


**The original documents are located in Box 122, folder “6/18/76 - Lebanon Evacuation” of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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Public Law 93-110



CONSULTATION

Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

REPORTING

Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced --

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(3) In numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;

the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth-

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and,

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.


(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (Public Law 93-148)

SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet


WITHDRAWAL ID 09112

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Briefing Paper  
  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Schedule for Road Evacuation  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 06/1976  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 006701295  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . JOHN O. MARSH FILES (WH Counsellor)  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 122  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . 6/18/76 - Lebanon Evacuation  
  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 01/30/1998  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . WHM

*Sanitized 9/21/05*

*Lebanon*

~~SECRET~~



DATE

TIME

SCHEDULE FOR ROAD EVACUATION

(Wash./Beirut)

(Wash./Beirut)

*Thurs*  
June 17/18

2000/0300

Send a message to American Embassy Beirut announcing the evacuation decision and providing detailed evacuation guidance. Information copies of the same message should be sent to area posts, EUR Embassies, USUN, USNATO, and Military Commands.

Notify the Syrian Government that Damascus will be the point of arrival for evacuees. Request all appropriate assistance from the Syrians in conducting the evacuation and arranging for the departure to third countries of the evacuees.


Send messages and diplomatic notes to the Governments of the UK and France announcing our evacuation decision; message to the UK would contain complete evacuation planning information.

Messages to all Arab Governments, the Soviet Union, the UN and Israel should be sent spelling out U.S. intentions to evacuate and the reasons behind the evacuation. Arab Governments should be asked to intervene energetically with the parties to the Lebanese dispute to ask them to permit the evacuation to take place peacefully.

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted

AUTHORITY RAC NLF-JM-F-2-21-1-2 9/21/05

BY *WJ* NSC/State/Grindwines  
NARA, DATE 10/23/09



25x

2100/0400

Using VOA and BBC facilities, alert American citizens to call the American Embassy for evacuation instructions. The same message should be repeated every half-hour until three hours before final evacuation.

2200/0500

Alert the American and International Red Cross to the fact of the evacuation and ask that they be prepared to provide facilities at safehaven points. Specifically, they should be asked to furnish a channel of communications between American citizens and their relatives. The Red Crosses would be given the safehaven decision as soon as the government in question responds.

*Fri*  
June 18

0900/1600

Meet with Immigration & Naturalization Services to brief them on the evacuation and ask them to be ready to assist non-American citizen relatives of evacuees to come to the U.S. should this be necessary.

~~SECRET~~


<u>DATE</u> (Wash./Beirut)	<u>TIME</u> (Wash./Beirut)	
		Arrange for charter flights from Damascus to Rome.
	1100/1800	Despatch State Department medical team to Damascus to stand by to provide emergency medical case for evacuees.  Despatch emergency food and water supplies in limited amounts to the Damascus airport.  Despatch adequate financial resources to safehaven to permit emergency loans or check-cashing facilities.
June 18/19	2100/0300	Also using VOA broadcast every hour until the evacuation a message which explains the reasons behind the evacuation.  Release press guidance in the U.S. and to wire services for worldwide distribution announcing our decision to evacuate and the reasons behind decision.
<i>Sat</i> June 19	0100/0800	Task Force leaves station (12 hours from coast) in order to ready itself to maintain air surveillance of road convoy until the convoy reaches Syrian-controlled areas.
June 19/20	2300/0600	Assemble U.S. citizens at departure points.
June 20	0000/0700	Vehicle convoy departs.  Task force launches overhead combat capable surveillance.
	<u>0900/1600</u>	Convoy vehicles begin to arrive in Damascus and proceed to Damascus airport staging area.
	1000/1700	Charter flights depart for Rome safehaven. (Some evacuees go by vehicle to neighboring countries; others take commercial flights.)
June 20/21	2100/0400	Disembarkation of evacuees in Rome safehaven.

