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File
[ca. 7/75]

ARGUMENTS AGAINST DISAPPROVAL OF HAWK SALE

The Bingham resolution disapproving the sale of HAWK anti-aircraft missiles to Jordan should be defeated for the following reasons:

- A moderate Jordan with close ties to the United States is important to peace and stability in the Middle East. Since 1970 U. S. support for Jordan, with the overwhelming approval of Congress, has enabled King Hussein to stand up to the pressures of the PLO and radical Arab governments and to resist Soviet offers of a closer relationship.
- King Hussein's power base in Jordan is his army and air force. The Jordanians observed the value of modern air defense systems in the 1973 war. The King has been under increasing pressure to meet at least some of the air defense needs of his military to retain the loyalty necessary to his government. He now has the money needed to acquire air defense weapons and is determined to do so.
- Disapproval or reduction of the sale would badly shake the confidence of King Hussein in the reliability of the U. S. as a friend and supplier of military equipment. The King has insisted upon the entire transaction for three reasons:
 - (1) 14 batteries is the bare minimum needed to defend critical points in Jordan, (2) he does not want to order and pay for 14 batteries, receive 6 and be unable to receive the remaining 8. He prefers a firm commitment for Jordan's minimum needs. There are sources willing to provide rapid delivery of greater quantities of more effective Soviet SAM weapons at cheaper prices. (3) He believes that if Congress blocks the sale of HAWK missiles already approved by the President, he can no longer have the confidence in close U. S. relationship which has been the cornerstone of his moderate foreign policy.
- Disapproval of the sale could actually increase the threat to Israel. Israel can only benefit from a moderate Jordan which cooperates closely with the United States. The HAWK missile system cannot be integrated with Syrian and Iraqi Soviet-supplied systems. If King Hussein should instead turn to the Soviet SA-6, Israel could eventually face an integrated air defense system on its entire eastern front comparable to that which denied Israel the skies over the Suez Canal in the 1973 war.

- Providing these weapons will not necessarily mean Jordan would fight Israel. A Jordanian decision to attack Israel would not be made merely on the absence or presence of a few air defense weapons. There is no assurance Jordan would not attack without an air defense system. Jordan would presumably take into account the value of a close relationship with the United States in weighing a decision to fight Israel.

- These defensive weapons will not significantly affect the military balance between Israel and its neighbors. These batteries are for the protection of critical Jordanian installations and particularly the capital of Amman. These weapons are for fixed point defense; they are not mobile and can be moved only with difficulty and increased threat of destruction or capture. The Israeli forces, with present weapons and those expected by 1979, when the 11 additional HAWK batteries will be delivered, would be able to knock out Jordan's limited defenses at minimal cost, leaving its cities open to attack as they are now.

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[ca. 7/75]

FIVE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In connection with the letter of offer to sell Hawk missiles to Jordan sent to the Congress by the Department of Defense on July 10, 1975, under Section 36 (b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, we will submit a new notification of the proposed letter of offer prior to the expiration of the initial twenty-day period on July 30, 1975, and again resubmit it for an additional time period of twenty days immediately thereafter in view of the Congress' regular August 1975 recess. If necessary, we will, at the expiration of this second twenty-day period, resubmit it for an additional period of twenty days.

Sincerely,

Robert S. Ingersoll
Acting Secretary

The Honorable
Thomas E. Morgan,
Chairman,
House International Relations Committee,
Washington, D. C.

March 1976?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 2.0

CONFIDENTIAL

MR 94-64, #20 NSCLtr. 3/11/96

EGYPT ARMS

By 1034 NARA, DND 4/1/96

1. It is important to Sadat to demonstrate, by broadening his relationship with the US to permit some military purchases, that his deliberate decision to end his dependency on the Soviets and pursue a pro-Western policy continues to bring benefits to his country. His courage in placing Egypt firmly on the path of peace, and in agreeing to a second disengagement with Israel last September, has incurred sharp criticism from some Arab states as well as from the USSR. They have attacked Sadat for following a US-designed peace process which they state will produce little gain for either Egypt or the broader Arab goal of a satisfactory final settlement. In particular, they allege that Sadat has crippled his Armed Forces--and therefore his bargaining position--by turning away from the Soviets while Israel continues to receive increasing amounts of US weaponry and financial aid. They also note that Syria and Libya (Egypt's most determined enemy) are receiving large amounts of new and sophisticated Soviet military equipment while Egypt is denied sufficient spare parts for its existing inventory.

