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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Testimony	Testimony of William Colby before the Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Senate Committee on Armed Services re strategic arms limitation before and after Valdivostok (74 pp.)	2/11/75	A
	2. <u>Janka to Marsh, 9/9/75</u>		
2a. Cable	SECSTATE WASHDC to USDEL SECRETARY re Jackson SALT appearance (3 pp.) <i>declassified 11/5/87 KR</i>	8/23/75	A

FILE LOCATION

Marsh Files
 General Subject File
 Strategic Arms Limitation

Box 31

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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This form marks the file location of item number 1
listed on the pink Withdrawal Sheet found at the front of this folder.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Sept. 9, 1975

Jack:

Attached is the correspondence you requested providing the background on Senator Jackson's request for Secretary Kissinger to appear before his subcommittee on SALT.

If you need anything further, please give me a call.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Les Janka'.

Les Janka

P.S. — We are still looking for the March letter. HAK has never responded in writing.

Handwritten initials 'LJ' in the bottom right corner of the page.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

STAFF LISTING: MARY STYNGTON, MO.; JOHN M. JACKSON, WASH.; W. A. EDWIN, JR., N.C.; EDWARD W. CANNON, IND.; BRUCE S. MCINTYRE, N.M.; BRUCE S. BYRD, JR., VA.; WALTER E. BURNES, IOWA; M. PATRICK, GA.; STANLEY THURMOND, S.C.; JOHN EDWARDS, TENN.; PETER H. DEDMON, CALIF.; BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.; WILLIAM B. SAREY, OHIO; WILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA.; EDWARD BRADWELL, JR., MISSOURI; JOHN R. STAFF DIRECTOR

FAD:RC
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

August 22, 1975

37

ACTION
Is assigned to

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

K.S. — [H]

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to reiterate the request made repeatedly to your office since last March that you appear before the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services in closed session to testify on matters related to the implementation of the SALT I, and the negotiation of the SALT II, agreements.

S. Mitchell

As you know, the Congress was assured at the time of the SALT I agreement that the agreement would not permit the Soviets to replace their old missiles with significantly larger ones. We were further assured, by you among others, that the Administration would regard any such move as a violation of the interim agreement. Now, of course, the Soviets have begun to deploy the SS-19 missile, whose volume is 50% greater than the missile it replaces, despite assurances that such a deployment would not occur.

As the only member of the Administration present at the negotiation of the SALT I agreement, and as the Secretary of State, you alone are in a position to tell the Subcommittee charged with responsibility for monitoring that agreement why the Administration has chosen to ignore its pledge to regard the deployment of the new Soviet SS-19 missile as a heavy missile and therefore one whose deployment contravenes the U.S. interpretation of the agreement.

Your persistent failure to appear before the Committee in the face of Soviet deployments inconsistent with your assurances to the Congress raises serious doubts about the manner in which that agreement was negotiated. Accordingly, I must again request that you provide the Subcommittee with a list of dates on which you are prepared to appear and respond to these and other questions.



Sincerely yours,

Dorothy Keshish
called K.S. 8/27

[Signature]
Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.
Chairman, Subcommittee on Arms Control



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

NO0604

PAGE 01 STATE 201514 TOSEC 100102

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

DRAFTED BY S:JCOVEY:H:KJENKINS:ML
APPROVED BY S - MR. EAGLEBURGER
S/S: J LHUGANSON

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

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NODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), PARM

SUBJECT: JACKSON SALT APPEARANCE

REFERENCES: (A) TOSEC 100027; (B) SECTO 10056

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. YOUR RECOLLECTION ESSENTIALLY CORRECT;

A. YOU HAVE SEVERAL TIMES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE JACKSON GROUP, MOST RECENTLY IN A MEMO DATED JUNE 5, IN WHICH YOU SAID YOU WANTED TO APPEAR IN JULY.

B. IN THE VAIL MEMO, IN ADDITION TO NOTING THAT YOU WERE PREPARED QUOTE TO MEET WITH SYMINGTON PROVIDED HE INVITES FULL COMMITTEE ON A DATE TO BE FIXED AFTER HE SHUTTLE UNQUOTE, YOU DISAPPROVED A RECOMMENDATION QUOTE THAT YOU AUTHORIZE US TO WORK OUT A DATE TO APPEAR BEFORE JACKSON AND CO. UNQUOTE. YOU DID NOT, HOWEVER, REVERSE YOUR APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE.