Points for Energetic U.S. Policy in Current Lebanon Crisis

- Death of U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon has serious potential for American domestic as well as foreign politics
- Important that President demonstrate forceful resolve to end Lebanese civil war and thereby protect American lives and interests in the Middle East
- To this end, forceful U.S. policy should be used emphasizing energy and military force of United States
- Simultaneously
  - Go to UN Security Council demanding end to Lebanese civil strife and foreign intervention (take swipe at Palestinians too, perhaps), and call for international peacekeeping in Lebanon (might get JCS section that deals with U.N. military off their duffs)
  - Go to American people and announce:
    - (1) That we are going to U.N.
    - (2) That we are moving Sixth Fleet forces with appropriate show-of-force tactics to demonstrate our resolve that fighting in Lebanon end and for possible evacuation of Americans and other foreign nationals
    - (3) That we are preparing for possible direct U.S. military actions under war powers act to stop fighting and/or evacuate civilians
  - Move Sixth Fleet into such position that aircraft may overfly Lebanon on recon and show-of-force flights, and then start graduated aircraft flights to these ends
  - Alert U.S. airborne and other forces for possible movement into Lebanon for holding airfields and other points for evacuation and/or holding open vital lines of communication and transportation
  - Contact Lebanese government (whatever there is) with idea of getting their permission for such overflights as we deem necessary and for offering large-scale disaster relief efforts, but that in any case we shall take such steps unilaterally as we deem necessary for safeguarding American lives and interests
  - Contact major governments interested, notably Soviet Union, Israel, Syria and other key Arab states as to our intentions and rationales--this for their information and as warning that Israel and USSR stay out
- It is assumed that appropriate intelligence watch has been instituted some time ago so that up-to-date information is available on status of forces presently in Lebanon, etc. If this is not available, it should be so ordered from wherever we can obtain it
- Ultimate U.S. aim should be establishment of rudimentary amenities in major Lebanese population centers, cessation of all fighting, withdrawal of foreign troops (and entry of no new forces), and safety of American civilians; to this end major shipments of needed medical supplies, food, etc. should be readied by the U.S., either under its own auspices, ICRC or other appropriate international agencies



The purpose of this call is to give you a confidential status report on the situation involving the present plans for the evacuation of Americans in Beirut.



You are aware that as a result of discussions involving Americans as well as representatives of other interests in Beirut, it has been planned to conduct an evacuation of Americans from Beirut by a motor convoy. Following the inability of the convoy to make the trip Friday night, it was planned to make another attempt tonight.


However, we have been informed by forces controlling the convoy route that the road has been interdicted and that heavy shelling along some portions make it impossible to accomplish the planned evacuation tonight.

However, the PLO has concurred in our proposal for an evacuation by sea, using a landing type vessel which is a part of the Sixth Fleet.

This will be an administrative operation, not a combat type operation. The mother ship (LPD) will proceed from its present location in the task force to a point approximately three to five miles off the coast. It will release

a landing craft (LCU) which will proceed to a beach area at Beirut near the evacuation assembly point where it will unload the evacuees. The landing craft has sufficient capacity to take all anticipated evacuees in one trip. We have been assured by the forces controlling the area where the operation will take place that security will be maintained throughout the operation. We expect the operation to take place sometime after midnight and to be concluded by 6:00 or 7:00 a. m.

We would appreciate your keeping a close hold on these details.



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONTACT LIST

<u>MEMBER</u>	<u>6/18</u> <u>TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
The Speaker	10:22 am	Speaker's office	In chair - left with Joel Jankowsky.
Tip O'Neill	10:32 am	Speaker's lobby	Jesus Christ!
John McFall	11:20 am	his office	Had constituent there. Out now.
John Rhodes	10:55 am	his office	Tough situation. Knows the evacuation route.
Bob Michel	11:50 am	his office	Has large Lebanese constituency and wants detailed briefing.
Al Cederberg	10:35 am	off Floor	No comment.
George Mahon	10:30 am	off Floor	No comment.
"Doc" Morgan	10:35 am	House Floor thru Doorkeeper - chairing bill	
Bill Broomfield	10:20 am	off Floor	No comment.
Mel Price	11:05 am	Rm. S 126	In Conference Committee.
Bob Wilson	11:15 am	Cathy Parham	In California.



Bob Wilson	11:12 am	Central Building	In Conference
Mr. Price	11:02 am	Room 2158	In Conference Committee
Bill Broomfield	10:50 am	off floor	No comment
"Doc" Morgan	10:52 am	speaking thru Doorkeeper - House floor thru	



George Johnson	10:30 am	off floor	No comment
Al Sedberry	10:32 am	off floor	No comment
Bob Miller	11:20 am	his office	detained regarding attorneys and wants his wife's telephone con-
John Hodges	10:22 am	his office	the explanation today today's situation. Knows
John McNeil	11:50 am	his office	Out now. Had conversation there


*Mr. March*

Mr. O. Hill	10:35 am	Speaker's lobby	Leave shortly
The speaker	10:55 am	Speaker's office	Just returned. In chair - left with

MEMBER      TIME      PLACE      COMMENT  
 2/18

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONTACT LIST

<u>MEMBER</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
The Speaker			
Tip O'Neill			
John McFall			
John Rhodes			
Bob Michel			
Al Cederberg			
George Mahon			
"Doc" Morgan			
Bill Broomfield			
Mel Price			
Bob Wilson			



UNITED STATES SENATE CONTACT LIST

<u>MEMBER</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
Eastland			
Mansfield			
Byrd, R.			
Scott, H.			
Griffin			
Stennis			
Thurmond			
Sparkman			
Case			
McClellan			
Young			





Public Law 93-118  
 93rd Congress, H. J. Res. 542  
 November 7, 1973

**Joint Resolution**

Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

War Powers Resolution.

