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November 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

SUBJECT: The President's Statement on the Relation
of the States and the Federal Government

In his address to the National Press Club on October 29, the President digressed briefly and made an unfortunate, in my opinion, and unnecessary constitutional comment:

... under our Constitutional system, both the cities and the Federal Government were the creatures of the States. The States delegated certain of their sovereign powers--the power to tax, police powers and the like--to local units of self-government, and they can take these powers back if they are abused.

The States also relinquished certain sovereign powers to the Federal Government--some altogether and some to be shared. In return, the Federal Government has certain obligations to the States.

This statement confuses several points. In a State where the cities are the creatures of the State, it is by virtue of the State constitution, not the Constitution of the United States, which is silent on the subject. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States or its history to suggest that the government of the United States is the creature of the States. The States cannot, for example, take away from the Federal Government, as they can from cities, the power to tax. And the Federal Government's obligations to the States (e.g., the guarantee of a republican form of government, etc., Article IV) are nowhere said to be



a compensation to the States for their having relinquished power to the Federal Government.

The Federal Government is the creature of the people, not of the States. It has its powers from the people through the Constitution. "We the People," not the States, did "ordain and establish" the Constitution. Even the 10th Amendment, frequently cited by states-righters, does not support the view that the powers of the national government are delegated by the States. The 10th Amendment says: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it [i.e., the Constitution] to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." (Emphasis added.)

The view that the States made the Union was the pre-Civil War Constitutional theory that justified secession (on the ground that if they made the Union they could unmake it). The Republican party was born in opposition to this theory, which was brilliantly refuted by Lincoln and decisively repudiated by the outcome of the Civil War. Lincoln expressed the Republican view that the Union is prior to the States, that they cannot undo the Union, that it is perpetual, that the Federal Government is "a government proper," and not a temporary "association of States in the nature of contract" that one might break or withdraw from. For the above reasons, I recommend that the President correct this position at his first opportunity, as follows:

Q. Mr. President, would you please explain what you meant in your speech when you said that the Federal Government is the creature of the States?

A. I have to admit to you frankly that when I said that I was in error. I was focusing with maximum attention on New York City and its relation to New York State and to the Federal Government, and I did not pay sufficient attention to this mistaken statement regarding the relation of the States to the Federal Government.

The Constitution clearly states that the people "ordain and establish" the Constitution, and the Constitution delegates powers to the Federal Government. The Federal



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Government is the creature of the American people as a whole not of the States.

If you agree, I recommend that this Q & A be added to the President's briefing book.

cc: Mr. Paul Theis
Mr. John Marsh
Mr. Philip Buchen



The Washington Post

Oct 31, 1975

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

The President and New York City

UNDOUBTEDLY THERE HAVE been presidential speeches more outrageous than the one President Ford delivered on New York City's financial problems. But it is hard to remember one. Mr. Ford used all the demagogue's tricks: misstating the problem, distorting the facts, running down the critics, resorting to pious platitudes and appealing to prejudice. In the end, he contradicted himself by recommending that the federal government, in the person of a federal judge, supervise New York's future finances after he had explained why supervision by the federal government would be disastrous. One way or another, the nation and New York City will survive the agonies that are now inevitable for that city but they will do so in spite of the President's leadership, not because of it.

Item: Mr. Ford says that New York's leaders are asking for a "blank check" which would require other Americans to support advantages for New Yorkers that they cannot afford for themselves. The reality is that New York's leaders are not asking the federal government for an open-ended supply of federal cash; they are asking that it arrange for the city to borrow money, which it would have to repay, on terms that would require it to submit to considerable financial discipline.

Item: Mr. Ford says that New York's political leaders have "abandoned" the city's financial problems on the federal doorstep like some founding. The reality is that New York State has not only taken financial control of the city and has committed millions of dollars to its aid but has forced a wage freeze, job cutbacks, a curtailment of construction and the renegotiation of a major labor contract.

Item: Mr. Ford claims all of the city's financial woes are due to bad management. The reality is that some of the city's problems have been forced upon it by events beyond its control; the price New York City has paid over the decades as the receiver of immigrants—first from abroad and later from the South and Puerto Rico—has been enormous.

Item: Mr. Ford says that the only losers if New York City goes bankrupt will be the "large investors and big banks." The reality is that thousands of little investors, in New York City and elsewhere, stand to lose directly and many more will be placed in indirect peril if the shock waves of such a bankruptcy spread.

Item: Mr. Ford says that "a few desperate New York officials and bankers" have been trying to stampede Congress into action. The reality is that deep concern about the impact of a New York default on the nation's entire economy exists among mayors, bankers and financial experts all across the country—including, among other ranking officials of Mr. Ford's own administration, his Vice President.

Item: Mr. Ford says that there are choices available to New York leaders other than default or bankruptcy or federal aid if only they would seize them. The reality is

that New York almost certainly cannot avoid defaulting on its debts within a few weeks unless it gets help from somewhere.

Item: Mr. Ford says that most other big cities have faced the same problems as New York's and have stayed financially healthy. The reality is that New York's problems are unique if only because of their size and that some other big cities are in serious financial difficulty.

Item: Mr. Ford says that the "cities and the federal government were the creatures of the States." We had thought that John Marshall and a Civil War had put this old states rights' shibboleth to rest more than a century ago.

There are more examples. But these should be sufficient to demonstrate the general character of the President's speech. Two additional aspects of the President's approach deserve mention. It is ironic that a President whose first budget recommended the largest governmental deficit since the pharaohs built the pyramids should choose to attack so viciously the officials of New York City for running a deficit less than half as large in relation to total spending as that of the federal government. And it is ironic that a President who has been a vigorous critic of the federal courts when they have taken partial control of a local school system should recommend that those same courts take total control of the nation's largest city.

As to the substance of Mr. Ford's program, it is clear that Congress should pass quickly the changes in the bankruptcy act he supports. Indeed, it ought to have passed these some time ago. Similar proposals were urged upon it last spring by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. And, despite the President's opposition, Congress does need to continue work on a program to provide an emergency federal guarantee for municipal bonds. It is faintly possible, although not likely, that somewhere—perhaps in the treasuries of the labor unions—New York City will find the money to avoid formal bankruptcy. But if it does not, its bankruptcy could create chaotic conditions in the municipal bond market which would make a federal safety net of some kind essential.

