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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Kite*

2-15-75

Charles Leppert:

Attached are some talking points and fact sheets supporting the President's request for additional aid to Indochina.

These may be helpful to you in getting your own thoughts and arguments together.

We will not want to distribute these on the Hill until the most appropriate timing in the battle.

*Les Janka*



TALKING POINTSSupplemental Assistance for Cambodia and South VietnamGeneral SituationCambodia

-- The situation in Cambodia is serious. The Communists -- no doubt encouraged by the low level of our aid -- continue to believe a total military victory is possible. They are now conducting an all-out offensive. We believe they will only come to the bargaining table when they see they cannot defeat the Cambodian army on the battlefield.

-- The Cambodian Government has shown it can thwart Communist advances if given the means to defend itself. A year and a half ago, many predicted the imminent collapse of the Government. In fact, the opposite has occurred: The Government and its forces have kept up the fight. They are now holding their own and have kept the Mekong River open so that supply convoys can reach Phnom Penh.

-- They are, however, in danger of defeat for lack of the material means to defend themselves. Funds currently available for military assistance will be totally exhausted and the army out of ammunition by April. At the current levels of economic aid, the Cambodian economy will probably experience a serious downturn in April and could collapse in June or July.

South Vietnam

-- The situation in South Vietnam is also serious. The South Vietnamese have also shown they are fully capable of defending themselves if given adequate levels of assistance. The recent tenacious stand by the garrison at Phuoc Binh in the face of armor attacks and against great odds, proves beyond any doubt that the South Vietnamese are willing to defend themselves.

-- The problem is that the present level of U.S. assistance does not allow them to adequately defend themselves. Our aid was sufficient until last June (1974) when cuts were imposed by the Congress. This

forced a reduction in ammunition expenditure. At the same time, the Communists stepped up attacks. The result was a great increase in casualties, a loss of mobility and a deterioration in the military situation. Government casualties were higher in 1974 than any previous year except 1972 (the year of a major Communist offensive). At the same time, ammunition expenditure dropped nearly 70 percent between 1972 and 1974.

-- Some have argued that if we cut our aid we would force a political settlement. Last year the Congress cut our assistance in half. The result was just the opposite. Hanoi saw Saigon in a weakened state and opted for increased military action. Cutting aid actually increased the fighting and the dying.

-- What is needed in both cases are relatively small increases to cover costs of ammunition, gasoline and other basic items.

#### U. S. Commitment

-- Some have said that granting additional aid would mean making a recommitment in Indochina.

-- We are not asking for a new commitment which would lead us down the path to greater involvement. We are just seeking to insure survival.

-- We are on the way out, not in.

-- We have already spent 98 percent of what it will take to end our involvement. The final two percent is critical to preserving what we built there.

#### Implications of Not Providing Adequate Aid

##### International

-- We have made a commitment to a friend. The depth of that commitment, in the eyes of the world, is measured not just by what we say but by the tens of thousands of American lives which have been lost and the many tens of billions of dollars which have been spent. The world

is watching us and the constancy of our pledges. If, after demonstrating the depth of that commitment through the expenditure of so much blood and treasure, we withdraw, who can have faith hereafter in our word?

-- Two years ago we signed an agreement that climaxed the longest military undertaking in our country's history. The agreement was endorsed by every great power in the Western World. Now, two years later a country of 13 million people has torn it to shreds and the survival of an American ally is threatened -- and we apparently stand helpless, our fidelity in question, our word at stake. Under the terms of that agreement we established the right to provide replacement items of equipment so that the South Vietnamese could take care of their own security. Now, in the face of massive infusion of Communist arms and supplies, we aren't even exercising that right. Current funds will allow only for the provision of critically needed fuel and ammunition. If we fail to do even that, our credibility as an ally will be totally lost.

-- The repercussions could be enormous. If our adversaries see our constancy and determination lacking here, they may be tempted to test our will in other areas of the world.

-- And, with our friends, the message is even more vital. We ask them to trust us, to work with us. In this world of ours, it is not without hazard to be a friend of the U. S. While our power is obvious, it is the strength of our will which is the vital ingredient in inducing our friends to stand at our side.

-- We are now involved in delicate negotiations in the Middle East. The success of these negotiations may well rest on whether the other parties believe we will keep our word and honor the commitments we make.

-- Like it or not, the burden of leadership of the western world is ours. Friend and foe alike judge us by our performance. If we falter, those who rely on us will be quick to make other accommodations to protect themselves. The results would be an alien world in which the costs for our survival would dwarf anything we have ever known.

### Domestic

-- The Vietnam war seriously divided this country. Vietnam must not be allowed to become the central issue of American domestic politics. The question of American reinvolvement is not at issue. If we do not

provide sufficient aid, the danger of an all-out Communist victory will be very real. Should this come to pass, we will have to choose whether we are going to abandon an ally or become directly involved in Vietnam again. Whichever choice is taken will rend the country and leave a stain which we may never be able to erase. To keep this question from arising, we must provide the South Vietnamese with the modest amounts necessary for their self defense. With sufficient money, Saigon can stand alone and defend itself. The question of American involvement need never arise.

-- How we end our involvement is vitally important. We have made many sacrifices and have a tremendous investment: Fifty thousand Americans died and we were spending \$30 billion a year. We achieved our purpose. South Vietnam remained free to choose its own course and was strong enough to defend itself. Now for want of a small amount, it all may have been for naught.

-- By providing what is needed now, our aid can be significantly reduced in the near future.

#### The Best Way to End Our Involvement

-- The South Vietnamese do not want to go on fighting, they want peace. On three separate occasions they have called for full implementation of the Paris Agreement with a specific date set for elections. The Communists have turned down these offers and broken off negotiations. They also have refused to let us search for our missing men, refused to contribute to the ICCS peacekeeping budget and attacked and overrun 11 government district capitals and one province capital.

-- As long as their survival is threatened, the South Vietnamese will fight back. All they ask is that we give them the wherewithal to defend themselves.

-- Giving them the means to do this is the best way to end America's involvement in Indochina.

-- America has never abandoned a friend. The American people do not want such an end for Vietnam and Cambodia.

-- On August 20, 1974, Minh Long District capital in Quang Nam and Man Buk District in Kontum Province was overrun.

-- October 4, Chuong Nghia district capital in Kontum was overrun.

-- Beginning on December 6, 1974, a more intense military campaign was undertaken by the Communists. Between then and January 27, 1975 they overran five more district capitals and one provincial capital -- Phuoc Binh which fell on January 6, 1975.

The above incidents reflect the basic fact that from the very inception of the cease-fire, the Communist side has carried out systematic attacks against major towns and installations (all of which were in government hands at the time of the cease-fire).

No comparable list of violations by the government has ever been put forth, nor could it be.

Today the GVN holds less, not more, territory than it did at the time of the ceasefire.

FACT SHEET

U. S. Military and Economic Assistance to  
Cambodia and Vietnam for FY 75

	<u>Administration Request</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Appropriated</u>	<u>Additional Amounts Requested</u>
<u>South Vietnam</u>				
Military	\$1.45 billion	\$1.0 billion	\$700 million	\$300 million
Economic	\$750 million	\$449.9 million	appropriation process now underway	0
<hr/>				
<u>Cambodia</u>				
Military	\$362.5 million	\$200 million <sup>1</sup>	appropriation process now underway	\$222 million
Economic	\$110 million	\$100 million	" "	0 <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The Foreign Assistance Act also authorizes the President to use "drawdown authority" to provide an additional \$75 million of military stocks to the Cambodian Army. The President authorized the use of these funds in early January 1975. The \$75 million of drawdown authority is not included in the ceiling on aid to Cambodia.

<sup>2</sup>There is no need for any additional economic assistance funds for Cambodia. The problem is that the Foreign Aid Authorization Act sets a ceiling of \$377 million on total aid to Cambodia during FY 75. With \$200 million for military assistance and \$100 million for economic aid, this leaves only \$77 million for commodity assistance within the PL-480 program. Originally \$77 million was thought to be enough. However, due to the significant number of new refugees created by the current Communist offensive, price rises and some initial inaccurate estimates, it is now clear that additional assistance, mainly food for refugees, is required. The commodities are available. No additional appropriation is required. However, unless the ceiling is lifted, they cannot be sent.



Who Is Violating the Cease-fire Agreement?Is It the Thieu Government That Is Violating the Cease-fire?

Issue: Some charge that it is the Thieu Government that has violated the cease-fire by regularly conducting attacks into Communist areas and capturing positions held by the Communists at the time of the cease-fire. They say that the Communists are just defending their own territory, and that the Communists have complied with all major parts of the Paris Agreement.

Facts:

The Communist side has grossly violated the Paris Accords from the very beginning:

-- They have illegally infiltrated into South Vietnam over 190,000 men and the following amounts of equipment:

- . over 400 tanks,
- . over 250 heavy artillery pieces,
- . over 1,000 anti-aircraft weapons,
- . sixteen SA-3 missile launchers and over 96 missiles,
- . ammunition and other supplies sufficient to allow them to carry out a 1972 level offensive for a year and a half.

-- They continue to station troops in Laos and Cambodia and maintain a road network and logistics bases there.

-- They refuse to contribute their share to the budget of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).

-- They refuse to deploy their military liaison teams to the field to serve with the Two Party Joint Military Commission. The purpose of these teams is to assist the ICCS monitor the cease-fire.

-- They refuse to allow unarmed teams to search for unrecovered bodies or for our over 900 men still missing in action. In fact, they ambushed one U. S. team in South Vietnam and murdered an Army officer.

-- Since July 1974 they have refused to attend meetings of the Four Party Joint Military Team in Saigon. The U.S. is a member of that team, the sole function of which is to resolve the status of our missing men and POW's.

Moreover, the record shows that the Communists have from the very start of the cease-fire regularly attacked major Government of Vietnam (GVN) population centers, positions, outposts and villages that were clearly in GVN hands at the hour the cease-fire began. The clearest examples of this blatant violation of the cease-fire is their attacks on government administrative capitals. To date they have captured 11 district capitals and one province capital. The following is a chronology of the most serious of these violations.

-- On January 29, 1973, the port town of Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai Province was attacked.

-- On February 28, 1973, the seige of the Tong Le Chanh Ranger Base in Tay Ninh Province began. It was to last until April 13, 1974, when the base was finally captured when the defenders ran out of ammunition and other vital supplies.

-- In March 1973, the Communists attacked along the Mekong River and attempted to take Hong Ngu and Tan Chau District Towns. They shelled both towns killing close to 100 civilians and wounding 500 others.

-- On September 22, 1973, the attack on the Le Minh Ranger Camp in Pleiku Province began.

-- On March 4, 1974, they mortared Cai Lay District Town in Dinh Tuong Province. The rounds hit a school yard during recess and killed 32 children and wounded 55 others.

-- On May 5, 1974, the village of Song Phu in Ving Long Province was mortared. Again the rounds hit in a school yard killing three students and wounding nine.

-- On August 7, 1974, Communist forces attacked and captured Thuong Duc District Town in Quang Nam Province.

## FACT SHEET

U. S. Military and Economic Assistance  
to South Vietnam and Cambodia for FY 75

Administration Request

-- Originally the Administration requested the following amounts of assistance for South Vietnam and Cambodia for FY 1975:

South Vietnam Military	\$1.45 billion
South Vietnam Economic	\$750 million
Cambodia Military	\$362.5 million
Cambodia Economic	\$110 million

Current Status of Administration Request (See attached sheet)

-- \$1.0 billion of military assistance of South Vietnam, which is contained in a separate section of the Defense bill was authorized but only \$700 million appropriated.

-- The Foreign Aid bill authorizes: \$449.9 million for economic aid to South Vietnam; \$100 million of economic aid to Cambodia; and \$200 million military assistance to Cambodia.

-- The Foreign Aid authorization allows a drawdown of U.S. military stocks to aid Cambodia in amounts up to \$75 million.

-- The Foreign Aid authorization places the following ceilings on all types of aid to Cambodia.

- . Military - \$200 million (plus drawdown)
- . Economic - \$177 million (this includes PL-480 commodity assistance which is part of the agriculture bill)

-- The appropriation process for the Foreign Aid bill has not been completed.

Problems

-- Military assistance to South Vietnam is too low. In view of the recent increase in fighting, ammunition supplies could become perilously low by April 1975. Strict conservation measures already in force have not allowed an adequate defense of some outlying towns and positions. Phuoc Long Province was captured by the Communists in January.

-- Food and other PL-480 commodities are available but cannot be sent because of the ceiling on total assistance to Cambodia. That ceiling must be eliminated.

