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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1975

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH
FROM: JIM CONNOR *JEC*
SUBJECT: Claim of Executive Privilege

The President reviewed your memorandum of November 13 on the above subject and approved the following:

"Claim Executive privilege and withhold documents"

Please follow-up with appropriate action.

cc: Dick Cheney

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(When With Attachments)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECISION

November 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JACK MARS *JM*
SUBJECT: CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain your decision on whether or not certain documents recently subpoenaed by the Pike Committee should be withheld on the grounds of Executive privilege.

BACKGROUND

Thus far in your Administration, you have not withheld documents requested by the Select Committees on Intelligence on the basis of Executive privilege.

On Thursday, November 6, the Pike Committee (on a motion initiated by Bob McClory) voted overwhelmingly to issue seven subpoenas, five of which were directed to the NSC, one to the State Department and one to the CIA. The due date on the subpoenas was 10:00 Tuesday morning, November 11. With the exception of the subpoenas directed to the Secretary of State, we are in substantial compliance, although serious disagreements still exist in certain areas.

The Kissinger subpoena requests State Department documents recommending covert operations during the period from 1961 to the present. A preliminary search of State Department records shows that eight documents (the first is 1962 and the latest is 1969) were sent from the State Department to the 303 Committee of the NSC (the predecessor to the 40 Committee). Three are memorandums to the President (two from Dean Rusk). The documents are recommendations of the State Department that the President approve covert operations. See Tab A for a summary of these documents. See Tab B for copies of the subpoenaed documents.

The State Department has declined to turn over these documents to the Committee, pointing out that they were sent to the White House and therefore the decision must be made here. They have been reviewed personally by Attorney General Levi, and he believes that they can be withheld on the basis of Executive privilege and that if this is challenged in court, we are likely to win the case.

This matter should not be viewed in isolation. As you know, the Executive Branch has long maintained the position that the President has the Constitutional right, when he believes the public interest so requires, to withhold certain information from the Congress; and that his judgment in making such withholding is not generally reversible by the courts.

Over the past few years, some elements in the Congress have made a cause of the principle that the Congress is able to demand all information whatsoever from the Executive Branch, despite the fact that the only Supreme Court opinion speaking to the point states (in dictum) that Executive privilege is a Constitutional prerogative. Thus, there is now pending in the Senate legislation which would require the Executive Branch to provide all information requested, and establishing a procedure for immediate court review if the President attempts to assert a privilege and the Congress rejects the assertion. Legislation is also pending to amend the Case Act so that no Executive agreement with a foreign country will be valid until reported to the Congress. The General Accounting Office has claimed the right to examine raw investigative files, and has demanded (and been accorded) the right to examine the confidential financial statements filed by Presidential appointees with the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission annually. The issue giving rise to the current contempt of Congress action against Secretary Morton is technically one of statutory construction, but is in fact pressed by the same Congressional forces and supported by the same underlying assumptions as are behind the attacks on Executive privilege. The matter has been carried to the point where the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce has asserted the right to interview staff attorneys in the Department of Justice concerning the manner in which they prepared an opinion by the Attorney General giving legal advice to a Cabinet Secretary. It is in our view certain that a clear-cut court victory or defeat on the issue of Executive privilege will have a significant effect in discouraging or stimulating all of these Congressional efforts.

It is the view of some of your advisors, after long seeking to avoid a confrontation on this matter, that there are many

in Congress who positively desire to provoke such a confrontation. If that is the case, it can ultimately not be avoided, and it should be our aim to select the particular issue on which our public and legal posture is the strongest. The State Department subpoena, in our view, meets this description.

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Should you decline to provide these documents subpoenaed by the Pike Committee by claiming Executive privilege?

Arguments Pro and Con

The following are the arguments why you should invoke Executive privilege in this case:

- It is probable that you will ultimately have to litigate the Executive privilege question on some issue. It is best to choose a case involving both national security and communications between Cabinet officials and the President and his staff advisors, which presents the strongest possible argument, both in the public's eye and before the courts. This represents such a case.
- These documents are from previous Administrations, thus there can be no claim that you were covering up to protect you or your Administration.
- There will be other controversial claims for information concerning the intelligence matter in such areas as recommendations from PFIAB, covert activities and NSC decision-making. It will help us resolve these other issues downstream by having joined the question in a strong case, which then is up to the courts to decide.

The following are the arguments for not invoking Executive privilege:

- This will undoubtedly result in a confrontation with Congress on an issue in which most of the Committee minority members are not on your side. This can be portrayed by Pike as his effort simply to enforce the "Republican subpoena".
- Undoubtedly many members of Congress, and some in the media, will portray this as a cover-up, especially in light of your stand on the assassination report, which is likely to soon become a contentious public issue.

In addition, former President Nixon may be required to testify before the Senate Select Committee (or wage a fight against being subpoenaed) and this could be occurring while you are litigating the Pike subpoena in court. This will undoubtedly result in some commentators comparing your actions with the Watergate cover-up.

- It may be possible to compromise this issue by giving the Committee a summary of the disputed documents. It should be noted, however, that thus far the Committee has rejected compromise offers. Also, the subpoena is unartfully worded and conceivably a court could ultimately reject the case on technical grounds.

DECISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Advise the Committee that you will withhold the documents described in Tab A on the basis of Executive privilege.

Favor: Attorney General Levi, Secretary Kissinger, Jack Marsh, Brent Scowcroft, Phil Buchen

Oppose:

Approve (claim Executive privilege and withhold documents) MR 7


Disapprove (do not claim Executive privilege) _____

TAB A

ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00531

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700173
Reason for Withdrawal : NS,National security restriction
Type of Material : LIS,List(s)
Description : re documents covered by subpoena
Creation Date : 11/1975?
Volume (pages) : 2
Date Withdrawn : 05/02/1988

SANTIZED 7/00



Date: 3/22/62
Memorandum for the President
From: [Author not indicated]
Subject: Recommendations on Covert Operations [REDACTED]

Date: 7/12/62
Memorandum for the President
From: Dean Rusk
Subject: British Guiana (South America)

Date: 12/23/64
Memorandum for the 303 Committee
From: [Author not indicated]
Subject: Coordination of OPLAN 34-a (Covert action [REDACTED])
[REDACTED]

Date: 3/1/65
Memorandum to the Members of the 303 Committee
From: [Author not indicated]
Subject: Representatives of Cubans in Exile - USG Relations with RECE

Date: 12/4/65
Memorandum to the 303 Committee
From: U. Alexis Johnson
Subject: Indonesian Army Request for Medical Assistance

Date: 4/29/66
Memorandum for the President
From: Dean Rusk
Subject: U.S. Assistance to India's Unconventional Warfare Force

Date: 9/21/67
Memo: 303 Committee - Mr. Jessup
From: INR/DDC - William C. Trueheart
Subject: Handling of Documents Relating to Cuban Intervention Captured in Bolivia

Date: 9/12/69
Memorandum for 303 Committee
From: [Author not indicated]
Subject: U.S. Policy on Support for Covert Action [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


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With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

SEE NEXT PAGE

MR 00-25 #14; NSC Ltr 7/26/00
By dae NARA, Date 2/13/02

SPECIAL NOTE

State Department has just identified two more documents which probably should be included in the above list. They are also attached at Tab B. The documents are:

1. 1970 Memorandum by Ambassador Johnson to the Forty Committee concerning King Hussein's urgent request for 5,000 rifles.
2. 1972 Memorandum from Ambassador Johnson to the Forty Committee recommending that funds be given 

TAB B

ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00532

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700173
Reason for Withdrawal : NS,National security restriction
Type of Material : MEM,Memo(s)
Creator's Name : Unknown
Creator's Title : Acting Secretary
Receiver's Name : President
Description : re Italy
Creation Date : 03/22/1962
Volume (pages) : 11
Date Withdrawn : 05/02/1988

EXEMPTED 4/11/02 dal



ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00533

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700173
Reason for Withdrawal : NS, National security restriction
Type of Material : MEM, Memo(s)
Creator's Name : Dean Rusk
Receiver's Name : President
Description : re British Guiana
Creation Date : 07/12/1962
Volume (pages) : 16
Date Withdrawn : 05/02/1988

Exempted from declassification

3/16/95 KBT

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Ford Library transcription of p. 1


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: British Guiana

We have reassessed the probable orientation of an independent British Guiana under Cheddi Jagan's leadership and I attach for your consideration a paper describing the program we propose to follow (Enclosure 1).

