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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	1. <u>Briefing paper for 9/4/75 meeting</u>		
1a. Memo	Sen. Mike Mansfield to the President re Portugal (7 pp. - page one is missing, only pp. 2-7 are here)	Undated (ca. 8/23/75)	C(A)
	<i>sup memo 11/21/00</i>		
1b. Memo	Sen. Mike Mansfield to the President re Saudi Arabia (9 pp.)	8/23/75	C(A)
	2. <u>Briefing paper for 9/9/75 meeting</u>		
2a. Briefing Paper	"Background Material and Talking Points on restoration of military assistance to Turkey" (4 pp.)	Undated (ca. 9/75)	A
2b. "	"Talking Points - Middle East" (2 pp.) <i>opened 4/1/96 krsht</i>	Undated (ca. 9/75)	A
	3. <u>Briefing paper for 12/10/75 meeting</u>		
3a. Talking Points	re trip to the People's Republic of China, Indonesia and the Philippines (4 pp.) <i>sup memo 11/21/00</i>	Undated (ca. 12/75)	A

FILE LOCATION

Charles Leppert Files
 Presidential Meetings with Congressional Leaders (3)

RESTRICTION CODES

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WHM, 5/7/84

8-9

Friday

July 25

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP MEETING

Legislative Wrap-up

Cabinet N.W. Gate
Room

yes	RHODES, John	(Clara Posey)	0600
yes	MICHEL, Bob	(Sharon Yard)	6201
yes	ANDERSON, John	(June Foster)	5676
yes	DEVINE, Sam	(Jennifer Susan) w/c	5355
yes	EDWARDS, Jack	(Charlotte)	4931
yes	CONABLE, Barber	(Dorothy Linda)	3615
yes	FREY, Lou	(Ann Pickett) w/c	3671
yes	VANDER JAGT, Guy	(Margaret)	3511
yes	QUILLEN, James	(Kathleen)	6356
yes	Cederberg	— Shelly	3561
yes	Schenckeli	— Helen	4315
yes	Clara Brown	— Lou	4324



Thursday, July 10
8:00 a.m. (90 Minutes) to 9:30 a.m.
NW gate - Cabinet Room

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP MEETING

Turkish Aid and Energy

<i>yes</i>	RHODES, John	(Clara Posey)	0600
<i>yes</i>	MICHEL, Bob	(Sharon Yard)	6201
<i>yes</i>	ANDERSON, John	(June Foster)	5676
<i>yes</i>	DEVINE, Sam	(Jennifer) <i>Sally</i>	5355
<i>yes</i>	EDWARDS, Jack	(Charlotte)	4931
<i>yes</i>	CONABLE, Barber	(Dorothy) <i>Linda</i>	3615
<i>NO</i>	FREY, Lou	(Ann Pickett)	3671
<i>yes</i>	VANDER JAGT, Guy	(Margaret) <i>Ann</i>	3511
<i>yes</i>	QUILLEN, James	(Kathleen)	6356
<i>yes</i>	CEDERBERG	Shelley	3561
<i>yes</i>	SCHNEELBELI	Helen	4315
<i>yes</i>	BROOMFIELD	Nancy	6135
<i>yes</i>	Clarance Bud Brown	Lou <i>Linda</i>	4324



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP MEETING

Monday, July 14 - 8:00 a.m. ---?

CABINET ROOM - NW Gate

Subject: Energy

CC	-ALBERT	5414	Imogene ✓
CC	-O'NEILL	8040	Mary Alyce ✓
CC	-McFALL	5604	Rita ✓
CC	-PHIL BURTON	4965	Nina Colman ✓
CC	-RHODES	0600	Clara ✓
CC	-MICHEL	6201	Sharon Yard ✓
CC	-ANDERSON	5676	June Foster ✓



Vern
Charlie —
Tom

~~FRIDAY~~ - MONDAY
TURKISH AID AND ENERGY
July 21 - 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.
Cabinet Room - enter N.W. Gate

you are invited

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP MEETING

<i>yes</i>	RHODES, John ✓	(Clara Posey)	0600
<i>yes</i>	MICHEL, Bob	(Sharon Yard)	6201
<i>yes</i>	ANDERSON, John	(June Foster) FRIDAY	5676
<i>yes</i>	DEVINE, Sam	<i>Susan</i> (Jennifer) w/c	5355
<i>yes</i>	EDWARDS, Jack ✓	(Charlotte) w/c	4931
<i>yes</i>	CONABLE, Barber	(Dorothy) <i>Linda</i> w/c	3615
<i>yes</i>	FREY, Lou	(Ann Pickett) w/c	3671
<i>yes</i>	VANDER JAGT, Guy	(Margaret)	3511
<i>yes</i>	QUILLEN, James	(Kathleen)	6356
<i>yes</i>	Cederberg	(Shelly)	3561
<i>yes</i>	Schneebeli	(Helen) FRIDAY	4315
<i>yes</i>	Clarency Brown FRIDAY	Lou	4324
<i>yes</i>	Broomfield FRIDAY	Nancy	6135



Thursday Midwest
SEPTEMBER 4 - N. W. GATE - SUBJECT - Energy

7:45 ~~8:00~~ to 9:30 a.m. — Cabinet Room —

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

BIPARTISIAN LEADERSHIP

GOP

yes — RHODES 0600 ✓ Clara Posey
yes ✓ MICHEL 6201 ✓ Sharon Yard
yes * ✓ ANDERSON 5676 ✓ June Foster

DEMOCRATIC

yes * ✓ ALBERT 5414 ✓ Imogene Holmes ✓
yes O'NEILL 8040 ✓ Mary Alyce ✓
yes ✓ MCFALL 5604 ✓ Rita Herod
yes BURTON, Phil 4965 ✓ ~~Nina Colman Thers Nardy~~ ✓
Frank Kieliger a.a.

*President would like a report on their trip

yes Morgan 4665 ✓ Connie ✓
yes — Broomfield 6135 ✓ Nancy ✓
yes Price 5661 ✓ Jan ✓
yes Bob Wilson (ca) 3201 ✓ Maggie
 (Cath called yes)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 3, 1975

MEETING WITH BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

Thursday, September 4, 1975

7:45-9:20 a.m. (95 minutes)

The Cabinet Room

From: Max L. Friedersdorf

M.L.F.

I. PURPOSE

To discuss energy and the Mid-East settlement with the leaders.

To receive briefings on the various leaders who travelled abroad during the August recess.


II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background:

1. Congress reconvened yesterday (Wednesday, September 3), after the August recess.
2. In the interim, an Egypt-Israeli settlement has been achieved in the Middle East, and controls on domestic oil expired Sunday, August 31, 1975.
3. During the recess, the Speaker and Bob Michel led a 20 Member delegation to the Soviet Union, Romania and Yugoslavia where the Congressional delegation met with all three heads of State. Phil Burton and Mel Price were also on this trip.
4. John Anderson and Senator Robert Byrd led another Congressional delegation, appointed by the President, to the People's Republic of China.
5. Senator Mansfield took a trip around the world, including a stop in Portugal. He sent along a report, a copy of which is in Tab A, on Portugal and Saudi Arabia.

B. PARTICIPANTS: See Tab B

C. Press Plan - The Press Office has announced the meeting. Press and White House photographers.



III. TALKING POINTS

A. Middle East

1. We have achieved a significant peace settlement in the Middle East which could result in stabilizing a dangerous situation.
2. Congressional approval will be required on the technician feature. Copies of this proposal have been sent to the Speaker and the President of the Senate.
3. Henry returned from the Middle East last night and is here to give us a first hand report on the settlement.