-- \$700 million does not provide all the ammo, POL, spare parts and replacement items needed. Eleven squadrons of aircraft have already been moth-balled. The Air Force has taken a 50 percent cut in flying time and has had to reduce its close in air support by 40 percent. Medical evacuations and essential troop redeployments have been significantly curtailed. Medical supplies and some spare parts will begin running out in early spring. A large number of naval ships will have to be dry-docked starting this spring as they cannot be supported.

-- The net effect is that the South Vietnamese forces are being slowly sliced to death.

-- Military assistance to Cambodia is drastically low. The \$200 million is almost totally exhausted. The President has authorized the use of the emergency drawdown authority. This provides an additional \$75 million. All money will be spent and Cambodia out of ammunition by April. If the current Communist offensive there continues, they could run out sooner.

-- Economic aid is also completely inadequate. At the rate authorized, the Cambodian economy will begin a serious downturn in April and will collapse, or be on the verge of it, by June.

-- Economic assistance to South Vietnam will allow the status quo to be roughly maintained, but will not provide the growth and development needed to achieve self-sufficiency.

#### Action Needed

-- A \$300 million supplemental appropriation to the Defense bill for military assistance to South Vietnam. This three hundred million is already authorized.

-- The Foreign Aid appropriation process began in January. Efforts must be made to insure there are no further cuts in economic aid to Vietnam and assistance to Cambodia.

-- The ceilings on military assistance to Cambodia must be eliminated.

-- Supplemental military assistance to Cambodia in the amount of \$222 million will have to be authorized and appropriated.

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<sup>2</sup>There is no need for any additional economic assistance funds for Cambodia. The problem is that the Foreign Aid Authorization Act sets a ceiling of \$377 million on total aid to Cambodia during FY 75. With \$200 million for military assistance and \$100 million for economic aid, this leaves only \$77 million for commodity assistance within the PL-480 program. Originally \$77 million was thought to be enough. However, due to the significant number of new refugees created by the current Communist offensive, price rises and some initial inaccurate estimates, it is now clear that additional assistance, mainly food for refugees, is required. The commodities are available. No additional appropriation is required. However, unless the ceiling is lifted, they cannot be sent.

FACT SHEETThe South Vietnamese and Cambodian Armies are Not Fighting  
And Are Wasting Ammunition

Issue: Some say that military assistance to South Vietnam and Cambodia (currently \$700 million and \$275 million) is adequate. The problem is their troops do not exercise proper discipline. They use this excessive firepower to take the place of aggressiveness and just sit in their bunkers and fire off ammunition.

Facts:

-- In Cambodia, the Government is reacting to a fierce enemy offensive. Government casualties were two and one-half times greater in January 1975 than in any time in the past 16 months. It is clear troops there are fighting and dying. Ammunition is being used for self-defense and not for capricious or wasteful fire.

-- At the current funding levels for Cambodia, all money will be spent and the army out of bullets by April. If the offensive continues, they will run out sooner. There is no economy possible that will stretch this ammunition out to the end of the year. The simple fact is that Cambodian soldiers are engaging the enemy and taking unprecedented casualties.

-- In South Vietnam, Government forces have instituted strick ammunition and supple conservation measures.

-- For example, in the Mekong Delta, artillery support for outlying outposts has been severely restricted. In some cases artillery units are allowed to fire only two rounds during an attack, and they must receive special permission from a higher headquarters before additional support may be given.

-- Air support has been drastically cut as well. Air strikes and close in support have been cut 40 percent.

-- As a result of these restrictions, ammunition expenditure has dropped about 70 percent between 1972 and 1974. (80,000 tons per month compared with the present 21,000 tons permonth)

-- However, casualty rates and the level of hostilities have not decreased commensurately. In fact, the Government had more casualties in 1974 than in any other year of the war (except 1972, the year of the all-out North Vietnamese offensive).

-- These two statistics make it clear that the cuts in ammunition expenditure have resulted in more soldiers killed and wounded. The South Vietnamese have substituted bodies for bullets.

-- Some people believe there is virtue in reducing firepower and cutting the supply of ammunition. The hard fact is that when firepower is reduced something must take its place. What usually happens is that casualties go up. The recent experience in Cambodia and South Vietnam confirms that. It is a strange axiom of war that by increasing firepower and ammunition expenditure, casualties are actually reduced. Those who agree that by cutting aid we will end the killing must face this brutal fact: reducing aid increases the suffering and dying.



Implementing the Political Provisions of the Paris Accords

Issue: President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) are often accused of refusing to implement the political provisions of the Paris Accords.

Facts:

The record shows that the Thieu Government has agreed to implement all provisions of the Agreement. It is the Communist side which has refused these offers and has walked away from the negotiation table.

A. Government of Vietnam Proposals and Communist Rejections

Since the signing of the Paris Accords in January 1973, the RVN on three separate occasions during the talks with the Viet Cong representatives in Paris proposed the complete implementation of all of the political provisions of the Paris Accords including the setting of specific dates for new elections.

- On April 25, 1973, the RVN put forward a preliminary draft agreement with a timetable for the implementation of the Accords including the formation of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord within one month and with new national elections to be held four months later, on August 26, 1973. This proposal was rejected by the Communist side.
  
- On June 28, 1973, the RVN presented a revised timetable proposing the following steps: (1) removal of all war-time restrictions on political activity beginning on August 28, 1973; (2) the formation of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord on September 28, 1973; and (3) new general elections on December 25, 1973. This proposal was rejected by the Communist side.
  
- On January 19, 1974, the RVN proposed still another new timetable leading to new elections on July 20, 1974. This proposal was also rejected by the Communist side.

## B. Government of Vietnam Proposals on Reunification of the Country

The Government of Vietnam has also attempted to open a dialogue with North Vietnam to begin discussion on the peaceful reunification of the country:

- On May 15, 1973, the South Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs publicly announced that he had sent a note to the North Vietnamese government indicating his readiness to meet with their Foreign Minister to negotiate normalization of relations between the North and South. On May 17, 1973, Communist radio rejected this offer, calling it a "perfidious, deceitful trick."
- On January 26 and May 16, 1974, the Foreign Minister repeated this offer. The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry response to this latter proposal was to issue a statement calling the offer a "deceitful and cheating trick" which "the Foreign Ministry resolutely rejects...."

## C. U.S.-RVN Keep Channels Open

Despite Communist intransigence, the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam have tried to maintain the framework of the peace agreement and have taken actions to keep channels of communication open.

- The RVN flies Communist officials from Communist areas in South Vietnam to Saigon each week despite blatant Communist attacks.
- The U.S. transports North Vietnamese officials from Saigon to Hanoi each week in U.S. aircraft, despite the fact that they will not let us search for our over 900 men still missing in action.
- The South Vietnamese Government permits the Communists to hold press conferences each week in Saigon, despite the Communist refusal to negotiate.

## D. The Communist Side Has Broken Off Negotiations

In addition to rejecting every proposal the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has put forth, the Communists have broken off all talks, both with the RVN and with the United States.

- On May 13, 1974, while the Paris talks were temporarily suspended, the Communist delegation announced it was indefinitely suspending its participation and the head of the delegation returned to Hanoi. They have not returned.
  
- On June 23, 1974, the Viet Cong representatives announced they would no longer participate with the RVN in the Two Party Joint Military Commission talks in Saigon which were intended to implement the cease-fire agreement.
  
- Also on June 23, 1974, both the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong delegations to the Four Party Joint Military Team in Saigon announced they would no longer participate in meetings. The purpose of these meetings had been to resolve the question of searching for men still missing in action and arranging to recover the bodies of the war dead. The Communists have never returned. RVN and U.S. delegates, however, continue to appear at the twice-weekly meetings in Saigon, but no discussion is possible on accounting for our missing men.

The RVN has tried to get the talks in Paris started again and on ten separate occasions they have called for resumption of negotiations. The Communists have either ignored these requests or rejected them.

GVN statements advocating resumption of the negotiations in Paris and Saigon which were broken off by the Communist side in May and June 1974 were made on the following dates:

1. June 13, 1974 - GVN Foreign Ministry communique.
2. August 22, 1974 - Note to the parties to the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam.
3. November 7, 1974 - GVN public declaration.
4. November 21, 1974 - Speech by President Thieu.
5. December 31, 1974 - Note to the parties to the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam.
6. January 3, 1975 - GVN public declaration.

7. January 4, 1975 - Note to the parties to the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam.
8. January 8, 1975 - Note to the parties to the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam.
9. January 8, 1975 - GVN public declaration.
10. January 24, 1975 - GVN public declaration.

[Feb. 1975?]

Resolved, that it is the sense of the Democratic Caucus that U.S. assistance to Indochina should not represent an open ended commitment to sustain the countries of that region.

Therefore, after July 1, 1975, no monies should be appropriated for military assistance to that region unless such monies are included in an overall package of assistance which clearly includes a termination date.

The President is urged to work with the Congress in developing such a package of aid which meets the concern of the Congress for open ended expenditures in that region.

Between now and July 1, 1975, no further assistance should be authorized for Indochina. But recognizing the current threat to Cambodia and the Republic of Viet Nam posed by increasing enemy action, the President should be authorized by the Congress, notwithstanding the limitations of existing legislation, to provide funds already authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 and the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1975 and to draw upon Defense stocks up to a total of \$200 million for the FY 1975.



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: JOHN O. MARSH  
MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: VERNON C. LOEN *VL*

SUBJECT: Viet Nam Supplemental

You may be interested in the attached report filed by Representative Leo Ryan, a liberal Democrat from California who is a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, based upon his recent study mission to South Viet Nam and South Korea.

Ryan may be willing to help with the supplemental.

bcc: 4 copies to Nancy Kennedy FYI  
bcc: Charley Leppert  
bcc: Doug Bennett



FEBRUARY 25, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSELETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO  
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF  
REPRESENTATIVES

February 25, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I wish to convey to the House of Representatives my deep concern over the present critical situation in Cambodia. An independent Cambodia cannot survive unless the Congress acts very soon to provide supplemental military and economic assistance.

Unless such assistance is provided, the Cambodian army will run out of ammunition in less than a month.

The Cambodian people are totally dependent on us for their only means of resistance to aggression. The Communist forces now attacking have a constant, massive outside source of supply from the North as has been demonstrated by their ability to sustain the current heavy offensive.

If additional military assistance is withheld or delayed, the Government forces will be forced, within weeks, to surrender to the insurgents.

The economic situation is almost as difficult. Refugees forced to flee their homes by the Communists' repressive measures and scorched-earth policies have poured into Phnom Penh and other cities. Severe food shortages are already beginning. If the Congress does not provide for continued deliveries of rice and other essential supplies, millions of innocent people will suffer -- people who depend on us for their bare survival.

The Government of the Khmer Republic has demonstrated on countless occasions its willingness to negotiate a compromise political settlement to bring peace to its tormented land. It has been proven over the past two years that the progressive outbacks of American support have only undercut the possibilities of negotiation by encouraging a ruthless enemy in the hope of obtaining a total victory.

These are the harsh realities which the Congress must bear in mind as it considers the Administration's request for supplemental assistance to Cambodia.

It has been a basic policy of this Government to give material support to friends and allies who are willing and able to carry the burden of their own self-defense. Cambodia is such an ally.

This is a moral question that must be faced squarely. Are we to deliberately abandon a small country in the midst of its life and death struggle? Is the United States, which so far has consistently stood by its friends through the most difficult of times, now to condemn, in effect a small Asian nation totally dependent upon us? We cannot escape this responsibility. Our national security and the integrity of our alliances depend upon our reputation as a reliable partner. Countries around the world who depend on us for support -- as well as their foes. will judge our performance. It is in this spirit and with this sense of responsibility, Mr. Speaker, that I urge rapid and favorable action on my request for additional assistance to Cambodia.

Sincerely,

/s/ Gerald R. Ford

Honorable Carl Albert  
Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

# # #



March 1975?