It is conceivable that by turning this icy shoulder to New York City, President Ford will force its leaders to take painful steps they would not otherwise have taken and to find solutions to their own problems that are not now visible. If so, his judgment on what the role of the federal government should have been will be vindicated. But that will still not excuse the rhetoric of a speech which deliberately conceals from the American people the potential seriousness of a problem for which there is no assured solution. To build political capital on the latent antagonism that exists toward New York City, and all it stands for, is no way for a national leader to prepare public opinion to deal with a crisis which may well turn out to have profound consequences nationwide.

NOVEMBER 3, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSEBIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON
DONALD RUMSFELD

Donald Rumsfeld was appointed Assistant to the President by President Ford in September 1974. In this capacity, he serves as a member of the Cabinet, Director of the White House Office of Operations, and Coordinator of the White House Staff. Previously, he headed President Ford's transition team in August of 1974.

Mr. Rumsfeld was born on July 9, 1932 in Chicago, Illinois. He received a B.A. in Politics from Princeton University in 1954. He served in the U.S. Navy as a naval aviator from 1954-1957.

Mr. Rumsfeld became active in government in 1958 when he worked as Administrative Assistant to Congressman Dave Dennison of Ohio. In 1959, he became a Staff Assistant to then Congressman Robert Griffin of Michigan. From 1960 to 1962, he was with the Chicago investment banking firm of A. G. Becker and Company.

In 1962, he was elected to the United States House of Representatives from the Thirteenth District of Illinois to serve in the Eighty-Eighth Congress. He was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968. In the Congress, he served on the Joint Economic Committee, the Committee on Science and Aeronautics, and the Government Operations Committee, and the Subcommittees on Military and Foreign Operations. He was also a co-founder of the Japanese-American Inter-Parliamentary Council.

In 1969, he resigned his seat in the House to join the Cabinet as an Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. In December of 1970, he was named Counsellor to the President and in October 1971, he was appointed Director of the Cost of Living Council.

Mr. Rumsfeld was named United States Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in February 1973. He served as the United States' Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group. In this responsibility, he represented the United States on a wide range of military and diplomatic matters.

Mr. Rumsfeld has received honorary degrees in law from Park College (Mo.); Lake Forest College (Ill.), and Illinois College (Ill.). Additional awards include the Opportunities Industrial Center's Executive Government Award and the Distinguished Eagle Scout Award.

Mr. Rumsfeld was married to the former Joyce Pierson of Wilmette, Illinois in 1954. They have two daughters, Valerie (19) and Marcy (15), and a son, Nicholas (8).

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/22/75

MEMORANDUM TO: DON RUMSFELD
JIM LYNN
BOB HARTMANN
DICK CHENEY
DAVE LISSY

FROM: BOB GOLDWIN

RG

I thought you might be entertained by the writing of this California judge who certainly knows how to say what he thinks.

Attachment



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**Two Professors Lose
Court Cases Involving
Issues of Free Speech**

In separate decisions published recently two courts ruled this summer against professors who were seeking reinstatement on grounds that their rights of free speech were violated. In one case, an associate professor sued Indiana University in Pennsylvania when it did not renew her teaching contract. In the other case, an assistant professor at the University of California at Berkeley sued when his name was removed from the tenure list.

In the Pennsylvania case, the Federal appeals court in Philadelphia upheld a Federal District Court decision that the associate professor's right to freedom of speech does not encompass essentially private expressions that have a potentially disruptive impact on the functioning of her department.

During the course of a faculty meeting, the teacher made personal attacks on the integrity of the department chairman. There also was evidence that her work performance was inadequate and that she failed to get along amicably with her colleagues. When the university failed to renew her contract she filed suit contending that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. In ruling in favor of the university the appellate court distinguished the case from those in which the U.S. Supreme Court found a First Amendment violation. In the other cases, the court said, teachers were punished for making public statements or other public communications on issues of public interest. In the current case, the court said, the teacher's statements did not come within the protection of the First Amendment.

In the California case, a superior-court judge ruled against an assistant professor of criminology whose name was removed from the tenure list after he was arrested twice on the same day during a confrontation at Berkeley's People's Park. Judge Robert J. Kroninger held that the assistant professor had failed to prove that he was denied tenure for exercising his rights to free speech. Judge Kroninger commented further:


"No freedom is absolute and even that which is 'free' has its price. We are free to criticize a friend's social manners, but we cannot be guaranteed continued friendship. A worker is free to tell his employer what he thinks of his business judgments but he should not count on a Christmas bonus.

"So also a nontenured contract professor in the University of California's Department of Criminology is free to demonstrate, express political beliefs and involve himself in controversial proposals for the restructuring of the local police department; but he should not be surprised if such matters are weighed in considering him for tenure.

"One has the almost absolute right to say what he pleases; but he does not have the right to require that everyone be pleased with what he says. . . .

"A contract teacher of astronomy is free to argue that the moon is pistachio ice cream, but if he is not offered tenure, is it because he exercised free speech or because his utterances raise doubts about his qualifications?

"The Constitutional right to talk nonsense does not include protection against being thought a fool. . . ."



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DON RUMSFELD
DICK CHENEY

FROM: BOB GOLDWIN *RG*

SUBJECT: School Desegregation



In his August 30, 1975, interview with WJAR-TV in Newport, R.I., the President stated that forced busing is not a way to achieve quality education for all students, including minority students. He called attention to the superior alternatives to busing established by Congress in the Education Amendments of 1974. The Education Amendments was the first major Bill signed by President Ford (PL 92-380, August 21, 1974). At its signing he said that Title II contained an "ordered and reasoned approach" to school desegregation. (A copy of Title II and a brief analysis are attached.)

Briefly, this Act requires that courts seek specific remedies for school discrimination less drastic than busing, wherever possible, and sets definite limits to busing.

Title II seems to be a significant instrument for improving the effectiveness of efforts to end discrimination in our schools, but for some reason most courts that have issued busing orders in the last year did so as if this law did not exist. (This is true, for instance, of the latest desegregation order for Omaha, which does not mention PL 92-380.) Perhaps there is some legal basis, unknown to me, that allows the courts to make this law inoperative, but if not, the courts are contravening the law and the express will of the Congress.