2. There has been, in fact, a net deterioration of Egypt's military capability since 1973. Soviet deliveries of major items (tanks, aircraft, artillery, APCs) to Egypt since the start of the October War have not fully compensated for Egypt's combat losses. The last major deliveries by the USSR took place almost one year ago in May. Since then the Soviets have supplied only minor equipment, ammunition and spare parts, and that in inadequate quantities to keep all the equipment already supplied fully operable. Moreover, the Soviets stopped all delivery of such critical spare parts as aircraft engines early this year.

3. The result has been to raise extremely serious questions within Egypt itself as to the correctness of Sadat's decision to turn away from the USSR and toward the US. When the Egyptian military establishment sees Soviet equipment flowing into Libya and US equipment into Israel while many of its own aircraft and tanks are sidelined for lack of spare parts, dangerous political under-currents are created. When other Arab regimes see that the US is unwilling to provide any military assistance at all to Egypt, it causes them, also, to question the wisdom of close relations with the United States. This has increased internal pressures on Sadat as well as Arab doubts about United States efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement.



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4. As long as the Arab/Israeli conflict remains unresolved, it will be vitally important to the United States to maintain the confidence of Egypt as a major participant in the search for a final peace. To support its position in that country during the past two years, the US has extended major financial credits to Egypt, entered into a broad array of technical assistance programs and encouraged private investment. The time has now come when we must make some initial moves in the military field to assist Sadat in defending himself and his policies of moderation against the Soviet squeeze and radical Arab criticism.

5. Neither the United States nor Egypt has discussed in specific terms what sort of long-term relationship should develop in the military field. However, we have made it very clear to Sadat that we would not envisage anything which could upset the military balance in the area, a balance which is strongly in Israel's favor. Judging from the talks we have had with Egyptian leaders, particularly Sadat, and what they have said to others, the Egyptians understand that we will not do anything of major military significance. They are primarily interested in the symbolism and political impact of a military relationship with the US--one which Sadat can point to in his discussions with his own military and can show to his Arab critics as underscoring the correctness of his strategic policies. In this context, actual numbers of items or amounts of equipment are less important than the types. The items of equipment which Sadat himself has mentioned to members of Congress are more important to Sadat for their psychological impact than for their ability to materially improve Egypt's Armed Forces.

6. We have not reached agreement with Egypt on what we will supply. The only specific military items we are presently considering are six C-130 aircraft and training for some Egyptian officers at military schools in this country. The Egyptians have been told that prior to any decision on these items or additional military goods or services the Administration will consult fully with Congress. The President intends in the near future to transmit to Congress a Presidential Determination making Egypt available for cash sales of military equipment and military training under the Foreign Military Sales Act. Congress will also be informed in advance--in the spirit of the stricter guidelines contained in the new security assistance act--of whatever specific items we may wish to sell.



7. We have considered arms in five broad categories:
- (A) Military training and visits.
 - (B) Passive military equipment such as target drones, mine detectors and radios.
 - (C) Air transport equipment, C-130s and Helicopters.
 - (D) Other non-offensive equipment such as radar and parts for equipment already in use.
 - (E) More sensitive items which the Egyptians have mentioned, although have not requested. This includes F-5s, APCs, anti-tank missiles, and some torpedos.

Depending on the outcome of consultations with Congress, we will proceed to consider specific sales in the first three categories. At some later point, we might want to consider more sensitive equipment.