B. Energy (See Tab C)

1. Controls expired on oil last Sunday night.
2. I intend to veto the six month allocation extension bill after Senator Mansfield has the opportunity to hold a conference later today.
3. I have indicated my willingness to continue efforts to seek a gradual decontrol during a meeting here last Friday with the Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader.
4. Frank Zarb is here to give us a brief report on the current situation regarding energy.

C. Congressional Travel

1. There were a number of highly interesting and important trips overseas during the recess and I thought it would be helpful if we could receive reports from the leaders today.
2. The Speaker led a large bipartisan delegation of senior Members to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Romania where they met with all three heads of State, as well as holding three lengthy sessions with deputies of the Supreme Soviet.
3. Mr. Speaker, perhaps we could now hear from you, Bob Michel, Phil Burton and Mel Price on this trip.
4. Senator Mansfield went around the world and visited such trouble spots as Portugal. Senator, would you care to brief us?
5. John Anderson and Bob Byrd led another delegation to the People's Republic of China and perhaps we could hear from John and Bob.



p. 1 missing
Sen. Mansfield to Pres. 8/23/75

1a

- 2 -

heretofore exercised authority in Portugal are in the driver's seat at the present time. The new leadership consists of younger officers who until very recently were in the middle and even lower grades. As such they shared few of the privileges enjoyed by their superiors in the Salazar-Caetano period. Yet, they bore the brunt of the anguish and attrition which resulted from the political bumbling and the catastrophic delay of the Salazar government in facing up to the transition in the Portuguese African colonies. It is 30 years since the British resolved a similar problem and about 20 since the French did so. Not until Salazar's death did the Portuguese even recognize the inevitable. The cost in lives and resources was enormous.

The stagnation of a long-entrenched military-political system pursuing a hopeless colonial war would have been enough to produce upheaval in Portugal. Add to this factor, an atrophied rural life heavily weighted by one of the most conservative wings of the Catholic church. Add to it, too, the indignation of an emotional people on discovering at long last, with the passing of Salazar, that the absence of a political life for so many years was not preordained. In these circumstances, a period of widespread political turbulence was to be expected. Nor is it likely that a new political order will be established very quickly. Indeed, the Portuguese will be very lucky if they avoid in the interim a full-scale civil war. If there is any universal Western concern with this situation, it should be to try to minimize the likelihood of such a disastrous conflict.

The Portuguese military leadership, which has been at the center of the storm, has not sought to monopolize the upheaval. Perhaps that is because it could not do otherwise. Some might also say it is due to political naivete.



However that may be, from the point of view of freedom, it is to the military's credit that they have encouraged the participation of political elements in the groping for a new sense of political direction. Indeed, "a hundred flowers have bloomed" in Portuguese political life.

Among these flowers there are some bizarre varieties. There are some strong-armers notably in the North and probably in the Azores, reminiscent of Mussolini's early cohorts. Among them, too, there are militant Communists. There is no doubt, moreover, that the Communists are exerting an influence disproportionate to their numbers in the evolution of the new order in Portugal by placement inside the government and in other strategic spots. That is unfortunate but it ought not to be surprising. Communists tend to work harder at the business and to maintain a tighter discipline. That might make them seem attractive allies to some military leaders. The Communists may also be receiving financial contributions from outside, although the Embassy has very little of a specific nature on these reports. What they have suggests that the amounts that have been supplied to date are nowhere near as large as some of the publicly reported figures which run as high as \$10 million.

To reiterate, however, Communist activity or, for that matter that of any political group, is dependent on the tolerance of the military leaders. That point cannot be stressed too strongly. The revolution began as a revolt within the military. The revolution remains under the control of the military. Barring large scale intervention from outside, it will evolve only in ways which are tolerable to the military. In this connection, it would be wise to refrain from labeling any of the leading figures in the military hierarchy as left, right, pro-Communist or anti-. The reasonably safe assumption for all of the



military leaders is that they are going to be pro-military. They will work with those civilians whom they regard, as they regard themselves, as working for the well-being and honor of Portugal. Whatever emerges in the end from the present situation, whatever the government, it is going to be one which is in accord with what the military believes is acceptable and is best for Portugal.

It is also reasonable to expect that unless the various political factions can resolve their struggles for factional power into a viable civilian political structure in the not too distant future, the Portuguese people will lose patience with the "new politics," and its various civilian protagonists. The initial signs, in this connection, are beginning to appear. It may well be that the people will yearn, again, for order and welcome a far more direct assertion of power by the military. The military authorities may then settle on one among themselves to be the personification of that authority. If that happens, with or without civil war, Portugal is likely to witness the emergence of a new military authoritarianism. It would not equate with the Salazar-Caetano period. There can be no turning back the clock. Real economic and social problems exist in Portugal, especially in the wake of the dissolution of the colonial empire. Any governing authority must deal with these problems or face national chaos and disenchantment.

A new military authority is likely to be young, vigorous, business-like and passionately nationalist in its dedication--at least at first. It may even, with the aid of civilian technicians and infusions of aid from outside, provide tolerably good public administration. Regrettably, it will also mean the end of the bright promise of a free and responsive political system in this small



piece of the Iberian Peninsula. That is a setback for freedom, no matter how it may seem at the outset.

U. S. Policies

Our policies in the Portuguese situation should derive from our national interests, not our ideological predilections, except to the extent that we refrain from impeding the emergence of free civilian institutions anywhere. On close examination, then, our interests are not as extensive as one would be led to expect from the amount of press coverage which has been given to the minutiae of Portuguese political developments.

To provide some sense of proportion, it would be well to bear in mind that Portugal is of considerably greater significance to Western Europe than it is to this nation. In an economic sense, our investments in Portugal and even our trade are but a fraction of those of the Western Europeans. If we find it abhorrent to contemplate the appearance of a Communist regime across the ocean, what of Spain and the other Europeans to whom it would be a next door neighbor? As for NATO one must assume that the organization is at least as important to the Europeans as it is to us although their indifference to its needs suggests, sometimes, the contrary. To be sure, a "Communist enemy" nation in the ranks of NATO is an appalling thought. But even if Portugal "went Communist," and that required the withdrawal or ejection of Portugal, would that necessarily mean the demise of NATO? After all, NATO has weathered the far more significant deactivation of French participation. NATO has also seen, without falling apart, the Eastern line of defense reduced to something approaching irrelevance



because of the Cyprus dispute. It has also managed to function without Spanish membership since the outset. There are some who are aghast at the administrative nightmare of trying to operate NATO with a member state in which Communists hold some positions in a coalition government. That may be a bureaucratic embarrassment but it hardly constitutes a cause for panic. Indeed, a modus vivendi has already been found for that contingency in the case of Portugal.

Beyond limited economic interests and a possible concern for NATO embarrassment, what else is there of fundamental interest to this nation? As a practical matter, there is only the U. S. base in the Azores at Lajes. As of now, there has been no interference with U. S. operations there, notwithstanding the fact that the lease has expired. Nor is there any indication of a determination in Lisbon to ask us to leave as is legally within Portugal's right. In short, either because of pre-occupation with other questions or because the present authorities in Lisbon have no objection to our remaining, there is no immediate need to deal with the base problem. Certainly there is no need to contemplate supporting an Azores "separatist movement" of obscure origin as a way of preserving our occupancy. If such a movement were to succeed and if by chance it happened to be pro-American and disposed to ask us to stay at the base in return for help, all we would gain by it over what we now have would be one more expensive dependent "independent nation" since the islands are in no way self-supporting.


