

**The original documents are located in Box 22, folder “Middle East - General” of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

### **Copyright Notice**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

NOV 14 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH  
THROUGH: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M.F.*  
FROM: VERN LOEN *VL*  
SUBJECT: UN Zionist Resolution

You asked for Congressional reaction to the UN General Assembly Resolution which describes Zionism as a form of racism.

On Tuesday, November 11, the House passed, 384-0, H. Res. 855, condemning the action. The Senate earlier passed S. Con. Res. 73 which is identical except that it calls for the Foreign Relations Committee to reassess U. S. participation in the UN Assembly. That provision was dropped from the House version after Rep. Kastenmeier (D-Wisc.) objected to the unanimous consent request of Majority Leader Tip O'Neill, who co-sponsored the House resolution with Minority Leader John Rhodes.

Judging from the comments I have heard both on and off the floor, Members are outraged at the action by the General Assembly, but not ready to cut off U. S. support as yet. Rep Lester Wolff (D-N. Y.) said Congress should "take a long hard look at our participation in the General Assembly," and Rep. Bella Abzug (D-N. Y.) urged the UN to reconsider and rescind the resolution.

Rep. John Rousselot (R-Calif.) went so far as to call for moving the UN to another country and Rep. Clarence Long (D-Md.) said that as a Member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, which handles the voluntary UN contributions, every request "will be closely examined in light of this vote on Zionism."

The Administration request for FY'76 is \$169 million, which has not yet been voted, on top of the \$150 million assessment as a UN member, already voted.

Such UN backers as Buchanan, Fraser, Bingham, Rosenthal and Findley said nothing during the brief discussions of the House resolution. However, Rosenthal and Buchanan on the same day joined in sponsoring H. Con.Res. 477, which reinstated the final paragraph of H. Res. 475 as follows:

"Resolved, that the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Foreign Relations begin hearings immediately to reassess the United States participation in the UN General Assembly."

A copy of that resolution and Mr. Rosenthal's statement are attached.

...The wheat exported to the U.S.S.R. in 1975, on the other hand, was probably purchased early in 1974 before wheat prices...  
 ...the cereal grain exports for the first six months of 1975 do not include any of the large purchases of wheat which have been made recently by the U.S.S.R. These purchases will not begin appearing in the export figures until later this year and during...

This is all grain through the mill. What is to be learned from it is the tremendous danger of one large purchaser creating enormous disruptions in the world marketplace and taking unfair advantage of other nations whose poorer economies may most desperately need a stable price on wheat and grain. In addition, the fact that the Soviet Union found itself paying more than the world price in early 1975 should be a lesson to the Soviets that the best course of action is a long-term stable grain and wheat purchase agreement. Finally, of course, such a regular system of purchases will protect the American consumer and American farmer from the boom-and-bust high-price-and-scarcity cycle of unpredictable, erratic and massive purchases of agricultural commodities.

**JOHN SIMONDS ASSUMES EDITORSHIP**

**HON. ANTONIO BORJA WON PAT**  
 OF GUAM  
 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
 Tuesday, November 11, 1975

Mr. WON PAT. Mr. Speaker, the Gannett News Service which owns and operates leading daily newspapers in Guam, Hawaii, and many other U.S. areas, has just named one of their most outstanding Washington bureau reporters, John Simonds, to be the new managing editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

John's departure from Washington will leave a vacuum for those of us in the Congress who have had the privilege of working with him. John Simonds always can be counted on to report events in a fair and unbiased manner. This characteristic and his sharp wit will be sorely missed by his many friends and associates.

During his career in Washington with Gannett, John Simonds has, I believe, established a proud and remarkable record of accurate journalistic reporting and sincere dedication to the high principles of his craft. Although John's relentless pursuit of a story has occasionally made me and my staff doublecheck our facts, working with him has always left the distinct impression of absolute professionalism.

As a result of his work with Members of Congress from Guam and Hawaii, John has become one of the most knowledgeable persons in journalism about Pacific affairs. His deep understanding of the many problems and intricacies of that part of the globe will stand him in good stead as managing editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. While I regret his departure from the Nation's Capital, John's presence at the rudder of one of

Hawaii's best daily newspapers will certainly enhance that publication's journalistic excellence.

I wish John and his beautiful wife, Kitty, the best of good fortunes as they move from the cold Potomac to sunny Hawaii.

The following information excerpted from a November 1, 1975 story in the Star-Bulletin provides a partial view of John Simonds' career to date:

**JOHN SIMONDS ASSUMES EDITORSHIP**  
 John E. Simonds, a Washington bureau staffer with the Gannett News Service since 1966 and its specialist on news of Hawaii and the Pacific areas, was named managing editor with responsibility for news operations.

In becoming managing editor, Simonds returns to the newsroom where he served for eight months in 1972 on temporary assignment from the Gannett News Service's Washington Bureau.

Simonds, 40, has spent 18 years in the newspaper business, beginning as a reporter with Seymour, Indiana Daily Tribune and has worked for the United Press International in Columbus, Ohio; the Providence, Rhode Island Journal-Bulletin and the Washington Evening Star where he was an assistant city editor before joining Gannett's Washington bureau.

A native of Boston, Simonds grew up in Nyack, New York, is a graduate of Bowdon College, Brunswick, Maine, and served as a Lieutenant in the Army.

His personal interest in Hawaii predates Gannett's purchase of the Star-Bulletin. He is married to Kitty Muller Simonds, a native of Maui, who has been a member of the staff of Hawaii Senator Hiram L. Fong for 11 years.

**HITLER WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD**

**HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL**  
 OF NEW YORK  
 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
 Tuesday, November 11, 1975

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, the United Nations, which was founded to combat the fascism and Nazism of World War II, has now apparently become an instrument of those venal causes. As history's supreme racist and the engineer of the slaughter of 6 million Jews, Hitler would have been proud of those 72 delegates to the General Assembly who voted last night to condemn Zionism.

A vote for that resolution was a vote against everything the United Nations purports to stand for. The sound emanating from supporters following the vote was not a cheer for victory but quite possibly a death knell for the United Nations.

The time has come for a total reassessment by the United States of its role in the United Nations and its financial and other support for the world body. Accordingly, I am today joining my colleague from Alabama, Mr. BUCHANAN, in introducing a concurrent resolution condemning the U.N. action and calling for hearings on further U.S. participation in the General Assembly to be held by the House International Relations Committee, on which I serve, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. An identical resolution is being submitted in the

other body by Senators HUMPHREY and HUGH SCOTT.

The General Assembly vote is in violation of the United Nations charter, which encourages respect for human rights and for freedom of religion. It is a moral outrage of the first magnitude.

The attack on Zionism wrecks havoc on the concept of peaceful resolution of international disputes and undermines the effectiveness of the United Nations by raising significant questions about the sincerity of the resolution's proponents in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The bitter irony of the General Assembly vote was pointed out by the Israeli delegate when he noted that it came on the anniversary of the 1938 Nazi assault on Jewish communities throughout Germany in which synagogues in all the cities were burned, Jewish holy books were destroyed and Jewish homes attacked.

Anti-Semitism is one of the oldest and most virulent forms of racism in history. It was partially as a response to such attacks that the philosophy of a Jewish national homeland—Zionism—evolved. To equate that philosophy with racism is to equate day with night. Zionism is the antithesis of racism.

The resolution follows:  
 H. CON. RES. 477  
 Concurrent resolution relating to the United Nations and Zionism:

Whereas the United States, as a founder of the United Nations Organization has a fundamental interest in promoting the purposes and principles for which that organization was created; and

Whereas in Article I of the Charter of the United Nations the stated purpose of the United Nations include:

"To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion;" and

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to launch on December 10, 1973, a Decade of Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and a program of action which the United States supported and in which it desires to participate; and

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly on November 10, 1975 adopted a resolution which describes Zionism as a form of racism thereby identifying it as a target of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Discrimination; and

Whereas the extension of the program of the Decade to include a campaign against Zionism brings the United Nations to a point of encouraging anti-Semitism, one of the oldest and most virulent forms of racism known to human history;

Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), sharply condemns the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 10, 1975 in that said resolution encourages anti-Semitism by wrongly associating and equating Zionism with racism and racial discrimination, thereby contradicting a fundamental purpose of the United Nations Charter; and be it

*Resolved*, That the Congress strongly opposes any form of participation by the United States Government in the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination so long as that Decade and program remain distorted and compromised by the



aforementioned resolution naming Zionism as one of the targets of that struggle; and be it:

**Resolved,** That the Congress calls for an energetic effort by all those concerned with the adherence of the United Nations to the purposes stated in its Charter to obtain reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution with a view to removing the subject of Zionism, which is a national but in no way a racist philosophy, from the context of any programs and discussions focusing on racism or racial discrimination; and be it further:

**Resolved,** That the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Foreign Relations begin hearings immediately to re-assess the United States further participation in the United Nations General Assembly.

## NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH CHINA MIGHT NOT HELP THINGS

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, November 11, 1975

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, one of the members of the Washington press corps uniquely qualified to analyze the complex triangle involving the United States, Red China and the Soviet Union is Frank Starr of the Chicago Tribune, who served as that publication's bureau chief for many years in Moscow.

Thus, in his article published in the Tribune on November 7, he analyzes the situation President Ford may face when traveling to China: I believe overall that his comments are very much to the point.

The article follows:

### NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH CHINA MIGHT NOT HELP THINGS

(By Frank Starr)

WASHINGTON.—Some last minute confusion erupted in planning President Ford's trip to China, and perhaps it's just as well. If the trip were shelved for a while, no damage would be done.

The only issue currently outstanding is one which the United States would do well to avoid: Beyond that, there's no purpose to be served by a Presidential visit to China except the care and feeding of what is essentially a static but still delicate new Asian relationship. Were it not for the bruise of a postponed trip, that job, being largely propagandistic, could be done as well by long distance.

So what is the issue? It is normalization of relations, an issue that few in this country understand the meaning of but one which some nonetheless periodically agitate to resolve.

Technically it means closing the United States Embassy on Taiwan, ending the American security commitment to Taiwan, removing troops stationed there, and upgrading the mission in Peking to embassy status.

There was a time right after the rebirth of U.S.-Chinese relations when Peking insisted it was in no hurry to "normalize," and U.S. officials echoed that sentiment. But since the latter part of 1973 a change has occurred among the Chinese, who now bring pressure.

They have begun to support Puerto Rican separatists, equating Puerto Rico with Taiwan, and the message China experts read from Secretary Kissinger's recent trip there was that Peking is prepared to leave everything static until Taiwan is cashiered.

But the debate seems to have begun in the

U.S. government during the summer, over whether to move. Thanks largely to pressure from President Ford's political right, such a move is now more difficult.

The argument in favor of pursuing normalization is best put by A. Doak Barnett, a leading student of Chinese affairs.

There is continuing in China, he says, a policy issue over the advisability of improving relations with the U.S. in their current status, those relations could retrogress more easily than if they were sealed by the exchange of ambassadors.

Additionally, he argues, Peking is not prepared to discuss the things the U.S. would like to pursue—trade, extended exchanges, and peace and security in Arsia—until normalization.

Further, the argument goes, Chairman Mao-Tse-tung is alive now. Delay would put the issue beyond the election year and into 1977 when China will probably be engaged in the uncertainties of succession, and opposition could then arise in China.

If Mao's successors adopted an attitude of limited detente towards Moscow and our relationship with China had not moved, that would make it more difficult.

The opposite argument [which, for what it's worth, I favor] notes that the mere existence of diplomatic ties has never prevented a worsening of relations. The current lines of communication are no better or worse than an embassy would provide.

The issues the United States wants to pursue are not urgent enough to warrant the spectacle of our dropping an ally because Peking wants us to. When Peking finds it in its interest to deal with such questions, it will find a way to deal with them.

Current contacts and exchanges, experts confirm, are not affected by the absence of full diplomatic relations. In fact, some countries which have such relations have less satisfactory exchanges than we.

As for the uncertainty of a Moscow-Peking detente, short of tandem policy coordination, which no one expects, that might improve rather than worsen U.S. contacts.

But for the moment the credibility of U.S. security guarantees in Taiwan is very much in question in any case, so discussing it in Peking can do no one any good.

Further, the firing of Defense Secretary James Schlesinger—whom the Chinese favored as a balance against what they saw as a U.S. bias toward Moscow—cannot create a favorable atmosphere for a Ford visit to Peking.

## NONAPPROPRIATED FUND EMPLOYEES

HON. WILLIAM D. FORD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, November 11, 1975

Mr. FORD of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I recently introduced H.R. 10419 to grant nonappropriated fund employees, who do the same work as appropriated fund employees, full parity both in wages as well as fringe benefits.

While on active duty in the U.S. Navy and later in the U.S. Air Force Reserve, I saw the work of these dedicated non-appropriated fund employees, and have never forgotten it.

While there are only a small number of nonappropriated fund employees in my congressional district, there are approximately 140,000 throughout the United

States, and another 3,000 to 4,000 working abroad.

The last two decades have been positive strides made in our country in eliminating discriminatory barriers. The Congress, executive branch and our courts have all played a part in making America truly a country where all its citizens are afforded equal opportunity, equality under the law, and generally equal pay for equal work.

The unfair distinction drawn between nonappropriated fund employees and their counterparts, appropriated fund employees, must be erased now. Both these groups perform the same range of services and yet the nonappropriated fund employees are treated inequitably. For example, in my district, nonappropriated fund employees doing the same work receive 30 to 60 percent less in hourly wages than appropriated fund employees.

In 1972, Congress granted partial relief to some nonappropriated fund employees by enacting Public Law 92-392—Wage Grade Act. However, this partial reform has failed to remove significant disparity in pay.

Hopefully, the Nation has learned from this experience that partial remedies never result in equitable solution of serious problems. We now have the opportunity to resolve this matter as it should have been done at the outset.

## COMPANIES THROUGHOUT THE NATION TO BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IF NEW YORK CITY DEFAULTS

HON. RICHARD L. OTTINGER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, November 11, 1975

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, my colleagues Congressman GILMAN, PATTISON, and FRYER and I have just completed an 11,000-mile trip around the country to advocate legislation authorizing a Federal loan guarantee for New York City and to sample public opinion on this proposal.

We were extremely heartened to find that more than three-quarters of the people we informally interviewed expressed support for New York and for legislation to avoid that great city's default. In our visits to Chicago, Los Angeles, Denver, Cleveland, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, and Des Moines, people in the streets, taxi drivers, people we met in hotels and at airports, were overwhelmingly favorable to backing up New York.

America is very closely interrelated. You cannot have catastrophe in one major center without it affecting the rest of the country. This is well illustrated by information we obtained over the weekend from the office of New York City's Comptroller, Harrison J. Goldin, about possible adverse effects on the Nation's businesses if New York City were to be allowed to default. In a partial listing for the seven States we visited,

tolerance to start condoning, even by inaction, the demagogery witnessed yesterday at U.N. headquarters.

### U.N. SHOULD BECOME INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE

(Mrs. FENWICK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. FENWICK. Mr. Speaker, I join with my colleagues in the strongest condemnation of what we have seen in the general assembly of the United Nations, an organization that we had hoped would be an instrument of peace in the world and, more than that, an organization devoted to principle, exerting moral force, rather than physical force, in the affairs of nations.

I think that all of us are bitterly disappointed and outraged at what we have seen, and I only hope that this will not move us 1 inch from our determination to make this organization what it should be—an instrument for peace.

I hope that it will not move us 1 inch from the direction in which we know we have to go, which is forward in an orderly world that exists on principles of justice and law.

Mr. Speaker, that is what I hope this very damaging action of the U.N. will bring about in the hearts and minds of the people of this Nation.

### THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CUT ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

(Mr. DEVINE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, we are hearing a lot of moaning and groaning and fining of teeth and wringing of hands here today about the U.N.

The majority leader (Mr. O'NEILL) made reference to the letter with 434 Members against the resolution, and I was one of the signators.

I guess it took the Zionist racist resolution to pinpoint the U.N. irresponsibilities and get the attention of the Members. A number of us around here have been talking about this organization for quite a period of time. It has resolved itself into nothing more than an international debating society. It has utterly failed year in and year out in its peace-keeping operation.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I would hope that the Members who are up here deploring this action will, when the time comes to vote on the contribution of the United States for this organization, use their heads and reduce the share of the United States, because we have been much too generous over the years.

I do not think that we should necessarily abolish the United Nations, but we should put it in the proper perspective, and not yield so much to all of these pipsqueak nations that have the same vote as we do.

### REQUEST FOR CONSIDERATION OF HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 475, PROVIDING FOR CONDEMNATION OF RESOLUTION OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY EQUATING ZIONISM WITH RACISM AND PROVIDING FOR HEARINGS TO REASSESS FURTHER U.S. PARTICIPATION IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, I send to the desk a concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 475) and ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the concurrent resolution, as follows:

#### H. Con. Res. 475

Concurrent resolution relating to the United Nations and Zionism.

