an unusual event in our relationship.

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MR. KEATLEY: Mr. Secretary, the Second Soviet - American Strategic Arms Control Agreement is about a year or so behind the schedule once expected. What are the prospects for concluding it any time during '75?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I wouldn't say it is a year behind schedule. It may be a few months behind the most optimistic schedule which was June-July of this year.

I think the prospects of having a second strategic arms limitation agreement within the next months is good.

Whether it will be in 1975 or in the early part of 1976, we will know more clearly after I receive a response to the propositions that we have made to Foreign Minister Gromyko when he was here in October.

MR. KEATLEY: Some people think delay is due to a Soviet effort to limit American weapons while not restraining seriously its own programs.

What convinces you that the Soviets do want an agreement that restrains both sides in roughly comparable ways?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think in fairness one has to point out that most of the significant concessions over the last 18 months in the negotiations have been made by the Soviet Union; with respect to equal aggregates, with respect to taking forward-base systems out of the negotiations, which means that several hundred or close to a thousand American airplanes are not counted, and with respect to the verification procedures. And I do not think it is fair to say that the issue is to limit our systems while not limiting the Soviet systems. The issue is that the two forces have been designed in a way which makes it difficult to compare the weapons on both sides and to know how to bring them into relation with each other.

Finally, we are down to only two or three issues and they can be settled at any time, after which it will take about four to six weeks of technical discussions to work out the final details.

About ninety per cent of the negotiation is substantially completed.

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MR. DANIEL: Mr. Secretary, you have remarked that our pledges to Israel have been published, but they were not published by the State Department.

This latest agreement in the Middle East is going to cost us Americans billions of dollars and may involve us in highly dangerous commitments. Why can't we know formally, officially and fully what has been promised in our names?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, everything that has been published was submitted by the State Department within three days of the completion of the negotiations to the Congress, so there was absolutely no attempt to keep anything from the Congress.

Secondly, we were prepared to work out with the Congress an agreed summary that would have put before the public the essence of the American commitment, so that the American public would have known precisely what it was we were really committed to.

What we attempted to avoid was formulations that in themselves were not legally binding, but indicated a general guidepost of policy, and to avoid forcing other governments to take a formal position with respect to understandings that in the past had always been handled on this basis.

Finally, I do not agree that this recent agreement cost the American public billions of dollars. Last year the Congress voted in a combination of emergency and regular aid, \$3 billion for Israel without the agreement. Before the agreement Israel requested \$2.6 billion as its regular need for economic and security assistance and we had set aside in

our planning a certain amount to be asked for Egypt. In fact, we will ask for less than the Israeli request when we submit our aid package to the Congress, and the additional sums that this agreement costs are, if anything, relatively small. Beyond that, we have taken no commitments that involve actions by the United States that involve the threat of war, or the risk of war.

I think these are facts that have to be understood.

I repeat: We have put everything before the Congress that was later published and the only disagreement concerned the form of publication, and whether we could work out with the Congress a form of publication that would risk the foreign policy dangers.

MR. LISAGOR: Mr. Secretary, quite apart from the amounts involved, given the mood of the Congress, have you made commitments or promises or assurances in the Sinai negotiations that this administration, or possibly the next administration, will not be able to fulfill?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The basic commitments of the United States have been put before the Congress. There are two categories of actions, those that can be done on presidential authority, and those that require congressional authorization and appropriation.

Those that can be carried out on the basis of presidential authority, we are certain we are able to fulfill either in this administration or in succeeding administrations.

Those that require congressional action have been carefully limited in all the documents we have agreed to, as



being subject to congressional action. No specific amounts were mentioned, and there the mood that you describe may in fact be a factor. But we think it is terribly important that the American people understand that it is not the agreement that provides the need -- that creates the need for assistance to the parties, but the long-term national interests of the United States, and that the assistance to the parties antedates the agreement.

MR. LISAGOR: Mr. Secretary, you have been met with a great deal of skepticism and suspicion in the Congress in the debate over the Sinai negotiations in your own testimony. Has this been a recoil against the secrecy that has gone on in the recent past and the lack of consultation that went on in other foreign policy matters recently?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think in fairness to the Congress one has to point out if one reads the whole transcript of all the sessions, executive and public, there was overwhelming support for the agreement. Its basic attitude -- maybe not in front of television cameras, but the basic attitude in the relationship between the congressional committees and the executive was one of dealing with a common problem in a joint way.