The fact that there is no immediate challenge to the Azores base affords us a good opportunity for a prompt examination of the purported "vital necessity" of this installation. It is not cheap to operate in the Azores in any event and all overseas bases are not, ipso facto, "vital" or even necessary



to U. S. interests. Indeed, it would seem to me most desirable to examine very closely the cost-effectiveness of any overseas installation, especially one which may be conceivably jeopardized by political developments before rather than after the fact. Moreover, in particular need of examination at this time, in my judgment, are those bases which are justified preponderantly in terms of relevance to the supply of Israel. That is a chief justification which I found to be advanced not only in regard to the Azores base but, also, with regard to bases in Thailand and the Philippines and wherever else in the world I made inquiry. If all these bases were used simultaneously for this purpose, Israel might well collapse of the weight of materiel which could pour into that country. "Israel-supply" seems to have become something of a bureaucratic gimmick with regard to base-justification abroad. There are many routes to Israel and the costs of alternatives should be measured against the cost of maintaining a base such as that in the Azores "at all costs."

To sum up, the need in Portugal, as I see it, is to keep a very cool approach in a situation whose alarmist aspects could well be over-stated. One cannot be sure what will emerge in the end. One can be sure, however, that if Portugal collapses in a civil war in the Spanish pattern, it will split the politics of every Western European country wide-open in ideological division. What then of NATO's fate?

It is well to note that the Soviet Union has not been ostentatiously conspicuous in the Portuguese situation and that the Chinese are steering clear of it entirely. We would be well-advised to follow suit. Indeed, we should restrain any tendency to label personages and developments in the glib and



confusing shorthand of ideological confrontation. "Lefist," "rightist," "Maoist," "to the left of the Communists" are inexact and migratory terms at best. In a situation such as exists in Portugal, where they are freely used, they may be subject to sudden and unexpected twists and turns which could lead to our entrapment in rigid and undesirable commitments.

As for situations such as Portugal in which our own national concerns, whether economic or defensive, are less than those of the Western Europeans, we would be well-advised to let the latter take the lead. Their stake in Portugal, as noted, is far greater than our own.

Insofar as the Azores military base is concerned, we ought now to have an impartial evaluation made of its cost-effectiveness in comparison with other available bases and techniques for fulfilling identical missions. The Azores installation may well prove to be more costly and even redundant. Certainly, it seems to me eminently desirable in our national interests to avoid involvement in separatist developments anywhere in Portugal, including the Azores. In the latter case, we could wind up with one more costly, continuing direct military responsibility. We are already extended in that fashion more than 3,500 miles across the Pacific from Hawaii. It is difficult to see in what way a new direct commitment 2,500 miles out into the Atlantic from the East coast will serve the interests of the people of the United States.



GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

This form marks the file location of item number ~~1~~ + b as listed
on the pink form (GSA form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet) at the front of the folder.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

SENATE

Mike Mansfield
Bob Byrd
Hugh Scott
Bob Griffin
Carl Curtis
John Sparkman
John Stennis
Strom Thurmond

HOUSE

Carl Albert
Tip O'Neill
Jack McFall
John Rhodes
Bob Michel
John Anderson
Phil Burton
Tom Morgan
Bill Broomfield
Mel Price
Bob Wilson

STAFF

Secretary Kissinger
Under Secretary Sisco
Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Max Friedersdorf
Alan Greenspan
Ron Nessen
Jim Cannon
Jim Lynn
Brent Scowcroft
Dick Cheney
Vern Loen
Bill Kendall
Charles Leppert
Tom Loeffler
Bob Wolthuis
Pat O'Donnell
Frank Zarb

REGRETS

Secretary Morton
Sen. Moss
Sen. Case
Don Rumsfeld
Phil Buchen
Bill Seidman



ENERGY TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT
AT BI-PARTISAN LEADERSHIP MEETING

1. With regard to oil decontrol, I met with Speaker Albert and Senator Mansfield last week to discuss this issue.
2. I feel that the 39-month phased decontrol plan with the \$11.50 cap on new oil I sent to the Congress in late July went more than half-way in meeting the concerns voiced by members of Congress. By increasing the quantity of oil decontrolled from 1 1/2% the first year to 2 1/2%, then 3 1/2% in the last 15 months and gradually increasing the cap by \$.05 per month, it would have rolled back prices during the first year and assured that future OPEC price increases would not be mirrored in higher domestic oil prices. Unfortunately, it was rejected by the House of Representatives.
3. At Mike Mansfield's and Carl Albert's request, I indicated that I would be willing to sign a 30-45 day extension of the EPAA if I could be reasonably assured that the Congress would accept my 39 month decontrol plan. I believe such an approach is best, and a compromise would be in the nation's best interest.
4. While I would like to compromise, I have heard statements from some members of Congress who appear to be putting politics ahead of the development of a national energy policy. While I hope they don't prevail, if compromise is not possible, I will veto any extension of price controls. However, to ease the impacts of immediate decontrol, I will take several steps.
5. First, I will remove the supplemental fees on petroleum imports and again support a windfall profits tax and rebates to consumers of the tax revenues.
6. As part of the natural gas emergency legislation I will propose shortly, I will ask for authority to protect historical users of propane, such as farmers and rural homes.
7. Finally, I will submit legislative proposals to help independent refiners and marketers adjust to decontrol.


Sat. 9/6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Vera:

There is a bipartisan leadership meeting on Monday morning, Sept. 8 at 9 a. m. in the Cabinet Room. It is on energy. Tom made calls to the congressmen. Vern, Charlie and Tom will be going. Tom talked to Vern about it on Saturday.

ND



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 6, 1975

MEETING WITH BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

Monday, September 8, 1975
9:00 - 10:00 a.m. (1 hour)
The Cabinet Room

From: Max L. Friedersdorf *M.6.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss with the bipartisan Congressional leadership the possibility of a compromise, phased price decontrol plan for domestic oil production.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN


A. Background:

1. Senator McClellan, Senator Stennis, and others suggested during a meeting Saturday with the President that the President invite the bipartisan Congressional leadership to the White House on Monday morning for another attempt to reach a compromise agreement on a phased price decontrol plan for domestic oil production.
2. Deadline for Presidential signature of the six-month extension for the allocation and price control authorities on petroleum is midnight, Tuesday, September 9.
3. The Senate has scheduled a vote to override the anticipated Presidential veto for 3 P.M., on Wednesday, September 10, and if the Senate overrides, the House will seek to override on Thursday, Sept. 11.

B. Participants: See Tab A

C. Press Plan - White House photo only.

III. TALKING POINTS: See Tab B



PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

SENATE


Mike Mansfield
Robert Byrd
Frank E. Moss
Hugh Scott
Robert Girffin
Carl Curtis

HOUSE

Carl Albert
Thomas P. O'Neill
John J. McFall
Phil Burton
John Rhodes
Bob Michel
John Anderson

STAFF

Secretary Morton
Frank Zarb
Donald Rumsfeld
Jack Marsh
Max Friedersdorf
Alan Greenspan
William Kendall
Jim Lynn
Jim Cannon
Phil Buchen
Dick Cheney
Bob Hartmann
Vern Loen
Pat O'Donnell
Charles Leppert
Tom Loeffler
Bob Wolthuis



SEP 5 1975

TALKING POINTS

ON

DECONTROL

1. As most of you know, the Federal allocation and price control authorities on petroleum expired on August 31, 1975.
2. Over the last several months, I have tried repeatedly to compromise with Congress on this issue.
3. Just before the August recess, I submitted a 39-month phased decontrol plan which included a \$11.50 cap on new oil. It went more than half-way in meeting the concerns voiced by members of Congress. By increasing the quantity of oil decontrolled from 1 1/2% the first year to 2 1/2%, then 3 1/2% in the last 15 months and gradually increasing the cap by \$.05 per month, it would have rolled back prices during the first year and assured that future OPEC price increases would not be mirrored in higher domestic oil prices. Unfortunately, it was rejected by the House of Representatives.
4. At Mike Mansfield's and Carl Albert's request, I indicated that I would be willing to sign a 30-40 day extension of the EPAA if I could be reasonably assured that the Congress would accept my 39-month decontrol plan. I believe such an approach is best, and a compromise would be in the nation's best interest.
5. While I would like to compromise, I have heard statements from some members of Congress who appear to be putting politics ahead of the development of a national energy policy. While I hope they don't prevail, it now appears that compromise is not possible until after my veto of any extension of price controls is sustained. However, to ease the impacts of immediate decontrol, I will take several steps.
6. First, I will remove the supplemental fees on petroleum imports and again support a windfall profits tax and rebates to consumers of the tax revenues. This will keep the price increases from decontrol to very modest levels.
7. As part of the natural gas emergency legislation, I will propose shortly, I will ask for authority to allocate and control the price of propane. It will assure that historical users of propane, such as farmers and rural homes get needed supplies at reasonable prices.


