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Question: Mr. President, stories appeared in the press recently in reference to certain statements attributed to Counsellor Sonnenfeldt concerning a changing view on Administration policy in reference to Eastern Europe. Does this article reflect your view and if not, what if your attitude toward the Sonnenfeldt view?

Answer: First, the article does not express my view. I have not had an opportunity to study the more lengthy views which were contained in a cable summarizing ~~eastern~~ remarks of Mr. Sonnenfeldt and, in fact, I have been advised the article is not even an accurate expression of his views.

I can assure you, however, of my view in reference to the eastern nations of Europe and that view has not changed. It is also contrary to the views alleged to be Administration policy in the article.

I am not in favor of any type of political or other domination of Eastern Europe by the Soviets and so long as I am President that will not be the policy of this Administration.



As I have said, I have not reviewed all of the materials which have given rise to this article and inasmuch as I do not have that background, I have directed my advisors to review completely this ^{MATTER} subject and be prepared to report to me ~~on this matter more fully~~ when I return to Washington.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

Q: Mr. President, there have been news reports in recent days that senior officials of your Administration have urged a policy of encouraging the Soviet Union to take over Eastern Europe once and for all because such an "organic union" would lessen Soviet insecurity in that area and thereby promote stability. Is this your policy or do these reports presage a change in Administration policy? Do you support these views?

A: I have not read the purported statement, but that is not the issue. The issue is U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe.

Let me state what that policy is. The United States strongly supports the aspirations for freedom and national independence of peoples everywhere -- including Eastern Europe.

I have spoken out against attempts of any kind at domination or the establishment of spheres of influence by any power. That policy has been made an important part of formal diplomatic documents.

I have made official visits to several Eastern European countries and invited Eastern European leaders here in order to underscore that policy. The policy has not changed. It will not change. It is a policy we will pursue with patient persistence and from which we will not be deterred.

My record is clear -- it is a record I am proud of.



Q On another subject, are the demonstrations in Thailand going to affect the rate of U. S. withdrawal?

A No, I do not believe so. The Thai have asked us to leave within the next four months, and we have announced our intention to do so and to start immediately.

Q Has it started physically?

A I do not know whether anyone has physically left as of Saturday, but it is just a question of time. There is no question on any delay. They will move as soon as it is possible to start moving.

Q Is there any question of negotiations being reopened if a new government is appointed?

A Not as far as I know.

BEGIN

Q On another matter, a column by Evans and Novak this morning quotes Mr. Sonnenfeldt out of a meeting in December. Can we have the full record of those statements so that we can examine the context of them?

A No. I do not believe you can have a



full record of the comments. The columnists are referring to classified discussions that took place in London at the annual Chiefs of Mission Meeting -- that is, Ambassadors from European countries with the Secretary and other senior officials. So we are not able to provide a record of that.

Q Well then, are the quotations accurate?

A We are just not going to get into the business of commenting on reports which claim to be based on leaked documents. But I will say, Murrey, that the policy described in that column is not the policy of the United States toward Eastern Europe --

Q Was it what Mr. Sonnenfeldt said?

A There have been no statements made by Administration officials, either privately or publicly --

Q Go slower, Bob.

A -- actual or imputed -- that change our policy. We do not accept the domination of Eastern Europe by anybody. You recall that President Ford made



two visits to Eastern Europe with the Secretary of State. The Secretary made another visit himself. These visits demonstrate that we want friendly relations with the countries of Eastern Europe --

Q You're not helping us --

A This has been a longstanding policy.

Q You're not helping us much here because the column alleges that what Mr. Sonnenfeldt said was not consistent with U. S. policy. You are telling us that U. S. policy hasn't changed, so you're not really dealing with the thrust of the column at all.

A I do not agree with you, Murrey. I think the thrust of the column was suggesting that in some way the United States was acquiescing in the domination of Eastern Europe. I said categorically we do not accept the domination of Eastern Europe by anybody.

Q No. The thrust of the column was, I believe, if you will re-read it -- it was quoting Mr. Sonnenfeldt, and it was raising a question of whether the views that were attributed to him were consistent with U. S. policy. And that's the question



I'm asking you.