Whereas the United States, as a founder of the United Nations Organization has a fundamental interest in promoting the purposes and principles for which that organization was created; and

Whereas in Article I of the Charter of the United Nations the stated purpose of the United Nations include:

"To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion;" and

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to lunch on December 10, 1975, a Decade of Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and a program of action which the United States supported and in which it desires to participate; and

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly on November 10, 1975, adopted a resolution which describes Zionism as a form of racism thereby identifying it as a target of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Discrimination; and

Whereas the extension of the program of the Decade to include a campaign against Zionism brings the United Nations to a point of encouraging anti-Semitism, one of the oldest and most virulent forms of racism known to human history; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), sharply condemns the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 10, 1975 in that said resolution encourages anti-Semitism by wrongly associating and equating Zionism with racism and radical discrimination, thereby contradicting a fundamental purpose of the United Nations Charter; and be it

Resolved, That the Congress strongly opposes any form of participation by the United States Government in the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination so long as that Decade and program remain distorted and compromised by the aforementioned resolution naming Zionism as one of the targets of that struggle; and be it

Resolved, That the Congress calls for an energetic effort by all those concerned with the adherence of the United Nations to the purposes stated in its Charter to obtain reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution with a view to removing the subject of Zionism, which is a national but in no way a racist philosophy, from the context of any programs and discussions focusing on racism or racial discrimination; and be it further

Resolved, That the Committee on Interna-

tional Relations and Foreign Affairs of the United States begin hearings immediately to re-assess the United States further participation in the United Nations General Assembly.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, and I certainly shall not object, it is my privilege and my honor to join with the distinguished majority leader in the presentation of this concurrent resolution.

There seems to be no doubt as to the necessity for this resolution. The General Assembly of the United Nations has seen fit to adopt a resolution which states that Zionism is racism. This body has previously adopted a resolution condemning such action.

Certainly this body and this Government can have no part of any such proceedings.

I congratulate the majority leader for offering this resolution and it is my privilege and honor to join with him in sponsoring it.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, reserving my right to object, I would like to ask the majority leader if I heard the reading of the concurrent resolution correctly in that, it calls for a reappraisal of whether this country should be part of the General Assembly? And if that is the import of this concurrent resolution, while I sympathize otherwise with its objectives, I would be constrained to object to the immediate consideration of it.

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I would ask unanimous consent that the last paragraph of the concurrent resolution be reread so that the gentleman from Wisconsin will understand exactly what is contained in the concurrent resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.  
The Clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Foreign Relations begin hearings immediately to reassess the United States further participation in the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, I object.

The SPEAKER. Objection is heard.

### TIME FOR REVIEW OF U.N. FINANCIAL SUPPORT

(Mr. FRENZEL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, yesterday at the United Nations, the General Assembly voted in favor of resolutions that glorified anti-Semitism and terrorism. Our U.S. Ambassador correctly described previous such resolutions as "obscene"



November 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM:

JACK MARSH

In reference to the recent action by the United Nations on the Zionist Resolution, do you suppose you could have your people take some soundings from Members, such as Buchanan, Fraser, Bingham, Rosenthal, Findley and their counterparts in the Senate, to see what the reaction is of those who have been strong U.N. backers to this action.

JOM/dl



[1176]



MONOGRAPH

**SOVIET ARMS AID  
IN  
THE MIDDLE EAST**

by  
**Roger F. Pajak**

The following **monograph** presents individual research in support of the continuing **World Power Assessment** project of Georgetown University's **Center for Strategic and International Studies**. It is for limited circulation and represents only the views of the author.



FOREWORD

In view of present tensions and the dangers of war in the Middle East, the extraordinary Soviet 20-year program of providing military equipment, supplies and training to Arab countries takes on a new significance. The program has been very large and has cost the Soviet Union on the order of \$7 billion for the Arab countries of the Middle East. The military and political results are still hard to assess, but it is clearly a major factor in the strategic situation in this explosive part of the world.

SOVIET ARMS AID  
IN  
THE MIDDLE EAST

We have asked a close student of Soviet arms aid diplomacy to put the record in a broad political perspective, setting forth Soviet successes and shortcomings in using what Moscow plainly considers a key instrument of Soviet Middle East policy. The author is Dr. Roger F. Pajak, a Foreign Affairs Adviser with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has a Ph.D. in International Relations and Soviet Studies from Michigan State University, Harvard University, and American University, and has been with the United States Government as a Soviet foreign affairs specialist since 1963. By training and because of his present work, he is exceptionally well qualified to deal with the subject of Soviet arms aid to the Middle East.

by  
Roger F. Pajak

Copyright © 1976 by Center for Strategic Studies  
All rights reserved

January 1976

FOREWORD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

In view of present tensions and the dangers of war in the Middle East, the extraordinary Soviet 20-year program of providing military equipment, supplies and training to Arab countries takes on special meaning. The program has been very large and very expensive, on the order of \$7 billion for the Arab countries of the Middle East. The military and political results are still hard to assess, but it is clearly a critical element in the strategic situation in this explosive part of the world.

We have asked a close student of Soviet arms aid diplomacy to put the record in a broad political perspective, setting forth Soviet successes and shortcomings in using what Moscow plainly considers a key instrument of Soviet Middle East policy. The author is Dr. Roger F. Pajak, a Foreign Affairs Adviser with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He received degrees in International Relations and Soviet Studies from Michigan State University, Harvard University, and American University, and has been with the United States Government as a Soviet foreign affairs specialist since 1963. By training and because of his present work, he is exceptionally well qualified to deal with the subject of Soviet arms in the Middle East.

Copyright 1976 by The Center for Strategic  
and International Studies

All rights reserved

Ray S. Cline  
Executive Director of Studies



FOREWORD

In view of present tensions and the dangers of war in the Middle East, the extraordinary Soviet 10-year program of providing military equipment, supplies and training to Arab countries takes on special meaning. The program has been very large and very expensive, on the order of \$7 billion for the Arab countries of the Middle East. The military and political results are still hard to assess, but it is clearly a critical element in the strategic situation in this explosive part of the world.

We have asked a close student of Soviet arms aid diplomacy to put the record in a broad political perspective, setting forth Soviet successes and shortcomings in using what Moscow plainly considers a key instrument of Soviet Middle East policy. The author is Dr. Roger F. Tork, a Foreign Affairs Adviser with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He received degrees in International Relations and Soviet Studies from Michigan State University, Harvard University, and American University, and has been with the United States Government as a Soviet foreign affairs specialist since 1963. By training and because of his present work, he is exceptionally well qualified to deal with the subject of Soviet arms in the Middle East.

Copyright © 1974 by the American Enterprise for Public Policy Research  
All rights reserved.

CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION

In the Soviet drive to gain influence and weaken the position of the West in the Middle East, arms aid has clearly emerged as the most durable instrument in Moscow's diplomatic repertoire. The priority accorded the Middle East in Soviet foreign policy is reflected in the share of total Soviet arms aid expended in the area. Of the estimated \$17 billion in such aid expended in the nonaligned, developing world from 1955 through 1974, the Arab countries of the Middle East received about \$7 billion, or roughly 40 percent of the total.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I	INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II	EGYPT . . . . .	2
III	SYRIA . . . . .	19
IV	IRAQ . . . . .	28
V	LIBYA . . . . .	37
VI	FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM . . . . .	44

U.S. Department of State, Communist States and Developing Countries: Arms Aid, 1954-1974 (Washington, January 1975).



CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION

In the Soviet drive to gain influence and weaken the position of the West in the Middle East, arms aid has clearly emerged as the most durable instrument in Moscow's diplomatic repertoire. The priority accorded the Middle East in Soviet foreign policy calculations is reflected in the share of total Soviet arms aid allocated to the area. Of the estimated \$12 billion in such aid extended to the nonaligned, developing world from 1955 through 1974, the Arab countries of the Middle East have received about \$7 billion, or roughly 60 percent of the total.<sup>1</sup>

How effective has arms aid been in accomplishing the objectives set for it by Moscow in the Middle East? With such advanced Soviet equipment as TU-22 supersonic bombers, MIG-23 swing-wing interceptors, and Scud tactical missiles being provided to the Arab states, has the program been worth the economic cost? Has it perhaps resulted in more problems than gains for Moscow? In particular, has negative Egyptian reaction to Soviet policy irrevocably reoriented Cairo to Western sources of arms supply?

In addressing these questions, this paper attempts to place the record of Soviet arms aid diplomacy in the Middle East in perspective. It delineates the checkered paths of the Soviet military assistance programs in the primary Arab "confrontation states" -- Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya -- particularly since the June 1967 war, with a view toward assessing the successes and shortcomings of this key instrument of Soviet policy in this volatile area.

---

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Department of State, Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974 (Washington, January 1976).



## CHAPTER II

### EGYPT

Among the developing countries of the Third World, Egypt ranks as the leading recipient of Soviet military assistance. Since the beginning of Moscow's assistance program in 1955, Egypt by the end of 1974 had received an estimated \$3.4 billion in Soviet arms aid.<sup>2</sup>

On the eve of the June 1967 war the arsenal of modern Soviet equipment in its hands gave Egypt, in conjunction with the well-equipped Syrian and Iraqi forces, a formidable military capability against Israel. But in the brief six day conflict, the Arab forces were decimated, with Egypt taking the heaviest losses.

Whatever second thoughts Moscow may have had about its provision of modern arms to the Arabs, who used them neither wisely nor well, the immediate Soviet reflex action was to initiate a large scale resupply airlift. Even while the fighting was going on, Soviet transport aircraft began deliveries of replacement equipment to Egypt and Syria.<sup>3</sup> Within three weeks 130 jet fighters were reportedly delivered.<sup>4</sup>

A year later, Soviet deliveries of military equipment had brought overall Arab inventories nearly up to pre-war levels. By July 1968, the Egyptian air force consisted of about 400 aircraft, only 30 fewer than prior to the June war.<sup>5</sup> By the second anniversary of the war, Moscow had delivered approximately \$700 million in aircraft, tanks,

---

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Lawrence Whetten, "The Military Consequences of Mediterranean Super Power Parity," New Middle East, November 1971, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup>George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, February 1972), p. 150.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

and other equipment to Egypt to replace what had been destroyed.<sup>6</sup>

Accompanying the heavy volume of materiel was an influx of Soviet instructors and advisers to improve the qualitative shortcomings in the Egyptian armed forces. In the summer of 1967, the number of Soviet advisory personnel in Egypt grew to about 3,000, several times the number present before the June conflict.<sup>7</sup>

In assuming a broadened training and advisory role in the Egyptian forces, Moscow penetrated the Egyptian military establishment to a depth it had never before achieved in any non-Communist country. Soviet advisers and technicians were reportedly assigned to every air and naval base, military training facility, and major maintenance depot in Egypt.<sup>8</sup>

The role of Soviet advisers thus changed dramatically after the June war. With the acquiescence of the Egyptian High Command, the Soviet Union acquired an important voice in Egyptian training and tactical matters.<sup>9</sup>

In January 1970, a watershed event occurred in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. As a result of Nasser's personal entreaties for some response to Israeli deep-penetration bombing raids in the Egyptian interior, the Soviets decided to establish and operate a full scale air defense system in Egypt. The first contingent of Soviet SAM missile crews -- numbering about 1,500 men -- arrived in March 1970 and began installation of an SA-3 surface-to-air missile system, specifically designed to counter low-flying aircraft. Shortly afterwards, the first Soviet-piloted MIG-21J interceptors (an improved version of the MIG-21), with supporting elements, began arriving at special

---

<sup>6</sup>Honorable R. Lawrence Coughlin, The Congressional Record (Washington: U.S. Congress, House, September 16, 1969), p. E7537.

<sup>7</sup>New York Times, July 16, 1968.

<sup>8</sup>William Beecher, "The Soviet Push in the Mideast," Army, April 1968, p. 23.

<sup>9</sup>A. Y. Yodfat, "Arms and Influence in Egypt--the Record of Soviet Military Assistance, since June 1967," New Middle East, July 1969, p. 30.



Egyptian air bases that would come under Soviet control.<sup>10</sup> By late spring, newly-arrived Soviet military personnel numbered about 15,000, some assigned as advisers to Egyptian air defense units, but the majority manning the new SA-3 and improved model SA-2 SAM sites proliferating in the Egyptian interior and in the canal zone.<sup>11</sup>

The widespread Soviet presence forced Israel to discontinue her deep penetration raids into Egypt as of mid-April. At about that time, Soviet-piloted MIG-21J aircraft began flying defensive combat patrols over the Egyptian interior, but refrained from interfering with Israeli aircraft operating in the canal zone.<sup>12</sup> Despite the presumed interest of both sides in avoiding a direct aerial clash, one such incident did occur on July 30, when the Israelis shot down four Soviet MIG-21's.<sup>13</sup>

During the remainder of 1970 and into 1971, Soviet deliveries continued at a high level, as Moscow introduced a variety of modern equipment into the Egyptian inventory. Egypt received some of the same types of air defense equipment as the Soviet forces, even before the Warsaw Pact nations in some cases. Besides being the first non-Communist state to receive the new SA-3 missile system, Egypt received the Frog tactical ground rocket and the mobile ZSU-23-4 radar controlled anti-aircraft gun -- regarded as the Soviets' most effective weapon against low-flying aircraft.<sup>14</sup> Also noteworthy among Soviet deliveries was some of Moscow's latest electronic command and control equipment to improve the Egyptian air defense system.<sup>15</sup>

For her largesse, the Soviet Union exacted various elements of non-economic repayment. The first was in the

---

<sup>10</sup>Charles Wakebridge, "Electrons over Suez," Ordnance, May-June 1972, p. 475.

<sup>11</sup>Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 152.

<sup>12</sup>Wakebridge, op. cit., p. 475.

<sup>13</sup>Lawrence Whetten, "June 1967 to June 1971: Four Years of Canal War Reconsidered," New Middle East, June 1971, p. 23.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>15</sup>International Defense Review, No. 3, May-June 1971, p. 211.

form of base rights and shore support for ships of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron. Following the June war, the Soviets were granted the use of various naval supply and repair facilities in Egypt, including a large dry dock, two floating docks, and repair yards in Alexandria,<sup>16</sup> as well as facilities at the former British naval base at Port Said.<sup>17</sup> The Soviets also were allowed to begin development of a deep water port, largely for their own use, at the secluded port of Mersa Matruh, near the Libyan border.<sup>18</sup>

Besides the use of Egyptian port facilities, the Soviets were allowed to base naval patrol aircraft in Egypt, thereby providing their fleet with important reconnaissance support. A variety of Soviet aircraft with Egyptian markings, located at several bases in Egypt, provided valuable tracking and positional data on U.S. and NATO naval craft for the Soviet Mediterranean squadron.<sup>19</sup>

Another significant quid pro quo received by Moscow in return for its assistance was Cairo's acquiescence in a Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed on May 26, 1971. The treaty committed both sides to consult on matters of joint concern and threats to the peace and to avoid joining alliances hostile to the other partner. Without precluding any of its options, Moscow thereby instituted a new element of deterrence against Israel, while reminding Cairo of its limited ability to maneuver.<sup>20</sup>

In keeping with the vagaries of the Middle East, however, the nadir for Moscow in Soviet-Egyptian relations before the October 1973 war was reached barely a year later, in July 1972,

---

<sup>16</sup>Washington Post, July 21, 1972.

<sup>17</sup>Sunday Telegraph (London), June 7, 1970.

<sup>18</sup>Wynfred Joshua, Soviet Penetration into the Middle East (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1971), p. 17.

<sup>19</sup>Vice Admiral Isaac Kidd, Jr., "View from the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1973, p. 27.

<sup>20</sup>Joshua, op. cit., p. 18.

with the expulsion of nearly all Soviet military personnel from Egypt. Frustrated by the military stalemate on the Suez Canal front and irritated by continued Soviet foot-dragging on his entreaties for more advanced weapons, President Sadat gave the order for expulsion. Given several days' advance notice, the Soviet withdrawal began even before Sadat's public announcement of July 18.<sup>21</sup> The suddenness and extent of the Soviet departure gave rise to speculation that Moscow had retaliated against Sadat's action by withdrawing its air defense units -- which reportedly were exempted from the original expulsion order -- as well as instructors and technicians.<sup>22</sup> This in turn may have prompted Sadat to order out the Soviet naval reconnaissance units.<sup>23</sup>

At any rate, the Soviets probably saw no point in arguing or pleading with Sadat, once the issue was made public.<sup>24</sup> Rather than exacerbate a bad situation, Moscow presumably felt impelled to temporarily retrench in Egypt, while working to improve its position elsewhere in the Middle East at least for the short term.

By early August, nearly all of the reported 21,000 Soviet advisory and air defense personnel in Egypt,<sup>25</sup> as well as naval reconnaissance units, had returned to the Soviet Union. Most of the air defense equipment, however, was turned over to the Egyptians, a notable exception being four MIG-25 Foxbat high altitude reconnaissance aircraft, which the Soviets took with them.<sup>26</sup> Only an estimated 700 or so Soviet instructors were believed to be in Egypt by the end of 1972.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>21</sup>Anthony McDermott, "A Russian Withdrawal; or Divorce, Egyptian Style," New Middle East, August 1972, p. 6.

<sup>22</sup>New York Times, July 19, 1972.

<sup>23</sup>Washington Post, August 2, 1972.

<sup>24</sup>New York Times, August 7, 1972.

<sup>25</sup>Military Aviation News, June 1975, p. 7.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., July 1975, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup>Strategic Survey 1972 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], April 1973), p. 26.

A flow of spare parts and replacement equipment was maintained to Egypt after the Soviet exodus, but it took the October 1973 war to cause Moscow to resume arms deliveries in earnest. The Soviets instituted a vast resupply airlift on the second day of the war.<sup>28</sup> During the resupply operation Egypt reportedly received about 100 fighter aircraft, 600 tanks, and equipment for 30 SAM batteries.<sup>29</sup>

Even during the war, however, further strains arose in the Moscow-Cairo relationship. The reported Soviet insistence on payment in hard currency for new advanced equipment did nothing to endear the Soviets to the Egyptians.<sup>30</sup> Cairo showed its displeasure by restricting Soviet contact with Egyptian troop units and access to equipment evaluation reports.<sup>31</sup>

Strains were reflected in a major speech by Sadat on April 18, 1974, in which the Egyptian leader announced that Egypt would end its exclusive reliance on the Soviet Union for arms and would seek them elsewhere. Sadat said that he had made this decision because Moscow, for the previous six months, had not acted fully on his requests for more advanced weapons.<sup>32</sup> In the wake of Sadat's announcement, all shipments of Soviet military equipment, including badly needed spare parts, came to a halt.<sup>33</sup>

From the date of Sadat's speech through the rest of the year, no Soviet deliveries of arms -- with the exception of two shipments of spare parts in August -- are known to have been made to Egypt.<sup>34</sup> An October announcement that

<sup>28</sup>New York Times, November 28, 1973.