However, there is profound concern in the Congress, much of which I can understand, that the pendulum had swung too far in the fifties and sixties in the direction of executive discretion and the Congress wants to make very sure that it is not giving a blank check to the executive for consequences that the Congress never intended, as it believes it did in the

case of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. That intention, I think, is justified, and we are prepared to cooperate with it.

There is concern with excessive secrecy which, too, we are attempting to meet.

On the other hand, one has to understand that a certain amount of confidentiality is essential, or the diplomatic process will stop, so somewhere between those two extremes one has to find a joint position between the Congress and the Executive. But we are not complaining about what happens in the Congress.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Secretary, in his New York Times column of August 15th, James Reston writes that you believe "The capitalist and communist worlds are two bankrupt systems in conflict now, neither adequate to the requirements and possibilities of a safe and decent world."

Does that accurately describe your analysis of the world situation today?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I think it is too abbreviated a formulation.

I was struck, on the trip to Europe with the President, on the occasion of the European Security Conference, at the problems that it seemed to me the East European countries had in establishing widespread support.

One is also struck by the debates that are going on in Western Europe about the stability of the government, and so I feel that the modern industrialized states have a basic problem of how to relate the complexity of their problems, the difficulty of the issues that the people face, to a national

purpose that gains long-term support. Basically I believe that the Western capitalist systems are more dynamic, with all their debates, than the ones on the other side, and therefore I am basically optimistic about the potentiality of the democratic systems to prevail and to defend themselves.

MR. VALERIANI: Another question on the agreement, Mr. Secretary. In the confidential assurances to Egypt, the United States promises to consult with Egypt in the event of an Israeli violation of the agreement on the significance of the violation, and possible remedial action.

Now, what does "remedial action" mean? Would that involve holding up supplies to Israel in the case of an attack?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, exactly the same assurance was given to Israel and both sides knew that the same assurance was given to the other side. What it meant was that the United States as the party that was the principal mediator in the negotiations, that knew the record of the negotiations, would make an effort, in case of a violation, to point out what its judgment was of the significance and of the possible cause of the violations.

What remedial action we would take that has not been discussed with either side.

In the other two disengagement agreements, those between Syria and Israel and those between Egypt and Israel, what happened is that a violation will be brought to our attention and we then bring it to the attention of the side that is accused and in every case that I can remember a remedy has been found. This is one of those clauses that

codifies existing practice and is not a novel departure.

MR. KEATLEY: Next week you will be in Peking and next month President Ford will go there. Will these visits result in diplomatic recognition of the Peking Government by the United States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The basic purpose, the basic relationship between us and the People's Republic of China is the result of the congruence of some perceptions of the international environment and therefore on many of these visits a significant part of the discussion concerns a review of the international situation and to see to what degree we agree or disagree.

The process of normalization of relations between the People's Republic and the United States has been established in the Shanghai communique. We intend to live up to this and we intend to continue the process of normalization to its ultimate conclusion.

I do not anticipate that it will be completed on the next visit, but I do not exclude that some progress would be made.

MR. DANIEL: Mr. Secretary, Warren Nutter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, has published a study in which he says your diplomacy in Russia has created too much detente and over-relaxation of tension; that the United States is giving away too much for too little.

As you know, many conservatives are consequently very suspicious of detente. Does this mean that the Ford Administration is going to retain its full faith in detente or will there

be some change under the pressure of 1976 politics?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The impression is created that detente, which is a bad word anyway, is something we grant to the Russians as a favor and that we withhold as a punishment.

The fact of the matter is that there are certain basic conditions that bring about this policy. The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States possess nuclear weapons capable of destroying humanity. The fact that we impinge upon each other in many parts of the world, so that we are, at one and the same time, rivals and yet we must regulate our conduct in such a way that we do not destroy humanity in conducting our disputes. We are ideological opponents, yet in a way we are doomed to coexist.

Those are the realities. They cannot be removed by rhetoric, and these are realities to which every President has been brought back throughout the history of the post-war period.

The foreign policy of this country will be conducted with concern for the national interest and for world peace, and it will not be affected by the presidential campaign.

MR. LISAGOR: Mr. Secretary, you are known for playing diplomacy close to the vest and some former intelligence officials in the government have said that what you and the President, President Nixon as well as Ford, have talked about to foreign leaders, never got communicated through the system so that they could make expert appraisals of that.

