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The One Hundred BILLION DOLLAR Question...National Defense

The following is a speech before the D.C. League of Republican Women at The Mayflower Hotel in Washington, April 1976.

The speaker is Mr. Frank Barnett, President of National Strategy Information Center of New York City. Mr. Barnett is a former military government official in Berlin and Russian interpreter, a Rhodes Scholar, an author and Professor and an educational consultant to a Committee of The American Bar Association.

For seven years, Mr. Barnett served on the summer school faculty of the National War College, where he lectured to a special seminar on "DEFENSE STRATEGY" for senior reserve officers.

Mr. Barnett is speaking today  
on the topic --

"ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTE"




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Since this is a Republican club in a political town in an election year -- I should offer fair warning that my remarks may seem antipolitical. However, I hope to be evenhanded in my polemics, pleasing nobody. Infuriating everyone. Just for the record, I am by origin a Robert Taft Republican from Peoria, Illinois. But the text for my critique today is not from the works of Herbert Hoover. Rather, I preach the gospel according to "Hippy," wherein it is written... "Let it all hang out."

My topic is "ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTE."

Let me begin by setting forth Frank Barnett's "heresies." These heresies relate to national will and weaponry; for unless these are adequate all criticism of detente is academic.

Heresy Number One -- Many of the ways in which Americans are saluting the Bicentennial are theatrically shallow or commercially obscene. (Thank heaven a few programs, such as the "ADAMS CHRONICLES" on ETV, are ennobling.) Now, it is by no means amiss to celebrate the "way we were"... provided we take equal pains to safeguard the road ahead. In the political inventions of the founding fathers, we were richly endowed; and we can take fresh resolve from our heritage.



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But the urgent task is not to eulogize the past. Our real job is to initiate present action to insure that our great grandchildren may be able to enjoy a TRI-centennial with the social, legal and economic freedoms of American society still viable.

When we hear the firecrackers, this coming 4th of July, we might remember that fireworks are just for a day. The American Revolution wasn't won in a day, or even a year, 1776. It wasn't until seven years later, in 1783, that our Independence was finally codified in the Treaty of Paris. Today, we will need at least seven years to pay even the first installment on an insurance premium for the TRI-centennial.

Heresy Number Two. The Presidential election this fall could make a decisive difference in the means we use to solve domestic problems -- land use, energy, employment, busing, welfare. But when it comes to foreign and defense policies, the differences among the leading candidates are not really so wide as campaign rhetoric sometimes makes them appear. President Ford, a former Naval person, is scarcely "soft on defense"; he has battled Congress to get a higher budget for American arms.

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On the other hand, Governor Reagan, Senator Jackson or Governor Carter, if nominated and elected on their defense platforms, would each have the same difficulty in managing national security policies. Whoever is elected will have to deal with the military expansion of the Soviet empire, the "anti-Pentagon cult" among some staffs on Capitol Hill, the doubt about our nerve among allies and the "cultural death-wish" of various intellectuals who see nothing of value in America.

In an open society a President or Prime Minister can lead, but he cannot run counter to the passions and priorities of the people. In the 1930's, as the Nazi shadow fell over Europe, even so elegant a man as Winston Churchill was unable to rally Englishmen to adequate defense until after the brutal shock of Dunkirk. And, in our own case, almost 50% of the American people were isolationists until the day after Pearl Harbor. So, whoever sits in the White House next year, America will need a Citizens' Lobby for National Security that must reach from liberals like Eugene Rostow, John Roche and Pat Moynihan to conservatives like Bill Buckley, Joe Coors and John Connally, similar perhaps to the 1940 "William Allen White Committee", made up of Republicans & Democrats who gave public opinion battle to the isolationists prior to World War II.

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Americans didn't win the Revolution with a one-shot performance at the Concord Bridge, or even by enduring the entire winter at Valley Forge. And we are not going to cope with Soviet naval power, Arab oil weapons and Cuban commandos simply by electing a particular President, unless a broad coalition of Republicans and Democrats gives our President persistent public opinion support.

Third and last Heresy. Without national will we are sounding brass. But national will is not something manufactured by a few philosopher kings or manipulated by Madison Avenue. National will is a construct linked to our deepest values; and we all help strengthen it or weaken it. Recently, national will has been eroded just as surely by some Republicans as by Democrats, and by conservative businessmen as well as liberal journalists.

