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2. report	Hollingsworth Report OCSA 92-76 5 pages Declassified with portions exempted	6/30/76	A
3. memo	Sullivan to Secretary of Defense, re: FY 77 budget 11 pages	10/20/75	A

FILE LOCATION

Special Files, Ford-Carter Debate Files

Second Debate--Defense Department Issue Papers (box 2) plc 3/28/84

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.....

TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH (DRAFT)  
(End of Fiscal Year - 30 June)

FY 52	3,635,912
FY 60	2,476,435
FY 64	2,685,000
FY 68	3,547,902
FY 69	3,460,162
FY 70	3,066,294
FY 71	2,714,727
FY 72	2,323,079
FY 73	2,252,810
FY 74	2,162,005
FY 76	2,081,909
FY 77	2,100,000



TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH (DRAFT)  
(As of Dates Given)

31 August 74	2,153,000 (rounded to nearest thousandth)
31 July 76	2,087,000 " " "

(Note: This is latest data available)

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

ANNUAL INDUCTIONS  
(End of Fiscal Year - 30 June)

FY 75	0
FY 74	0
FY 73	35,700
FY 72	27,100
FY 71	156,200
FY 70	206,800
FY 69	265,300
FY 68	339,600
FY 67	299,200
FY 66	339,700

Brent suggests caution  
on these because they require  
some explanation.

## Henry's Slant

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger directed the Central Intelligence Agency to slant U. S. estimates of the Soviet Tupolev Backfire bomber's range capability, White House officials are charging. Kissinger **ordered that the range estimate be reduced to coincide with the present U. S. position in the strategic arms negotiations** now under way behind the scenes by Kissinger, according to a White House staff member. Other Administration officials corroborate the story. Kissinger already has conceded to the Soviets that the Backfire will not be considered in the heavy bomber category in the treaty negotiations and is making sure intelligence estimates confirm his position, the White House official added.

The way in which the estimate was derived was through intelligence data provided to McDonnell Douglas. The aerospace firm completed an analysis under contract for the CIA to determine the supersonic Backfire's capability. A 3,500-naut. mi. range estimate reached by McDonnell Douglas was accurate, the White House official said, but the data provided were not all of the information available to U. S. intelligence officers. **Only those data the CIA wanted to provide the company were offered to achieve the desired results supporting Kissinger's position**, according to the official.

## Different Approach

Similar study is now in progress for the Pentagon by McDonnell Douglas, but it is based on a different set of data—all the information available to Defense Dept. intelligence officials. That study's preliminary results revealed the Backfire's range is closer to the original U. S. intelligence estimate of 6,000 naut. mi., **clearly marking the aircraft in the heavy bomber category that would be counted in the 2,400 strategic delivery vehicle limit** set in the Ford-Brezhnev Vladivostok agreement. The Ford Administration is preparing to consummate a treaty based on Vladivostok permitting the Soviets to operate the Backfire as an intermediate-range bomber and through other concessions limiting U. S. cruise missiles.

Since the McDonnell Douglas/CIA study, the Pentagon has pulled together top-ranked propulsion and aerodynamic experts from around the nation to examine the study. **They have concluded there is no validity in the estimate of the Backfire's range being only 3,500 naut. mi.** McDonnell Douglas officials declined to talk to AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY about the studies, claiming national security is involved.

## Cost Growth

Defense Dept. selected acquisition reports on the costs of 44 major weapon programs total \$175.8 billion, an increase of \$4.8 billion over the previous SARs submitted to Congress on Mar. 31. The latest reports, based on June 30 estimates, **reflect the addition of a fourth Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and a major escalation in program estimates for the Air Force/McDonnell Douglas F-15 air-superiority fighter (AW&ST Aug. 2, p. 38).** The June estimate for the F-15 acquisition program totals \$12.2 billion, up by \$734.7 million from the March report. The growth includes a \$3.8-million cost overrun in prior year funding and a projected cost growth of \$730.9 million from Fiscal 1978 through Fiscal 1980.

Other major cost growths since March include the Navy/Grumman F-14 air-superiority fighter, \$162.9 million; the Navy/Lockheed S-3A carrier-based ASW patrol aircraft, \$111.1 million; the Navy/Lockheed Trident fleet ballistic missile, \$358.6 million, and the USAF/Boeing Minuteman 3 ICBM, \$257.6 million, largely reflecting an add-on buy of 60 missiles in Fiscal 1977.

## Noise Compromise

Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller has been asked by President Ford to draft a compromise proposal on aviation noise policy because of the severe split in positions between Transportation Secretary William T. Coleman, Jr., on one side, and James Lynn, director of the Office of Management and Budget, and James Cannon, director of the Domestic Council, on the other. The President met with Coleman, Lynn and Cannon early last week **but reached no decision on the vital retrofit/replacement issue.** Presidential indecisiveness forced Coleman to cancel an appearance before the House Public Works and Transportation aviation subcommittee last week. Coleman met at least twice last week with the vice president on the issue, and those Administration officials who would like to see the issue decision delayed indefinitely were concerned a decision could be forthcoming from the President in the next few days.

—Washington Staff

## Fumbling the Defense Issue

National defense has surfaced strongly as one of the major issues of the 1976 presidential election campaign between President Gerald Ford and his challenger, Gov. Jimmy Carter. It is encouraging that this vital issue of defense has assumed such an important role so early in what promises to be a spirited contest complete with national television debates. It is discouraging, however, to see both candidates and their parties fumbling the issue badly and shadow-boxing with outdated rhetoric that indicates they have no real conception of the rapidly developing realities of the Soviet technological threat.

Sen. Walter Mondale, the Democratic vice presidential candidate, leaped into the defense debate recently in San Francisco with a series of cliches that reflect faithfully the views of that band of liberal Democratic senators—Humphrey, Kennedy, Proxmire, Mansfield and McGovern—who regard most defense matters as inherently bad and have an apparently unbounded faith in the Soviet Union's good faith and goodwill. These senators, including Sen. Mondale, by their votes on key defense issues over the past few years have inflicted more irreparable damage to the U. S. defense posture than any foreign enemy. Their consistent votes to take the U. S. defense posture even below the already unbalanced SALT 1 levels have provided the Soviets with an incredible windfall and powerful new leverage for ongoing negotiations. Their vote to demolish unilaterally the sole U. S. anti-ballistic missile operational installation and cut ABM advanced research, while extracting no similar actions from the Soviet, will go down in history as an act of incredible folly. Sen. Mondale and his cohorts cannot erase their votes on that measure and should be held accountable.