A Special National Intelligence Estimate dated April 11, 1962, concluded "We believe...that Jagan is a Communist, though the degree of Moscow's control is not yet clear. A Jagan government in the post independence period would probably follow a policy of nonalignment in international affairs, but would probably lean in the Soviet direction."



We have also been given by the FBI a report of the American Communist Party's intention to work for Jagan economic assistance from the Soviet Bloc (Enclosure 3). Attached is a study we have prepared of contacts by the People's Progressive Party (PPP) with communists, communist fronts and the communist bloc since September 1961 (Enclosure 4). During cross examination before the Commonwealth Commission of Enquiry into the causes of the February riots Jagan admitted on June 22, 1962 that he was a communist. This admission goes after much muddled explanation by Jagan as to what the term "communist" meant and was qualified by his definition that comunist was a system based on "from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs." Further Questioning on Jagan's political beliefs was cut short on June 26 by the British Chairman of the Commission with the ruling that it was useless to pursue the subject since it had "already been established beyond peradventure" that

Dr. Jagan

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mk00-26, FBI: st. ltr 6/11/02, CIA: ltr 6/15/03

By dsl NARA Date 7/15/03

This document consists of 4 pages;
Number 4 of 7 copies, Series 9.

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eg 5 to DOD-Gilpatrick
eg 7 to CIA McConer
JUL 12 1962
to T.H. Parrott


SG 46
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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A Special National Intelligence Estimate dated April 11, 1962, concluded "We believe . . . that Jagan is a Communist, though the degree of Moscow's control is not yet clear. A Jagan government in the post independence period would probably follow a policy of nonalignment in international affairs, but would probably lean in the Soviet direction."



We have also been given by the NSA a report of the American Communist Party's intention to seek for Jagan economic assistance from the Soviet bloc (Inclosure 2). Attached as a study we have prepared of contacts by the People's Progressive Party (PPP) with communists, communist fronts and the communist bloc since September, 1961 (Inclosure 4). During cross examination before the Commonwealth Commission of Enquiry into the causes of the February riots Jagan admitted on June 22, 1962 that he was a communist. This admission came after much muddled explanation by Jagan as to what the term "communist" meant and was qualified by his definition that communism was a system based on "from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs". Further questioning on Jagan's political beliefs was cut short on June 26 by the British Chairman of the Commission with the ruling that it was useless to pursue the subject since it had "already been established beyond peradventure" that

Dr. Jagan

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Dr. Jagan was a communist.

In the light of all the evidence which has now accumulated, I believe we are obliged to base our policy on the premise that, once independent, Cheddi Jagan will establish a "Communist" regime in British Guiana and associate his country with the Soviet bloc to a degree unacceptable to us for a state in the Western Hemisphere. Such a development would have severe adverse effects in the foreign relations field and obvious undesirable repercussions within this country.

It is also my view that a policy of trying to work with Jagan, as urged by the British, will not pay off. Jagan is already too far committed emotionally and suspicious of our intentions.

I propose that we transfer the locale of the discussions with the U.S. on British Guiana to Washington and that I call in the British Ambassador and speak to him along the lines indicated in the attached paper. My thought in transferring the locale to Washington is to enable us to deal through a sympathetic British Ambassador with the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister rather than sending messages to our Embassy in London which in practice usually discusses British Guiana with the not so sympathetic Colonial Office. It is further helpful to us to talk in Washington because we have available here people with the most up-to-date U.S. information on British Guiana and we would be able to provide nuances of our current thinking to the British Ambassador.

Recommendations

I recommend that you approve specifically the following:

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realistic economic and social development program.

2. That we inform the British of our intentions [redacted]

3. That we commence, immediately [redacted] in British Guiana and initiate [redacted] discussions of political action with Burnham, Sai and D'Aguiar (Enclosure 5).

4. That in the light of the discussions referred to in No. 3 and other developments affecting British Guiana we work out the details of a political action program and seek your further approval before implementation.

5. That you approve my talking with the British Ambassador along the lines of Section I of the attached paper and that we try to maintain Washington as the venue for any further discussions on British Guiana in the immediate future. This would constitute a reply to Prime Minister Macmillan's letter to you of May 30 (Enclosure 6).

Dean Rusk

Concurrence

[redacted]

Enclosures

1. Action Program for British Guiana.

[redacted]

2. FBI report. ✓

4. State Department report on "FPP Relations with Communists, Communist Fronts, and Communist Bloc". ✓

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5. Program of Political Action. C 1176

6. Letter from Macmillan to the President of May 30.

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
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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

I. The United Kingdom

A. Discussion

Last September we agreed with the British on a policy of trying to work with Japan. On February 19, 1962, the Secretary wrote to Lord Home that he had reached the conclusion we could not put up with an independent British Guiana under Japan and urged him to agree that new elections should be scheduled and that Japan should not accede to power again. The British reacted strongly and negatively. On March 8 the President directed that no final decision on our policy toward British Guiana should be taken until further consultations were held with the British. The Secretary spoke with Lord Home in March in Geneva and, during Prime Minister Macmillan's April visit, State Department representatives reiterated to members of Macmillan's staff our hope that alternatives to Japan's leadership would emerge prior to independence.



The dominant British preoccupation is to disengage themselves of responsibility for British Guiana as quickly and decently as possible. They see no easy practical alternative to Japan and are seeking to stabilize the situation under his leadership. They are intent on avoiding being faced with a need to suspend the constitution and resume direct rule as they did in 1953. You will recall that at the time of the February riots British troops were sent to Georgetown at Japan's request to restore law and order. On June 8 the British advanced to Japan \$1,000,000 to meet a desperate financial situation. In neither case were we consulted. Both of these decisions had the effect of bolstering Japan's government.

Our objective of replacing Japan will, therefore, probably be resisted by the British. They will mistrust the efficiency of a U.S. political action program in the Colony and fear that the result could require reinstatement of direct British rule.

We must face up to this difference with the British. While further consultations are unlikely to result in agreement, we hope to secure British acquiescence, by delaying a

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decision we will just lose opportunities to accomplish our objective and arrive that much closer to British Guiana's independence without our having done anything about Japan. Under the circumstances we should inform the British of our conclusions and of the program we are undertaking at the same time soliciting their cooperation.

Accordingly, we propose that the Secretary speak to the British Ambassador on the following lines.

B. Talking Points with the British Ambassador

1. The President appreciated Prime Minister Macmillan's letter of May 30. He has asked me to convey our thoughts in reply through you to Lord Howe and to the Prime Minister.


2. We welcome the Prime Minister's suggestion for special consultations about British Guiana. We would prefer to hold them in Washington, however, since we have no British Guiana expert on our staff in London. (The Colonial Attaché at the British Embassy is an expert on the subject.)

5. It is quite clear that Japan is distrustful of U.S. motives and there is little chance of our obtaining his confidence. It seems unrealistic, therefore, to hope now that British Guiana can be kept on the side of the West by a policy of cooperation. Our hopes for this in September, 1961, have been destroyed by subsequent events.

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
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6. We cannot afford to see another communist regime established in this Hemisphere. You can appreciate that the reaction both within the U.S. and throughout Latin America would be severely adverse.

7. We feel compelled, therefore, to set as our objective, an independent British Guiana under some other leader than Jagan.

8. We are glad that you envisage new elections. This would provide an opportunity for a government of a different complexion to come into power through democratic process. However, the coalescing of the various elements now opposed to Jagan into a winning combination will be no easy task. Postponement of the independence conference is also welcome news since it will afford more time.

9. The President has personally studied the problem and has come to the conclusion that there is no alternative to developing a program to bring about a suitable coalition and to assure that Jagan does not win a new election.



11. In the economic field we are going ahead with the additional detailed studies our survey mission recently returned from British Guiana recommended. We hope thereby to let the people of British Guiana know we are serious about helping them and to be that much further along with the preliminary work by the time a new government comes into power.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUYANA

II. Action in British Guyana

A. Discussion

The task is to determine the best manner to bring into power a government friendly to the West and ready to pursue a multi-racial policy and a realistic social and economic program.

We believe we should take advantage of the now elections which the British envisage prior to independence. After independence Jagan will be freer to consolidate his hold over the country, to organize a PFF-controlled militia and to obtain overt support from the Communist Bloc including Cuba. Now elections could come about either through the fall of the Jagan government by the defection of Balram Singh Rai, Minister of Home Affairs, and two or three other PFF members or by agreement among the parties and the British on elections as a step towards independence.