8. Finally, I will submit legislative proposals to help independent refiners and marketers adjust to decontrol. For independent refiners, new legislation will provide a continuation of the subsidies they now receive under the allocation act. These subsidies will phase out gradually to ease the transition back to a free market. For independent marketers of gasoline, I will propose legislation to provide for legal remedies if coercive action is taken by major oil companies.

PROPANE

Propane is a petroleum product which is used in agriculture for crop drying, rural home heating and in industrial and electrical utilities. Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA), the FEA allocated propane and controlled its price. Using these authorities, historical users such as farmers were assured needed supplies. Because of the natural gas shortage, large industrial and utility users who are curtailed may attempt to substitute propane. Such purchases could divert large quantities of propane from historical users or cause large price increases.

Because the President intends to veto the six month extension of the EPAA, new authorities are needed to protect historical propane users. The President will request legislation as part of comprehensive emergency legislation to deal with the natural gas shortage, which will:

- ° Provide allocation and pricing authorities for all propane use.
- ° Assure historical users of adequate supplies at reasonable prices.
- ° Regulate the use of propane by new industrial users who are experiencing natural gas curtailments.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 8, 1975

MEETING WITH REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

Tuesday, September 9, 1975
8:00-9:30 a.m. (90 minutes)
The Cabinet Room

From: Max L. Friedersdorf *M.L.F.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss with Republican Leaders the veto of the Education Appropriations Bill, status of the energy issue, Turkish Aide and the Middle East settlement.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background:

1. The House will vote today on an attempt to override the President's veto on the Education Appropriations Bill which is \$1.2 billion over the budget. Prospects for sustaining the veto are discouraging.
2. The Senate has scheduled a vote for 3:00 p.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, September 10, on an attempt to override the President's veto of the six month extension of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act.
3. The House failed by a vote of 206-223 on July 24, 1975, to lift the ban on military aid to Turkey. Attempts to schedule another vote before the August recess failed and the issue is still pending before the House Rules Committee. "Doc" Morgan has indicated he prefers not to push the issue in Rules Committee until talks concerning Cyprus scheduled in New York this week are concluded.
4. Egypt and Israel have signed a Middle East settlement negotiated by Secretary Kissinger. Stationing of American technicians as monitors is receiving scrutiny by Congress and the House and Senate will consider concurrent resolutions of approval. The Administration is hopeful that the concurrent resolution can be approved in the next ten days.

B. Participants: See Tab A



C. Press Plan:

Announce to the Press as a regular Republican Leadership meeting. Press and White House photographers.

III. AGENDA See Tab B

IV. TALKING POINTS See Tab C

1. We have a number of important issues to consider today.
2. The most immediate concern is the veto consideration in the House today of the Education Appropriations Bill which is \$1.2 billion over the budget.
3. Perhaps John Rhodes and Bob Michel can give us a report on the veto vote in the House today?



PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

SENATE

Hugh Scott
Bob Griffin
Carl Curtis
Bob Stafford
John Tower
Ted Stevens
Strom Thurmond
Jake Javits
Paul Fannin
Cliff Case

HOUSE

John Rhodes
Bob Michel
John Anderson
Sam Devine
Jack Edwards
Barber Conable
Lou Frey
Jimmy Quillen
Guy Vander Jagt
Al Cederberg
Al Quie
Herm Schneebeli
Bill Broomfield
Bob Wilson

STAFF

Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
Secretary Morton
Don Rumsfeld
Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Max Friedersdorf
Phil Buchen
Jim Lynn
Alan Greenspan
Bill Seidman
Jim Cannon
Ron Nessen
Frank Zarb
Brent Scowcroft
Dick Cheney
Doug Bennett
Vern Loen

Bill Kendall
Pat O'Donnell
Charles Leppert
Tom Loeffler
Bob Wolthuis

REGRETS

Senator Young
Bill Baroody



AGENDA

- 8:00-8:15 a.m.
(15 minutes) The President opens the meeting and announces the agenda for discussion (Education Appropriations Bill veto, energy, Turkish Aid, and the Middle East settlement.)
- 8:15-8:30 a.m.
(15 minutes) The President calls upon Rhodes and Michel for a report on the House vote on the Presidential veto of the Education Appropriations Bill.
- 8:30-8:45 a.m.
(15 minutes) The President reviews the energy situation and calls upon Frank Zarb for comments.
- 8:45-9:00 a.m.
(15 minutes) The President introduces the subject of the ban on military aid to Turkey and calls upon Secretary Kissinger for comments.
- 9:00-9:15 a.m.
(15 minutes) The President refers to the Middle East settlement and calls upon Secretary Kissinger for comments.
- 9:15-9:30 a.m.
(15 minutes) The President invites leaders to raise any other subjects of interest.
- 9:30 a.m. The President concludes the meeting.



OIL DECONTROL

1. As most of you know, the Federal allocation and price control authorities on petroleum expired on August 31, 1975.
2. Over the last several months, I have tried repeatedly to compromise with Congress on this issue.
3. Just before the August recess, I submitted a 39-month phased decontrol plan which included a \$11.50 cap on new oil. It went more than half-way in meeting the concerns voiced by Members of Congress. By increasing the quantity of oil decontrolled from 1 1/2% the first year to 2 1/2%, then 3 1/2% in the last 15 months and gradually increasing the cap by \$.05 per month, it would have rolled back prices during the first year and assured that future OPEC price increases would not be mirrored in higher domestic oil prices. Unfortunately, it was rejected by the House of Representatives.
4. At Mike Mansfield's and Carl Albert's request, I indicated that I would be willing to sign a 30-40 day extension of the EPAA if I could be reasonably assured that Congress would accept my 39-month decontrol plan. I believe such an approach is best, and a compromise would be in the nation's best interest.
5. While I would like to compromise, I have heard statements from some Members of Congress who appear to be putting politics ahead of the development of a national energy policy. While I hope they don't prevail, it now appears that compromise is not possible until after my veto of any extension of price controls is sustained. However, to ease the impacts of immediate decontrol, I will take several steps.
6. First, I will remove the supplemental fees on petroleum imports and again support a windfall profits tax and rebates to consumers of the tax revenues. This will keep the price increases from decontrol to very modest levels.
7. As part of the natural gas emergency legislation, I will propose shortly, I will ask for authority to allocate and control the price of propane, such as farmers and rural homes get needed supplies at reasonable prices.
8. Finally, I will submit legislative proposals to help independent refiners and marketers adjust to decontrol. For independent refiners, new legislation will provide a continuation of the subsidies they now receive under the allocation act. These subsidies will phase out gradually to ease the transition back to a free market. For independent marketers of gasoline, I will propose legislation to provide for legal remedies if coercive action is taken by major oil companies.