Amendment to H. R. \_\_\_\_\_  
Offered by Mr. \_\_\_\_\_

Page \_\_, after line \_\_, insert the following:

Sec. \_\_. Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2415) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

*military*  
*and to end of U.S. assistance by such date*

"(h) The Congress directs that United States policy shall be to achieve an end to the conflict in Cambodia no later than June 30, 1975. To achieve the policy stated in the first sentence, in addition to any amounts included in subsection (a)--

"(1) of the amounts authorized to carry out chapter 2 of part II of this Act; not more than \$20,000,000 may be provided for military assistance for Cambodia;

"(2) of the defense articles and services which may be ordered under section 506 of this Act for fiscal year 1975, not more than \$7,500,000 may be ordered for Cambodia; and

"(3) of the amounts authorized under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, not more than \$17,700,000 may be provided for economic assistance for Cambodia,



for each of three successive thirty-day periods beginning on the date of enactment of this subsection, but only (A) after the President reports in detail during such thirty-day period to Congress that, at the time of such report--

"(i) the United States is undertaking specific steps to achieve an end to the conflict in Cambodia not later than June 30, 1975, in order to relieve human suffering and to end all United States military assistance to Cambodia by such date;

"(ii) the Khmer Republic is actively pursuing specific measures to reach a political and military accommodation with the other side in the conflict;

"(iii) initiatives have been taken toward the other side to achieve a peaceful and orderly conclusion to the conflict, including safe passage out of Cambodia for those persons who desire to leave the country, appropriate care and help for the refugees and victims of the conflict, and assurances that combatants and prisoners will be treated in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; and



"(iv) the United States, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3238, is requesting the Secretary-General, after due consultation, to lend assistance to achieve a peaceful and orderly conclusion to the conflict, including, if appropriate, the use of peacekeeping forces; and

(B) if the Congress, within ten calendar days after receiving such report, does not adopt a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the provisions of such report."



Excerpts of testimony given by Rep Paul McCloskey before Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy on Thursday, March 6, 1975

\*\*\*\*\*

This brought us down to the question, that they (the Cambodian Army) run out of ammunition on April 15th.

So we came to the point that, it seemed to me, in any event, that the more humane thing to do is give them not only rice, to lift the PL 430 ceiling of \$ 75 million, but to give them \$116 million, not the \$222 million that the Administration asked.

\*\*\*\*\*

Our thought was that fewer lives would be lost if we allowed the perimeter (around Phnom Penh) to exist until the rainy season than might be lost when they run out of ammunition, because we have helped these people at this point, if they run out of ammunition and the Khmer Rouge enters that perimeter, if the refugees statements are accurate, and we have no reason to discount them, and if the Khmer Rouge vengeance is against the policy of the Cambodian army not taking any prisoners, it might reasonably be expected more people's lives would be lost if the perimeter collapses than by continuing the fighting, continuing the killing of soldiers.

\*\*\*\*\*

These are the facts and circumstances that have led me to the point to the House and to the Senate that we vote the ammunition necessary between April 15th and the end of this fiscal year to permit that perimeter to exist.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES T. LYNN  
THRU: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF  
FROM: VERN LOEN *VL*  
SUBJECT: Cambodian Military Aid

Since last night, Chairman Otto Passman, D-La., of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations has come around to the view that he should concentrate on getting the ceiling lifted for Cambodia, but by only half as much as the \$222 M the Administration requested.

He then would negotiate with the Senate to get a higher figure to which he could agree in conference.

The plan he was considering last night would call for raising the ceiling on Cambodian aid, but with strong language specifying that any additional aid to Cambodia must come out of prior-year appropriations. No figure would be mentioned.

State Department informs me that the basic law prohibits the substitution of military aid for economic aid. They also have trouble with the idea of using the pipeline because it contains the wrong types of aid.

Officially, the State Department has decided to stick with the \$222 M supplemental request. Unofficially, they would accept almost any figure in the House with the hope of getting it raised in the Senate.

Reports coming back from the Congressional Study Group in Vietnam and Cambodia indicate they will make a favorable report, but perhaps not for the full amount for either Vietnam or Cambodia. Passman is

considering calling the chairman of that delegation, Jack Flynt (D-Ga.), before his subcommittee in an effort to get the votes to raise the ceiling on Cambodia. This might be a way out for some Members such as Conte and Coughlin, who have been locked in on Cambodia every since the military incursion three years ago.

cc: General Scowcroft  
Jack Marsh

FILE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1975

Dear Mr. Chairman:


It is my understanding that the House Foreign Affairs Committee will meet tomorrow morning to consider H.R. 2704.

It is my hope that the Committee before finally acting on this measure will reconsider the proposal known as the Hamilton/Dupont Amendment which was acted on by the Committee last Thursday.

As you are aware, we voiced serious objections to some provisions of this compromise. However, we view it as the only legislative vehicle to bring this issue before the full House, permitting full consideration of Administration views.

Therefore, we recommend that the full Committee today report favorably the Hamilton/Dupont compromise with regard to the additional Cambodian funding, so the House can work its will.

Sincerely yours,



Charles W. Robinson  
Acting Secretary

The Honorable  
Thomas E. Morgan,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
House of Representatives.



March 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK MARSH

THRU:

MAX FRIEDERSDORF  
VERN LOEN

FROM:

CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.

SUBJECT:

Congressional Inquiries on Southeast  
Asia and the Marianas Islands

I have talked to both Rep. Clausen and Ketchum on the attached inquiries. Rep. Ketchum is satisfied with the explanation provided by Ambassador Hayden Williams on the political status negotiations concerning the Marianas Islands.

Rep. Don Clausen was not satisfied with the response to his suggestions concerning setting up a SEATO concept for keeping peace in Southeast Asia. Clausen contends that he has discussed this concept with people in the Executive Branch for months with no follow up. Clausen contends that the time of bilateral agreements in foreign policy has passed and there is a real need to establish institutional arrangements for peace-keeping in Southeast Asia. Clausen acknowledged the meeting with Dick Smyser and discussing the same concept but is frustrated by the lack of leadership and follow through by the Executive Branch.

cc: Bennett  
Wolthuis





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK MARSH

THRU:

MAX FRIEDERSDORF  
VERN LOEN VL

FROM:

CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. *CLJ*

SUBJECT:

Results of Notifications to House Members  
on tax cut bill and naval evacuation of  
refugees in Vietnam.

Attached per your request are the results of the above notifications.



Speaker Carl Albert	Telephoned by Vern Loen to U. S. Mission in Peking and left message with duty officer for delivery to Speaker.
John J. Rhodes	Minority Leader - telephoned by Vern Loen to U. S. Mission in Peking and left message with duty officer for delivery to Mr. Rhodes.
Tip O'Neill	Majority Leader - telephoned by Leppert in Athens, Greece. Was pleased that President decided to sign tax cut bill and said "that's great."
John McFall	Majority Whip - telephoned by Vern Loen. Said "President was doing right thing in signing the tax bill."
Bob Michel	Minority Whip - Vern Loen telephoned, no direct contact, his telephone out of order. Message left with his secretary, Sharon Yard who stated she would inform Mr. Michel.
Herman Schneebeli	Ranking Minority - Ways and Means Committee. Telephoned by Leppert, stated the President had a tough decision and felt the President would do what he had to do and that he understood that.
John Anderson	Chairman - House Republican Conference. Telephoned by Leppert in Athens, Greece. Anderson felt President made the right decision and would respect the embargo.
Al Ullman	Chairman - Ways and Means Doug Bennett reached him in Jacksonville, Fla. His reaction was very favorable, very pleased with the President's decision. Expressed his intention to eliminate the "load" provisions of the bill (in agreement with the President).
Barber Conable	Second Ranking Republican - Ways and Means (conferred) Doug Bennett reached him at home in Washington. He was disappointed but understood the apparent reasoning behind the President's decision. Commented that "He will always be my President."



Joe Waggoner

- Ways and Means Democrat.  
Doug Bennett reached him in Athens, Greece. He felt the President's decision was a wise one. Was glad the President was coming down hard on the budget deficit prospects.

Phil Landrum

- Ways and Means Democrat (conferee)  
Doug Bennett reached him in Georgia. Pleased with President's decision. Felt it was the wisest course. Again expressed his feeling that if vetoed, a second bill could cost more than \$30 B.

Dan Rostenkowski

- Ways and Means Democrat (conferee)  
Doug Bennett reached him in Chicago. Very pleased with President's decision. Again expressed opinion that Congress must now cooperate and compromise with the President.



Results of Member notification of Naval Evacuation of Refugees in Vietnam 3/29/75

- Speaker Carl Albert - Cabled Message to U.S. Mission in Peking, China for delivery to Speaker.
- John Rhodes - Cabled message to U.S. Mission in Peking, China for delivery to Mr. Rhodes.
- Tip O'Neill  
John Anderson - Cabled Message to U.S. Embassy, Athens, Greece for delivery to Mr. O'Neill and Mr. Anderson
- John McFall - Telephoned by Vern Loen and McFall suggested that George Meany, as result of talk with John Murtha, would support limited aid to Vietnam with cut off date and recommended that President call Meany.
- Thomas Morgan - Chairman - Committee on International Relations  
Telephoned by Leppert. Morgan stated he saw no problem with President's action.
- William Broomfield - Ranking Minority Member, Committee on International Relations. Out of contact due to death of father. Vern Loen telephoned message to his secretary.
- Mel Price  
Bob Wilson - Chairman and Ranking Minority Member - Armed Services Committee  
Cabled to U.S. Embassy, Athens, Greece.
- George Mahon - Chairman, Committee on Appropriations  
Telephoned by Vern Loen. Mahon approved President's action.
- Elford Cederberg - Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Appropriations  
Telephoned by Leppert. Out of contact and left message with his Administrative Assistant, Mike Forgash.
- Bob Michel - Minority Whip. Telephoned by Leppert, phone out of order, left message with his secretary, Sharon Yard
- Jack Edwards - Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations  
Telephoned by Vern Loen. Edwards was non-committed



~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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(REVISED SUPPLEMENTAL)  
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975  
SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS

---

APRIL 1975



Military Assistance,  
South Vietnamese Forces

OASD (LA)  
Control No.  
S-75-0220  
Copy



DAD. 7/2/84  
~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975  
SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS  
APRIL 1975

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

CLASSIFIED BY PDASD (Comptroller)  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1983

Note: Classified material contained in this document is indicated by brackets.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES  
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION REQUEST, FISCAL YEAR 1975

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

APPROPRIATION LANGUAGE

For necessary expenses to support South Vietnamese military forces, to be obligated only by the issuance of orders by the Secretary of Defense, for such support, [\$700,000,000]\$1,422,000,000: Provided, That this appropriation shall be deemed obligated at the time the Secretary of Defense issues orders authorizing support of any kind for South Vietnamese military forces, which obligations shall in the case of non-excess materials and supplies to be furnished from the inventory of the Department of Defense be equal to the replacement costs thereof at the time such obligation is incurred and in the case of excess materials and supplies be equal at the actual value thereof at the time such obligation is incurred: Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated in this title shall be used for compensation or allowances of more than 2,850 citizens of the United States in South Viet Nam who are members of the Armed Forces or employees of or under contract to the Armed Services or the Department of Defense or any department or agencies thereof. (Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1975.)



MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES  
PROGRAM AND FINANCING (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

IDENTIFICATION CODE 07-38-1087-0-1-052	FY 1975 PRESENTLY AVAILABLE	FY 1975 REVISED ESTIMATE	FY 1975 PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL
PROGRAM BY ACTIVITIES:			
AIRCRAFT	37,300	82,200	44,900
SHIPS	1,350	1,350	-----
TANKS, OTHER VEHICLES AND WEAPONS	4,410	268,732	264,322
AMMUNITION	265,930	517,744	251,814
MISSILES	510	7,555	7,045
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	14,630	36,063	21,433
MILITARY PUBLIC WORKS	1,160	1,160	-----
OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT	16,100	16,100	-----
SUPPLY OPERATIONS	74,000	167,700	93,700
TRAINING	6,680	6,680	-----
ADMINISTRATION	39,220	39,220	-----
OTHER ACTIVITIES	238,710	277,496	38,786
10 TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	700,000	1,422,000	722,000
FINANCING:			
BUDGET AUTHORITY	700,000	1,422,000	722,000
RELATION OF OBLIGATIONS TO OUTLAYS:			
71 OBLIGATIONS INCURRED, NET	700,000	1,422,000	722,000
72 OBLIGATED BALANCE, START OF YEAR	-----	-----	-----
74 OBLIGATED BALANCE, END OF YEAR	- 160,000	- 322,000	- 162,000
90 OUTLAYS	540,000	1,100,000	560,000



MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES  
 OBJECT CLASSIFICATION (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

IDENTIFICATION CODE 07-38-1087-0-1-052	FY 1975 PRESENTLY AVAILABLE	FY 1975 REVISED ESTIMATE	FY 1975 PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL
11.8 SPECIAL PERSONAL SERVICES PAYMENTS	26,550	26,550	-----
13.0 BENEFITS FOR FORMER PERSONNEL	240	240	-----
21.0 TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS	2,700	2,700	-----
22.0 TRANSPORTATION OF THINGS	1,240	1,240	-----
23.0 RENT, COMMUNICATIONS, AND UTILITIES	1,790	1,790	-----
24.0 PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION	50	50	-----
25.0 OTHER SERVICES	121,840	215,540	93,700
26.0 SUPPLIES AND MATERIALS	383,680	674,280	290,600
31.0 EQUIPMENT	161,910	499,610	337,700
99.0 TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	700,000	1,422,000	722,000

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Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

(Dollars in thousands)

FY 1975 Presently Available	37,300
FY 1975 Revised Estimate	82,200
FY 1975 Proposed Supplemental	44,900

Budget Activity: Aircraft

Justification of requirements:

This request for \$44,900,000 provides for [two C-130A] replacement aircraft, aircraft support equipment, ground equipment, engines and spare parts for VNAF aircraft in the RVN area of control. [\$10,295,000 is for two aircraft, from current production, to replace the two C-130] aircraft provided by USAF. [\$16,016,000] provides spares, ground equipment, and engines for reconstitution of [four UH-1H helicopter squadrons] relocated to southern South Vietnam. [\$9.8 million] provides for similar reconstitution of [one F5E fighter-bomber squadron.] [\$5.222 million] permits reconstitution of [single squadrons of CH-47 helicopters, O-1 and U-17 aircraft.] [\$3,567 million] is for spares and equipment to support [A-37 attack aircraft] operating at increased tempo.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exhibit P-1 (Modified)

Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

Nomenclature	Unit Cost	Quantity	Cost
[ C-130A Aircraft	\$5,147,500*	2	\$10,295,000 ]

[ \*As required by law, represents current replacement cost to USAF. Actual acquisition costs of C-130A aircraft was approximately \$2,750,000. ]



~~SECRET~~

Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

(Dollars in thousands)

FY 1975 Presently Available	4,410
FY 1975 Revised Estimate	268,732
FY 1975 Proposed Supplemental	264,322

Budget Activity: Tanks, Other Vehicles and Weapons

Justification of requirements.

This budget activity request of [\$264.322 million] is urgently required to reconstitute [four Infantry Divisions, convert 12 Ranger Groups to four Ranger Divisions and upgrade 27 Regional Force Groups into 27 Separate ARVN Infantry Regiments.] The equipment is required to halt the present NVA invasion.

Principal elements of the request include [\$42.7] million for tanks and track vehicles for the [four Infantry divisions; \$33.9] million for tanks and track vehicles for the [four Ranger Divisions; \$48.8 million] for wheel vehicles for the [four Infantry Divisions; \$45.0 million] for wheel vehicles for the [four Ranger Divisions; \$44.0 million] for wheel vehicles for the [27 ARVN Infantry Regiments; \$19.2 million] for weapons for the [four Infantry Divisions; \$11.5 million] for weapons for the [four Ranger Divisions; \$15.9 million] for weapons for the [27 ARVN Infantry Regiments; and \$3.4 million] required for engineer equipment.

The above equipment is urgently required to reconstitute and upgrade ground combat units if South Vietnam is going to be given a chance to stabilize the military situation.

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Exhibit P-1 (Modified)

Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

WEAPONS, MAJOR

<u>Item</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Unit Cost</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
[ 1	Rifle Recoil 106MM	(13,522)	56	757,232
2	Mortar 4.2 in M30	(14,310)	20	286,200
3	Howitzer 105MM M101	(21,254)	600	12,752,400
4	Howitzer 155MM M114	(30,618)	144	<u>4,408,992</u>
				18,204,824 ]

WEAPONS, MINOR

[ 1	Rifle M16	(142)	101,849	14,462,558
2	Pistol Cal 45	(46)	22,994	1,057,724
3	Machine Gun 7.62 M60C	(1,081)	5,122	5,536,882
4	Launcher Grenade, M79	(222)	11,664	2,589,408
5	Launcher Rocket, XM202	(1,100)	822	904,200
6	Rifle Recoil 57MM	(2,586)	483	1,249,038 ]



Exhibit P-1 (Modified) (Continued)

WEAPONS, MINOR

<u>Item</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Unit Cost</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
[ 7	Mortar 60MM	(533)	412	219,596
8	Mortar 81MM, M29A1	(4,500)	453	2,038,500
9	Circle Aiming, M1	(534)	652	348,168
				<u>28,406,074</u>
				46,610,898

TANKS

1	Tank, M48A3	(280,043)	114	31,924,902 ]
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OTHER TRACKED VEHICLES

<u>Item</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Unit Cost</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
[ 1	Carrier Mortar, M125	(92,927)	48	4,460,496
2	APC M113	(76,887)	332	25,526,484
3	Carrier Mortar, M106	(84,194)	32	2,694,208
4	Carrier Comd Post, M577	(89,481)	24	2,147,544
5	Carrier Cargo, M548	(93,848)	24	2,252,352
6	Recovery Vehicle, M578	(185,074)	16	2,961,184
7	Recovery Vehicle, M88	(169,410)	4	677,640
8	Recovery Vehicle, XM806	(51,220)	16	819,520
9	Car Commando, XM706	(52,875)	48	2,538,000
10	Carrier Flame Thr, M132	(22,687)	24	544,488
				<u>44,621,916</u> ]





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Exhibit P-1 (Modified)

Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

OTHER VEHICLES

<u>Item</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Unit Cost</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
[ 1	Truck Utility, 1/4 Ton, M151	(7,320)	5,438	39,806,160
2	Truck Cargo, 3/4 Ton, M37WOW	(4,498)	2,189	9,846,122
3	Truck Cargo, 2 1/2 Ton M35	(17,731)	4,128	73,193,568
4	Truck Cargo, 5 Ton, M543	(8,753)	336	2,941,008
5	Truck Tanker, 2 1/2 Ton, M49A1C	(11,362)	24	272,688
6	Truck Tractor, 5 Ton, M52	(8,454)	12	101,448
7	Truck Dump, 5 Ton, M51	(8,764)	96	841,344
8	Truck Wrecker, 5 Ton, M816WW	(68,165)	143	9,747,595
9	Trailer Tank Wtr, 1 1/2 Ton, M149	(2,318)	336	778,848
10	Trailer Cargo, 1 1/2 Ton, M105	(1,049)	348	365,052
11	Trailer Ammo, 1 1/2 Ton, M332	(1,254)	240	300,960
12	Semi Trailer Stake, 12 Ton, M127	(8,635)	16	138,160 ]

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Exhibit P-1 (Modified) (Continued)

OTHER VEHICLES

<u>Item</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Unit Cost</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
[ 13	Semi Trailer Low Bed, 25 Ton, M172	(9,375)	12	112,500
14	Tractor, Full Tracked	(37,275)	28	1,043,700
15	Grader RD, MTZD 12'	(12,613)	16	201,808
16	Loader Scoop	(5,047)	16	80,752
17	Crane, 20 Ton	(62,706)	16	1,003,296
18	Crane, 10 Ton	(34,137)	4	136,548
19	Roller, 10 Ton	(18,932)	8	151,456
20	Tractor, 5 Ton	(8,454)	12	101,448
				\$141,164,461 ]

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Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

(Dollars in thousands)

FY 1975 Presently Available	265,930
FY 1975 Revised Estimate	517,744
FY 1975 Proposed Supplemental	251,814

Budget Activity: Ammunition

Justification of requirements:

This request for \$251,814,000 is for essential ground and air munitions. It is designed to support intense combat for the remainder of FY 75. \$198 million is for [60 days] of ground ammunition. This provides for approximately [50,000] short tons (ST) of ground ammunition consumption per month. \$21 million is requested for Air Force munitions to support consumption at [10,000 ST] per month. \$33 million is for initial issue of basic load ground ammunition for reconstituted and converted ARVN combat forces.

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Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

<u>Item</u>	<u>Ammunition Category</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1	Small Arms	26,040,748
2	Mortar	39,700,042
3	Artillery	136,872,820
4	Rockets	4,616,284
5	Grenades/Signal	20,773,278
6	Mines	3,462,213
7	Explosives	230,814
8	GP Bombs	19,240,389
9	Misc. Air	877,611
		\$251,814,199

~~SECRET~~

Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

(Dollars in thousands)

FY 1975 Presently Available	510
FY 1975 Revised Estimate	7,555
FY 1975 Proposed Supplemental	7,045

Budget Activity: Missiles

Justification of requirements.

This request for \$7,045,200 is for [114] TOW missile launchers. [Thirty-six (36)] of these are required to reconstitute [four ARVN Infantry divisions; thirty-six (36)] are necessary for equipping [12 Ranger groups as four Infantry divisions,] and [42] are required to [convert regional force to regular force ARVN regiments.] With the large NVA tank force threatening the SVN defensive perimeter, TOW missiles are essential to effective defense.

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exhibit P-1 (Modified)

Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

<u>Item</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Unit Cost</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1	TOW Missile Launcher:	[ \$61,800 ]	[ 114 ]	\$7,045,200



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

(Dollars in thousands)

FY 1975 Presently Available	14,630
FY 1975 Revised Estimate	36,063
FY 1975 Proposed Supplemental	21,433

Budget Activity: Electronic Equipment

Justification of requirements.

This request for \$21,432,514 is for radio and telephone communications equipment to be used in stabilizing the combat situation in South Vietnam. \$9,275,244 is requested for quantities of twenty-two various signal equipments to be used for reconstitution, in the defensive perimeter, of [four South Vietnamese Army divisions.] \$7,481,716 is requested for [upgrade of 12 existing ranger groups to four full strength regular divisions.] \$4,675,554 is requested for quantities of twelve various signal equipments for [upgrade of 27 Regional Force groups to full strength regiments.]

Equipments which are required include manpack and transportable radio equipment, which represent the largest money value, and field telephone sets which are the largest quantity items requested.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

(Dollars in thousands)

FY 1975 Presently Available	74,000
FY 1975 Revised Estimate	167,700
FY 1975 Proposed Supplemental	93,700

Budget Activity: Supply Operations

Justification of supplemental requirements.

This request for \$93.7 million would fund packing, crating, handling and transportation costs for materiel provided South Vietnam under the supplemental request. The request is based on recent cost experience and assumes that virtually all supplementally funded items would be received in Vietnam during FY 75. This is consistent with the nature of items requested and their urgency of need. The request considers that a higher ratio of air shipment than previously used will be required for these urgent needs.





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Department of Defense  
Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces

(Dollars in thousands)

FY 1975 Presently Available	238,710
FY 1975 Revised Estimate	277,496
FY 1975 Proposed Supplemental	38,786

Budget Activity: Other Activities

Justification of supplemental requirements.

This request for \$38.8 million reflects urgent requirements for stabilization and reconstitution of South Vietnamese Forces. This request is for petroleum, lubricants, general supplies, repair parts, medical supplies and mine detection equipment. \$21.0 million is requested for general supplies and repair parts. These include critical replacement parts for artillery, vehicles, tanks, communications equipment and naval craft. Also included are vitally needed batteries for communications equipment and vehicles, individual field equipment, and defensive supplies for building bunkers and revetments. \$10.4 million is a minimum request for POL products, including diesel fuel, gasoline, jet fuel and lubricants, to sustain combat operations at intense rates for the remaining months of the fiscal year.

\$7.0 million is requested for medical supplies needed for the current combat situation. [\$.4 million] is requested for mine detectors for [engineer companies of the reconstituted and upgraded infantry] units.

In compliance with Section 844 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, FY 1975 (Public Law 93-437), no petroleum fuels furnished under the above request will be produced in the Continental United States.



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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ introduced the following bill; which was referred  
to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_

A BILL

To authorize funds for humanitarian assistance and evacuation programs in Vietnam and to clarify restrictions on the availability of funds for the use of U.S. Armed Forces in Indochina, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That this Act may be cited as the "Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975."

Sec. 2. There is authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1975 not to exceed \$150,000,000 to be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, on such terms and conditions as the President may deem appropriate for humanitarian assistance and evacuation programs in South Vietnam.

Sec. 3. Nothing contained in Section 839 of Public Law 93-437, Section 30 of Public Law 93-189, Section 806 of Public Law 93-155, Section 13 of Public Law 93-126, Section 108 of Public Law 93-52, or any other comparable provision of law shall be construed as limiting the availability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for the purposes of Section 2 of this Act.