Are those charges true?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I sometimes suspect that if I started reading the most top secret documents from the top of

the Washington Monument, we would still be accused of playing diplomacy close to the vest.

To some extent a certain amount of confidentiality is essential. This depends entirely on the relationship of confidence that exists between the head of the State Department Intelligence, for example, and the Secretary of State.

The current Director of Intelligence in the Department of State attends every top level meeting with Soviet and other key leaders, and he has no problem of receiving access.

There are some -- in every administration there have been some extremely confidential documents that were not necessarily distributed to every intelligence analyst in town. They are always distributed to some key advisers. Who the key advisers are depends on whom the Secretary of State and the President have confidence in, but it is in the interests of the President and the Secretary of State to get the widest possible relevant advice, so I would reject this particular charge.

MR. SPIVAK: Gentlemen, we have less than three minutes.

Mr. Secretary, the President has just lifted the embargo on grain sales to Poland. Can you tell us what is holding up the decision on grain sales to the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are still discussing a long-term grain deal with the Soviet Union and until that is completed we are not in a good position to judge the total availabilities in relation to the demands, but as the President indicated yesterday, we are making progress in that long-term grain deal.

MR. SPIVAK: Are you certain that a deal will go through?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not certain, but I am optimistic.

MR. SPIVAK: Will the U. S. be likely to attach any significant reciprocal conditions to a deal?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The context in which a deal is made is always clear. The conditions of the agreement themselves as they now stand and as they will be negotiated, are, in our view, very favorable to the United States.

MR. VALERIANI: How close are you to making a deal, Mr. Secretary, and in that connection, do you think you can make a deal for buying Russian oil?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are discussing both of these issues, not directly linked, but in a parallel framework. We are quite close to making a deal on grain. We still have some additional considerations to discuss in the case of oil but we have made progress on that too.

MR. SPIVAK: We have less than a minute.

MR. KEATLEY: If President Ford is elected next year and if he asks, will you stay on as Secretary of State?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't -- first of all, I haven't been asked yet, and that is a decision I will make then.

MR. DANIEL: Mr. Secretary, you seem to agree that we are now coming to the end of the step-by-step process of maintaining peace in the Middle East. Where do we go from here?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think we then have to find some larger frameworks which combine several of the issues and several of the parties and maybe all of the issues and all of the parties.

We are in a process of consultation about that now.

MR. SPIVAK: I am sorry, but our time is up.

Thank you, Secretary Kissinger, for being with us today on  
MEET THE PRESS.

(Next week: Mayor of New York City, Abraham Beame.)

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M E E T   T H E   P R E S S

Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1975

GUEST:

SENATOR LUBERT H. HUMPHREY (D., Minn.)  
Chairman, Joint Economic Committee

MODERATOR:

Lawrence E. Spivak

PANEL:

Peter Lisagor - Chicago Daily News  
Robert Novak - Chicago Sun-Times  
R.W.Apple, Jr. - The New York Times  
Bill Monroe - NBC News

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MEET THE PRESS

1 MR. SPIVAK: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is the  
2 Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Senator  
3 Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota.

4 Senator Humphrey entered public service in 1941. He  
5 was Mayor of Minneapolis from 1945 until his election to the  
6 U. S. Senate in 1948. He served as Vice President under Lyndon  
7 Johnson from 1964 until 1969 and was the Democratic presidential  
8 candidate in 1968. He was re-elected to the Senate in 1970.

9 We will have the first questions now from Bill Monroe of  
10 NBC News.

11 MR. MONROE: Senator, President Ford seems to be talking  
12 about federal help for New York after the city goes bankrupt.  
13 Doesn't it make sense to let New York go bankrupt in that it  
14 will put every American citizen on notice they must manage their  
15 affairs properly or face the consequences?

16 SENATOR HUMPHREY: I think it makes absolutely no sense.  
17 I think the President's decision is bad economics and also bad  
18 politics.

19 The City of New York will be helped if it needs help.  
20 The only question is when, and what the President is saying is,  
21 let the city go down the drain first, run the risk of the  
22 cut-off of vital municipal services and then possibly the  
23 Federal Government will come in and have to bail it out.