A I said that the policy described in that column is not the policy of the United States toward Eastern Europe.

Q I know.

A And I said there have been no statements by Administration officials -- and that includes Mr. Sonnenfeldt -- either public or private, actual or imputed, to change that policy.

Q Is that another way of saying that he was misquoted in that column?

A I think I will leave it the way I stated it.

Q Are you repudiating what's said in the column? I think you are.

A Yes.

Q But the column did not refer to domination of Eastern Europe. It spoke of an organic union.

Now, that's not domination.

A I am not going to go through the column sentence by sentence, but I think there was a thrust to the column. And I think I have stated



very clearly what our position is on the column.

Q I don't want to ask you to keep repeating what you've said, except to point out that you have not given us any comment on either side of whether the quotations attributed to the speaker are accurate quotations.

A As I said at the beginning, Murrey, I am not going to go into a line-by-line discussion of that column.

Q That's not what I'm asking you for. I asked you if the quotations were accurate or not.

A The policy described in the column, either in quotes or out of quotes, is not the policy of the United States towards Eastern Europe.

Q Bob, you said --

Q Is this the first time --

Q -- this is the first time a statement by a State Department officer has ever been made to that effect?

Q Does that cover the remarks that Sonnenfeldt might have made at London?

A Yes. I said including Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

Q At London in that meeting?




Q Any place.

Q Or even repudiating --

Q Wait a minute.

[Cont'd on pg. B-1.]



Q Are you reputing what Mr. Sonnenfeldt said, or are you reputing the column's interpretation of what he said?

Q What you actually said, Bob, as I understand it, is there have been no statements by Administration officials, either privately or publicly, that change our policy.

Do you mean that to say that Sonnenfeldt did not suggest any change in the policy?


A I am not suggesting that he suggested any change.

Q How about Ozzie's question?

Q I asked whether you were reputing the column's interpretation of what Sonnenfeldt said or if you were repudiating what he said.

A I do not think I want to get into that sort of a detailed discussion of this column, because in general I am saying that the policy described is not the policy of the United States; and I have said that there has been nothing said by Administration officials that suggests any change in our policy.

Q Is this the first time in your knowledge that this policy described in this article has been repudiated?



A I think it has been consistent U.S. policy that we do not accept the domination or hegemony of anybody in Eastern Europe. And I think the whole thrust of our policy with Eastern Europe supports that.

Q But what you are repudiating is your interpretation of that column; namely, that the United States is acquiescing -- you say the domination of Eastern Europe; whereas, I believe the general interpretation of that column is different, that there is talk there of accepting an organic union between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which is really quite different from accepting domination. Now, are you repudiating that too?

A I am not going to go beyond what I have said. I am not going to get drawn into commenting on the column in its detail of what is in quotation marks or what isn't in quotation marks--how one person may interpret or how another person interprets. I think from what I have said there is a clear understanding of how we stand on the general outline of the column.

Q Was Sonnenfeldt in this case reprimanded



or repudiated for these views?

A Why? In the first place, you are assuming that it is an accurate account of his views.

Q Has Mr. Sonnenfeldt said whether or not it is an accurate account? The quotes themselves.

A I consulted with Mr. Sonnenfeldt in preparing my briefing this morning.

Q And he said the quotes were not accurate?

A I said I was not going to get into commenting on whether quotes that purport to be based on leaked documents are accurate or inaccurate.

Q Bob, in the past when it serves your purposes you do not shrink from saying that a quoted statement, leaked or not, is accurate or inaccurate or taken out of context. Why are you shrinking from doing so now?

A I do not think I have.

Q You say you have repudiated it.

A I think if you look back over your notes --

Q Going back to what Ozzie said, you didn't have any difficulty attacking a column by Safire on the Secretary and the Kurds in which you characterized the whole column, which included a quote as I recall, as



being a distortion, and so forth.

A I do not recall commenting on a specific quoted sentence. But rather I think in general we comment on the general thrust of a column, and in particular, one that purports to be based on leaked documents.