A constituency-by-constituency analysis of the 35 seats in the Legislative Assembly indicates that, in another election, the Jagan's Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) can count on 16 safe seats; Burnham's Peoples National Congress (PNC), 11 seats; and D'Aguiar's United Front (UF), 2 seats. This leaves 6 seats in the doubtful category and it is on these constituencies that our efforts would be focussed.

The combined strength of the opposition elements clearly is required to defeat Jagan. Assuming we are able to bring about this cooperation, the following results in the 6 marginal constituencies may be hoped for:

Maharica (1961 results - PPP - 51.1%) -
victory by Rai supported by the UF and PNC.

Pomeroon (1961 result - PPP - 42.5%) -
victory by PNC supported by the UF and Rai.

Houston

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Houston (1961 result - PPP - 50.1%) -
victory by PNC supported by the UF and Rai.

Demarara Coast Central - (1961 result -
PPP - 50.6%) - victory by PNC supported by
UF and Rai.


Georgetown North - (1961 result - UF - 50.01%) -
victory by UF supported by PNC.

Georgetown Central - (1961 result - UF - 55%) -
victory by UF supported by PNC.

(The UF and the PNC are the only real contenders
for these two Georgetown seats).

On this basis a PNC-UF grouping would have 19 seats in the
Legislative Assembly to 16 for the PPP.

As can be seen from this political arithmetic a favorable
result is by no means assured



B. Strategy

Our present thinking on strategy involves the following:

1. Tacit election arrangements between Burnham and D'Aguiar
to avoid election conflicts rather than formation of a PNC-UF coal-
ition. In the August 1961 elections the PNC and UF spent a good deal
of time fighting each other. If an understanding is reached energies
could be concentrated on the doubtful constituencies. Because of
dislike by the Negroes for the Portuguese a coalition probably would
cost the PNC votes and the UF leaders are unlikely to place themselves
at Burnham's mercy by disbanding their party.

2. An independent campaign by Rai who has now been expelled
from the PPP. We believe that he could carry with him an appreciable

number

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
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number of moderate Indian voters, particularly Indian businessmen, and that his influence is needed to swing the balance against the PPP in three key constituencies having a high proportion of Indian voters. Probably Rai should run independently rather than on a coalition ticket with the PNC to avoid charges that he is a traitor to the Indian race. The Indians constitute about 40% of the population and are the most rapidly growing group. Thus, it is essential to provide them an opportunity to participate in governing the country.

3. An undertaking by Burnham that while he would head the new government, important and specific positions in it, e.g., a Deputy Prime Ministership for Rai, would be given to the Indian and business groups. Running on a Negro platform, Burnham could not hope to win. During the campaign he would have to emphasize multiracialism, efficiency in government and a realistic social and economic development program.

G. Implementation



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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

III. Economic Program

A. Discussion

The desire for economic advancement is a major feature in British Guiana's political life. Jagan's policies and the incompetence of his government are destroying public confidence in his ability to meet this desire. Jagan is shopping for economic aid from both East and West. He has had little success to date except from the U.S., which recently advanced him approximately \$1.8 million to keep him from bankruptcy. Because of the political importance of economic assistance we should maintain maximum flexibility in the economic field.

Moving ahead with preparations for a development program has the approval of all three political parties in British Guiana, and is strongly urged by the British Government. The preliminary report of the Hoffman Mission recommends that the development of the interior should have a high priority in any overall plan. This would draw the population from the over-crowded coastal strip which depends on sugar cultivation. The preliminary surveys we are now undertaking, and the development program itself, would thus bring important economic benefits to the country. It would also have valuable political impact. Such a development program would be expensive and could not be entirely financed by the United States, except over a considerable period of time. However, certain aspects, notably hydro-electric development, should prove bankable.

B. AID Action

1. For the immediate future, our aid level should be maintained at about the current level to support a continuing Technical Assistance program.


2. We should keep up the momentum generated by the Hoffman Mission in order to convince the people of British Guiana that we are sincerely interested eventually in assisting them.

3. We should proceed with the surveys intended to establish the validity of the development program, tentatively envisaged by the

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Hoffman Mission. They involve:

- a) an engineering and feasibility study of the Atkinson-McKonzie Road;
- b) actual cutting of the Barbice Dam to establish whether a permanent cut would be feasible;
- c) a hydro-electric study in the Barbice area;
- d) a soil study in the Barbice area.

4. Depending on political developments we should be prepared to move quickly into an adequate economic support program of at least \$5 - 10 million annually designed to promote U.S. policy objectives. By completing the surveys now, we should be able to move forward rapidly at the appropriate time.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

IV. The Congress

A. Discussion

The Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees appear reluctant to discuss British Guiana. They sense difficulties comparable to those experienced in Cuba. They seem to wish to avoid being implicated in a possible failure to stop communism in British Guiana. There is particular concern about "aid to Jagan" which may get involved with the current debate on aid to Poland and Yugoslavia. It is important that as many Congressmen as possible are informed about our approach to the British Guiana situation and that they support our policy. For reasons of security only certain Congressmen can be informed of the general nature of our entire program. We should persist in our efforts to brief the Congress along the following lines.

B. Action by State and AID

Brief selected Congressmen taking the following approach:

- 1) Our objective is an independent British Guiana under a non-Communist government prepared to take its place in the inter-American system.
- 2) Such a new government should have a multi-racial complexion. It should have a realistic economic and social development program. It should favor private investment.
- 3) There is political ferment in the Colony and increasing dissatisfaction with Jagan. This dissatisfaction stems from his incompetence and to a lesser extent from his ideology. The bulk of the population is pro-American. There are persistent reports of communist connections on the part of the leaders of the P.P.F.
- 4) New elections are likely prior to independence. While opposition groups are strong they are divided among themselves. The results of the election are hard to predict. (A full briefing of the racial and political alignments would be given together with an analysis of the previous election results.)

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5) The British bear primary responsibility for the colony. They are anxious to decolonize quickly but they wish to do so decently. They are under pressure in the UK to abandon colonialism. Latin American opinion is hostile to European colonialism in the Western Hemisphere. Latin American opinion would in general share our objective in British Guiana. The British have already postponed the independence conference originally projected for May.

6) We plan to continue for the moment our modest technical assistance program. This keeps our feet in the door and our technicians in contact with grass roots public opinion which is pro-American. We will conduct various surveys in connection with the evaluation of a possible development program. Should the political situation become favorable, we would then consider extending modest economic assistance.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

V. Public Opinion and Propaganda

A. Discussion

There is a steady flow of mail and expressions of press interest in the British Guiana situation. This is stimulated partly by Americans of Guianese descent and partly by the activities of opposition groups in the Colony seeking financial support in the U.S. Jagun's appointment with the President, his speech at the National Press Club, and his appearance on television in October 1961 developed public interest. The riots and the burning of Georgetown in February has kept this interest alive. Among right-wing groups in the U.S., the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade has been the most active. Both Dr. Schwartz and his colleague Dr. Sluis have been gazetted as prohibited immigrants into the Colony due to the Crusade's activities there. Public comment generally views developments in the Colony with alarm and urges that action (unspecified) be taken. All oppose the giving of "aid to Jagun".

B. U.S. Public Line

1. Avoid comment in the immediate future as far as possible. If forced to give opinions we should view the situation with concern and indicate our sympathy for the people of British Guiana. We would point out that primary responsibility rests with the U.K. which has postponed the date of the independence conference originally scheduled for May.

2. Later, when developments warrant, we should state U.S. public statements emphasizing: (a) the mismanagement of the Jagun government; (b) the communist ideologies of certain PFP leaders and their significance.

C. Propaganda

1. We should stimulate news in Latin America, especially the Caribbean, and if possible in the U.S., public statements on the line of two above.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

VI. Continuance Plans

A. Discussion

Should the program described above fail completely there are other actions which could be taken to hamper or prevent a communist takeover in British Guiana. Each has severe drawbacks and is less desirable than the action proposed. The Venezuelan and Brazilian claims are considered to be weak and neither country desires to take over the narrow coastal strip on which British Guiana's population and its problems are located. The deliberate promotion of racial strife or character assassination is repugnant to most Americans. Race riots in British Guiana could have serious repercussions in Surinam and Trinidad which also have mixed African and Indian populations.

B. Diplomatic

1. Encourage Venezuela and possibly Brazil to pursue their territorial claims. This could result in an indefinite delay in independence.