24 What we propose in Congress is that there be a federal  
25 guarantee under strict circumstances where the city will have

1 to put its budget in balance, where the state will take over the  
2 fiscal responsibility of the city and where there will be  
3 severe penalties for any failure to produce on the plan that is  
4 adopted.

5 President Ford is attempting to punish New York. What  
6 New York needs is a friendly doctor with a prescription, not a  
7 mortician that tells New York that it ought to die and then hope  
8 for resurrection.

9 MR. MONROE: Wouldn't bankruptcy have some benefits  
10 nevertheless?

11 For example, if public employee unions have to be  
12 cut back on fringe benefits, wouldn't it be easier for a judge  
13 to do it instead of politicians who often seem to give in  
14 to the public unions?

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1           SENATOR HUMPHREY: I see no reason to put this burden  
2 on the courts of the United States. The courts are already  
3 overburdened. The state of New York has responsibility for  
4 the City of New York. The federal bond guarantee program  
5 as proposed in the Congress -- and I was one of those who  
6 proposed it, along with Senator Proxmire and Senator Steven-  
7 son -- that program will place severe discipline upon the City  
8 of New York and may I say, already many adjustments have been  
9 made in New York City's budget. Other adjustments will have  
10 to be made in New York City's budget, and I believe that  
11 it is a bad symbol for the United States to have its largest  
12 city declared by the President of the United States to follow  
13 the path of bankruptcy.

14           I want the President of the United States to be as  
15 considerate of New York City and of New York State as he  
16 is of countries all over the world. Within the same week he  
17 said no help for New York, he sends us up a program for  
18 \$5 billion of additional military aid in support assistance  
19 for the Middle East.

20           MR. MONROE: Senator, considering the fact that the  
21 President has said he will veto any legislation aimed at  
22 staying off default, as a practical matter isn't it impossible  
23 at this point to stave off default?

24           SENATOR HUMPHREY: That may be the case, but if that  
25 happens, I want the public to know what it means.

1 It means that cities all over the United States will have the  
2 interest rates raised upon their municipal bonds.

3 It means there will be additional unemployment in this country.

4 It means the Federal Treasury will lose from \$3 to 4 billion  
5 worth of revenue, and it means about 100,000 more people in New  
6 York City will be unemployed.

7 Mr. Ford's program is an economic disaster, and why in  
8 the name of common sense he pursues it, except that apparently  
9 he thinks it is popular out in the hinterlands. I want to  
10 tell him that the recent poll doesn't show it to be that  
11 popular.

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13 MR. LISAGOR: Senator Humphrey, the great mentioner  
14 mentions you quite often these days as a possible Presiden-  
15 tial candidate, and you do run ahead of other Democrats in  
16 the public opinion polls, so I would like to ask you a  
17 question about your health. You were reported to have had  
18 a possible malignancy of the bladder I think last year. Has  
19 that been eliminated now?

20 SENATOR HUMPHREY: May I assure you, Mr. Lisagor, that  
21 no one is more happy to answer this question than Hubert  
22 Humphrey. Indeed what problem I had has been eliminated,  
23 and I have a clean bill of health, and I want you to know  
24 that when I run for the United States Senate, I will make  
25 clear to everybody what my health condition is, and

1 if perchance as your question seems to indicate there was any  
2 need of it for other possibilities, it will also be made a  
3 matter of public record.

4 MR. LISACOR: Then you feel you have the stamina and  
5 the energy to run for President again?

6 SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, if I so desired. There is no  
7 shortage of energy or stamina. There may be other reasons,  
8 such as that I am not a candidate.

9 MR. LISAGOR: Senator, you matured in politics when the  
10 standards of morality were somewhat less strict than they are  
11 today, when people, politicians took free rides on corporate  
12 airplanes, and when they accepted large contributions from  
13 corporations without asking too many questions about motive  
14 and intent.

15 My question is, would a Humphrey candidacy in 1976 be  
16 subject to the post-Watergate scrutiny without causing you  
17 embarrassment?

18 SENATOR HUMPHREY: It would indeed. I was Mayor of the  
19 City of Minneapolis, ran a clean administration, known as an  
20 honest mayor. I have tried to conduct my public life so that  
21 it would be one that I could be proud of personally, privately  
22 and my family. I will be able to conduct a campaign for  
23 any office on the basis of any standards that are set as  
24 responsible standards by the government of the United States.

