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Notes for Stevens Institute of Technology Speaking Engagement, Hoboken, N.J.,
Jan. 10, 1968.

Subject: Vietnam and the Draft.

--On Vietnam, there is little to add to notes worked up for Duquesne U. appearance except that we should be alert to the possibility that some in the Johnson Administration will be so anxious to get the war over with that they will lean toward a tenuous peace. The Administration indicated such a possibility during the Manila Conference when it was announced that the U.S. was prepared to withdraw its forces from Vietnam if the North Vietnamese also agreed to withdraw, thus leaving the South Vietnamese government to cope with the Vietcong. I can only conclude that the North Vietnamese considered this to be a trick and therefore did not respond. Had they believed the offer was sincerely made, they would have been fools not to accept...because the view of many senior U.S. officers in Vietnam was that this arrangement would have produced the ultimate collapse of the South Vietnam government and a certain Vietcong takeover. There probably is no valid basis for peace talks on Vietnam except a mutual cease-fire. It is difficult to envision a satisfactory minimum de-escalation by the Northvietnamese in exchange for a cessation of bombing of the North, for instance. It is actually unrealistic to insist that there be a halt both in movement of supplies and troops from the North into the South in exchange for a bombing halt. I say this because we certainly would go on supplying our own troops during a bombing halt, and therefore we could not expect the enemy not to supply theirs. It might make more sense to insist on a halt in enemy reinforcements in exchange for a bombing halt, but with no provisio on supplies. This of course would give the enemy unimpeded access to fresh supplies until such time as the supplies crossed from the North into the South and would be a tremendous boost for them. The halt in the bombing also would be a tremendous relief for the enemy. We would gain nothing except talks that might produce no results

while the killing went on in South Vietnam. As for conducting talks while a cease-fire is in effect, we have seen how the enemy observes an official cease-fire. But if a cease-fire were declared and talks were begun, the eyes of the world would be turned on the Communists and any cease-fire violations they might perpetrate. We come back, then, to the original premise that negotiations for the sake of negotiations--while the fighting continues but bombing of the North stops--appears to be completely unrealistic in the absence of meaningful reciprocity on the part of the enemy.

War is a tragedy, but it is the duty of every American to serve his country when called upon to do so. If he is a conscientious objector, he must be allowed to serve the Nation in some way other than that of bearing arms. But apart from making room for the conscientious objector, we must all face up to our responsibilities as American citizens enjoying the rights and privileges that come to us as a birthright. It is an unusual man who deliberately and gladly risks his life, but millions of Americans have done so in defense of their country. In the case of Vietnam, it would be a happy circumstance indeed if we had enough volunteers so that we would not have to employ the draft. But we must use the draft, and so the Congress last year extended the draft for four years beyond June 30 when the Selective Service Act was due to expire. The President proposed a lottery system in place of drafting men through the call of local draft boards under general rules applying to selection and deferments. The Congress wisely refused to allow the President to carry out his lottery plan. I personally opposed it because I don't think we should blindly take some of the best brains in the country into the military service under a blind-chance lottery system. College should not become a haven for draft dodgers but neither should we indiscriminately draft college students

for Army duty. So Congress passed a new draft law prohibiting the President from drafting young men by lot without congressional approval in the form of new legislation. We also sought to end the uncertainty that many college students feel about the draft, so we specifically granted an automatic deferment to any draft registrant "satisfactorily pursuing a fulltime course of instruction at a college, university or similar institution of learning" until he gains his baccalaureate degree or becomes 24 years of age. During debate on the draft legislation, a group of House Republicans pushed hard for an all-volunteer Army. But we need 3 million 300 thousand men under arms to carry out our mission in Vietnam and elsewhere in the world--and experience shows we could hope to attract no more than 2 million men to a purely voluntary force.

Now we find certain Americans urging young men to avoid the draft or to refuse to enter military service. As you know, five individuals including the chaplain of Yale University have been indicted for such activity. I do not want to prejudge the guilt of the individuals so charged, but if they are guilty of the count specified they certainly have violated federal law.

Title 50, Section 462 (a) of the United States Code, provides that:

"Any member of the Selective Service System or any other person...who knowingly counsels, aids or abets another to refuse or evade registration or service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this title...shall, upon conviction in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than \$10,000, or/both such fine and imprisonment."