<sup>29</sup>Washington Post, November 24, 1973; Near East Report, January 16, 1974, p. 10.

<sup>30</sup>Washington Post, November 19, 1973.

<sup>31</sup>Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 17, 1973, p. 16.

<sup>32</sup>New York Times, April 19, 1974.

<sup>33</sup>Washington Post, May 23, 1974.

<sup>34</sup>Military Aviation News, November 1974, p. 7.





Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev would visit Cairo in January heightened Egyptian hopes that a resumption of Soviet deliveries was imminent. These hopes were dashed on December 30 when Moscow suddenly announced the indefinite postponement of Brezhnev's visit, ostensibly for reasons of health.<sup>35</sup>

In his first public remarks after the postponement of the visit, Sadat again took the Soviet Union to task for its refusal to replace all equipment lost in the October war. During an interview he stated: "I want every Arab to know that since the ceasefire of October 1973 ... there has been no Soviet replenishment and no major arms received up to this moment."<sup>36</sup>

In a dramatic move to secure military equipment from a different quarter, Sadat visited Paris in January 1975 with a shopping list for arms. During his visit, the Egyptian leader reportedly concluded a deal for several hundred million dollars worth of equipment, including 44 advanced Mirage F-1 fighter aircraft, mostly for delivery in the late 1970's.<sup>37</sup> Already in late 1974, Egypt had begun to receive the first of 36 Mirage fighters ordered on her behalf by Saudi Arabia.<sup>38</sup>

Sadat's Paris shopping spree apparently served to send a message to Moscow, as reflected in the arrival in Cairo on February 3 of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko for two days of talks. Gromyko attempted to soothe the bruised Egyptian feelings by "activating" some arms contracts that had been suspended by Moscow since early 1974.<sup>39</sup> On February 18, the delivery of six advanced, swing-wing MIG-23 fighters to Egypt was reported, the first shipment of major Soviet equipment in nearly a year.<sup>40</sup> Some spares and other equipment also began to arrive, reportedly under existing contracts con-

<sup>35</sup>Washington Post, December 31, 1974.

<sup>36</sup>New York Times, January 9, 1975.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., February 19, 1975; Washington Post, January 30, 1975.

<sup>38</sup>New York Times, November 20, 1974.

<sup>39</sup>Washington Post, February 17, 1975.

<sup>40</sup>New York Times, February 19, 1975.

cluded before and shortly after the 1973 war.<sup>41</sup>

The arrival of two squadrons -- about 24 aircraft -- of MIG-23's in early 1975 finally raised overall Egyptian combat strength to nearly the pre-October war level, according to Western specialists.<sup>42</sup> Even the MIG-23's in Egypt's inventory, however, cannot be optimally employed without the accompaniment of TU-114 radar-equipped early warning aircraft, which the Soviets apparently have been unwilling to export because of the sensitive equipment involved.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, the reported cessation of Soviet shipments of air defense equipment -- SAM's, antiaircraft guns, and radar -- since the war has made it difficult for the Egyptian air defense forces to maintain a high degree of combat readiness. According to Egypt's air defense commander, his forces "have not received a single missile replacement from the Soviet Union since the end of the October war."<sup>44</sup>

Another factor adversely affecting Egyptian combat readiness has been the process of absorbing newer Western equipment, especially advanced Mirage fighters, into the predominantly Soviet-supplied inventory.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, dwindling Egyptian stocks of spare parts and the dearth of current Soviet shipments have forced a curtailment of Egyptian training. The standard 20 hours of monthly flight time for air force pilots, for example, has been reduced to about 15 hours.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>41</sup>Washington Post, February 9, 1975.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., June 13, 1975.

<sup>43</sup>Robert Jackson, The Israeli Air Force Story (London: Tom Stacey, Ltd., 1970), p. 244.

<sup>44</sup>Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 7, 1975, p. 15.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., June 30, 1975, p. 12.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., Washington Post, June 13, 1975.

Compounding these technical and materiel problems for Egypt is the current Soviet demand that Cairo resume payments for military equipment. Cairo has been seeking a renewed moratorium on repayment of its Soviet military aid debt -- estimated at \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion<sup>47</sup> -- for some time. With a reported 75 percent of Egypt's annual exports -- otherwise capable of earning badly-needed hard currency -- currently going to Communist countries for overall foreign debt payment, Sadat has appealed for a renewed ten-year suspension of arms payments to enable Egypt to concentrate on rebuilding its economy. According to Sadat, Syria has already been granted such a moratorium.<sup>48</sup>

During a May 1, 1975 speech, Sadat complained publicly of the Soviets' rejection of a payments delay recently requested by Foreign Minister Fahmi in Moscow. "We never said we will not pay," Sadat stated. "We are asking for a reassessment of our position." Finally, making clear that recent Soviet deliveries were made under pre-October war commitments, not new agreements, he complained, "The Soviet Union has refused to replace our losses, even if we pay cash."<sup>49</sup>

Further infuriating Sadat was a new Soviet arms aid arrangement with Libya disclosed in May 1975 (see below). With Libya's small 30,000 man army scheduled to receive as many as 1,200 tanks, additional SAM equipment, and late-model MIG-23's, compared with the relative trickle of Soviet equipment then arriving in Egypt, the Egyptians were understandably disgruntled. Sadat was especially vexed by Soviet "irresponsibility" in giving "expensive and dangerous war toys" to Libyan leader Qadhafi, whom Sadat regards as "100 percent sick."<sup>50</sup>

To offset the serious shortfall in equipment requirements from the Soviet Union, Egypt has been trying to expand arms supply arrangements with the West. Another step in that direction was taken in May 1975 with the agreement by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates,

<sup>47</sup>Washington Post, July 20, 1975.

<sup>48</sup>The Economist, June 28, 1975, p. 67; Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 3, 1975, p. 16.

<sup>49</sup>Washington Post, May 2, 1975.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., June 13, 1975.

and Qatar to establish a \$1 billion Arab military industrial organization centered in Egypt.<sup>51</sup> With Saudi Arabia initially providing the bulk of the financing, the new organization is reported to be in the final negotiating stages with the UK over a \$1 billion arrangement to supply Egypt with 200 Hawk light strike aircraft and 250 Lynx helicopters,<sup>52</sup> as well as antitank missiles and electronic equipment.<sup>53</sup>

For the second phase of this long-term Arab rearmament program, Cairo is also negotiating with the UK and France for the establishment of complete factories in Egypt for the licensed production of both the Hawk and the Lynx. While it would require some years to attain a substantial output, these facilities would eventually serve as the nucleus of Egypt's arms industry.<sup>54</sup> Financing for these arrangements would be provided at a planned level of \$1 billion annually from 1975-78 by the newly established Arab industrial organization.<sup>55</sup>

Egyptian officials concede that Cairo's increasing shift in procurement policies entails a high degree of risk for Egyptian war readiness. This is especially marked because of the reported increase in Israeli combat capability since the October war.<sup>56</sup> While Egyptian government officials are optimistic over the country's ability to diversify its arms procurement and still field a credible military force, some Egyptian military officers take a gloomier view.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>51</sup>Military Aviation News, May 1975, p. 6; The Economist, June 21, 1975, p. 69.

<sup>52</sup>Military Aviation News, June 1975, pp. 6-7.

<sup>53</sup>Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 1975.

<sup>54</sup>Washington Post, May 12, 1975; Washington Star News, June 27, 1975.

<sup>55</sup>The Economist, June 21, 1975, p. 67.

<sup>56</sup>Strategic Survey 1974 (London: IISS, April 1975), p. 15.

<sup>57</sup>New York Times, July 22, 1975.



Indications are that military dissatisfaction over Sadat's arms diversification policies may be on the increase, as reflected in an abortive plot to overthrow him in June 1975. According to a Beirut newspaper, the Egyptian chief of intelligence and some 40 senior officers were reported to have been summarily retired under suspicious circumstances.<sup>58</sup> Other recent reports refer to disgruntlement on the part of many officers who feel that Sadat's antagonizing of Moscow provides the Soviets with a pretext for refusal to provide additional equipment to Egypt. Some military elements also are upset by Sadat's espousal of peace negotiations which they feel squander the fruits of the October war and make the option of renewed hostilities less credible.<sup>59</sup>

The Soviet Union may in fact be attempting to nurture such sentiment on the part of the Egyptian armed forces with a view toward undermining the Sadat government. The Egyptian Communist Party -- inactive since 1964 on Moscow's orders -- is reported to be clandestinely preparing for a "return to action" in anticipation of the "sudden explosions" to which Sadat's policies are expected to lead.<sup>60</sup> Soviet Arabic broadcasts to the Middle East of late are taking a similar line. A recently issued Egyptian Communist Party document refers to the "patriotic trend" in the armed forces and alludes to Communist support in that quarter, while claiming that the party is "the only organized political force" in Egypt, outside the government's own political machine. While not directly calling for the overthrow of Sadat, Moscow may be orchestrating its propaganda, as well as the activities of Egyptian Communist Party elements, toward setting in motion events that may lead to the replacement of the Sadat regime<sup>61</sup> -- currently perhaps Moscow's fondest hope in the Middle East.

---

<sup>58</sup>Washington Post, July 30, 1975.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., August 28, 1975.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

Another recent element of strain in Soviet-Egyptian relations has been Cairo's hampering of the Soviet use of naval facilities in Egypt. As of the early summer of 1975, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet reportedly has been denied the use of two of its prime berthing facilities -- the port of Mersa Matruh, near the Libyan border, and an anchorage in Egyptian waters in the Gulf of Sollum. While Soviet naval craft have always been required to request permission to enter Egyptian ports and anchorages, these requests heretofore have been treated as formalities and routinely granted. Since last June, however, Soviet requests to enter the above two areas reportedly have not been answered, in effect amounting to a denial of entrance.<sup>62</sup>

Soviet ships have still been using the important maintenance and repair facilities in the main port of Alexandria, but they have been encountering increasing harassment on the part of Egyptian port officials. Long delays in gaining permission to enter the port have been reported, as well as requirements to fill out additional forms and other types of red tape. Foreign diplomatic sources have ascribed this Egyptian harassment of Soviet naval facilities as pressure on Moscow vis-a-vis Egypt's military debt question and the continuation of Soviet arms shipments.<sup>63</sup>

An interview published in a Kuwaiti newspaper of September 9, 1975, provided the occasion for another of Sadat's bitter denunciations of the Soviet Union. Stating that "no person with dignity can accept the method of Russian dealing", Sadat accused Moscow of failing him in his "year of decision", prior to the October war. "Since I assumed power in Egypt," Sadat continued, "the Russians have not been satisfied with me. They want another president." Speaking of arms supplies, Sadat complained that he was "ten steps behind Israel and three steps behind Syria."<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup>New York Times, July 28, 1975; Washington Post, July 20, 1975.

<sup>63</sup>Washington Post, July 20, 1975.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., September 10, 1975.



The deteriorating state of Soviet-Egyptian relations was further reflected in the reported withdrawal of four Soviet-manned Foxbat reconnaissance aircraft from Egypt in September. These high performance aircraft, among the most advanced in the Soviet inventory, had been operating in Egypt since the October war. With the loss of their Egyptian base of operations for these aircraft, it was reported that the Soviets were negotiating with Syria for use of a similar base in that country.<sup>65</sup>

Meanwhile, with prospects for new Soviet arms acquisitions currently remote, Sadat began to entertain serious hopes for securing some assistance from the US, particularly after initialing the Sinai II disengagement pact with Israel on September 1, 1975. While realistically aware that Washington could approve nowhere near the scale of major arms commitments in effect for Israel, Sadat hoped for at least a symbolic amount of defensive equipment, such as a squadron of F-5 fighter aircraft at a minimum. Sadat further hoped that his purchase of French Mirages in 1974 and early 1975 would demonstrate that the Soviets no longer controlled Egypt's military posture.<sup>66</sup>

Statements by US officials following Sinai II concomitantly gave some indication that the US might favorably consider Egyptian requests for military equipment during Sadat's planned visit to the US in October 1975. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times on September 24, 1975, President Ford stated that "we will discuss with the Egyptians certain arms assistance for them" adding that "there is to some extent an implied commitment." Due to the strains between Egypt and the Soviet Union, Mr. Ford averred that Sadat "has taken a very strong position" that "his own national security" would be jeopardized if Western sources of military equipment were not found.<sup>67</sup> Several days later,

<sup>65</sup>Baltimore Sun, November 23, 1975.

<sup>66</sup>Washington Post, October 19, 1975.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., September 25, 1975.

the White House press secretary reiterated that the US would consider Egyptian requests for military equipment "to increase Egypt's confidence in its course" of diversifying its sources of arms supply.<sup>68</sup>

While the US appeared to be seriously considering ending its two-decade-long arms embargo against Egypt, indications were that Washington was not prepared to make any specific commitments to Sadat in the near term. Several days prior to the scheduled arrival of Sadat in the US, Secretary of State Kissinger stated: "I don't think we will be prepared at this moment to make any specific commitments of military aid, but we will be prepared to discuss the problem with him in general terms."<sup>69</sup>

Not surprisingly, the question of US military sales to Egypt during Sadat's visit to the US, October 26-November 5, 1975, apparently was restricted to general discussions of Egyptian military needs, with no commitments made on an arms supply relationship. Sadat reportedly was told that the US could not now discuss specific arms acquisitions, but that "the subject could be reopened later."<sup>70</sup>

Sadat, however, did win an administration promise of approximately \$1 billion in aid -- \$750 million in economic assistance and an additional \$250 million in food aid. Egyptian government officials acknowledged that this was a fourfold increase in the amount of US assistance to Egypt over the previous year, while there had been no US assistance at all for the eight years prior to that. Thus despite the lack of a specific American arms supply commitment, Sadat reportedly viewed his US visit as one of his most important acts in formalizing the end of his prior exclusive dependence on Moscow.<sup>71</sup>

Following his visit to the US, Sadat stopped in London for three days of arms supply talks with British officials. At a press conference there on November 8, 1975, Sadat claimed to be "completely satisfied" with the discussions in "diversi-

<sup>68</sup>New York Times, September 27, 1975.

<sup>69</sup>Wall Street Journal, October 24, 1975.

<sup>70</sup>Washington Star, November 9, 1975.

<sup>71</sup>New York Times, November 6, 1975.

fyng the sources of Egyptian weapons supply." British officials reportedly indicated that Her Majesty's Government had all but lifted its existing embargo on supersonic Jaguar fighter bombers for Cairo. These modern aircraft were reported to be at the top of Sadat's arms shopping list. The sale of 200 Jaguars, valued at about \$1.2 billion, was reported in the British press.<sup>72</sup>

Asked why his arms purchasing mission apparently had been more successful in the UK than in the US, Sadat replied that he had begun his arms diversification program with the UK and France last year and could now negotiate "specifics" with both countries. While in the US, he stated that he could only sketch his military needs in "broad outlines."<sup>73</sup>

Inasmuch as the Jaguar is jointly produced by the UK and France, it remained unclear what production sharing arrangements would have to be completed for the deal. The purchase is reported to involve an initial order of 30 to 60 aircraft, with the Egyptians interested in eventually producing the aircraft under license.<sup>74</sup>

Sadat also is reported to have concluded an agreement for the purchase of British Swingfire antitank missiles in a \$40 million deal. In addition, the Egyptians reportedly expressed an interest in purchasing the British Chieftain main battle tank, but London has been unwilling to introduce this tank into the area because of the possibility of disrupting the Arab-Israeli military balance. As an alternative, the British reportedly proposed a feasibility study to re-engine the Soviet tanks now in the Egyptian inventory, and the Egyptians are said to be considering this possibility.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup>Cited in the Washington Post, November 9, 1975.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 17, 1975, p. 22.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

In the meantime, the Egyptian armed forces are becoming increasingly desperate for alternative sources of equipment and supplies. Because of the shortage of spare parts, the army and air force are reported to have begun resorting to cannibalization of existing equipment to maintain operational readiness. Concern accordingly has been evinced in the armed forces over Sadat's failure to obtain US equipment. Some military elements reportedly feel that, under present conditions, Egypt does not pose a credible threat to Israel and thus lacks sufficient military leverage to induce further Israeli withdrawals from the occupied territories.<sup>76</sup>

Egypt, in the view of British military analysts, regards US military equipment over the next five years as critical to its security interests. In the estimation of the Egyptian military high command, a view shared to some extent by Israeli analysts, Egypt has sufficient equipment strength available to defend in the Sinai or, if necessary, to fight Israel in combination with other Arab states. The current preoccupation of Cairo is with the military balance two or three years from now. This is where the need for modern US or other Western equipment, especially fighter aircraft and air defense radar, is viewed as acute.<sup>77</sup>

The Soviet Union, in the opinion of some Western military analysts, is not overly concerned by Sadat's efforts to "turn around" the Egyptian military forces. Sadat, according to a Soviet source, "is only one man." Furthermore, the source regards the arms aid program envisaged by Sadat as well beyond Cairo's financial resources, even if generous US aid is forthcoming.<sup>78</sup>

Egypt's prospects for obtaining large-scale Western military assistance to compensate for the reduced level of Soviet support appear to bear upon the internal

<sup>76</sup>New York Times, November 10, 1975.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., October 22, 1975.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid.



political situation in the country. The armed forces, in this respect, are regarded as Sadat's primary source of political support.<sup>79</sup> The ability of Sadat to secure a continuing supply of modern weaponry -- from whatever source -- to the satisfaction of his military establishment will remain the crucial question in the survival of the Sadat government.