Gov. Carter, who makes much of his youthful Navy service on the early nuclear submarines, indicates by his recent speeches that he too has only a vague and flimsy grasp of the real defense issues facing this nation with its gravest foreign threat since the War of 1812. Although he has some capable defense advisers in Paul Nitze and Elmo Zumwalt, he apparently has difficulty understanding what they are trying to tell him. Instead, he seems to be picking up sheaves of defense position papers prepared by the armchair academic experts of the Brookings Institution in Washington—the same people who think the B-52 fleet of the Strategic Air Command can fly forever.

There is certainly some merit in the case for some of the administrative military reforms echoed by Gov. Carter and some defense budget savings can be effected by their implementation. But nowhere in his extensive discussion of the defense problem is there any evidence that Gov. Carter understands the extremely grave dangers from the Soviet Union's massive quantitative and qualitative arms buildup that is growing every hour he orates.

This is a genuine and fast-moving trend for which hard evidence can be found across the spectrum from under the sea to outer space. Until Gov. Carter demonstrates some sign that he has some comprehension of this problem, he will not merit his fellow citizens' endorsement of his self-appraised leadership qualifications.

In the case of President Ford, the fumbling of the defense issue is both inexplicable and tragic. In many ways, he has tried to take the appropriate action to counterbalance the massive Soviet threat externally and to curb the Machiavellian manipulations of Henry Kissinger internally.

In addition, he has had a chilling demonstration of what an orchestration of the defense issue did for his Republican challenger, who carried him down to the Kansas City convention eve and narrowly missed upsetting the presidential incumbent. Ronald Reagan had very little else in his repertoire besides the defense issue.

His amazing durability in the race for the Republican nomination rested primarily on the response of masses of American citizens, who are growing increasingly uneasy over these plainly visible trends. The people of this country are far ahead of their political candidates in recognizing the dangers inherent in the threat, and Reagan's success clearly demonstrated it.

After narrowly averting defeat for the nomination over the defense issue on which he could have run with great strength, President Ford has now apparently quickly forgotten the lesson and is pursuing the mirage of a SALT 2 agreement containing the worst of the Kissinger concessions. This will make him guilty of every Reagan campaign charge and cost him dearly in November votes he had won in August.

President Ford took decisive action last year to curtail the unlimited national security powers of Henry Kissinger and restore an element of legitimate debate inside the White House on national security affairs. This prevented Kissinger's first attempt last January at a complete sell-out to the Soviets on the Backfire supersonic bomber, the U. S. cruise missiles and nuclear throw weight to achieve a SALT 2 agreement. Now, inexplicably, President Ford has become mesmerized by the State Dept. Svengali and is hurrying to complete the same sell-out for a SALT 2 agreement before the election, with apparently no idea of the quantity of votes it will cost him or of the potential damage to the future of his country.

Meanwhile, the Soviets must be smirking at the inability of the American political contenders to perceive either the weight or direction of the massive Russian military thrust and their persistence in wallowing blindly along a path that can only lead to future tragedy for the nation they are striving to lead.

—Robert Hotz



# NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

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
SEPTEMBER 8, 1976

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—FACT SHEET—

## U. S. MILITARY STRENGTH OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

June 30, 1976



	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total Outside the United States	<u>237,200</u>	<u>96,800</u>	<u>29,500</u>	<u>100,300</u>	<u>463,800</u>
U.S. Territories and Possession (including Afloat)	7,400	15,400	1,500	5,800	30,100
Foreign Countries	229,800	81,400	28,000	94,500	433,700
<u>Western Europe and Related Areas</u>	<u>190,100</u>	<u>39,500</u>	<u>4,600</u>	<u>62,300</u>	<u>296,500</u>
Belgium	1,300	100	*	600	2,000
Germany	182,200	300	100	25,900	208,500
Greece	600	500	*	2,100	3,300
Iceland	*	2,000	100	1,000	3,100
Italy	3,900	3,600	200	3,900	11,600
Morocco	*	700	200	*	900
Netherlands	600	*	*	1,400	2,000
Portugal/Azores	*	300	*	1,000	1,400
Spain	*	3,800	200	5,200	9,200
Turkey	1,000	*	*	3,200	4,400
United Kingdom	100	2,300	300	17,500	20,300
Other	100	100	200	500	900
Afloat	-	25,700	3,300	-	29,000
<u>Southeast Asia</u>	<u>800</u>	-	-	<u>400</u>	<u>1,200</u>
Thailand	800	*	*	400	1,200
<u>Western Pacific</u>	<u>37,800</u>	<u>30,500</u>	<u>22,500</u>	<u>30,500</u>	<u>121,300</u>
Japan (incl. Okinawa)	4,300	7,100	20,500	13,400	45,300
Philippines	*	5,000	900	8,700	14,600
South Korea	33,000	200	*	7,100	40,400
Taiwan	400	400	*	1,300	2,200
Afloat	-	17,700	1,200	-	18,900

(OVER)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Other Areas</u>	<u>8,500</u>	<u>26,700</u>	<u>2,300</u>	<u>7,200</u>	<u>44,600</u>
Australia	*	400	*	300	700
Bermuda	-	1,300	100	-	1,400
Canada	*	500	*	300	800
Cuba	-	2,000	500	*	2,500
Diego Garcia	-	1,100	-	-	1,100
Guam	100	5,300	400	3,800	9,600
Iran	600	100	*	400	1,100
Midway Island	-	800	-	-	800
Panama/Canal Zone	6,800	300	100	1,800	9,100
Puerto Rico	400	3,300	500	100	4,200
Other	500	1,200	700	500	2,900
Afloat	-	10,400	-	-	10,400

Less than 250

Bahamas  
 Bahrain  
 Barbados  
 Brazil  
 Ethiopia (includes Eritrea)  
 Hong Kong  
 Johnston Island  
 Leeward Islands  
 Norway

Less than 1,000

Greenland  
 Saudi Arabia

\*Under 100

Totals may not add due to rounding.

END



September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: Top-Heavy Military Structure

QUESTION: There are frequent allegations that our present military structure is top-heavy -- too many generals and admirals, more flag officers now than at the end of World War II when our force level was much higher -- more captains on the CNO's staff than serving on ships, etc. Would you please comment?