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I suggest that:

- 1) The President request the Office of the Counsel to the President and the Justice Department to give him an analysis of the applicability of Title II to current, court-ordered desegregation;
- 2) depending on the result of this analysis, the President again call the attention of the public, the press, the Congress, and especially the courts to the provisions of Title II.

Attachments



- b) Assigning students to the closest school taking into account only school capacities.
- c) Permitting students to transfer from a school in which a majority of the students are of their race to one in which a minority are of their race.
- d) Creating or revising attendance zones or grade structures without requiring transportation.
- e) Construction of new schools or closing of inferior schools.
- f) Establishment of magnet schools.

3. Section 215 (a) - Limits on Busing

This section rules out busing past the next nearest school as a remedy to correct violations:

No court, department of agency of the United States shall...order the implementation of a plan that would require the transportation of any student to a school other than the school closest or next closest to his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student.

4. Section 203 - Authority of the Courts

The prior provisions have been largely ignored by the courts. Section 203 (b) contains the only significant qualification of the otherwise unambiguous language of Title II:

...It is necessary and proper that the Congress... specify appropriate remedies for the elimination of the vestiges of dual school systems, except that the provisions of this title are not intended to modify or diminish the authority of the courts of the United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: ROBERT GOLDWIN
FROM: KIRK EMMERT *K.E.*
SUBJECT: Education Amendments (1974)



On August 12, 1975 President Ford signed the Education Amendments of 1974 (PL 92-380). In his accompanying statement the President said that this Bill contained

an ordered and reasoned approach to dealing with the remaining problems of segregation in our schools, but I regret that it lacks an effective provision for automatically re-evaluating existing court orders.

In Title II of the Education Amendments (1974) Congress dealt with the question of appropriate remedies for correcting unconstitutional discrimination in public education. Title II contains several provisions which are designed to redirect the course of school desegregation.

1. Section 213 - Specific Remedies

In formulating remedies, courts and government agencies shall impose only such remedies as "are essential to correct particular denials" of rights. (This section is meant to counter the tendency of the courts to order the racial balancing of a whole school district as a remedy to correct specific violations.)

2. Section 214 - Priority of Remedies

This section establishes a hierarchy or priority of remedies. The courts and other government agencies shall require the first of the following remedies, or the first combination of remedies, which would correct a denial of rights:

- a) Assigning students to schools closest to their homes, taking into account both school capacities and natural physical barriers.

OPEN MEETINGS OF EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES

Sec. 110. Title VIII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965⁴⁶ is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"OPEN MEETINGS OF EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES

"Sec. 812. No application for assistance under this Act may be considered unless the local educational agency making such application certifies to the Commissioner that members of the public have been afforded the opportunity upon reasonable notice to testify or otherwise comment regarding the subject matter of the application. The Commissioner is authorized and directed to establish such regulations as necessary to implement this section."

ETHNIC HERITAGE STUDIES CENTERS

Sec. 111. (a)(1) Section 907 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965⁴⁷ is amended by striking out "the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973" and inserting in lieu thereof "each of the fiscal years ending prior to July 1, 1978".

(2) The amendments made by this subsection shall be effective on and after July 1, 1973.

(b) Section 903 of such Act⁴⁸ is amended by—

(1) striking out "elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education" in clause (1) of such section, and inserting in lieu thereof "elementary or secondary schools or institutions of higher education";

(2) striking out "elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education" in clause (2) of such section and inserting in lieu thereof "elementary or secondary schools or institutions of higher education";

(3) inserting the word "or" after clause (1) of such section; and

(4) inserting the word "or" at the end of clause (2) of such section.

TITLE II—EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND
THE TRANSPORTATION OF STUDENTS

SHORT TITLE

Sec. 201. This title may be cited as the "Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974".

PART A—EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

Subpart 1—Policy and Purpose

DECLARATION OF POLICY

Sec. 202. (a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States that—

46. 20 U.S.C.A. § 881 et seq.
47. 20 U.S.C.A. § 900a-5.

48. 20 U.S.C.A. § 900a-1.



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(1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and

(2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school assignments.

(b) In order to carry out this policy, it is the purpose of this part to specify appropriate remedies for the orderly removal of the vestiges of the dual school system.

FINDINGS

Sec. 203. (a) The Congress finds that—

(1) the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to schools solely on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment;

(2) for the purpose of abolishing dual school systems and eliminating the vestiges thereof, many local educational agencies have been required to reorganize their school systems, to reassign students, and to engage in the extensive transportation of students;

(3) the implementation of desegregation plans that require extensive student transportation has, in many cases, required local educational agencies to expend large amount of funds, thereby depleting their financial resources available for the maintenance or improvement of the quality of educational facilities and instruction provided;

(4) transportation of students which creates serious risks to their health and safety, disrupts the educational process carried out with respect to such students, and impinges significantly on their educational opportunity, is excessive;

(5) the risks and harms created by excessive transportation are particularly great for children enrolled in the first six grades; and

(6) the guidelines provided by the courts for fashioning remedies to dismantle dual school systems have been, as the Supreme Court of the United States has said, "incomplete and imperfect," and have not established a clear, rational, and uniform standard for determining the extent to which a local educational agency is required to reassign and transport its students in order to eliminate the vestiges of a dual school system.

(b) For the foregoing reasons, it is necessary and proper that the Congress, pursuant to the powers granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, specify appropriate remedies for the elimination of the vestiges of dual school systems, except that the provisions of this title are not intended to modify or diminish the authority of the courts of the United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Subpart 2—Unlawful Practices

DENIAL OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY PROHIBITED

Sec. 204. No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by—

(a) the deliberate segregation by an educational agency of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin among or within schools;

(b) the failure of an educational agency which has formerly practiced such deliberate segregation to take affirmative steps, consistent with subpart 4 of this title, to remove the vestiges of a dual school system;

(c) the assignment by an educational agency of a student to a school, other than the one closest to his or her place of residence within the school district in which he or she resides, if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation of students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin among the schools of such agency than would result if such student were assigned to the school closest to his or her place of residence within the school district of such agency providing the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student;

(d) discrimination by an educational agency on the basis of race, color, or national origin in the employment, employment conditions, or assignment to schools of its faculty or staff, except to fulfill the purposes of subsection (f) below;

(e) the transfer by an educational agency, whether voluntary or otherwise, of a student from one school to another if the purpose and effect of such transfer is to increase segregation of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin among the schools of such agency; or

(f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs.