Q Bob, would you accept that the thrust of this column is that we should acquiesce in even more domination than already exists, in which we already do acquiesce?

A I think you will have to ask Mr. Evans and Mr. Novak for the interpretation of what they mean by what they have written.

Q Can we get it straight whether you are repudiating (a) the column, or/and (b) Sonnenfeldt?

A Well, (b) we are not in any way repudiating Mr. Sonnenfeldt. There is nothing I have said today that should suggest that. And (a), yes we are repudiating the column. And I think it is clear from everything I have said about it. *end*

Q On another subject, Bob, we have been given to understand that the Secretary was intending to travel to Moscow probably in mid-March as the next



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FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO: DICK CHENEY

INFO:

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EXDIS For Ambassador
E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ECON, PFOR

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy toward USSR and Eastern Europe

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By W/H/m, NARA, Date 11/28/00

1. Following is a non-verbatim summary of the Counselor's discussion of this subject to the EUR Chiefs of Mission Meeting in London in mid-December. It is intended for your background guidance and that of your senior staff and is not to be used directly in your talks with host government.
2. Begin summary. We are witnessing the emergence of the Soviet Union as a super power on a global scale. This will be a long-term process. It is a process that is just beginning in global terms as the Soviets are just now breaking out of their continental mold. They are just now developing modalities for carrying out such a global policy.
3. The reason why it is possible for the United States and its Western European Allies to develop the policies that will allow us to cope with this situation is that Soviet power is developing irregularly. It is subject to flaws and to requirements which in some cases only the outside world can meet.
4. Their thrust as an imperial power comes at a time well after that period when the last imperial power, Germany, made the plunge, and it hence comes at a time when different rules and perceptions apply. The Soviets have been inept. They have not been able to bring the attractions that past imperial powers brought to their conquests. They have not brought the ideological, legal, cultural, architectural, organizational and other values and skills that characterized the British, French and German adventures.
5. In addition, there are serious underlying pressures and tensions in the Soviet system itself. The base from which imperialism asserts itself has serious problems in the economic and social sectors. There are also internal nationalist groups which are growing. Non-Russian nationalist groups in Russia are growing at a disproportionately faster rate, which will add to these tensions in the base whence springs Soviet imperialism.

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6. The Soviets have been particularly unskilled in building viable international structures. They have nothing approaching the European Community or the many other successful Western institutions. In Eastern Europe particularly, the single most important unifying force is the presence of sheer Soviet military power. There has been no development of a more viable, organic structure. If anything, the last thirty years have intensified the urges in Eastern European countries for autonomy, for identity. There has been an intensification of the desire to break out of the Soviet straitjacket. This has happened in every Eastern European country to one degree or another. There are almost no genuine friends of the Soviets left in Eastern Europe, except possibly Bulgaria.

7. The Soviets' inability to acquire loyalty in Eastern Europe is an unfortunate historical failure because Eastern Europe is within their scope and area of natural interest. It is doubly tragic that in this area of vital interest and crucial importance it has not been possible for the Soviet Union to establish roots of interest that go beyond sheer power.

8. It is, therefore, important to remember that the main, if not the only, instrument of Soviet imperialism has been power.

9. The reason we can today talk and think in terms of dealing with Soviet imperialism, outside of and in addition to simple confrontation, is precisely because Soviet power is emerging in such a flawed way. This gives us the time to develop and to react. There is no way to prevent the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower. What we can do is affect the way in which that power is developed and used. Not only can we balance it in the traditional sense but we can affect its usage -- and that is what detente is all about.

10. It is often asked how detente is doing. The question itself evades the central issue we are trying to pose. That is, what do you do in the face of increasing Soviet power? We will be facing this increased power if our relationship with the Russians is sweet or our relationship with the Russians is sour. The day when the U. S. could choose its preferences from two alternatives is over: that is, turning our back on the world - usually behind the protection of another power like the British Navy - or changing the world. That choice no longer exists for us. There is too much power in the world for us to ignore, not just the Soviets, but other industrial powers, raw material producers, and even the combined political power of the dwarf states. Nor do we today have enough power to simply overwhelm these problems.