25 MR. LISAGOR: Well, I asked the question because one of

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your campaign aides, even in 1972, was convicted for accepting illegal campaign contributions, if I remember correctly.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: You are absolutely right in that, but it is my judgment that he did not knowingly ever accept any money from a corporation. That case, as you know, is being appealed. I have to say to you, Mr. Lisagor, that it is almost impossible in a national campaign or even in a state campaign to be sure of every contribution, because corporations have a way of disguising contributions, making them look private, only later on, as you know, to fill in and to pay back to the particular donor. I have never condoned this kind of activity, and I shall never condone it. I was one of those that believed in strict campaign reform and I believed in it before it became popular.

1 MR. APPLE: Senator, some months ago you made the statement,  
2 "I will enter no primaries." Are you willing to say that  
3 today?

4 SENATOR HUMPHREY: I surely am, Mr. Apple. I have no  
5 intention to enter any primaries. I will enter no primaries;  
6 I am not a candidate for President. I authorize no group to  
7 work in my behalf.

8 MR. APPLE: That requires several follow-up questions.  
9 You have been through this game before. Does that mean that  
10 you will file with the respective secretaries of states in the  
11 primary states where your name is automatically put on the  
12 ballot a disclaimer of intention to become a candidate?

13 SENATOR HUMPHREY: That is correct, Mr. Apple.

14 MR. APPLE: Now, Governor Anderson of your home state  
15 and a number of people are discussing the possibility of putting  
16 together a draft-Humphrey Committee. Will you disavow their  
17 effort if they do so?

18 SENATOR HUMPHREY: Mr. Apple, if you have been reading the  
19 Minneapolis Tribune and the Minneapolis Star, which doesn't have  
20 a wide circulation, I realize in this environment you would have  
21 known that I have already disavowed that.

22 I am not asking anybody to support me for the presidency.  
23 I have no campaign for it and any "Draft Humphrey" movement  
24 that starts will have to be on their own initiative and, if I  
25 find out about it, I write to them and tell them to cease and



1 desist.

2 MR. APPLE: Senator, after the New York primary, many  
3 people think that there will still be some confusion in Demo-  
4 cratic ranks.

5 There will be three primary filing dates still open at  
6 that point, including New Jersey and Kentucky. Are you certain  
7 that after New York you won't change your mind as you have to  
8 some degree in past years?

9 SENATOR HUMPHREY: Mr. Apple, I changed my mind in 1972,  
10 but I changed it by this time, as you know. I have said to  
11 you that I am not a candidate for the presidency; I will not  
12 seek that office; I will not be entering primaries. That is my  
13 judgment. That has been my statement. I have also said to you  
14 that if the convention per chance should turn to me --- which I  
15 think is highly improbable -- but if it should, that I will be  
16 ready to accept the challenge and I will go out and conduct a  
17 campaign that will be worthy of the Democratic party and I would  
18 win.

19 MR. NOVAK: Senator Humphrey, on September 26th, after a  
20 majority of your colleagues had passed the anti-busing amendment  
21 in the Senate against your opposition, you delivered an impac-  
22 sioned defense of compulsory forced racial busing and called it  
23 the only available way to integrate most urban schools.

24 Senator, are you willing, or would you be desirous of  
25 writing that pro-busing statemnt into the Democratic platform in

1 1976?

2 SENATOR HUMPHREY: Mr. Novak, first of all, it wasn't  
3 impassioned. First of all, I didn't even deliver it. I put it  
4 in the Congressional Record, but I thank you for the  
5 descriptive phraseology. It makes it sound better than it really  
6 was. It was put together rather quickly. I do believe in the  
7 Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-  
8 tion, equal protection of the laws and equal rights for our  
9 people, but let me tell you what my position is on busing:  
10 I prepared a statement in 1972 on busing. I thought you might  
11 be interested to see that I still have it. I was sure there  
12 would be a question on busing because who would ever expect  
13 there would be a conference like this without a question on  
14 busing?

15 Here is what I said then. Here is what I say now.

16 "I am opposed to massive forced busing solely for the  
17 purpose of racial balance on a quota basis. No parent, black  
18 or white, wants his child to have an inferior education. It  
19 makes no sense to bus a child from a good school to a poor  
20 school. It makes sense to bus a child from a poor school to a  
21 better school. It makes better sense to improve schools in all  
22 neighborhoods."

