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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1976

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JAMES E. CONNORGE *EX*

SUBJECT:

John Connally's PFIAB Membership

The President reviewed your memorandum of October 11 on the above subject and approved the response to Representative Nedzi refuting the conflict of interest charge and endorsing Connally's continuing membership on PFIAB.

Please follow-up with appropriate action.

cc: Dick Cheney

Original package returned to NSC.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1976

MR PRESIDENT:

John Connally's PFIAB
Membership

In addition to the staff comments contained in Brent Scowcroft's memorandum on the above subject, we thought Doug Bennett should have an opportunity to review. He fully concurs with the the position taken and the letter to Congressman Nedzi.

Jim Connor

October 13, 1976

MR PRESIDENT:

**John Connally's PFIAB
Membership**

In addition to the staff comments contained in Brent Scowcroft's memorandum on the above subject, we thought Doug Bennett should have an opportunity to review. He fully concurs with the the position taken and the letter to Congressman Nedzi.

Jim Connor

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.:

Date: October 11, 1976

Time:

FOR ACTION:

cc (for information):

✓ Douglas Bennett

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date:

Time:

Wednesday, October 13, 1976

3:00 P.M.

SUBJECT:

John Connally's PFIAB Membership

ACTION REQUESTED:

For Necessary Action

For Your Recommendations

Prepare Agenda and Brief

Draft Reply

For Your Comments

Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

Bennett - fully

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

Jim Connor
For the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: BOB LINDER

FROM: TRUDY FRY

**The attached is sent to you for
review before it is forwarded to the
President.**

What do you think about Doug Bennett
seeing this?

yes



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES CONNOR
FROM: DOUGLAS P. BENNETT **DPB**
SUBJECT: John Connally's PFIAB
Membership

Per your Action Memo of October 11 on the above subject, I fully concur with the position taken and the letter to Congressman Nedzi.

MEMORANDUM

4676 Add On


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

October 11, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: John Connally's PFIAB Membership

Representative Michael Harrington (Democrat - Massachusetts) has written (Tab B) to urge that you request the resignation of John Connally from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. His contention is that Connally's involvement in a private organization that is alerting Italians to the threat of Communism (Citizens Alliance for Mediterranean Freedom) is incompatible with his oversight and advisory responsibilities as a member of PFIAB. Harrington charges that "while Mr. Connally's public and private positions may not directly violate any conflict of interest statutes, his simultaneous roles as advisor and advocate contravene the spirit of public policy directed at intelligence community reform." In Harrington's view, Connally's continued presence on PFIAB "only heightens the prevailing public skepticism" about the seriousness of your efforts to strengthen the foreign intelligence oversight and review process.

Harrington has circulated copies of his letter to you to colleagues in the House and Senate, inserted it in the Congressional Record, written at least one newspaper article, and otherwise attempted to make his feelings public and stimulate support. These activities do not, however, appear to have stirred up much interest. The new Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been silent on the subject. The only mail received at the White House has been a letter from Representative Sam B. Hall of Texas (Tab C) expressing his total opposition to Harrington's ploy and a request from Representative Nedzi (Tab D) for your views. Nedzi is chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House Armed Services Committee. In his letter he expresses no personal views about Connally's membership on PFIAB but asks for your views because Harrington's conflict of interest charges "may require consideration" by his subcommittee.

CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS(2)

XGDS of E. O. 11652 by
authority of Brent Scowcroft;
Exemption Category (Section
5 (B) (2).

Determined to be an administrative marking
Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983

By KL NARS date 5/17/88

Phil Buchen believes there is no conflict of interest involved between John Connally's PFIAB role and his activities with the Citizens Alliance for Mediterranean Freedom. Jack Marsh and Max Friedersdorf agree.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the response to Representative Nedzi at Tab A, refuting the conflict of interest charge and endorsing Connally's continuing membership on PFIAB.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Nedzi:

The President has asked me to respond to your letter of August 27 concerning John Connally's membership on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

It is our firm belief that there is no conflict of interest between Mr. Connally's PFIAB role and his activities with the Citizens Alliance for Mediterranean Freedom.