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Number of copies, Series 23 September 1964 00534

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JO3 COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Coordination of OPLAN 34A

Because of the large number and wide variety of operational activities being undertaken in the Indochinese peninsula, and because of the possibility that such operations may come into conflict with other U.S. activities in the area, primarily the reconnaissance missions of various sorts that are coordinated by the Committee, the Department of State believes that OPLAN 34A activities should continue to come within the purview of the JO3 Committee. It is proposed, therefore, that the Committee:

1. Consider the question of the resumption of MAFOPS under OPLAN 34A;
2. Arrange for scrutiny of currently authorized, pending MAFOPS under OPLAN 34A to determine whether they run a risk of coming into conflict with any reconnaissance missions in the area which have been authorized as a result of coordination in the JO3 Committee;
3. Consider the schedule of operations under OPLAN 34A which will be presented for Phase III, as was done for Phase II at the meeting of June 4, 1964;
4. Take note for the following principles to govern subsequent coordination of OPLAN 34A with other U.S. activities in the area:
 - a. The Department of State and the Department of Defense to agree on a monthly OPLAN 34A schedule and to coordinate this schedule with other U.S. activities;
 - b. Representatives of the Ambassador and MACV in Saigon to ensure that after operations have been postponed because of weather or other factors, their resumption in more favorable ensuing periods does not give rise to an unfortunate conjunction between them and other U.S. activities in the area which may also have been suspended under pressure of local factors, and then resumed;
 - c. The Department of State and the Department of Defense to report monthly to the Secretary of the JO3 Committee that agreement has been reached on a monthly OPLAN 34A schedule, and that this schedule has been coordinated with other U.S. activities in the area.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MR00-26 #17; 02-22-64 611102

By dal NARA, Date 6/20/02

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Warrant

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*orig + 3 copies
to Peter Jessup
ARA has other
copies.*

MEMORANDUM

March 1, 1965

TO: Members of the 303 Committee

*C 6 filed Cuba
C 2 sent to [unclear]*

The Department of State recommends that the 303 Committee at its next meeting reach a decision on the question of what support, if any, the U.S. Government should extend to the Cuban exile organization RECE (Representation of Cubans in Exile).

The attached study by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, in the preparation of which he consulted operating-level representatives of the 303 Committee agencies, describes the background of the RECE request for US support (pages 1-5 of the study), discusses the basic factors affecting a decision (pages 5-9), and comes to the principal conclusions (pages 9-10) that (a) the U.S. Government has only a limited interest in keeping RECE alive (and some degree of US support is essential if it is to continue in existence); (b) at the outside, the only assistance which could be justified would be limited to a monthly administrative subsidy, support for an Agency-guided propaganda program, and a "reserve-type", safeguarded course of classroom military training for a limited number of Cuban exiles; but (c) even this limited assistance might not be acceptable to RECE.

For its part, the Department of State considers that the choice between giving RECE no assistance or giving it the limited assistance described by the Coordinator as the maximum justified is very narrow. Taking into account the analysis made by the Coordinator and having in mind possible interest in relating the RECE question to the Artimo problem -- and on the latter issue the Department has strong views -- the Department is inclined to favor giving no assistance to RECE.

Attachment:

Study on USG relations with RECE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

*14R 95-35 #17 State Hr. 8/25/95
By KBJH NARA, Date 9/11/95*

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USG Relations with RECE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NR 95-35 #17 State/tr. 8/25/88

By KBH NARA, Date 9/11/95

PROBLEM:

To determine what, if any, support the U.S. Government should extend to the Cuban exile organization RECE (Representacion Cubana del Exilio -- The Representation of Cubans in Exile).

BACKGROUND:

Original Intentions of RECE

The original purpose of RECE, formally established eight months ago after a "referendum" in which about 41,000 adult Cuban exiles voted to recognize a single slate of five men as their "voice", was to be a militant, essentially non-political action organization which would embrace all Cuban exiles without distinction as to political affiliations and which would "carry the war" to Cuba. The extent of RECE's original ambitions was made clear in a plan approved in mid-November by the five-man leadership, following a trip to Brazil, Venezuela, Panama and some of the Central American countries by three of the leaders, including Comandante Arnaldo Oliva.

The core of the proposal was a military plan in two phases: paramilitary and conventional. On the paramilitary side, the plan called for an integrated operation involving:

1. Infiltration of specialized teams to set up intelligence and propaganda nets, to carry out (and organize internal assets for) sabotage and assassination attempts against key regime figures, and to prepare conditions for the formation of guerrilla bands;
2. The conduct, on a progressively ascending scale, of "commando" raids from outside against targets in Cuba; and
3. The organization and execution, when conditions permitted, of guerrilla operations, with supply to be effected by sea and air.

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The conventional phase would involve the formation of a purely Cuban force, or preferably a mixed Cuban-Latin American force under Cuban command, which would be organized and trained to carry out an invasion, as part of a larger force which would be required in the event of (1) an uprising in Cuba, followed by intervention by an international organization which would need a well-organized force familiar with Cuba, or (2) aggressive action by Castro against a Latin American state, followed by armed intervention under paragraph 5 of the MIM resolution of July 26, 1964. In short, the conventional force would be the Cuban exile component of a general invasion. The conventional force, which would be created simultaneously with the execution of the paramilitary phase, would also serve other purposes: the knowledge of its existence would be a great psychological boost to Cubans inside the island, would promote unity in the exile community and would accelerate the erosion of the power structure in Cuba. The Cuban element in the force would also provide an organized army to fill the security vacuum in a post-Castro situation.

The conventional force would be trained and based in Brazil, Paraguay or Argentina; the training and operating bases for the paramilitary force would be in Central America. This geographical array was based, according to Oliva and Dr. Ernesto Freyre (the senior among the four civilian members of the RECE leadership), on the definitely sympathetic reactions they had received during their tour of South and Central America. They have acknowledged since the drafting of the original plan, however, that all of the countries concerned indicated that they would await evidence of USG approval of RECE's proposals before committing themselves to any support.

US Reaction to RECE's Original Plan

The hope that RECE would become the US "chosen instrument" was implicit from the beginning. It was made increasingly explicit in the leadership's contacts with US officials. The US approach was made in late November when Oliva and Freyre tried to obtain from Assistant Secretary Mann a statement of US support for the RECE plan. Immediately prior to this meeting, the

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Two men indicated that they had been encouraged by their agency contact (established by decision of the 303 Committee on July 9, 1964) to come up with such a plan. Subsequently, however, they acknowledged that they had not been misled by anyone but had assumed that, once they had demonstrated the "seriousness and responsibility" of RECE, U.S. approval would be readily given. In any event, Mr. Mann said that we would not extend assistance to the activities RECE had in mind, specifically commande attacks and conventional operations. He stated that any support by us could only be moral, and that could be given only in the sense that we and RECE were united in a desire to rid Cuba of Castro. In response to the point, strongly emphasized by the RECE people, that unless it "did something" it would collapse, he expressed the hope that RECE could remain in existence and suggested -- as he had in an earlier meeting in June -- that RECE engage in more acceptable pursuits like propaganda. He asked that RECE keep in touch with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

Revised RECE Plan

In mid-December, Oliva and Freyre presented another plan to the Coordinator. The revised plan retains proposals, elaborated with more than usual care and technical proficiency, for clandestine and commande training and operations, drops the idea of a conventional force, and adds two elements. The first additional proposal calls for a RECE propaganda operation, budgeted at about \$18,000 per month, to be directed against Cuba, the exile community and Latin America. Propaganda directed against internal targets in Cuba would be designed to stimulate clandestine activity, (minor and major sabotage, assassination attempts, unification of guerrilla activity), with the ultimate objective of unifying elements within Cuba. Toward Latin America, propaganda would seek to obtain greater solidarity and identification with "joint action" against Communism. The intent is clearly to follow a hard and even inflammatory line, but Oliva and Freyre have indicated that they would take Agency guidance.

The second additional proposal -- a substitute for and in

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a sense a way-station toward the conventional force idea -- calls for the training in US service schools of exile personnel capable of leading conventional forces in the future, especially in connection with the pacification process following a Castro collapse, and capable of establishing the basis of an organized army. Although it would clearly like to have as many men trained as possible, RECE apparently will settle for 30-40 men for this program, with training at the battalion level and above. In addition to training for the three services -- and the Air Force component would include pilot training for young exiles -- RECE suggests preparation of other personnel in unconventional warfare. In the RECE proposal, exiles given regular training would participate "as allies" and administratively would be controlled by the Chief of Personnel of the "Cuban Liberating Force". The intent appears to be a looser arrangement, with more Cuban exile autonomy, than that followed with the Brigade in 1963 and 1964.