~~SECRET~~

KR, 11/5/87





Department of State

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 201514 TOSEC 100102

2. JENKINS HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED TO JACKSON AND HIS STAFF (FOSDICK AND PEARL) THAT YOU HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO APPEAR, BUT HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO SET A DATE. YOU

WILL RECALL THAT ON AUGUST 21 FOSDICK PHONED JENKINS AND SAID THAT THEY KNEW THAT YOU HAD DECIDED NOT TO APPEAR AND THEREFORE JACKSON WOULD "GO PUBLIC" WITH PRESS RELEASE TO THAT EFFECT. CONTRARY TO HER STATEMENT, NO PRESS RELEASE HAS BEEN ISSUED SO FAR, AND YESTERDAY WE OBTAINED AN ADVANCE COPY OF A LETTER FROM JACKSON TO YOU REFERRING TO ALLEGED SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-19 "DESPITE ASSURANCES THAT SUCH DEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT OCCUR", AND REQUESTING "THAT YOU PROVIDE THE SUBCOMMITTEE WITH A LIST OF DATES ON WHICH YOU ARE PREPARED TO APPEAR AND RESPOND TO THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS." (IN THIS LETTER JACKSON CHARACTERIZED HIS SUBCOMMITTEE AS, "THE SUBCOMMITTEE CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR MONITORING THAT AGREEMENT" (SALT I)).

3. JACKSON FIRST REQUESTED YOUR APPEARANCE IN MARCH AND HAS SINCE GROWN INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT. HIS STAFFERS HAVE SAID THAT "IT IS CLEAR WE ARE GETTING THE RUN AROUND." THIS COULD BE BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIM THAT THEY KNOW YOU HAVE DECIDED NOT TO APPEAR. THEY MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN SOURCE OF THIS WEEK'S US NEWS & WORLD REPORT "WASHINGTON WHISPERS" COLUMN ITEM: "SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER HAS REFUSED TO APPEAR UNDER OATH BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONING ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF RUSSIAN CHEATING ON THE SALT I AGREEMENT AND U.S. FAILURE TO REACT WHEN THE SOVIETS REPLACED LIGHT MISSILES WITH HEAVY MISSILES."

4. THE ONLY INSTANCE IN WHICH YOU HAVE, IN FACT, SAID YOU WOULD NOT APPEAR WAS IN A RECENT STAFF MEETING WHEN HYLAND AND JENKINS DISCUSSED PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SKEPTICISM ABOUT SALT I AND II AND YOU APPROVED THEIR SUGGESTION TO PREPARE A CLASSIFIED WHITE PAPER ON THE SUBJECT.

5. THUS THE RECORD IS CLEAR THAT YOU HAVE NEVER FORMALLY REJECTED JACKSON'S INVITATION, WE SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 STATE 201514 TOSEC 100102

READY TO RESPOND TO ANY JACKSON STATEMENT, AS THREATENED, SHOULD IT BE MADE. WHILE THE STATEMENT MAY HAVE TO BE ADJUSTED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF JACKSON'S OWN TEXT, I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:

QUOTE SENATOR JACKSON'S OFFICE WAS INFORMED IN JUNE OF THE SECRETARY'S AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO TESTIFY ON SALT VIOLATIONS. THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIS STAFF SEVERAL TIMES SINCE THEN AND HAS ADVISED THEM THAT, WHILE THE SECRETARY REMAINS COMMITTED TO TESTIFYING, HIS SCHEDULE HAS THUS FAR MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SUGGEST A FIRM DATE FOR HIS APPEARANCE. SENATOR JACKSON, WE ASSUME, HAS BEEN KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF THE INFORMATION PASSED ON

TO HIS STAFF. THUS, WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR SENATOR JACKSON'S STATEMENT, NOR THE MOTIVATION FOR IT. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO FIX A DATE FOR THE SECRETARY'S APPEARANCE AT SOME TIME AFTER THE SECRETARY HAS RETURNED FROM THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT SHOULD FURTHER BE NOTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS RESPONDED FULLY TO SENATE REQUESTS FOR TESTIMONY RE THIS SUBJECT. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND DIRECTOR COLBY, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE BOTH APPEARED BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS ALLEGED SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS. UNQUOTE MAW