The functions of PFIAB are set forth in Executive Order 11460, a copy of which is enclosed. Governor Connally's unique perspective, having served as both Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of the Navy, and his broad understanding of world affairs fully qualify him for PFIAB membership. The Citizens Alliance for Mediterranean Freedom has nothing whatever to do with the U. S. Intelligence Community.

We believe that the members of PFIAB should have the same rights as other citizens to speak out publicly on international affairs. Governor Connally's remarks concerning the Communist threat in the Mediterranean region, rather than disqualifying him for PFIAB membership, point up his perceptive understanding of the challenges to freedom we face today. It is for this very reason that the President places such high value on Governor Connally's views and advice.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Honorable Lucien N. Nedzi
Chairman
Special Subcommittee on Intelligence
Committee on Armed Services
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Enclosure

from Title 50

monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The term 'base month' shall mean the month of October 1966 for the first increase under section 291(a) (2) and thereafter the month for which the price index showed a per centum rise forming the basis for a cost-of-living annuity increase.

"(e) No increase in annuity provided by this section shall be computed on any additional annuity purchased at retirement by voluntary contributions.

"(f) The monthly installment of annuity after adjustment under this section shall be fixed at the nearest dollar, except that such installment shall, after adjustment, reflect an increase of at least \$1."

[Amended Pub.L. 90-539, Sept. 30, 1968, 82 Stat. 902; Pub.L. 91-135, § 5, Dec. 20, 1969, 83 Stat. 849; Pub.L. 93-210, § 1(a), Dec. 23, 1973, 87 Stat. 908. For effective dates of amendment, see Effective Date of 1969 and 1973 Amendments to Pub.L. 88-643 set out hereunder.]

Effective Date of 1973 Amendment. To Pub.L. 88-643, Pub.L. 93-210, § 1(b), Dec. 23, 1973, 87 Stat. 908, provided that: "The amendments made by subsection (a) [amending section 291(b) of Pub.L. 88-643] shall apply only with respect to annuities which commence on or after July 2, 1973."

Effective Date of 1969 Amendments to Pub.L. 88-643, Pub.L. 91-135, § 6, Dec. 20, 1969, 83 Stat. 849, provided that:

"(a) The amendments made by section 1 [amending section 211(a) of Pub.L. 88-643] shall become effective at the

beginning of the first applicable pay period beginning after December 31, 1969.

"(b) The amendments made by sections 3, 4, [respectively amending sections 231(a) and 232(h) of Pub.L. 88-643] and 2, [amending section 221 of Pub.L. 88-643, and adding new pars. (g) and (h) at the end thereof] with the exception of 2(c) [amending subsec. (c) thereof] shall become effective October 20, 1969.

"(c) The amendments made by sections 2(c) and 5 [amending sections 221(c) and 291 of Pub.L. 88-643] shall become effective November 1, 1969.

"(d) The amendments made by sections 2(a), 2(e), 3, and 4(a) (1)-(2) [amending section 221(a), adding section 221(h), and amending sections 231(a) and 232(b) of Pub.L. 88-643] shall not apply in the cases of persons retired or otherwise separated prior to October 20, 1969, and the rights of such persons and their survivors shall continue in the same manner and to the same extent as if such sections had not been enacted."