---

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., November 10, 1975.

### CHAPTER III

#### SYRIA\*

Syria, with \$2.1 billion in Soviet military aid received through 1974, ranks as the second largest recipient of Soviet arms among the nonaligned countries.<sup>80</sup> Soviet arms aid cooperation with Syria dates from 1956, when in January of that year the Syrian government concluded its first arms accord with Moscow, because of the "impossible conditions" for purchasing arms attached by the West. After the 1956 accord, follow-up agreements, technical assistance, and good will naval visits ensued in the usual Soviet pattern.<sup>81</sup>

Though encountering problems and periodic setbacks, a Soviet working relationship was maintained with Syria over the next decade. By the eve of the June 1967 war, Syrian military and economic dependence on Moscow was pronounced.<sup>82</sup>

Though not suffering as heavily in the June war as Egypt, Syrian equipment losses were substantial. In aircraft, for example, Syria lost 32 MIG-21's, 23 MIG-15/17's, 2 IL-28 bombers, and 3 helicopters, for a total of 60 aircraft, or practically two-thirds of her entire air force.<sup>83</sup>

Within a year, however, Soviet resupply had more than replaced Syria's losses. Replacement deliveries, reportedly valued at about \$300 million, included 120 aircraft -- many late model MIG-21 and SU-7 fighters among them to replace earlier vintage MIG-15's and 17's lost in the conflict -- and some 400 tanks. As many as 1,000 additional Soviet advisory personnel also arrived in the country. At the same time, Soviet long-range bombers initiated visits to Syria, and the construction of naval support facilities began under Soviet supervision in the ports of Latakia and Tartus.

---

<sup>80</sup>U.S. Department of State, op. cit.

<sup>81</sup>Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 105.

<sup>82</sup>Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 123.

<sup>83</sup>Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 152.

\*This chapter and that on Iraq following are a revised version of an article that appeared in the Winter 1976 issue of Strategic Review.

The latter would prove valuable for Syrian naval craft as well as ships of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, as regular Soviet naval visits in 1968 began to demonstrate.<sup>84</sup>

While Syria remained crucial to Soviet calculations in the area, policy differences between the two countries grew more acute after the June war. The apparent central difference was over policy toward Israel. In contrast to Moscow's espousal of a political approach to a settlement, the Syrians continued to press for reprisals and the total defeat of Israel, as underscored by their heavy support of the Palestinian guerrillas. These differences placed a considerable strain on Soviet-Syrian relations.<sup>85</sup>

At the end of 1968, reports in the Lebanese press mentioned Syrian attempts to approach the West for military equipment, ostensibly because of Soviet threats to withhold arms if Damascus continued to oppose an Arab-Israeli political settlement. Although a Syrian military delegation returned empty-handed from Paris, Damascus shortly afterwards concluded a new agreement with Moscow, in an apparent successful use of counterpressure on the Soviets.<sup>86</sup>

The Syrians apparently tried to repeat this tactic the following year, when, in May 1969, a Syrian military mission visited Peking. The aim reportedly was to pressure the Soviets to provide additional advanced weapons by seeking assistance from the Chinese.<sup>87</sup> The latter turned down a reported Syrian request for SAM's, but did agree to provide infantry weapons for the Palestinian guerrillas based in Syria.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>84</sup>A.Y. Yodfat, "The USSR, Jordan, and Syria," Mizan, March-April 1969, p. 84.

<sup>85</sup>Charles McLane, Soviet-Middle East Relations (London: Central Asian Research Center, 1973), p. 91.

<sup>86</sup>Yodfat, "The USSR, Jordan, and Syria," op. cit., p. 88.

<sup>87</sup>New York Times, May 18, 1969.

<sup>88</sup>Honorable R. Lawrence Coughlin, op. cit., p. E7537.

By the middle of 1970, three years after the June war, Syria was nearly totally dependent on the Soviet Union for the sustenance of its military machine. The air force, which had tripled in size since the war, boasted 175 late model MIG-21 fighters and SU-7 fighter bombers (as opposed to 55 before the war) and 85 MIG-17 fighters.<sup>89</sup> Deliveries to the ground forces during the three-year period included 250-300 tanks, over 100 armored personnel carriers, 400 field guns and mobile rocket launchers, and an estimated 40 SA-2 SAM missiles.<sup>90</sup> Transfers to the navy included two Soviet-supplied minesweepers, six Komar-class missile patrol boats, and at least a dozen motor torpedo boats.<sup>91</sup>

Striving to correct the operational deficiencies in the Syrian armed forces were an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet military instructors and advisers, perhaps one-fifth the number in Egypt at the time. As in Egypt, the Soviet personnel were engaged in training, planning, and logistics activities down to divisional, and in some cases lower, levels. Although some improvement was said to have been made in Syrian operational efficiency since the June war, Soviet officers in Syria did not consider the Syrian forces ready for renewed hostilities with Israel.<sup>92</sup> Operational and maintenance standards remained lamentably poor, a partial legacy of the eight coups d'etat undergone by the country in the previous 17 years. Morale in the armed forces accordingly remained at a low ebb.<sup>93</sup>

Another military aid agreement signed with Moscow in February 1971 continued the flow of materiel in that year. Deliveries over the next six months included 35 additional fighter aircraft and 22 MI-8 helicopters -- the first known delivery of the latter craft, designed to carry combat troops.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>89</sup>Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 1, 1970, p. 16.

<sup>90</sup>Lenzowski, op. cit., p. 152.

<sup>91</sup>Joshua, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>92</sup>Christian Science Monitor, July 9, 1970.

<sup>93</sup>Jackson, op. cit., p. 168.

<sup>94</sup>New York Times, July 12, 1971.



While the April 1972 Soviet friendship treaty with Iraq received considerable attention in the Western press, a similar treaty with Syria was conspicuous by its absence. Surprisingly enough, Syrian wariness over a closer involvement with Moscow reportedly caused Damascus to reject a Soviet offer of such a treaty.<sup>95</sup> Another Soviet-Syrian arms accord, however, was signed in May, the accord promising the Syrians their first SA-3 SAM's, as well as additional missile-equipped patrol boats.<sup>96</sup>

Following the sudden ouster of virtually all Soviet personnel from Egypt in July 1972, Western observers awaited some reactive move by the Soviets in the area. It came two months later in the form of a prominent airlift of Soviet military equipment to Syria. During late September and early October, some 20 AN-12 transport aircraft, as well as several merchant ships, arrived in Syria with new equipment, reportedly including 12 to 15 MIG-21 fighters, new T-62 medium tanks, and SA-3 missiles.<sup>97</sup> Also arriving in the airlift were a reported 150 new Soviet advisers, probably SA-3 instructors and technicians, adding to the several thousand already in the country.<sup>98</sup> Moscow evidently took this conspicuous and dramatic step to demonstrate that it still maintained a secure foothold in the Middle East.

Also in September, Western sources reported that Moscow negotiated some type of arrangement with Damascus, whereby the Soviets would expand naval facilities at the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus for their use. Up to that time Soviet naval craft could only make port calls at those locations. The exact nature of the arrangement was not made clear, but the Soviets presumably planned to establish an alternate base of operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, until the status of their Egyptian bases became clarified.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>95</sup>Strategic Survey 1972 (London: IISS, April 1973), p. 27.

<sup>96</sup>R. M. Burrell, "Opportunities for the Kremlin's Drive East," New Middle East, July 1972, p. 13.

<sup>97</sup>Washington Post, September 28, 1972.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., October 6, 1972.

<sup>99</sup>New York Times, September 14, 1972.

The chief of Israeli military intelligence, General A. Yariv, publicly stated at the time that the Soviets were "playing up" developments in Syria to bolster their diplomatic position in the area following their setback in Egypt. While stating that his country was watching the situation carefully, Yariv commented that there were no signs of a substantial increase in the Soviet presence in Syria -- a factor of more concern to Israel than new equipment deliveries. He added that the recent shipments apparently were intended to bolster Syria's "relatively weak side," her air defense, given reports of the newly-arrived SA-3 equipment.<sup>100</sup>

The diplomatic reaction from the September-October air and sea lift had just abated, when another, even larger, airlift began in November and continued into December. The latter, about twice as large as the previous airlift, involved about 40 aircraft, including the very large AN-22 transport, capable of carrying a 220,000 pound payload. All that has been reported on the contents of the later airlift was the inclusion of an unspecified number of MIG-21 fighters, presumably to replace the dozen or more shot down in dogfights with the Israelis over the previous half year.<sup>101</sup>

Deliveries continued on a heavy scale during 1973. During the first six months, Soviet shipments amounted to a reported \$185 million, compared with about \$150 million for all of 1972.<sup>102</sup>

In September 1973, Syrian and Israeli aircraft tangled in the biggest air battle in the Middle East since the 1967 war. Israel claimed it shot down 13 Syrian MIG-21's for the loss of one of its Mirages. The day following the

<sup>100</sup>Washington Post, September 28, 1972.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid. January 10, 1973.

<sup>102</sup>London Sunday Times Staff, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 72.

battle, Soviet Ambassador Mukhitdinov was reportedly summoned by President Assad, who demanded advanced MIG-23 fighters from Moscow, as well as Soviet participation in Syrian SAM launch operations in future clashes with the Israelis. When the Soviets apparently demurred unless Damascus signed a friendship treaty with Moscow, Assad restricted the movement of Soviet advisers in the country.<sup>103</sup> "Those damned Syrians," complained Ambassador Mukhitdinov, "will take anything except advice."<sup>104</sup>

The October war showed the extent of the vast Soviet-supplied arsenal in Syria. The Syrians deployed a reported total of 32 SA-6 batteries (Egypt deployed 46), each battery having four launchers with three missiles apiece. In the first three days of hostilities, the number of SAM missiles fired on the combined Syrian and Egyptian fronts reportedly totalled over 1,000, reflecting a deployment density surpassing that of any known SAM system in the world, the Soviet Union included.<sup>105</sup> Syrian losses reportedly totalled 222 aircraft of all types (about two-thirds of total air force strength), some 1,100 tanks (50 percent of total tank holdings), and 17-20 SAM batteries (over half of Syria's inventory).<sup>106</sup>

While Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt virtually ceased after the war, Soviet shipments to Syria continued at a high rate. By August 1974, Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres claimed that not only were Syrian losses replaced, but that Syria was stronger than before the war. Mr. Peres stated that Syrian air force strength totalled about 400 aircraft -- about 25 percent more than prior to October 1973 -- and that its SAM system was about 20 percent larger. In addition, all tank losses had been made up, mostly with modern T-62's. Peres added that about 3,000 Soviet advisers were in Syria, some operating the missile defense

---

<sup>103</sup>Washington Post, September 26, 1973.

<sup>104</sup>London Sunday Times Staff, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>105</sup>London Sunday Times Staff, op. cit., p. 189.

<sup>106</sup>New York Times, August 8, 1974.

system and other electronic equipment.<sup>107</sup> A Pentagon spokesman in effect subsequently confirmed the Israeli information, saying he would not quarrel with the levels mentioned by Peres. He added, however, that US analysts estimated the number of Soviet advisers present at about 2,000.<sup>108</sup>

Besides replacing Syrian war losses, the Soviets provided additional modern equipment to Damascus. In the spring of 1974, the first advanced swing-wing MIG-23 fighters were identified in Syria,<sup>109</sup> the first country outside the Soviet Union to receive this late-model aircraft.<sup>110</sup> A total of 45 were reported in the country.<sup>111</sup> Other newly-arrived sophisticated equipment included 30 Scud surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 180 miles, over 100 Frog shorter-range tactical rockets,<sup>112</sup> vehicle-mounted multiple SA-7 SAM launchers, and new 180 mm howitzers.<sup>113</sup> The Scuds, with their capability of striking Israeli cities with high explosive warheads, posed the gravest concern to Tel Aviv and raised the threat of an Israeli preemptive strike in the event of an imminent renewal of hostilities.<sup>114</sup>

Prior to the post-October resupply of the Syrians, Israeli military planning was based on the premise that Egypt

---

<sup>107</sup>Ibid.

<sup>108</sup>Defense/Space Daily, December 19, 1974, p. 264.

<sup>109</sup>Washington Post, September 12, 1974.

<sup>110</sup>Known by the NATO codename, Flogger, the aircraft is capable of speeds more than twice the speed of sound, with approximately the same performance characteristics as the F-4 Phantom, except for a less favorable range and ordnance capacity (Washington Post, February 2, 1975).

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., September 12, 1974.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., November 20, 1974.

<sup>113</sup>International Defense Review, No. 3, May-June 1974, p. 284.

<sup>114</sup>Washington Post, November 20, 1974.



was the fulcrum of war or peace in the area. It was further regarded that no war was feasible without Egyptian participation, and that while Cairo was involved in negotiations, the likelihood of hostilities was not imminent.<sup>115</sup>

The spate of Soviet shipments to Syria in 1974 changed the outlook of the Israelis. The latter by mid-year regarded the Syrians as capable of launching a full-scale onslaught on their own, with the expectation that the Iraqis and other Arab countries would join in.<sup>116</sup> Indeed, US officials at that time also felt that "the Syrians were well ahead of where they were before the war," as a result of the heavy volume of Soviet deliveries, while the Egyptians were approximately at their pre-war strength. Concomitantly, Washington regarded Israel as stronger militarily vis-a-vis both Egypt and Syria than before the war.<sup>117</sup>

The critical Syrian weakness remained trained and experienced manpower. Half of Syria's tanks were reportedly manned by inexperienced crews, while many aircraft remained grounded due to the shortage of fully qualified pilots, only about 60 of whom were reported to have survived the war.<sup>118</sup> Until Syrian pilots could be trained, some of the newly arrived MIG-23's were reportedly being flown by Cuban and North Korean pilots.<sup>119</sup>

Despite shortcomings in training and experience in its armed forces, Syria -- one of the most volatile and impatient of the Arab states -- poses a serious threat

<sup>115</sup>New York Times, August 8, 1974.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., October 3, 1974.

<sup>118</sup>U.S. News and World Report, March 17, 1975, p. 14.

<sup>119</sup>Time, December 2, 1974, p. 46.

to the current fragile peace in the Middle East. It remains to be seen whether Syria, now heavily subsidized by Saudi Arabian funds, will continue its tentative probings toward the West for military equipment and industrial development,<sup>120</sup> or will remain closely tied to Moscow.

<sup>120</sup>Washington Post, June 23, 1975.





## IRAQ

Iraq ranks after Egypt and Syria as the third major Arab recipient of Soviet arms aid, having received \$1.6 billion in such assistance through 1974.<sup>121</sup> The close Soviet-Iraqi arms supply relationship began following the coup of General Abdul Kareem Kassem against the Nuri al-Said government in July 1958. As the sole Arab member of the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact, Iraq had alienated Arab nationalist elements and had been eclipsed in prestige by Egypt, Iraq's traditional rival. Kassem, seeking to counteract these factors, changed Iraq's foreign policy stance to one of nonalignment and severed military ties with the West. In order to further strengthen his domestic position and enhance Iraq's regional stature, Kassem concomitantly approached the Soviet Union for military assistance.<sup>122</sup>

The Soviets responded quickly to the Iraqi requests. Delivery of a squadron of MIG-15 fighters in late 1958 was followed by the arrival of a large military training mission. Other deliveries of aircraft, including MIG-17 and MIG-21 fighters, transports, helicopters, and trainers, took place in the early 1960's as the Iraqi air force was reorganized and modernized.<sup>123</sup>

Despite this assistance, strains arose in Baghdad's relations with Moscow. The Iraqi Communist Party, following its abortive revolution in February 1963, received rough treatment by the Right Baathists, an extremist faction which overthrew the Kassem regime during the same month. Even more troublesome in Soviet-Iraqi relations was the regime's war against the rebellious Kurdish tribesmen in northeast Iraq, which had been underway since 1961. Moscow, which had maintained a protective attitude

<sup>121</sup>U.S. Department of State, op. cit.

<sup>122</sup>Joshua, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>123</sup>Jackson, op. cit., p. 171.

toward the Kurds for some time, was seriously disturbed by Baghdad's handling of the rebellion.<sup>124</sup> It went so far as to publish a warning in Pravda in June 1963 that the Soviet Union would not remain indifferent if Soviet arms were used against the Kurdish dissidents. Arms shipments concomitantly were curtailed. These moves provided the first known instance of Moscow's use of leverage against an aid recipient and served to restrain the Iraqis in their anti-Kurdish operations.<sup>125</sup>

After the Right Baathist regime was overthrown by a military junta in November 1963, the new Iraqi government removed most strictures against the local Communists and arranged a truce with the Kurds. The Soviet attitude toward Baghdad changed markedly, as reflected in the resumption of arms shipments in early 1964.<sup>126</sup>

While Soviet-Iraqi relations improved over the next several years, the Kurdish problem continued to fester between the two countries. In 1965, Baghdad again launched a large-scale offensive against the dissidents. This time, however, Moscow appeared unwilling to strain relations with Baghdad and refrained from pressuring Iraq. Within the broader context of overall policy objectives in the Arab world, Moscow apparently was not prepared to manipulate its arms aid tie at this time.<sup>127</sup> Soviet cooperation continued with the installation of an SA-2 surface-to-air missile system and the delivery of three additional squadrons of all-weather MIG-21 interceptors and Iraq's first TU-16 medium jet bombers.<sup>128</sup>

<sup>124</sup>McLane, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

<sup>125</sup>The Economist, June 29, 1963, p. 1344.

<sup>126</sup>McLane, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

<sup>127</sup>Joshua, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>128</sup>Military Aviation News, July 1974, p. 5.