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".

PURPOSE AND POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

CONSULTATION

SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

REPORTING

SEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

97 STAT. 555

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

97 STAT. 556

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;



The President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth —

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

#### CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.



## CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL

Sec. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report on such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.


(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

## CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Sec. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within



three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

#### INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION

Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred—

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

59 Stat. 1031.


"Introduction  
of United  
States Armed  
Forces."

(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.

(d) Nothing in this joint resolution—

(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or

(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.



SEPARABILITY CLAUSE

Sec. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

CARL ALBERT

*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

JAMES O. EASTLAND

*President of the Senate pro tempore.*

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S.,

November 7, 1973.

The House of Representatives having proceeded to reconsider the resolution (H. J. Res. 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States with his objections, to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it was

*Resolved*, That the said resolution pass, two-thirds of the House of Representatives agreeing to pass the same.

Attest:

W. PAT JENNINGS

*Clerk.*

I certify that this Joint Resolution originated in the House of Representatives.

W. PAT JENNINGS

*Clerk.*

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

November 7, 1973.

The Senate having proceeded to reconsider the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States with his objections to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it was



Resolved, That the said joint resolution pass, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative.

Attest:

FRANCIS R. VALLEO

Secretary.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 93-297 (Comm. on Foreign Affairs) and No. 93-547 (Comm. of Conference).

SENATE REPORT No. 93-220 accompanying S. 440 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 119 (1973):

June 25, July 18, considered and passed House.

July 18 - 20, considered and passed Senate, amended, in lieu of S. 440.

Oct. 10, Senate agreed to conference report.

Oct. 12, House agreed to conference report.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 9, No. 43:

Oct. 27, vetoed; Presidential message.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 119 (1973):

Nov. 7, House and Senate overrode veto.



## CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL

Sec. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

## CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Sec. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within



*Lebanon*

SENSITIVE/  
EYES ONLY


June 17, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:           MAX FRIEDERSDORF  
FROM:                        JACK MARSH

Because of the uncertainty of the Lebanon situation and the possibility that we may have a sudden requirement to pass information to the Hill, I think it would be helpful for you and Wolthuis, as well as your House and Senate people, be on page-boy when you leave the White House this afternoon.

However, to avoid any undue concern, I ask that you not make this request until later this afternoon and also that it be done in a routine and casual way. I do not want to cause any undue alarm because as of this moment, I know of no reason for any type of notification to the Hill out of the ordinary.

JOM/dl



SENSITIVE/  
EYES ONLY

June 18, 1976

Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon

Due to the continuing uncertainty of the situation in Beirut, the President has directed the United States Embassy there to assist in the departure by overland convoy to Damascus of its U.S. citizens who wish to depart Lebanon at this time.

The convoy is expected to leave Beirut Saturday, and American citizens are being alerted both by the Embassy and by broadcast on the Voice of America to be prepared for departure at that time if they so wish.

The remains of Ambassador Francis Meloy and Mr. Robert Waring have been brought to Damascus overland. They will be picked up by a U.S. plane and returned to the United States, arriving on Saturday.

Only those Embassy officials not essential to our continuing operations will be leaving Lebanon. [FYI: It is expected that approximately 35 to 40 will remain. End FYI] The American Embassy in Beirut is to remain open to continue our efforts to help bring an end to the strife which has brought this tragedy to Lebanon.



June 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: JACK MARSH

When I met with Senators Mansfield and Hugh Scott this afternoon to discuss the Lebanese evacuation, both the Senators indicated their desire to attend the arrival ceremonies at Andrews Air Force Base tomorrow afternoon when the aircraft returns with the bodies of the American diplomats.

cc: Dick Cheney  
Max Friedersdorf  
Terry O'Donnell  
Les Janka

JOM/dl



---

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1<sup>st</sup> notice to M/Cs  
re Lebanon



June 18, 1976

Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon

Due to the continuing uncertainty of the situation in Beirut, the President has directed the United States Embassy there to assist in the departure by overland convoy to Damascus of its U.S. citizens who wish to depart Lebanon at this time.

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Only those Embassy officials not essential to our continuing operations will be leaving Lebanon. [FYI: It is expected that approximately 35 to 40 will remain. End FYI] The American Embassy in Beirut is to remain open to continue our efforts to help bring an end to the strife which has brought this tragedy to Lebanon.



June 18, 1976

Public Statement on Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon

Due to the continuing uncertainty of the situation in Beirut, the President has directed the United States Embassy there to assist in the departure by overland convoy to Damascus of its U.S. citizens who wish to depart Lebanon at this time.

The first such convoy is expected to leave Beirut ~~Monday~~ Saturday ~~morning, Beirut time~~, and American citizens are being alerted both by the Embassy and by broadcast on the Voice of America to be prepared for departure at that time if they so wish.