Communication of Restricted Data. Authorization for the communication of Restricted Data by the Central Intelligence Agency, see Ex.Ord.No.10699, Dec. 12, 1960, 25 F.R. 12729, set out as a note under section 2162 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

Legislative History: For legislative history and purpose of Act Apr. 4, 1953, see 1953 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 1339.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10656

Ex.Ord.No.10656, Feb. 6, 1955, 21 F.R. 859, formerly set out as a note under this section, which established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelli-

gence Activities, was revoked by Ex.Ord.No.10933, May 4, 1961, 26 F.R. 3951, set out as a note under this section.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10933

Ex.Ord.No.10933, May 4, 1961, 26 F.R. 3951, formerly set out as a note under this section, which established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, was

revoked by Ex.Ord.No.11460, Mar. 20, 1969, 34 F.R. 5535, set out as a note under this section.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11460

Mar. 20, 1969, 34 F.R. 5535

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

Section 1. There is hereby established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, hereinafter referred to as "the Board". The Board shall:

(1) advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities making up the overall national intelligence effort;

(2) conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence and related activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies are engaged;

(3) receive, consider and take appropriate action with respect to matters identified to the Board, by the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies of the intelligence community, in which the support of the Board will further the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort; and

(4) report to the President concerning the Board's findings and appraisals, and make appropriate recommendations for actions to achieve increased effectiveness of the Government's foreign intelligence effort in meeting national intelligence needs.

Sec. 2. In order to facilitate performance of the Board's functions, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all other departments and agencies shall make available to the Board all information with respect to foreign intelligence and related matters which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to the President in accordance with the terms of this Order. Such information made available to the Board shall be given all necessary security protection in accordance with the terms and provisions of applicable laws and regulations.

Sec. 3. Members of the Board shall be appointed by the President from among persons outside the Government, qualified on the basis of knowledge and experience in matters relating to the national defense and security, or possessing other knowledge and abilities which may be expected to contribute to the effective performance of the Board's duties. The members of the Board shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed hereafter.

Sec. 4. The Board shall have a staff headed by an Executive Secretary, who shall be appointed by the President and shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be

prescribed Secretary to the applicant with compensation be necessary Board's d. Sec. 5. of the B and memb other exp the work from the headi

Privileges Summary Termination

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Under this Central Intell to terminate son whose con patible with United States standing the protecting the ployees in ca v. U. S., 1962 nued 83 S.Ct. 61.

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2. Privilege: As governme secrecy was against employ Agency, prop Director of the court made su that the privi

§ 403a. S

When used

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prescribed by the Board. The Executive Secretary shall be authorized, subject to the approval of the Board and consistent with law, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary for performance of the Board's duties.

Sec. 5. Compensation and allowances of the Board, the Executive Secretary, and members of the staff, together with other expenses arising in connection with the work of the Board, shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the heading "Special Projects" in the

Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969, Public Law 90-350, 82 Stat. 195; and, to the extent permitted by law, from any corresponding appropriation which may be made for subsequent years. Such payments shall be made without regard to the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised Statutes and section 9 of the Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 672 and 673) [sections 672 and 673 of Title 31, Money and Finance].

Sec. 6. Executive Order No. 10938 of May 4, 1961, is hereby revoked.

RICHARD NIXON

Notes of Decisions

Privilege 2
Summary judgment 3
Termination of employment 1

Library references
United States 29 et seq.
War and National Defense 40
C.J.S. United States §§ 34, 62
C.J.S. War and National Defense § 48

1. Termination of employment

Director of Central Intelligence Agency acted within authority conferred upon him by Congress and in accordance with his own regulations when he terminated one's employment with Agency for lack of suitability for positions and grades available after Director reviewed case, consulted with senior officials, and concluded that the individual was unsuitable for continued employment and deemed it necessary in interests of United States to terminate the employment. *Torpatz v. McCone*, 1962, 300 F.2d 914, 112 U.S.App. D.C. 159, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 182, 371 U.S. 886, 9 L.Ed.2d 121.

Under this section, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has authority to terminate the employment of any person whose continued retention is not compatible with the best interests of the United States, and this is so notwithstanding the provisions of other statutes protecting the rights of Government employees in cases of dismissals. *Rhodes v. U. S.*, 1962, 156 Ct.Cl. 31, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 39, 371 U.S. 821, 9 L.Ed.2d 41.

