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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/GDSACTION

February 17, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: U. S. Military Relationship with Egypt

Secretary Kissinger has developed a proposal (Tab C) for dealing with our future military relationship with Egypt. This proposal is designed so as to cope with the opposition to such a relationship in Israel as well as in the U. S. It is based on a concept of grouping equipment which we might supply into categories ranging from the least to the most sensitive politically.

You have approved the sale of six C-130s and the provision of military training to the Egyptians. Secretary Kissinger informed Israeli Prime Minister Rabin of the C-130 sale, and you have broached the issue in general terms with Chairman Morgan and the group of Congressmen who visited Egypt in early January. If we are to meet the commitment to Sadat to begin delivery of the C-130s in March, it will be necessary to begin consultations with Congress immediately. Moreover, word of the C-130 sale has appeared in the press and has provoked a sharp increase in questioning from Congress. Two required elements in consulting Congress will be a Presidential Determination making Egypt eligible for purchases under the Foreign Military Sales Act and a Letter of Offer and Availability for the C-130s in accordance with the Nelson-Bingham Amendment.

The Kissinger memorandum points up the need to develop an overall strategy at the outset of our military supply relationship with Egypt. Sadat has been promised C-130s and U. S. military training, as well as a response for his broader request for U. S. arms. There is pressure from U. S. firms for licenses to export military-related equipment to Egypt. There is also considerable public and Congressional interest in the issue, and countries such as Great Britain are pressing us to approve the transfer to Egypt of certain weapons manufactured by them under U. S. license. It is in the U. S. interest to establish at least a modest military relationship with Egypt in order to sustain Sadat's confidence in the U. S., with all that implies for our ability to influence events in the

SECRET/NODIS/GDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 92-66 #22 NSC Mr. 9/19/95

By KBH NARA, Date 10/30/95

area, and to maintain our credibility with countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. These nations see a U.S./Egyptian military supply relationship as a symbol of U.S. support for a moderate Arab leader who has turned away from the USSR. Weighing against this is Israel's extreme sensitivity to any U.S. arms relationship with the Arabs.

Given the high visibility and political sensitivity of this issue, we must expect a major debate in Congress on the entire question of U.S. arms assistance to Egypt when any notification is made to Congress. The Administration's response to Congressional and public questioning as to what we plan to do militarily for Egypt, including our long-term intentions, will have a significant effect on whether or not approval can be obtained for the C-130s, and on the fate of other items we may wish to provide in the future.

It is therefore important to have an overall approach which will provide a framework for the C-130s transfer and for our overall arms relationship with Egypt. Sadat, as well as the Congress, needs to know what we intend to do. A first step is to devise categories of equipment or services according to their probable political sensitivity, ranging from a minimal U.S. response to a full-scale U.S./Egyptian military cooperation relationship. The following categories include illustrative items or services which have attracted Egyptian interest, in ascending order of political sensitivity and military impact. (Approval of this categorical approach is not intended to imply approval for any specific items, which should be examined on a case-by-case basis.)

CATEGORY A: Dual Purpose Military/Civilian Equipment

Executive aircraft

Telephone and telegraph equipment

Air traffic control equipment

CATEGORY B: Military Training and Visits

Training at U.S. schools

Visits by senior military officers

CATEGORY C: Passive Military Equipment (Surveillance/Electronic)

Target drones

Radio transceivers

Passive night vision devices

CATEGORY D: Transport Equipment

Military Transport aircraft (C-130s)

Helicopters

CATEGORY E: Non-Lethal Items Associated with Lethal Systems

Air Defense Command and Control Equipment

U. S. Engines for installation in Soviet-built tanks

CATEGORY F: Lethal Military Equipment (politically less sensitive)

Armored personnel carriers

Anti-tank missiles (TOW)

Less sophisticated fighter/interceptor aircraft (particularly F-5) and related equipment and arms

Torpedoes

CATEGORY G: Lethal Military Equipment (politically more sensitive)

Tanks

Advanced and attack aircraft (particularly F-4, A-7, F-14/15/16)

Missiles

I concur in the recommendation of Secretary Kissinger to develop an overall strategy for dealing with this very sensitive issue. The category approach offers a reasonable framework for developing our own planning on the subject,

for discussing our intentions with Egypt and other interested states (e. g., Iran and Saudi Arabia) and for explaining our position to Congress.

The question of Congressional consultations will have to be handled with care. There will need to be a full and frank discussion as to why it is in the national interest to pursue an arms relationship with Egypt, what effect our sales to Egypt will have on the Arab-Israeli military balance, and an exploration of what categories of equipment and services would be acceptable to Congress. During this consultation process, the question of approval of exceptional items in the higher categories such as the MK-44 torpedo and the F-5 aircraft, in which Egypt is particularly interested, can be introduced if the climate appears favorable.