Sec. 4. For the purposes of Sec. 2, evacuation shall be defined as the removal to places of safety as expeditiously as possible, and with the minimum use of necessary force, the following categories of persons:

- (a) American citizens;
- (b) Dependents of American citizens *and of permanent residents of the United States;*
- (c) Vietnamese nationals eligible for immigration to the United States by reason of their relationships to American citizens; and
- (d) Such other foreign nationals to whose lives a direct and imminent threat exists, provided that United States armed forces necessary to carry out

\* 177, 000, 000 - already approp.  
35 000, 000 - unexpended.



their evacuation do not exceed those necessary to carry out the evacuation of (a), (b) and (c) above.

Sec. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to abrogate any of the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148.

Sec. 6. Funds <sup>heretofore or</sup> hereafter made available under Section 36 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 may be used for humanitarian assistance purposes without regard to limitations contained in subsections 36(a)(1), 36(a)(6) and 38(a)(1) of that Act.

Sec. 7. Any of the provisions of this Act may be rescinded by concurrent resolution of the Congress.



[April 1975]

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOUSE AND SENATE VERSIONS  
(H.R. 6096 and S. 1484)

No.	House Version	Senate Version
1.	Title: To authorize funds for humanitarian assistance and evacuation programs in Vietnam and to clarify restrictions on the availability of funds for the use of United States Armed Forces in Indochina.	To authorize the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States to protect citizens of the United States and their dependents and certain other persons being withdrawn from South Vietnam.
2.	Short title: Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975.	Vietnam Contingency Act of 1975.
3.	Sec. 2: Authorizes not to exceed <u>\$150 million</u> for FY 1975 notwithstanding any other provision of law on terms and conditions President deems appropriate for humanitarian assistance and evacuation from S. Vietnam.	Sec. 2: Authorizes establishment of and appropriation for Vietnam Contingency Fund for FY 1975 of \$100 million for humanitarian and withdrawal purposes as the President determines in the national interest. Sec. 7 (b)(1): Authorizes <u>\$150 million</u> for humanitarian assistance to <u>refugees and other needy victims of conflict</u> in S. Vietnam and Cambodia.
4.	No comparable provision.	Sec. 7 (b)(2): Provides that funds shall be furnished under direction and control of U.N. or specialized agencies or auspices of other international organizations, international agreements or voluntary relief agencies.
5.	No comparable proviso.	Sec. 7 (b)(2) Proviso: Distribution of services, supplies, etc. only under direct supervision and control of representatives of international organizations or voluntary relief agencies.
6.	No comparable provision.	Sec. 7 (b)(3): Report to Congress every 90 days describing assistance provided, recipients, distributors, and means of distribution.

*Hand Asst Authority?*

*will Sec. 6 Pres. any This?*



*no obj*

No.	House Version	Senate Version
7.	No comparable provision.	Sec. 7 (c): Title I or II deliveries scheduled for Cambodia prior to enactment of Act to be delivered, if requested by Cambodia; through multilateral, international channels.
8.	No comparable provision.	Sec. 7 (a): Policy to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and victims of the conflicts in S. Vietnam and Cambodia under U.N. direction and control or auspices of voluntary relief agencies
9.	Sec. 3: Waiver of limitations in other laws for use of Armed Forces of U.S. for purposes of this Act.	Sec. 6: Similar provision, listing 2 additional laws -- Sec. 741 of P.L. 93-238 and Sec. 307 of P.L. 93-50.
10.	Sec. 4: Definition of evacuation and use of force, and listing categories of evacuees.	Sec. 3 (a): Provision for use of force for evacuation of certain citizens and dependents.
11.	No comparable provision.	Sec. 3 (c): Presidential certification required concerning existence of threat and efforts to terminate same, and as to rapid evacuation of those threatened.
12.	Sec. 4 (d): Definition of evacuation of foreign nationals.	Sec. 4: Authorizing President to evacuate foreign nationals upon his determination and certification to Congress of existing threat and efforts to terminate such threat.
13.	Sec. 4, last sentence: / Limitation on authority to effect evacuation.	Sec. 4, paras. (c), (d) and (e): Limitations on use of force as to numbers, duration and areas.
14.	Sec. 5: Declaration that Act does not abrogate War Powers Resolution.	Sec. 3 (b): Requires President to submit report on use of forces as required by sec. 4 (a) of War Powers Resolution. Sec. 5: Statutory authority within meaning of sec. 8 (a) of War Powers Resolution.

OPPOSE

No objection

Refer to A

Refer to A

Refer to House

OPPOSE C

Refer to B

General

Refer to House



<u>No.</u>	<u>House Version</u>	<u>Senate Version</u>
15.	Sec. 7: Act may be rescinded by concurrent resolution.	No comparable provision.
16.	No comparable provision. <i>no objection</i>	Sec. 8:(a): Reports to Congress on evacuees and those remaining in S. Vietnam.
17.	No comparable provision. <i>opposed</i>	Sec. 9: Submission to Senate committees of President's general plan for withdrawal described in sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
18.	No comparable provision.	Sec. 10: Policy concerning evacuation of deserters who turn themselves in

*OK*



[April 1975?]

WRITE ONLY ON ONE SIDE OF EACH PAGE

94th CONGRESS

1st SESSION

H. RES.

(NOTE.—Fill in all blank lines except those provided for the date and number of resolution.)

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

H.R. 6096

submitted the following resolution; which was

RESOLUTION

3 day rule

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move, clause 2(1)(6) of Rule XI to the contrary notwithstanding, that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6096) to authorize funds for humanitarian assistance and evacuation programs in Vietnam and to clarify restrictions on the availability of funds for the use of United States Armed Forces in Indochina, and for other purposes, and all points of order against sections 3 and 6 of said bill for failure to comply with the provisions of clause 5, Rule XXI are hereby waived.

After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed \_\_\_ hour(s), to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider the amendment recommended by the Committee on International Relations now printed on page 3, lines 11 and 12. of the bill notwithstanding the provisions of clause 5, Rule XXI. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

Appropriation in legislative bill

Transfer of funds





A BILL

[April 1975?]

To enable the United States to render assistance to or in behalf of certain migrants and refugees.

1           Be it enacted by the Senate and House of  
2           Representatives of the United States of America  
3           in Congress assembled, That this Act may be  
4           cited as "Migration and Refugee Assistance Act  
5           of 1975".

6           SEC. 2. (a) Subject to the provisions of  
7           subsection (b), there are hereby authorized to  
8           be appropriated, in addition to amounts other-  
9           wise available for such purposes, such sums as  
10          may be necessary for the performance of functions  
11          under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of  
12          1962, as amended, with respect to aliens who  
13          have fled from Cambodia or Vietnam, such sums to  
14          remain available until expended.

15                           (b) None of the funds authorized  
16          to be appropriated by this Act shall be available  
17          for the performance of functions after June 30,  
18          1976, other than carrying out the provisions of  
19          clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) of section 2(b)  
20          of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of  
21          1962, as amended. None of such funds shall be  
22          available for obligation for any purpose after  
23          September 30, 1977.



1           SEC. 3. In carrying out functions  
2 utilizing the funds made available under this  
3 Act, the term "refugee" as defined in  
4 section 2(b)(3) of the Migration and Refugee  
5 Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, shall be  
6 deemed to include aliens who (A) because of  
7 persecution on account of race, religion, or  
8 political opinion, fled from Cambodia or  
9 Vietnam; (B) cannot return there because of  
10 fear of persecution on account of race,  
11 religion, or political opinion; and (C) are in  
12 urgent need of assistance for the essentials  
13 of life.

ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT  
MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1975

The draft bill provides an express statutory authorization for a temporary program of relief and resettlement for refugees from Cambodia and Vietnam. This program, extending no longer than the end of the fiscal year 1977, would be carried out under the authorities contained in the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended. However, because it does not constitute permanent authority, the proposed legislation is in the form of a separate law, rather than an amendment to the 1962 Act.

Title. Section 1 identifies this Act as the "Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975". This title associates the legislation with the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, while also emphasizing it is a separate Act for a temporary program.

Authorization. Section 2(a) authorizes the appropriation of funds for assistance to Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees. The assistance would be provided under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, utilizing established procedures and administrative machinery with which the voluntary agencies and state and local governments are familiar.

During the next fourteen months, it is estimated that appropriations in the amount of \$507,000,000 will be required to carry out a program of temporary relief, transportation, and resettlement in the United States and third countries for 150,000 refugees. Additional costs for assistance to or in behalf of refugees in the United States will be incurred in fiscal year 1977. Because this program spans slightly more than two fiscal years, section 2(a) authorizes the appropriations to remain available until expended. However, the authorization is subject to the provisions of section 2(b) which limits the duration of the program to June 30, 1976, except for the functions within the United States, with respect to which the authorization continues through fiscal year 1977. In the event of a need for funds for resettlement in third countries or other overseas activities after June 30, 1976, they would be requested in the

normal authorization and appropriation process under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended.

Definition of Refugee. Section 3 extends to refugees who have fled from Cambodia and Vietnam the authorities in the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act which are applicable to refugees in the United States from within the Western Hemisphere. These authorities include assistance to state and local public agencies, transportation of refugees to other areas within the United States, and training for employment. Programs under the authority of this section will be available only to those refugees who meet the requirements of financial need applicable to other refugees assisted under the 1962 Act and will terminate no later than the end of the fiscal year 1977, upon the expiration of the authorization contained in section 2.

## FACT SHEET

### Evacuation and Resettlement of Indo Chinese Refugees

#### Evacuation

- 86,000 U.S. citizens and South Vietnamese have been evacuated by air and sea by U.S. military.
- All American citizens who wanted to leave South Vietnam did get out.
- An estimated 41,000 more South Vietnamese have fled their country on boats, by ship or over land.
- Only \$98 million is available under existing authority for the evacuation program. To date, DOD has incurred over \$70 million in costs for the evacuation. Without additional funds, the U.S. Government will be able to continue resettlement efforts only one more week.

#### Restaging Sites

- All refugees are being processed through Guam and Wake Islands where they are receiving housing, food, Immigration and Naturalization Service screening, and rigorous health care.
- An appeal internationally by U.S. to offer opportunities for resettlement in third countries, has resulted in the active participation of the UNHCR and ICEM, ICRC on Guam. Representatives are on site assisting in such resettlement.

- The health condition is very good, and no unusual health problems exist.
- Less than 100 people out of 30,000 on Guam have been hospitalized, most of which were for maternity care, pneumonia, mild diarrhea - but no serious disease.
- INS is processing through those refugees whose documents are in order and are eligible for entry into U.S.
- PHS Center for Disease Control has established a surveillance system to identify and treat illness.

Reception Centers Stateside

- The three centers are Camp Pendleton, Calif.; Fort Chaffee, Ark.; Eglin Air Force Base.
- American voluntary agencies which have enabled the resettlement of millions of displaced persons who have been war victims are working closely with USG to resettle those refugees who enter the U.S.
- The major agencies are:

(see next page)

U.S. Catholic Conference  
Migration and Refugee Services  
1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.  
659-6631

American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees  
1709 Broadway, Room 1316  
New York, N.Y. 10019

Church World Service  
Immigration & Refugee Program  
475 Riverside Drive  
New York, N.Y. 10027

Lutheran Immigration & Refugee Service  
315 Park Avenue South  
New York, N.Y. 10010

United Hias Service, Inc.  
200 Park Avenue South  
New York, N.Y. 10003

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.  
250 West 57th Street  
New York, N.Y. 10019

International Rescue Committee  
386 Park Avenue South  
New York, N.Y. 10016

American Council for Nationalities Service  
20 West 40th Street  
New York, N.Y.  
212/279-2715

Traveler's Aid-International Social Services  
345 East 46th Street  
New York, N.Y.  
212/687-5958

The last three agencies have entered into a cooperative arrangement to process resettlement cases but wish to be listed separately as agencies engaged in resettlement.



- In addition, the Red Cross, Travelers Aid International have provided extraordinary assistance.

- The private sector has come forward with major expressions of assistance, including United Airlines which is providing transportation from reception centers to final destinations throughout the country.

- By the time each refugee leaves a reception site he will have a local sponsor identified by a voluntary resettlement agency, a rigorous health screening, and all children 1 - 5 will receive immunizations for measles, rubella, polio, diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus.

- The voluntary agencies will assume responsibility for finding housing, enrolling children in schools, assisting in employment opportunities for heads of households, assistance in language skills, etc.

### Resettlement

- Every effort will be made to ensure that resettlement to the extent possible will not be concentrated in a few enclaves in the country and will not result in economic or social service hardship.

- The Department of HEW, subject to Congressional action on the Administration's bill, will provide full reimbursement to State and local social service and health agencies for costs they may incur in providing income assistance, health maintenance, social services and educational services to refugees who are in need of such assistance.