The fact that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency commenced plaintiff's separation under the selection procedure, did not preclude the employee's later separation under this section, and applicable departmental Regulation 20-740. *Id.*

2. Privilege

As governmental claim of privilege of secrecy was, in slander suit brought against employee of Central Intelligence Agency, properly invoked generally by Director of the agency, and as district court made sufficient inquiry to assure that the privilege had not been lightly

invoked, without pressing so far as to reveal the very state secrets the privilege is intended to protect, district court properly balanced conflicting interests and properly allowed invocation of the privilege against taking employee's deposition. *Heine v. Raus*, C.A.Md.1968, 399 F.2d 785, 33 A.L.R.3d 1318, on remand 305 F.Supp. 816.

Absolute executive privilege was available to defendant, a Central Intelligence Agency employee against whom slander action was brought, if the instruction given defendant to warn members of Estonian emigre groups that plaintiff was a Soviet Intelligence Agent was issued with approval of Central Intelligence Agency Director or of a subordinate authorized by the Director, or if the giving of the instruction was subsequently ratified and proved by such an official. *Id.*

Record established that instructions given defendant, Central Intelligence Agency employee to warn members of Estonian emigre group that plaintiff was Soviet intelligence agent were given with approval of CIA director or of subordinate authorized by director to issue such instructions, and that giving of instructions was ratified and approved by deputy director, entitling defendant to assert defense relating to disclosure of state secrets in slander action. *Heine v. Raus*, D.C. Md.1968, 305 F.Supp. 816, affirmed 432 F.2d 1007, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1268, 402 U.S. 914, 28 L.Ed.2d 658.

3. Summary judgment

Summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Central Intelligence Agency employee against whom slander action was brought on ground of executive privilege would be vacated and case remanded for determination of whether defendant's instruction to warn members of Estonian emigre groups that plaintiff was a dispatched Soviet Intelligence Agent was issued with approval of the Central Intelligence Agency Director or of a subordinate authorized by the Director, or whether the giving of said instruction was subsequently ratified and approved by such an official. *Heine v. Raus*, C.A.Md.1968, 399 F.2d 785, 33 A.L.R.3d 1218, on remand 305 F.Supp. 816.

§ 403a. Same; definitions

When used in sections 403b-403j of this title, the term—

- (a) "Agency" means the Central Intelligence Agency;
- (b) "Director" means the Director of Central Intelligence;
- (c) "Government agency" means any executive department, commission, council, independent establishment, corporation wholly or partly owned by the United States which is an instrumentality of the United States, board, bureau, division, service, office, officer, authority, administration, or other establishment, in the executive branch of the Government.

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON
6TH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
(202) 225-8020

DISTRICT OFFICES:
POST OFFICE BUILDING
SALEM, MASSACHUSETTS 01970
(617) 745-5800

POST OFFICE BUILDING
LYNN, MASSACHUSETTS 01901
(617) 599-7103

August 14, 1976

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I write to urge that you request the immediate resignation of John Connally from the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The conflict between Mr. Connally's public role as a member of the Board and his private role as chairman of the Citizens Alliance for Mediterranean Freedom -- in which he openly advocates interference or, as he terms it, "meddling," in the internal affairs of foreign governments -- can only be reconciled by his resignation.

In February you affirmed your commitment to a "comprehensive program" of reform of the intelligence agencies to halt documented past abuses. As part of the broader effort at reform, you expanded the membership of the Board and reappointed John Connally to it. Yet any promise of reform your action may have inspired is severely compromised by Mr. Connally's continued presence on the Board. To permit an individual who actively and professionally endorses the concept of U.S. intervention abroad to review our intelligence efforts represents a major step backwards in the concept of effective oversight.