THOMAS E. MORGAN, PA., CHAIRMAN

3-22

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Congress of the United States *Five*
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MARIAN A. CZARNECKI
CHIEF OF STAFF

March 18, 1976

*MF
encl*

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I hereby transmit a resolution adopted this morning by the House Committee on International Relations regarding the sale of Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

James G. Morgan
Chairman

TEM:gia
Enclosure



Committee Resolution

Whereas the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives finds that it does not have sufficient information with which to fulfill its responsibilities under section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act with respect to the proposed offer of sale to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of E-3A Airborne Early Warning Aircraft, described in the statement submitted by the President on February 27, 1976 (transmittal number 76-41): Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives requests the President to submit a revised statement with respect to the proposed offer of sale described in the preamble of this resolution when more specific information concerning this proposed offer of sale is available.

Sec. 2. The Committee has made no judgement with respect to this proposed offer of sale and will consider a new submission with respect to this proposed offer of sale without prejudice.

Sec. 3. The Committee recognizes that our relations with our allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are of the highest importance to the United States and, accordingly, will follow, with interest, the progress on negotiations concerning the proposed offer of sale of E-3A Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to such Organization.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

March 23, 1976

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

TO: BILL KENDALL
JOE JENKS
✓ CHARLIE LEPPERT
TOM LOEFFLER
BOB WOLTHUIS

FROM: LES JANKA

SUBJECT: Comparison of Arab and Israeli
Arms Levels

MR 94-64, #21 NSC 1st 3/4/96

By KSH NARA, Date 4/1/96

In the upcoming fight on the Egyptian C-130 issue, one of the major arguments used by our opponents will be that we should do nothing to weaken Israeli strength vis-a-vis the Arabs. These opponents will quote extensive statistics showing that Israel faces overwhelming Arab strength in every weapons category. The following points can be made in refuting these claims. These arguments should be used verbally and this paper should not be given to anyone on the Hill.

Reports on the ratio of deliveries since the start of the October War and other ratios comparing present and projected overall totals (e. g., TIME, March 22, 1976) are often misleading and must be carefully scrutinized for the following reasons:

-- Arab war losses were far higher than those of Israel; therefore, more substantial deliveries of military equipment are required to restore Arab inventories to their pre-war levels. This is particularly striking in the case of Egypt whose vital inventory is still below the level of October 1973 due to the virtual cessation of Soviet arms deliveries.

-- The ratio of numbers of Israeli major weapons to those of the Arabs is better today than it was at the time of the October 1973 war. Moreover, these ratios do not take into account Israeli qualitative improvements in the weapons inventories. Thus, the major items in the Israeli inventory, particularly tanks, aircraft, missiles, and "smart bombs", and electronic equipment are more sophisticated and accurate in performance than those in Arab inventories.

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-- Israeli military personnel are unquestionably superior to the Arabs in their ability to operate effectively and maintain their equipment. Also, the single command, common tactics and morale of the Israeli Defense Forces reduce the numerical advantages in manpower and equipment of the different Arab national forces.

-- The Israelis enjoy a significant advantage over the Arab states in their ability to domestically produce weapons and to repair and quickly return to action damaged military equipment.

-- The overall military balance is more favorable to Israel than it was in October 1973, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In calculating the balance, Libya, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have been included as well as Egypt and Syria.

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RATIONALE FOR ARMS SALES TO EGYPT

1. It is important to Sadat to demonstrate that his deliberate decision to end his dependency on the Soviets and pursue a pro-Western policy continues to bring benefits to his country. His courage in placing Egypt firmly on the path of peace, and in agreeing to a second disengagement with Israel last September, has incurred sharp criticism from the USSR and some Arab states:

-- They have attacked Sadat for following a US-designed peace process which they state will produce little gain for either Egypt or the broader Arab goal of a satisfactory final settlement.

-- They allege that Sadat has crippled his Armed Forces--and therefore his bargaining position--by turning away from the Soviets while Israel continues to receive increasing amounts of US weaponry and financial aid.

-- They say that the US will not assist Sadat, even symbolically, in the military field, proving the worthlessness of Sadat's pro-US policy.

2. There has been a net deterioration of Egypt's military capability since 1973. Total deliveries of major items (tanks, aircraft, artillery, APCs) to Egypt since the start of the October War have not fully compensated for Egypt's combat losses. Numerically, Egypt has about the same number or fewer jet aircraft, tanks and APCs, artillery and missiles than it did in October 1973. The last major deliveries by the USSR took place in May 1975. The Soviets stopped all delivery of such critical spare parts as aircraft engines early this year, and have exerted pressure on other nations to prohibit them from substituting for the USSR. As a result, aircraft and motorized equipment are frequently inoperative. Egypt is opening a new military relationship with Western Europe but it is still very modest in quantity and quality of equipment and is expected to develop only slowly.