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11. So the Soviets will be seen and heard on the world stage no matter what we do. Therefore, the question of whether or not detente is up or down at a particular moment is largely irrelevant. We Americans like to keep score cards. But the historic challenge of the Soviet Union will not go away and the problem of coping with the effects of that growing Soviet power also won't go away. We don't have any alternative except to come to grips with the various forms of power which surround us in the world. We have to get away from seeing detente as a process which appeases or propitiates Soviet power. We have to see our task as managing or domesticating this power. That is our central problem in the years ahead, not finding agreements to sign or atmospheres to improve, although those have some effect. Our challenge is how to live in a world with another super power, and anticipate the arrival of a third super power, China, in twenty years or so.

12. The debate in the United States on detente is illustrated by comments that Soviet trade is a one-way street. It seems that today you can't just get payment for the goods you sell -- you must get Jewish emigration, or arms restraint, or any number of other things.

13. Our European friends have extended considerable credit to the Soviets and Eastern European countries, while the US does not extend lines of credit but rather approves financing on the basis of each project. That feature gives us some control over the direction of Soviet economic development. The Europeans have surrendered on this point. While not falling into the trade trap, we have seen trade as a set of instrumentalities to address the set of problems we face with the Soviets. We have to find a way to develop a coherent trade strategy that goes beyond the commercial views of individual firms.

14. The grain agreement is a good but narrow example of what I am talking about. The Soviets were forced to accept that they need substantial imports from the United States. That gives us leverage, but only if it is done within a coherent framework of policies to achieve certain objectives. MFN has been considered a concession to the USSR, and in a sense it is. The Soviets don't like paying interest -- they prefer to earn their way as they go. If this is an accurate assessment, then with MFN and credit policies we can get the USSR to be competitively engaged in our US markets. If done skillfully, this forces them to meet the requirements of the sophisticated US market. MFN entry into US markets can have an impact on Soviet behavior. This is not a trivial matter.

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15. It is in our long-term interests to use these strengths to break down the autarkic nature of the USSR. There are consumer choices being made in the USSR that, although more below the surface than those in the United States, can be exploited. This is just one illustration. There are many assets in the West in this area and instead of looking at them as just commercial sales, we need to be using them to draw the Soviet Union into a series of dependencies and ties with the West. It is a long-term project.

✓ 16. When we lost the MFN battle with Congress, we lost our ability to impose a degree of discipline on the Soviet Union as we were able to do in the case of the grain deal. This is the real tragedy of losing that trade issue. In the long-term, we have suffered a setback.

✓ 17. With regard to Eastern Europe, it must be in our long-term interest to influence events in this area -- because of the present unnatural relationship with the Soviet Union -- so that they will not sooner or later explode, causing WW III. This inorganic, unnatural relationship is a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West. There is one qualification to this statement. If Western Europe becomes so concerned with its economic and social problems that an imbalance develops, then perhaps the dangers to the United States' interests will be endangered by the simple change in the balance of power.

✓ 18. So, it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one. Any excess of zeal on our part is bound to produce results that could reverse the desired process for a period of time, even though the process would remain inevitable within the next 100 years. But, of course, for us that is too long a time to wait.

19. So, our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence. This has worked in Poland. The Poles have been able to overcome their romantic political inclinations which led to their disasters in the past. They have been skillful in developing a policy that is satisfying their needs for a national identity without arousing Soviet reactions. It is a long process.

20. A similar process is now going on in Hungary. Janos Kadar's performance has been remarkable in finding ways which are acceptable to the Soviet Union which develop Hungarian roots and the natural aspirations of the people. He has conducted a number of experiments in the social and economic areas. To a large degree he has been able to do this because the

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Soviets have four divisions in Hungary and, therefore, have not been overly concerned. He has skillfully used their presence as a security blanket for the Soviets, in a way that has been advantageous to the development of his own country.

21. The Romanian picture is different as one would expect from their different history. The Romanians have striven for autonomy but they have been less daring and innovative in their domestic systems. They remain among the most rigid countries in the internal organization of their system.