ANSWER: Attached are statistics which describe the changes in military manpower and the senior command/management structure of the Department of Defense since 1950. Our total military strength hit 3.6 million in 1952 and again in 1968, two wartime peaks. Some observations:

- The officer strength of the US defense establishment is, like the total number of people in uniform, at its lowest point since before the Korean War. The officer fraction of the total has been remarkably constant (12-14%) for two decades. The officer-to-total ratio has leaned out under GRF/DHR.
- The number of flag/general officers has steadily decreased since the 1968 Vietnam War peak. The ratio of flag/general officers-to-total-military is being leaned out under GRF/DHR, from 5.8 to 5.5 per 10,000 total.
- Civilian supergrade (GS-16 and above) numbers have been reduced steadily since 1969, in parallel with senior military grades. The ratio of flag/general officers-to-supergrade civilians has remained constant at 0.92.

The relevance of the various ratios in the attached table is subject to question. There is every reason to expect officer-to-enlisted ratios to increase, for example, due to changes in the complexity of modern warfare -- more two-pilot aircraft, smaller more numerous tactical units, new strategic nuclear missile system requirements -- since WW II.

SPECIFIC: The fact is that there are significantly fewer generals and admirals today than there were at the end of WW II. In 1945, we had 2,068 general and flag officers compared to 1,184 today. At the peak of the Vietnam War there were 1352. (We project a reduction to 1,170 at the end of FY 1977, further reducing to 1,157 by end-FY 1978.)

General/Flag Officers

<u>Actual (End Fiscal Year)</u>						<u>Planned</u>	
<u>1945</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>Today</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
2068	1239	1287	1339	1199	1184	1170	1157

Although the number of general/flag officers has been almost halved, there are more compared to the total military population today than was the case in WW II. The point is that the number of senior military officers should not be expected to change in direct proportion to the overall size of the Armed Forces, but depends more on basic organization and functional needs.

The significant organizational changes since WW II include: establishment of a separate Air Force, establishment of Unified Commands and International Headquarters, and strengthening the Office of the SecDef and OJCS. Significant changes in functional requirements derive from the facts that procurement and distribution of material and equipment are more technically demanding and require a much higher degree of economic control than was the case 30 years ago; furthermore, command and control systems are more elaborate.

SPECIFIC: Using the Navy as an example, the fact is that there are more captains (O-6) at sea than on CNO's staff. Sea billets for captains include commanding officers of ships, squadrons, and air groups as well as afloat staffs.

- o 262 O-6's on CNO staff; 369 O-6's on sea duty; 310 O-6's in ships and squadrons; plus 59 on sea duty in maritime aircraft squadrons and staffs.

It is not unreasonable to find this number of the Navy's most experienced and capable officers assisting the CNO in fulfilling his statutory responsibilities to the Secretary of the Navy.

15 September 1976

SELECTED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STRENGTHS

End FY	Strengths					Ratios			
	Total Mil (000)	Total Enl (000)	Total Off (000)	Total Gen/ Flag	Total Civ Supergrades <sup>a/</sup>	Off to Tot Mil	Gen/Flag per 1,000 Tot Mil	Gen/Flag per 1,000 Tot Enl	Gen/Flag to Supergrades <sup>a/</sup>
1950	1,460	1,279	181	881	122b/	.12	.60	.69	7.22
1951	3,249	2,926	323	1,047		.10	.32	.36	
1952	3,636	3,260	376	1,142	236b/	.10	.31	.35	4.84
1953	3,555	3,178	377	1,197		.11	.34	.38	
1954	3,302	2,948	354	1,205		.11	.36	.41	
1955	2,935	2,583	352	1,239		.12	.42	.48	
1956	2,806	2,456	350	1,279		.12	.46	.52	
1957	2,796	2,453	343	1,276		.12	.46	.52	
1958	2,601	2,275	326	1,282		.13	.49	.56	
1959	2,504	2,185	319	1,268		.13	.51	.58	
1960	2,476	2,160	317	1,260	726b/	.13	.51	.58	1.74
1961	2,484	2,169	315	1,254		.13	.50	.58	
1962	2,808	2,465	343	1,303		.12	.46	.53	
1963	2,700	2,365	334	1,292		.12	.48	.55	
1964	2,687	2,350	337	1,294	1,323	.13	.48	.55	.98
1965	2,655	2,317	339	1,287		.13	.48	.56	
1966	3,094	2,745	349	1,320		.11	.43	.48	
1967	3,377	2,993	384	1,334		.11	.40	.45	
1968	3,546	3,132	416	1,352	1,490	.12	.38	.43	.91
1969	3,460	3,041	419	1,336	1,556	.12	.39	.44	.86

a/ Complete data on civilian supergrades (GS-16,17,18) not readily available for some years before 1968.


b/ Authorizations.

End FY	Strengths					Ratios			
	Total Mil (000)	Total Enl (000)	Total Off (000)	Total Gen/ Flag	Total Civ Supergrades	Off to Tot Mil	Gen/Flag per 1,000 Tot Mil	Gen/Flag per 1,000 Tot Enl	Gen/Flag to Supergrades
1970	3,066	2,664	402	1,339	1,545	.13	.44	.50	.87
1971	2,715	2,343	371	1,330	1,503	.14	.49	.57	.88
1972	2,323	1,987	336	1,324	1,460	.14	.57	.67	.91
1973	2,253	1,932	321	1,291	1,415	.14	.57	.67	.91
1974	2,162	1,860	302	1,249	1,363	.14	.58	.67	.92
1975	2,128	1,836	292	1,199	1,303	.14	.56	.65	.92
1976	2,082	1,801	281	1,184	1,287	.13	.57	.66	.92
1977	2,102	1,824	278	1,164	1,267	.13	.55	.64	.92

#### COMMENTS

1. The officer strength of the US defense establishment is, like the total number of people in uniform, at its lowest point since before the Korean War. The officer fraction of the total has been remarkably constant (12-14%) for two decades. The officer-to-total ratio has leaned out under GRF/DHR.
2. The number of flag/general officers has steadily decreased since the 1968 Vietnam War peak. The ratio of flag/general officers-to-total-military is being leaned out under GRF/DHR, from 5.8 to 5.5 per 10,000 total.
3. Civilian supergrade (GS-16 and above) numbers have been reduced steadily since 1969, in parallel with senior military grades. The ratio of flag/general officers-to-supergrade civilians has remained constant at 0.92.

September 16, 1976



SUBJECT: Combat/Support Ratio

QUESTION: It has been alleged that the military has too many support troops per combat troop and that millions of dollars could be saved if this ratio were reduced. Would you please comment?