PROPANE

Propane is a petroleum product which is used in agriculture for crop drying, rural home heating and in industrial and electrical utilities. Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPPA), the FEA allocated propane and controlled its price. Using these authorities, historical users such as farmers were assured needed supplies. Because of the natural gas shortage, large industrial and utility users who are curtailed may attempt to substitute propane. Such purchases could divert large quantities of propane from historical users or cause large price increases.

Because the President intends to veto the six month extension of the EPAA, new authorities are needed to protect historical propane users. The President will request legislation as part of comprehensive emergency legislation to deal with the natural gas shortage, which will:

- ° Provide allocation and pricing authorities for all propane use.
- ° Assure historical users of adequate supplies at reasonable prices.
- ° Regulate the use of propane by new industrial users who are experiencing natural gas curtailments.

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on the pink form (GSA form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet) at the front of the folder.

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TALKING POINTS -- MIDDLE EAST

1. Before going into the details of Henry's recent visit to the Middle East, let me make the following comments about the present disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. First, long before I sent Henry to the area, it was clear that we had to continue movement toward a settlement, either by a partial step or by an overall approach. As you know, we have been attempting for many months to establish a successful negotiation between both countries. The divergence of their positions following the March discussion, however, made this extremely difficult and forced us into a thorough review of our alternative courses of diplomatic action. It was clear, however, that we had to continue movement toward a settlement, either by another partial step or by attempting an overall approach. Accordingly, I sent Henry on this latest trip.
 2. I regard this present agreement as an achievement about which the United States can be justly proud. Some Americans are undoubtedly cautious about a deeper U.S. involvement in the Middle East and an American presence in the Sinai as a result of the agreement, but the price this country has to pay is small indeed in comparison to what we would have had to pay if there had been no agreement at all. The positive advantages of the agreement are many -- a stabilization of the conflict for a period, an improvement of the U.S. position in the Middle East, a continued reduction and isolation of Soviet influence in the area, the reaffirmation of the strength of our relationship with Israel, and the opening of a doorway to further future movement toward a final settlement.
 3. Henry could you please discuss the results of your trip.
- [Secretary Kissinger's remarks.]
4. Let me conclude by reiterating my deep personal gratitude at the success of the negotiations. We have managed to avert a serious deterioration in the Arab-Israeli situation that could have resulted in war; we have given ourselves and our friends important advantages in the Middle East; and we have kept the door open to further future movement toward a final settlement. It is important, in fact, to recognize that this agreement is not a final act but is only a step toward a conclusive and lasting peace.

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By 1634 NARA Date 4/1/96



Its significance is that it gives us time and opportunity to solve the other problems related to a final settlement without the threat of imminent conflict.

5. The responsibility, however, to continue our efforts is still with us; to this end, we will need the continued confidence of all parties, Arabs as well as Israelis. We cannot be generous with one side and turn our back on the other; this is the essential reason why I shall be asking the Congress for increased assistance for Egypt when the Administration's assistance request for the Middle East goes forward, and why it is essential that we honor certain requests from Arab countries for U.S. military equipment. I shall count on your support for these programs.
6. I thank you for your encouragement in the past, and I urge your firm and active support for the present agreement.



Sept. 9

Tues.

- N.W. Gate - Cabinet Room
Midwest + Energy

~~8:00~~ - 9 am

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP MEETING

G.O.P.

yes - RHODES, John	(Clara Posey)	0600
yes - MICHEL, Bob	(Sharon Yard)	6201
yes - ANDERSON, John	(June Foster)	5676
yes - DEVINE, Sam	(Susan)	5355
yes - EDWARDS, Jack	(Charlotte)	4931
yes - CONABLE, Barber	(Linda)	3615
yes - FREY, Lou	(Ann Pickett)	3671
yes - VANDER JAGT, Guy	(Margaret)	3511
yes - QUILLEN, James	(Kathleen) Candy	6356

Add-ons

yes - Cederberg	(Shelley)	3561
yes - Schneebeli	(Helen)	4315

~~Clarence "Bud" Brown (Lou) 4324~~

yes - Finie	2271	Mary
yes - Broomfield	6135	Nancy
yes - Bob Wilson	3201	Maggie



9-~~2~~2.75

Nancy - Pls. invite for Tuesday,
Sept. 9, leadership
(GOP) meeting, the
following:

House

Rhodes
Michel
Anderson
Dunn
Edwards
Conable
Free
Gubler
Vander Jagt
Cederberg
Guie
Schmuheli
Broomfield
Bob Wilson

Senate

Scott
Griffin
Curtis
Stafford
Tower
Stevens
Young
Kunowad
Favre
Farrin
Case





REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP - WEDNESDAY , SEPT 24 - 8:00 am - 9:30 am
 Cabinet Room, NW Gate - Agenda: Turkish Aid & Energy - *Sinai +*

*House Select
Comm. Intell.*

HOUSE

SENATE

*out of
Committee*
 yes-Rhodes - 0600 - Clara
 yes-Michel - 6201 - Sharon
 yes-Anderson - 5676 - June
 yes Devine - 5355 - Susan
 no Edwards - 4931 - Charlotte
 yes-Conable 3615 Linda
 yes-Frey - 3671 - Ann
 yes-Quillen - 6356 - ~~Robert~~ *Crady*
 yes-Vander Jagt - 3511 - Margaret
 yes-Clarence Brown 4324 - Lou
 yes-Schneebeli 4315 - ~~John~~ *Mary Runfola*
 yes-Cederberg 3561 - Shelly
 no Broomfield 6135 - Nancy *← out of Country*
 yes Mc-Clary - 5221 - Martha

Scott
 Griffin
 Curtis
 Stafford
 Tower
 Stevens
 Young
 Fannin
 Case

BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP - THURSDAY, SEPT 25 - 8:00-9:30 a.m.
 Cabinet Room, NW Gate - Agenda: Turkish Aid & Energy - *Sinai*

HOUSE

SENATE

yes ~~Rhodes~~
 yes-Michel
 yes-Anderson
 yes Albert - 5414 *Imogene*
 yes O'Neill 8040 *Mary Olyce*
 yes McFall ~~615604~~ *Rita*
 no Phil Burton 4965 *Nina* *Notes trip*

Scott
 Griffin
 Curtis
 Mansfield
 Rob't Byrd
 Moss



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 24, 1975

MEETING WITH BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

Thursday, September 25, 1975

8:00-9:30 a.m. (90 minutes)

The Cabinet Room

From: Max L. Friedersdorf *M.L.F.*

I. PURPOSE


To discuss energy, Turkish Aid and the Sinai settlement.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background:

1. Extension of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act is pending in the Senate after the House passed a 45-day extension retroactive to September 1. Senator Mansfield has suggested the President accept a November 15 extension with a November 1 restriction on the President to submit a new phased decontrol plan.
2. The House has passed H.R. 7014, the unacceptable Dingell bill and a conference with the Senate on S. 622 is expected shortly.
3. On Wednesday, September 24, the House Rules Committee reported out by a vote of 9-6, the bill to lift the ban on military aid to Turkey which is scheduled for Floor action early next week. A close vote is expected. (Speaker Albert was extremely helpful in firming up votes in the Rules Committee, and in defying Brademas on scheduling House action prior to the October 12 elections in Turkey.)
4. The Egypt-Israel Sinai agreement is pending in both Committees of the House and Senate. House International Relations is scheduled to report the bill on Thursday, September 25, and Floor consideration may be scheduled for next week.

B. Participants: See Tab A



C. Press Plan:

Press Office to announce as a regular bipartisan leadership meeting. Press and White House photographers.