Current Situation

Oliva and Freyre, with whom the Coordinator has maintained contact while the revised RECE plan was being examined, have now informed the Coordinator that "Fepin" Bosch has suspended as of January the monthly payment of \$10,000 dollars which has kept the organization going. They have requested an urgent decision on their outstanding request for support. They point out that without US assistance RECE cannot, in honor, seek a resumption of payments by Bosch nor can it expect American businessmen and wealthy Cubans, with whom it has been in touch in the past, to contribute to the organization's financing as they have indicated they would if there were evidence of US approval of the RECE plans. Oliva and Freyre emphasize that RECE would, and should, collapse if the US Government cannot see its way clear to give its approval and material support. This judgment is almost certainly sound.

An important factor in the present situation which undoubtedly further disturbs the RECE leadership is the recent resurrection by old-line Cuban politicians of the government-in-exile theme. This trend, stimulated in part by statements

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attributed to and subsequently disavowed (at least partially) by the Brazilian Foreign Minister, complicates the RECE position and puts it at a competitive disadvantage in terms of exile opinion since the organization in the past has disclaimed any pretensions to become a government-in-exile. Moreover, RECE's principal claim to be representative of the exile community -- the "referendum" it conducted in early 1964 -- is now somewhat clouded by ex-President Frio's claim that his version of a government-in-exile has been endorsed by scores of thousands of exiles in balloting conducted in Miami and other exile centers. The Frio totals surpass the response to the RECE referendum of early 1964. Imperfect and inconclusive though the RECE referendum was, it was at least conducted conscientiously. Frio's, on the other hand, has been based on the collection of affirmative answers -- with no provision for negative votes -- to the general question of whether the exiles were in favor of a government-in-exile, a formulation impossible for any red-blooded exile to oppose.

RECE Recognition of Lack of US Commitment

Oliva and Freyre have given absolute assurances to the Coordinator that they recognize without reservation that they have not been led by anyone in the United States Government to expect a decision in favor of their request and that consideration of their proposals does not in any way imply or foreshadow a favorable decision.

This recognition does not, of course, lessen their strong hope and wish for such a decision. It does mean that any re-cremations following a negative decision would be based on disappointment with general US policy and not on any sense of betrayal of promises to RECE as an organization.

DISCUSSION:

Basic Alternatives

1. We can deny all support to RECE -- in which case it will collapse.

2. We can provide support to RECE for all its proposed programs -- in which case we will have executed a major policy change, with all its implications, in favor of full involvement in a broad range of activities against the Cuban regime.

3. We can offer limited support for relatively innocuous RECE programs -- in which case (a) we will have become partially involved, but (b) we will have no assurance that our limited support will in fact be sufficient to keep RECE alive by either objective or RECE standards.

Basic Considerations

1. Advantages of extending full or partial support to RECE

- Without some degree of US support RECE will collapse
- There are some excellent persons in the RECE leadership whose continuing availability would be of interest to us. This is especially true of Oliva who is generally considered to be an honest, dedicated, non-political, capable military officer whose talents and qualities are all too rare in the exile community.
- RECE probably has a better, though imperfect, claim than other groups to being representative of the exile community.
- In view of the increasing prospect of a harder Cuban and general Communist line in Latin America, it may be useful to have a force in being which could be employed if developments in Latin America or on the world scene counselled an increase in direct pressures on Cuba.
- The availability of qualified Cuban military personnel, prepared by the US, to form the command nucleus of a security force in a post-Castro situation would make our tasks in such a situation easier.

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- The continued existence of RECE might help improve morale among anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in the exile community. This morale has been steadily declining and will be further impaired when it becomes apparent that support to Artima has been withdrawn, if that decision is in fact taken.
- On the other hand, the collapse of RECE, attributable to a refusal of US support, will probably have consequences adverse to us within Cuba (both among anti-Castro elements and in the regime for different reasons) and in some countries in Latin America. It will certainly have a depressing effect on the exile community.
- Evidence of even limited US support for RECE may generate further support from wealthy Cuban exiles and others.
- RECE may be more amenable to US guidance and control than other exile organizations.
- Support for RECE propaganda activities, which would have to be guided, could be handled in low key and would be consistent with our assistance in this field to other exile groups.
- A program of "reserve-type" training of a small number of military personnel designated by RECE probably could be arranged and could probably be conducted in low key.
- The continued existence of RECE may have some value in reducing current pressures for a government-in-exile -- which are not really great at the moment but which have a nuisance effect.

2. Disadvantages of extending full or partial support to

- The existence of RECE is not essential to our current policy.

RECE

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- If the Cuban or the world situation were to change in such a manner as to warrant increased direct pressures, REGE or something like it could be re-constituted, even though with some difficulty.
- Except in the propaganda field, our support of exile organizations has probably produced more problems than results.
- Our experience in supporting clandestine and commando activities by autonomous exile groups has been especially negative, and such activities are the heart of the REGE proposals.
- On the basis of our experience, it appears that, if an increase in direct pressures should become desirable, the use of disciplined, directly controlled Agency resources would be more effective and, on balance, less risky than resort to autonomous or semi-autonomous exile groups.
- It is quite likely that the Central American and Caribbean countries will be much less ready than heretofore to supply bases and facilities to REGE as a consequence of the recent Gattlerrez Menoyo and Artina incidents.
- The training in US service schools of military personnel nominated by REGE would create acute problems for Defense -- even greater than those involved in the Brigade training program -- especially because of the apparent REGE interest in an arrangement diluting the degree of US military control over the students.
- Even limited "reserve-type" training would be difficult to arrange and conduct.
- The REGE proposal for training of personnel nominated by REGE in covert operations would create acute problems of security, administration and expense for the Agency.

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- There is no real operational need for propaganda activities by RECE.
- Although RECE has maintained reasonably good discretion thus far about its contacts with US officials, there is really no reason to believe that it will be more secure than other groups have been in the past, and the chances are good that the US connection will become known. This is particularly important in an international sense with respect to clandestine and commando activities, and considerably less so with respect to propaganda activities and training of military personnel in US service schools.
- Support -- especially support for the full range of the RECE proposals -- will be interpreted as US designation of RECE as its chosen instrument. Although this will lead to requests for support from other groups, these can be handled, but there would be difficulties with Artibe.
- It is entirely possible that RECE, despite its near-desperation as a result of its loss of funds, would not accept anything short of support for its clandestine, commando and military training proposals.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The US has an interest, but a limited one, in keeping RECE in existence.
2. The continued existence of RECE is not so important to the US as to warrant the taking of significant risks or the expenditure of substantial funds.
3. Specifically, it is not in the US interest under present circumstances to provide RECE with an action capability (i.e., a capability in clandestine and commando activities).
4. Neither is it in the US interest under present circumstances to provide RECE-designated personnel with military

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training in US service schools.

5. The maximum program of assistance to RECE which would be commensurate with the limited US interest would comprise the following elements:

- a. The assumption by the US of the monthly administrative subsidy of \$10,000 now suspended by Pepin Bosch.
- b. Moderate assistance (in the \$10,000 a month range) to RECE for the conduct of propaganda activities -- in addition to the monthly administrative subsidy.
- c. The provision to a limited number of RECE-designated personnel (e.g., 30-40 men) of "reserve-type" courses in command and staff responsibilities (battalion level and above) as additional support. This training would be limited to the classroom variety on, perhaps, a twice-monthly basis, with instruction to be conducted by Oliva and three or four other qualified associates of his, who would receive a suitable, regular salary. The instructional staff would operate on the basis of a course of study designed by the US military, but no US military personnel would be used in conducting the courses.

6. There is no assurance that such limited and qualified assistance would be considered by RECE adequate to its needs.

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9/1/65

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 00536

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME U. Alexis Johnson
RECEIVER'S NAME 303 Committee
DESCRIPTION re intelligence matter
CREATION DATE 11/04/1965
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 004700173
COLLECTION TITLE PRESIDENTIAL HANDWRITING FILE
BOX NUMBER 31
FOLDER TITLE National Security - Intelligence
 (7)-(16)
DATE WITHDRAWN 05/02/1988
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST WHM

SANITIZED 6/11/02 dal

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

original to Ptn. J.
unnumbered copy to
CS 76 G- pm. Loe.
C 7 to JWR/100

MR 00-26, #18, at 220 6/11/02

By dal NARA, Date 6/20/02

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November 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE 303 COMMITTEE:

Subject: Indonesian Army Request for Medical Assistance.

1. About November 1, General Sukendro, in the course of a transit through Bangkok, conveyed to [redacted] a request for immediate US assistance in the furnishing of medical supplies in large quantities. He also suggested the possibility of our supplying rifles to arm pre-army civilian groups in the Java area.