ANSWER: The balance between combat troops and support troops has fluctuated over time, as the complexity of ground warfare has changed and the emphasis has shifted between sustained combat and initial, forward defense. The following table summarizes, in consistent terms, the distribution of Army manpower since 1945:

	Approximate Distribution of Army Manpower <sup>a/</sup>								
	WW II 1945	HST 1950	Korea 1952	The 1955	LBJ 1965	SE Asia 1968	RN 1970	GRF 1975	Present
Combat	42%	38%	38%	28%	47%	35%	50%	50%	53%
Support	50%	62%	62%	72%	53%	65%	50%	50%	47%

As you can see, the ratio of combat troops to support troops has varied widely, tending to lean out in wartime as additional troops begin to use the sustaining base maintained during time of peace. Today we have the same number of combat divisions as before the SE Asia conflict, but much less support manpower. That does not mean necessarily


<sup>a/</sup> In computing the distribution, divisions, separate combat brigades, armored cavalry regiments, nondivisional field and air defense artillery, combat engineer, assault and attack helicopter, special forces units and separate maneuver battalions have been considered in the combat tabulation. Nondivisional units -- such as communication, maintenance, medical, support aviation, transportation, ordnance, military police, and finance -- that supply and service combat forces are considered as support.

that there is less need for support troops: it means that we have consciously structured our active force to include as much readily deployable combat power as possible, while recognizing that we would have to rely more heavily than ever before on the Reserve Components to provide the necessary support forces. We can't push that too far, but I believe that we have been moving in the direction of the economies referred to in the question.

Of course, our objective is a defense posture sufficient to maintain -- in conjunction with our Allies -- the desired military balance. To the extent that active forces assume a greater part of the combat posture, and Reserve Components provide the requisite base of support, there are not necessarily large reductions in the resources required. Dollars saved in the active force posture must be reapplied to Reserve support base readiness and war reserve materials.




# COMBAT TO SUPPORT RATIOS US ACTIVE ARMY





RA  
**COMBAT TO SUPPORT RATIOS**

**US ACTIVE ARMY**



September 16, 1976

SUBJECT: Implications of a \$5-\$7 Billion Cut in Defense

QUESTION: The Democratic Party platform calls for reducing present Defense spending by \$5-\$7 billion. Could that be done by cutting fat and running the Department more efficiently, or would the impact be more severe?

ANSWER: Let's begin by looking at some facts. Presidents from both parties have, over the past decade, proposed budgets they believed to be adequate to meet the requirements of the nation's defense. Congresses have -- almost ritually -- cut those defense requests each year by \$3B to \$8B. The result has been a series of budgets which, although they appeared to grow from \$72B in 1967 to \$106B in 1976, represented a steady decrease in spending on national defense.

In real terms -- that is, in dollars applied to baseline capabilities, corrected to cancel the effects of inflation -- the resources devoted to Defense decreased steadily by about 2% a year between 1967 and 1976. The budget for 1976 was the first which did not involve a reduction in more than a decade; the budget just approved for 1977 has established an upward trend. Chart I (attached) depicts this upturning in constant FY 77 (not inflated) dollars.

The point is that a trend of decreasing US defense budgets, arrested only this year, coincident with an upward trend (3%-4% annual growth) in spending on military programs on the part of the Soviet Union over the past decade, has been unmistakably adverse to US national security.

The question of how a \$5 to \$7 billion cut in the Defense budget would affect us must be answered in that context.



- Such a cut would put the U.S. once again on a downward path, aggravating already adverse trends.
- A cut of that magnitude could be accomplished, of course, merely by transferring budget authority for some functions now covered in the DOD budget to another appropriation. Done any other way, the impact would be severe. There is simply not that kind of flexibility in the Defense budget.
- Chart 2 illustrates the implications of such a cut. The DOD budget is displayed in terms of major functions -- R&D, procurement, readiness, and manpower. The consequences of applying the cut in toto to any one of those categories are described, even though the more likely approach in Congress would be a chipping away at all four categories.

CHART I

THE CHANGING TREND

- FY77 BUDGET \$ -





CHART 2

IMPLICATIONS OF A \$5-7 BILLION DEFENSE CUT



Put us on the same course of reduced DOD expenditures we have followed for the past several years prior to FY 76.

September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: U.S. Forces Overseas

QUESTION: It has been alleged that the U.S. has too many troops and bases overseas and that millions of dollars could be saved if the overseas troops and bases were reduced. Would you please comment on the advantages and disadvantages of having the troops and bases in foreign lands?

ANSWER: Such allegations have been a recurrent theme in U.S. political campaigns for several years. There is a certain superficial appeal to such calls to "bring the boys home" and "save the taxpayers' money." These notions don't look so good when one begins to assess the cost in terms of our national security interests and foreign policy objectives ... what we would lose by seriously reducing current forward deployments and overseas basing facilities.

Our overseas deployments are concentrated in two areas, both of which are of central importance to US national security objectives: NATO Europe and Northeast Asia. In Western Europe, deployed U.S. troops constitute about one-tenth of the ground forces of the NATO Alliance, the treaty which has been the centerpiece of US foreign policy since World War II. These forces -- both on land in the Central Region and seaborne in the Mediterranean -- contribute vitally to the Alliance's warfighting capability; moreover, they are regarded by our Allies as politically significant symbols of continuing U.S. commitment to mutual security. In the past two years, we have streamlined and modernized our forces in Europe, first, by converting some 20,000 billets from support to combat functions and, in addition,

by various redeployments designed to improve NATO warfighting capabilities.

Significant reductions in the level of U.S. deployments would, thus, reduce total NATO military capabilities in Central Europe and the Mediterranean. It would also affect our political relationships, since the Allies would inevitably interpret any such action on our part as a clear signal that our interest in Western Europe's security and our commitment to their support had been downgraded. It could also give rise to a serious miscalculation on the part of the Soviets, were they to conclude the same thing and seize the opportunity to exert pressure, either political or military, upon the NATO Allies to make them more pliant towards Soviet objectives in Europe. The United States has too many vital interests at stake in Western Europe -- deep political and cultural ties, large investments, major national security interests -- to invite Soviet adventurism there.

In Northeast Asia, the stakes are similarly high. Stability on the Korean peninsula is vital to the security of Japan, our major ally in Asia. Deployed US forces are a necessary addition to South Korean military forces, ensuring that, in the event of attack, the South Korean's will have the ground strength and air support they themselves currently lack. The outbreak of renewed hostilities in Korea would be likely to force the Chinese and the Soviets, out of political rivalry and mutual mistrust, to vie in backing the North Koreans. This would tend, in turn, to bring the United States into a face-to-face confrontation with one or both of these two powers.

As in NATO Europe, therefore, the presence of US troops in South Korea serves a dual purpose: military and political. Reduction of US deployed strength would suggest to allies and possible adversaries alike that the US regards stability in Northeast Asia as less essential to our own national security and foreign policy objectives than before.