We complain that youth trashes cities, mugs our elderly and wears the American flag on the seat of its blue jeans. But who banished religious education and the study of civic virtue from the school systems? Not youth -- adults let it happen.

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Who imposes on the nerve-endings of youth a continuous bombardment of messages coded in demi-pornography and violence? Why, the lords of capitalist TV and Filmdom -- and amoral, avaricious advertising executives. Certain of the white knights of mass media also purvey political slander and government secrets, chiefly to boost circulation -- meanwhile pontificating that while a free society can criticize the Church, the White House and the Supreme Court, the noble press must be a law unto itself. (In Britain, which also reveres freedom, an Official Secrets Act obliges Journalists to join the ranks of responsible citizens.)

Some of our leading businessmen and bankers, whose salaries are well over \$100,000 per year, flock to Moscow as if they were penurious Austrian peasants beseeching the Czar for economic favors. It was George Meany and the American labor movement, not America's businessmen and lawyers, or the Republican White House, who gave Alexander Solzhenitsyn a forum for freedom in this country.

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While the Russians were making Angela Davis into a Communist Joan of Arc with their unceasing propaganda, Professor Kissinger allegedly advised President Ford not to "offend" Moscow by supporting the U.S. tradition of dissent against tyranny by honoring Solzhenitsyn. (More recently, one of Kissinger's deputies intellectually "reburied" the masses of Eastern Europe when he said that America might aid Russia in keeping "organic control" of restive non-communist peoples.)

With a few exceptions, American business leaders have been too busy, or too indifferent to the moral issue, to listen to Solzhenitsyn, a genuine hero of our times, not some plastic troubadour from a synthetic Camelot. But many American businessmen and bankers have been naively gratified to be asked to dinners in honor of Georgi Arbatov. (Arbatov is the Cardinal Richelieu of Soviet DISINFORMATION operations, a master of political warfare who poses as a "scholar" in charge of a Soviet "think-tank" on American affairs.) Arbatov whispers sly promises of peace and profit into eager capitalist ears, while Soviet marshals and admirals perfect their war-winning tools of conflict.

If we are going to revive American national will, Americans will have to be tougher, smarter and more principled than we have been so far in the 1970's.



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All of us -- outside of governments as well as inside --  
Republicans and Democrats alike.

After Angola, the U.S. may learn to take Brezhnev seriously when he openly proclaims that "peaceful coexistence" means solid support by Russia for wars of national liberation in the third world. That's not just rhetoric for the Russian homefront. Ideological struggle to the Leninist mind is not an empty abstraction...it means Soviet money, arms, airlift, subversion and the latest refinement, a foreign legion of Cubans. As Lenin might have put it: "One step backward in Egypt; two steps forward in mineral-rich South Africa; three steps forward with Soviet bases in Libya, Somalia and Iraq!"

Secretary of State Kissinger's historical dream of detente seems to have been that Washington, Moscow and perhaps Peking could forge a 20th century equivalent of the Holy Alliance to manage arms reduction, prevent nuclear war and cement diplomatic ties with trade and technology. Now, "Detente-Shock" has led to sharp attack on Secretary Kissinger, especially by presidential candidates.

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The Secretary has responded with a question, "What practical alternatives to detente do you propose...what level of confrontation would you actually sustain?" Secretary Kissinger's question is legitimate. It should open a much needed debate. But the subject is too important to be treated in slogans either by Secretary Kissinger or by his critics.

First of all, let us be clear that there are two quite different views of detente. To Americans, detente is an end in itself, a "live and let live" philosophy. To Moscow, detente is a means to gather advance technology from the West, plus a strategy-thru-time by which the Soviets hope to change the correlation of world forces. Is this speculation? Not at all. Some years ago the American Bar Association commissioned a group of scholars to read through 10,000 pages of Soviet literature...Party journals, resolutions at Party Congresses, speeches by Politburo leaders. From the 10,000 pages, the scholars were asked to abstract the Russian definition of "peaceful co-existence" as used in communist "in-house memoranda."