For the Board to provide "independent, nonpartisan advice on the effectiveness of our foreign intelligence efforts," as you stressed on March 11, the members themselves must be impartial, dispassionate and objective. An individual who is devoting a portion of his private life to heading an organization whose express purpose is overt interference in the internal affairs of foreign governments can hardly be said to possess the degree of impartiality necessary to review covert interference in the affairs of these same governments by the intelligence agencies. The intelligence agencies themselves are capable and zealous advocates of their plans and programs. If the overseers and analysts are equally zealous advocates, then the oversight and review process becomes irretrievably impaired.

The President
Washington, D.C.

Page Two
August 14, 1976

In a June 6 New York Times ad, John Connally announced the formation of the Citizens Alliance for Mediterranean Freedom, an activist organization that would concern itself with the "deteriorating situation in Southern Europe, the Middle East and Northern Africa." As its first order of business, Mr. Connally stated, the organization would attempt to warn Italian citizens "not to become beguiled by the unfulfilled promises of communism." To this end, Mr. Connally continued, an effort would be made to recruit "millions" of Americans to carry out a "vigorous program of activity" which would include the establishment of "communications" between "concerned Americans and their counterparts in Mediterranean nations." When asked if such activities constituted "meddling" in the internal affairs of foreign countries, Mr. Connally conceded that such action "probably is meddling" (Houston Post, May 4).

The case of Italy provides a clear illustration of the incompatibility of Mr. Connally's public and private sector roles. Last December, in briefings of congressional committees, then CIA Director William Colby reported your approval of "\$6 million in secret cash payments to individual anti-Communist political leaders in Italy...in an effort to prevent Communist gains" (New York Times, January 7). As a member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, whose purpose is to review the objectives, conduct and management of the overall national intelligence effort (Executive Order 11460), Mr. Connally would be expected to make recommendations on our intelligence efforts in Italy. But as head of a private group that is actively engaged in furthering specific political objectives in Italy, it is inconceivable that Mr. Connally would be in a position to provide the Executive Office with a detached and balanced assessment of the scope and direction of our foreign intelligence efforts in that country.

While Mr. Connally's public and private positions may not directly violate any conflict of interest statutes, his simultaneous roles as advisor and advocate contravene the spirit of public policy directed at intelligence community reform. Thus I find it clearly improper -- indeed, alarming -- that an individual charged with the serious responsibility of evaluation of intelligence activities should compromise this obligation by pursuing private ends through a course of action which in his own words constitutes "meddling" in the internal affairs of other countries. After a year of public debate over the need for intelligence community reform,


The President
Washington, D.C.

Page Three
August 14, 1976

Mr. Connally's continued presence on the Board only heightens the prevailing public skepticism about the seriousness of Executive efforts to strengthen the oversight and review process.

The history of abuses by our intelligence agencies can be directly traced to superficial or nonexistent oversight by Executive and Legislative authorities. In the interest of the reforms you affirmed earlier this year, I am taking this opportunity to urge in the strongest terms that you give this matter your immediate and most serious consideration. Clearly the only appropriate response is that you request Mr. Connally's immediate resignation from the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Yours sincerely,



Michael J. Harrington

MJH:sml

cc: Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence

Representative Lee Hamilton, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Investigations, International Relations Committee

14
SAM B. HALL, JR.
FIRST DISTRICT
STATE OF TEXAS

WASHINGTON ADDRESS:
1009 LONGWORTH HOUSE
OFFICE BUILDING
20515

8-26
COMMITTEES:
JUDICIARY
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
C

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

August 19, 1976

Mr
encl
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your benefit copy of a letter that I have mailed to Honorable Michael J. Harrington in reply to his letter to you dated August 14, 1976, and his "Dear Colleague" letter dated August 16, 1976, concerning the request for the resignation of John Connally from the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

As you can see from my letter to Mr. Harrington, I am totally opposed to his request.