Iraqi losses in the June 1967 war, though sizable, were on a much smaller scale than those of Egypt and Syria. Aircraft losses included 9 MIG-21's, 5 Hawker Hunters, 1 TU-16 medium bomber, and 2 transports. As a result of Soviet replacement deliveries, Iraqi air force strength a year after the war substantially exceeded the pre-war level. By mid-1971, the Soviets had, over a four year period, provided Iraq with 110 MIG-21 and SU-7 fighters, over 20 helicopters and trainers, 100-150 tanks, some 300 armored personnel carriers, and about 500 field guns and artillery rockets.<sup>129</sup>

The Soviet aid relationship with Iraq flourished, nurtured at least partly by Baghdad's unusually good repayment record. With hard currency earnings from oil exports, Iraq was better able than any other Soviet client to meet its repayment obligations to Moscow.<sup>130</sup>

The military-diplomatic relationship between Moscow and Baghdad was formalized in April 1972 in the signing of a fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation during Premier Kosygin's first visit to Iraq.<sup>131</sup> Apparently resulting from Iraqi initiative, the treaty constituted a major step in Soviet efforts to consolidate and formalize a political position in the Arab world independent of the Soviet presence in Egypt.

Similar to the 1971 treaty with Egypt, the accord called for cooperation in the military, political, and economic spheres and regular consultations on international issues affecting the interests of both parties. Also, like the Egyptian treaty, it did not provide for mutual assistance in the event of hostilities, but stipulated only that the two sides would continue to assist each other in strengthening their defense capabilities and to "coordinate their positions" should a threat to peace arise.<sup>132</sup>

---

<sup>129</sup>Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 153.

<sup>130</sup>A. Y. Yodfat, "Russia's Other Middle East Partner," New Middle East, November 1971, p. 28.

<sup>131</sup>Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union in the Middle East," Current History, October 1972, p. 169.

<sup>132</sup>Strategic Survey 1972 (London: IISS, April 1973), p. 28.

Despite the relatively cautious nature of the Soviet commitment, Soviet-Iraqi relations continued to be close. Soviet arms shipments continued, highlighted later in the year by the installation of the first SA-3 SAM sites in the country.<sup>133</sup>

A rather curious--and still unexplained--development occurred in the late summer of 1973 with the delivery of about a dozen supersonic TU-22 Blinder medium-range bombers to Iraq. Although the Blinder had been in Soviet service for some 12 years, this was the first and only deployment of this type of aircraft outside the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Capable of speeds of approximately 900 mph, with a range of 1,400 miles, the Blinders were described by the Pentagon as "far more formidable than any aircraft supplied by Moscow to Egypt or any other Arab nation so far."<sup>134</sup> Oddly enough, though delivery occurred just prior to the October war, no mention was made of the aircraft being used in the war.

While the bomber could represent a threat to Israel or Iran, Iraq's prime adversaries, the general assessment of Western military specialists was that introduction of the aircraft did not alter the military balance.<sup>135</sup> Soviet motives in supplying the aircraft were unclear, but US officials viewed the move as an attempt by Moscow to reassure its Arab clients that they could continue to rely on the Soviet Union for advanced military equipment.<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>133</sup>Ibid.

<sup>134</sup>Military Aviation News, October 1973, p. 15.

<sup>135</sup>New York Times, October 3, 1973.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid.



Little definitive information is available on the extent of Iraqi involvement in the October war, but Baghdad's equipment losses were believed to be small. Following the conflict, the Soviets continued to supply new types of late model equipment to Iraq. Scud surface-to-surface missiles--with conventional warheads--were reported in Iraq for the first time in late 1974. Additional Soviet military advisory personnel also were reported in the country, giving rise to speculation that the missiles would remain under Soviet control initially. Scud missiles--minus nuclear warheads--had previously been provided to Egypt and Syria.<sup>137</sup>

In October 1974, it was reported that the MIG-23, one of the most modern fighters in the Soviet inventory, also had been introduced into Iraq for the first time. About 12 were reported to have arrived in Iraq, although no fully qualified Iraqi pilots were yet available to fly them.<sup>138</sup>

Western observers speculated that the arrival of the MIG-23's was in response to the continuing military buildup by neighboring Iran, especially the orders for 80 advanced US F-14 fighters placed by Teheran in the first half of 1974. Another possible use mentioned for the aircraft was employment against the Kurdish dissidents -- the subject of renewed hostilities by the Iraqi government following the Kurds' rejection in March 1974 of Baghdad's limited autonomy plan. Reports had been circulating that the TU-22's delivered earlier already had been involved in bombing strikes against the Kurds. The latter aircraft reportedly were flown by Soviet crews in high-altitude bombing strikes to minimize chances of being shot down, a consequence which could have proven diplomatically embarrassing for Moscow.<sup>139</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup>Washington Post, February 2, 1975.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid.

<sup>139</sup>International Defense Review, No. 5, September - October 1974, p. 574.

This reported involvement of Soviet pilots, as well as ground force advisers,<sup>140</sup> in combat missions was the first such reported role for Soviet personnel since the clash of Soviet-manned Egyptian MIG's with Israeli aircraft in 1970.<sup>141</sup> Reports had appeared in Western newspapers of Soviet participation in bombing missions against anti-government dissidents in the Sudan in 1971, but these were not confirmed.<sup>142</sup>

US specialists believe that the use of advanced Soviet aircraft against the Kurds probably had more political than military significance. The utilization of high performance aircraft and Soviet pilots would not have an appreciable military impact in an elusive guerrilla war, such as the anti-Kurdish campaign in the rugged mountains of northeastern Iraq, where few profitable targets existed for aerial attack.<sup>143</sup> The active Soviet role at any rate presumably did serve the useful purposes of providing operational experience for Soviet military personnel and signifying Soviet support at a crucial time for Baghdad.<sup>144</sup>

By early 1975, however, problems again arose in Soviet-Iraqi relations. Friction began with the Soviet purchase of a sizable amount of Iraqi oil which Moscow resold at a profit to third countries. Baghdad was further perturbed by Moscow's non-reaction over Iran's occupation of two small, but strategic islets in the Persian Gulf, Iraq's outlet to the sea. Overshadowing these two developments, however, was the perennial sore spot caused by the Kurdish war.

---

<sup>140</sup>Washington Post, February 2, 1975.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., October 5, 1974.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid., January 1, 1971; Manchester Guardian, March 5, 1971.

<sup>143</sup>Washington Post, October 5, 1974.

<sup>144</sup>Ibid.

The festering problem of Kurdish separatism had practically transfixed Iraqi foreign policy for some time. While Baghdad remained committed to preventing any significant Kurdish autonomy, Moscow had long viewed the Kurdish minority in Iraq as a potential base from which similar separatist tendencies could perhaps be fostered in the larger Kurdish population of neighboring Iran. Exacerbating the situation, from Moscow's viewpoint, was the Iraqi army's reported tendency in the renewed hostilities to concentrate on local Kurdish leaders with Communist proclivities.<sup>145</sup>

As the harsh winter weather stalled Iraq's anti-Kurdish offensive at the beginning of 1975, Baghdad made repeated urgent entreaties to the Soviet Union for additional artillery, infantry weapons, and ammunition. These entreaties elicited little response from Moscow, severely straining ties with the Iraqi government.<sup>146</sup> The uncooperative Soviet attitude apparently contributed to Iraqi efforts to acquire military equipment in the West.

Baghdad had made some large-scale purchases from France already the previous year. Included in the 1974 deals were 31 Alouette III helicopters, armed with SS-11 antitank missiles,<sup>147</sup> 1,000 automatic 60 mm mortars, 60,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and laser range finders for armored cars, for a total reported value of about \$70 million, amounting to a significant arms purchase arrangement.<sup>148</sup>

Iraq's discernible edging away from its traditional xenophobic isolation was thus given added impetus by Moscow's foot dragging in providing additional arms supplies in early 1975. Questioned about Iraq's reported arms shopping in the West, after a decade and a half of nearly exclusive reliance on Moscow, Iraqi President Saddam Tikriti in April 1975 stated: "If national conditions dictate that

---

<sup>145</sup>Ibid., February 9, 1975.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid.

<sup>147</sup>SIPRI Yearbook 1975 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975), p. 203.

<sup>148</sup>Military Aviation News, September 1974, p. 16.

we should diversify in this field we shall do so ... We have a free will."<sup>149</sup>

Iraq indeed appears to have emerged from its former paranoiac isolation toward a more open role in the Arab world. In March 1975, Baghdad -- while still wary of Iranian ambitions for hegemony in the Gulf area -- concluded a border accord with Tehran. This accommodation paved the way for a successful culmination of the Iraqi offensive which finally ended the Kurdish war a few weeks later.<sup>150</sup> Baghdad's cooperative international mood continued with the conclusion in July 1975 of a border agreement with Saudi Arabia, ending years of enmity with that country, as well as an economic aid program with Jordan, another traditional rival. Finally, development contracts concluded with Japanese and Western European firms<sup>151</sup> -- instead of the Soviet Union -- to enlarge the Iraqi port of Um Qasr may signify a further degree of estrangement between Iraq and the Soviet Union.<sup>152</sup>

This does not mean that Moscow is prepared to allow its painstakingly developed relationship with Iraq to crumble away. While Baghdad has long been important in Soviet policy calculations in the Middle East, it is currently all the more so because of the tenuous Soviet position in Egypt. The Soviet Union remains vitally interested in preventing another Iraqi defection from the ranks of the "progressive" Arab states as occurred in 1955. Moscow also maintains an avid interest in Iraqi oil,

---

<sup>149</sup>Washington Post, April 25, 1975.

<sup>150</sup>New York Times, March 23, 1975.

<sup>151</sup>Washington Post, July 20, 1975.

<sup>152</sup>Instead of a "formidable Soviet naval base" located at Um Qasr, as reported in the Western press over the past few years, two US newsmen who visited the site in February 1975 reported only "half a dozen jetties built out into the estuary from naked sand," plus "a cluster of sheds, housing, and headquarters buildings of the Iraq navy" (see Washington Post, February 12, 1975).



perhaps the most accessible foreign source available, as well as in potential access to Iraqi port facilities in the Persian Gulf. Given such motivations, one can expect a sustained commitment on the part of Moscow in arms aid and other support for Iraq.<sup>153</sup>

---

<sup>153</sup>McLane, op. cit., p. 58.

## CHAPTER V

### LIBYA

In September 1969, a group of radical officers overthrew the constitutional monarchy in Libya. The ruling Revolutionary Command Council quickly established close ties with Cairo. Its leader, Colonel Qadhafi, became the most ardent proponent of revolutionary Pan-Arab policy and called for the early liberation of Arab lands occupied by Israel.<sup>154</sup>

The overthrow of the royalist government opened a new phase in Soviet relations with Libya. Moscow moved quickly to recognize the Qadhafi regime. The latter, while remaining hostile to Arab Communism, was not averse to establishing ties with the Soviet Union. In the process of consolidating its hold on the country, the new government ingratiated itself with Moscow by causing the US and the UK to evacuate their Libyan bases in early 1970.<sup>155</sup>

Soviet military equipment sought by Qadhafi was not long in coming. The first deliveries of 30 medium tanks and 100 armored personnel carriers and other vehicles arrived in July 1970.<sup>156</sup> The equipment was subsequently exhibited in the September 1 parade commemorating the first anniversary of the revolution.<sup>157</sup>

While willing to procure Soviet ground forces equipment, Qadhafi did not wish to deal exclusively with Moscow for arms.<sup>158</sup> In fact, he earlier had negotiated a surprisingly large contract with France for 110 sophisticated Mirage

---

<sup>154</sup>Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 153.

<sup>155</sup>McLane, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>156</sup>Washington Post, July 23, 1970.

<sup>157</sup>Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 153.

<sup>158</sup>Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 153.

fighter aircraft. With only a handful of barely-trained pilots in its tiny air force, Libya evidently had cooperated closely with Egypt in arranging the deal, inasmuch as Cairo had been trying unsuccessfully to procure Mirages at least since early 1968.<sup>159</sup>

For the next several years, the Soviets kept a low profile in Libya. When the October 1973 war erupted, Libya made a substantial contribution to the Arab cause in the form of financial assistance and equipment transfers. Libya was reported to have provided some \$500 million in support for the war effort, including the financing of 70 replacement MIG-21's and other equipment for Egypt and Syria. Despite vehement denials at the time, Libya subsequently acknowledged the participation of some of its Mirages in the war. These aircraft evidently were flown by other Arab pilots, inasmuch as only 25 Libyan pilots were then qualified to fly the 100 Mirages in the inventory.<sup>160</sup>

Meanwhile, a rift that began during the October conflict between Qadhafi and Sadat over the latter's handling of the war grew increasingly bitter. Qadhafi subsequently condemned Sadat's willingness to engage in negotiations toward a peace settlement, repeatedly advocating a renewed war to destroy Israel. The feud finally degenerated into a series of personal accusations and counter-accusations between the two Arab leaders.<sup>161</sup> Cairo ended its close military cooperation by abruptly withdrawing all Egyptian pilots from Libya, as well as the SAM equipment and two naval craft that Egypt had loaned to that country. The Egyptians also ceased work on the air defense system it had been building around Libyan bases at Tobruk, Benghazi, and Tripoli.<sup>162</sup>

---

<sup>159</sup>New York Times, January 24, 1970 and July 23, 1970.

<sup>160</sup>Military Aviation News, May 1974, p. 20.

<sup>161</sup>Sketch, September 13, 1974, p. 13.

<sup>162</sup>Washington Post, February 18, 1974.

To replace the Egyptian advisers, Libya requested the augmentation of a small Pakistani advisory contingent which had been training Libyans on transport aircraft and helicopters for some two years. The total number of Pakistani advisers grew to about 600, including between 20 and 40 pilots. Besides the Pakistanis, a small number of French, Italian, and Yugoslav instructors also were reported to be present in the country.<sup>163</sup>

While the saturation point of the small Libyan armed force had been reached by early 1974, according to qualified observers, Libyan Prime Minister Jalloud was reported to be seeking additional military equipment from Western European countries. Unsuccessful in this attempt, among other reasons because of Libya's support of dissident movements in Northern Ireland, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and elsewhere,<sup>164</sup> Libya had little choice but to again approach Moscow, despite Qadhafi's continued antipathy toward the Soviets. During Prime Minister Jalloud's first visit to Moscow in May 1974, an overall trade agreement was concluded which included the Soviet supply of SAM missiles and other arms in exchange for Libyan oil.<sup>165</sup> It will be noted that this accord was concluded shortly after Moscow's suspension of arms shipments to Egypt, following steadily deteriorating relations with Cairo. The strain in relations with Egypt probably made it easier for the Soviet leadership to paper over existing differences with Qadhafi and come to a modus vivendi with him.

Another large Soviet arms agreement was reported to have been concluded in December 1974. In addition to TU-22 supersonic bombers (thus far provided only to Iraq), MI-8 helicopters, SA-3 and SA-6 SAM missiles, tanks, and anti-tank missiles, the deal evidently included advanced MIG-23 Floggers, the first 13 of which were delivered in early May 1975, shortly before the visit to Libya of Soviet President Alexei Kosygin.<sup>166</sup>

---

<sup>163</sup>Ibid.

<sup>164</sup>Ibid.

<sup>165</sup>Washington Post, May 21, 1974 and October 20, 1974.

<sup>166</sup>Military Aviation News, March 1975, p. 17, and May 1975, p. 17.



By that time, the number of Soviet military advisers and technicians in Libya had more than doubled to about 480 over the 200 present a year before. The Soviets were reportedly providing training on SAM's, antitank missiles, and T-62 tanks for Libyan personnel and serving as advisers in Libyan artillery and armored units. Soviet personnel reportedly also were operating SAM equipment around key installations in the country. Increasing friction between Soviet and Libyan personnel was reported to have led to pressure on Qadhafi by Libyan officers to expel the Soviets, but Qadhafi apparently was unwilling to reduce the Soviet presence while delivery contracts remained in effect.<sup>167</sup>

Qadhafi was driven into an even tighter relationship with Moscow by the British government's refusal in April 1975 to sell six submarines and 38 Jaguar advanced strike aircraft. London was willing to sell other items on Libya's \$1.4 billion shopping list -- transport aircraft, frigates, tank transporters, ammunition, and support equipment -- but was unwilling to risk upsetting the military balance in the area by including the sensitive submarines and fighter aircraft.<sup>168</sup> The all-or-nothing demands of the Qadhafi regime resulted in the collapse of negotiations.

Following the Kosygin visit to Libya in May, the semiofficial Egyptian newspaper, Al Ahram, reported the conclusion of a huge new Soviet arms deal -- valued at \$4 billion -- with Libya, in return for the use of military bases.<sup>169</sup> Egyptian President Sadat, in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, put an even higher figure of \$12 billion on the value of the accord.<sup>170</sup> Foreign observers speculated, however, that the Egyptian reports may have been a spin-off of the increasingly vehement polemics be-

---

<sup>167</sup>New York Times, February 21, 1975.

<sup>168</sup>Washington Post, April 12, 1975.

<sup>169</sup>Cited in the New York Times, May 23, 1975.