It is also worth noting that the total number of our troops overseas is currently at a 20-year low. Attached is a table that shows assigned US troop strength overseas from 1955 to 1976. The present number is half what it was in 1955, and approximately a third of what it was at the peak of the Vietnam War in 1967. Interestingly enough, total overseas deployed strength steadily decreased during the Eisenhower Administration, increased markedly during the Kennedy-Johnson period, and has steadily decreased since 1968.

Finally, there is considerable question as to how much money the US would save by significant reductions to overseas deployment levels. Assuming that the forces withdrawn were kept in the force structure -- a necessity given the military balance in the world -- extensive expansion of CONUS basing facilities would be needed to accommodate the returning forces. This would occasion a considerable one-time expense which would require some years to amortize. Furthermore, to maintain the capability to return rapidly and reinforce Central Europe or Northeast Asia in the event of hostilities, we would need to expand our existing airlift and sealift capability considerably -- another expensive endeavor. On the other hand, if we chose to redefine



our overseas interests in terms much narrower than hitherto since World War II, we might choose to demobilize the homecoming forces and remove them from the force structure entirely. This would severely reduce our conventional capabilities, almost certainly raising, rather than lowering, the nuclear threshold. We would then very possibly find it necessary to invest more money in expanding and improving our strategic forces to make up for the conventional capability, forward deployed, we had sacrificed.



U.S. Troop Strength - World-Wide and Overseas  
(Ashore and Afloat)  
(In thousands)

	<u>As of June</u>	<u>Overseas</u> <sup>1/</sup>	<u>World-Wide</u>
HST	1950	325 <sup>2/</sup>	1,460
	1951	NA	3,249
	1952	1,180	3,636
	1953	1,217	3,555
	1954	1,031	3,302
IKE	1955	867	2,935
	1956	813	2,806
	1957	799	2,796
	1958	734	2,601
	1959	699	2,504
	1960	698	2,476
JFK	1961	703	2,484
	1962	770	2,808
	1963	762	2,698
LBJ	1964	755	2,685
	1965	778	2,653
	1966	1,013	3,092
	1967	1,247	3,377
	1968	1,241	3,547
RN	1969	1,195	3,459
	1970	1,071	3,066
	1971	842	2,714
	1972	628	2,322
	1973	585	2,252
GRF	1974	519	2,162
	1975	517	2,128
	1976	464	2,082

1/ Includes U.S. Territories and Possessions

2/ Afloat excluded (not available)

14 Sep 76

I. TROOP WITHDRAWALS

A. General Withdrawals

*Troop Withdrawals*  
*9FK/109 - 700,000/1,200,000/200,000*  
*PN/F - 1,200,000/404,000*  
*UP - all Demos*  
*Down - " RFP"*

CARTER. Carter always mentions troop withdrawals in the context of cutting the defense budget. He said, for example, "we have a bloated bureaucracy in the Pentagon, too many troops overseas, too many military bases overseas..." (11/23/75), and "we're wasting enormous quantities of money. We've got too many military bases overseas." (3/21/76).

Response. Generally you should try to emphasize the fact that Carter statements have been fuzzy, at times contradictory, and invariably wrong when citing particular facts and figures. This should be done in the context that he is ill-informed on defense matters (because of lack of experience on national problems) and badly served by all too sloppy staff work.

When asked about troop withdrawals, you should ask if Carter means: (a) cutting the total number of U.S. troops by bringing home and deactivating some; or b) maintaining the overall number of troops yet deploying less overseas and more in the U.S.

If Carter means (a) or reducing the overall number of troops, a response is that we are at the lowest level since before the Korean War, going from a peak of 3.5 million in 1968 to 2.1 million today. We just cannot afford to go any lower and maintain the overall military balance (the Soviet Union has 4.4 million under arms).

If Carter means (b) or merely bringing home troops, a response is that such a move would lower capabilities and deterrence without lowering costs in the near future. Troops stationed in the U.S. just do not have the deterrent effect of those stationed on the NATO or Korean borders. Should deterrence fail, such troops at home do not have the capability for defense that those in place, with equipment and facilities on hand, have. In terms of cost, the savings of redeploying troops in the U.S. would be, at best, minimal. To bring home one-fourth or 50,000 of our ground forces assigned to NATO would cost an additional \$700 in the first year, with some type of capability in Europe maintained for such forces. No savings at all would accrue for 15 years, at the least.



*Defense - no free lunch.*

## B. Withdrawals from Asia

CARTER. "I think that to reduce our land forces in South Korea gradually over a period of years would be an appropriate action to take," (5/10/76). Carter would try to reassure Japan by "consultation" that this withdrawal from Korea had no impact on our commitment to Japan (6/23/76). According to a Carter policy statement in early 1976, he would advocate a gradual U.S. troop withdrawal from Japan as well.

RESPONSE. Events last month showed that the threat from North Korea is still a serious one. Our troops serve there, as they have successfully for 25 years, for deterrence. Redeployment to the U.S. would initially cost money and would save nothing for a number of years. Japan is concerned about our commitment to Korea, and we are concerned about our commitment to Japan, our second largest trading partner (after Canada), a good friend, democratic government, and an ally. All of Asia, indeed the world, would be concerned about Japanese rearmament. As a nation, we have guaranteed Japan's security since World War II in part to discourage such rearmament; lessening that commitment would surely encourage more militaristic forces in Japan to rearm. If not rearming in such a situation, Japan could go neutral (like India?) which would also be a serious move for us as a Nation and for the overall balance in the world.

## II. ECONOMY MOVES

### A. General Measures

CARTER. Most of his remarks on defense focus on economy measures -- to trim down the huge bureaucracy and flabby, "frilled" military establishment. The Democratic Platform sets the tone: "...with the proper management, with the proper kind of investment of defense dollars, and with the proper choice of military programs, we believe we can reduce present defense spending by about \$5 billion to \$7 billion." Carter has come down to this figure from \$12-15 billion March, 1975; and \$7 to \$8 billion in January, 1976.