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Peaceful coexistence (in other words, "detente") means to the Soviet Union: restraints to avoid nuclear war between the super-powers, but, also a continuation of ideological war, class war, economic war and propaganda war as usual. And, very specifically Moscow-style detente includes support for "anti-imperialist wars of liberation."

To advance detente, it was argued by many in Washington that the U.S. had to offer "incentives without strings," to induce the USSR to behave peacefully. The premise was that, if America was open-handed, we could expect reciprocal favors from Brezhnev.

Let me recite briefly what favors Moscow has actually delivered. ONE. With masses of Soviet weaponry, the North Vietnamese finally realized Ho Chi Minh's ambitions by marching into Saigon in 1975, burying peace with honor, weakening U.S. credibility throughout Asia, and (one would suppose) somewhat dimming the luster of Henry Kissinger's Nobel Peace Prize.

TWO. In the fall of '73, Brezhnev ignored his promise to cooperate with the United States in managing the Mid-East crisis. Some of the 2,000 Russian technicians in Egypt knew perfectly well the Yom Kippur war was coming. But no word was sent by Moscow to Secretary Kissinger. When the Egyptians and Syrians launched surprise attack, Moscow radio exhorted other Arab states to join in and press for victory.

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Moscow also incited Arab leaders to intensify the oil embargo. Detente was nowhere to be seen in the oil politics and desert battles of the Mid-East.

THREE. In Angola, the new Czars in Moscow brushed off Secretary Kissinger's pleas and threats, and skillfully projected raw Russian and Cuban power into Africa. Brezhnev now boasts the 20th century equivalent of Queen Victoria's Navy. With that four-ocean Navy and his Cuban "Gurkhas," Brezhnev can indulge himself openly in saltwater imperialism, even though we are told that ours is the era of "negotiation."

FOUR. We almost lost Portugal, a NATO ally, when the Russians provided an estimated 50 million dollars to pay the wages of Communist cadres who organized leftist trade unions, peasant co-ops and street commandos. While Congress tied the hands of the CIA, fortunately West European Socialists helped the non-Communists in Lisbon to recover. But the "class war" continues. That's Russian-style detente.

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Secretary Kissinger has occasionally implied that if detente evaporates, nuclear war cannot be far behind. But surely this is a simplistic and misleading dichotomy, fit more for a politico than a Harvard professor. We have survived many more years of cold war struggle with the Soviet Union than years of detente. And the Cold War, after all, never turned nuclear. Surely there is a middle ground between shipping grain on credit (plus turning our back on Solzhenitsyn) and shooting missiles.

Further, we need not abandon some forms of cooperation with the Russians, provided we recognize the limits of rhetoric in altering Moscow's avowed policy of ideological-war-as-usual. That means U.S. diplomacy based on an immediate quid for present quo, plus self-enforcing agreements that do not depend on Soviet good-will. For example, we might trade American food and technology (what the Russians want) for Communist political restraint and genuine progress towards balanced arms and troop reductions (the things we want). Or, since the Russians have oil, gold and chrome, (which we need)...why not barter for these goods instead of selling our grain and technology to Russia on credit? In short, we should insist on "trade-offs" rather than offer U.S. largesse in the vague hope Russia will be enmeshed in a web of decent behavior.

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"Who is enmeshing whom?"...is a fair question to put to Professor Kissinger.

Let's turn for a moment to the military balance, inside which context "detente" is taking place. Many Americans are aghast at the 112 billion dollar defense budget for 1977. Perhaps, if Americans knew the Russians were spending the equivalent of 130 billion dollars, they would be less critical of the Pentagon. It is a paradox that during the crisis-torn days of the Cold War the Soviets spent only 9% of their gross national product on military power. Today, in an era of "peace and negotiation," Moscow is spending at least 14% of Russia's GNP on military might.

Owing to Congressional budget cuts, inflation and the high pay we must offer to attract men to the voluntary services, the United States has actually been disinvesting in defense for at least 5 years. Since Fiscal - '71, our real defense resources have been reduced by 45 billion dollars, an average of 9 billion dollars per year.

How does that translate into reality on the field of battle?

Let me give you an example. In the theater of our "blue chip" alliance - NATO - the military balance is as follows:

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The Soviet side, that is to say the Warsaw Pact forces, out-guns NATO 3-to-1 in tanks, 2-to-1 in infantry, 2-to-1 in tactical air, 4-to-1 in artillery. The numbers all favor the Russian side although, in some categories of military technology, we still have advantages.