3. Within Egypt itself serious questions are being raised as to the correctness of Sadat's decision to turn away from the USSR and toward the US. The Egyptian military establishment sees Soviet equipment flowing into Libya, Egypt's avowed enemy and the enemy of peace in the Middle East. Meantime, its own aircraft and tanks are increasingly sidelined for lack of spare parts. This has increased internal pressures on Sadat and fired Arab doubts about US efforts to support Egypt and to bring about a peaceful settlement.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

NR 94-64, # 22 NSC/br 3/1/96

By V34 NARA, Date 4/1/96



4. It is vitally important for the US to maintain the confidence of Egypt as a major participant in the search for a final peace. The time has now come when we must make some initial moves in the military field to assist Sadat in defending himself and his policies of moderation against the Soviet squeeze and radical Arab criticism. Not to do so could produce a radical backlash not only in Egypt but in other moderate Arab states which follow closely the US-Egyptian relationship.

5. The President has made it very clear to Sadat that we do not envisage anything which could upset the military balance in the area, a balance which is strongly in Israel's favor. The Egyptians are primarily interested in the symbolism and political impact.

6. The only specific military items we are presently considering are six C-130 aircraft and training for some Egyptian officers at military schools in this country. The Egyptians have been told that prior to any decision on these items or additional military goods or services, the Administration will consult fully with Congress.

~~MR 94-64, #2 (same as)~~By KBH NARA, Date 4/17/96CONFIDENTIALEGYPT ARMS

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Depending on the outcome of consultations with Congress, we will proceed to consider specific sales in the first three categories. At some later point, we might want to consider more sensitive equipment.



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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MR 94-64, # 22 (same as)

By CBH, NARA, Date 4/1/96



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Leppert

1741

FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 2, 1976

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in further response to your March 18 letter to the President regarding the resolution adopted by the International Relations Committee on the sale of early warning aircraft (AWACS) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Committee's resolution, adopted on March 18, indicates that the Committee did not have sufficient information to evaluate the proposed sale. It requests the President, when more specific information is available, to resubmit the notice of intent to issue a letter of offer which was transmitted to the Congress on February 27 pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act.

According to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, before a letter of offer can be issued to a foreign government or international organization for the sale of defense articles or defense services valued at \$25 million or more, notice of the proposed sale must be submitted to the Congress. The letter of offer may not be issued during the period of 30 calendar days following such notice, during which period Congress may adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving the sale. The Act does not provide for any other disposition of a notice of proposed sale, such as the request for resubmittal contained in the Committee resolution of March 18.

The Executive Branch is seriously concerned about the future implications of a procedure whereby the statutory period for Congressional review of proposed sales could be extended by committee action not envisioned in the law. For this reason, we cannot agree that the provisions of section 36(b) would be applicable to the resubmittal of a notice of the proposed sale to NATO when in fact the requirements of the Act have been met, absent a substantial change in the nature or scope of the previously reported transaction.

Nevertheless, we fully recognize the continuing interest of the International Relations Committee in this matter and would wish to consult with you before a letter of offer was consummated. In addition, the House Armed Services Committee, in its report on the Department of Defense Authorization Act, has directed that action toward the consummation of the AWACS




sale not be taken until the expiration of thirty days after a report on the terms and conditions of the sale is submitted to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. We also wish to be fully responsive to this directive.

It now appears that the negotiations with NATO will not be completed before early next year. Should these negotiations result in a substantial modification of the proposed transaction described in the notice of February 27, 1976, we would, of course, submit a new notification to you pursuant to section 36(b).

In view of the foregoing, I have been authorized to affirm that we will notify you of our intent to proceed with this transaction at least thirty days before consummating a letter of offer. I trust that you will find this assurance responsive to the concerns of the Committee.

Sincerely,



Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

The Honorable
Thomas E. Morgan
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