I believe this provision of federal law should be strictly enforced, particularly in time of war. This is a society of laws. To encourage

disrespect for the law is to encourage anarchy and a breakdown of our society as we know it. I believe in responsible dissent. To criticize, to protest, to condemn policy or individuals is the privilege of every American under the First Amendment to the Constitution. But the Constitution does not give any American the right to interfere with the war effort by seeking to persuade young men to evade the draft or refuse military service.

The degree to dissent being permitted in this country in time of war is nothing of remarkable. I favor free expression of dissent when it is responsible, when it does not interfere with the rights of others. But when it degenerates into violence or deprives others of a right, I disapprove. And I commend those university officials who have declared they will not tolerate student protests which actually prevent military or business firm recruiters from interviewing students who desire an interview. This kind of protest is not responsible. I also agree with university administrators who frown on demonstrations which interfere with the pursuit of learning. It has always been my understanding that a student is in college to learn. Those who use a college campus to stir up trouble for the college authorities and prevent other students from getting a college education ought to go out and hire a hall.

But whatever the nature of the protest, I do not think quickie drafting of individuals should be used as punishment. If an individual has violated the law, then upon being charged and found guilty he should receive whatever punishment the law provides for the offense charged. The draft should not be used as an instrument of repression. Neither should local draft boards decide the legality of an anti-draft protest.



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL DELIVERY OF ADDRESS
EXPECTED ABOUT 12:30 P.M. (EST)
FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1967

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ADDRESS BY
GENERAL W. C. WESTMORELAND, USA
COMMANDER, U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
BEFORE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS
FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1967 - 12:30 P.M. (EST)

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress

I am deeply honored to address the Congress of the United States. I stand in the shadow of military men who have been here before me, but none of them could have had more pride than is mine in representing the gallant men fighting in Vietnam today. Without reservation, I can say that I command the most professional, competent, dedicated and courageous servicemen and women in our military experience. They are sensitive to their mission and, as the record shows, they are unbeatable in carrying out that mission.

As their commander in the field I have seen many of you during the last three years. Without exception you have shown interest, responsibility and concern for the commitment which we have undertaken.

The Republic of Vietnam is fighting to build a strong nation while aggression -- organized, directed and supported from without -- attempts to engulf it. This is an unprecedented challenge for a small nation such as the Republic of Vietnam. But it is a challenge which will confront any nation that is marked as a target for the communist stratagem called "war of national liberation." I can assure you here and now that militarily this stratagem will not succeed in Vietnam.

In three years of close study and daily observation, I have seen no evidence that this is an internal insurrection. And I have seen much evidence to the contrary -- documented by the enemy himself -- that it simply is aggression from the North.

Since 1954, when the Geneva Accords were signed, the North Vietnamese have been sending leaders, political organizers, technicians and experts on terrorism and sabotage into the South. Clandestinely directed from the North, they and their Hanoi-trained southern counterparts have controlled the entire course of the attack against the Republic of South Vietnam.

MORE



More than two years ago, North Vietnamese divisions began to arrive, and the control no longer was as clandestine. Since then, the buildup of enemy forces has been formidable. During the last 22 months, the number of enemy combat battalions in the South has increased significantly, and nearly half of them are North Vietnamese. In the same period, overall enemy strength has nearly doubled in spite of large battle losses.

Enemy commanders are skilled professionals and provide good leadership. In general, their troops are thoroughly indoctrinated, well trained, aggressive and under tight control.

The enemy's logistic system is primitive in many ways. Forced to transport most of his supplies down through Southeastern Laos, he uses combinations of trucks, bicycles, men and animals. But he does this with surprising effectiveness. In South Vietnam, the system is well organized. Many of the caches we have found and destroyed have been stocked with enough supplies and equipment to support months of future operations.

The enemy emphasizes what he calls strategic mobility although his tactics are based on foot mobility, relatively modest firepower, and often primitive means of communications. However, his operational planning is meticulous. He gathers intelligence, makes careful plans, assigns specific tasks in detail and then rehearses the plan of attack until he believes it cannot fail. The enemy impresses local villagers into his service, demanding that they provide food, shelter and laborers to carry supplies and equipment for combat units, and to evacuate the dead and wounded from the battlefield.

When all is ready he moves his large military formations covertly from concealed bases into the operational area. His intent is to launch a surprise attack designed to achieve quick victory by the sudden application of overwhelming power. This tactic has failed because of our firepower and spoiling attacks.

For months now we have been successful in destroying a number of main force units. We will continue to seek out the enemy, catch him off guard, and punish him at every opportunity.

But success against his main forces alone is not enough to insure a swift and decisive end to the conflict.