Now admittedly the overall military balance is complex. The Russians are ahead in total numbers of missile launchers, throw-weight, overall submarine strength and tank production. On the other hand, the United States is still ahead in accuracy of missiles, sheer number of warheads and aircraft carriers. Some people say we're "number two"; other people say we're "second to none" or we have "sufficiency." What no American expert disputes is the trend. Our last three Secretaries of Defense -- Mr. Laird, Dr. Schlesinger, Mr. Rumsfeld -- have all warned us that our military power is declining vis-a-vis Soviet war-fighting preparation.

Let me give you one final set of statistics. At the strategic nuclear level, the Russians now have 1618 ICBMs, while we have 1054. The Russian advantage in launchers is partially offset by the fact that we have nearly 3 times as many warheads as do the Russians.

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On the other hand, the Russians by 1980 will have four times the lifting power or missile "throw-weight"; and, since, under SALT, it is perfectly permissible for both sides to improve accuracy, by the beginning of the '80s, the Russians could well have more warheads, more megatonnage and equal accuracy. In other words they might then achieve a first-strike capability - i.e., be capable of killing our own missiles in their silos, obliterating our bombers on the ground and destroying perhaps 1/3 of our submarines in port on repair docks.

Now Secretary Kissinger has posed the question "What after all, is the meaning of strategic superiority? What do you do with it?" Well, if the Soviets clearly become "number one" in strategic weaponry by 1980, it doesn't mean inevitable atomic war. It need not imply a sudden strike out of the blue by Moscow. But it could well mean that Moscow in the '80s will then more effectively project its conventional power and its guerrilla forces all over the world, precisely because Russian nuclear "superiority" would paralyze the West into inaction at lower levels of defense.

Lebanon is a case history. Are there any lessons for the United States in this protracted tragedy in the Eastern end of the Mediterranean? It's probably too early to tell, and there may be too many "hidden scenarios" that only future historians will reveal.



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So I set forth this view purely as a hypothesis, chiefly in the hope it will be refuted.

My pessimistic premise is that future historians may point to Lebanon (even more than Angola) as revealing the decline of U.S. power. Why? Turn back the clock of history to 1958. Lebanon, a friend and ally of the United States, was then threatened by left-wing insurrection. But, in 1958, President Eisenhower simply sent a message to the Sixth Fleet Commander, "Save our Friends." The Sixth Fleet Commander landed a task force of American Marines on the beaches near Beirut. And the coup effort stopped instantly! As a matter of fact, there were no casualties. Our Marines didn't fire a shot. Why? Behind the Marines on the beaches was the unchallengable and awesome power of the Sixth Fleet, for there was virtually no Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean in 1958. And behind the Sixth Fleet was an American nuclear advantage of about 8 to 1.

What has happened? 1976, our year of a proud Bicentennial, sees American civilization celebrating its heritage which includes what scholars call the "Judeo-Christian tradition."

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Today in the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, Christians are being slaughtered in the streets of Lebanon, and Israel is threatened with a possible "new front" situation. Hence, one would think that a mighty republic, the United States, revering the Judeo-Christian tradition, might pay some attention to Lebanon in 1976 as she did in 1958 when we saved it.

Now, one can argue that it's simply moral indifference, isolationism or worry about reopening the wounds of Vietnam that keeps our politicians from saying anything about Lebanon. But isn't it interesting that politicians from both parties, who flock to prayer breakfasts on every occasion, have not even discussed this issue of a "religious war"? One of the reasons may be that the military balance has so changed. If the Sixth Fleet Commander in 1976, tried to repeat the Eisenhower scenario of 1958, he would discover, of course, that the American Fleet in the Mediterranean is shadowed by Soviet submarines and partly vulnerable to land-based Soviet aircraft. Today, an American Admiral might find that a Soviet helicopter carrier would be capable of landing Russian marines on the shores of Lebanon!

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Finally, instead of the nuclear balance being 8-to-1 in our favor, as in 1958, we are now no better off than "parity," and possibly the balance is 3-to-2 against us.