I believe these consultations should begin immediately. The Presidential Determination and the Letter of Offer should actually go to Congress by March 1 if we are to meet the C-130 delivery schedule promised Sadat. Two alternative Presidential Determinations with accompanying justification have been prepared for your consideration and are attached at Tabs A and B.

The first Determination at Tab A is unrestricted, consistent with the approach of trying to work out with Congress prior agreement on general categories, with a case-by-case follow-up. In the course of consultations more precision would be developed as to what we will and will not sell, and when. This would become a sort of unofficial "legislative history" of our military supply relationship and, as such, would tend to supplement the formal Determination and accompanying justification. This approach would allow maximum flexibility, give us the possibility of moving gradually into a broader military supply relationship which would be more meaningful to Egypt, and would avoid the problem of having to go back to Congress with a new Determination for each new step.

The alternative Determination at Tab B would be part of a more limited approach to the entire problem, in which we would consult Congress and seek approval only for the C-130s and military training, stating that this is all we intend to do at present and that we will come back to Congress at a later date when and if we decide to do more. This concept, because of its restrictive nature, would cause us problems with Egypt and other governments such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UK. However, it might be more acceptable to some members of Congress than opening up the idea of a broader relationship, even though we could always fall back from the broader to the narrower approach if absolutely necessary in the context of consulting Congress on the former.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve moving forward with an unrestricted Presidential Determination and beginning consultations with Congress immediately on the basis of the category approach outlined above. A Presidential Determination, accompanied by a justification, is attached for your signature at Tab A. (State and Defense concur.)

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively

That we proceed on the basis of a Presidential Determination and Congressional consultations restricted to the sale of C-130s and training services. An appropriate Presidential Determination and justification for this more restricted alternative is provided for your signature at Tab B.

Approve alternative option _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Eligibility of Egypt for Cash Purchases of Equipment
and Services under the Foreign Military Sales Act,
as Amended

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 3(a)(1) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, I hereby find that the cash sale to Egypt of equipment and services, including training of Egyptian personnel, will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are requested, on my behalf, to report this finding to the Congress.

This finding, which futher amends Presidential Determination No. 73-10 of January 2, 1973 (38 F.R. 7211) as amended by Presidential Determinations No. 73-12 of April 26, 1973 (38 F.R. 12799), No. 74-9 of December 13, 1973 (39 F.R. 3537), and No. 75-2 of October 29, 1974 (39 F.R. 39863), shall be published in the Federal Register.

*Signed
2/19/76*

cc: The Secretary of Defense

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Justification for Presidential Determination to Authorize Cash Purchases of Equipment and Services for Egypt

United States policy in the Middle East since late 1973 has had two thrusts:

- the intensive effort to help Arabs and Israelis move toward a negotiated peace and
- an effort to broaden and deepen our bilateral relationships with the nations of the Middle East.

The two are mutually reinforcing and are intended to strengthen the US position in an area of increasing importance, and reduce the potential for another war in the Middle East.

Since the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, relations between the United States and Egypt have evolved in a manner which has opened the way for mutual cooperation on a broad front. Over the past two years, a close and fruitful political relationship necessary for the continued success of the step-by-step approach to a Middle East settlement has been established between the United States and Egypt. In pursuance of the goal of a peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflict, President Sadat has taken major steps toward a negotiated solution and has turned much of Egypt's resources to the task of economic and social development. He has made clear his desire to work closely with the United States in developing Egypt and has turned away from previous policies of close cooperation with the USSR in the political, economic and military fields.

The United States has an important stake in maintaining the momentum behind our new relationship with Egypt. We have embarked upon a program of economic and technical assistance to Egypt designed to strengthen its economy and improve the lot of its people. It is particularly important that we allow our improved bilateral relationship with Egypt to develop by allowing at this time a modest degree of cooperation in the military field.

As a result of severe restrictions placed upon its acquisition of military equipment from other sources the Egyptian Government seeks to diversify its sources of military supply. In this context, and because of its desire to increase its cooperation with the United States, Egypt has asked the

United States to provide training for Egyptian personnel and make available certain types of military equipment. The provision of such equipment and services would strengthen the confidence of Egyptians in the United States, broaden the constructive relationship between Americans and Egyptians, make it possible for Egypt to continue to follow the policy course it has pursued over the past two years, and thus assist in our efforts to obtain a final and durable peace in the area.