Yours very truly,


Sam B. Hall, Jr.

cc: Congressman Michael J. Harrington

Honorable John Connally

Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Congressman Lee Hamilton, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Investigations,
International Relations Committee

SAM B. HALL, JR.
FIRST DISTRICT
STATE OF TEXAS

WASHINGTON ADDRESS:
1009 LONGWORTH HOUSE
OFFICE BUILDING
20515

COMMITTEES:
JUDICIARY
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

August 20, 1976

Honorable Michael J. Harrington
405 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Harrington:


I received your "Dear Colleague" letter dated August 16th in which you urged the President to request the resignation of John Connally from the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

In reading your August 14th letter to the President, I notice that you state that Mr. Connally's public and private positions may not directly violate any conflict of interest statutes -- with this I agree. To the contrary, however, I do not believe that Governor Connally's admonition to the Italian citizens "not to become beguiled by the unfilled promises of Communism" is anything less than an admirable statement. I do not believe that it can be interpreted as "meddling" when a concerned American citizen expresses his views concerning the evils of Communism.

Therefore, I totally reject the tenor of your letter of August 14th and would respectfully request of the President that he continue to utilize the services of Governor Connally in the conduct of the affairs of this nation. I must add that I have known Governor Connally for fifteen years and firmly believe that there is not a more loyal and dedicated person in America today than he.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am,

Yours very truly,



Sam B. Hall, Jr.

Honorable Michael J. Harrington
Page Two

cc: Honorable John Connally

Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Representative Lee Hamilton, Chairman
Subcommittee on Investigations, International
Relations Committee

8-30

F. EDWARD HEBERT, LA.
CHARLES E. BENNETT, FLA.
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, N.Y.
RICHARD H. ICHORD, MO.
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, MICH.
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, MO.
CHARLES H. WILSON, CALIF.
ROBERT L. LEGGETT, CALIF.
FLOYD V. HICKS, WASH.
RICHARD C. WHITE, TEX.
BILL NICHOLS, ALA.
JACK BRINKLEY, GA.
ROBERT H. (BOB) MOLLOHAN, W. VA.
DAN DANIEL, VA.
G. V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, MISS.
HAROLD RUNNELS, N. MEX.
LES ASPIN, WIS.
RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIF.
MENDEL J. DAVIS, S.C.
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLO.
ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR., TEX.
ANTONIO B. WON PAT, GUAM
BOB CARR, MICH.
JIM LLOYD, CALIF.
LARRY MC DONALD, GA.
THOMAS J. DOWNEY, N.Y.

BOB WILSON, CALIF.
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, ALA.
G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST, VA.
FLOYD D. SPENCE, S.C.
DAVID C. TREEN, LA.
GEORGE M. O'BRIEN, ILL.
ROBIN L. BEARD, TENN.
DONALD J. MITCHELL, N.Y.
MARJORIE S. HOLT, MD.
ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR., VA.
ELWOOD H. (BUD) HILLIS, IND.
ANDREW J. HINSHAW, CALIF.
RICHARD T. SCHULZE, PA.
FRANK M. SLATINSHEK, CHIEF COUNSEL

U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, D.C. 20515

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

MELVIN PRICE, CHAIRMAN

August 27, 1976

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515


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Dear Mr. President:

Our attention has been invited to press reports and allegations that there exists a possible conflict of interest between the membership of Mr. John Connally on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and his reported private activities as Chairman of the Citizens Alliance for Mediterranean Freedom. Specifically, reports have been received concerning the public statements of Mr. Connally with reference to political matters in Italy and other Mediterranean countries, which were allegedly made by Mr. Connally in the latter capacity and, thus, could be in possible conflict with his duties as a member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Since I believe that this subject is one which may require consideration by the Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in pursuit of its oversight responsibilities, I, as chairman of the subcommittee, would appreciate receiving your comments on this possible conflict of interest involving Mr. Connally as noted above.

Sincerely,



LUCIEN N. NEDZI
Chairman
Special Subcommittee on Intelligence

LNN:wha