That's what you do with strategic superiority! You neutralize the capability of an adversary to use conventional force to intervene. The option that Ike had, of using a low-cost, no casualty weapon system, a landing of Marines, is not in our inventory today. (At least, it's not an "easy" option.)

So much for an audit of detente.

Are there any feasible alternatives? Yes, but they will require that Americans stop being "sentimental" and utopian in their thinking about world affairs. Number One. Despite the firing of the oil weapon in 1973, Americans really don't want to regard United States agriculture as a "strategic" asset. But we may have to overcome our reluctance to turn a humanitarian resource to political ends if our adversaries continue to conduct a raw material war against us.

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Both the Russians and the Chinese now encourage 3rd World nations to mobilize "mineral and resource" weapons against the United States and our allies in Japan and Western Europe. If this irresponsible counsel is followed, we are not without recourse to protect ourselves. After all the United States, Canada and Argentina dominate the food export market as surely as OPEC controls the oil market.

Russia needs American feed-grains. Moscow's very modest herds of cattle must be expanded if the Russian people are to get the meat they have been promised by their leaders.

For the United States to hold back on feed-grain exports would force Soviet leaders to choose between "A", depriving restless Russian consumers of meat, because all major Communist resources were committed to war production, or, "B", feeding Russian people at the cost of cutting Soviet military investment and even demobilizing Russian soldiers to work inefficient farms.

But American farmers and their Congressmen, you will say, will buck at losing the Russian market.

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Well, to insure national security, to show our serious intent over Soviet covert aggression in Portugal, Somalia and Angola, the U.S. Government could buy the export part of our crop, store it in a food bank and sell it to friends at fair prices, or even give it to China and Pakistan.

Since we are spending a hundred billion dollars on military defense against the Russians, an additional three billion dollars for "preclusive buying" of grain, and setting up a strategic food reserve, might be a useful additional investment, even an insurance policy. The fool lever, moreover, should not be applied only against the Soviet Union but, in crises, it could be used to redress the balance with all those countries who threaten to form raw material cartels to pressure the United States to alter its foreign policy, suspend aid to Israel, and destroy our resource base.

If we don't at least plan a "food strategy" for the resource war we did not start, we have only ourselves to blame for the out-come. We have on the books the Export Control Act of 1949 & 1969. The machinery of controlling "what goes to whom" is already there.

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Hopefully, we will never be driven to actually implement such unpleasant measures. Quite possibly, the prospect that America might employ economic warfare in her own defense could have a salutary effect on the behavior of those who now think any political attack on the United States is a "no-risk" game to themselves.

A second alternative to detente -- a new alliance of free world Naval powers to counter the Soviet Union's growing four-ocean Navy. This would not be a mere "joint maneuver" of ships and planes, but the creation of a consortium of bases, ports, production facilities, logistic programs and countries. The old SEATO and SENTO are dead, and even NATO is ailing. But there are new potentials. We know who our friends are in the oil-bearing lands of the East: Iran, Saudi Arabia, most of the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, Indonesia. They are "defense-minded" as we are; and in some instances they fear attack from the same enemies who threaten us. The oil lifeline from the Persian Gulf to the U.S., the Common Market and Japan is a 3 trillion dollar asset that should justify a working Naval alliance based on common interests all the way from Britain clear to Japan.

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In the Pacific, as well as in the Mid-East, a similar potential is waiting to be energized. There is an association of Southeast Asian nations -- ASEAN -- and an Asian and Pacific Council -- ASPAC. ASEAN includes Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. ASPAC includes these five plus Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. Altogether, this is a formidable power bloc. Not military, but with enough economic and political clout to give pause to any aggressor if properly linked to our Persian Gulf and European allies. And so, why should we not contemplate the need for a Pacific/Indian Ocean Defense Agreement, or PIODA? PIODA would be the "energy and naval alliance" for the era of energy scarcity. PIODA would aim to neutralize the Soviet-sponsored "resource war" backed by Russian sea power.

A third alternative to present "detente" policy: Washington could increase our tilt towards Mainland China. Internally, Chinese Communism is no more savory than the Soviet brand. (As a matter of fact, there are many who argue persuasively that the iron discipline and regimentation of the Chinese people are in many respects worse than the Soviet Union's.)