This enemy also uses terror--murder, mutilation, abduction and the deliberate shelling of innocent men, women and children -- to exercise control through fear. This tactic, which he employs daily, is much harder to counter than his best conventional moves.

During the week ending 22 April Viet Cong terrorists killed 126 innocent civilians, wounded 86 and abducted 100 others. The victims included 27 Revolutionary Development workers, 11 village or hamlet officials or candidates, six policemen, and 13 refugees or defectors from VC control.

Last Sunday, terrorists, near Saigon, assassinated a 39-year old village chief. The same day in the delta, they kidnapped 26 civilians assisting in arranging for local elections. The next day the Viet Cong attacked a group of Revolutionary Development workers, killing one and wounding 12 with grenades and machine-gun fire in one area, and in another they opened fire on a small civilian bus and killed three and wounded four of its passengers. These are cases of calculated enemy attack on civilians to extend by fear that which they cannot gain by persuasion.

One hears little of this brutality here at home. What we do hear about is our own aerial bombing against North Vietnam, and I would like to address this for a moment.

For years the enemy has been blowing bridges, interrupting traffic, cutting roads, sabotaging power stations, blocking canals and attacking air-fields in the South, and he continues to do so. Bombing in the North has been centered on precisely these same kinds of targets and for the same military purposes--to reduce the supply, interdict the movement and impair the effectiveness of enemy military forces.

Within his capabilities the enemy in Vietnam is waging total war all day--every day--everywhere. He believes in force, and his intensification of violence is limited only by his resources and not by any moral inhibitions.

To our forces, a cease fire means just that. Our observance of past truces has been open and subject to public scrutiny. The enemy permits no such observation. He traditionally has exploited cease fire periods when the bombing has been suspended to increase his resupply and infiltration activity.

This is the enemy--this has been the challenge. The only strategy which can defeat such an organization is one of unrelenting military, political and psychological pressure on his whole structure--at all levels.

From his capabilities and his recent activities, I believe the enemy's probable course in the months ahead can be forecast.

In order to carry out his battlefield doctrine I foresee that he will continue his buildup across the Demilitarized Zone and through Laos, and he will attack us when he believes he has a chance for a dramatic blow. He will not return exclusively to guerrilla warfare, although he certainly will continue to intensify his guerrilla activities.

I expect the enemy to continue to increase his mortar, artillery, rocket and recoilless rifle attacks on our installations. At the same time he will step up his attacks on hamlet, village and district organizations to intimidate the people, and to thwart the democratic processes now underway in South Vietnam.

Given the nature of the enemy, it seems to me that the strategy we are following at this time is the proper one, and that it is producing results. While he obviously is far from quitting, there are signs that his morale and his military structure are beginning to deteriorate. Their rate of decline will be in proportion to the pressure directed against him.

Faced with this prospect, it is gratifying to note that our forces and those of the other free world allies have grown in strength and profited from experience. In this connection it is well to remember that Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines all have military forces fighting and working with the Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam. It also is worthy of note that 30 other nations are providing non-combat support, and that all of these free world forces are doing well, whether in combat or in support of nation-building. Their exploits deserve recognition, not only for their direct contributions to the overall effort, but for their symbolic reminder that the whole of free Asia opposes communist expansion.

As the focal point of this struggle in Asia the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces merit special mention.

In 1954 South Vietnam had literally no armed forces in being. There was no tradition of leadership, nor was there an educational system to provide leaders. The requirement to build an army, navy and air force in the face of enemy attack and political subversion seems, in retrospect, an almost impossible task. Yet, in their determination to resist the communists, the Vietnamese have managed to do it.

What I see now in Vietnam is a military force that performs with growing professional skill. During the last six months, Vietnamese troops have scored repeated successes against some of the best Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Units.

Perhaps more important in this total effort is the support given by the Vietnamese military to the government's nation-building or Revolutionary Development program. Nearly half of the Vietnamese Army now is engaged in or training for this vital program which will improve the lot of the people. This is a difficult role for a military force. Vietnamese are not only defending villages and hamlets, but with spirit and energy they have turned to the task of nation building as well.

In 1952 there were some who doubted that the Republic of Korea would ever have a first rate fighting force. I wish those doubters could see the Korean units in Vietnam today. They rank with the best fighters and the most effective civic action workers in Vietnam. And so today when I hear doubts about the Vietnamese armed forces, I am reminded of that example.