22. We seek to influence the emergence of the Soviet imperial power by making the base more natural and organic so that it will not remain founded in sheer power alone. But there is no alternative open to us other than that of influencing the way Soviet power is used.

23. Finally, on Yugoslavia. We and the Western Europeans, indeed the Eastern Europeans as well, have an interest which borders on the vital for us in continuing the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet domination. Of course we accept that Yugoslav behavior will continue to be, as it has been in the past, influenced and constrained by Soviet power, but any shift back by Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit would represent a major strategic set-back for the West. So we are concerned about what will happen when Tito disappears, and it is worrying us a good deal.

24. So our basic policy continues to be that which we have pursued since 1948-49, keeping Yugoslavia in a position of substantial independence from the Soviet Union. Now at the same time we would like them to be less obnoxious, and we should allow them to get away with very little. We should especially disabuse them of any notion that our interest in their relative independence is greater than their own and, therefore, they have a free ride. End summary.

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MARCH 26, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM: JACK MARSH

IN REFERENCE TO SUBJECT WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING, I ADD THE FOLLOWING:

--MYRON KUROPAS, BAROODY'S SHOP, REPORTS THE ETHNIC GROUP OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS REPRODUCED AND MAILED THE EVANS-NOVAK COLUMN TO ETHNIC LEADERS AND ETHNIC PRESS. THIS IS TO TIE IN WITH A MEETING OF ETHNIC LEADERS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE THIS WEEKEND TO DISCUSS PLATFORM ISSUES.

--JERRY HAS TALKED WITH BRYCE WHO ADVISES;

1. THIS CAN BE A MAJOR ISSUE AND POSSIBLY ACCELERATE WITHIN THE NEXT 12 HOURS.
2. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT BRING IT UP ON HIS OWN BUT SHOULD RESPOND TO A QUESTION.
3. STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD COME OUT HARD, FAST AND KNOCK DOWN THE WASHINGTON POST STORY AS BEING INACCURATE AND CONTRARY TO UNITED STATES POLICY.

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Determined to be an administrative marking
Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983

By ADD NARS date 1/18/86

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NNNN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 26, 1976

FOR: Jack Marsh

FROM: Myron B. Kuropas *MK*

THRU: William J. Baroody, Jr. *(B)*

SUBJECT: The Evans-Novak Article of March 22: A Damage Survey and Recommendations

As you are aware, the Evans and Novak article which appeared in the Washington Post on March 22 wherein State Department counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt is alleged to have argued on behalf of an "organic union" in Eastern Europe, caused a furor in a number of ethnic communities. I have heard directly from Latvian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Lithuanian leaders and it is my understanding that an ethnic meeting of representatives of the Czechoslovak National Council, the Coordinating Committee of Hungarian Organizations in North America and the Joint Baltic American Committee met last night to discuss the article and to plan a strategy to voice their protests.

In addition:

- 1) Andrew Valuchek, Special Assistant to the Chairman for Ethnic Affairs, mailed the article to his ethnic contacts for discussion in Providence, Rhode Island this weekend when the Democratic Platform Committee will be in session to develop, among other things, their ethnic posture.
- 2) Congressman Edward Derwinski, Chairman of the Republican Heritage Groups Council, met with the Secretary of State on Thursday. The Congressman was most unhappy with Dr. Kissinger's responses.

FOR: Jack Marsh
Page 2

3) Mr. Aloysius Mazewski, President of the Polish National Alliance of the U. S. A, has sent a letter to President Ford condemning the Sonnenfeldt position. Other letters can be expected from the Hungarians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Ukrainians.

4) The Joint Baltic American Committee condemned the position in a letter to me dated March 26. (See attachment).

In my view, Administration efforts to assuage the Eastern European ethnic leadership after Helsinki (see attached letter to Estonians as example) have been undermined by the Sonnenfeldt position which has also resulted in certain international implications. (See attached Washington Post article.)

The Administration, it seems, needs to take immediate steps to stem what could be a growing tide of resentment.