The overland route to Damascus has been chosen in view of the fact that it has been safely used by various foreign national groups to leave Lebanon during the last several days, including a British convoy which successfully delivered the remains of Ambassador Francis Meloy and Mr. Robert Waring to Damascus this morning.

Only those Embassy officials not essential to our continuing operations will be leaving Lebanon. [FYI: It is expected that approximately 35 to 40 will remain. End FYI] The American Embassy in Beirut is to remain open to continue our efforts to help bring an end to the strife which has brought this tragedy to Lebanon.



June 18, 1976


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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON NESSEN

AT 8:00 P.M. EDT

JUNE 18, 1976

FRIDAY

MR. NESSEN: The purpose of the meeting was to review the final evacuation plans.

Q Do you have a list of participants?

MR. NESSEN: No.

Q It would be nice if you brought it out, though.

MR. NESSEN: I am just not going to be able to tell you the details of the evacuation, I think for obvious reasons.

What has happened now is that the President has sent General Brown and Secretary Clements back to the Pentagon to monitor the developments from there. Brent Scowcroft is here, of course. So is Cheney, and me, and Marsh is going to go home for a while and feed his kids and come back.

The President has gone home to dinner and will then keep in touch with the situation here.

I don't know precisely what to do with the lid situation because I don't have any way of knowing whether there will be anything further out of here tonight or not. As I say, I plan to stay and Cheney and Scowcroft and Marsh will be back and the others manning the fort over at the Pentagon, and so I don't know what to tell you.

Q Could you give us a call if you have something? Is that pretty difficult?

MR. NESSEN: You mean a limited call-out for a full call-out or what we could do is leave a sign-up for a call-out.

MORE

#515



Q What are you expecting?

MR. NESSEN: It is hard for me to anticipate anything.

Q When do they start to move, actually, our time?

MR. NESSEN: I can't give you that.

The President, as I say, is going to have dinner and then will keep on top of the situation.

Why don't we do this? Why don't we have a sign-up list for those who are interested in a call-out if we have anything, and we will be faithful about calling out and if you don't hear, then you will know that we won't have anything here before 8:00 a.m.

I am not going to promise that we are going to have anything at 8:00 a.m., but that would be the earliest we would have anything if we don't call out tonight. How does that sound?

Q Ron, again, if you want to make it off-the-record, fine, but we are talking about a motorcade that is going to travel about 80 miles.

MR. NESSEN: I don't know what the distance is, and I can't tell you what the route is.

Q We are talking about something that should be completed very quickly.

Q No more than two or three hours?

MR. NESSEN: It is not on I-95, Russ, I can tell you that.

Q On Pennsylvania Avenue in rush-hour, it is not going to take that long to travel 80 miles, is it?

Q On the record, can you give us any guidance if there are any plans to use American military personnel in that or does your original disclaimer hold?

MR. NESSEN: My original disclaimer holds.

Q Ron, what if something should develop between now and dawn there when the Americans are to gather at the Riviera Hotel? Is that the kind of thing that you would do a call-out about? I don't know what to anticipate, but the call-out would be --

MR. NESSEN: Why don't you leave it up to my judgment? I will call out if there is anything significant to announce.

Q Ron, the presence of Brown and Clements standing by in the Pentagon ready room suggests the Sixth Fleet is on some kind of alert.

MR. NESSEN: Not an alert, Russ, but they have been there all along from the very beginning for the purpose of taking part in an evacuation of Americans if that should become necessary and it remains their assignment.

Q Let me ask the question more specifically. If the convoy were to encounter difficulties, say artillery fire along the way, and if the convoy were halted, is it contemplated a U.S. air strike would be called in?

MR. NESSEN: I can't answer that, Walt.

Q If we came back at 11:00, would we be able to man the barricades here?

MR. NESSEN: If you would like to --

Q I would like to come back.

MR. NESSEN: This office will be open, obviously.

Q Can we get back through the gate?

Q Why don't you tell them at the gate?

MR. NESSEN: I am going to be here, and we will make the arrangements.

Q Ron, do you have numbers for us on the number of people signed up for the convoy?

MR. NESSEN: Not firm numbers, no.

Q Do you have a ball-park figure?

MR. NESSEN: The ball-park figure is up to about 200 assignments so far.

Q Wouldn't you expect some people would come who didn't necessarily sign up?

MR. NESSEN: It is possible.

I think you ought to keep in mind that what we were talking about earlier is that something over 400 of the Lebanese-Americans in the relatively peaceful Northern zone are controlled by the Christians, and there is no reason for them to get out.

A certain number live in areas where it is difficult or impossible to get to an evacuation convoy, and others are Lebanese-Americans and they may have American passports, but they have no real ties with the United States or relatives here now and so for their own personal reasons they are not expected to want to leave Lebanon at the moment.