As you know we are fighting a war with no front lines since the enemy hides among the people, in the jungles and mountains, and uses covertly border areas of neutral countries. Therefore one cannot measure the progress of battle by lines on a map. We therefore have to use other means to chart progress. Several indices clearly point to steady and encouraging success:

Two years ago the Republic of Vietnam had fewer than 30 combat ready battalions. Today it has 154.

(MORE)

Then there were three jet-capable runways in South Vietnam. Today there are 14.

In April 1965 there were 15 airfields that could take C-130 transport aircraft. Now there are 89.

Then there was one deep water port for sea-going ships. Now there are seven.

In 1965 ships had to wait weeks to unload. Now we turn them around in as little as one week.

Then there was no long-haul highway transport. Last month alone 161,000 tons of supplies were moved over the highways. During the last year the mileage of essential highways open for our use has risen from about 52% to 80%.

During 1965 the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and its allies killed 36,000 of the enemy and lost approximately 12,000 in return. During recent months this three to one ratio in favor of the allies has risen significantly and in some weeks has been as high as ten or twelve to one.

In 1965, 11,000 Viet Cong rallied to the side of the government. In 1966 there were 20,000. In the first three months of 1967 there have been nearly 11,000 ralliers, a figure that equals all of 1965 and more than half of all of 1966.

In 1964 and the first part of 1965 the ratio of weapons captured was two to one in favor of the enemy. The ratio for 1966 and the first three months of this year is two and one-half to one in favor of the Republic of Vietnam and its allies.

Our President and the representatives of the people of the United States, the Congress, have seen to it that our troops in the field have been well supplied and equipped. And when a field commander does not have to look over his shoulder to see whether he is being supported, he can concentrate on the battlefield with much greater assurance of success. I speak for my troops, when I say -- we are thankful for this unprecedented material support.

As I have said before, in evaluating the enemy strategy it is evident to me that he believes our Achilles' heel is our resolve. Your continued strong support is vital to the success of our mission.

Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen in Vietnam are the finest ever fielded by our nation. And in this assessment I include Americans of all races, creeds and colors. Your servicemen in Vietnam are intelligent, skilled, dedicated and courageous. In these qualities no unit, no service, no ethnic group and no national origin can claim priority.

These men understand the conflict and their complex roles as fighters and builders. They believe in what they are doing. They are determined to provide the shield of security behind which the Republic of Vietnam can develop and prosper for its own sake and for the future and freedom of all Southeast Asia.

(MORE)

Backed at home by resolve, confidence, patience, determination and continued support, we will prevail in Vietnam over communist aggression.

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress --

I am sure you are as proud to represent our men serving their country and the free world in Vietnam as I am to command them.

- E N D -

House Republican Policy Committee
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
140 Cannon House Office Bldg.
Phone: 225-6168

Viet Nam
March 2, 1966
Immediate Release

Republican Policy Committee Statement on Viet Nam

The deep division within the Democratic Party over American policy in Viet Nam is prolonging the war, undermining the morale of our fighting men and encouraging the Communist aggressor. It has confused the people in other nations about the American purpose and has led North Viet Nam to believe that in time we may falter, that we do not have the necessary will or determination to win. As a result, the peace that this nation and the free world seeks has been delayed, the fighting intensified, and the threat of a major war deepened.

In an effort to please the conflicting elements in the Democratic Party, the Administration has had to dodge and shift. Its policy and position on Viet Nam continues to be marred by indecision, sudden change and frequent reinterpretation. Under the circumstances, it is little wonder that the enemy has been encouraged, our friends dismayed, and the "national unity that can do more to bring about peace negotiations than almost any other thing" delayed.

We, therefore, call upon the President to disavow those within his party who would divide this country as they have divided the Democratic Party. Certainly, as the President has stated, "there is much more that unites us than divides us." However, as long as the party in power cannot agree on such basic issues as whether Americans should be in Viet Nam at all, what our Nation is trying to achieve there and whether the right means are being used, there will continue to be uncertainties, misunderstandings and fears about the war in Viet Nam. America, indeed the world, is waiting for the President to take command of his party. Until this is done, the divisive debate will continue, the confusion will grow, and a peaceful solution will elude us.

Republicans are united in their support of the fighting men in Viet Nam. We also support a policy that will prevent the success of aggression and the forceful conquest of South Viet Nam by North Viet Nam.

In addition, we believe that the people of South Viet Nam should have an opportunity to live their lives in peace under a government of their own choice, free of Communist aggression.

Certainly, these objectives cannot be realized by admitting the Communists to a share of power in a coalition government. For this is "arsenic in the medicine," the "fox in the chicken coop." It would pave the way for a Communist takeover as surely as did the coalition governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Hungary. Moreover, it would make a cruel and indefensible mockery of the sacrifices of the fighting men in Viet Nam.