23 That is the position of Hubert Humphrey, 1972, '73, '74,  
24 '75, '76, and that will be my position at the Democratic  
25 Convention.

1 MR. NOVAK: But, Senator, do you not consider busing as  
2 the only available way to enable school integration in many  
3 areas and therefore support it in many areas?

4 SENATOR HUMPHREY: My friend, if it is to be used to  
5 improve the quality of education as a temporary measure, it  
6 has validity and it should be used. It isn't as if you back  
7 away from it.

8 I am simply saying that massive busing as the answer is  
9 not the answer.

10 MR. NOVAK: And to return to my original question, sir, if  
11 that is the only answer and you should not back away with  
12 it and it is available, do you think that should be written  
13 into the national platform of the Democratic party in 1976?

14 SENATOR HUMPHREY: I do feel that busing as a temporary  
15 measure designed to provide quality education for a child to  
16 go from a poor school to a better school is a measure that can  
17 be supported. As a temporary measure.

18 But I do not support massive busing.

19 As I have said here, solely for the purpose of racial  
20 balance on a quota basis.

21 Let's understand, we have had busing going on in this  
22 country. The issue is not busing. The issue is the education  
23 at the end of the bus ride. That is the issue. What is the  
24 quality or what is the quality of education at the end of the  
25 bus ride?

1 MR. SPIVAK: Senator, you have been described as a big-  
2 government man who believes that the Federal Government must  
3 solve all our problems as a last resort. Do you accept that  
4 characterization of you?

5 SENATOR HUMPHREY: Absolutely not. I am one of the few  
6 people in the Congress that has been a Mayor of a City. I  
7 believe that most government is at the local basis. I have  
8 supported, of course, programs of the New Deal, the Fair Deal,  
9 the programs that Mr. Eisenhower put before the Congress in  
10 many instances, like the National Defense Education Act. I  
11 have supported a good deal of federal activity, but I believe  
12 every program needs to be constantly re-examined. I think it  
13 needs to be updated. I believe that you have to recognize the  
14 changes that have taken place in our society.

15 I think the central issues that face the American people  
16 in the immediate future are issues of, how do you provide 'jobs for  
17 the American --

18 MR. SPIVAK: Senator, may I ask you this question then:  
19 You have seen our federal budget grow from about \$30 billion  
20 in 1948 when you came to the Senate to about \$350 billion in  
21 1976. Why do you think that despite all the billions of dollars  
22 the Federal Government has spent, we found no solution to the  
23 recessions, unemployment, to inflation?

24 SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, we have unique circumstances but  
25 let's get the budget into proper relationship because it surely

1 isn't in balance.

2 Today the federal budget is 22 per cent of the gross  
3 national product. In 1960 it was 20 per cent of the gross  
4 national product. In 1970 it was 21 per cent of the gross  
5 national product.

6 The budget relates to the gross national product and one  
7 of the reasons it is 22 per cent today is because this  
8 administration has so mismanaged this economy that it has  
9 both raging inflation on the one hand and high unemployment  
10 on the other. And every percentage point of unemployment  
11 raises the budget's cost \$16 billion. That is the increase in  
12 the deficit.

13 If you reduce the unemployment of this country by two  
14 percentage points, you will reduce the budget by over \$30  
15 billion.

16 Now, there are programs in our budget that are necessary  
17 and I don't believe anybody on this panel is going to want to  
18 cut back on Social Security. I hope you are not wanting to cut  
19 back on medical for the elderly. I doubt that you want to  
20 cut back on school lunches. These are programs that take up  
21 a large share of the budget. Now, the biggest share of the  
22 budget is the national defense and that is the part that Mr.  
23 Ford says is untouchable. This budget that Mr. Ford gave us had  
24 \$99 billion for national defense. It had one-fourth or better  
25 than that of the whole budget.

1 MR. SPIVAK: Aren't you forgetting that the Democrats  
 2 in Congress are in control? Why aren't they doing something  
 3 about these things? They are the ones who pass the appro-  
 4 priations. Why do you keep blaming the Administration?

5 SENATOR HUMPHREY: May I say first of all, we get a bud-  
 6 get request from the President. This will be a little news  
 7 to you. The President sent us a budget of approximately  
 8 \$350 billion. He has increased that budget request by \$16.6  
 9 billion. The Democratic Congress has reduced the budget  
 10 by over \$300 million.