III. AGENDA See Tab B

IV. TALKING POINTS

1. Energy - See Tab C
2. Turkish Aid - See Tab D
3. Sinai Agreement - See Tab E



PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

SENATE

Jim Eastland
Mike Mansfield
Hugh Scott
Carl Curtis
Frank Moss

HOUSE

Carl Albert
Tip O'Neill
Jack McFall
Bob Michel
John Anderson

STAFF

Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Morton
Don Rumsfeld
Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Phil Buchen
Ron Nessen
Jim Cannon
Jim Lynn
Max Friedersdorf
Alan Greenspan
Brent Scowcroft
Dick Cheney
Frank Zarb
Vern Loen
Bill Kendall
Pat O'Donnell
Charles Leppert
Tom Loeffler
Bob Wolthuis

REGRETS

Secretary Schlesinger
Sen. Griffin
Sen. Byrd
Rep. Rhodes
Rep. Burton
Bill Seidman
Bill Baroody



AGENDA

- 8:00-8:10 a.m.
(10 minutes) The President opens the meeting and discusses the status of energy legislation
- 8:10-8:20 a.m.
(10 minutes) The President calls upon Frank Zarb for comments on energy.
- 8:20-8:35 a.m.
(15 minutes) The President calls on the Speaker and Senator Mansfield for comments on energy legislation.
- 8:35-8:40 a.m.
(5 minutes) The President introduces the subject of Turkish Aid, thanks the Speaker for scheduling the bill for House action next week, and urges a favorable vote.
- 8:40-8:55 a.m.
(15 minutes) The President calls upon Secretary Kissinger and leaders for any comments on Turkish Aid.
- 8:55-9:00 a.m.
(5 minutes) The President introduces the subject of the Sinai agreement and the need for prompt approval.
- 9:00-9:10 a.m.
(10 minutes) The President calls upon Secretary Kissinger and leaders to comment on the Sinai agreement.
- 9:10-9:30 a.m.
(20 minutes) The President invites the leaders to discuss other topics of interest.
- 9:30 a.m. The President concludes the meeting.



TALKING POINTS ON ENERGY

1. Controls have been off since September 1. While there has been very little movement in the market up to now, it is important to clarify the situation by October 1.
2. Frank Zarb has met with the leadership and many members of the Congress over the last several days and the possible directions are unclear.
3. I asked the Congress for four separate pieces of legislation which would enable us to handle the absence of controls very nicely. I think it is important that we reach a resolution of this issue very quickly. The uncertainty must end, and we must either get an extension of controls or enact needed new legislation such as a windfall profits tax or propane control authorities.
4. I am very disturbed by the public statements by some members of Congress which indicate that they would prefer no extension and no enactment of needed authorities in the absence of controls. Such a position is clearly irresponsible and is playing politics with an important national issue.
5. I understand that H.R. 7014 will go to conference with S. 622 and I want to make clear that this is not an acceptable compromise on the oil price control issue.
6. Frank, would you like to add anything before we hear from the members?



GOP LEADERSHIP - TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1975 - 8:00-9:30 a.m.
Cabinet Room, NW Gate - AGENDA: ENERGY & SINAI AGREEMTN.

SENATE


Scott
Griffin
Tower
Curtis
Stafford
Stevens
Young
Fannin
Case

HOUSE

yes Rhodes - Mary Murphy - 0600 ✓
yes Michel-
yes Anderson - June Foster - 5676 ✓
yes Devine
yes Edwards
yes Conable
yes Frey
yes Vander Jagt
yes Quillen - 6356 - Condy ✓
yes Bud Brown 4324 - Lin ✓
yes Schneebeli 4315 - Helen ✓
yes Cederberg 3561 - Shelly ✓
yes Broomfield 6135 - Nancy ✓
Foraythe }
Ruppe } C.L. invite

STAFF

Kissinger
Schlesinger
Morton
Rumsfeld
Hartman
Marsh
Buchen
Nessen
Cannon
Lynn
Friedersdorf
Seidman
Greenspan
Barody
Scowcroft
Cheney
Zarb
Bennett
Loen
Kendall
Leppert
O'Donnell
Loeffler
Wolthuis



~~Cancelled~~
~~Tues 21~~
10/21 ~~wed 22~~

8-9:30

Cabinet Room NW gate

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP MEETING

midEast

Proposed Agenda Energy - HR 7014 + S.622
Food Stamps

~~Cancelled~~
called 10/20
11:25
finished calls at 1:30

- yes RHODES, John ✓ (Clara Posey) 0600 ✓
- yes MICHEL, Bob ✓ (Sharon Yard) 6201 ✓
- yes ANDERSON, John ✓ (June Foster) ✓ 5676 ✓
- yes DEVINE, Sam ✓ (Susan) 5355 ✓
- yes EDWARDS, Jack ✓ (Charlotte) 4931 ✓
- yes CONABLE, Barber ✓ (Linda) 3615 ✓
- ~~yes FREY, Lou ✓ (Ann Pickett) 3671 ✓~~ 10/21
- yes VANDER JAGT, Guy ✓ (Margaret) 3511 ✓
- yes QUILLEN, James ✓ (Kathleen) Candy 6356 ✓

Add-ons

- yes Cederberg ✓ (Shelley) ✓ 3561 Bona Ortiz
- yes Schneebeli Phil ✓ R. (Helen) ✓ 4315 ✓
- yes Clarencé "Bud" Brown ✓ (Lou) 4324 ✓
- ~~* yes Broomfield ✓ Nancy Louise Lopping 6135 ✓ Nancy yes 10/21~~
- yes Wampler ✓ Jane ✓ (Diane) 3861 ✓
- yes Latta ✓ Joyce 6405 ✓

* Broomfield will attend (10/21 call)



Thurs. 23
Wed. 22 - 8-9:30 Cabinet Room
N.W. Gate.

Proposed Agenda

Energy HR 7014 - S. 622
Food Stamps
MidEast

Cancelled

10/21

11:15

BIPARTISIAN LEADERSHIP

GOP

yes
yes
yes

RHODES ✓ 0600

Clara Posey ✓

MICHEL ✓ 6201

Sharon Yard ✓

ANDERSON ✓ 5676

June Foster ✓

DEMOCRATIC

yes
yes
yes
yes

ALBERT ✓ 5414

~~Imogene Holmes~~ Lois ✓

O'NEILL ✓ 8040

Mary Alyce ~~Joe~~ ✓

MCFALL ✓ 5604


Rita Herod ✓

BURTON, Phil ✓ 4965

Nina Colman ✓

Mary ✓

Joe O'Connell ✓



~~Broomfield~~
~~Morgan~~
~~Cederberg~~

~~6:30~~

~~Personnel Changes~~

~~7:30 Press Conference East Room~~
~~Room 12 Room to watch~~

~~Mahon~~

~~Bob Wilson~~

~~Mel Price~~

WEDNESDAY, November 5 - 8:00 to 9:30 a.m.
Cabinet Room - N. W. Gate - (SAME AGENDA)

BIPARTISIAN LEADERSHIP

GOP

* ~~RHODES~~ *yes* 0600

~~Glara Peseey~~ - *Mary* ✓

* ~~MICHEL~~ *yes* 6201

~~Sharon Yard~~ - *Cindy* ✓

* ~~ANDERSON~~ *yes* 5676

~~June Foster~~

Cancelled

all calls made by 6:00

DEMOCRATIC

✓ ~~ALBERT~~ *yes* 5414

~~Imogene Holmes~~

✓ ~~O'NEILL~~ *yes* 8040

~~Mary Alyce~~ ✓

✓ ~~MCFALL~~ *yes* 5604

~~Rita Herod~~

Jack McDonald ✓

~~NO~~ ~~BURTON, Phil~~ 4965 ~~Nina Colman~~ *Nancy*

~~NO~~ * ~~HUTCHINSON~~ 3761 ~~Dorothy~~ *NO*

N.D.