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Get to
NSC

draft

PHI
CIA-I
should not
sign

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

R- note date
in Jackson Ltr
(21 Sep.) Get into
this & get word
by Kendall to
Jackson today



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: JACK MARSH

FROM: RUSS ROURKE *R*

Bud McFarlane advises me that they delivered the NSC deletions to CIA at 2:00 a.m. this morning. George Cary and Lyle Miller advise me that the Colby to Jackson letter to accompany the "sanitized testimony" is still in the draft stage. They will call me as soon as the testimony is actually delivered to the Committee.

Will keep you advised.

P. S. The report was delivered to the Senate Committee at 3:30 today.

Please do!
m



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH

FROM: RUSS ROURKE

As per your note, Bill Kendall is calling Senator Jackson today to advise him of the negative decision re his request.

Secondly, we have asked NSC to contact CIA and decide between them as to which of the two will submit a formal written response to Jackson.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6195

September 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH
FROM: Jeanne W. Dav *JWD*
SUBJECT: Release of Colby/Duckett
Testimony on Soviet Compliance
with SALT I

We have your September 12 memorandum to General Scowcroft on Senator Jackson's desire to release the Colby/Duckett testimony of February 11 on Soviet compliance with SALT I.

General Scowcroft has discussed the matter with Mr. Colby and General Walters and it has been agreed that the testimony should remain classified and may not be released.



OLC 75, 2168

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS., CHAIRMAN

STUART SYMINGTON, MO.
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV.
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, N.H.
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., VA.
SAM NUNN, GA.
JOHN C. CULVER, IOWA
GARY HART, COLO.
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VT.

STROM THURMOND, S.C.
JOHN TOWER, TEX.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA.
ROBERT TAFT, JR., OHIO
DEWEY F. BARTLETT, OKLA.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

T. EDWARD BRASWELL, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

September 5, 1975

The Honorable William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:

On Tuesday, February 11, 1975, I chaired a hearing of the Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Senate Armed Services Committee at which you testified on Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreements.

We intend to issue a sanitized version of that hearing. I have reviewed the attached transcript which is presently classified "Top Secret," and I have marked for deletion those statements that convey information whose disclosure might jeopardize our national security. If you feel that there is further information whose disclosure would jeopardize the national security of the United States, please have that material bracketed and, in each instance, supply the Subcommittee with a justification.

I should be most grateful if you could complete your agency review by September 21.

Sincerely yours,



Henry M. Jackson
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Arms Control



September 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: PHIL BUCHEN
BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH

SUBJECT: Declassification of Senate Testimony

Through the Legislative Affairs Office at CIA I have been advised that Senator Jackson is pressing to release the Colby/Duckett testimony taken February 11, 1975 before the Jackson Subcommittee on the subject of Soviet compliance with SALT I.

Senator Jackson has indicated to the Agency the Subcommittee's recommendation for declassification and has requested approval of their recommendation or justification for any exceptions to the same.

In light of the pending situation before the House Select Committee, this request takes on additional meaning and the response should be carefully considered.

It should be noted there is no indication of a unilateral declassification and publication by the Senate Subcommittee. The fact they are choosing this route can be cited to the House Select Committee as both the established and proper procedure for handling material of this type.

cc: Max Friedersdorf

bcc: Mitch Rogovin

Don Rumsfeld



September 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH

FROM: RUSS ROURKE

As per your note, Bill Kendall is calling Senator Jackson today to advise him of the negative decision re his request.

Secondly, we have asked NSC to contact CIA and decide between them as to which of the two will submit a formal written response to Jackson.

JOM/RAR/d1



September 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH
FROM: RUSS ROURKE

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JOM/RAR/dl



September 24, 1975

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FROM: RUSS ROURKE

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JOM/RAR/di



September 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH
FROM: RUSS ROURKE

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Secondly, we have asked NSC to contact CIA and decide between them as to which of the two will submit a formal written response to Jackson.

JOM/RAR/dl

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: JACK MARSH
FROM: RUSS ROURKE *R*

Jack, the attached memo from you to Brent Scowcroft was not sent.