Q How many of the 53 Embassy employees do you anticipate leaving at this point?

MR. NESSEN: I would rather not put a number on that right now.

Q Will there be some thinning out at the Embassy?

MR. NESSEN: Yes, it is anticipated.

Q Has that thinning out already occurred?

MR. NESSEN: No.

Q How will the President keep focus? Through Scowcroft?

MR. NESSEN: Right.

Q Is the President planning to go to bed tonight?

MR. NESSEN: I don't know at this point, Walt.

Q Do you know when his wife is due back?

MR. NESSEN: About 10:30. I guess she is keeping pretty much to his schedule.

Q Does the use of the American military include the air cover for the convoy, possible air cover?

MR. NESSEN: It is not anticipated.

If you want to go away until 11:00, that is safe. As I say, I will be here.

Q Okay. May we have a lid until 8:00 a.m.?

MR. NESSEN: You actually have a lid until 8:00 a.m., that is correct. Sign up for a call-out, and for those of you who want to man the barricades, you are welcome to bring pizzas back and stuff.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Ron.

END (AT 8:08 P.M. EDT)

#515



June 19

*File  
in file*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Jack:

I contacted House Representatives  
with regard to being with the  
President this afternoon at  
Andrews.

The Speaker has a problem and  
so does Michel and will not be  
able to make it. The rest are  
out of town.

Charlie



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE FILES  
FROM: JACK MARSH *JM*  
SUBJECT: Lebanon Evacuation  
Friday, June 18, 1976



Attached are the following items:

- Tab A -- Outline of Information Furnished to Senior Congressional Leaders
- Tab B -- Notes on Capitol Hill Visits in Reference to Lebanon Evacuation
- Tab C -- Summaries of House and Senate reaction to the briefings

The following additional points are noted:

1. It should be noted the summary was delivered to the named Members or one of their representatives prior to the release of the summary to the press.
2. In addition to other references about applicability of the War Powers Act, it has been the position of the Administration that it is not applicable in situations involving evacuation of American citizens. Additionally, war powers were not involved because at the time of the delivery of the statement, there was no anticipated introduction of United States forces into hostilities.
3. For further reference to evacuation situations, attention is directed to the file involving the Phnom Penh evacuation, particularly Senator Case's comments on this subject (Tab D).

TAB A

Outline of Information Furnished to Senior Congressional Leaders\*\*

Friday, June 18, 1976

1. It was pointed out that amphibious forces of the Sixth Fleet had been moved to within 20-25 miles of the Lebanon coast where they were out of view from general visual observation.

2. The aircraft carrier for aircraft support was within 100 miles from the coast.

3. A C-135 communications-type aircraft had been assigned to perform a radio relay mission from the convoy. This aircraft would probably fly at an altitude of 20,000 feet and would be at a distance of 20 miles and to the rear of the convoy. The Israelis and the Syrians were aware of the planned use of this particular aircraft in order to provide communications support to the convoy.

4. The time being announced for the assembly was 11:00 p. m. local time and the departure from the assembly was expected sometime after midnight, probably before 3:00 a. m. The information as to the departure time, as well as the disposition of the U. S. Fleet and air resources was considered highly sensitive and a close hold was requested on any such information.

5. The plan was to move by motorcade in a southern direction to join up with Syrian forces and the critical period would be the period of approximately 2 hours from departure from Beirut until joining with the Syrian forces. The Syrians were cooperating with us in this endeavor and would escort the convoy from the pickup point to Damascus where chartered aviation would be available to complete the evacuation; however, it is expected a number of the evacuees would not avail themselves of this opportunity and would prefer to continue on a land route in their own transportation to some other destination.

6. There were approximately 1,400 citizen evacuees and as many as 400 resident aliens; however, because of the unique situation involving dual citizenship, the number who are expected to take advantage of this evacuation would more nearly be 200-400.

\*\* Senator Mansfield and Hugh Scott, Speaker Albert by phone, Majority Leader O'Neill, Republican Whip Michel and Chairman Mahon. Unavailable were Minority Leader Rhodes and Representative Cederberg.




7. We were cooperating closely with the British in this effort and the decision to use the land route was based upon a number of recommendations, including the experiences of the French, the United Nations and the British who had earlier evacuated individuals by land.

8. The reason for earlier radio broadcasts alerting the residents to the evacuation was due to the breakdown of local communications, particularly the phone system whereby radio became the only means of assuring communications with a large number of the people.

9. The reason the airport was not being used was because one of the two runways was out of service and the airport was closed because of a lack of personnel, particularly communicators, as well as the fact that it was located in an area in which there was uncertainty as to control, particularly from hostile gunfire and shelling. However, this situation could possibly change whereby it would be available for such a purpose.

10. It should be noted the foregoing information was given to the Leaders indicated on the previous page by asterisk in the late afternoon and not to all on the general contact list at Tab C.