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But, the Peoples' Republic of China (Peking) does not menace the U.S. militarily. Red China has no ICBMs, no far-flung Navy. Its Army does not threaten American friends and allies in the Middle East or Africa; and so we should "tilt towards China."

Can we rely on the Chinese? Only history will tell. But the answer is "possibly." Not because Peking likes us, but because Peking's leaders are genuinely afraid of Soviet nuclear strikes against China. Peking's leadership needs at least a demi-alliance with the United States to create uncertainty in Moscow about U.S. reactions to war between China and Russia.

But what about Taiwan and our commitment to our old friends there? Peking seems in no hurry to ingest Taiwan. For now, Peking's security needs take first call. American support is far more valuable to Peking as a counter to Soviet aggression than possession of the outlying province of Taiwan. It's a safe bet that our increased leaning toward the Chinese Communists need not in any way impair our loyalty to staunch friends on Taiwan or compromise our continued protection of the Chinese Nationalists.



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Indeed why simply accept the status quo when we might promote a more lasting settlement of the "two Chinas" problem. For this we have not only the precedent developed by Willy Brandt for bringing the two Germany's closer together, but some of the principles both Chinas share in common. Since both Peking and Taipei agree there is but one China, why should we not invoke the Willy Brandt solution for divided Germany? That solution was "one nation, two states."

It worked! Ten years ago East Germany and West Germany refused absolutely to recognize each other and traded the same sort of polemics Taiwan and Mainland China now hurl at each other. Today the two Germanys have agreed to live and let live. Why? Because of the formula "one nation, two states!!" It's the kind of semantic invention that works if both parties have solid reason for wanting it to.

Finally, let me repeat that no alternative to detente can be implemented without a regeneration of American will.

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This includes a moratorium on parading our guilt complexes before the entire world. We must say "Hold!" "Enough!" to quixotic fishing expeditions into the U.S. intelligence community, and any further Congressional dismantling of American military power.

We've investigated the CIA and the DIA and the FBI and the NSA. Isn't it perhaps time that we took a comparative look at the growing activity of the GRU and the KGB? For the KGB today is a new, much more sophisticated animal than it was under Stalin, (and the GRU is an efficient "acquisitive" animal, scrounging everywhere for technical and industrial data). If Congress is reluctant to inquire into the GRU and KGB, why not create a Blue-Ribbon Citizens' Committee to investigate the activities of Soviet intelligence here and in Western Europe, Japan and Latin America? Hearings might be held in London, Paris, Tokyo and Rio over the next 18 months. A stream of Soviet defectors could detail the bizarre and macabre tale of Soviet espionage, dirty tricks and murderous felonies. Alexander Solzhenitsyn could be asked to testify.

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Western experts like Robert Conquest and John Baron who have authored excellent books in the field might add their evidence. Literally hundreds of Russian and East European exiles are well acquainted with KGB operations against human freedom. (Their case histories of KGB activity would also give the American press something to wring its hands over other than Watergate.)

Let me in this context speak a word for CIA and the principle of "covert operations." Covert operations, after all, are a low-cost, low-casualty weapon system. If you persuade by propaganda you may not have to use napalm. Now, even if we preserve the strategic balance, the President of the United States certainly needs options between landing the Marines (which might risk escalation) and letting Soviet proxies commit unopposed aggression as in Angola. Covert actions in the arena of propaganda, political warfare, and counter guerrilla war have been branded as "immoral and unAmerican." Well, is it moral to stand aside and let one's allies be shot and imprisoned? Is it unAmerican to placate a dictator and his henchmen today, and then be forced to bomb a whole people next year when formal war is declared?

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Covert operations directed against a handful of Communist bosses is far more moral than waging an eleventh-hour war against a captive people forced into battle by the ruling tribal Politburo.

What will the Russians say if we follow Moscow's own lead -- if we borrow Brezhnev's operational code -- and agree to wage ideological warfare as usual, in tune with the Soviet definition of detente? Well, of course at first, Moscow will snarl and bluster and call us "Facist beasts." Later, once the Soviets see we are really serious people, they may agree to two-sided "arms control" of propaganda and covert operations. But restraint should be two-sided! If we suspend our political warfare and covert operations, we should get a genuine quid pro quo from Moscow. If not ---

The Fourth Alternative. The Soviet empire still has political weaknesses. Its East European populations are potential insurgents who have risen three times in the last 30 years.