Roving Ambassador W. Averell Harriman stated:

"I think those who dissent . . . should recognize that it does give comfort to the enemy - or not comfort, but it does give encouragement to the enemy."

In an article datelined 'Saigon', February 27, and entitled "Look Is Different Where Action Is", Washington Post correspondent Ward Just stated:

"From Washington it may seem that the war aims of the U. S. Government have not been defined and Senators may believe the Vietcong represent the will of the Vietnamese people, but in Saigon this talk strikes officials as neither instructive nor ameliorating.

It unhinges friends and fence sitters in the Ky government and now it has unhinged American diplomats."

In his 1963 Berlin speech President John F. Kennedy stated:

"I am not impressed by the opportunities open to popular fronts throughout the world. I do not believe that any democrat can successfully ride that tiger."

New York Times columnist C. L. Sulzberger concluded that:

"both Peking and Hanoi must have gained fresh encouragement
by the joining of our Know-Nothings with our Know-It-Alls."

Richard L. Strout, staff correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, has stated:

"Hubert H. Humphrey has embarked on an all-out counteroffensive to sell the Vietnam war to the American people, and overcome the uneasiness, restlessness, and doubts which have appeared in the past month.

Roving Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, who accompanied the Vice-President on his whirlwind tour of nine nations, has come back just as firmly determined as Mr. Humphrey to combat what seems to be interpreted as defeatism. Both Humphrey and Harriman take the position that it was providential they were in Asia at the time of the Fulbright hearings in order to counter there the misapprehension over American resolve.

Humphrey also said that the "ADA" (Americans for Democratic Action) are "just the people" he will try to persuade.

V-N



REPUBLICAN RESEARCH REPORT

*Prepared by the
Research Division*

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
1625 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

ROBERT L. L. McCORMICK
Director of Research

RAY C. BLISS
Chairman

REPORT No. 5 -- Series B

May 20, 1966

VIETNAM

Anatomy of the Johnson-Humphrey Administration's Misleading
Statements Concerning the Conduct of the War in
Vietnam




U. S. MILITARY COMMITMENTS ABROAD 1966

U.S. Men
Under Arms
2.7 million

OUT OF 2.7 MILLION
835,000 STATIONED ABROAD

About 1/3 Stationed Abroad
10% in Viet Nam




II. UNITED STATES COMBAT CASUALTIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM FIGHTING 1961 THROUGH 1965

In the Presidential campaign of 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson said:

"Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions."

(Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, p.953 8/12/64)

U. S. COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIET NAM
FIGHTING 1961 THROUGH 1965



	<u>Deaths</u>	<u>Wounded</u>
1961	1	1
1962	31	74
1963	77	411
1964	142	1,038
1965	1,365	5,969
Total*	1,616	7,493


	<u>Deaths</u>	<u>Wounded</u>
Jan 1, 1961	1,616	7,493
Jan 1, 1966		
Jan 1, 1966		
May 7, 1966		
Total*	3,234	17,614

*Figures from News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) April 7, 1966.

*Figures from News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) May 7, 1966.



U. S. TROOP BUILD-UP IN VIET NAM



I. UNITED STATES TROOP BUILD-UP IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

In the Presidential campaign of 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson said:

"We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to get involved in a nation with 700 million people and get tied down in a land war in Asia."

(Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, p.1126 9/25/64.)

III. UNITED STATES SOUTH VIETNAM MILITARY POSTURE

A. Global Commitments:

1. The New York Times military writer, Hanson Baldin, concluded in an article, February 21, 1966:

"The Nation's armed services have almost exhausted their trained and ready military units, with all available forces spread thin in Vietnam and elsewhere."

2. At a Press Conference on March 2, 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said:

"Far from over-extending ourselves we have actually strengthened our military posture." (New York Times, March 3, 1966, Jack Raymond)

3. Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.), Chairman of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, in a speech before the Reserve Officers Association, said:

"The heavy drain of Vietnam has brought on serious problems in personnel, equipment repair parts and other materials." (New York Times, Jack Raymond, March 3, 1966)

4. The Pentagon announced on April 9, 1966, that 15,000 United States troops were being recalled from Europe and the New York Times editorial of April 10, 1966 observed "the temporary withdrawal from West Germany to meet military needs in Vietnam confirms the strain." (New York Times, April 11, 1966)

B. Military Shortages:

Secretary of Defense McNamara on March 2, 1966 said:

"It can be stated categorically that no shortages have impeded our combat operations in Southeast Asia or affected the morale or welfare of our men." (Washington Post, March 3, 1966)

The Pentagon acknowledged on April 12, 1966 that:

"... both local and world wide shortages of some types of bombs-- particularly the latest 750-pounders best suited for Vietnam targets--influenced the reduction in air strikes."