TAB B

Notes on Capitol Hill Visits in Reference to Lebanon Evacuation

Friday, June 18, 1976

1. Meeting with Senators Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott

This meeting took place in Senator Mansfield's Office at approximately 4:00 p.m., Friday, June 18, 1976.

In addition to myself and the two Senators, Arthur Houghton, NSC Staff, accompanied me.

Houghton outlined the evacuation program, including the disposition of the Sixth Fleet and also the employment of an aircraft radio relay. Both Senators indicated their appreciation for this information and in response to the inquiry on others who should be briefed, they indicated disclosure to them would be sufficient.

They indicated they had not received inquiries from other Members of the Senate and unless we were asked for the same, it was their opinion this information given to them would be adequate.

Senator Mansfield indicated his pleasure that we were approaching the situation in the manner and the method being employed rather than the use of military resources for the evacuation, such as helicopter airlift.

The Senators indicated their desire to attend the arrival ceremonies of the remains of the two American diplomats killed in Beirut earlier in the week.

2. Meeting with Bob Michel, Republican Whip

The meeting took place in the hallway outside the Republican Whip's Office at approximately 4:15 p.m. Friday, June 18, 1976.

Representative Michel has a substantial Lebanese constituency in his Congressional District and he asked earlier in the day for additional information in reference to the evacuation. He was given the general information as to evacuation plans, Fleet disposition, radio relay aircraft and the general evacuation plans. He asked several questions but did not voice any great concern or other objections to the proposal.



3. Meeting with Representative George Mahon, Jr.  
Appropriations Committee

This meeting took place between approximately 4:30 and 5:00 p.m., Friday, June 18, 1976 in the Committee Office of the Chairman, which is just off the House Floor.

Attending in addition to the Chairman were Arthur Houghton of the NSC staff and myself.

We went over the evacuation plan at some length and pointed out the disposition of the United States forces including the radio relay aircraft. The Chairman asked some questions about the number of people that might be involved. He also asked questions as to the cause of the murders of the American diplomats.

He indicated his appreciation for the information which he was given and did not voice any objections or reservations to the proposal.

4. Several efforts were made to reach Congressman John Rhodes, Minority Leader of the House, but because of his schedule this was impossible. He was meeting with other House leaders for part of the afternoon and departed the Capitol early to participate in a program away from Capitol Hill.

5. It was learned Congressman Cederberg was in Michigan.

6. Meeting with Congressman Tip O'Neill.

This meeting was held in the corridor with Congressman Tip O'Neill, who was moving from the Speaker's Office to the House Floor to vote. The meeting occurred at approximately 6:30 p.m.

He displayed considerable interest in the program and seemed to be very pleased that he had been informed of the basic elements involving the disposition of the United States forces and their stand-by posture. He asked several questions in reference to how many people might be involved. Tip also said if he were asked as to whether he had been informed of this proposed action, he would respond he had been briefed.




TAB C

7. House Speaker Carl Albert

Numerous attempts were made to reach Congressman Carl Albert, Speaker of the House; however, his schedule involved a series of meetings with other Members precluding a personal meeting with him during the day.

At approximately 9:30 p. m. I called him at his home and relayed to him the same information which had been conveyed to the other leaders of the House and Senate.

He expressed his appreciation and indicated he was sorry he was not able to meet personally in the afternoon because of the press of other business and he did not voice any objection or reservation to the proposed evacuation as it was presented to him.



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONTACT LIST

<u>MEMBER</u>	<u>6/18 TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
The Speaker	10:22 am	Speaker's office	In chair - left with Joel Jankowsky.
Tip O'Neill	10:32 am	Speaker's lobby	Jesus Christ!
John McFall	11:20 am	his office	Had constituent there. Out now.
John Rhodes	10:55 am	his office	Tough situation. Knows the evacuation route.
Bob Michel	11:50 am	his office	Has large Lebanese con- stituency and wants detailed briefing.
Al Cederberg	10:35 am	off Floor	No comment.
George Mahon	10:30 am	off Floor	No comment.
"Doc" Morgan	10:35 am	House Floor thru Doorkeeper - chairing bill	
Bill Broomfield	10:20 am	off Floor	No comment.
Mel Price	11:05 am	Rm. S 126	In Conference Committee.
Bob Wilson	11:15 am	Cathy Parham	In California.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


June 19, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH  
FROM: JOE JENCKES *J.J.*  
SUBJECT: Senate Reaction to Lebanon Evacuation

Bill Kendall and I delivered material on the Lebanon evacuation to the following Senators on Friday, June 18, 1976, between 10:25 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. Listed below are their reactions.