BALANCE NOT REQUIRED

Sec. 205. The failure of an educational agency to attain a balance, on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin, of students among its schools shall not constitute a denial of equal educational opportunity, or equal protection of the laws.

ASSIGNMENT OF NEIGHBORHOOD BASIS NOT A DENIAL OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Sec. 206. Subject to the other provisions of this part, the assignment by an educational agency of a student to the school nearest his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student is not a denial of equal educational opportunity or of equal protection of the laws unless such assignment is for the purpose of segregating students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin, or the school to which such

student is assigned was located on its site for the purpose of segregating students on such basis.

Subpart 3—Enforcement

CIVIL ACTIONS

Sec. 207. An individual denied an equal educational opportunity, as defined by this part may institute a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States against such parties, and for such relief, as may be appropriate. The Attorney General of the United States (hereinafter in this title referred to as the "Attorney General"), for or in the name of the United States, may also institute such a civil action on behalf of such an individual.

EFFECT OF CERTAIN POPULATION CHANGES ON CERTAIN ACTIONS

Sec. 208. When a court of competent jurisdiction determines that a school system is desegregated, or that it meets the constitutional requirements, or that it is a unitary system, or that it has no vestiges of a dual system, and thereafter residential shifts in population occur which result in school population changes in any school within such a desegregated school system, such school population changes so occurring shall not, per se, constitute a cause for civil action for a new plan of desegregation or for modification of the court approved plan.

JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS

Sec. 209. The appropriate district court of the United States shall have and exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted under section 207.

INTERVENTION BY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Sec. 210. Whenever a civil action is instituted under section 207 by an individual, the Attorney General may intervene in such action upon timely application.

SUITS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Sec. 211. The Attorney General shall not institute a civil action under section 207 before he—

(a) gives to the appropriate educational agency notice of the condition or conditions which, in his judgment, constitute a violation of subpart 2 of this part; and

(b) certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that he is satisfied that such educational agency has not, within a reasonable time after such notice, undertaken appropriate remedial action.

Subpart 4—Remedies

FORMULATING REMEDIES; APPLICABILITY

Sec. 213. In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity or a denial of the equal protection of the laws, a court, department, or agency of the United States shall seek or

impose only such remedies as are essential to correct particular denials of equal educational opportunity or equal protection of the laws.

PRIORITY OF REMEDIES

Sec. 214. In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity or a denial of the equal protection of the laws, which may involve directly or indirectly the transportation of students, a court, department, or agency of the United States shall consider and make specific findings on the efficacy in correcting such denial of the following remedies and shall require implementation of the first of the remedies set out below, or of the first combination thereof which would remedy such denial:

(a) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence which provide the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students, taking into account school capacities and natural physical barriers;

(b) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence which provide the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students, taking into account only school capacities;

(c) permitting students to transfer from a school in which a majority of the students are of their race, color, or national origin to a school in which a minority of the students are of their race, color, or national origin;

(d) the creation or revision of attendance zones or grade structures without requiring transportation beyond that described in section 215;

(e) the construction of new schools or the closing of inferior schools;

(f) the construction or establishment of magnet schools; or

(g) the development and implementation of any other plan which is educationally sound and administratively feasible, subject to the provisions of sections 215 and 216 of this part.

TRANSPORTATION OF STUDENTS

Sec. 215. (a) No court, department, or agency of the United States shall, pursuant to section 214, order the implementation of a plan that would require the transportation of any student to a school other than the school closest or next closest to his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student.

(b) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence which require directly or indirectly the transportation of any student if such transportation poses a risk to the health of such student or constitutes a significant impingement on the educational process with respect to such student.

(c) When a court of competent jurisdiction determines that a school system is desegregated, or that it meets the constitutional requirements, or that it is a unitary system, or that it has no vestiges



of a dual system, and thereafter residential shifts in population occur which result in school population changes in any school within such a desegregated school system, no educational agency because of such shifts shall be required by any court, department, or agency of the United States to formulate, or implement any new desegregation plan, or modify or implement any modification of the court approved desegregation plan, which would require transportation of students to compensate wholly or in part for such shifts in school population so occurring.

DISTRICT LINES

Sec. 216. In the formulation of remedies under section 213 or 214 of this part the lines drawn by a State, subdividing its territory into separate school districts, shall not be ignored or altered except where it is established that the lines were drawn for the purpose, and had the effect, of segregating children among public schools on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.

VOLUNTARY ADOPTION OF REMEDIES

Sec. 217. Nothing in this part prohibits an educational agency from proposing, adopting, requiring, or implementing any plan of desegregation, otherwise lawful, that is at variance with the standards set out in this part nor shall any court, department, or agency of the United States be prohibited from approving implementation of a plan which goes beyond what can be required under this part, if such plan is voluntarily proposed by the appropriate educational agency.

REOPENING PROCEEDINGS

Sec. 218. A parent or guardian of a child, or parents or guardians of children similarly situated, transported to a public school in accordance with a court order, or an educational agency subject to a court order or a desegregation plan under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in effect on the date of the enactment of this part and intended to end segregation of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin, may seek to reopen or intervene in the further implementation of such court order, currently in effect, if the time or distance of travel is so great as to risk the health of the student or significantly impinge on his or her educational process.

LIMITATION ON ORDERS

Sec. 219. Any court order requiring, directly or indirectly, the transportation of students for the purpose of remedying a denial of the equal protection of the laws may, to the extent of such transportation, be terminated if the court finds the defendant educational agency has satisfied the requirements of the fifth or fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, whichever is applicable, and will continue to be in compliance with the requirements thereof. The court of initial jurisdiction shall state in its order the basis for any decision to terminate an order pursuant to this section, and the ter-

mination of any order pursuant to this section shall be stayed pending a final appeal or, in the event no appeal is taken, until the time for any such appeal has expired. No additional order requiring such educational agency to transport students for such purpose shall be entered unless such agency is found not to have satisfied the requirements of the fifth or fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, whichever is applicable.