RESPONSE. Generally five points should be made. (1) The way Carter is coming down on his defense cuts, pretty soon he'll be supporting the President's budget. We are quite pleased with his statements which -- though contradictory -- are showing an increasing awareness of the threats to freedom, adverse trends, etc. (2) Any government agency, indeed any business, can get greater efficiency. The call for better management of the defense establishment has been made since DoD began, and will be made as long as it exists. It is a constant need deserving constant attention. In this post-Vietnam era, we are constantly making adjustments and modernizing. (3) Most if not all the specific proposals made by Carter have already been done, or at least are being done. It is easy to promise things already accomplished or underway. Furthermore, the figures he gives as savings are consistently wrong. He is ill-informed and, as a result, is misleading



the American public, not only on the general point that huge sums can be saved through better management, but also that savings of specified amounts will accrue from his recommended actions. (4) The President has taken many more actions to improve efficiency than ever mentioned by Carter. Under his own authority, the President has taken efficiency measures which save \$2.2 billion in FY 1977 and will save \$50 billion in the next 15 years. Other actions require legislation. Unfortunately, the Democratic Congress has yet to act on the whole package sent up last January which would save some \$800 million in FY 1977, and more than \$70 billion over a fifteen year period (FY 1977-91). Rather than clamor for actions already underway in DoD, he should push his party leaders in Congress to take new actions. (5) Although necessary, we feel that there are more important national security issues facing America than these management concerns. The real issue of national security in 1976 is: How can we keep the peace in the decades ahead while preserving our principles, maintaining our vital interests abroad, assuring our allies, etc? This involves a careful consideration of the threats to freedom which do exist in the world, the increasing power and appetite of the Soviet Union, the adverse trends, etc.'

#### B. Transfers of Personnel

CARTER. "We must recognize that our military personnel are transferred too much. At any given moment, about one out of seven of those personnel is in the process of moving...This year, \$2.5 billion will go simply to move service personnel, their families...Such frequent moves not only eat up money, they undermine morale. If we extend the average tour of duty by just two months, we could save \$400 million per year" (VFW Speech, 8/24/76).

Response. (1) We are working on this problem with our PCS/Turbulence reduction efforts and have been working on it since I took office ten months ago -- long before Mr. Carter addressed the issue. (2) His figures are inaccurate. He is ill-informed by sloppy staff work and consequently misleading the American people. The \$2.5 billion figure includes some civilian personnel as well as "service personnel." Most important, a two-month extension of service would save less than half the amount he presents (\$186 million, not \$400 million as he states).

#### C. Training Ratios

CARTER. "We need to reexamine our military training programs... We now have an average of one and a half military students for each instructor. By moving to a ratio of only three students to each instructor, we could save an estimated \$1 billion per year." (VFW Speech, 8/24/76).

RESPONSE. (1) We have already taken action in this area as well -- reducing training staff by 14% (or 31,600) while increasing the number of students trained 2% between FY 1975 and

1977. Flight training has been reduced by 44% and graduate education by 36% between FY 1973 and 1977. (2) Again, Carter's figures are wrong; again the result of sloppy staff work. At present there are five students per instructor, not 1.5 as he states. Moving to three per student, as Carter advocates, would only cost money, not save it. Does he wish to increase the number of instructors per students?

#### D. Cost Overruns

CARTER. "Cost overruns have become chronic. The Pentagon itself estimates that the total current cost of overruns on the 45 weapons systems now in the process of development in the three services -- exclusive of inflation -- is \$10.7 billion. Over the next five years that would approximate the cost of the proposed B-1 bomber program over the same period." (VFW Speech, 8/24/76).

RESPONSE. (1) Cost overruns are serious, but they are a problem of society in general -- both business and government -- rather than one confined to the military. In fact, a recent GAO Report states that the Pentagon is better in this regard than other government agencies. Whereas military programs grew by 33%, non-military acquisition programs in the government grew over 100% from base estimates. The Federal Highway Administration and Appalachian Regional Commission both grew by 100% and Department of Transportation by 50%. In private business, the Bay Area Rapid Transit grew by 73%, the Washington Metro by 86% (and is still growing), the John Hancock Building in Boston by 100%. (2) Carter's figures are actually low; the correct amount is \$13.4 billion for 44 weapons systems.

#### E. Officer to Non-Officer Ratio

CARTER. "What we have now are...too many major military officers and generals" (8/23/75). "Waste and inefficiency are both costly to taxpayers and a danger to our own national existence. Strict management and budgetary control over the Pentagon should reduce the ratio of officers to men..." (8/12/74). "We've got too top-heavy a layer of personnel assignments. We've got more admirals and generals than we had at the end of the Second World War." (3/21/76)

RESPONSE. (1) Again, his facts are wrong, again because of sloppy staff work. We do not now have more generals and admirals than at the end of WW II. In fact, today we have about half the number (1138 today vs. 2068 in 1945). (2) Efforts to reduce the officer to non-officer ratio have been underway for some time. Between FY 1973 and 1977, the reduction in senior officer personnel has been nearly twice that of military personnel overall (13% vs 7%). These cuts include an 8% reduction in admirals and generals, and a 12% reduction in colonels and lieutenant colonels. (3) While we are making progress, the amount of savings possible by reducing the number of officers is minimal. To fire all generals

and admirals outright would save DoD only \$60 million per year. To replace them with colonel-level officers in the same positions would save only \$10 million per year. (4) The officer to non-officer ratio must remain higher in peacetime than during war -- such as World War II -- in order to allow for rapid mobilization, should the need arise.

F. Tooth-to-Tail Ratio

CARTER. "We've got too many support troops per combat troop" (3/21/76). "What we have are...too many support troops per combat troop..." (11/23/75).

RESPONSE. (1) We have taken action in this area, beginning four years ago. From FY 1973-76, we reduced support forces by 244,000 while increasing combat strength by 29,000. (2) We are now streamlining the entire military establishment, in part by eliminating or proposing for elimination 15 command headquarters and 25,600 headquarters positions since FY 1974.

G. Transferring Programs From DoD

CARTER. "The Defense Department now overlaps the functions of civilian agencies, with a great waste of money" (5/2/76). He advocated transferring programs "like education, training, housing, social programs, and transportation" from DoD to civilian agencies.

RESPONSE. It is misleading the American people to state that such transfers could save substantial sums of money if the functions of the various programs were maintained. This resembles Carter's widely-heralded streamlining of the Georgia government by reducing the overall number of agencies, etc. What he neglects to mention, however, is that while he was governor, state spending increased 58% and the number of state employees increased 24%.

III. OTHER POINTS

A. Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

CARTER. "The biggest waste and danger of all is the unnecessary proliferation of atomic weapons throughout the world. Our ultimate goal should be the elimination of nuclear weapon capability among all nations" (12/12/75). "I think this nation ought to have as its ultimate goal zero nuclear weapons for any nations in the world" (12/15/74). "...we (must) demonstrate meaningful progress toward the goal of control and then reduction and ultimately elimination of nuclear arsenals" (5/14/76).