Eastland	None
Mansfield	Good move by the President. Glad no use of helicopters.
Byrd, R.	No comment
H. Scott	Obviously the necessary and desirably thing to do.
Griffin	No comment
Stennis	No comment
Thurmond	None
Sparkman	None
Case	None
McClellan	None
Young	None

CC: Max Friedersdorf



TAB D



The purpose of this call is to give you a status report on the situation involving the evacuation plans of Americans in Beirut.

You should be aware that as a result of discussions involving Americans as well as representatives of other interests in Beirut, it is planned to conduct an evacuation of Americans by a motor convoy following the procedures originally planned for Friday night. This evacuation will probably occur about midnight. The discussions indicated that the evacuation should be accomplished with a minimum of difficulty.

However, if it should develop that the motor convoy cannot be undertaken on or about the time it is scheduled for departure, then there is under consideration the use of a landing-type vessel that is part of the Sixth Fleet. However, the effort involving the landing craft is not a combat operation. This craft will proceed to a beach area at Beirut near the evacuation assembly point where it will be

available for loading the evacuees.

The evacuation described above is expected to take place some time within the next 12 hours.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK MARSH

FROM:

JOE JENCKES *J. J.*


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Mansfield - <i>K</i>	Good move by the President. Glad no use of helicopters.
Byrd, R. <i>K</i>	No comment
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Thurmond <i>J</i>	None
Sparkman <i>J</i>	None
Case <i>J</i>	None
McClellan <i>J</i>	None
Young <i>J</i>	None

CC: Max Friedersdorf



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONTACT LIST

6/19/76



<u>MEMBER</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
The Speaker	12:05	---	No answer after repeated calls. At 12:05 spoke to A.A. Ward. (J.M. contacted.)
Tip O'Neill			Unable to reach. Had police leave call request on cottage door in Mass. No return call by 12:25 a.m.
John McFall	10:45 pm	--	Sheraton Boston Hotel, Boston, Mass. ---Asked what time operation would begin. Responded 11:00 pm USDST, 7:00 am Beirut time. Hopes everything goes all right.
John Rhodes	12:34		Washington home. "Sounds like the right thing to do. Where do you take the evacuees? To the ship. Knew that the overland convoy route is an SOB." (JM & CL)
Bob Michel	10:38 pm	--	At residence in Washington, D. C. ---No Comment.
Al Cederberg	11:15 pm	--	Holiday Inn, Midland, Michigan---Surprised that evacuation not completed last night (6/18) . Asked if British would participate. Believes evacuation by sea better than by overland route.
George Mahon	10:40 pm	--	At residence in Washington, D. C. ---Asked why we are not resorting to overland convoy. Responded that route has been interdicted and there is heavy shelling along some portions. Hopes all goes well.
"Doc" Morgan			White House does not have Washington home phone. Press aide reached at 10:59. Wouldn't reveal Morgan's home phone but he would keep trying for us. His Pa. home number is 412-377-3144 but there is no answer.
Bill Broomfield	10:50 pm	--	At Capital Hill Club, Washington, D. C. ---In complete support of operation.
Mel Price	10:39		place: Washington, D. C. home-- "Thank you"
Bob Wilson	10:49	-	Not at home - Reached A.A. Ed Terrar - Gave overview to Ed. Wilson at Tides Inn, Irving, Va. No answer in his room or hotel page. Ed felt Wilson didn't need to be reached on this.

## MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1976

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ of Senators regarding evacuation plan from Lebanon.

Senator	Time	Place	comment
Eastland	10:50pm	DC	I'm mighty glad you done it
Mansfield	10:15pm	DC	Has reservations. Like overland route better. Got others out that way.
Scott, H.	10:20pm	DC	Approves.
Griffin	10:50pm	Cap Hill Club	OK, but don't downplay military side of it.
Sparkman	10:35pm	DC	Sounds very encouraging. Was getting worried. Sound good.
Case	10:30pm	DC	Fine. Approves operation. Glad we are doing it.
McClellan	10:43	DC	Other nationalities coming out? That shouldn't be any problem. They ought to be glad let us get them out
Young	10:50	DC	OK, good luck
Thurmond	11:00	So Car	RW told AA, Beasley
Stennis	11:10	DC	RW told Ed Braswell

R. Byrd call still outstanding as of 11:30 pm



AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON NESSEN

AT 2:20 A.M. EDT

JUNE 20, 1976

SUNDAY

MR. NESSEN: After careful consideration of the alternatives and in light of the uncertain security situation along parts of the road to Damascus at the present time, the President has decided that the best means for the departure of Americans wishing to leave Lebanon is by sea. Other foreign nationals can be included.

Let me say parenthetically at that point it appears now that about 200 Americans and perhaps 300 or more British have expressed an interest in going by this route. That is the current outlook.

This operation would be beginning Sunday morning Beirut time.

This is a humanitarian operation. It will be carried out by an unarmed Navy landing craft. This landing craft is known as an LCU -- about 41 meters long. I guess that would be about 120 feet. It can hold up to 500 people.