<sup>170</sup>Ibid., May 29, 1975.

tween Libya and Egypt, which had reached the stage of a bitter personal feud between Qadhafi and Sadat. Observers expressed doubt in particular over the alleged agreement to establish Soviet bases, citing Qadhafi's public opposition to any such facilities in the Mediterranean area.<sup>171</sup>

Moscow denied Egyptian press reports of an agreement for bases in Libya in the form of an article in Pravda, which harshly rebuked Al Ahram, "a newspaper for an Arab state friendly to the Soviet Union," for publishing such accounts. The Soviet newspaper did not deny reports of a new arms deal with Libya, but ridiculed the figure of \$12 billion as "quite a statement."<sup>172</sup>

A "Libyan spokesman" in Cairo in early June reportedly placed the value of the arms accord at \$800 million, a vast deal in itself for a country of two million people, but provided no further details.<sup>173</sup> Shortly thereafter, Qadhafi publicly scoffed at reports of a multibillion deal with Moscow or of Libyan acquiescence in the use of Libyan base facilities by the Soviets. "We deal with the Soviet Union on a commercial and not an ideological basis," he stated.<sup>174</sup>

Definitive information on the May 1975 arms accord is still sparse. Western officials believe the arrangement includes an increase to 1,000 tanks from the 600 reportedly ordered in 1974.<sup>175</sup> In addition, six F-class diesel submarines are included, as well as assistance in the rebuilding of World War II submarine servicing and repair facilities at the Libyan ports of Tobruk and Benghazi. About 100 Libyan naval personnel are reported to have gone to the Soviet Union for submarine training, while the number of Soviet

---

<sup>171</sup>Ibid., May 23, 1975.

<sup>172</sup>Cited in the New York Times, May 28, 1975.

<sup>173</sup>Washington Post, June 13, 1975.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid., July 16, 1975.

<sup>175</sup>New York Times, May 29, 1975.



military advisers in the country is expected to reach about 600.<sup>176</sup> Although an effective Libyan submarine capability would be at least several years in the offing, the possibility of such a capability in itself is disconcerting to Western defense specialists.<sup>177</sup>

In another portentous development, Libya and the Soviet Union -- shortly after the visit of Kosygin -- jointly announced that Moscow would provide Libya with the latter's first nuclear reactor. The 10 megawatt facility would be used for "peaceful measures only," as announced by the Libyan news agency. US nuclear experts confirmed that a reactor of that size could only be used for research purposes, being too small for the production of sufficient quantities of plutonium for a weapon.<sup>178</sup>

The agreement, nevertheless, served to further exacerbate Libyan-Egyptian relations. Referring to the new Soviet commitments to Libya, Sadat was quoted as saying that the supply of "such an arsenal like this raises many questions." Following on the heels of the arms accord, Sadat added that the nuclear agreement "doesn't surprise me at all."<sup>179</sup>

Indeed, the overall motivations behind the May accords remain somewhat puzzling. The arms deal may have been an enlargement of the already sizable December 1974 agreement. Egyptian officials have disparaged the Libyan capability to

---

<sup>176</sup>Baltimore Sun, June 30, 1975; Washington Post, July 20, 1975.

<sup>177</sup>Not the least of any resulting problems would be the difficulty of determining the origin of a submarine attack, should any ensue in a crisis situation in the Mediterranean area (see Washington Post, July 20, 1975).

<sup>178</sup>Washington Post, June 3, 1975.

<sup>179</sup>Ibid.

absorb, let alone maintain and operate, the types of modern, sophisticated equipment now being delivered or on order.<sup>180</sup> President Sadat himself has voiced concern that Libya might use the newly delivered equipment -- some of which Moscow has so far denied him -- against Egypt. Sadat went on to suggest that training the Libyan army to operate the equipment reportedly earmarked for it would necessitate a Soviet presence of 20 to 50 years.<sup>181</sup>

While the full implications of the current Soviet-Libyan relationship are still being debated, it appears that the Soviets are trying to solidify their new foothold in Libya, thus putting new pressure on Sadat to repair his unravelling ties with Moscow.<sup>182</sup> Although the Soviets probably did not acquire military base rights in Libya, they reportedly did gain access to limited naval use of ports in the country.<sup>183</sup> With the abrupt cancellation of Brezhnev's planned January 1975 visit to Cairo still vividly in the Egyptian mind, Kosygin's May visit to Tripoli and the resulting new arms agreement probably were intended by Moscow to unsettle Sadat, as well as to recoup some of the prestige lost at Egypt's hand in the Middle East since early 1974.

---

<sup>180</sup>Ibid., June 13, 1975.

<sup>181</sup>New York Times, May 29, 1975.

<sup>182</sup>Washington Post, June 3, 1975.

<sup>183</sup>Military Aviation News, June 1975, p. 18.

## FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM

Despite some setbacks and frustrations, arms aid on balance is probably still regarded by the Soviet leaders as their most effective instrument of policy toward the Arab Middle East. Although the net cost of the program has increased substantially over the past several years, from a low cost dispensing of obsolescent weapons to provision of some of the most advanced items in the Soviet inventory, there is little doubt that arms exports have proven a worthwhile political investment from Moscow's point of view.

Because of its significant contribution to the strengthening and survival of Moscow's Arab clients, the arms aid program had had extraordinary impact vis-a-vis the Soviet presence in the area. Fostering an image of the Soviet Union as a powerful friend and ally of the Arab countries, the program has served as the prime instrument for acquiring influence in the Arab world, providing Moscow with political entree into areas where its role had hitherto been limited or nonexistent.

This is not to say that the program has been a diplomatic panacea for Moscow. It is not apparent, for example, that such aid has enabled the Soviets to exercise leverage for political concessions in the Arab countries. Nor has the aid facilitated the activities of local Communist parties in the area. Moreover, the Soviets have found that their military aid largesse has created a variety of risks and problems. The ready provision of assistance has nurtured a dependence on the part of Moscow's Arab clients, implying a continual obligation on the part of the Soviet Union. Thus becoming identified to some extent with the policies and actions of client states over which it has had little, if any, real control, Moscow has found this situation both embarrassing and dangerous.

Reflecting something of Moscow's priorities in the area, Soviet arms supplies to Egypt--despite the virtual suspension of shipments in 1974 -- nearly equal those to the other Arab Middle East countries combined. Iraq and Syria still depend almost exclusively on Soviet equipment, while recent Soviet deliveries to Libya have made that country a major recipient.

What does the future portend for Soviet arms aid in the Middle East, particularly for the currently strained aid relationship with Egypt? Despite the recent vicissitudes in Soviet-Egyptian relations and Cairo's probings for US and Western European arms, it still appears that some type of working arrangement will be maintained between Cairo and Moscow. Both sides have too much at stake to accept a complete split.

While the Soviet Union has attempted to further cement relations with Iraq and Syria and to secure its foothold in Libya, it still regards Egypt as crucial to its Middle East policy. To permit the current strain in relations to lead to a complete rupture between Moscow and Cairo would have incalculable consequences on the Soviet position in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World. At the same time, Egypt, for its part, must realize that it has no practical short-term alternative than to rely on Moscow, at least for spare parts for equipment on hand, to maintain a viable military capability. It would simply require too much time -- at least five years as a conservative estimate -- to reequip and retrain the Egyptian forces with modern armaments from another supplier. Consequently, it appears that arms aid -- with suitable fine tuning -- will continue as a prime instrument of Soviet foreign policy vis-a-vis the Arab states.



**November 5, 1974**

**MEMORANDUM TO:**

**COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL  
ECONOMIC POLICY**

**FROM: JOHN O. MARSH, JR.**

**I would appreciate your comments on the  
attached, please.**

**Thank you.**

**Attachment: Mideast Economic Cooperation**



## MIDEAST Economic Cooperation

An aggressive program for the involvement of the U. S. Government and business interests in the economic development of the Mideast has great potential to advance a variety of important U. S. economic, political and security interests. For this effort to realize its full potential, however, it should be regional rather than bilateral in scope; should effectively dovetail the efforts of U. S. business and finance with those of the Washington bureaucracy; and should be centered in a single executive agency, in order to provide bureaucratic cohesion and organizational impetus to the program, and to ensure that it is rapidly responsive to national policy. The Marshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Administration provides a good model for such organization. (The principal difference is that in this case investment capital would be regionally generated, with the U. S. providing planning, managerial expertise, and industrial goods.) The analogy to the Marshall Plan would additionally highlight the importance which the Administration assigns to the initiative, and emphasize its historic significance.





EXCERPT FROM SECNAV LETTER OF 30 APRIL 1974 TO  
DIRECTOR, OMB (Subject: NEW ADMINISTRATIVE INITIATIVES)

2. (U) MIDEAST Economic Cooperation

An aggressive program for the involvement of the U.S. Government and business interests in the economic development of the Mideast has great potential to advance a variety of important U.S. economic, political and security interests. For this effort to realize its full potential, however, it should be regional rather than bilateral in scope; should effectively dovetail the efforts of U.S. business and finance with those of the Washington bureaucracy; and should be centered in a single executive agency, in order to provide bureaucratic cohesion and organizational impetus to the program, and to ensure that it is rapidly responsive to national policy. The Marshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Administration provides a good model for such organization. (The principal difference is that in this case investment capital would be regionally generated, with the U.S. providing planning, managerial expertise, and industrial goods.) The analogy to the Marshall Plan would additionally highlight the importance which the Administration assigns to the initiative, and emphasize its historic significance.



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 6, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN MARSH  
FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*  
SUBJECT: Requests for Comments on  
Middle East Economic Development

In response to your request for NSC staff comments on the attached, it is difficult for us to evaluate the "MIDEAST Economic Cooperation" proposal without knowing the overall context into which this statement might go. However, we have the following preliminary comments:

--In our foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East, we are keenly aware of the potential for an expanded US role in Middle East development.

--For this purpose, the US has entered into a series of Joint Commissions with a range of Middle Eastern nations in order to expand and develop opportunities in the economic field. State, Treasury and other economic bodies within the Government are carefully developing the framework of the Joint Commission network throughout the Middle East, in a way which complements the peace-making process.

--In view of this, any initiative along the lines of the attached should be submitted to the Under Secretaries Committee in charge of the Joint Commissions so that it can be put in the perspective of our foreign and economic interests in the highly complex Middle East negotiating situation.


--As a particular comment, it is worth noting that mention of the "Marshall Plan" evokes memories of a time when the US was able to provide massive aid. The thrust of our policy today is to build a framework for cooperation which links US technology with foreign funds.

--If the attached is a suggestion from a private citizen, we would be willing to clear on an appropriate letter of reply addressing the concerns expressed in this statement.



## MIDEAST Economic Cooperation

An aggressive program for the involvement of the U. S. Government and business interests in the economic development of the Mideast has great potential to advance a variety of important U. S. economic, political and security interests. For this effort to realize its full potential, however, it should be regional rather than bilateral in scope; should effectively dovetail the efforts of U. S. business and finance with those of the Washington bureaucracy; and should be centered in a single executive agency, in order to provide bureaucratic cohesion and organizational impetus to the program, and to ensure that it is rapidly responsive to national policy. The Marshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Administration provides a good model for such organization. (The principal difference is that in this case investment capital would be regionally generated, with the U. S. providing planning, managerial expertise, and industrial goods.) The analogy to the Marshall Plan would additionally highlight the importance which the Administration assigns to the initiative, and emphasize its historic significance.





COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

NOV 15 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR

JOHN O. MARSH, JR.

SUBJECT: Mid-East Economic Cooperation

In your November 5 memorandum you requested our comments on an attached draft paper, entitled "Mideast Economic Cooperation." This draft argued that: (1) greater U.S. government and business involvement in the economic development of the Mid-East is highly desirable; (2) the thrust of the U.S. effort in this direction should be regional rather than bilateral in scope; (3) it should be centered within a single executive agency; and lastly (4), the ECA of the Marshall Plan would provide a good organizational and conceptual model.

Our reaction is as follows:

° There is, of course, a major effort already under way in this area. One way in which the USG has attempted to restructure its economic relation with the Mid-Eastern countries is through a series of joint bilateral cooperation commissions operating at the Cabinet level. Any further moves on our part to establish major, new institutional arrangements before significant substantive progress is achieved could be counterproductive. They would at best further inflate expectations and at worst lend credence to the charge that we are trying to divert attention from substance to form.

° Although the present setup may be adequate in the short run, what is required is clarification and institutionalization of current arrangements for backstopping our Mid-East initiatives. To some degree this should emerge from the NSDM #278 exercise on Joint Commissions. In the long run there might be a number of advantages in centralizing our Mid-East initiatives within a single executive agency. However, the short run is crucial, and in the short run this would only add to the confusion.

° A regional approach to Mid-Eastern economic development might well generate greater resource demands on the USG than the current series of bilateral initiatives to Mid-Eastern countries.

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

DTP, 1/14/86

121

~~SECRET~~(GDS)


° The ECA approach in Europe was predicated on a number of factors not operative in the Mid-East.

- Europe was an area of paramount concern, now we profess worldwide economic responsibilities. Other regional areas have also been presidentially designated as high priority, e.g., Latin America (NSDM #257).
- Europe could create a reasonably harmonious regional organization (the OEC) for us to work with and through.
- The task was reconstruction, a far easier one than initial economic development.

Overall, it is not clear yet that the Mid-East nations have a common goal, other than pricing of oil. In fact, there are indications each nation has different goals.

° Some other comments:

- Development of new industries in the Mid-East without markets may bring import restrictions from other nations.
- It is important in the short run to see that our policies in each separate bilateral commission are consistent.



WILLIAM D. EBERLE  
Executive Director

Attachment

~~SECRET~~(GDS)





m

963

\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

OP IMMED /ROUTINE  
DE RUMAD #6736 3251125  
O R 211053Z NOV 74  
FM USIS/TEL AVIV

TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
NSC WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
USIS/LONDON  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 6736

USIAC  
USINFO FOR IOP/M, IPS, IRS, INE  
BEIRUT FOR VOA AND RAPA  
ROME FOR VOA  
GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL  
USINFO FOR PRESIDENT'S PARTY IMMEDIATE  
E O 11652: N/A  
SUBJ: MEDIA REACTION (229/74) 21 NOV 74

1. SUMMARY: UNDERSECRETARY SISCO'S CLARIFICATIONS

ON PLO AND PROSPECTS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST ARE MAJOR MEDIA TOPICS. MAARIV EDITORIAL DESCRIBES " TONGUE SLIPS" AND THEIR RETRACTIONS AS " MOST ORIGINAL POLITICAL TACTIC" WHICH SENIOR US OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN USING IN HANDLING PALESTINIAN SUBJECT. AL HAMISHMAR REPORTS FONHIN ALLON SAID THAT SISCO'S CLARIFICATION



\*\*\*\*\* W H S R C O M M E N T \*\*\*\*\*

ADANCE TEAM, JANKA

PSN:013750

PAGE 01

TOR:325/13:12Z

DTG:211053Z NOV 74

\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

SAVED HIM PROTEST TO STATE DEPARTMENT, DAVAR(ESHED) SAYS SADAT-FEISAL INTRANSIGENCE-- AND NOT ISRAELI SHORTSIGHTEDNESS-- OBSTRUCTED ISRAELI-JORDANIAN PEACE AGREEMENT, HAARETZ US CORRESPONDENT REPORTS: (A) ISRAEL WILL PROTEST SYRIAN BREACH OF PROMISE MADE TO DR. KISSINGER TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FROM ITS TERRITORY; AND (B) US IS CONCERNED THAT EGYPT MIGHT REFUSE TO OPEN CANAL BEFORE ADDITIONAL IDF WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI, HAARETZ AND MAARIV TALK ABOUT DIFFICULTIES IN US-ISRAEL ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS AND MENTION POSSIBILITY THAT FINANCE MINISTER RABINOWITZ'S XCHEDULED TRIP TO US MIGHT BE DELAYED. US-JAPANESE COMMUNIQUE RECEIVED WIDE COVERAGE ALL MEDIA; EMPHASIS ON AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE ON OYL AFFAIRS. PRESS AND RADIO HIGHLIGHT FONMIN ALLON'S APPEAL THAT US-USSR DETENT EXTEND TO MIDDLE EAST AS WELL. END SUMMARY.

2. UNDERSECRETARY SISCO'S CLARIFICATIONS ON PLO

(A) ALL MEDIA COMPARE SISCO'S CLARIFICATIONS ON PLO TO HIS ORIGINAL STATEMENT (USIA INTERVIEW). JERUSALEM POST AND DAVAR CORRESPONDENTS IN WASHINGTON CARRY SISCO'S REPLY TO THEIR QUESTIONS THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN US POLICY TOWARD PLO. ONE RADIO REPORTER REMARKED THAT BY MAKING ORIGINAL STATEMENT ON PLO, SISCO PLEASED THE PALESTINIANS KNOWING THAT HE CAN LATER MAKE CLARIFICATIONS THAT WILL SATISFY ISRAEL. (B) MAARIV EDITORIALIZES: " ON THE DELICATE AND COMPLEX SUBJECT OF PALESTINIANS, THE US HAS ADOPTED A MOST ORIGINAL POLITICAL TACTIC... SENIOR US OFFICIALS ARE FLOATING TRIAL BALLONS... THROUGH 'TONGUE SLIPS' AND RETRACTIONS... WE ARE VERY CONCERNED THAT ALL THESE 'MISUNDERSTANDINGS' AND 'TONGUE SLIPS' ARE NOT INCIDENTAL... BUT RATHER INTENDED... SISCO'S CLARIFICATION IS NOT ENOUGH... ISRAELI POLITICIANS SHOULD ACT TO PREVENT AN EROSION IN US POSITION ON PALESTINANS... (LEST) THE FREQUENT 'TONGUE SLIPS' ARE AIMED AT PAVING THE WAY FOR SUCH A CHANGE..." (C) AL HAMISHMAR WRITES: "... IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, FONMIN ALLON SAID THAT UNDER SECRETARY SISCO'S CLARIFICATION HEADED OFF A STRONG PROTEST TO STATE DEPARTMENT REGARDING SISCO'S (EARLIER) REMARKS ON THE PLO..." PAPER QUOTES ALLON: " I PREFER TO ACCEPT THE AMENDMENT AND (THEN) HOLD THE US TO THIS INTERPRETATION."