"A Pentagon spokesman acknowledged 'we are reacquiring some excess stocks of war material.'" (Washington Post, April 12, 1966, John G. Norris)

Senator Richard Russell was quoted as "utterly astounded" by the announced shortages of bombs in Vietnam:

"I was assured no later than last week by Secretary of Defense



McNamara and others in the Defense Department that we had adequate ammunition of every kind in Vietnam." (Washington Post, April 12, 1966)

C. Combat Readiness:

1. "A high Pentagon spokesman acknowledged yesterday that Army divisions in the United States have been reduced below full combat readiness by the demands of the Vietnam war and the defense expansion program." (Washington Post, March 3, 1966, John G. Norris)
2. "Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara denied today suggestions that the Army's home-based strategic reserves were seriously below combat readiness." (New York Times, March 31, 1966, Benjamin Welles)

D. South Vietnamese Armed Forces:

1. General Maxwell Taylor, retiring United States Ambassador to South Vietnam stated on Meet The Press, August 8, 1965:

"I am quite confident in the course of the next year, 1966, the Vietnamese can raise considerably more forces than in the past."

2. On February 22, 1966, a Washington Post article by Stanley Karnow stated:

"...a crucial problem confronting planners here is whether the United States, South Vietnam and other nations committed to this war effort can muster sufficient manpower..."

"A serious shortage of both civilian and military manpower exists within the South Vietnamese government structure."

3. On February 24, 1966, Neil Sheehan, writing in the New York Times, reported:

"...about 113,000 men deserted from the South Vietnamese armed forces last year, a total equivalent to nearly half of the American force that has been committed to the defense of this country."

4. Reuben Salazar of the Washington Post, February 25, 1966, noted:

"In 1964 a total of 8.3% of the armed forces deserted. In 1965 the percentage rose to 14.2%."

5. Neil Sheehan on May 13, 1966, stated in The New York Times:

"For the record time in five weeks the number of American troops killed and wounded in a week has exceeded South Vietnamese losses..."



"American casualties exceeded the South Vietnamese for the first time during the week ended April 9, when United States troops suffered 95 killed, 501 wounded and 4 missing or captured. In the same period the South Vietnamese losses were 67 killed and 204 wounded, missing or captured...

"In the week ended Saturday (5/7/66) 82 American servicemen were killed and 615 wounded in the fighting throughout the country."

IV UNITED STATES BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

A. The Decision to Bomb

"When asked if the Communist attacks indicated a need to carry the war to North Vietnam, McNamara said that Communist 'terror tactics' required counter action 'on the soil of South Vietnam.' Military action against North Vietnam would not be a 'proper response' to the Communist infiltrators."

(Robert S. McNamara, quoted in The Washington Post, 5/14/64)

In the Presidential campaign of 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson said:

"There are those that say we ought to go North and drop bombs, to try and wipe out the supply lines."

(Remarks in Oklahoma at the Dedication of the Eufaula Dam, 9/25/64)

"But we must not go around over the world rattling our rockets and threatening our bombs."

(Remarks in Springfield, Illinois, at the Sangamon County Courthouse, 10/7/64)

On February 7, 1965, United States carrier based planes bombed North Vietnam in retaliation for the Viet Cong attack upon the United States compound at Pleiku. (Facts on File, 1965, p.49.)

B. The Effectiveness of the Bombing

Before the Senate Armed Services Committee meeting of January 21, 1966, Secretary McNamara testified:

"I submit to you that it is not correct to state that the initial objectives of the bombing have not been met."

(U.S. News and World Report, February 28, 1966.)

Stanley Karnow, The Washington Post, February 8, 1966, quoted a top United States Defense Department official as saying:

"We can quadruple bombings against North Vietnam without affecting the war significantly."

V. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION ACROSS THE 17TH PARALLEL

General Maxwell Taylor speaking on Face the Nation said:

"I think even today the fact that a Viet Cong or a North Vietnamese battalion fights only about one or two days a month is indicative of the fact that they can't support combat on an enlarged scale."