Previous Refugee Emigrations

Displaced Persons	1945-1952	450,000
Eastern Europeans	1953-1956	189,000
Hungarians	1956-1957	30,701
Cubans	1959-Present	675,000
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,344,701</b>

2 May 1975

Preliminary Estimates of  
Transport, Temporary Care,  
and Resettlement Costs  
(150,000 Evacuees in Staging  
Areas, of which 130,000 to  
be resettled in U.S. and  
20,000 in Third Countries)

1.	<u>Daily Maintenance</u>		\$	185,000,000
	\$15 per person per day for 30 days (150,000 people) at staging areas, \$15 per person per day for 60 days (130,000 people) at processing centers. Includes food, utilities, medical care, etc.			
2.	<u>Airlift</u>			99,000,000
	\$530 per person (130,000 people) from staging areas to processing centers, plus air supply of materials estimated at \$30 million.			
3.	<u>Resettlement Costs</u>			78,000,000
	Estimated at \$600 per person to be provided to voluntary agencies which will transport and administer resettle- ment, 130,000 people in U.S.			
4.	<u>Subsequent Welfare and Medical (HEW)</u>			125,000,000
	Welfare and Social Services	\$50,000,000		
	Medicaid	30,000,000		
	Bilingual and Vocational Training	30,000,000		
	Public Health	15,000,000		
5.	<u>Movement of Added 20,000 Refugees to Third Countries for Resettlement (State/ORM)</u>			20,000,000
	Estimated at \$1,000 each to cover transport and program administration.			

NEW APPROPRIATION NEEDED

\$ 507,000,000

2 May 1975

Preliminary Estimates of  
Evacuation Costs  
(150,000 Evacuees from  
South Vietnam to Staging  
Areas)

1. <u>Sealift</u>	\$ 30,000,000
Contract shipping for evacuation	
2. <u>Airlift</u>	33,000,000
\$300 per person to staging areas (110,000 people)	
3. <u>Facilities</u>	35,000,000
. \$20 million for establishment of staging areas, \$15 million to open processing centers.	
	<hr/>
Total Requirement	\$ 98,000,000

Less Amount Provided from IPR Funds under Presidential Determination (614[a] Waiver)	\$ 98,000,000
--	---------------

APPROPRIATION NEEDED

-- 0 --

~~SECRET~~

[April 1975?]

DRAFT CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION STATEMENT

The President, in his foreign policy report to the nation on April 10, advised the Congress that he might need to evacuate American citizens and a number of Vietnamese from South Vietnam under certain contingencies.

Since that time, the Executive has frequently consulted the Congress in several forums about the planning and the prospects for such evacuation. At the President's instruction, the Congress has been kept fully informed.

The President has now instructed the American Ambassador in Saigon to evacuate the remaining staff of the American Mission, along with other Americans and a number of Vietnamese who have been associated with us and whose lives might be in jeopardy.

To assure the effectiveness and the safety of the evacuation, the President has directed the use of U. S. ~~(fixed wing and)~~ helicopter airlift, as well as the deployment of U. S. Marine security forces to protect the landing zones. Tactical air cover has also been authorized.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)  
White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DHD NARS, Date 4/27/84



[April 1975]


~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

DRAFT CABLE

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. Please inform (Senator \_\_\_\_\_) (Congressman \_\_\_\_\_) of the following developments ASAP:
2. BEGIN MESSAGE: The President has authorized our Ambassador in Phnom Penh to begin evacuation of the American staff under our established evacuation plans. Phase One will begin immediately and will reduce down to a bare minimum essential staff those Americans remaining. It will utilize fixed-wing aircraft and the civilian airport. Most US citizens, some third-country nationals, and some Khmer will be lifted out under Phase One.
3. Should it become essential--because of ~~an~~ security developments in Phnom Penh--to remove the remaining minimum staff, this will be done. You should be aware that this final step could require, in extreme circumstances, the use of helicopters and limited number of Marine security forces to secure landing zones.
4. It is essential that this information be held in strictest confidence. ~~You can understand that~~ <sup>to prevent</sup> any publicity <sup>that</sup> could jeopardize the lives of the remaining Americans in Phnom Penh. END MESSAGE.
5. Please confirm when message has been delivered.

Clearances: L - Mr. Leigh  
 DOD - Mr. Fryklund  
 -WH - Mr. Wolthius  
 EA - Mr. Habib  
 M - Mr. Eagleburger



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)

White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983

By DAD NARS, Date 4/27/84

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 1, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY  
(Palm Springs, California)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
PRESS CONFERENCE  
OF  
PHILIP C. HABIB  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

PRESS BRIEFING ROOM  
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

12:20 P.M. EDT  
9:20 A.M. PDT

MR. HABIB: I have no opening statement. I thought it would be better, to suit your purposes, if we went right to questions.

Q How would the United States regard Mr. Lon Nol when he arrives here? As chief of state? As an important visitor?

MR. HABIB: Marshall Lon Nol, as you know, has gone to Indonesia for a rest. After that, it is presumed he will be stopping in Hawaii for medical treatment. As you will recall, Spencer, some time ago he had been treated there, and after that, he will probably be, as his desire, come on to the United States. It will be treated as not an official visit in that sense. It is at his request, and our people have been instructed to provide all the appropriate facilities, and we will do so. He remains, as you know, chief of state constitutionally in Cambodia.

Q May I ask you about Vietnam? What is the outlook from the American side as to where this North Vietnamese-Vietcong offensive is going to stop. Are they going to roll clear on to Saigon?

MR. HABIB: If you don't mind, that is one of those questions where I will take a little time to answer. Quite obviously, what you are seeing taking place in Vietnam is the massive military violation of the Paris agreements in such a manner that North Vietnamese regular forces have been committed all over the 1st Corps and 2nd Corps and have continued their operations in 3rd and 4th Corps.

MORE

Where they are going to get to and how far they are going to get is a question that remains to be seen.

As of this moment, the 1st and 2nd Corps have been substantially overrun. Your question is how far is it going to go? I don't know. The question is, where will the South Vietnamese be able to stabilize their military lines.

I think you have got to go back a little ways to look at this thing in its proper perspective, and I am going to impose upon you a bit today for doing so.

Let's face it. If you take a look at the situation today in terms of North Vietnamese regular troops in South Vietnam, there are more North Vietnamese regular troops in South Vietnam today than there have ever been before.

There certainly are many more than at the time the Paris agreements were signed.

As best as we can tell, as many as five or six out of the eight North Vietnamese reserve divisions have been committed to the battle in South Vietnam.

If you look at the terms of the agreement that I tried to explain to some of you before, you know very well that the agreement that was signed solemnly -- a solemn agreement -- provided, among other things, not only that there would be a ceasefire, but that the North Vietnamese would not introduce new forces into South Vietnam, that weaponry could only be replaced on a one-for-one basis.

In fact, what has happened is that you have had gross violation of the agreement from the day it was signed. In the face of that gross violation of the agreement, we, in turn, have not been able since 1973 to be responsive to the breaches of the agreement as signed and endorsed by the other members -- signed by the North Vietnamese and endorsed by the other members -- at the Paris Conference.

Moreover, over a period of time, whereas the North Vietnamese had been able to introduce into South Vietnam greatly enhanced and modernized military equipment -- weaponry, ammunition of new varieties, more sophisticated -- whereas they have been able to do that, in fact, rather than being able to even meet the terms of the agreement for one-to-one, which permitted one-for-one replacement, there has been nothing like that flow of arms and material into South Vietnam for the defense of the Republic of Vietnam.

MORE

So, what you are seeing is not simply something that happened in the last week or so. You are seeing, in effect, the cumulative results of these gross violations of the agreement on the part of the North Vietnamese and the inability to maintain that kind of response over time that would have been necessary to sustain the agreement.

North Vietnam has deliberately chosen to take this path of gross violation of the agreement. The evidence is clear as to what that has involved. In the past, it has been rather popular to say, "Oh well, both sides violated the agreement." That kind of equivalency is irrelevant, if not completely dishonest.

Of course, there were violations on both sides, but when you compare them in terms of their relative degree, the ability of the North to mount the kind of campaign that you are seeing today depended upon both the violations in fact, in spirit, and intent. Anybody who reads anything else into this thing is just blind to circumstances as they have been evolving for several years.

Yes, sir?

Q Are you suggesting that the collapse of the Saigon government is due primarily to these massive North Vietnamese violations and not to any kind of internal collapse in the Saigon government or the army?

MR. HABIB: I am suggesting it is a combination of many factors. As a matter of fact, I am trying to bring about just that perspective in the understanding of it.

I think if you are going to look at the situation, you have to look at it in total. It is true that only some of the South Vietnamese forces did not, as you put it, sort of melt away in front of this onslaught, but in order to understand the circumstances, the situation and the forces at work, you have got to go back to the physical presence of the North Vietnamese in total violation of the agreement.

Unless you are prepared to start from that point and work your way forward, I don't think you will have full comprehension of just what happened. In terms of exactly what did happen, you are just as good an analyst as I am.

I think the Secretary of Defense addressed a good deal of that yesterday in his press remarks. Quite clearly, what the South intended to do was to produce a strategic withdrawal in the face of this overwhelming force that was being put against it and its own judgment of its own capability.

MORE



After all, that was a factor. Now that strategic withdrawal did not succeed, there is no question of it. All you have to do is look at what happened in the 1st and 2nd Corps.

Q What is the United States willing and able to do about this? I wish you would separate the answer into two phases; one, diplomatically, what is the United States willing and able to do about it, and apart from the diplomacy.

MR. HABIB: First, in terms of what the United States is able to do about it. As you know, the President did dispatch General Weyand to take a look at the military situation and to provide him with a careful assessment of the situation. The mission -- General Weyand will be providing that assessment to the President. I understand General Weyand will be returning the latter part of this week, but that you will have to get confirmed over at Defense.

When that assessment is completed and available, the President naturally will then make the decision as to what will be required.

Obviously, it is quite clear that the necessity and the need for resources for the South to defend itself will be greater. There is no question that the losses have been large, but moreover, and beyond that, the human tragedy that has been created with respect to the refugees is of such great dimension that it will require -- and naturally we would expect -- that the United States would contribute to the amelioration of that situation.

There will be consideration given -- careful consideration given -- to both the military and the economic humanitarian requirements of the situation. As far as your further question as to what can be done, I take it you mean on the diplomatic side.

As you recall, we anticipated the nature of the violations of North Vietnam's solemn word, and have for several years. The answer is they have disregarded their diplomatic obligations. They signed a solemn agreement. The Administration called particular attention to the danger in January. The President, the Secretary of State and other responsible, authoritative officials have been calling constant attention to these matters over the last several months, as you know.

The Administration is, however, not blind to reality and is not also ignorant of the nature of the North Vietnamese intentions and strategy. Quite obviously, what they decided to do was to go for the military blow that they have inflicted. This is not something that was created in two weeks. This is something that has been planned for some time. You cannot do this sort of thing in just a weekend of meetings and decision-making.

They have positioned their forces. They have positioned their armaments. They have drawn their plans and they have taken the military course, as I said earlier, in gross violation of their solemn obligation. Any other word that one wants to apply to it is just sheer verbage.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have said you anticipated this for several years. It has only been two years since the Paris agreement was signed. Are you implying you never expected them to live up to their agreement in the first place?

MR. HABIB: I don't recall that. Did I say several years? I thought I said several months. I am sorry, I mean for several months.

Q That was my question you took off on. Could I ask you a follow-up? You spoke of the Paris accords prohibiting the reintroduction of the North Vietnamese. As I recall, it was worded there would be no foreign troops. The reason for that wording, of course, is diplomatic because they never would admit they ever had any troops down there, but the United States well knew why the wording was that way.

What I am asking is, at what point did you come to the realization that a blow of this size and extent was necessary? Several months ago, or a year ago?

MR. HABIB: Obviously, the present campaign -- let me take your question in two parts. First of all, the North Vietnamese know very well that the agreement provides that where there is nothing said specifically about the immediate withdrawal of the North Vietnamese forces that were then in the South, the agreement was quite specific that there could not be, could not be introduced North Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam. That was clearly understood and clearly stated.

As far as what has happened laterally, I think you have got to go back to this season's campaign. If you want to talk about this season's campaign, you have to go back to about December when, as I said earlier, after having positioned their forces and undoubtedly developed their campaign strategy, they began to probe and push militarily.