You will recall that Bill Kendall determined that CIA was advising Henry Jackson, and/or his staff re the turn down on the Jackson letter of request (attached) of September 5.

George Cary advised me today that Bill Colby has now re-thought his position on the matter and believes it might be wise to give Jackson a "sanitized version of the attached testimony". Thus far, however, Colby has been unable to convince Brent Scowcroft of the wisdom of such an action. As of 2:00 p.m. today (September 25, 1975), Colby and Cary are trying to get a decision on this matter from Scowcroft/McFarlane.

3:30 p.m. - McFarlane has just advised me that "something" will be going up to Jackson today. It will be a sanitized version ("CIA has stricken some things, NSC has stricken some things, etc... it will, at least, be a document with which we can negotiate").

Russ -

Please Follow-up.

JM



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH

At my instructions, Bill Kendall is verbally advising Henry Jackson of the turn down re the attached request.

If the matter has not already been taken care of, I ask that you contact CIA and decide which of you should submit a formal written rejection to Senator Jackson's letter of September 5.

Many thanks.



September 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JACK MARSH

At my instructions, Bill Kendall is verbally advising Henry Jackson of the turn down re the attached request.

If the matter has not already been taken care of, I ask that you contact CIA and decide which of you should submit a formal written rejection to Senator Jackson's letter of September 5.

Many thanks.

RAR/dl



September 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JACK MARSH

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If the matter has not already been taken care of, I ask that you contact CIA and decide which of you should submit a formal written rejection to Senator Jackson's letter of September 5.

Many thanks.

RAR/dl



September 24, 1975

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FROM: JACK MARSH

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Many thanks.

RAR/dl



September 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JACK MARSH

At my instructions, Bill Kendall is verbally advising Henry Jackson of the turn down re the attached request.

If the matter has not already been taken care of, I ask that you contact CIA and decide which of you should submit a formal written rejection to Senator Jackson's letter of September 5.

Many thanks.

RAR/dl




THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 10, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

FROM: JACK MARSH 

SUBJECT: Luncheon Conversation with Richard Pearl, Senator Scoop Jackson's Staff

Richard Pearl met with me Friday, February 6 for lunch at his request and the conversation was devoted principally to the subject of SALT. He made the following points:

- He is very concerned about the current course of negotiations in reference to SALT II.
- He feels we are headed for a very damaging SALT agreement and one which will become an issue in the primaries and in the General Election.
- The Senate in particular and the Congress in general would object strenuously to the current SALT position and there is no chance of this being passed.
- Senator Scoop Jackson will make a determined effort to defeat the SALT agreement along the lines presently discussed and will resort to a total effort to prevent it from being adopted.
- He is of the view that the President is not receiving an objective and unbiased presentation of SALT, and the arguments he is receiving are one-sided.
- Jim Wade, who represented Defense in Moscow, while a very able person, may have been unduly influenced by his environment and his prominence in the recent negotiations.

- Scoop Jackson's polls in Massachusetts show growing unrest and concern by the populous in reference to the question of detente. He mentioned a recent Jackson poll where questions related to detente were presented and there showed a 48% general dissatisfaction of the public in detente.
- It would be tragic if we were to forfeit the technology of the cruise missile for any type of agreement the President would propose by the Soviets.
- We would be better off to have no agreement this year than to have the one that is presently under discussion.
- He apparently had most of the data and information in reference to the current SALT agreement and mentioned some of the various options that had been presented including the numbers of aircraft, etc.
- He mentioned that Henry Kissinger had called Jim Schlesinger before he left for Moscow to try and get Jim's advise and inputs and hopefully support for what Henry sought to do, but Schlesinger advised him that in his opinion he should not go to Moscow.
- He's confident if the current proposal is pursued, there will be a number of resignations of those who are participating in the arrangements and he knows of three people who are active in the SALT effort who will resign in protest over this.
- He felt that some people outside the present government community should be solicited on this such as Woolstetter at the University of Chicago, Nitze and one or two others in order to get both sides presented.
- He felt the real questions were the Joint Chiefs of Staff come down on this but one of the problems in getting a clear position on the Joint Chiefs was the parochial interests of the various services which inevitably become involved.

- He questions the validity of the argument of either SALT agreement or substantial increases to strategic weapons budget.

- He is of the view that we should not try to obtain an agreement but we should not break off the talks.