Subpart 5--Definitions

Sec. 221. For the purposes of this part--

(a) The term "educational agency" means a local educational agency or a "State educational agency" as defined by section 801(k) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.⁴⁹

(b) The term "local educational agency" means a local educational agency as defined by section 801(f) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.⁵⁰

(c) The term "segregation" means the operation of a school system in which students are wholly or substantially separated among the schools of an educational agency on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin or within a school on the basis of race, color, or national origin.

(d) The term "desegregation" means desegregation as defined by section 401(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.⁵¹

(e) An educational agency shall be deemed to transport a student if any part of the cost of such student's transportation is paid by such agency.

Subpart 6--Miscellaneous Provisions

REPEALER

Sec. 222. Section 709(a)(3) of the Emergency School Aid Act⁵² is hereby repealed.

SEPARABILITY OF PROVISIONS

Sec. 223. If any provision of this part or of any amendment made by this part, or the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the provisions of this part and of the amendments made by this part and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

49. 20 U.S.C.A. § 881(k).
50. 20 U.S.C.A. § 881(f).

51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c(b).
52. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a)(3).

APPLICATION OF PROVISIO OF SECTION 407(a) OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 TO THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES

Sec. 255. The proviso of section 407(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964⁵⁴ providing in substance that no court or official of the United States shall be empowered to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or one school district to another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional standards shall apply to all public school pupils and to every public school system, public school and public school board, as defined by title IV, under all circumstances and conditions and at all times in every State, district, territory, Commonwealth, or possession of the United States, regardless of whether the residence of such public school pupils or the principal offices of such public school system, public school or public school board is situated in the northern, eastern, western, or southern part of the United States.

ADDITIONAL PRIORITY OF REMEDIES

Sec. 256. Notwithstanding any provision of law, after June 30, 1974 no court of the United States shall order the implementation of any plan to remedy a finding of de jure segregation which involves the transportation of students, unless the court first finds that all alternative remedies are inadequate.

REMEDIES WITH RESPECT TO SCHOOL DISTRICT LINES

Sec. 257. In the formulation of remedies under this title the lines drawn by a State subdividing its territory into separate school districts, shall not be ignored or altered except where it is established that the lines were drawn, or maintained or crossed for the purpose, and had the effect of segregating children among public schools on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin, or where it is established that, as a result of discriminatory actions within the school districts, the lines have had the effect of segregating children among public schools on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.

PROHIBITION OF FORCED BUSING DURING SCHOOL YEAR

Sec. 258. (a) The Congress finds that--

- (1) the forced transportation of elementary and secondary school students in implementation of the constitutional requirement for the desegregation of such schools is controversial and difficult under the best planning and administration; and
- (2) the forced transportation of elementary and secondary school students after the commencement of an academic school year is educationally unsound and administratively inefficient.

54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c-6(a).

(b) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, no order of a court, department, or agency of the United States, requiring the transportation of any student incident to the transfer of that student from one elementary or secondary school to another such school in a local educational agency pursuant to a plan requiring such transportation for the racial desegregation of any school in that agency, shall be effective until the beginning of an academic school year.

(c) For the purpose of this section, the term "academic school year" means, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Commissioner, the customary beginning of classes for the school year at an elementary or secondary school of a local educational agency for a school year that occurs not more often than once in any twelve-month period.

(d) The provisions of this section apply to any order which was not implemented at the beginning of the 1974-1975 academic year.

REASONABLE TIME FOR DEVELOPING VOLUNTARY PLAN
FOR DESEGREGATING SCHOOLS

Sec. 259. Notwithstanding any other law or provision of law, no court or officer of the United States shall enter, as a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity or a denial of equal protection of the laws, any order for enforcement of a plan of desegregation or modification of a court-approved plan, until such time as the local educational agency to be affected by such order has been provided notice of the details of the violation and given a reasonable opportunity to develop a voluntary remedial plan. Such time shall permit the local educational agency sufficient opportunity for community participation in the development of a remedial plan.

TITLE III—FEDERAL IMPACT AID PROGRAMS

DURATION OF PAYMENTS UNDER PUBLIC LAW 815,
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

Sec. 301. (a)(1) The first sentence of section 3 of the Act of September 23, 1950 (Public Law 815, Eighty-first Congress)⁵⁵ is amended by striking out "June 30, 1973" and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1978".

(2) Section 15(15) of such Act⁵⁶ is amended by striking out "1968-1969" and inserting in lieu thereof "1973-1974".

(b) Section 16(a) of such Act⁵⁷ is amended in clause (1)(A) thereof, by striking out "July 1, 1973" and inserting in lieu thereof "July 1, 1978".

(c) The amendments made by this section shall be effective on and after July 1, 1973.

55. 20 U.S.C.A. § 633.
56. 20 U.S.C.A. § 645(15).

57. 20 U.S.C.A. § 646(a)(1)(A).

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO: DON RUMSFELD
DICK CHENEY
ALAN GREENSPAN
BILL SIMON
BILL SEIDMAN
JIM CANNON
JIM LYNN
PAUL O'NEILL
JERRY JONES

FROM: BOB GOLDWIN

rag

I share with you this communication from Professor Milton Friedman ("the real Milton Friedman").

Attachment

9/25/75



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

1126 EAST 59TH STREET
CHICAGO • ILLINOIS 60637

September 22, 1975

Mr. Robert A. Goldwin
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bob:


I enclose herewith a brief guest opinion that I gave on the CBS Morning News recently. I use it as an occasion to express my dismay that the Administration has not seized on inflation-proofing the tax system as a major element of its economic policy.

Inflation-proofing the tax system is one of those rare proposals that is desirable and politically popular.