You recall at that time we called attention to that. That continued on over into the new year. Then, you have got the further movement. You began to get the movement of the reserve divisions. You began to get the North, for example, making it very clear that it was mobilizing. The signs of mobilization were clear.

MORE

The launching of the latest onslaught was based upon the earlier probe and the earlier build-up. It is not hard to read the tea leaves as to what was happening when this was going on.

Q Can we go back to the question of before that, as to what the United States can do diplomatically. The other side has put forward once again its offer to negotiate without President Thieu and abide by the Paris agreements.

How much worth do you put into this, and what can be done in the way of negotiation?

MR. HABIB: That is someone to talk about abiding by the Paris agreement in the face of what I have characterized as gross violation -- gross violations have been going on for some time. They now have been raised to the highest point since the agreement was signed. To speak about returning, in terms of the Paris agreement, really requires a great deal of credulity on the part of anyone to accept that.

Q Does this mean that we are rejecting --

MR. HABIB: On the contrary. As you know, the United States has always felt the terms of the Paris agreement should be lived up to, that the terms of the Paris agreement are to be lived up to right now.

The North Vietnamese make it very clear that they are not prepared to live up to the terms of the Paris agreement by their actions. They can say things, they can talk about things that do not necessarily have to mean what they say or what they appear to be intended to mean.

When one speaks about the Paris agreement, one has to talk about what has happened to the Paris agreement. Are they prepared, in effect, to abide by the terms of the Paris agreement as it was when they signed it? Are they prepared to abide by the terms of the Paris agreement? There is no question that the Paris agreement does not allow them to do what they are doing. There is no basis within the Paris agreement for either the forces in the South that have been put there in violation of the agreement; the equipment that is in the South, which has been put there in violation of the agreement; and the use of those forces and equipment, which is in violation of the agreement.

There is nothing in the Paris agreement that permits North Vietnam to move its main forces clearly in violation of that agreement.

MORE

Q What about the other part of the question?

MR. HABIB: What was the other part of the question?

Q It was about President Thieu.

MR. HABIB: What about him? Would you rephrase the question?

Q Is the United States continuing its full support to President Thieu?

MR. HABIB: This idea that the United States support this or -- the United States supports the government of the Republic of Vietnam. The President of that government is President Thieu. That is the answer to the question.

Q Mr. Habib, I am curious about the phrase you used earlier that it was clear that the United States would have to provide more -- I think it is fair to say, if I understand you correctly -- in both the military side and on the humanitarian side.

MR. HABIB: That is correct.

Q Are you talking about more than already requested for South Vietnam, more than the \$300 million requested in the supplemental?

MR. HABIB: I think the answer to that, of course, to be technical, will depend on the assessment that is provided by General Weyand on the mission and the President's determination. What I am doing is repeating what the Secretary of Defense said yesterday to the press, that he anticipated the requirements would be, of course, greater.

Q Greater than what?

MR. HABIB: Greater than the amount that was originally requested. That was the \$300 million supplemental.

Q So, you are talking about more than the \$300 million?

MR. HABIB: I am not stating that. I said that one can anticipate that possibility, in terms of the requirement of the situation, but I am not stating that. I am trying to be responsive to the question.

On the economic side, you will recall there was not any request on the economic side in terms of economic assistance for Vietnam beyond that which was appropriated. There undoubtedly will be required substantial funds for the care, feeding, relocation and shelter of the masses of refugees that have been generated by this campaign. Again, I am not stating, I am just anticipating. I am trying to be responsive to your question.

Q Does your answer to those two questions, saying that we are obviously going to need more, is this based on the premise of the belief on your part and on the part of the United States government that South Vietnam can still be saved?

MR. HABIB: That, in the end, is going to be a question that the Vietnamese are going to decide. I want to make that very clear. The decision of the Vietnamese to defend themselves is their decision. It is our decision, or our Congressional and other organizational responsibilities, to determine what we are prepared to do to assist them in that process.

What I am saying to you is, if the situation develops as it appears to be developing, the requirements for resources -- which can only come basically, in large part, from the United States -- are going to probably be greater than had been anticipated.

Q You are talking about more arms for the South Vietnamese government when the question that seems to be posed by what we are seeing is the question of whether it is already collapsing and panic may be setting in in Saigon itself.

MR. HABIB: The answer to that is obviously that what the South Vietnamese are seeking to do, is to stabilize the military situation in Three and Four Corps in that area, which is apparently the next target of the North Vietnamese. The answer is they are already, in effect, in battle in some of those areas.

As you know, there has been considerable activity over in the Tay Ninh area up until this week and there has been some on the Northern and Northeastern edges of MR-3, Military Region 3.

Now, the question that you are posing is the question of a prescience, which I am afraid I cannot give you the answer, the answer is the test is there, whether they will be able to defend themselves.

The question that is being put to us, as I understand it, is are we prepared to provide the resources to permit them to defend themselves.

Q Mr. Habib, following on the relief question, there is a report of a scheduled meeting of relief agencies or relief officials here this afternoon. Can you tell us a little about that, what that is supposed to do?

MR. HABIB: Yes. I think Mr. Parker addressed the group yesterday. It was on the record. Mr. Parker, who is disaster coordinator, is meeting with the volunteer agencies, heads of the volunteer agencies, as I understand it, to look into the question of what might be done and what can be done in terms of the humanitarian requirements of the situation.

Q Mr. Secretary, two questions. The first, is there any reasonable estimate at all in any range as to the amount of supplies and equipment that have been lost in the battle, abandoned in the battle?

MR. HABIB: We do not have one as yet, Murray. I expect that will be part of the assessment, which we are receiving. It is information of which we have got scattered bits and pieces. I hesitate to quote figures on that basis. It is quite obvious there have been massive losses.

I have seen some of the figures that have been used in some of the press reports. Those, to my knowledge, are not official figures. We will wait until we get them. When we have some clear idea what has been lost, we will then have a better idea also of what might be required.

Q Let me pursue that a moment, if I may. The estimates you refer to run up to and beyond \$1 billion. Is the Administration in a position now of seeking from Congress assistance in the range that will restore those losses, those massive losses?

MR. HABIB: You are coming back to the question of what is the assessment that General Weyand is going to bring back in terms of the situation and the requirements. I don't think it would be proper to simply assume, as you are trying to get the assumption to follow on that, that it will be a replacement of losses.

What will be looked at, I am sure, are the requirements of the situation. That is not to say that it is the replacement of everything that has been lost.

Q Frankly, for a week now, all the questions we have asked here about the diplomacy, about the military strategy, about the situation in South Vietnam, have produced a single answer: The Administration is waiting for the return of General Weyand.

MR. HABIB: How do you expect the Administration to make a judgment without the assessment which it instituted immediately upon the major campaign that has been mounted, took place?

Q Wasn't Admiral Gaylor in the area?

MR. HABIB: No, he just went through for a couple of days. He was in Cambodia. As you know, the President dispatched General Weyand specifically for this purpose, and this requires careful study. It has been given that careful study and, as I said earlier, I think the President will be receiving General Weyand's report before the end of the week.

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Q At the present time, then, there is no diplomatic activity that the United States has underway?

MR. HABIB: With respect to Indochina?

Q Yes.

MR. HABIB: You know, there you get back into the old business about what is diplomatic activity. There is a record. There is what has gone on previously. There is the agreement, itself, to which we call attention constantly. There are the statements and the positions expressed by the President and the Secretary.

I don't know what you mean by diplomatic. If you mean are we trying somehow or another to turn off the military campaign in favor of a return to agreement, the answer is, of course, we are. The equivalent answer, if you look at the other side of the coin, is what you are dealing with is fundamentally a decision by North Vietnam to take the military option and not the diplomatic option.

The diplomatic option was negotiated. The North Vietnamese are taking the military option, and you know and I know that when that military option is being exercised, it is exercised to the full.

What follows if the military situation is stabilized -- until it is stabilized, the North Vietnamese are embarked upon a campaign militarily. If the military situation stabilizes, will the North Vietnamese continue to embark upon a military campaign? That is a decision they will have to make.

Q The military option may run right through the center of Saigon.

MR. HABIB: That is your assessment at this point, Murray.

Q No, I am asking.

MR. HABIB: If one wants to get into hypothetical questions of what happens if it all caves in, it is really not the sort of thing I engage in. You know I wouldn't. Obviously, there is a grave military situation. Obviously, the requirements of the situation are for stabilization of the military situation. There is no question about that.

Q But are you saying the United States must wait until the military option is concluded?

MR. HABIB: No, of course not. I am not saying anything of the sort.

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Q Could I follow up on that?

MR. HABIB: I knew you would. (Laughter)

Q At the time of the Paris agreement there was also an international conference that was convened and a number of major powers, in effect, ratified those agreements. Murray asked you about diplomatic activity.

Why, in light of the North Vietnamese penchant for both diplomatic and military activity taking place at one and the same time, why hasn't the United States moved to reconvene that conference?

MR. HABIB: If you will recall, in January the United States wrote formally to the participants in that conference and pointed out what was going on and called their attention to it. We did not get much of a response.

Q You never asked for a reconvening of the conference.

MR. HABIB: No, we did not at that time.

Q Why?

MR. HABIB: Marvin, North Vietnam has taken a course which is in complete and total violation of anything that can be construed as the diplomatic solution that was solemnly agreed to.

While they are embarked upon that course, they show no signs whatsoever of taking any serious steps to abide by the terms of that solemn agreement. You asked me a direct question, whether we have actually called the reconvening, and the answer to that question is no, not at this time.

Q My follow-up question was why, and you have said the North Vietnamese are now pursuing a military course which is obvious to anybody, and I am asking why the United States is not doing anything?

MR. HABIB: The answer is quite obvious. The feeling is until the military situation is stabilized, they will not be diverted from that course. That is the historical record with this kind of a situation.

In any event, that does not mean in any way that we, ourselves, abrogate, disregard, or lose any desire to see the terms of the agreement reinstated and re-established. How that comes about and through what course it comes about, I think there again that is one of those things that a little bit of time might demonstrate.

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Q Mr. Habib, you have not blamed Congress at all.

MR. HABIB: No, I have not said a word about anything, about blaming anybody. I tried to describe a situation. I don't know what you mean. Do you want me to put blame? If I am going to put blame, I am going to put the blame one place. I will put the blame on North Vietnam.

Q Almost every ranking American official has blamed the Congress, in part, for what is happening in South Vietnam, including the Secretary of Defense last night. The fact that you are not raises a question in my mind as to whether the Administration is now changing its tactic, or do you continue to place a good part of the blame on the Congress for not appropriating the money?

MR. HABIB: Let me describe the situation. I don't like to use phrases like "blame the Congress." That is your phrase. I described the situation --

Q That is the situation, Mr. Habib, that has developed.

MR. HABIB: I will repeat it to you again. Let me describe it to you. You said I have a right to answer the question. Let me answer it my way.

I stated three elements of the situation and its evolution. I stated, first of all, the gross violations of the agreement on the part of the North Vietnamese. I stated, second of all, that since 1973, we have been unable to respond to those gross violations, and I have said, finally, we have not been able to provide the resources necessary to have over time -- not speaking about last month or last week -- over time we have not provided the resources which we are giving the South Vietnamese every reason to believe they would receive, within our constitutional processes.

You could read that any way you want, but that is the way I describe the situation.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up. While you have been unable to provide this, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, for their part, have been supplying North Vietnam rather substantially. What efforts have you made to try to get them to stop that?

MR. HABIB: You know, there was nothing in the agreement that prevented them from supplying. What the agreement provides is that replacements in South Vietnam could only be up to a one-to-one basis. The violation of the agreement resides in North Vietnam sending to South Vietnam military resources beyond the one-to-one replacement.

As to what steps one might or might not take to stop it, one would have hoped that there would have been a degree of prudence with respect to such things, but it is quite obvious that North Vietnam has received all that it has needed to mount this massive campaign.

Moreover, you have got to go back again and think of it over a period of time, that the North Vietnamese in North Vietnam have always had substantial supplies. What the agreement provided was they could not move them to the South. When they move them to the South, then they are in violation of the agreement.

Q Then, are you saying it is all right?

MR. HABIB: I am talking in terms of the legal requirements of the agreement. I just wanted to make it very clear I was not accusing anybody of violating the agreement by the shipment of supplies to North Vietnam. That is not contrary to the agreement.

As I said, one would have hoped it would have been exercised with a greater degree of prudence, but it was not exercised.

Q If it is not a violation of the Paris agreement of 1973, isn't it a violation of the U.S.-Soviet detente in 1972?