(The Washington Post, February 14, 1966)

Later, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 17, 1966, General Taylor testified:

"Another limiting factor is the logistic difficulty of the Viet Cong in supporting increased numbers of troops in combat."

(The Washington Post, February 18, 1966)

On April 4, 1966, The New York Times reported a high ranking United States official in Saigon as saying:

"North Vietnam has vastly increased the flow of men and material to the South in the last two months....what has been occurring for many months constitutes an invasion of South Vietnam from the North."

VI. POLITICAL INSTABILITY

A. Non-Interference in Vietnamese Politics:

Max Frankel reported in the New York Times (April 9, 1966) that the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, William Bundy, in an interview on the Today Show referred to the Buddhist movements as follows:

"One is, perhaps, the more moderate one, which wants to get ahead with the constitution and the rest...That's Tam Chau.

"The other, which is associated and, I think, led by Tri Quange, wants to accelerate the timetable very, very much indeed, and wants to see procedures established for a constitution and elections that would be dominated by them, I think is a fair way to describe it."

Under Secretary of State, George Ball, however, was quoted as saying on Face the Nation, (April 10, 1966):

"But the last thing in the world we want to do is to try to inject an American view as to what the South Vietnamese people should choose in the way of their government or which leaders are more useful to them. This is a decision that they should make....

"We cannot interfere in the internal affairs of South Vietnam or any other country."

B. Instability Impairing the War Effort:

Seymour Topping, Far Eastern correspondent for the New York Times, reported April 5, 1966:

"The war effort against the Vietcong is faltering while South Vietnam's Government strives to crush an internal challenge to its authority by a Buddhist led political movement.

"The pacification and rural reconstruction programs assigned high priorities at the Honolulu Conference two months ago by President Johnson and the South Vietnamese leaders have lost impetus because the Government is preoccupied with the political crisis."

Under Secretary of State George Ball declared on Face the Nation (April 10, 1966):

"The interesting thing is that while the newspaper headlines have been filled with the political turbulence in South Vietnam, the very silent, serious effective work looking towards the improvement of the social and economic and political base in South Vietnam has been going forward--as have the military operations. There has been no particular reduction in them."

On April 12, 1966, Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester issued a statement confirming news reports from Saigon that:

"There has been a temporary reduction in sorties within South Vietnam..."

"There has been a temporary problem in the distribution of bombs within the country. This distribution problem has resulted primarily from the disorder at Danang which caused diversion of ordnance-carrying vessels to other unloading areas. Steps are being taken to alleviate the distribution problem."

VII. "ADMINISTRATION COVER-UP?"

1. Democratic Congressman Richard L. Ottinger of New York was quoted in the New York Times, March 31, 1966 as saying:

"Congressmen returning from South Vietnam reported they had been 'badly misled' by United States officials who had shown them around. He said, that information indicated that Congressmen who visited South Vietnam were shown and told only things that made the United States look good. Mr. Ottinger said the reports strengthened his belief that top Government officials were misinforming the public on other vital issues besides the Vietnam War." (New York Times, March 31, 1966)

2. Two days later, April 2, 1966, it was announced:

"...the Administration ordered a postponement today of all Congressional trips to South Vietnam. The Administration's underlying concern was brought into the open by the imminent plan of a House Government Operations Subcommittee, headed by Representative John E. Moss of California, to go to South Vietnam to investigate the aid program..." (New York Times, April 2, 1966, John W. Finney)

VIETNAM

The Eisenhower Administration Is Not Responsible for the Present U.S. Involvement

When Eisenhower left office, there were 700 U.S. military advisers in Vietnam, but there was no war, no U.S. casualties, no U.S. combat troops, and no commitment to send any. John F. Kennedy wrote, "...we saw a near miracle take place" in South Vietnam between the Geneva Conference of 1954 and 1960.

The 1954 SEATO Treaty did not obligate the U.S. to use its forces in Vietnam. Senator Smith (N.J.), a signer of the Treaty, explained to the Senate that it was not "a compulsory arrangement for our military participation in case of attack." Regarding "the commitment of American ground forces to the Asian mainland," he said, "We carefully avoided any possible implication regarding an arrangement of that kind."

Republicans Support U.S. Troops and a Quest for a Peace That Maintains the Independence of South Vietnam

An independent South Vietnam has been a U.S. objective since 1954. Under Eisenhower it was achieved without war. Every effort should be made to bring about a peace which preserves this independence.

As long as American troops fight there, they must be supported fully by Congress.