It is desirable:

- (1) *on grounds of equity.* Under present arrangements, inflation automatically alters the tax structure in ways that nobody intended and few favor. I do not believe that any Congress would at any time have explicitly enacted as heavy an income tax on low and middle incomes as we now in fact have.
- (2) *on grounds of fiscal responsibility.* Inflation enables Congress to have the appearance of lowering taxes while in fact the real tax burden rises. Inflation now automatically provides additional revenue to finance congressional extravagance. No single measure could do so much so readily to slow down future government spending as inflation-proofing the tax system. The bureaucrats at the Treasury (though not the Secretary) will object to the future loss of revenue. But that is shortsighted on two grounds: first, the revenue will be more than eaten up by additional spending; second, as inflation proceeds, it ultimately has a perverse effect on revenue adjusted for inflation, as is happening now in Britain.
- (3) *on grounds of promoting capital formation.* Business has a valid complaint that present methods of taxation in effect tax capital by making insufficient allowance for depreciation during times of inflation. The best way to remedy this defect is not by measures directed specifically at "aiding" business but by a general reform of the tax system that eliminates this effect of inflation for everyone: individual taxpayers, small business, large business.

Inflation-proofing the tax system would, I believe, be highly popular politically:



Mr. Robert A. Goldwin
Page 2


- (1) *on grounds of equity.* The ordinary man is confused and resentful about inflation. He knows that he has to run faster and faster to stay in the same place. But he does not fully understand why. He would welcome being protected against inflation at least with respect to taxes.
- (2) *as a means of checking the growth of government.* There is, I believe, an enormous undercurrent of popular sentiment against further expansion in the size of government. Yet it is difficult to exploit this sentiment by proposals with respect to individual spending measures. It is much more effective to do so by proposals that attack the aggregate sum which the government has available to spend.
- (3) *as a sound money measure.* Note that Senator Buckley and Representative Crane have led groups in the Senate and the House that have introduced bills to inflation-proof the tax system.
- (4) *as an anti-inflationary measure.* Inflation-proofing the tax system would reduce the advantage to the government from inflation and hence could be expected to strengthen the will of the government to end it.

From the special vantage point of the Executive, the proposal to inflation-proof the tax system has some particular political advantages:

- (1) It would be an act of the Executive to require Congress to be fiscally responsible, to vote higher taxes explicitly rather than permitting or promoting inflation as a way of paying for extra expenditures.
- (2) If started for the base year 1976 it would involve *no* current loss of revenue, but yet would be viewed by the public as a measure reducing taxes.
- (3) It is not a novel, untried, or irresponsible measure. It has been adopted by Canada, a number of European countries, and several in South America. It is favored by ~~the~~ economists on the right and by ~~the~~ economists on the left.
- (4) It would appeal to both business and the working man.

Best personal wishes and regards.

Cordially yours,



Milton Friedman



MF:gv

Enclosure

Milton Friedman
September 6, 1975

Congressional Salaries and Taxes


CBS COMMENTARY FOR SEPTEMBER
(Broadcast on September 10, 1975)

BEFORE LEAVING FOR THEIR AUGUST RECESS, THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOUND TIME TO GIVE THEMSELVES, AS WELL AS OTHER HIGH GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS, A NICE SALARY INCREASE. IN ADDITION, TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY AT LEAST WOULD NOT SUFFER FROM THE INFLATION THAT THEY PRODUCE, THEY PROVIDED FOR AUTOMATIC FUTURE INCREASES IN SALARY TO KEEP UP WITH THE COST OF LIVING.

NOW THAT CONGRESS HAS TAKEN CARE OF ITSELF, IT WOULD BE NICE IF IT COULD SPARE A LITTLE TIME TO CONSIDER THE TAXPAYER. HE TOO NEEDS A COST-OF-LIVING ESCALATOR CLAUSE. AS MATTERS NOW STAND, INFLATION AUTOMATICALLY RAISES TAXES DISPROPORTIONATELY. IF PRICES GO UP BY 10 PER CENT, AND YOUR DOLLAR INCOME GOES UP BY 10 PER CENT, YOU MIGHT SUPPOSE THAT THAT WOULD BE A STAND OFF. BUT IT WILL NOT BE. THANKS TO TAX LAWS WRITTEN FOR A WORLD OF STABLE PRICES, YOUR TAXES WILL, ON THE AVERAGE, GO UP BY ABOUT 15 PER CENT. YOU HAVE TO RUN FASTER AND FASTER JUST TO STAY IN THE SAME PLACE.

THERE IS NO TECHNICAL PROBLEM IN INFLATION-PROOFING THE TAX SYSTEM. MANY EXPERTS HAVE SHOWN PRECISELY HOW TO DO IT.

BUT THERE IS A POLITICAL PROBLEM. NOW THAT THEIR SALARIES ARE PROTECTED AGAINST INFLATION, WHY SHOULD CONGRESSMEN WORRY ABOUT THE TAXPAYER? QUITE THE OPPOSITE. INFLATION INCREASES TAXES TO FINANCE HIGHER CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES--WITHOUT ANY CONGRESSMAN HAVING TO VOTE FOR HIGHER TAXES! INDEED, HE CAN EVEN VOTE TO CUT TAXES--WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PERMITTING INFLATION TO RAISE THEM! CAN YOU REALLY EXPECT CONGRESSMEN TO KILL THE GOOSE THAT IS LAYING THOSE PAPER EGGS? NOT UNLESS YOU MAKE THEIR JOBS DEPEND ON THEIR DOING SO.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO

DON RUMSFELD
MIKE DUVAL
DICK CHENEY
DAVE LISSY
JIM CAVANAUGH
PAUL O'NEILL

FROM:

BOB GOLDWIN *RG*

This article from The Public Interest is of unusual interest, especially the factual analysis contained on page 4.

9/25/75

*"Ligon Work, not Welfare"
Nathan Ploz from
The Public Interest*



September 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DON RUMSFELD
FROM: BOB GOLDWIN
SUBJECT: Trust and Mistrust

As I listened to your discussion with Dick Heffner on the Open Mind I had the thought that twenty minutes on the subject of trust is not good balance, misrepresents you as too much of a do-gooder, and puts you in the unfortunate position of sounding a bit like a preacher.

The same argument would be transformed if combined with an argument on the role of mistrust in the American system. The key would be this quotation from a letter by Thomas Jefferson:

"Some people say we must trust officials of government. I say that we must not trust them, but bind them down with the cords of the Constitution."

We can discuss this when we meet at 11 a.m. on Friday, September 12, if you are interested.



"Some people say we must trust officials of government. I say that we must not trust them, but bind them down with the cords of the Constitution."