With authorization under the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Department of Defense can respond to these requests through cash sales.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Eligibility of Egypt for Cash Purchases of C-130 Aircraft
and United States Military Schools under the Foreign
Military Sales Act, as Amended

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 3(a)(1) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, I hereby find that the cash sale to Egypt of C-130 aircraft and training of Egyptian personnel, will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are requested, on my behalf, to report this finding to the Congress.

This finding, which futher amends Presidential Determination No. 73-10 of January 2, 1973 (38 F.R. 7211) as amended by Presidential Determinations No. 73-12 of April 26, 1973 (38 F.R. 12799), No. 74-9 of December 13, 1973 (39 F.R. 3537), and No. 75-2 of October 29, 1974 (39 F.R. 39863), shall be published in the Federal Register.

cc: The Secretary of Defense

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Justification for Presidential Determination to Authorize Cash Purchases of C-130 Aircraft and Training for Egyptian Personnel in United States Military Schools

United States policy in the Middle East since late 1973 has had two thrusts:

- the intensive effort to help Arabs and Israelis move toward a negotiated peace and
- an effort to broaden and deepen our bilateral relationships with the nations of the Middle East.

The two are mutually reinforcing and are intended to strengthen the US position in an area of increasing importance, and reduce the potential for another war in the Middle East.

Since the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, relations between the United States and Egypt have evolved in a manner which has opened the way for mutual cooperation on a broad front. Over the past two years, a close and fruitful political relationship necessary for the continued success of the step-by-step approach to a Middle East settlement has been established between the United States and Egypt. In pursuance of the goal of a peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflict, President Sadat has taken major steps toward a negotiated solution and has turned much of Egypt's resources to the task of economic and social development. He has made clear his desire to work closely with the United States in developing Egypt and has turned away from previous policies of close cooperation with the USSR in the political, economic and military fields.

The United States has an important stake in maintaining the momentum behind our new relationship with Egypt. We have embarked upon a program of economic and technical assistance to Egypt designed to strengthen its economy and improve the lot of its people. It is particularly important that we allow our improved bilateral relationship with Egypt to develop by allowing at this time a modest degree of cooperation in the military field.

As a result of severe restrictions placed upon its acquisition of military equipment from other sources the Egyptian Government seeks to diversify its sources of military supply. In this context, and because of its desire to increase its cooperation with the United States, Egypt has asked the

United States to provide training for Egyptian personnel and make available C-130 aircraft. The provision of such equipment and services would strengthen the confidence of Egyptians in the United States, broaden the constructive relationship between Americans and Egyptians, make it possible for Egypt to continue to follow the policy course it has pursued over the past two years, and thus assist in our efforts to obtain a final and durable peace in the area.

With authorization under the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Department of Defense can respond to these requests through cash sales.

ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00623

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700213
Reason for Withdrawal : NS,National security restriction
Type of Material : MEM,Memo(s)
Creator's Name : Henry Kissinger
Receiver's Name : President
Description : re military relationship with Egy
Creation Date : 01/12/1976
Volume (pages) : 8
Date Withdrawn : 05/05/1988

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*Sanitized copy in open file,
3/19/93*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

7600461
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January 12, 1976

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

Subject: US Military Relationship with Egypt

The purpose of this memorandum is to outline for your consideration a scenario to lay the groundwork for a US military supply policy toward Egypt early in 1976.

There are several reasons for developing an overall strategy for a military supply relationship with Egypt: (a) Sadat has been promised a response to his statement of need, and to his requests for various individual items, (b) we have received during the past year a steady stream of requests from US firms for export licenses or advisory opinions on export licenses, and we need a policy framework for giving applicants a prompt and straight answer, (c) the issue of arms for Egypt is stirring considerable public and Congressional interest -- not only direct supply by the US but our attitude toward the transfer to Egypt of US-supplied arms to third countries, and (d) we are being pressed by third countries (as well as Egypt) to approve the transfer of arms to Egypt, both when our approval is not required (e.g., the British Jaguar) and when it is (e.g., the British MK-44 torpedo).

More fundamentally, establishing at least a modest military supply relationship with Egypt is very important if we are to sustain Sadat's confidence in the United States during a period when he is under heavy criticism and pressures from certain Arab countries and the USSR. It is also important in

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GDS

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
EXEMPTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 1.3 (a) (5)

MR 92-68 #23, State Mr. 2/5/93

By KBH, NARA, Date 3/19/93

maintaining our credibility with the Governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia, who have supported our Middle East policy and support Sadat, as forces for moderation in the Middle East. They have been anxious for some time to have the United States supply military equipment to Egypt, seeing it (as Sadat does) as a concrete symbol of our willingness to support a moderate leader who has turned his country away from the USSR. They are also eager to assist Egypt directly by providing training on US-supplied military equipment, particularly aircraft (F-4s, F-5s and C-130s), and Saudi Arabia has informed us and Sadat that it is prepared to pay for the arms which Egypt is allowed to buy from the US.