* ~~BROOMFIELD~~ 6135 ~~Nancy~~ *yes ND -*

* ~~SCHNEEBELI~~ 4315 ~~Helen~~ *yes ND - Called by Nancy D.*

~~RODINO~~ 3436 ~~Ronna~~ *yes ND -*

~~MORGAN~~ 4665 ~~Connie~~ *yes ND (out of town)*

~~ULLMAN~~ 5711 ~~Jenny~~ *yes Doug Stamm* ✓



(7:30 Press Conference in East Room -
 They may watch ^{Press} Conference in
 Roosevelt Room)

Agenda: Personnel Changes -

BIPARTISIAN LEADERSHIP

6:30 P.M. - Cabinet Room
 N.W. Gate

GOP

yes RHODES 0600 Clara Posey
 yes MICHEL 6201 Sharon Yard
 NO ANDERSON 5676 June Foster

DEMOCRATIC

yes ALBERT 5414 Imogene Holmes ✓
 NO - O'NEILL 8040 ~~Mary Alyce~~ Bri Weiss ✓
 yes MCFALL 5604 Rita Herod ✓
 yes BURTON, Phil 4965 ✓ Nina Colman ✓

gary Hymel called w/Regret

yes Broomfield 6135 Nancy.

NO Morgan 4665 Connie

yes Cederberg 3561 Shelley

yes Mahon 4005 ~~Helen~~ Nancy ✓

yes Bob Wilson 3201 Maggie - Wilburn ✓
 Doug.

yes Mel Price 5661 Jan



Tuesday, November 4, 1975 - 8:00 to 9:30 a.m.

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP MEETING

agenda- TAX CUT - SPENDING -LIMIT- MIDEAST-ENERGY-NEW YORK CITY

yes *Latta* — *joyce* *yes* — 6405
yes *Cederberg* — *Shelley* *Jim* 3561
Markwood

- * RHODES, John *yes* (Clara Posey) 0800
- * MICHEL, Bob *yes* (Sharon Yard) 6201
- * ANDERSON, John *No* (June Foster) 5676
- DEVINE, Sam *yes* (Susan) 5355
- EDWARDS, Jack *yes* (Charlotte) *w/c* 4931
- CONABLE, Barber *yes* (Linda) 3615
- FREY, Lou *Yes* (Ann Pickett) 3671
- VANDER JAGT, Guy *Yes* (Margaret) 3511
- QUILLEN, James *Yes* (Candy) 6356

in Texas - be back in aft.

Horton yes Ruby ✓ 4916
Erlebarn yes Gleva ✓ 3515
Add-ons

~~Cederberg (Shelley) 3561~~

- * Schneebeli *yes* (Helen) 4315 *w/c*
- Clarence "Bud" Brown *yes* (Lou) (3) *health* 4324
- * Hutchinson *yes* Dorothy ✓ 3761 *w/c*
- * Broomfield *yes* Nancy ✓ 6135
- McKinney *yes* Lynn ✓ 5541 *w/c*
- Johnson, Al *yes* ~~Barbara~~ ✓ 5121
- Butler *yes* Lee ✓ 5431



Called to advise that there was no Leadership
Tuesday, Rumored on Hill that there was

11/10/75

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP MEETING

RHODES, John	(Clara Posey)	Lee	0600	+
MICHEL, Bob	(Sharon Yard)	Linda	6201	
ANDERSON, John	(June Foster)	Holly	5676	7
DEVINE, Sam	(Susan)	Brenda	5355	
EDWARDS, Jack	(Charlotte)	✓	4931	
CONABLE, Barber	(Linda)	✓	3615	
FREY, Lou	(Ann Pickett)	✓	3671	
VANDER JAGT, Guy	(Margaret)	✓	3511	
QUILLEN, James	(Candy)	✓	6356	

Add-ons

Cederberg	(Shelley)		3561	
Schneebeli	(Helen)		4315	
Clarence "Bud" Brown	(Lou)		4324	



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF *M.L.F.*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Republican Congressional Leadership -
Republican Members of the Energy Bill Conference

Attached is a list of those participating in this evening's
7:30 p.m. meeting in the Cabinet Room.

Unfortunately, several of the leaders who probably would
argue in favor of a signing will not be present. This
includes Hugh Scott, Carl Curtis and John Anderson.



PARTICIPANTS

The President

SENATE

Bob Griffin
Paul Fannin
Cliff Hansen
Dewey Bartlett
Jim McClure
Ted Stevens
Lowell Weicker
Glenn Beall
Howard Baker
John Tower
Bob Stafford

HOUSE

Bud Brown
Jim Broyhill
Bob Michel
Sam Devine
Jack Edwards
Barber Conable
Lou Frey
Herm Schneebeli

STAFF

Jack Marsh
Dick Cheney
Max Friedersdorf
Brent Scowcroft
Alan Greenspan
Ron Nessen
Jim Cannon
Jim Lynn
Bill Seidman
Frank Zarb
Vern Loen
Bill Kendall
Pat O'Donnell
Charles Leppert
Tom Loeffler
John Hill
Eric Zausner
Bob Wolthuis



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 11/28/75

TO:

Vera

FROM: Max L. Friedersdorf

For Your Information _____

Please Handle X _____

Please See Me _____

Comments, Please _____

Other

*please make your
calls on Monday.*



Wed Dec. 10 - 8-9:30

GOP LEADERSHIP MEE TING - TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9 - 10:00 a.m. (90 min)
CABINET ROOM NORTHWEST GATE - AGENDA: REPORT ON PRESIDENT'S CHINA
TRIP/GOP POLITICS 74 Bill / Energy

HOUSE

SENATE

- | | | |
|------------------|--|----------|
| ✓ yes | Rhodes - Mary Murphy <i>Clara</i> | Scott |
| ✓ YES | Michel - Sharon | Griffin |
| OOT ✓ yes | Anderson - Jane Foster | Curtis |
| ✓ yes | Devine - Susan | Stafford |
| ✓ YES | Edwards - Charlotte | Tower |
| ✓ yes | Conable - Linda * | Stevens |
| ✓ yes | Frey - Ann Pickett | Case |
| ✓ yes | Quillen - Jane Wooten * | Young |
| ✓ yes | Vander Jagt - Margaret - * | |
| ✓ yes | Cederberg - Shelley | |
| ✓ YES | Broomfield - Nancy | |

~~Jim Sparling~~
* may be called on by the TP
to report on Candidates -

STAFF

- Kissinger
- Rumsfeld
- Callaway
- Spencer
- Hartmann
- Buchen
- Marsh
- Cheney
- Nessen
- Cannon
- Lynn
- Greenspan
- Scowcroft
- Seidman
- Baroody
- Friedersdorf
- Loen
- Kendall
- O'Donnell
- Leppert
- Loeffler
- Wolthuis
- Rourke

✓ Schneebeli 4315 Helen

✓ Bud Brown . 4324 ~~Law~~ Sue Seubing

* Geneva - Trade Conference



TALKING POINTS FOR
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
MEETING
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975

1. I have not, as yet, made up my mind on whether I will sign the omnibus energy bill now in Conference. This will be a tough decision on my part and while I have heard from most of my advisors, I will not make a final decision until I see the final bill.
2. On the one hand, this bill incorporates several of my major proposals outlined last January and begins the decontrol process, so long sought by this Administration. And while I feel this is the best possible piece of energy legislation I can expect before the election, it does have several major drawbacks, particularly the decontrol provision which will not provide adequate incentive for increased production in the next two years.
3. I hope, nevertheless, that whatever my final decision is, you will support that decision in the Congress.
4. As you know, natural gas legislation is expected to reach the House floor for a vote in the near future. Frank, will you please give us a status report on this legislation?