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Chinese Communists pose a threat to Moscow in the Far East and require a million-man Russian Army to guard against them. The Ukraine is potentially Russia's "Ireland." And there are Armenian, Mongol, Moslem and Christian minorities, as well as Jewish, inside the belly of Mother Russia. Russia uses "detente" policy to provide some safe-guards against her internal instability. Through treaties, Russia has eroded the West's former movement towards all-European freedom. If there were any lingering hopes for liberty in Poland, Hungary and Russia's Baltic Colonies, they were dashed last year when 35 nations met in Helsinki to "confer legitimacy" on the Soviet conquest of East Europe. In effect, the West guaranteed the status quo for Soviet gauleiters over people who detest the Russians. But as Brezhnev explained, both before and after Helsinki, the solidarity of Moscow's Socialists with their "revolutionary brothers in the outside world" was in no way impaired by Helsinki verbiage.

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In short, America must not support freedom for Czechoslovakia, but Moscow and her Cuban mercenaries can help liberate Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal from capitalist chains! That's one-sided detente.

There are a wide range of psychological operations available to us because of these built-in weaknesses of the Soviet system. For all her military might, and despite Moscow's strict control of internal Russian media, the USSR has instabilities. To wit:

Number One. The heresies of Titoism and Maoism: Great Russian chauvinism; and now a "Protestant revolt" among West European Communists.

Two. The still extant nationalisms throughout Eastern Europe, the Ukraine, the Baltic States, Armenia, Uzbekistan and Mongolia.

Three. Intellectual revolt as typified by Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, and those brave dissidents who publish SAMISDAT - the Russian peoples' underground press.

Four. The struggle for power among the Communist party, the Soviet military, the technocratic and other elites in the Soviet command structure.

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and Five. The latent potential for defection that has always resided within the Red Army and emerged so dramatically in World War II.

These vulnerabilities of Russia are open to American and Western propaganda. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation are still in place and could operate more forcefully, which is why Moscow wants to close them down. American labor unions have done yeoman work against Communist-backed unions in Europe, Latin America and Africa. American labor unions could be asked to do this same task again.

May I say, however, that "psychological operations" is not a weapon that can be deployed in a vacuum. For the propaganda of freedom to work, American and allied military power must remain strong and viable. Our will to act, when necessary, must be credible; and economic pressures must run in tandem with diplomacy and a strong defense posture.

And now, one word in conclusion. If present trends continue, we will clearly be "number two" by 1980. So what will you do to avert the Gulag Ice Age?

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Isn't it time to call off the masochist trip called "drowning the national psyche in Watergate"? For some of the Eastern media -- chiefly the Washington Post, the Public Broadcasting System, the New York Times, the New Yorker, and other provincial house organs sold in Cambridge, Manhattan and Georgetown -- Watergate has been the media event of the past half-century. At Park Avenue cocktail parties, trendy and guilt-ridden citizens postulate that Watergate ranks as a crime against humanity, on a par with Dachau or Katyn Forest.

Actually, Watergate revealed that 50-some Americans did underhanded, amoral and illegal things in order to practice, or "cover up," political dirty tricks -- tricks, by the way, that belong to the same genre of nasty games played by many low-brow and big league American politicians of both parties in this century. (We all know, for example, that the recount of some close elections has been rendered moot by the astonishing disappearance of the ballot boxes.)



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Watergate proved to the world that, for what the French and Germans (or even the British) might have considered a "venial" sin by the Executive, an American President could be turned out of office and two-score of his aides jailed for burglary, tapping phones and concealing evidence. (The "mortal" sin -- misusing the CIA and IRS and FBI for domestic political purposes was attributable to Kennedy and Johnson as much as to Nixon.) The sheer "wonder" of Watergate - especially since America is alleged to be so "violence-prone" -- was that no violence disfigured the orderly transition. For all the fantasies of the American left about right-wing military coups, no tanks surrounded the presses of the Washington Post. No pro-Nixon loyalists rioted in the streets; and a crisis that would have brought down a European government -- if, in fact, the dirty business had ever been allowed to surface -- was, in America, easily transcended. The Republic survived in serenity, with nearly everyone feeling virtuous, while the young reporters who unraveled the scandal were enriched, both monetarily and with the Pulitzer Prize.