On the other hand, Israel is always sensitive to US arms supply to Arab countries and we can be certain that any decision taken with respect to a military supply relationship with Egypt will receive the closest scrutiny. Israel will expect to be consulted by us before a final decision is made and could well come out against even a modest program, despite prior consultation.

The need for a decision on an overall policy is urgent due to our commitment to Sadat to begin delivering C-130s in March and to our earlier commitment to supply military training which the Egyptians have now formally requested us to implement. Also, the British are pressing us about the release of MK-44 torpedoes. Our supply of either aircraft or training will require a Presidential Determination that Egypt is eligible for sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act. Additionally, in order to deliver the first C-130 on schedule, the Letter of Offer (LOA) will have to go to Congress for review under the Nelson-Bingham Amendment before the LOA can be released to Cairo for signing.

Since significant opposition can be expected from the Israelis, certain members of Congress, and some portions of the media and since Egypt's needs are compelling, we must have a strong rationale for whatever we do. Our decisions will have to take into account the "level of tolerance" for US military support

of Egypt. The best way to determine this is through Congressional consultations.

Once the initial request for Congressional approval of C-130s and training is made, we must expect a major debate in the press and Congress, as well as stiff questioning by the Israelis on what else we intend to do for Egypt in the military field. In talking to Congress and/or to Israeli officials about the C-130 and training questions, it will be necessary for us to provide a policy line on the intentions of the USG for direct supply of (or refusal to supply) various broad categories of military equipment to Egypt, on our policy toward third-country assistance or transfers to Egypt involving US-supplied equipment, and probably on our attitude toward the acquisition of sophisticated arms by Egypt from Western European sources. We are certain to get questions on all these aspects of the Egyptian arms issue and our response will have a significant influence upon whether or not we can obtain approval for the C-130s, as well as upon the fate of future items we might wish to supply. There is almost no prospect of being able to avoid answering these questions in fairly specific terms if we wish to obtain the necessary Congressional support and avoid restrictive conditions as the price of approval. Moreover, it is important to Egypt, as well as potential third-country suppliers, to have realistic expectations of what we intend to do and not do, so Sadat can plan to obtain elsewhere what we cannot provide.

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STAFFING

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.:

Date: February 17, 1976

Time:

FOR ACTION:

cc (for information):

- Max Friedersdorf
- Phil Buchen
- Jack Marsh

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date:

Wednesday, February 18

Time:

10 A.M.

SUBJECT:

Brent Scowcroft memo 2/17/76 re
U. S. Military Relationship with Egypt

ACTION REQUESTED:

For Necessary Action

For Your Recommendations

Prepare Agenda and Brief

Draft Reply

For Your Comments

Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

*Friedersdorf - concur Scowcroft
recommendation*
Marsh - concur Tab "A"

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

James E. Connor
For the President

Date: February 17, 1976

Time:

FFB 17 1976

due: 2/18

10:06

FOR ACTION:

cc (for information):

- Max Friedersdorf
- Phil Buchen
- Jack Marsh

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: Wednesday, February 18

Time: 10 A.M.

SUBJECT:

Brent Scowcroft memo 2/17/76 re
U.S. Military Relationship with Egypt

ACTION REQUESTED:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> For Necessary Action | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> For Your Recommendations |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Agenda and Brief | <input type="checkbox"/> Draft Reply |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> For Your Comments | <input type="checkbox"/> Draft Remarks |

REMARKS:

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Concur Tab "A"
JM

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

James E. Connor _____
For the President

Date: February 17, 1976

Time:

FOR ACTION:

Max Friedersdorf

Phil Buchen

Jack Marsh

cc (for information):

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: Wednesday, February 18

Time: 10 A.M.

SUBJECT:

Brent Scowcroft memo 2/17/76 re
U. S. Military Relationship with Egypt

ACTION REQUESTED:

 For Necessary Action For Your Recommendations Prepare Agenda and Brief Draft Reply For Your Comments Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

February 19, 1976

No legal objections. (I assume that the Letter of Offer to be provided in accordance with the Nelson-Bingham Amendment will be reviewed by the legal offices at State and Defense before it is submitted to the Congress.)

T.W.B.
Philip W. Buchen

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

James E. Connor
For the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CONNOR
FROM: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M.F.*
SUBJECT: Brent Scowcroft memo 2/17/76 re
U.S. Military Relationship with Egypt

The Office of Legislative Affairs concurs with Scowcroft memo .