Our recommendations are as follows:

- 1) The President discuss the Sonnenfeldt position and disavow it as totally non-representative of American foreign policy. The stronger the form of the disavowal, the better.
- 2) The President meet with Leonid Pliusch, a Soviet dissident, when he comes to Washington to testify before the Congressional Subcommittee.
- 3) Consideration be given to the President giving his support to H. R. 9466, a bill which would establish a Commission to monitor the Helsinki Agreement.

THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE

POST OFFICE BOX 432
ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20850
U. S. A.

THE ESTONIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL
THE AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION
IN THE UNITED STATES, INC.
THE LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL, INC.

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 301
340-1954

March 26, 1976

Dr. Myron Kuropas
Special Assistant to the President
for Ethnic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C., 20500

Dear Dr. Kuropas,

Enclosed you will find a copy of the Evans-Novak article "A Soviet-East European Organic Union," which appeared March 22nd, 1976, in the Washington Post.


We were shocked to read that a high administration official such as State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt feels that United States policy must "strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one."

The Joint Baltic American Committee would be most appreciative, if you would look into these remarks attributed to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, and clarify this entire unfortunate disclosure by columnist Robert Novak.


We would like to know, whether Mr. Sonnenfeldt, in fact, made the remarks attributed to him, and whether these remarks represent his own personal views, or represent a new official United States policy toward the Eastern European governments.

We would also appreciate a clarification of whether Mr. Sonnenfeldt's briefing to the United States ambassadors of European nations was, in fact, a directive to implement the policy of "Soviet-East European Organic Union."

Dr. Kuropas, it is very disturbing to the Baltic-American communities in the United States to read these types of articles attributed to "high government officials. To clear up this matter, and to alleviate the fears of the thousands of American citizens who read this article, we hope your response is prompt and reassuring that Mr. Sonnenfeldt's doctrine is not the policy of the United States.


Gunars Meierovics, Chairman
Joint Baltic American Committee


Edward J. Sumanas
Public Relations Director


John E. Genys, Ph.D.
Lithuanian American Council, Inc.


Maldo Kari
Estonian American National Council

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1976


TO AMERICANS OF ESTONIAN ANCESTRY:

I am delighted to accept the high honor of Honorary Patron of ESTO '76 -- The Estonian Salute to America's Bicentennial.

As we celebrate the birth of freedom in America, your Estonian Festival calls attention to the remarkable contributions of millions of talented and hard-working immigrants from all over the world to building America into the great nation we know today.

In recalling the fortitude of our founding fathers, we must also rededicate ourselves to making America the same stronghold for men and women of individual spirit and energy it was in 1776 -- the cradle of liberty.

I am keenly aware of your great anxiety concerning your homeland, families and friends who have been and are still profoundly affected by East - West political developments in Europe. Last summer, just before departing for Helsinki, and before that in February of 1975, I met with your leaders to discuss these concerns and to emphasize that the accord I would sign in Helsinki was neither a treaty nor a legally binding document.



The Helsinki agreements, I pointed out, were political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.

I further stated that your understandable concern about the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic nations was groundless.

I can assure you that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and is not doing so now. Our official policy of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.

* It is the policy of the United States -- and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life -- to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe by every proper and peaceful means.

Finally, I indicated that there is included in the Declaration of Principles on Territorial Integrity the provision that no occupation or acquisition of territory in violation of international law will be recognized as legal.

In our White House meeting, I said this is not to raise the hope that there will be any immediate change in the map of Europe, but rather to emphasize that the United States has not abandoned and will not compromise this long-standing principle.

At the conference itself, I told the participants from the countries of the East that:

"We will spare no effort to ease tensions and to solve problems between us, but it is important that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their government to human rights and fundamental freedoms."

I assure each of you that this nation will be vigilant regarding detente. This nation will strive to maintain a safer and saner relationship with our competitors. At the same time, the relaxation of tensions can be implemented only on the basis of mutual concessions within the context of an American defense that is second to none. We will safeguard and advance our vital interests and security.

As we commemorate the 200th anniversary of our revolution, more and more Americans are mindful of their bi-national heritage. In this regard, I was especially pleased to learn that your community is preparing for a worldwide Estonian Festival in conjunction with our Bicentennial.