Because it does look like there might be perhaps more than 500 who want to go, there will be another smaller landing craft which is normally carried by an LCU called an LCM. An LCM is really fairly small. It is designed to carry one truck and one artillery piece. It can hold up to 150 people. So there will be those two Navy landing craft both unarmed.

The United States has received assurances as to the safety of the evacuees.

Q From whom, Ron?

MR. NESSEN: ON BACKGROUND, Jim, indirectly from the PLO.

Just to fill in a few more details for you, it was about 6 o'clock that the United States learned that we could not get a guarantee of safety along the road to Damascus because of fighting, including a reporting of a fire fight at one point along the road. And so at that time the President made the decision.

MORE

#517



Brent Scowcroft was in the NSC office, Secretary Kissinger at the State Department, Clements and Brown at the Defense Department. After consultations back and forth, the President made the decision about 6 o'clock.

Jack Marsh and his staff have contacted the leaders and relevant Members of Congress.

Q Both parties?

MR. NESSEN: Yes.

The President came over to the NSC office about 1:55 to monitor the operation. He was going into the Oval Office -- just did, and he will be staying there to monitor the operation. Don Rumsfeld has returned from his trip, arriving at the Pentagon about midnight, and he is there also.

Q The operation has begun?

MR. NESSEN: The pick-up has not begun, let me put it that way.

Q About 3:00 A.M. our time.

MR. NESSEN: Where did you get that from?

Q They had a time out of the Counsellor's office -- local time.

Q I saw 4 o'clock on the wires.

Q It said 2 o'clock, too.

MR. NESSEN: As there are various estimates of what time, we had better not pin it down.

What will happen is a Navy ship called an LSD by the name of the SPIEGEL GROVE -- it is about 510 feet long -- part of the Sixth Fleet -- will move to within three to five minutes of the beach outside the territorial waters, and will release the LCU and the LCM, which will then go the rest of the way to the beach and pick up the people.

Q Is this the end of the information now?

MR. NESSEN: Yes. If you want to go and file now, I will talk to the other folks who arrived late.

Q What did the President do earlier this evening?

MR. NESSEN: He was over in the residence with Mrs. Ford -- had dinner and took a nap before coming over here at 1:55 A.M.

END

(AT 2:35 A.M. EDT)



BEIRUT EVACUATION

Chronology

20 June 1976

(All times based on preliminary reports)



0123 EDT Execute Message  
Dispatched

0230 EDT Speigel Grove arrived 3 miles off Beirut Beach

0310 EDT LCU - 1654 Departed Speigel Grove for Beach

0328 EDT LCU Beached

0333 EDT LCU Ramp Lowered to Embark Evacuees

0356 EDT 105 evacuees on Board LCU. Evacuees are being loaded

0402 EDT 120 evacuees aboard LCU. Attempting to verify evacuees still  
in hotel.

0407 EDT 176 evacuees on board. LCU loading satisfactorily. No  
further breakdown available. Reported 2 NBC, 2 UPI, 1 AP  
reporter(s) on beach among evacuees. Security remains good.

0436 EDT Have been informed that last bus has arrived at embark site.  
Presently 272 evacuees on LCU.

0442 EDT LCU departed beach

0447 EDT Around 270 evacuees on board LCU verified. Report of no  
remaining evacuees on beach.

0452 EDT LCU presently 4,400 yards from Speigel Grove and closing.

Medical status of evacuees:

- 1 evacuee with broken arm
- 1 preg woman
- 1 child at breast
- 1 aged
- 2 dogs
- 1 parakeet

0455 EDT Due to swells in the area, debark of evacuees on accommodation ladder  
not considered safe. Evacuees to be on loaded in well deck. LCU  
advised by security force (on Beach) that, only evacuees on hand  
when left, there would be no more evacuees.

0508 EDT LCU was advised by convoy radio that once LCU left beach there would  
be no more evacuees

0512 EDT LCU entered Speigel Grove well deck.

0543 EDT Speigel Grove released and evacuation operation terminated.



JUN 21 1976

*File  
Lebanon*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH  
MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. *CLP*

SUBJECT: Rep. Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill  
(D. - Mass.)

At 10:00 a. m. on Sunday, June 20, 1976, Rep. O'Neill telephoned me at home and was returning our calls of Saturday night, June 19, concerning the evacuation of Americans from Lebanon.

I told "Tip" that we had tried to reach him Saturday night to inform him of the President's decision to evacuate Americans from Lebanon by sea. Failing to reach him, I asked the police to go by his home in the resort village and leave a note for him to call me. I then told "Tip" that the evacuation of Americans by sea had taken place during the night (early morning Lebanon time) and that it was successful and without incident to my knowledge.

O'Neill thanked me for informing him and was pleased that the evacuation was without incident.