---Jefferson



October 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
RICHARD CHENEY

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

This letter was cleared through the Domestic Council and was sent out yesterday from Jim Connor's office.

Is any use of it contemplated? Will it be made public? Should it be used to let the Office of Education, National Institute of Education, Justice Department and others know what the President's position is on these issues? This letter breaks new ground and they may not know where the President stands unless they are informed.

RAG:kt
Attachment



October 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
THROUGH: RICHARD CHENEY
FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

If you think I can be of use to the President on his forthcoming foreign trips, I would be more than pleased to go--but no otherwise.



October 17, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
THROUGH: RICHARD CHENEY
FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

I received a letter from a professor friend in New York suggesting what might be done to change not what the President says to the people of New York City but how he will say it.

He made the following arguments and assertions:

--Many years before the McGovern campaign, Lindsay had polarized the people of New York City.

--Lindsay was re-elected in 1969 by splitting the opposition; 60% of the votes were for his opponents.

--Thanks to Lindsay, reinforced by McGovern, most New Yorkers are middle Americans of the George Meany variety.

--This means that their views are not those of the New York Times and the Washington Post.

--Failure to realize this fact caused President Nixon to be surprised at the spontaneous loyalty parade staged by the hard-hats in opposition to the Vietnam demonstrations.

My professor friend recommends that someone do a brief and accurate report on the political complexion of New York City today, as contrasted to the political attitudes of the New York press. In particular, the report should describe the last mayoralty campaign, the primaries that preceded it, whom the New York Times supported and what the voters actually did.

The objective would be to get guidance on the best way to address the people of New York City about their problems and their relationship to the Federal government. Is this something that Foster Chenick could be asked to do?



Dear Bob:

The following makes a suggestion that something be done which might influence not what the President will say to New York City but how he will say it.

People who have not been close to events in New York City in recent years often have an inaccurate notion of the present political complexion of its inhabitants. It is not widely known that, many years before McGovern, Lindsay had polarized the people of New York in the way McGovern was later to do, and that the majority of New Yorkers were opposed to Lindsay's "limousine liberalism." Lindsay was re-elected despite the opposition of almost 60% of the voters in 1969 because he split the opposition. In 1973 New Yorkers were finally able to get rid of him. Thanks to Lindsay, most New Yorkers are middle Americans of the George Meany variety, i.e., their views are not those of the New York Times and the Washington Post. Failure to appreciate this fact led Nixon to be surprised at the spontaneous loyalty parade staged by the hard-hats at the height of the Vietnam demonstrations.

Someone on the President's staff should do a brief and accurate report on the political complexion of New York City today. (In particular, he should describe the last mayoralty campaign, the primaries that preceded it, whom the paper supported, and what the voters did.)

NY Times

Cordially yours,

s/ Hilail



QUEENS COLLEGE
of THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
FLUSHING • NEW YORK 11367

LIBERAL ARTS INSTITUTE

TELEPHONE: 212-520-7438



Dear Bob,

The following makes a suggestion that something be done which might influence not what the President will say to New York City but how he will say it.

People who have not been close to events in New York City in recent years often have an inaccurate notion of the present political complexion of its inhabitants. It is not widely known that, many years before McGovern, Lindsay had polarized the people of New York in the way McGovern was later to do, and that the majority of New Yorkers were opposed to Lindsay's "insouciant liberalism." Lindsay was re-elected despite the opposition of almost 60% of the voters in 1969 because he split the opposition. In 1973 New Yorkers were finally able to get rid of him. Thanks to Lindsay, most New Yorkers are middle Americans of the George Meany variety, i.e., their views are not those

of the N.Y. Times and the Washington Post. Failure to appreciate this fact led Nixon to be surprised at the spontaneous loyalty parade staged by the hard-hats at the height of the Vietnam demonstrations.

Someone on the President's staff should do a brief and accurate report on the political complexion of New York City today. (In particular, he should describe the last mayoralty campaign, the primaries that preceded it, whom the papers supported, and what the voters did.)

Cordially yours,
Richard
Gilden

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
RICHARD CHENEY

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

RG

In case you missed it.

Attachment - "On Closing Harley's Bar"
10/16/75

10/21/75



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
RICHARD CHENEY
JERRY JONES
JAMES CONNOR
WILLIAM SIMON
JAMES LYNN
PAUL O'NEILL
ALAN GREENSPAN
JAMES CAVANAUGH

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

RG

This amusing account of attitudes of some young people toward transfer programs cannot be relied on fully for factual precision. But it is instructive.

Attachment -

*Learning to think Right
in the Welfare State
(Printed sent)*

10/21/75



October 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
THROUGH: RICHARD CHENEY
FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

Pat Moynihan called to tell me that John Brademas has asked him to testify before his subcommittee on select education on the question of extending the life of the National Institute of Education. You probably are aware that Moynihan is the "father" of NIE. He wants to know whether the White House has any objection to his testifying. Moynihan himself has no objection.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO:

DON RUMSFELD
DICK CHENEY

FROM:

BOB GOLDWIN *BWG*


SUBJECT:

Busing letter

We put a lot of effort into the letter on busing sent to Dr. Lonnie Johnson. I am told that he and his colleagues of the African Methodist Episcopalian Church were pleased with its responsiveness and that it was circulated to the Bishops of the AME Church. But to the best of my knowledge, it has not reached the ear of the public.

I recommend that we consider releasing the relevant portions of that letter to the media.

To the best of my knowledge, no one in the government outside of the White House has seen the letter or knows its contents.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO:

DON RUMSFELD
DICK CHENEY
JERRY JONES
JIM CONNOR
JIM CAVANAUGH
JAMES LYNN
ALAN GREENSPAN

FROM:

BOB GOLDWIN *BWG*

In case you missed this Newsweek article.
Polsby is one of the best political scientists.
This page is brief but instructive.

Attachment



Nelson W. Polsby



What Do The Voters Really Want?

About a dozen people in the last couple of weeks have come up to me and said, "You're a political scientist. Who's going to be the Democratic nominee for 1976?" My last interrogator was a former high official of the Democratic Party, somebody better plugged in than I ever hope to be to the latest word from Washington. Getting the standard question from him really puzzled me. Do meteorologists visit gypsy tearooms?