2. We immediately cabled Ambassador Green to take two actions: First, to re-confirm that Sukendro's request in fact represented the clear desire of Messrs. Nasution and Suharto and the army leadership. Second, to open up through the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Galbraith, a channel to the army leadership for broader political discussions. We made clear to Ambassador Green that we wished to have political discussions with the army leadership in general and that we would specifically wish to hit them on the question of their pursuing a drastic nationalization policy against our oil companies. We believe, and we are sure Ambassador Green concurs, that failure to reach at least some understanding on this subject will not only make it extremely difficult in the long term for us to assist the army in any overt fashion, but could present us with serious embarrassment as and when we account to the Congress even for covert assistance.

3. We have today received Djakarta 1626 and 1635, the first



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reporting on the opening of the political channels and the second containing the Ambassador's strong recommendation that we move immediately with a sympathetic response on the request for medication. We concur in this recommendation, and believe that immediate action would be highly desirable in that Sukendro appears to be the designated agent so that the matter can much better be handled with him, at least as to the technical aspects, than with any other channel that we could quickly devise. Accordingly, we have drafted the attached outgoing cable to Bangkok and Djakarta (Tab A).

4. This still leaves the question of some underlying political understanding. We believe that the way to handle this is for [redacted] to indicate to Sukendro that before we can render any substantial assistance we are going to need to talk about the political views of the army and that this will be done in Djakarta through our DCM. Language to this effect is in the draft message at Tab A. Concurrently, as indicated in the message, we would instruct Ambassador Green and Mr. Galbraith to indicate through the new political channel that we were taking preliminary steps but that we would need to understand what the army has in mind on crucial US-related subjects before we can actually supply the assistance on the substantial scale indicated.

if he concurs
5. Since this matter is of considerable urgency, I request that Mr. McGeorge Bundy seek to obtain telephonic concurrence today from the members of the committee for the dispatch this evening of the draft cable. CIA and IIA representatives (Mr. Colby and Mr. Friedman) have been involved in this matter in detail and can advise their respective 303 Committee members as to any further details.

U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary
for Political Affairs

Attachment:

Tab A - Draft cable.

FE:WPBundy:nik

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ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00537

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700173
Reason for Withdrawal : NS,National security restriction
Type of Material : CAB,Cable(s)
Creator's Name : State Department
Receiver's Name : AMEMBASSY BANGKOK and AMEMBASSY DJ

AKARTA

Description : re medical supplies for Indonesia
n army
Creation Date : 11/04/1965
Volume (pages) : 3
Date Withdrawn : 05/02/1988

SANITIZED 4/11/02



OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

80
Origin
SS

ACTION: Amembassy BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
" " DJAKARTA IMMEDIATE

749
575

INFO: CINCPAC IMMEDIATE
DOD/OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
WHICH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5(c)

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EXDIS

MR 00-26 #19, et. seq. 6/11/02
By dal NARA Date 6/20/02

Ref: Djakarta's 1333.

010

1. In view assurances reftel re Sukendro's role, agree we should proceed to process request for medical supplies, both because request explicitly made and because medical supplies relatively innocuous if fact of our assistance surfaced.
2. We are looking separately into question of communications equipment passed from Djakarta [REDACTED], prefer to keep this subject in Djakarta-Washington channel, and do not believe subject should be discussed with Sukendro. If he raises it, we would, however, like to know more precisely what he has in mind.
3. We do not have specific request from Sukendro for anything else. Apart from medical supplies, what he has done to date is to give us general outline of supply problem which Army faces and general outline his prospective shopping list. Since other questions such as supply of arms would present us with additional serious problems not involved in medical supplies issue, we do

Drafted by FE:SPA:DCCutrell:lll

Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by G - Alexander Johnson

FE: Mr. Bundy (draft)

S/S J. P. Walsh

INR/DDC - Ambassador Koren (draft)

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

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not wish to pursue subject with Sukendro for the present.

4. We understand Sukendro still in Bangkok. Mission should approach him through established channel and tell him following:

A. We are willing to act on his request for medical supplies and are now reviewing list in terms availabilities, locations, means covert purchase and pricing. We are having trouble with some items list which we cannot identify by nomenclature given, and would like keep in touch with Sukendro or someone he designates for clarification. If Sukendro wishes to handle personally, we would like to know where will be in next few days so that list of questioned items can be sent to him.

B. When we have completed study of package we will compare again with Sukendro and will inform him re size of package and any discrepancy in time of availability of component parts. In meantime we would like Sukendro's views as to preferred method and place of delivery.

5. In delivering foregoing message would like to be sure our representative does not speculate about possibility favorable action on further items other than to indicate our general willingness to consider Army requests for small-scale covert assistance. Representative should also tell Sukendro that we will be glad to talk to him outside Indonesia about limited covert assistance, but that before Washington can consider any substantial assistance it will need to know more about Army's



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political views and intentions and Army's attitude toward US-Indonesian relations. Representative should add that in order obtain this information he understands we are attempting to set up political contact with Indonesian Army in Djakarta through our DCM.

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ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00538

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700173
Reason for Withdrawal : NS,National security restriction
Type of Material : MEM,Memo(s)
Creator's Name : Dean Rusk
Receiver's Name : President
Description : re U.S. assistance to India
Creation Date : 04/29/1966
Volume (pages) : 4
Date Withdrawn : 05/02/1988

EXEMPTED 6/11/02 *del*

SECRET

Sept 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO: 303 Committee - Mr. Jessup

FROM: INR/DDC - William C. Trueheart

SUBJECT: Handling of Documents Relating to Cuban Intervention
Captured in Bolivia

The 303 Committee, prior to its 8 September meeting, concurred by telephone in the recommendation made in the ARA/State memorandum of September 5 on the handling of documents relating to Cuban intervention captured in Bolivia; that is, that we ask the Bolivian Government to announce that it had captured certain documents and had requested the USG and other governments to analyze their significance. (See paragraph 6 of 303 minutes dated 12 September.)

The Bolivian Government subsequently decided to present the documents to the twelfth meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers on September 22. The Bolivian Government has informed other governments that it has the documents and plans to make them public. We were not able to persuade the Bolivian Government to seek prompt evaluations from other governments essentially because the Bolivian Government did not want to turn the documents over to another government. Moreover, it felt that it could not obtain a useful evaluation of the documents from another government before the 12th MFM. The Department therefore has obtained the concurrence of Defense and CIA in a proposal to furnish an evaluation of the documents to the Bolivian Foreign Minister in Washington in time for his use before the 12th MFM. Ambassador Henderson in La Paz will give the Bolivian President the same evaluation. The Foreign Minister has agreed that the GOB will accept full responsibility for the evaluation.


This procedure is one that the Department would have been content to recommend to the Committee had it believed that

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MR00-26, #21, at-ccy 6/11/02

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By del NARA, Date 6/20/02



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the Bolivian Government would accede to it. The risk that we may have to acknowledge that we gave the Bolivians our evaluation of the documents is regarded as acceptable.

INR/DDC:JRCgardner:ssj:fjm

Concurrence: ARA - Mr. Sayre

SECRET

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
 Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 00540

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
 TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum
 CREATOR'S NAME Unknown
 RECEIVER'S NAME 303 Committee
 DESCRIPTION re intelligence matter
 CREATION DATE 12/12/1969
 VOLUME 12 pages
 COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 004700173
 COLLECTION TITLE PRESIDENTIAL HANDWRITING FILE
 BOX NUMBER 31
 FOLDER TITLE National Security - Intelligence
 (7)-(16)
 DATE WITHDRAWN 05/02/1988
 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST WHM

Sanitized 7/15/03 dal

77
TAB A

SECRET/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE 303 COMMITTEE

December 12, 1969

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy [redacted]

[redacted] Directed at the Soviet Union

SUMMARY:

The Department of State was instructed by NSDM 25 of September 17, 1969 to review and up-date NSC 5502/1 dated January 31, 1955 on the subject of "U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities." That document, which was reviewed and approved again by the NSC Planning Board on November 1, 1960, has provided the authorization for [redacted] programs directed at the Soviet Union involving emigres from Soviet-dominated areas. In view of the essentially [redacted] it has been determined that decisions not only on programs but also on policy should be the responsibility of the 303 Committee.