Yet, two years later we are still subjected to "instant guilt replay," via movies and pseudo-documentaries on Public television that show Watergate as a conglomerate of the Dreyfus Affair and the burning of the Reichstag.

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(Nixon's crimes loom even larger than the herding of the tens of thousands of Japanese-Americans into concentration camps by the liberals of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration.) Only the other day, a senior civil servant said he didn't see how America could cope with the Russian threat until we got our own moral house in order, since Watergate had exposed such an Achilles Heel.

In the long view of History, Watergate will have vastly less significance for our future than (a) the achievement by the USSR of "parity-plus" at the strategic level and (b) the ability of Moscow to use its four-ocean navy and Cuban foreign legion to back guerrilla war on all continents. Most of our European friends wish we would cease "brooding" about Watergate as if the norms of political conduct had been established by Nancy Drew and Huck Finn. Out there, in the big world beyond Cinderella and Father Flanagan there are other "norms" of behavior established by chaps like Brezhnev and Beria, Gromyko and von Ribbentrop, Mao and Molotov, Suslov and Goebbels.

The fifty "penny-ante" crooks, misguided partisans and "apprentice-Rasputins" of the Watergate Affair didn't loot large sums of money or use plastique explosives; and they didn't kidnap anybody.

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Meanwhile, inside Mother Russia, 500,000 members of the KGB -- over a period of three decades -- imprisoned, killed and worked to death 5 million of their fellow Russian citizens. They acted officially: KGB bosses got medals from Stalin. The writer who used "investigatory journalism" to expose the Gulag Archipeligo didn't get any Lenin Prize from Stalin's trainee -- Brezhnev; and, to date, the Soviet film industry has not released a movie called All the Commissar's Men. But, somehow, a large segment of the self-elected intelligentsia in New York City equate Watergate with the Gulag Ice Age and act as if a country so depraved as America doesn't "deserve" to survive.

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### CONCLUSION

Valley Forge was won by the grit and stamina of ordinary soldiers, as well as the genius of Washington. We are not required, as they were, to stand with bare feet in the snow and face British artillery -- but cannot we expect more Americans to face the "arrows of intellectual fashion" and tell it like it is? If our business leaders cannot be expected to pledge their "lives, fortunes and sacred honor" in defense of free enterprise, could they at least sacrifice one tenth of their stock options to avoid transferring technology to the heirs of Genghis Khan?

For, if America should, by 1980, be pressed into a corner, by a combination of Soviet nuclear blackmail and psychological warfare, if we then should be isolated from our allies and divided against ourselves, the epitaph on America's tombstone might read as follows...

"HERE LIES THE ONLY CIVILIZATION THAT PERISHED AT THE PEAK OF ITS POWER WITH ITS POWER UNUSED.

HERE LIES A DECENT PEOPLE WHO WANTED LOVE, NOT EMPIRE, AND GOT NEITHER; WHO TRIED TO TRADE POWER FOR POPULARITY -- AND LOST BOTH.

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HERE LIES A NATION OF ADVERTISERS WHO KNEW HOW TO CHANGE CONSUMER TASTES IN CIGARETTES BUT WERE THEMSELVES MANIPULATED ON THE ISSUES THAT REALLY MATTERED TO THEIR SALVATION.

HERE DIED A SORT OF LANCELOT IN THE COURT OF NATIONS WHO, GRANTING ALL HIS GRIEVOUS FLAWS, WAS STILL PERHAPS THE NOBLEST KNIGHT OF ALL -- EXCEPT, THIS LANCELOT. CRIPPLED WITH AN UNDESERVED GUILT COMPLEX, LET HIS WEAPONS AND IDEALS FALL UNUSED, AND SO CONDEMNED ALL MANKIND TO THE THOUSAND YEAR PRISON OF THE RUSSIAN BEAR."

Now personally, I hope America's page in history will be written in a much nobler vein. But, whether that epitaph is written or not will depend not exclusively on decisions made in the White House, or the Pentagon, or the Department of State, but on the courage and sheer civic commitment of America's private citizens.