RESPONSE. This is a noble goal, one possible if the world were a Garden of Eden with an absence of threat to freedom. However, as a serious proposal in the real world, it shows a lack of rigorous

analysis and consideration of the repercussions. Since World War II, the U.S. has been able to deter aggression and maintain the overall military balance because of our nuclear weaponry, particularly our superiority in the number of nuclear warheads. Were we and the Soviet Union to simply eliminate nuclear weapons in the near future, we would have to increase our conventional strength substantially, perhaps doubling or tripling our forces, with all that implies in terms of doubling or tripling the budget, reinstatement of the draft, etc., in order to meet the superior Soviet conventional forces. Alternatives to this vast increase of our conventional forces would be unthinkable: retreat to a form of isolationism or accommodation to the Soviet view of the world.

#### B. Euro-Communism

CARTER. "I believe that we should support strongly the democratic forces in Italy, but still we should not close the doors to Communist leaders in Italy for friendship with us. I just hate to build a wall around Italy in advance, should the Communists be successful" (5/10/76).

RESPONSE. Leaders in America just should not give the wrong signals about the acceptability of a government with Communist leaders in NATO. Such signals are easily picked up and used for legitimization, as was done by Italian Communist leader Berlinguer who (according to UPI dispatch, 6/16/76) said in a nationally televised broadcast from Rome: "...others, including Presidential hopefuls from the Democratic Party, have said that although they don't like the idea of our participation in a government, this should be viewed with relative tranquility." The Communist newspaper, L'Unita, earlier praised Carter for saying that the U.S. should not rule out cooperation in advance if the Communists entered a coalition government, according to the same dispatch.

#### C. Other Points Mentioned by Carter

FMS. "Can we be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war? If I become President, I will work with our allies...and also seek to work with the Soviets to increase the emphasis on peace and to reduce the commerce in weapons of war" (7/18/76). "...we (must) put a stop to the dubious practice of arms giveaway programs for potential adversaries" (8/24/76).

RESERVES. "...I have been concerned that our reserve forces, both the regular reserve and the National Guard, do not play a strong enough role in our military preparedness. We need to shift toward a highly trained, combat-worthy reserve, well-equipped and closely coordinated with regular forces -- always capable of playing a crucial role in the nation's defense" (8/24/76).



LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR. "Our Defense Secretary and Secretary of State have talked about limited war. My belief is that if we ever start a limited atomic war that it would very quickly escalate into an all-out war...I think we ought to be prepared to recognize...that once a nuclear war starts...a very good likelihood is that it would be an all-out nuclear war" (7/7/76).

B-1 BOMBER. "We don't need the B-1 bomber" (2/9/75). "I believe we should cancel the B-1 bomber. It's too expensive and its an unnecessary new system" (12/2/75). After a visit to SAC Headquarters in Omaha, Carter stated he would continue research and development on the plane because "it might be after I become President I would change my mind" (5/10/76). The Democratic Platform states, "Exotic weapons which serve no real function do not contribute to the defense of this country. The B-1 bomber is an example of a proposed system which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers' dollars."

DTR 210954Z Oct 76  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 0118  
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 16556 (or 0)

SUBJECT: COMMERCIAL CABLE REGARDING VLADIMIR SLEPAK

1. EMBASSY OCTOBER 21 RECEIVED COMMERCIAL CABLE FROM ATLANTA, GEORGIA WITH FOLLOWING TEXT:

QUOTE: PLEASE DELIVER THIS CABLE ON BEHALF OF GOVERNOR CARTER TO VLADIMIR SLEPAK AND ACKNOWLEDGE DELIVERY:

I HAVE READ WITH GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE TREATMENT THAT YOU AND SOME OF YOUR COLLEAGUES SUFFERED RECENTLY. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE SPOKEN OUT ON THIS MATTER AS GOVERNOR AND DURING THIS CAMPAIGN AND HAVE REFERRED TO YOUR CASE BY NAME. I WANT YOU TO KNOW OF MY DEEP PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE TREATMENT THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES RECEIVE. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER.  
END QUOTE.

2. GIVEN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY OF OUR DETERMINING AUTHENTICITY OF MESSAGE, WE WILL DEFER TAKING ANY ACTION PENDING CONFIRMATION FROM DEPARTMENT AND GUIDANCE. WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH SLEPAK AND COULD DELIVER. PLEASE ADVISE.

MATLOCK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By WAM, NARA, Date 11/24/00

*Cable has been authenticated*

*Return to  
Don Rumball*

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AN ASSESSMENT  
OF THE  
CONVENTIONAL WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITY  
AND POTENTIAL  
OF THE  
US ARMY IN CENTRAL EUROPE  
BY  
LTG JAMES F. HOLLINGSWORTH  
VOLUME I - BASIC REPORT



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30 JUN 1976

*MR 94-162, #3 OSD Hr. 11/5/96 Army  
5/23/97*  
By KBH NARA, Date 10/16/97

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

1. ~~(TS)~~ PROLOGUE: The defense of NATO is second only to the defense of the United States as our national security objective. Over the last two and one half decades, our force structure and planning for the defense of Central Europe evolved and now, in conjunction with our NATO allies, we must stand ready to defend in Central Europe against the threat posed by the USSR/Warsaw Pact. Advancements in military technology, weaponry and managerial improvements have been incorporated into our structure and plans over the years while political and economic constraints within NATO, and major qualitative and quantitative Warsaw Pact improvements, have complicated the task of defense.

With the advent of nuclear parity between the U.S. and the USSR, the need for a capable, viable conventional force in Central Europe has become paramount. This U.S./Allied force must serve as a real deterrent, and must be capable of defeating a Warsaw Pact attack. As an alliance we should be capable, with total mobilization, of fighting conventionally for as long as the Warsaw Pact can sustain conventional combat. Our emphasis, however, must be placed on developing NATO's ability to win a quick, decisive, conventional victory against a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact with no more than 48 hours of warning. The forces and firepower in being in Central Europe, plus their immediate reinforcements must have that capability. With it, NATO will be an effective deterrent; without that capability, we invite disaster.

It is equally clear that the US Army must examine requirements for the defense of Central Europe that go beyond the boundaries of V and VII US Corps. U.S. leadership and initiatives in this area must be encouraged and supported by the Department of Defense and the Congress.

The key is to have a credible conventional deterrent on the ground in Europe backed up by the ability to reinforce in hours and days, not weeks and months. This force must be capable of providing massive firepower--tactical air force and artillery--so that we expend the cheap part of our society--materiel--against the cheap part of communism--people. This is what it's all about, and what this assessment will examine.

2. ~~(S)~~ PURPOSE: The purpose of this report is to assess the threat and the war fighting capabilities and potential of US Army units in Central Europe to defend, in conjunction with NATO allies, against the Warsaw Pact, and to make recommendations based on that assessment.