Your contributions to this nation are recognized and appreciated. I know you will continue to enrich our country's heritage with your art, your architecture, your music and the individual contributions of your many talented individuals.

I commend you for your continued contributions to our national legacy, to our durable system of representative government. Today, I salute you for your struggle on behalf of all human freedom.

Ronald R. Ford

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 26, 1976

FOR: Jack Marsh *JM*
FROM: Myron B. Kuropas *MC*
THRU: William J. Baroody, Jr. *(B)*
SUBJECT: The Evans-Novak Article of March 22: A Damage Survey and Recommendations

As you are aware, the Evans and Novak article which appeared in the Washington Post on March 22 wherein State Department counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt is alleged to have argued on behalf of an "organic union" in Eastern Europe, caused a furor in a number of ethnic communities. I have heard directly from Latvian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Lithmanian leaders and it is my understanding that an ethnic meeting of representatives of the Czechoslovak National Council, the Coordinating Committee of Hungarian Organizations in North America and the Joint Baltic American Committee met last night to discuss the article and to plan a strategy to voice their protests.

In addition:

- 1) Andrew Valuchek, Special Assistant to the Chairman for Ethnic Affairs, mailed the article to his ethnic contacts for discussion in Providence, Rhode Island this weekend when the Democratic Platform Committee will be in session to develop, among other things, their ethnic posture.
- 2) Congressman Edward Derwinski, Chairman of the Republican Heritage Groups Council, met with the Secretary of State on Thursday. The Congressman was most unhappy with Dr. Kissinger's responses.

FOR: Jack Marsh
Page 2

3) Mr. Aloysius Mazewski, President of the Polish National Alliance of the U. S. A, has sent a letter to President Ford condemning the Sonnenfeldt position. Other letters can be expected from the Hungarians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Ukrainians.

4) The Joint Baltic American Committee condemned the position in a letter to me dated March 26. (See attachment).

In my view, Administration efforts to assuage the Eastern European ethnic leadership after Helsinki (see attached letter to Estonians as example) have been undermined by the Sonnenfeldt position which has also resulted in certain international implications. (See attached Washington Post article.)

The Administration, it seems, needs to take immediate steps to stem what could be a growing tide of resentment.

Our recommendations are as follows:

- 1) The President discuss the Sonnenfeldt position and disavow it as totally non-representative of American foreign policy. The stronger the form of the disavowal, the better.**
 - 2) The President meet with Leonid Pliusch, a Soviet dissident, when he comes to Washington to testify before the Congressional Subcommittee.**
 - 3) Consideration be given to the President giving his support to H. R. 9466, a bill which would establish a Commission to monitor the Helsinki Agreement.**
-

THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE

POST OFFICE BOX 422
ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20850
U. S. A.

THE ESTONIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

THE AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION
IN THE UNITED STATES, INC.

THE LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL, INC.

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 301
740-1934

March 26, 1976

Dr. Myron Kuropas
Special Assistant to the President
for Ethnic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C., 20500

DEAR Dr. Kuropas,

Enclosed you will find a copy of the Evans-Novak article "A Soviet-East European Organic Union," which appeared March 22nd, 1976, in the Washington Post.


We were shocked to read that a high administration official such as State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt feels that United States policy must "strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one."


The Joint Baltic American Committee would be most appreciative, if you would let into these remarks attributed to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, and clarify this entire unfortunate disclosure by columnist Robert Novak.


We would like to know, whether Mr. Sonnenfeldt, in fact, made the remarks attributed to him, and whether these remarks represent his own personal views, or represent a new official United States policy toward the Eastern European governments.


We would also appreciate a clarification of whether Mr. Sonnenfeldt's briefing to the United States ambassadors of European nations was, in fact, a directive to implement the policy of "Soviet-East European Organic Union."

Dr. Kuropas, it is very disturbing to the Baltic-American communities in the United States to read these types of articles attributed to "high government officials. To clear up this matter, and to alleviate the fears of the thousands of American citizens who read this article, we hope your response is prompt and reassuring that Mr. Sonnenfeldt's doctrine is not the policy of the United States.