3. TERRORIST TARACKS

(A) HAARETZ US CORRESPONDENT (MARGALIT) REPORTS: "... FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE BY PDPFLP SPOKESMAN IN DAMASCUS... REGARDING THE ATTACK ON BEIT SHEAN, ISRAEL WILL PROTEST THE SYRIAN BREACH OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT... (THIS BREACH) IS IN CONTRADICTION TO THE PROMISE WHICH SYRIA MADE TO DR. KISSINGER TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FROM ITS TERRITORY..."





THIS WAS A SECRET PROMISE AND DR. KISSINGER NEVER ADMITTED THAT HE HAS RECEIVED SUCH A PROMISE..."

(B) JERUSALEM POST REPORTS: "JORDANIAN TROOPS WERE YESTERDAY STILL LAYING SEIGE TO THE VILLAGE OF ZAMILYE, NEAR THE ISRAELI BORDER FACING THE BEISAN (VALLEY), IN SEARCH FOR COLLABORATORS OF THE TERRORISTS WHO COMMITTED THE OUTRAGE IN BEIT SHEAN ON TUESDAY."

4. ISREALI- EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

HAARETZ (MARGALIT) WRITES: "...THERE IS INCREASED CONCERN IN THE US THAT EGYPT MIGHT INSIST ON AN ADDITIONAL IDF WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI BEFORE OPENING THE CANAL...KISSINGER PROMISED DINITZ LAST WEEK TO CLARIFY EGYPT'S POSITION... THE FOLLOWING PICTURE EMERGES: KISSINGER OBTAINED TWO PROMISES FROM EGYPT ( ISRAEL HAS ACCEPTED HIS METHOD OF OBTAINING PROMISES); (A) WHEN CANAL REOPENS, ISRAELI CARGOES WILL BE PERMITTED; AND (B) EGYPT WILL START CLEARING CANAL AND REHABILITATE ITS VILLAGES AFTER DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. EGYPT, HOWEVER, HAS NOT SPECIFIED A DATE FOR RE-OPENING CANAL... SOME ISRAELI SOURCES CLAIM THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEM INVOLVED OVER THIS ISSUE...(SINCE) CANAL WILL NOT BE READY FOR NAVIGATION BEFORE MARCH/ APRIL, 1975...ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SECOND PHASE OF WITHDRAWAL CAN START (BEFORE THEN) ...AS PRACTICAL IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED BEFORE THAT DATE ANY WAY..." WRITER RECALLS REMARK MADE BY AN ISRAELI ELEMENT ON POSSIBILITY THAT CANAL RE-OPENING AND IDF WITHDRAWAL WILL BE IMPLEMENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY.

5. ISRAELI-JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS

DAVAR (ESHED) DISAGREES " WITH THOSE WHO, SINCE ARAFAT MADE HIS DEBUT AT UNGA, HAVE BEEN FEELING SORRY OVER LOST OPPORTUNITIES TO CONCLUDE PEACE AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN." ESHED NOTES:"... THERE ARE THOSE WHO MOURN BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS NOT CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN...AND THERE ARE THOSE WHO MOURN BECAUSE OF ISRAEL'S LACK OF COOPERATION IN HELPING EMERGENCE OF LOCAL PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP...THEY BOTH FORGET THE BASIC ASSUMPTION.. THAT NO ARAB ELEMENT IS CAPABLE OF DETACHING ITSELF FROM THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD, NO MATTER HOW WEAK ITS CONNECTIONS ARE WITH ARAB COUNTRIES...AND CONCLUDE A SEPARATE ARRANGEMENT WITH ISRAEL.. HUSSEIN'S HOPES TO RECOVER THE WEST BANK WERE DIMMED BY EGYPT-FEISAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW HUSSEIN'S MANDATE ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION...FEISAL'S POSITON ON JERUSALEM OBSTRUCTED CHANCES FOR SEPARATE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS...IT IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR FEISAL TO RECOVER JERUSALEM...THAN TO OBSTRUCT SOVIET PENETRATION INTO THE AREA...UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE FOR ISRAEL...ASIDE FROM CAUTIOUS MOVEMENT IN ITS (SIMULTANEOUS) CONFRONTATION WITH THE ARAB WORLD...STAEF-BY-STEP UNTIL THE PROBLEMS ARE RESOLVED...THERE WILL BE NO DECISION ON THE PALESTINIAN-



\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

JORDANIAN ISSUE...BEFORE ADDITIONAL PROGRESS ON THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN FRONT IS MADE..."

6. PRESIDNET FORD'S TALKS IN JAPAN; US-USSR SUMMIT  
ALL MEDIA HIGHLIGHTED FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS REPORTS  
ON PRESIDENT'S TALKS IN JAPAN AND TEXT OF US-JAPANESE COMMUNIQUE.  
IN AN APPEAL AIMED AT FORTHCOMING SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS AT  
VLADIVOSTOK, FONMIN ALLON REPORTEDLY URGED FORD AND BREZHNEV  
TO EXTEND THEIR 'DETENTE' TO MIDDLE EAST AS WELL. ALLON SAID  
THAT ISRAEL SUPPORTS REAL AND HONEST DETENTE THAT WOULD COVER ALL  
PARTS OF THE WORLD NOT ONLY US, USSR AND EUROPE.

7. US-ISRAELI ECONOMIC TALKS  
MAARIV REPORTS: "...FINANCE MINISTER RABINOWITZ'S SCHEDULED  
TRIP TO US MIGHT BE POSTPONED UNLESS AMERICANS COME UP WITH  
NEW PROPOSALS THAT WOULD RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH ERUPTED  
INT EH TALKS...TREASURY SOURCES CONFIRMED THAT DIFFICULTIES EXIST  
OVER A NUMBER OF CLAUSES...INCLUDING US ASSISTANCE IN SENDING  
GRAINS AND FINANCING ISRAELI PURCHASES IN US.

MOSS  
BT



\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

OP IMMED  
 DE WTE #3992 2091840  
 O 281833Z JUL 75  
 FM JACK MARSH

Determined to be an administrative marking  
 Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and  
 Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983

By            ~~RMD~~ NARA date 1/14/82

TO DICK CHENEY (WARSAW)

~~SECRET~~ WH51350

JULY 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY  
 FROM: JACK MARSH

JUST PRIOR TO LEAVING, THE PRESIDENT TALKED ON THE PHONE WITH  
 SENATOR CASE IN REFERENCE TO THE ARMS SALES TO JORDAN.

IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD GET BACK TO CASE WITH GUIDANCE ON  
 MONDAY, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE MET.

I SUGGEST YOU COMMUNICATE WITH BRENT AND GET BACK TO ME AT  
 EARLIEST INASMUCH AS WE HAVE HAD INQUIREIES FROM THE SENATOR  
 TODAY ON THIS MATTER.

0100





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Determined to be an administrative marking  
Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and  
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983

July 28, 1975

By BJD-NARA date 1/4/86

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY

FROM: JACK MARSH *Jack*

Just prior to leaving, the President talked on the phone with Senator Case in reference to the arms sales to Jordan.

It was agreed that we would get back to Case with guidance on Monday, before the Committee met.

I suggest you communicate with Brent and get back to me at earliest inasmuch as we have had inquiries from the Senator today on this matter.

~~SECRET~~



OP IMMED  
 DE WTE #3995 2092117  
 O 282120Z JUL 75  
 FM JACK MARSH

Determined to be an administrative marking  
 Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and  
 Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983

By ~~DAO~~ NARE date 1/1/86

TO DICK CHENEY (WARSAW)

~~SECRET~~ WH51353

JULY 28, 1975

FROM: JACK MARSH

TO: DICK CHENEY

YOU CAN DISREGARD MY REQUEST FOR AN ANSWER FOR SENATOR CASE,  
 I HAVE FOUND OUT WHAT I NEEDED TO KNOW.

0061



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

JOHN O. MARSH

*RKW for John*

FROM:

VERN LOEN *VL*

SUBJECT:

Congressional Visit with President  
Sadat on August 9, 1975

It was my privilege to take detailed notes on an hour-long meeting between President Sadat and eight Members of Congress at Mr. Sadat's Mediterranean Coastal retreat on the above date. Participating members were Sen. Dale Bumpers, D-Ark.; and Reps. William J. Randall, D-Ark.; Ralph S. Regula, R-Ohio; Marvin Esch, R-Mich.; Roy A. Taylor, D-N.C.; Edwin Eschleman and William Goodling, both R.-Pa. and Robert Eckhardt, D.-Texas.

President Sadat responded candidly to questions posed by each Member. Being aware of the delicate negotiations underway, each Member was extremely careful to pose his question tactfully and with the understanding none was there to negotiate--simply to develop facts in their roles as voting Members of Congress. Mr. Sadat's responses, which were taped, follow:

"My main concern is peace. Ours is a backward country. I want to concentrate on our plan for economic development to the year 2000. Go ahead and inspect our military facilities. Those airplane dugouts cost 150,000 pounds apiece. This is wasteful.

"Israel exhibits belligerency toward Egypt. With peace, all will be very bright.

"I discussed our problems with President Ford at Salzburg. I asked the help of the U.S. and its allies, especially in regard to our need for liquidity.

"President Ford is a straightforward, honest man. It has been a new era since November, 1973, when I first met Secretary Kissinger.





"Egypt represents between 1/3 and 1/2 of the Arab World. You have more interests in the hands of the Arabs than the Israelis. They must be convinced to take the road to peace, stop their military buildup. I'm not afraid of peace -- Israel is afraid of peace. There can be no war without Egypt.

SOVIET ROLE: "The Soviets still misunderstand why I sent their experts out of the country in July, 1972, resulting in a cutoff of Soviet military aid. In 1974 we decided to diversify our arms sources. I am not worried about economic aid. The time may come when I ask for arms from the United States -- will you agree to sell me arms? (No answer from Congressmen.)

"I shall always fight to be independent, but please don't worsen my position with the Soviets. Ninety per cent of my arms are Russian. Therefore, the Soviets still provide air training personnel; then they leave.

U. S. ROLE: "After the '67 war we had confrontation with you because of the ugly face of Lyndon Johnson. President Ford & Dr. Kissinger now show the real face of America as a big brother--not a world policeman.

REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACE: "Israel should withdraw from our lands occupied after the '67 war. For 27 years the Israeli propaganda says Arabs say no to everything--not for peace.

"I declared publicly that I was ready for peace with Israel in 1971. This is the turning point right now. I started by opening the Suez Canal and releasing the refugees.

"After 27 years of belligerency, hatred, violence and blood, we cannot normalize relationships in a month. They can't start shopping in Cairo tomorrow. Let's try in our generation. End the present atmosphere formally. This will lead to other steps.

"Israel is using our land as a wedge for bargaining. I tell them they must withdraw--they are negotiating every inch.

"As much as Israel is suspicious, we are suspicious, too. We also want guarantees. Israel is hesitant and confused. They should withdraw from the Sinai. Let the United States and USSR or Security Council give us guarantees.

"If Israel gives back my lands, we will negotiate at Geneva under auspices of the two superpowers. They started three of the four wars. There must be a reciprocal approach.

"Israel is afraid of peace because of weak leadership, weak government.

It is playing for time, looking to the U.S. elections next year. They expect the U.S. to take no major foreign policy action in 1976, as is your custom in an election year."

- - - - -

Afterwards, President Sadat posed obligingly for individual photographs, even with junior staff members. The Egyptians hosted a luncheon on a veranda overlooking the beach. Transportation for the two-hour journey from Cairo was provided by means of two Russian-built transports that are part of the Egyptian Air Force.

On the evening of August 8, the Congressional delegation, accompanied by staff, held a similar discussion in Cairo with members of the People's Assembly, led by the deputy Speaker.

Ambassador Eilts was in the United States on his peace mission. Mrs. Eilts hosted a reception on August 9 at their home (guest list of 240 attached).

SUMMARY: It was the guarded concensus of the Congressmen that President Sadat is a genuine, straightforward world leader of imposing stature. They were most reassured by his candid views and expressed desire for peace, in contrast to the carefully orchestrated Israeli propaganda approach and the stolidly militant aura of that nation. However, I doubt that many of them will be very vocal in their assessments for fear of the Jewish reaction back home.

cc: Max Friedersdorf  
Les Janka  
Don Ogilvie (OMB)



RECEPTION AT THE RESIDENCE OF AMBASSADOR & MRS. ELITS

In honor of the Honorable John M. Maury  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs  
and Members of the Congressional Delegation

Saturday, August 9, 1975 - 7:30 to 9:30 p.m.

Host and Hostess

The Honorable John M. Maury  
The Honorable Dale Bumpers and Mrs. Bumpers  
The Honorable William J. Randall and Mrs. Randall  
~~The Honorable George H. Brown and Mrs. Brown~~  
The Honorable Ralph S. Regula and Mrs. Regula  
The Honorable Marvin Esch and Mrs. Esch  
The Honorable Roy A. Taylor and Mrs. Taylor  
The Honorable Edwin Eschleman and Mrs. Eschleman  
The Honorable William F. Goodling and Mrs. Goodling  
The Honorable Robert Eckhardt and Mrs. Eckhardt  
~~The Honorable James O. Eastman~~

Mr. Michael Finlay  
Mr. Michael Van Dusen  
Mr. Peter Collins  
Mr. Vernon Loen  
Ms. Mildred Ward  
Miss Nancy Berg  
Mr. Donald Sanders  
Col. Charles Hammond  
Mrs. Nancy Wooldridge  
Lt. Col. Michael Rhode  
Lt. Col. Charles Wollerton  
Lt. Col. Keith K. Hunt  
Mr. William Rosemund

Diplomatic Missions

His Excellency the Ambassador of Canada and Mrs. Touchette  
His Excellency the Ambassador of Federal Germany and Mrs. Steltzer  
His Excellency the Ambassador of Great Britain and Lady Adams  
Ambassador and Mrs. Wee Don Chang; - Consul General of South Korea  
His Excellency the Ambassador of Spain and Mrs. Alabart





The Presidency

Mr. Tahsin Beshir - Controller General of the Press

The People's Assembly

His Excellency the Speaker and Mrs. Marei  
 Dr. and Mrs. Gamal El Oteifi - Deputy Speaker  
 Dr. and Mrs. El Sayed Ali El Sayed - Deputy Speaker  
 Mr. and Mrs. Moheb Stino - Chairman, Industry and Power Committee  
 Mr. and Mrs. El Hussein Abdel Rahman - Chairman, Public Utilities Committee  
 Mr. and Mrs. Moustafa Kamel Mouned - Chairman, Economic Committee  
 Mr. and Mrs. Ahmed Fouad - Chairman, Planning & Budget Committee  
 Mr. and Mrs. Abdel Fattah Moustafa - Chief of Protocol  
 General and Mrs. Abdel Kerim Darwish - (Dr. Laila Takia - Member, Education and Scientific Research Committee)

The Foreign Relations Committee

Mr. and Mrs. Zakaria Loutfi Gornas - Chairman  
 Mr. and Mrs. Mohie El Din El Shazly  
 Mr. and Mrs. Mansour Mohamed Hassan  
 Mr. and Mrs. Safwat Mohie El Din  
 Mr. and Mrs. Ahmed El Demerdash Tount  
 Dr. and Mrs. Roushdi Said

The Arab Socialist Union

Dr. and Mrs. Rifaat El Mahgoub - First Secretary  
 Dr. Zeinab El Sobki - Secretariat for Women's Affairs

The Arab League

Dr. and Mrs. Sayed Nofal - Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs  
 Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed Selim El Yehia - Assistant Secretary for Information  
 Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed Wahid El Din El Dall - Director, Arab Affairs Dept.  
 Mr. and Mrs. Abdel Raouf El Ridi - Organizations Dept.

Suez Canal Authority

Mr. and Mrs. Mashhour Ahmed Mashhour - Director  
 Mr. and Mrs. Ali Mahmoud - Deputy Director  
 Mr. and Mrs. Adel Ezzat - Director, Engineering Dept.