MR. HABIB: I don't know whether you would go that far. I don't think we are quite prepared to draw that sweeping a conclusion.

Q Following Jim McCarthy's question -- and picking up the word you used before "prescience" -- I want to ask you what the motivation is for the desire to rush military arms to South Vietnam now? Does it grow out of the conviction the arms will make a critical difference on the part of ARVN to defend whatever is left of South Vietnam?

MR. HABIB: Are you referring to this air shipment? Is that what you are referring to?

Q -- or whatever they will get in the way of additional resources, or is it a symbolic reply to the allegations coming from Vietnam about American betrayal?

MR. HABIB: I don't think it is symbolic in that sense. I think it certainly, in terms of immediate shipment, has a certain psychological significance. It also has a certain practical, material significance. As you know, there has been substantial material loss, ordinance. As I recall, the first air shipment that went in was principally Howitzers, 105's or 155's, I am not sure which. I think it was a little of both, but it is not intended to be that kind of an answer.

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Quite obviously, the South Vietnamese are concerned, and that concern is not concealed as to the ability and willingness of the United States to supply the military resources that are necessary in the current circumstance.

The Administration has made clear, as far as the Administration is concerned, they have the will, and hope that the Congress will appropriate the funds that will permit these things to go into works.

We are still operating on those obligational authorities that exist under the original appropriation. As you will remember, that appropriation was spaced out on a quarterly basis so that supplies could continue to roll in. What you are seeing moving in now are supplies that stem from that original obligational authority.

Q Mr. Secretary, may I follow up? What plans does the United States have, if any, for the evacuation of Americans from Saigon? At what point would you start evacuating Americans from Saigon? Is there any emergency plan? That is the first question.

MR. HABIB: Let me answer that first, if I may. In every country of the world where there is evidence of a struggle, we have what is known as an emergency evacuation plan. That is a universal plan. So, the answer to your question is what plans do we have? We always have such plans for all countries in the world, what we call our E&E plan.

Q Have you started consideration of the possibility of evacuation?

MR. HABIB: The only thing that is going on at this point, as you probably have read in the press, is that some of the dependents on a case-by-case basis, by choice, are permitted to leave if they so wish, but there has been no triggering of any evacuation.

While of course, we have taken our people out of the areas along the coast that fell within the last week or so, our people got out of Danang, our people got out of Nha Trang and Dilot and Qui Nhon. Those are all parts of what you might call our local evacuation plan, but beyond that, the E&E plans are there. They are always there. They are there for every country.

You had a second question. Let's take the second part of the question.

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Q Where, specifically, would the United States -- what would the South Vietnamese army have to do to convince the United States that it had, in fact, stabilized the military situation and therefore, would be --

MR. HABIB: The evidence has to be clear on the grounds.. At the present time, the defense of Three or Four Corps are the heart of the matter, and obviously, the heart of the heart of the matter is the area around Saigon. That is the area one has to now watch. We will have to see the capability and we will have to see the results.

Q Mr. Habib, if we could examine a little further your premise that one reason for the present situation is our inability to provide adequate resources to South Vietnam to meet its requirements.

Over the past three years, the United States has given \$6.4 billion in military aid to South Vietnam, and during the same period -- according to the intelligence community -- the Soviet Union and Communist China have given North Vietnam \$1.5 billion in military aid. I am quoting, sir, from the intelligence community report.

I think the question arises out of that, that with four times, five times as much aid from the United States why has this not been sufficient to meet the military requirements of South Vietnam?

MR. HABIB: It has always been true that the requirements of an extended defense line are much greater in terms of the resources necessary than the requirements for an attacking force that could pick or choose its areas.

What was happening in Vietnam over the years -- and again it is not a question of what happened last week, John. I am not addressing that in response to your question. I think, over the years, what you have had is that extensive, defensive structure of every line of communication, every province, every province capital, every district capital with a few exceptions, an attempt for a total defensive posture.

When the level of assistance began to decline -- and it did, as you know, substantially in fiscal 1975 and began in 1974 -- then it became a choice as to whether or not they could still sustain that kind of total, overall defensive posture.

It was quite obvious that the strategic decision that was made by the Vietnamese government was to make that withdrawal. The tactical failure of the withdrawal in the 1st and 2nd Corps is another matter, but the strategic decision taken to begin that withdrawal was based upon an inability to provide the mobility and the resources that are necessary to exercise that kind of overall defensive strategy.

That is not surprising. The defense, for example, of an outlying post depends on the ability to re-enforce it. You cannot have total strength in every spot when the other fellow could pick his spot to hit you.

So, the defense of an outlying post depends on the mobility to get there, and it depends upon firepower. If you don't have the mobility and you don't have the firepower, you then have to change your strategy. They tried to do so, and it did not work, at least in 1st and 2nd Corps.

Q Mr. Habib, to sum up on Doug Kiker's questions, we realize there is an emergency evacuation plan. I understand there are about 650 U.S. Marines on those Navy ships that are lying off the coast of Vietnam. Are they involved in an evacuation plan?

MR. HABIB: Do you mean the ships that just went in for the evacuation of refugees?

Q Yes.

MR. HABIB: I don't know what the figures are for the number of Marines on the ships that went in.

Normally, ships carry a small complement of Marines for ship's duty, but for that, you had better address that to the Defense Department.

Quite obviously, that kind of question, in terms of how many are there and what they are doing, ought to be addressed to the Defense Department. I am not competent to answer that.

MORE

Q Could you tell us if the South Vietnamese have enough divisions remaining in fighting strength to stabilize the military situation?

MR. HABIB: I would rather not go into the order of battle at the moment. I certainly am not going to make any judgments. That is going to be put to the test. I am not going to assume that they can't do it, which I think some of the questions have indicated. I think that that is something that they are going to have to determine out of their own strength and spirit.

Q Mr. Secretary, in view of the resistance of the American public and Congress to the \$300 million already asked, where does that leave you when you talk about anticipating the possibility of needing more than \$300 million?

MR. HABIB: The question is one which will have to be put and addressed -- the circumstances will have to be described, the requirements will have to be justified. It will have to go through the process that we normally go through in these things, and then in its wisdom the Congress will decide. That is the process, and it is one that is going to be gone through.

Q Has the process started?

MR. HABIB: The Congress is adjourned at the moment.

Q No, I mean the process of the Administration.

MR. HABIB: Yes, in terms of assessing the requirements, as I have been accused of as has been going on (Laughter) for a while, and the answer is yes, that is exactly what the assessment -- among the other things, that is one of the things the assessment concludes, among other things, the assessment of the situation as well as the requirement. I think that is what the President charges.

Q In view of what you describe as North Vietnam's gross violation of the Paris agreement, has this country or has South Vietnam any obligation to obey that agreement any further?

MR. HABIB: Under normal international conventions -- I think there was some sort of convention signed in Geneva some years ago -- obviously, when one signatory to an agreement violates the agreement, the other signatory is then free to do what he wishes.

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There is no intention on the part of the United States to abrogate the agreement. On the contrary, as we have tried to make clear, as the President and the Secretary have, the United States look to North Vietnam's gross violation agreement as at the heart of the matter.

We would not take that position if we thought in terms of the nonapplicability to the agreement. How much longer do we want to go?

Q Cambodia, with Lon Nol having left, do you see any possibility of any negotiation?

MR. HABIB: If you ask that of the Cambodian government, the government in Phnom Penh, that is their most profound desire, and their most profound hope, and maybe their most profound prayer. It certainly is ours.

The President has always spoken for some time now -- it is not something that happened last week -- of the desirability of a compromise settlement. Is that possible in the present circumstance. There again, that is one of those things that is going to be put to the test.

There is no lack of desire on the part of the people in Phnom Penh, from everything we know, to seek a resolution of the conflict in which the killing stops and somehow or other Cambodians decide what happens then. It would not be from lack of wanting on their part, but it may be from lack of wanting on the part of the Khmer Rouge.

You obviously have a situation there where the Khmer Rouge have a military bit in their teeth, and they keep pounding away. Indiscriminate rocket bombing of Phnom Penh is not a military -- in the old days, we would call that terror bombing, but those phrases have gone out of fad now.

Q You described the military situation as grave in South Vietnam. Would you describe the political situation as grave, and can you give us your assessment of the political situation?

MR. HABIB: I don't think it would serve any useful purpose for me to comment on the internal situation now, Jerry. After all, I am on the record and I am a government official. I just don't think it would serve any useful purpose for me to comment on the internal political situation in Vietnam.

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Q Mr. Secretary, a two-part question. Is there anything that President Thieu has conveyed to the United States that conveys any feeling on his part that the United States has sold out or betrayed South Vietnam? That is the first question. The second one is, giving the portrait you have just given us of the fidelity of the North Vietnamese to a solemn agreement, did the United States genuinely believe, when it signed that agreement on January 27, 1973, that the North Vietnamese would in fact honor the agreement as it was written?

MR. HABIB: The answer to the first part of your question is President Thieu has not communicated any such feeling. On the contrary, whatever feeling that has been communicated has been the confidence that the United States will not let South Vietnam down.

With respect to our attitude toward the agreement when it was signed, quite obviously the agreement was negotiated in good faith. We signed it in good faith, and we had expected it to be carried out, in the major sense, in good faith.

Obviously, in circumstances in which that agreement was signed, nobody expected perfection with respect to every clause and every cease-fire line and every point within it. In terms of its gross terms, in terms of its gross requirements, in terms of the general thrust that you set the military war aside and you then pursue the continuing controversy through measures other than military, there is no question we had a right to expect that.

After all, it was not only solemnly signed, but it was endorsed by a convocation, including the major powers. As far as we were concerned and as far as the South Vietnamese were concerned, that has always been the basic thrust of the policy.

I am not one of those who will tell you the government in Saigon never violated the agreement in one respect. You know that is not true, and they know it is not true, and I know it is not true, but in terms of the gross requirements of the agreement, the overall purposes of that agreement, there is no question that they had nothing to lose by abiding by it.

But the North Vietnamese, from the beginning, began the build-up in violation. You would have hoped, we went at them in the beginning and said knock it off, in effect, or this is a violation of the agreement.

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You will recall the Secretary met in 1973 twice in respect to the violations of the agreement, but the build-up went on. It took its ultimate evolution in the current campaign.

Q Mr. Habib, back on relief, can you tell us what the niceties of it are in terms of the --

MR. HABIB: Requirements?

Q -- well, in terms of the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of displaced people in the Southern part of Vietnam, whether the United States and other relief agencies, relief organizations, can somehow get relief supplies to those people in the areas that have already been overrun or whether we have just written them off now?

MR. HABIB: In the first place, we would hope that those people would be permitted to get out, to exercise their rights of freedom of movement. Some of you might recall that Article 13 of the Declaration of Human Rights gives people that right, the right of freedom of movement, so we would certainly support the desire of those people to pick the place in which they would like to be.

Now, we will do what we can to provide the assistance to those to whom we can get it. We are already embarked on that project. I think Mr. Parker explained that to you. We will be seeking additional resources for that purpose, and you have already seen a clear indication that that is something that, in the traditional American experience, not only our people expect of us, but everybody expects of us, and I know we will not disappoint them in that regard.

We have also, of course, supported the South Vietnamese in their appeal to the United Nations and other countries in the world to provide the assistance that will be necessary, and some countries are already coming forward, not only with respect to the evacuation of the refugees, but with respect to their care, their feeding and their relocation.

It is going to take great sums. There are more than just a few hundred thousand people involved. No one knows how many will be able, in any event, to get to that position where you can treat them and care for them.

Spencer?

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Q Mr. Secretary, you spoke of the earnest desire of the United States to see a settlement in Cambodia. The settlement would be between what parties? Who would represent the Khmer Rouge? Would that be Norodom Sihanouk's coalition, or what?

MR. HABIB: The United States has made it clear, and I will refer you back to a conference we had here not long ago, and if you want the precise wording, you really better look at that piece of paper, but as I recall, what we said at that time was something to the effect that it is not a question of personalities that is involved.

The United States is not seized of that problem, nor are the Cambodians in Phnom Penh. They have made it clear again and again that no one is any obstacle to peace. The obstacle to peace in Cambodia, the obstacle to a stopping of the shooting in Cambodia, is the unwillingness of the Khmer Rouge to have anything to do with anything except what they are doing.

They won't talk to anybody. There is no attempt at finding a way out other than at the end of a gun. All you have to do is to read the impassioned appeal of the authorities in Phnom Penh to realize that the war does not go on because they want it to.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

END (AT 1:10 P.M. EDT)  
(AT 10:10 A.M. PDT)