11 Now we are going to reduce it more. Right now we  
 12 have a great reduction of over \$7 billion in the national de-  
 13 fense budget. The Democrats have to take a look at what the  
 14 needs are of the country, but what I am talking about is that  
 15 the President talks as if he wants a balanced budget when  
 16 he in fact is recommending a greater unbalanced budget than  
 17 the Democrats are even willing to support.

18 MR. MONROE: Senator, some young Democrats such as Gov-  
 19 ernor Brown of California are identifying themselves with  
 20 the idea of austerity, cutting back programs. In the  
 21 minds of many people you are identified with spending. The  
 22 Wall Street Journal calls you an inveterate spender. You are  
 23 identified with big social programs.

24 If Governor Brown represents the wave of the future,  
 25 wouldn't you be the wrong man for the Democrats to put up

1 next year for President?

2 SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, first of all, I am not running  
3 for President, but one of the reasons I am not running is  
4 because I like to answer questions like you are putting to  
5 me, Mr. Monroe. Let me lay it right smack bang on the  
6 line. I believe in investing in this country. I have great  
7 faith in America. I think there are segments of the country  
8 that need public investment. I believe there are the  
9 sick and the needy and the elderly and the disabled who  
10 need help. I think there is a need in our country for better  
11 transportation. And there are other things. However, I be-  
12 lieve Congress has the responsibility for effective oversight.

13 Now, let me say to all my friendly governors: You send  
14 me a list of the programs you think we ought to cut out for  
15 your state and I will introduce the legislation to cut them  
16 out.

17 In other words, if the State of California, or any other  
18 state doesn't want these programs, just send us in a letter  
19 to Hubert Humphrey, 232 Russell Building, U.S. Senate, and I  
20 will introduce legislation promptly to see that your state is  
21 removed from any of those budget authorities, or any of  
22 those particular public laws, because I don't want to see  
23 any money spent that somebody doesn't want in their respec-  
24 tive states. Listen. We put out Federal Revenue Sharing  
25 to state governments that permits people to be able to

1 talk a good deal about economy at the state level.

2 The federal government has taken on heavy burdens, and  
3 those burdens, many of them have been asked for by the mayors  
4 and the legislatures and the governors.

5 MR. LISAGOR: Senator Humphrey, a group of public opinion  
6 experts appeared before your committee the other day and said  
7 that seven of ten Americans believe that their elected leaders  
8 have consistently lied to them for ten years. How do you  
9 overcome that?

10 SENATOR HUMPHREY: I think you overcome that by faith-  
11 ful performance of public duty. I think you overcome it  
12 by not over-promising. I believe you overcome it by  
13 responsiveness to the public need. Too many promises made,  
14 too few fulfilled. Also, might I say there has been great  
15 expose of what has happened in government, sometimes half-  
16 truths, sometimes full truth.

17 There is no better way to overcome doubt than by per-  
18 formance.

19 MR. LISAGOR: Let me ask you another short question on  
20 that same public opinion panel. They said that the Democrats  
21 favor big business over the average worker just as much as  
22 Republicans do. Do you agree with that?

23 SENATOR HUMPHREY: It didn't go that far. No, I think  
24 the Democrats are good for business. We don't favor big  
25 business. We are good for it because every businessman knows



1 that they do much better when the Democrats are in power.  
2 The big businessmen frequently feel if they belong to the  
3 country club and they are big business, they have got to  
4 be Republicans. Now, I don't mind them saying they are  
5 Republicans, but for their own good and their own stockholders'  
6 good, they ought to vote Democratic.

7 MR. APPLE: Senator, you told me in 1960 that you had  
8 always dreamed of being president. Now you are first in  
9 the Gallup Poll. All over this country political reporters  
10 like us are being told by politicians, if Hubert would only  
11 get into it I would be out for him in a moment.

12 Why are you not running, given those two facts?

13 SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, Mr. Apple, what you have said  
14 of course is one of the most rewarding experiences of my  
15 life, to have people feel as they do, and I think it is true  
16 that they feel that way. I get those kinds of comments  
17 throughout the country.

18 I believe people today are looking for leadership of  
19 experience. Those of us that have gone through the difficult  
20 times as well as the good times. I believe that  
21 they have a feeling that I have tried to perform my duties, at  
22 least as I saw them.