3. ~~(S)~~ SCOPE: This report focuses on the strategy, operational plans, tactics, structure, doctrine and U.S./Allied cooperation and interoperability necessary to defeat a conventional Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack in Central Europe.

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4. (S) BACKGROUND: The Chief of Staff of the Army directed that an assessment be made of the war fighting capabilities of US Army units in Central Europe. A study team was formed on 28 March 1976 and collected information in Europe from 30 March 1976 to 22 June 1976.
5. (S) METHODOLOGY: A four-man study team visited every major US Army and NATO headquarters in Central Europe. Over a three month period, each US Army corps, division and separate brigade or regiment was seen. Discussions with senior officials and soldiers at each level occurred and data were collected in a variety of areas. Additionally, NATO commands, to include SHAPE, AFCENT, NORTHAG, CENTAG, 2d ATAF and 4th ATAF, were visited, as well as each allied corps headquarters in AFCENT (except the Netherlands Corps). Headquarters, USEUCOM and USAFE, to include 17th Tactical Air Force, were visited as were USNAVEUR and the American Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). As a result of these extensive visits during a concentrated period of time, and with full examination of the facts and figures collected, a clear perception of the current capability and needed improvements was developed. This report is not based on detailed analytical study but rather on an overall perception of the status of the situation in Europe. Some follow-on computer assisted analytical work by appropriate headquarters will be necessary to refine some of the recommendations contained in this report. This should be done on an expedited basis.

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SECTION VII

ASSESSMENT

✓ 1. (S) GENERAL: As outlined in the introduction to this report, the purpose of this study effort has been to "conduct an assessment of the war fighting capabilities and potential of the US Army units in Central Europe . . ." To accomplish this, it has been necessary to look not only at the US Army's posture in Europe, but, perhaps more importantly, how it fits into the Central Region battle--based on an on-the-ground appreciation of the terrain, the threat, the capabilities of our allies, and strategy. No assessment of the US Army's capabilities and potential can be addressed in isolation. The following comments assess the US Army in Europe in the context of a NATO war. This assessment is based on the threat which clearly indicates the Warsaw Pact capability of conducting a surprise attack with no more than 48 hours warning. Obviously, an assessment based on a different scenario (e.g., 23/30) would result in different conclusions.

✓ 2. (S) WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITY: In terms of soldier and junior leader potential, the war fighting capability of the US Army in Europe is excellent. In terms of quality of equipment and general availability and readiness of equipment on hand, it is excellent. However, in view of the threat described in Section II of this report, the ability of US Army Europe, as an organizational entity, to project its full potential in the defense of Central Europe is severely constrained by:

✓ - Inadequate appreciation (at the policy making level) of the Warsaw Pact's capability to launch a surprise attack.

✓ - Resultant force structure and strategic planning predicated on an unrealistic warning time--23/30.

✓ 3. (TS) STRATEGY: The current "flexible response" strategy that balances direct defense, . . . . . for the defense of NATO is valid. There is, however, a need to emphasize and increase the credibility of the first phase of that strategy. The direct conventional defense capability for Central Europe is not credible today. It is based on "in-place" forces which are inadequate in terms of fire-power and location to stop a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact, and strategic reinforcements which would require weeks and months to reinforce rather than hours and days.

The US strategic planning guidance for the direct conventional defense of NATO does not take into account the NATO agreed assessment that the Warsaw Pact is capable of attacking the Central Region with up to 54 divisions with no more than 48 hours warning. Forces and supplies are positioned in Europe without recognition that the most likely main avenue of a Warsaw Pact attack would be in the north German plain. As a result, our force structure, plans, and concepts for the conduct of

the defense against a surprise attack are inadequate.

4. (S) ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL PLANS: With our current force structuring and strategic planning dependent on adequate warning, any assessment of organization for combat and operational planning must reflect these major deficiencies:

✓ - Malpositioning of forces in Central Europe ready to respond to the major threat.

✓ - Acceptance of a "transition to war" concept rather than an immediate readiness for war.

✓ - Inadequate in-place, hardened, and ready command, control and communications capabilities.

✓ - Failure to properly emphasize the every day operational capability of NATO headquarters/staffs.

✓ - Inadequate fire support.

✓ - Tactical concepts and operational plans based on trading space for time.

✓ - Shortages in POMCUS and its malpositioning.

5. (S) RATIONALIZATION: With a requirement for ..... readiness on the part of USAREUR to be ready to fight, rationalization becomes a strategic, economic, and tactical necessity. We must take bold steps in this area. National goals must be subordinated to the common NATO goal. The force to defend Central Europe should have common doctrine, tactics and equipment. This is not the case now, and as a result millions of dollars are wasted annually by redundancy and duplication of effort in equipment development. NATO is doing a great deal to overcome the complex problem of rationalization, but until solutions are developed, NATO's full potential as a fighting force will not be realized.

Standard

6. (TS) SUMMARY: .....  
.....  
.....

..... This is not primarily the fault of USAREUR, but essentially a function of the scenario within which it has been told to live and plan, and the evolution of events which have stationed our forces where they are today in Europe. It is time to meet the problem head on and develop a conventional defense strategy and position our forces to meet the real capability of the Warsaw Pact. The tactical and strategic nuclear capability within NATO will continue to be a significant deterrent and must be maintained while a credible conventional deterrent is developed.



CARTER ON SCHLESINGER

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Q. Should a President tolerate Cabinet members who dissent from Administration policy as heavily as James R. Schlesinger did as Secretary of Defense?

A I believe I could prevent that disharmony occurring by being more heavily involved in the evolution of basic commitments. I always managed the affairs of Georgia on long-range goals and I can't imagine a basic strategic difference developing between myself and one of my Cabinet members if the understanding were that we worked toward the long-range goals. There might be some differences on tactics. But I think I could tolerate the degree of independence shown by James Schlesinger.

\* \* \*

Q. Of the recent Secretaries of Defense, is there one that you have found you admire the most as a model for the job -- Schlesinger, Melvin Laird, Clark Clifford or Robert McNamara?

A. Well, I'm a little reluctant to choose one because of the implied criticism of the others. I think they all brought beneficial characteristics to the job -- McNamara was coldly analytical, and I think operated under very difficult circumstances in Vietnam.



Laird was much better able to work harmoniously with the Congress. I think Schlesinger was a brilliant strategist who was very independent, who thought he didn't have quite close enough relationships with the President and the Secretary of State to avoid public disharmonies, but I think a very competent, brilliant man. I wouldn't want to say who was my favorite.

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