Ministry of Economy & Economic Cooperation

His Excellency the Minister of Economy & Economic Cooperation and Mrs. Shafiq  
Dr. and Mrs. Ahmed Effat - Coordinator for U. S. Assistance to Egypt  
Mr. and Mrs. Gamal El Nazer - Undersecretary  
Mr. and Mrs. Wagih Shindi - Undersecretary  
Dr. and Mrs. Zaki Aboul Nasr - Chief of Cabinet to the Minister  
Dr. and Mrs. Hamed El Sayeh - Chairman, National Bank  
Mr. and Mrs. Fouad Sultan - President, Misr-Iran Bank  
Mr. and Mrs. Abdel Moneim El Basma - Deputy Governor, Central Bank  
Mr. and Mrs. Bahir Onsi - Deputy Chairman, Arab-African Bank  
Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed El Barbari - Director General, Foreign Department

Ministry of Finance

His Excellency the Minister of Finance and Mrs. Abu Ismail

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Mohamed Riad, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador and Mrs. Mahmoud Abdel Ghaffar - First Undersecretary  
Ambassador and Mrs. Gamal Mansour - Undersecretary  
Dr. and Mrs. Ossama El Baz - Chief of Cabinet to the Minister  
Mr. and Mrs. Hisham Amer - Counselor, Minister's Office  
Dr. and Mrs. Mounir Zahran - First Secretary, Minister's Office  
Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed El Baradei - Second Secretary, Minister's Office  
Mr. and Mrs. Esmat Abdel Halim - First Secretary, USA Desk  
Mr. Ibrahim El Shuweini - First Secretary, USA Desk

Ministry of Petroleum

Mr. and Mrs. Selim Rizkallah - Undersecretary

Ministry of Transport

Mr. and Mrs. Mahmoud Kamel Moragi - Chairman, General Egyptian Railways  
Authority

Ministry of War Production

Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed Abdel Fattah - Chairman, General Organization for  
Military Factories & Aviation Industries  
Dr. and Mrs. Ahmed Salem Mohamed - Director, General Egyptian Organization  
for Military Factories & Aviation Industries



Ministry of War

Major General and Mrs. Mohamed Khalil - Assistant to the Minister  
Mr. and Mrs. Hassan Ahmed El Kateb - Official Military Spokesman  
Lt. General and Mrs. Mohamed Ali Fahmy - Chief of Staff, ARE Armed Forces  
Major General and Mrs. Hassan El Geady - Chief of Operations  
Vice Admiral and Mrs. Fouad Zikri - Commander, ARE Naval Forces  
Air Vice Marshal and Mrs. Mahmoud Shaker Abdel Moneim - Commander, ARE  
Air Forces  
Lt. General and Mrs. Helmi Afifi - Commander, Air Defense Forces  
Major General and Mrs. Ibrahim Fouad Nassar - Director, Military Intelligence Dept  
Major General and Mrs. M. H. Shawkat - Deputy Director, Military Intelligence Dept.  
Brigadier General and Mrs. El Mo'taz E. Hah Safa - Chief, Military Attaches Branch  
Capt. and Mrs. Mohamed Mortada El Tawal - Assistant, Military Attaches Branch  
Squadron Leader and Mrs. A. Ashraf - Director, Aircraft Clearances, Military  
Attaches Branch

Rear Admiral and Mrs. Aly Osman - Deputy Commander, ARE Naval Forces  
Rear Admiral and Mrs. Farouk El Sheik  
Rear Admiral and Mrs. Hussein Assem Fawzy

Major General and Mrs. Moustafa H. El Samal  
Major General and Mrs. Fawzi Abdel Fattah

Air Vice Marshal and Mrs. N. Nabih El Housseiny  
Air Vice Marshal and Mrs. Badie Waffar M. Gabra

Egyptian Press

Mr. and Mrs. Ali Hamdi El Gammal - Editor in Chief, Al Ahram  
Mr. and Mrs. Hamdi Fouad - Director, Diplomatic Section, Al Ahram  
Mr. and Mrs. Mohsen Mohamed - Editor in Chief, Al Gomhouria  
Mr. and Mrs. Galal El Hamamsi - Editor in Chief, Al Akhbar  
Miss Maha Abdel Fattah - Diplomatic Correspondent, Al Akhbar  
Mr. and Mrs. Fomel Labib - Managing Editor, Al Nassawar

Cairo American College

Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Kennedy - Superintendent

American University

Dr. and Mrs. Frank Blanning - Dean of Students  
Dr. and Mrs. Thomas Lamont





### American Firms in Cairo

Mr. and Mrs. Guenter Neubert - Chase Manhattan Bank  
Mr. and Mrs. J. T. Schulenberg - Chevron Oil Co. of Egypt  
Mr. and Mrs. John Goodridge - First National City Bank  
Mr. and Mrs. D. B. Wilkie - Director, FUPCO  
Mr. and Mrs. Donald Spielman - Mobil Oil Egypt  
Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed Aboul Ezz - Mobil Exploration

### Foreign Press

Miss Libby Bassett - ABC  
Mr. Gordon Martin - BBC  
Mr. and Mrs. John Sheehan - CBS  
Mr. and Mrs. Abdallah Schleifer - NBC  
Mr. and Mrs. Wilton Wynn - Time Magazine  
Mr. Maurice Guindi - UPI

### American Embassy

The Honorable Frank E. Maestroni and Mrs. Maestroni  
Mr. and Mrs. Bryce M. Gerlach  
Mr. and Mrs. Howard Russell  
Brigadier General and Mrs. LeRoy W. Svendsen  
Capt. and Mrs. Peter Block  
Col. and Mrs. William Graham  
Col. and Mrs. William Dolan  
Mr. Wilbert Templeton  
Mr. and Mrs. Edward Peck  
Mr. and Mrs. John Craig  
Miss April Glaspie  
Mr. Whitley Bruner  
Mr. Thomas Murphy  
Mr. and Mrs. D. Ford Brown

TOTAL: 240



Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted materials. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to these materials.

# U.S. Experts 'Starkly Wrong' About '73 Mideast War Data

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. intelligence experts were "starkly wrong" about the imminence of the 1973 war in the Middle East that led to the Arab oil boycott, the House intelligence committee disclosed yesterday.

By then, Cline testified, "My staff and I had concluded that hostilities probably were imminent" and drew up a draft memo to that effect. He said he asked that Kissinger be notified "that we had reached this conclusion" but learned later that night that the State Department secretariat, and

before Oct. 6, "failed to turn up any official statement from any office or committee responsible for producing finished, analytical intelligence which contributed anything resembling a warning" as such.

The study found that "instead of warnings, the Com-

by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In addition, Cline said under the so-called "detente" treaties, the Soviet Union was obligated to consult with the United States on threats to peace.

Rep. Morgan F. Murphy (Ill.) said he thought this "pretty dangerous situation."



# Kissinger, Aides Hit on 1973 War

United Press International

A former intelligence official says he tried to tell Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that war in the Middle East was imminent in 1973 but Kissinger aides

pendents from Egypt and Syria two days before the attack. Other evidence before the committee indicated the Defense Intelligence Agency correctly predicted the attack three days in ad-

ed channels of communication that existed under President Richard M. Nixon and Kissinger, who was — and still is — both Secretary of State and the President's chief national

row sphere." He recommended no one man should be allowed to hold both Kissinger's jobs simultaneously.

Cline, a professional intelligence man for 30

# Signs of 1973 Mideast War Eluded U.S. Spy Agencies

By **NICHOLAS M. HORROCK**  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11—The United States intelligence community acknowledges that it failed to predict the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and that several intelligence agencies even predicted that there would be no war only hours before the hostilities broke out, according to a secret report made public today.

The report represents the first public admission by the intelligence agencies that they failed to warn of the war. On Oct. 30, 1973, however, Ameri-

can intelligence was extensive across the canal and in the Golan Heights area."

The report of the committee, which is charged with advising the National Security Council on war and critical situations, went on to note, "It is possible that the Egyptians or Syrians, particularly the latter, may have been preparing a raid or other small-scale action."

The committee met, its report said, at "0900 on 6 October 1973," which was a few hours before the attack.

In an intelligence summary dated the same day but presumably prepared the night

The report maintained that "certain substantive preconceptions (deletion) turned the analyst's attention principally toward political indications that the Arabs were bent on finding non-violent means to achieve their objectives and away from indications (mainly military) to the contrary."

Maj. Gen. Howard P. Smith, an Air Force officer in charge of the Pentagon agency's analytical section, said that three analysts had been transferred as a result of the failure.

The material from the secret report was made public today.

The committee has sought first by letter and later by subpoena, materials given to Presidents Johnson and Nixon on four major recent crises, including the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the 1968 Communist Tet offensive in South Vietnam, the Cyprus crisis and the recent revolution in Portugal.

Representative Otis G. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk County and the committee chairman, complained today that the Administration had been unwilling or slow to respond to the committee's requests. "All we have

# What's News—

*World-Wide*

No U.S. intelligence agency unequivocally predicted the October 1973 Mideast war, the House Intelligence Committee was told. However, the ex-director of the State



OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

---

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE  
OF  
JOSEPH J. SISCO  
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE BRIEFING ROOM

5:20 P.M. EST

MR. NESSEN: As promised, we have Joe Sisco, the Under Secretary of State, to give you a report not only on today's meeting, but since we didn't have anything on Sunday, Joe is going back over the entire visit and catch you up on the entire visit as well as today's specific meeting.

Q Is this on the record?

MR. NESSEN: Yes.

Q Was it true he thought Chicago was the greatest city in America?

MR. SISCO: I might say that we were all impressed, I am saying this on the record, Peter, for obvious reasons, because you are I are native Chicagoans, but it was an impressive show that Mayor Daley put on. It was impressive in every respect.

Let me just make a few brief observations and then open the floor to questions.

The two Presidents held their final meeting here a moment ago, as you know, after having held meetings earlier in the week here in Washington and likewise in Jacksonville.

We consider the visit of President Sadat as important, timely and very useful. First of all, I think the visit strengthened the close personal rapport that was established between the two Presidents initially at their meetings in Salzburg.

MORE

Secondly, we believe the visit gave President Sadat an opportunity to see and know our country and our people better and vice versa, and, therefore, we believe that as a result of the visit country-wide, the opportunity given to the President to address the Joint Session of Congress today, this has contributed to greater understanding between the two Governments.

Third, I would say that the principal focus of the discussions between the two Presidents was on the simple question of where we go from here in the Middle Eastern diplomacy. I think it is fair to say that both Governments feel it is important that the process of peace continue with respect to the Middle East and, therefore, there was a substantial amount of the discussion focused on the diplomatic aspects.

On our part, we reaffirmed that we are prepared to undertake a serious effort to see whether we can get negotiations started between Syria and Israel. Secondly, we reaffirmed also our intention to continue consultations looking towards the possibility of a renewal of a Geneva Conference. And, third, as indicated by the Secretary of State in his statement before the UN General Assembly, we are also, and continue to be, prepared to explore any other informal meetings to get the process of peace moving once again in the aftermath of the recent Egyptian-Israeli Agreement and while the implementation process of that agreement goes on.

A fourth aspect of the visit, we feel that the visit and the talks contributed to a strengthening of the bilateral relationships between the United States and Egypt and in broadening the areas of cooperation between the two Governments. I would cite, in particular, the agreements that were signed earlier in the week -- a health cooperation agreement, a P.L. 480 agreement, an agreement on a museum exhibition, and an agreement on avoiding double taxation between the two countries and today's initialing by the respective Foreign Ministers of an agreement in principle in the areas of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

As most of you know, the agreement initialed today is expected to cover cooperation in the fields pertaining to peaceful uses of atomic energy, including design and construction and operation, research and power reactors. I will not go into the details because I think that the statement put out today is self-evident and a full explanation in and of itself.

I will take any questions now.

MORE

Q Mr. Sisco, why was there no joint communique issued?

MR. SISCO: This question has been asked. I would not candidly attach any significance whatsoever to no joint communique having been issued. We felt and they felt that in view of the number of public statements made by everybody concerned, in view of the fact that the concrete results have all been signed on the basis of the specific agreements that I indicated to you, including the one initialed today, that really primarily what had to be said had really been said either in public statements or in the various announcements. So I would not read any kind of hidden designs that there were any contemplated or expected difficulties with writing a communique. Really, all of you have the concrete results.

Q Could I follow that up by asking -- you referred to public statements and there have been some public statements that are a little confusing in that President Sadat before he came here said he was going to ask the U.S. for arms. Today, and most recently, he said, "I did not come here asking for anything."

What was the situation and what was the response?

MR. SISCO: I think I can answer that very quickly, Marilyn. President Sadat indicated he was not coming here with any shopping list. That is the fact of the matter.

The question of arms was discussed in a general way. I think most of you are familiar with what President Sadat has said publicly insofar as his situation is concerned with respect to arms. He has said it in various interviews. That principally was the focus of the discussion on arms. There were no specific commitments made and there was no specific shopping list to address ourselves to.

Q Was there a general agreement to study the matter, or how would you phrase that?

MR. SISCO: I would not go beyond what I had to say, Marilyn, other than there was a general discussion of this and no specific commitments were made.

Q Well, sir, I would ask you without offending you what the President's response was and whether you could project for us the continuing dialogue on arms?

MR. SISCO: Well, we have said publicly on a number of occasions that we expected a general discussion of this question to take place. It did.

MORE



We also said even before the visit, and as I am saying after the visit, that no specific commitments have been made. However, obviously this is an issue that in time will have to be addressed and we have said this heretofore. I am not adding anything new but this is really basically where it stands.

Q About the atomic reactor, what about that? Will they be getting other supplies and atomic energy from France and other places?

MR. SISCO: The question is will they be getting other supplies or other reactors. As you know, what was initiated today was an agreement in principle to cooperate in the field and as part of this cooperation initially what is involved are two power reactors not to exceed in total 1,200 megawatts. That is really what is involved under stringent safeguards.

What was initialed today, you should understand, is not actually the agreement. It was really the framework or the setting down of the principles on which a detailed agreement would be signed. It is largely the framework and I think it is important for me to make that point so that there will be no confusion because discussions with respect to the detailed agreement would have to continue.

Q Has President Ford accepted in principle President Sadat's invitation to visit Egypt, and what is the outlook for such a visit?

MR. SISCO: Well, there isn't anything concrete on that with respect to any specific date. I know that the two Presidents agreed that they would remain in very close contact over the coming weeks and months, but there is nothing specific on any plans.

Q Does that mean that President Ford has not accepted the invitation?

MR. SISCO: I think there has been and is an interest on the part of the President with respect to a possible visit to Egypt, but the point I am making is that nothing specific was agreed to in this regard.

Q There were points of conflict between the two Presidents. President Ford spoke out against the anti-Zionism resolution in the United Nations and President Sadat said some things anti-Jewish and anti-Zion at the National Press Club. Also President Sadat spoke rather intensively on several occasions about support for the Palestinians -- in some cases he mentioned the PLO and in some he didn't. President Ford pointed out what the U.S. policy was about the PLO and its position.

How do they resolve these things, or what do they say about them that you can tell us?

MORE

MR. SISCO: Well, first of all with respect to the Zionism matter, I think each side's view is very clear in this regard. You noticed, for example, that President Sadat said in his address before the Congress that there are matters on which views are going to agree or converge and there are other matters where this is not the case.

With respect to the position on Zionism as reflected at the UN, I think you are very clear as to what position Egypt has adopted and what position we have adopted.

With respect to the second part of your question, the question of the Palestinians, I don't think I can really add to what President Sadat had to say to the Congress. It was very clear as to the nature of the appeal that he made.

As far as our position is concerned, one, we have always said that in any durable peace the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians would have to be taken into account.

Insofar as the question of the actual participation of the PLO at any conference, again you know what our position has been. We have felt and continue to feel that the inhibiting factor here is that the PLO has failed to acknowledge and recognize Security Council Resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist.

So what it amounts to is that in this regard the Egyptian view is clear and so is the U.S. view and our policy has remained unchanged.

MORE

Q I have two questions. First of all, was it understood at the outset of the talks that there would be no communique or was that decided during the visit?

And my second question is, what concrete steps are in the making on the American side in order to further any Israeli-Syrian accord?

MR. SISCO: We had considered tentatively the question of whether a communique had to be issued but we left it open right from the beginning for determination in the course of the talks and we mutually agreed there was really no need for a communique based on this since we have put out the essential results.

I want to be very categoric. We then didn't even address the specifics in any communique and I want to be very clear that the fact that no communique was issued is not to be taken that we started the process and that some huff or some difference arose. We didn't do that.

Let me take the second part of the question. With respect to the on-going efforts to achieve negotiations, we are going to review the situation now at the State Department in the light of these talks. As part of that, we have called back our Ambassador from Damascus and we will, as part of that internal consultation, begin -- today is Wednesday, I think probably near the end of this week we will review the situation in the light of these talks.

Q What can you say about the efforts to arrange a meeting between President Ford and President Asad while the President is on his European trip?

MR. SISCO: There are no immediate plans for such a meeting and, Peter, I would not expect a meeting to take place.

Q Mr. Sisco, has the U.S. Government decided what position they will take on the Egyptian resolution in the General Assembly?

MR. SISCO: No, in fact I can't say that we have really studied the text. I gather that a resolution has been submitted in the last 24 hours. We will have to give that careful study.

Q Is that on Palestinians, too?

MR. SISCO: It is basically, Marilyn. I haven't seen the text but basically it is along the lines of what President Sadat indicated in his General Assembly speech. I understand it is a question of the Palestinians participating in a Geneva Conference "on equal footing." As I said, I haven't seen the text and we haven't studied it.

MORE

Q Given the American position on the Palestinians, why does that take study and consideration?

MR. SISCO: For one thing, I think it is pretty well for us to look at the text before one decides how one is going to vote, but obviously this text is going to be looked at from the point of view of what American policy is and I hope I have made what American policy is very clear in response to Joe Polakoff's question.

Q May I ask you another question about the Suez Canal and free transportation? Is there some statement on the part of Egypt on that?

MR. SISCO: She asked whether she could ask a question with respect to Israel cargoes going through the Suez Canal. My response is that, as all of you know, this question of Israel cargoes going through the Canal was part and parcel of the agreement signed between Egypt and Israel. That principle has been implemented, as you all know.

Q Mr. Sisco, would you take a question on another subject?

MR. SISCO: I have got my hands full and I would rather not get into anything else.

Q You wouldn't rule out that some general agreement was made on arms, and could you clarify that in any way?

MR. SISCO: I don't think I can be any more categorical than I was. I said, one, the nature of the discussions was general, and, secondly, I was categorical in saying no specific commitments were made. I can't be more categorical.

Q The question was asked if some general agreement was made and you said you would not go beyond your previous statement.

MR. SISCO: There is no general agreement and my answer is "no," if you read into what I said that I was trying to keep that open.

Q When do you expect Mr. Rabin to come to Washington?

MR. SISCO: I have no late information on that.

Q Did you discuss with Mr. Sadat the date of passage of another ship in the Canal?

MR. SISCO: No, this has not come up.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 5:35 P.M. EST)



Cong.

November 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF  
FROM: JACK MARSH

In reference to the recent action by the United Nations on the Zionist Resolution, do you suppose you could have your people take some soundings from Members, such as Buchanan, Fraser, Bingham, Rosenthal, Findley and their counterparts in the Senate, to see what the reaction is of those who have been strong U.N. backers to this action.

JOM/dl