23 I simply have to tell you that I feel I can serve my  
24 country in the Senate. I want to be free of any ambition.  
25 I want credibility. The minute that I start moving around

1 these campaign circuits they are going to say, "There he goes  
2 again, and he is going to be out seeking votes." I am seeking  
3 nothing. I don't want anything from you, I don't want any-  
4 thing from the public. I don't want anything from anybody.  
5 What I want to do is to do what I believe is right, and I  
6 am going to call the shots exactly as I see them, just as I  
7 did a moment ago on a question, here.

8 MR. APPLE: Do you think that is a good strategy to get  
9 the Democratic Presidential nomination, calling them as you  
10 see them?

11 SENATOR HUMPHREY: I don't know. I think the American  
12 people want candor and they are going to get it.

13 MR. SPIVAK: We have less than three minutes.

14 MR. NOVAK: Senator Humphrey, it was recently announced  
15 President for  
16 you are settling your massive campaign debts for/1972 at  
17 a rate of three or four cents on the dollar. Now, when many  
18 Americans are finding it very hard to settle their own personal  
19 debts at 100 cents on the dollar, and New York City is on the  
20 verge of default having to settle 100 cents on the dollar,  
21 how can you rationalize your approval of an arrangement like  
22 that?

23 SENATOR HUMPHREY: I don't like the arrangement, Mr.  
24 Novak. I don't like debts, private, public or campaign. I  
25 have instructed my campaign committee to do the very best they  
can within the law and within the campaign law all that is  
legal to make an appropriate settlement of outstanding bills  
that we have. Many of these so-called debts were loans that  
were made by people of considerable means, and they understood  
at the time that there was some probability that those could

not be fully repaid.

1                   MR. NOVAK: Did you personally approve that arrangement, / Senator,  
2 I would like to know?

3                   SENATOR HUMPHREY: Did I personally approve the arrange-  
4 ment of settling the debts?

5                   MR. NOVAK: Yes.

6                   SENATOR HUMPHREY: Indeed, I did because I think there  
7 should be some payment made; I think we ought to pay as much as  
8 we could.

9                   One of the reasons I don't want to run for President,  
10 Mr. Novak, is, I don't want to have to answer silly questions  
11 like this any more. I am sick and tired of being asked about  
12 campaign debts and everybody knows that everybody who has ever  
13 run for office has ended up with a deficit and that has been  
14 the problem.

15                  MR. SPIVAK: Senator, since you are not a candidate, and  
16 I am glad to hear you are not a candidate because you can  
17 answer this question, you have been very close to the President;  
18 you know what the condition of the country is today: What  
19 qualities do you think are essential today for a man to be a  
20 good president?

21                  SENATOR HUMPHREY: I think a man, to be a good president,  
22 has to recognize that he has to be a leader and an educator.  
23 He cannot pander to the worst that is in us. He ought to appeal  
24 to the best that is in us. He can hire people to be a good  
25 administrator. Those are the cabinet officers, but what he

2  
1 needs to be is a man that has a philosophy of life for our  
2 country, that has great dreams about what America ought to be  
3 like. He ought to be what Teddy Roosevelt said and what Woodrow  
4 Wilson said. He looked at the White House as a "bully pulpit."  
5 He ought to have inspiration and Wilson said he looked at the  
6 White House as the "nation's classroom" and the man who  
7 occupied it as the "nation's teacher."

8 He ought to be an educator. He ought to be able to show  
9 a path, a sense of direction and, above all, he needs to be  
10 candid with the American people.

11 MR. SPIVAK: In less than 15 seconds, is there a  
12 Democrat you now see on the horizon who could take the position  
13 as you describe it?

14 SENATOR HUMPHREY: There are very good people on the horizon.  
15 Let's let them be tested and they will be in the primaries and  
16 we will begin to get a better view of their capabilities.

17 MR. SPIVAK: I am sorry, but our time is up. Thank you,  
18 Senator Humphrey, for being with us today on MEET THE PRESS.

19 (Next week: MR. SPIVAK: Next Sunday, in a special one-  
20 hour edition of MEET THE PRESS, marking our 28th anniversary on  
21 television, our guest will be the President of the United States.

22 Join us for this special program beginning one-half hour  
23 earlier than usual, 11:30 Eastern, 10:30 Central time on most  
24 of these stations.)  
25