SECRET

[rn. 12/75]

TALKING POINTS

People's Republic of China

1. I went to China with the intention of sustaining and building on the dialogue which we have established with the leaders in Peking over the last four years. I believe this serves the most fundamental interests of our country: to help shape the evolution of a more stable balance among the great powers; and to create the conditions for a more permanent and realistic relationship with a country with almost a quarter of the world's population.

2. I went to Peking with no illusions. We clearly have basic areas of disagreement with the Chinese. Quite apart from the differences of philosophy, culture, and social systems, they perceive the state of the world in much more ominous terms than do we. They believe the prospects for a new world war are substantial. They maintain a bitter hostility toward the Soviet Union that is reflected in both political and military confrontation.

3. For all these areas of difference, we did find much in common with the Chinese. Although our approaches to dealing with the Soviet Union differ, given our varying positions in the world and our respective national interests, we share a distrust of Soviet intentions. The Chinese support a strong NATO, as we do. They urge the Japanese to maintain strong ties to the U.S., a policy of obvious value to us. They wish to see Soviet influence excluded from the Middle East. And we both are wary of Moscow's efforts to extend Soviet influence directly or indirectly into such places as Angola, the Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. I believe my talks with Chairman Mao and Vice Premier Teng strengthened the basis for continuing parallel actions on these issues of common concern. We also clarified our areas of continuing difference. I indicated, for example, that our people find it difficult to accept some of the Chinese criticism of our policies that serve their own interests as well as ours -- as in the Middle East.

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
 By W.H.W., NARA, Date 11/21/00




4. On Korea, our public policies clearly differ, but my impression is that the Chinese would not find instability on the peninsula helpful to their security concerns any more than we would. I believe they will oppose the stirring up of trouble there.
5. On Taiwan and the normalization question, the Chinese did not press for a change in the present situation. They know that there are strong feelings in this country, and they see that our influence there keeps the situation stable. At the same time, their interest in the eventual completion of the normalization process has not changed. I believe that it is important that that should at some point take place -- for the larger strategic interests involved -- but there was no attempt to resolve the specific timing and the actual modalities of a new arrangement.
6. As you know from the public announcement, the Chinese very helpfully provided information on seven MIAs lost in past years along the Chinese periphery. Hopefully this may encourage Hanoi to be more forthcoming in accounting for our Indochina MIAs.
7. To summarize, I believe my four days in Peking contributed to the strengthening of our relationship with the People's Republic of China in a manner that will further our efforts to create a more stable international situation.

Indonesia and the Philippines

1. My visits to Indonesia and the Philippines were especially useful parts of the Pacific trip. They put our overall relations with the region into perspective in the context of my trip to China and our active dealings with the Japanese this past year.
2. Both President Marcos and President Suharto said that the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia last spring had produced very real questions about the future role of the U.S. in their part of the world.



3. My visit elicited comments from both of them that they do not want the U. S. to retreat to a "fortress America." They want us to play a constructive and responsible role in Asia. I told them this was precisely our intention. My speech at the East-West Center in Hawaii on Sunday was designed to explain to the American people our overall approach to the Pacific region.
4. I was highly impressed by the receptions we received in both countries, particularly in the Philippines. We have many friends and much public good will in these two countries. They are looking to us for leadership and support. I told them both that we want to sustain strong and friendly relations.
5. President Marcos is basically concerned with two aspects of our relationship: achieving more favorable terms of trade for Philippine products, and revising our base arrangements so that it does not appear as though they have no control over them. Marcos genuinely wants the bases to remain. He told me the Chinese had not in any way pressed him for their removal.
6. We agreed that we would negotiate on both subjects in the near future. We hope to include investment guarantees that would be helpful to American investors, as well as trade arrangements which are in Philippine interests, in our overall treaty. While we may agree to some changes in the base arrangements, there will be no reduction in our operating capability.
7. Indonesia is a country which merits our close attention and interest. It is the fifth most populous country in the world. It is also rich in oil resources, although its per capita income is still very low.
8. Indonesia is a member of OPEC, and we have tended to lump it together with the other OPEC countries when enacting restrictive or retaliatory legislation. I do not believe this has been a wise course. Indonesia has not in the past supported the harshest OPEC actions, such as the embargo and the full amount of the recent ten percent price increase.



9. The Indonesians are concerned about the possible spread of Communist subversion in their country. They keep Peking and Hanoi at arms length and try to react quickly to possible threats.
10. The Indonesians also indicated they want to encourage U. S. investment in their country.

TALKING POINTS: TAX REDUCTION AND SPENDING RESTRAINT PROGRAM

1. There are two broad objectives of my tax reduction and spending restraint program. First, the reduction in the level or rate of growth in Federal spending was designed to make a start toward regaining control over the excessive rise in government expenditures which has been a major force behind the inflation of recent years.
2. Secondly, the tax reduction was designed to provide relief for the American taxpayer who has witnessed a larger and larger portion of his income sent to Washington in the form of taxes. My tax program was structured to focus relief among those middle income Americans who have borne the major burden of greater taxes.
3. I have insisted on coupling my proposed tax reduction with a comparable reduction in the growth of Federal spending. To legislate a permanent reduction in Federal revenues without a simultaneous reduction in the level of Federal expenditures is to delude our constituents that we are providing them a tax cut. We only substitute the capricious tax of inflation for the income tax we seemingly cut.

We must summon the political courage to consider both tax reductions and expenditure restraints together. We must avoid the temptation to do what is easy today and put off what is difficult until later.

4. I am convinced that the great majority of Americans desire sustained economic growth without inflation and are willing to support the measures necessary to achieve this goal.

This is the purpose of my program. It is a program which is fair and achievable and a program for which I am proud to request your wholehearted support.

5. Some have suggested that establishing a limitation on Federal spending in FY 1977 now disrupts the congressional budget process. But this is a convenient criticism rather than a substantive one. To recognize and explicitly acknowledge the parameters within which one is going to make budgetary decisions is a constructive rather than a disruptive step. Establishing a level of Federal spending permits all those in the government to realize the bounds within which they must operate. We all know from our individual experience that we should not decide how much we would like to spend first and then see if we have enough resources to accommodate that level of spending. Rather, we determine what level of spending we can afford and then make our decisions within that constraint.

Comparison of Tax Cuts Relative to 1972-74 Law
(in \$ billions assumes 1975 Income Level)

<u>Individual Cuts</u>	<u>Tax Reduction Act of 1975</u>	<u>H.R. 10612</u>	<u>President's Proposal</u>
-- standard deduction changes	\$ 2.5	\$ 2.5	\$ 4.0
-- exemption/taxable income credit	\$ 5.3	\$10.2	--
-- personal exemption	--	--	\$10.1
-- rate changes	--	--	\$ 6.6
-- earned income credit <u>1/</u>	\$ 1.5	--	--
-- house purchase credit	<u>\$ 0.6</u>	--	--
	\$ 9.9	\$12.7	\$20.7
 <u>Business Cuts</u>			
-- investment credit	\$ 3.3 <u>2/</u>	3.0	3.0
-- small business rate and surtax exemption changes	\$ 1.5	\$ 1.5	\$ 1.5
-- 2% corporate rate reduction	--	--	\$ 2.2
-- Six point utility package	--	--	\$ 0.6
	<u>\$ 4.7</u>	<u>\$ 4.5</u>	<u>\$ 7.2</u>
Total Tax Cuts	<u>\$14.6</u>	<u>\$17.2</u>	<u>\$27.9</u>

1/ Includes both refundable and non-refundable portions.

2/ Includes extra 1 percent credit for ESOP's.

(For additional detail see Annex Tables 21 and 22.)