The principal policy recommendations in this paper are:

- that the present policy of selective support of emigre-related activities be continued;
- that the United States avoid policies, such as those favored by some emigres, supporting separate nationhood for racial or language groupings within the Soviet Union; and
- that [redacted] be kept under periodic review, keeping in mind the option of withdrawing support in return for identifiable political advantages.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)(d)

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MR00-26, #22; pt 1, 4/10/02, CIA 6/15/03

By dal, NARA, Date 3/15/03

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The CIA has distributed a related memorandum [redacted]

[redacted]

which serves both as background for examination of this revised policy document and to support a request for funding for FY 1970. The CIA request does not include funds

for the Radio Liberty Committee [redacted]

[redacted]

because those programs were

approved by Higher Authority on February 22, 1969. The four programs for which CIA is requesting continued support involve the expenditure of [redacted] in FY 1970. These four programs have the approval of appropriate officers in the Department of State: Bureau of European Affairs (Deputy Assistant Secretary Swank and Soviet Union Country Director Dubs) and the Planning and Coordination Staff (Mr. R. Davies).

TRENDS IN US-EMIGRE RELATIONS

Anti-Soviet emigres* were regarded as an important potential asset in the early post World War II years, at a time when fear of eventual if not imminent war with the USSR was very real in the West. Emigre organizations and individual Soviet refugees were in demand

[redacted]

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to help staff proliferating anti-Soviet activities and serve generally as a reserve for a possible war emergency.


After the 1950's, the United States became more selective in its support for emigre activities. It had become clear that the emigres were hopelessly split between groups with opposing aims, philosophies and ethnic composition and that it was difficult for any government working closely with them not to be dragged into the morass of emigre politics. In the mid-1950's, efforts were, in fact, abandoned to try to unite the anti-Soviet emigres behind a common program. The declining interest in emigres was also related to the realization that they were aging and had grown increasingly out of touch with developments in the USSR. The relations between the United States Government and the emigre community also became more distant as the United States and the Soviet Union moved toward a more normal relationship.

In the early 1960's, the more responsible emigre leaders came to realize that there was no hope of returning to their homeland in the wake of a Soviet-American war or after the overthrow of the Soviet regime. They therefore shifted the emphasis of their activities toward stimulating and publicizing the growing intellectual ferment and expressions of dissidence within the Soviet Union.

United States officials had come to understand that assistance to the emigres for the eventuality of war with or revolution within the USSR was unrealistic. The skills of the emigres would be available in the event of war, regardless of whether or not the United

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States was subsidizing emigre organizations. The sort of mass unrest and revolutionary changes predicted by some emigres were unlikely to occur within the USSR under conditions short of war. To the extent that significant changes in Soviet policy or leadership might take place, they were likely to result from the actions of a relatively narrow circle of leaders responding to changing attitudes and imperatives within Soviet society.

It was recognized, at the same time, that the emigres could play an important role in overcoming the resistance to change in Soviet society by stimulating dissatisfaction with existing policy among the Soviet people, especially under the less repressive conditions which followed Stalin's death. As broadcasters, editors and scholars working for Radio Liberty and other emigre information activities, the emigres were able to address themselves more candidly than U. S. officials could to developments within the USSR; and there was evidence that the emigres reached an important audience in the USSR precisely because they spoke with special intimacy and concern about developments in Mother Russia. In short, the United States Government concluded that anti-Soviet emigres had a special contribution to make to United States information programs, both overt and covert, which collectively aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Soviet people and their leaders in directions which would make the Soviet Government a more constructive and responsible member of the world community.

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It was also recognized that the emigres had a certain role to play per se. For some Soviet intellectuals and liberals, they served as in the 19th century as the "conscience-in-exile" and repository of the best cultural traditions of the Russian people and in extremis as a haven of refuge. The emigre organizations accordingly provided - and continue to provide - encouragement to intellectuals in their struggle for personal freedom against the Soviet regime.

Emigre groups have continued to seek official American recognition and support for their particular organizations and aims. In their response, American officials have been authorized to express traditional American sympathy for all peoples struggling to preserve their cultural traditions and religious beliefs and to protect the human rights of their people. At the same time, it has long been United States Government policy, to remain neutral between the Russian proponents of a unitary Russia and emigres from national minority areas favoring separatist policies.

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NATURE OF PRESENT ACTIVITIES


The United States Government is presently involved with the emigre community in a number of activities which are summarized below. Details regarding these activities are set forth in the CIA memorandum.

a. Radio Liberty Committee (RLC): [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RLC is composed of three major divisions: (1) a radio station (Radio Liberty) which broadcasts via shortwave to the Soviet Union 24 hours a day in 18 languages; (2) a book publication and book distribution program designed to provide Soviet citizens with books not normally accessible to the Soviet public, and; (3) the Institute for the Study of the USSR which produces research papers and publications targeted at the developing countries in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. In all instances RLC emigre employees are picked for talent and ability without regard to private emigre political beliefs or affiliations.


b. [REDACTED]

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


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c.



d. In addition to the activities discussed above,




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UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS

A. HIGH PROFILE SUPPORT

The United States could reverse field and follow a more vigorous pro-emigre policy, which might take the form, for example, of (i) more forth-

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coming identification by United States officials with emigre activities and objectives, (ii) extension of subsidies for emigre activities or organizations not presently receiving U.S. Government assistance; (iii) adoption for the first time of a policy of open support for the independence of national minority areas like the Ukraine.

PRO

-- Blatant support of anti-Soviet emigre activities would suggest the determination of the Administration to follow a tough policy toward the USSR, exploiting any vulnerability, in the event that the USSR does not become more cooperative on major issues in dispute.

-- Any substantial intensification of emigre propaganda activities might have some feedback in terms of defections, in acquisition of information, and in stimulating dissension inside the USSR;

-- United States identification with the independence of national minority areas would strike a responsive chord in an area like the Ukraine and could strengthen nationalist resistance to Russian domination.

CON

-- The Soviet leaders, who are chronically suspicious of US policies, could conclude that the United States Government had embarked on a frankly subversive and hostile course of action and that it is disinterested in negotiations on outstanding issues.

-- The Soviet leaders will not be induced to be more cooperative by the threat of increased American aid to the emigres since they believe that the emigres are feeble and that the Soviet government can control internal dissent.

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-- Inside the USSR, hard-line supporters of strict conformity and suppression of dissent would have their hands strengthened.

-- Repression would retard the process of evolution in popular and leadership attitudes which United States policy has sought to promote.

-- Support for the national independence of minority areas would alienate and unify Russian opinion everywhere so that the United States would lose with one hand what it might hope to gain with the other.

-- The USSR would be encouraged to increase its own anti-American activities around the world, including support for radical and subversive movements within the United States.

-- The problems of finding emigre organizations which are potentially effective and useful to the United States Government have increased with time. Many emigres are now even more out-of-touch with Soviet reality, older and less active than in the early post-war years.

B. WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SUPPORT

The question of support for specific emigre activities is periodically reviewed. For example, a decision was taken in February 1969 to continue to finance the Radio Liberty Committee.

It can be argued that it would be in the national interest to divorce the United States Government entirely from the emigration and its activities.


PRO

-- There would be a financial saving.

-- A decision to withdraw American financial support from all emigre-

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related activities would become known to Moscow and could be read as evidence of a sincere interest in improving US-Soviet relations and in developing closer collaboration on matters of mutual concern.

-- Efforts of Soviet conservatives to justify repression of dissent on the basis of American "subversion" would lose some of their plausibility.

CON

-- It can be argued that suspicions regarding American intentions are so deeply ingrained than any change in U.S. policy toward the emigres would have minimal impact on Soviet leaders.

-- A source of support would be removed for those in the USSR who are morally sustained by a sense of contact with the emigration.

-- With the removal of emigre radio and other information activities, the Soviet authorities would find it easier to see their own version of the truth and would be under less pressure to make reforms.

-- Elimination of support could be construed in some US domestic circles as approbation of the Soviet system and of communism.

C. LOW PROFILE SUPPORT

The United States can continue its present policies of support of selected emigre-related activities, based on a periodic evaluation of their effectiveness.

PRO

-- Radio Liberty and the information activities of emigre organizations would continue to provide facts and analysis in support of popular aspirations in the USSR for a more open, freer, humane society.

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-- The existence of emigre voices speaking from abroad would continue to provide moral support and information to those Soviets who have the courage to voice their convictions openly in the USSR.

-- Continuation of U.S. Government support for emigre activities on their present limited scale is not incompatible with negotiations with the Soviet Union on matters of mutual concern.

-- Withdrawal of U.S. Government subsidies would eliminate, not merely the information activities which reach directly into the USSR, but also useful auxiliary activities which provide anti-communist information to target audiences in non-communist areas.

CON

-- By continuing the present level of activities, the United States would not realize the advantages cited under the earlier options.