Doubt now arises whether LBJ is holding to this objective. The doubt is based on 1) the Administration's endorsement of the 1954 Geneva Agreements as a basis for peace; 2) LBJ's refusal to say whether he rules out imposing a coalition government including Communists on South Vietnam; and 3) Goldberg's proposals to the UN for a withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. Any of these three courses involve grave risks of ending in a Communist victory.

The Administration's Shortcomings in Vietnam

LBJ held off military action until South Vietnam was near collapse. He has failed to use the economic power of the U.S. in the struggle. He has not been candid about the military situation, the mission of U.S. troops, war costs, enemy casualties, or peace feelers.

In 1964 he played politics with Vietnam by denouncing "those who say you ought to go north and drop bombs," and saying, "We are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."

These things, as much as the differences among Democrats about Vietnam, encourage the enemy to believe that they will eventually win.

What Should Be Done

This is the third biggest war in U.S. history in terms of the American troop commitment. We cannot accept an endless war in Vietnam fought principally by the U.S. On the other hand, withdrawal would lead to a bigger war later in Asia. In an effort to end this war on honorable terms, the U.S. must repair its alliances and secure more military, economic, and political support from others. It must more effectively encourage the South Vietnamese to do their part in the war and to hasten political and economic progress. If the Administration has good reasons for not shutting off the port of Haiphong as recommended by General Taylor in February 1966, it should explain them.

We hope that the Manila Conference, held just before the election, will result in progress toward an honorable peace and - failing that - more support from other nations in the military effort.

PROTESTERS

NY TIMES, 4/13/67, edit.:

Draft File

In an enlightened ruling a three-man Federal court has written an opinion that reaffirms the right of protest in time of war.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held unconstitutional the amendment to the Selective Service Act that forbids destruction or mutilation of a draft card....

...the law has always required that a registrant have a card in his possession. It was under this provision...that the Appeals Court upheld the defendant's conviction of violating the Selective Service Act. In doing so, the court pointed out that Congress could not impose a special punishment for those who expressed their views by burning a card in public any more than it could punish them for peaceful picketing. Both are symbolic gestures that are an integral part of one's right to speak freely.

...
This ruling goes counter to decisions reached in similar cases in the Second and Eighth Circuits, but it is in accord with the judiciary's responsibility to protect the individual liberties of all....

Failure to possess a draft card properly leads to punishment for these youthful dissenters. Freedom is not served by piling on additional and severely repressive penalties against symbolic actions of the dissenters in expressing their dissent.




REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

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NEWS

 FOR RELEASE

File Viet-ham

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The Following Statement was Approved Unanimously
by The Republican Coordinating Committee meeting
in Washington, D. C. December 13, 1965

Questions are being raised both at home and abroad as to the devotion of the American people to peace. One cause of this confusion has been the inability of the Johnson Administration to establish a candid and consistently credible statement of our position in Viet Nam. Official statements of the Administration have been conflicting and repeatedly over optimistic. The Communists have skillfully exploited this inadequacy of our present leadership.

We Republicans believe that the people of South Viet Nam should have an opportunity to live their lives in peace under a government of their own choice free of Communist aggression.

We believe that our national objectives should be not the unconditional surrender of North Viet Nam, but unconditional freedom for the people of South Viet Nam and support of their struggle against aggression.

Our nation, with vigorous Republican support and leadership, has dedicated itself to successful resistance to Communist aggression through programs for Greece and Turkey; in Iran, Lebanon and Quemoy-Matsu; in Austria, Trieste and Guatemala; by timely action in the Dominican Republic, and today in Viet Nam.

Under our present policy in Viet Nam, there is a growing danger that the United States is becoming involved in an endless Korean-type jungle war. A land war in Southeast Asia would be to the advantage of the Communists.

-- MORE --



Since it appears that the major portion of North Vietnamese military supplies arrive by sea, our first objective should be to impose a Kennedy-type quarantine on North Viet Nam.

To accomplish our objectives we also recommend the maximum use of American conventional air and sea power against significant military targets.

Our purpose is and must be, once again to repel Communist aggression, to minimize American and Vietnamese casualties, and to bring about a swift and secure peace.



NOTES

HOBOKEN, N. J.

JAN 10, 68

Gerald R. Ford
M.C.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S.

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The Detroit News
May 9, 1966

5/9/66

VIETNAM REPORT

and

Special Color Map

HOW THE TROUBLE BEGAN

By AUSTIN WHEATLEY
Editorial Writer and
Detroit News Foreign Affairs Specialist

from the South; Laos and Cambodia
were barred from all military alli-
ances: there were to be no military