Guntars Velterovics, Chairman
Joint Baltic American Committee


Edward J. Stimanus
Public Relations Director


John E. Genys, Pres.
Lithuanian American Council, Inc.


Raudo Kari
Estonian American National Council

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1976

TO AMERICANS OF ESTONIAN ANCESTRY:

I am delighted to accept the high honor of Honorary Patron of ESTO '76 -- The Estonian Salute to America's Bicentennial.

As we celebrate the birth of freedom in America, your Estonian Festival calls attention to the remarkable contributions of millions of talented and hard-working immigrants from all over the world to building America into the great nation we know today.

In recalling the fortitude of our founding fathers, we must also rededicate ourselves to making America the same stronghold for men and women of individual spirit and energy it was in 1776 -- the cradle of liberty.

I am keenly aware of your great anxiety concerning your homeland, families and friends who have been and are still profoundly affected by East - West political developments in Europe. Last summer, just before departing for Helsinki, and before that in February of 1975, I met with your leaders to discuss these concerns and to emphasize that the accord I would sign in Helsinki was neither a treaty nor a legally binding document.

The Helsinki agreements, I pointed out, were political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.

I further stated that your understandable concern about the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic nations was groundless.

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Shirley R. Ford

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The importance of language, etc.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

A Soviet-East Europe 'Organic Union'

Intense debate was set off within the Ford administration three months ago when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's right-hand man declared in a secret briefing that permanent "organic" union between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is necessary to avoid World War III.

That policy, going well beyond any public position of the U.S. government, was announced in mid-December by State Department counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt. He told a London meeting of U.S. ambassadors to European nations that the "organic, unnatural relationship between Moscow and

the Soviet Union to establish roots of independence that go beyond sheer power."

After describing details as a means of affecting the use of Soviet power, Sonnenfeldt warned Eastern Europe's "present unnatural relationship with the Soviet Union" may "boom or later explode, causing World War III. This inorganic, unnatural relationship is a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West."

Sonnenfeldt cautioned that "any excess of zeal on our part" could reverse the "desired process" (the Soviet-East-

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, THERE HAVE BEEN NEWS REPORTS IN RECENT DAYS THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION HAVE URGED A POLICY OF ENCOURAGING THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE OVER EASTERN EUROPE ONCE AND FOR ALL BECAUSE SUCH AN "ORGANIC UNION" WOULD LESSEN SOVIET INSECURITY IN THAT AREA AND THEREBY PROMOTE STABILITY. IS THIS YOUR POLICY OR DO THESE REPORTS PRESAGE A CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION POLICY? DO YOU SUPPORT THESE VIEWS?

A: I HAVE NOT READ THE PURPORTED STATEMENT, BUT THAT IS NOT THE ISSUE.

LET ME STATE WHAT MY POLICY IS. FIRST, THE ARTICLE CLEARLY DOES NOT EXPRESS MY VIEW. IN FACT, I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THE ARTICLE IS VERY INACCURATE.

I CAN ASSURE YOU OF MY VIEW OF EASTERN EUROPE. THAT VIEW HAS NOT CHANGED, AND IT IS ALSO CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS ALLEGED TO BE ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN THE ARTICLE. THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE ASPIRATIONS FOR FREEDOM AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF PEOPLES EVERYWHERE -- INCLUDING EASTERN EUROPE.

I AM TOTALLY OPPOSED TO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE BY ANY POWER AND SO LONG AS I AM PRESIDENT THIS WILL BE THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS POLICY A PART OF FORMAL WRITTEN DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS.

I HAVE MADE OFFICIAL VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND INVITED EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS HERE TO UNDERScore THAT POLICY. IT IS A POLICY WE WILL PURSUE WITH PATIENT PERSISTENCE AND FROM WHICH WE WILL NOT WAIVER.

MY RECORD IS CLEAR -- IT IS A RECORD I AM PROUD OF.

Q: WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT SONNENFELDT?

A: I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT WHAT HAS BEEN REPORTED REPRESENTS MR. SONNENFELDT'S VIEWS. I HAVE ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO FIND OUT THE TRUE FACTS.

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