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

On balance, the low profile policy which has evolved toward the emigration appears both realistic and well suited to United States objectives. Accordingly, it is recommended:

- a. That the United States continue to work with emigres and their organizations for the primary purpose of encouraging an evolution in attitudes within the USSR.
- b. That the present general level of involvement with anti-Soviet emigres be regarded as compatible with our limited adversary relationship with the USSR.
- c. That the effectiveness of the activities presently being subsidized

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be reviewed periodically.

d. That the possibility of withdrawing support from emigre-related organizations, including the Radio Liberty Committee, be kept under review, on the understanding that any withdrawal should be based on concrete political advantage.

e. That any proposals to organize the emigres for the possible eventuality of war with, or revolution in, the USSR be opposed as unrealistic and likely to damage US-Soviet relations.

f. That the United States support the aspirations of minority peoples in the USSR for preservation of their national culture, religious identity and human rights, but that it avoid identification with any emigre policy favoring separate nationhood for racial or language groupings within the Soviet Union.

g. That the United States policy of non-recognition of incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR be maintained, subject to possible review, but that Baltic refugee organizations receiving U.S. Government subsidies be discouraged from active propaganda or other efforts to detach the Baltic States.

h. That emigre activities should continue to be monitored as appropriate even where no US subsidy is involved, since the emigres occasionally obtain useful information on the USSR through their own channels, and are a potential source of embarrassment to the United States in its relations with the USSR.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 00541

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME U. Alexis Johnson
RECEIVER'S NAME Principals on the 303 Committee
DESCRIPTION re intelligence matter
CREATION DATE 02/24/1970
VOLUME 6 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 004700173
COLLECTION TITLE PRESIDENTIAL HANDWRITING FILE
BOX NUMBER 31
FOLDER TITLE National Security - Intelligence
 (7)-(16)
DATE WITHDRAWN 05/02/1988
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST WHM

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DRAFT

Feb 24, 1970

SECRET/NOFORN

TO : The Principals on the 303 Committee

FROM : J - Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT : Our Response to King Hussein's Urgent Request for 5,000 Rifles - ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

This memorandum replaces that of February 20 in which we recommended favorable consideration of King Hussein's current urgent request for 5,000 rifles. We have revised our earlier memorandum to reflect the most recent thinking of the King who has reaffirmed his original preference for the M-14 rifles which he would supply directly to his army and thereby release army weapons for distribution to loyal tribal supporters. Although the King has again indicated he still prefers M-14s, he would settle for M-1s or Enfield 303s.

We have informed the King that we have approved his request for rifles and will give him the details as soon as they have been worked out. We are told that he is very satisfied with our positive response, and he regards it not only as a manifestation of U.S. support in the material sense but also as a sign of our moral and psychological backing. Although he has avoided momentarily a major confrontation with the fedayeen by coming to agreement with them in connection with his new law and order decrees, the prospect of a major confrontation in due course remains. Thus, he still hopes that delivery of these rifles can be expedited as much as possible. We share his view that speed of delivery is still important.

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DDI/tr 3/23/04

MR00-26 #23 DocId: 611102 CIA/tr 6/5/03

By dal NARA Date 9/2/04

After consultation with the Department of Defense
..... we have come up with two
alternative courses of action:

A. DOD Option

1. To make available to King Hussein
..... sufficient funds;
2. To enable him to make an overt purchase from
Department of Defense stocks of some 5,000 M-14 rifles which
would be airlifted in U.S. aircraft for allocation to the
Jordanian Army, permitting the release of M-1 rifles from
Jordanian Army stocks to loyal tribesmen;
3. To advise the king that, if queried, he should
be prepared to acknowledge this cash purchase from the
United States, which we in turn would also be willing to
confirm.

B.

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DOD is prepared to follow Course A above

..... The relative advantages and disadvantages of
these two courses are discussed below.



DOD Action

A. Pros

1. We--and the King--get credit with the Jordanian Army, as well as with the loyal tribes, as a result of the acquisition by the Army of a supply of M-14's. Since the Army is the principal pillar of support for the King, this is an important consideration.

2. This transaction is more aboveboard.
..... The operation would be a straight DOD sales transaction and delivery would be by identifiable U.S. aircraft.

B. Cons

1.
.....

2. Delivery schedules would be somewhat slower since packing the M-14's and diverting planes for the airlift would require time. Moreover, the normal bureaucratic procedures, including the paperwork involved in the sale transaction, would in all probability take some time. In addition, while the rifles and the ammunition would be airlifted, the bi-pods and the spare parts would have to be



A. The supply via DOD of 5,000 M-14's and one-half million rounds of ammunition plus M-16's and spare parts. This would involve supporting a 303 Committee decision:

1. To demand \$1.2 million for this operation;

.....

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

B. This would involve supporting a 303 Committee decision:

1.
2.

.....

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Clearances:

- NSA - JCS/Sec
- NSA - R/Sec
- NSA - Inf. Sec
- NSA - Sec

NSA/ISS: E/Sec/Sec/ISS/Sec/Sec
 Date: 2/24/79 g/1



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 00542

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIALMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME U. Alexis Johnson
RECEIVER'S NAME 40 Committee
DESCRIPTION re intelligence matter
CREATION DATE 07/10/1972
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 004700173
COLLECTION TITLE PRESIDENTIAL HANDWRITING FILE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

00542

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10 JUL 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE 40 COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Request for Funds for President [REDACTED] to Pass to President Bokassa of the Central African Republic in Forgery Case.

Background

On July 1, 1972 President Bokassa of the Central African Republic told a public audience that a certain great power was committing subversion in his country, and that he was considering breaking relations. Other information reaching Embassy Bangui indicated that Bokassa had received forged documents of the type which have been appearing in African capitals in recent months attempting to show that the CIA is actively working to overthrow regimes in power. Since President [REDACTED] cooperated with us last March by showing us the documents he received, and had allowed us to demonstrate to him that they were forgeries, we asked him to contact Bokassa and warn him not to do anything rash on the basis of documents which might be forgeries planted by unfriendly powers seeking to harm US-African relations. [REDACTED] agreed to contact Bokassa, and did so by telephone. He reported back to Ambassador McKesson that Bokassa was planning to break diplomatic relations on the basis of the documents he had received, but that he had persuaded Bokassa to wait for a scientific analysis. Shortly after [REDACTED] made this report to McKesson, Bokassa called in Ambassador Manfull on Saturday morning and gave him the documents, requesting that the USG analyze them. The crisis in our relations with Bokassa appears to be at an end, at least for the moment.

When we asked [REDACTED] to contact Bokassa on this problem, they were happy to cooperate. However, they indicated that whenever they deal with Bokassa on a problem, they are usually expected to give Bokassa a financial contribution since Bokassa is always broke. They were going to help us on our forged documents problem in any event, but wanted us to know that they would probably have to give Bokassa a gift, and thought it only fair to ask us to put up the money. After Bokassa turned the documents over to Embassy Bangui on Saturday, Ambassador McKesson was

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MR 00-26, #24, de-let, #11102, CIA de-let, #15103

By dal NARA Date 7/15/03

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contacted by the [REDACTED] Foreign Minister who said they were still interested in knowing if the USG would be willing to make a financial contribution.

Ambassador McKesson feels certain that [REDACTED] intervention turned Bokassa completely around on the forged documents question. He feels that [REDACTED] either had to promise Bokassa a gift, or is expected to provide one on the basis of their regular relationship. McKesson feels that while we made no promises when we made our original request, we are under a political and moral obligation to be forthcoming.

This problem has been discussed informally with CIA, which is the Agency primarily concerned with the wave of forged documents circulating in Africa in recent months. It agrees that [REDACTED] action has had the desirable impact of avoiding embarrassment to the USG, and has given it a new opportunity to trace the origin of these documents. They are therefore in agreement that we should make the requested payment. We consider [REDACTED] request unfortunate, and sufficient to make us wary of dealing with him on matters of this type in the future, but we nonetheless believe that in the present circumstances we should make the payment. The CAR shares a frontier with Congo (Brazzaville); a break in our relations with the CAR and a reduction in our limited influence there would mean that there would be two countries on the border of Zaire, where we have an important stake, with which we would not have relations. Our efforts to maintain our position in the CAR are therefore justified by our wider interests.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Ambassador McKesson has been dealing closely with [REDACTED] on the issue; and in the circumstances it would seem best to permit him to make the payment if it is authorized.

Recommendation

That the Committee authorize \$20,000 to be made available to Ambassador McKesson to pass to President [REDACTED]

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