I suppose the quickest way to dispel the notion that, as a political scientist, I have some hot line to the future of American politics would be to give a quick and authoritative answer when the question is posed. Like: "I don't know."

There would be a grain of truth in that response; things are moving around in a pretty confusing way these days, what with the new laws restricting campaign expenditures, providing a Federal subsidy for primary campaigns of candidates who qualify ahead of time, dividing state convention delegates proportionally or by districts, and so on. One of the Democratic hopefuls (Morris Udall, the tall one) complained: "How can I tell you my game plan when they're still mimeographing the rules?"

INTELLIGENT HANDICAPPING

Until things shake down a little more, a political scientist can't do very intelligent handicapping; neither can anybody else, of course, and that, I suppose, is what provokes the questions. But while we can't say who is going to win, there are some things a political scientist can say about what, in general, is happening to the political system that ought to interest political leaders and activists as they get ready to get ready for the Presidential sweepstakes of 1976. And for that we can turn to the public-opinion surveys that have been churning out with some regularity since the 1940s.

Recent summaries of some of these surveys, by able scholars like Jack Dennis of the University of Wisconsin and Norman Nie of the University of Chicago, have turned up some fascinating findings about public support for American political parties.

■ The number of people who can distin-

guish between the parties on ideological grounds, who say that which party gets elected makes a difference, is *up*.

■ But the number of people is also *up* who don't mind seeing divided government, with Congress and the Presidency controlled by different parties.

■ The number of people who say that the parties don't care what they think and don't respond to popular control is *up*.

■ But the number of political activists, people who volunteer time or give money to the party of their choice, is also *up*.

■ The number of people who pay attention to political issues has gone *up*, roughly during the same period that dissatisfaction with political parties has increased.

OFF THE SCENT

I think it is this last finding that has thrown everybody off the scent and caused a lot of bad mistakes in the calculations of political leaders. If dissatisfaction with parties increases as people become more and more attentive to issues, it's because the parties aren't issue-oriented enough, right? Well, maybe not. I don't know of any cleanly definitive test of the proposition, but what the findings above seem to me to add up to is just the opposite conclusion—that as parties become more ideological and issue-oriented, they become more attractive to a certain stratum of activists, but they turn off most people. Many voters correctly perceive that when parties become more issue-oriented, which party wins makes more of a difference. Under these circumstances, they trust the parties less and welcome divided government, where there is a chance for moderation, if not stalemate.

If moderation is what the voters are after, why don't the parties try to give it to them? The answer seems to be that activists who actually run the parties are far less moderate about politics than ordinary people. For each major party, the results are a little different. The Republicans are more and more the minority party in this country, claiming the loyalty of less than one voter in five. They do have an asset in an incumbent President who could

shape his image in a moderate direction, if he cared to. Yet he is under the severest sort of pressure from within the party to dump his middle-of-the-road Vice President and substitute a right-wing militant as his running mate for 1976.

The Democrats, meanwhile, have concocted an obstacle course for their prospective nominees that would try the stamina of an ox. The combination of Federal subsidies for primary campaigns and an enormous number of be-kind-to-losers primaries, where nearly everybody stands to gain some delegates, means that party activists will have a picnic next year, administering ideological loyalty oaths in state after state and sending hordes of candidate- and issue-but not party-oriented delegates to the national convention. The paradoxical result of "opening up" the Presidential nomination process in the Democratic Party has been to make the party more responsive to enthusiasts for particular candidates, but far less responsive to people who care about winning elections. Democrats, being the party of choice for about 40 per cent of Americans, have to swallow far more poison than Republicans in order to commit suicide. But who can look at the record of 1968 and 1972 and doubt that in a pinch they can bring it off?

SOUR ON POLITICS

As party activists unlimber their battle cries—recollections of "A choice, not an echo" and "In your heart you know he's right"—the rest of us go a little sour on politics. This, at any rate, is what the public-opinion surveys appear to be telling us. And it is affecting popular attitudes not only toward each of the major political parties and their candidates, but also toward the party system.

Nelson W. Polsby is professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, and author of "Political Promises" and, with Aaron Wildavsky, "Presidential Elections."

October 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DON RUMSFELD
DICK CHENEY
JERRY JONES
JIM CONNOR
JIM CAVANAUGH
JAMES LYNE
ALAN GREENSPAN

FROM: BOB GOLDWIN

In case you missed this Newsweek article.
Folsby is one of the best political scientists.
This page is brief but instructive.

Attachment



October 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DON RUMSFELD
THROUGH: DICK CHENEY
FROM: BOB GOLDWIN

I recommend that the "school opening" speech (copy attached), written with the intention of being given late in August, be looked at again for possible delivery now, or very soon.

Changes would have to be made in the opening paragraphs, but the greatest part of the draft, which the President liked very much, seems as appropriate now as in August. In a conversation the other day, Robert Bork said he thinks the timing would be better now than in August.

Consideration should be given to adding to the speech a proposal of some significant action. Possibilities could include a Presidential Commission to study alternatives, or asking the Secretary of HEW to have the Office of Education and the National Institute of Education look into the questions raised in Ambassador Moyuahan's memo to the President and the Attorney General to suggest legal alternatives.

The thrust of the argument would be as follows: The Supreme Court has ruled that segregated public schools are unconstitutional, and everybody—including the President—is pledged to that principle. The courts have ever since sought means to bring about the goal of desegregation, and busing was intended to be one of those means. But court-ordered busing is working badly. (See attached news clippings.) Increasingly, it is showing itself to be counter-productive and disruptive; it is not giving us desegregation and



better schools, but rather is increasing the separation of citizens and students on the basis of race, and is disrupting the educational processes in major cities. If the courts called a halt to ordering busing, that in itself would be a beneficial step. But then the next necessary step would have to be to seek more effective and less disruptive methods of desegregating and, simultaneously, improving the schools. Study is needed, now, to absorb the best research of recent years, and that is what the President is calling for.

I recommend that the draft of the August speech be given to Bob Hartmann, that the President discuss it with him to indicate how he wants it to be revised and also to get the benefit of Bob's views on what can and should be done with it, and that then the writing task go forward under his supervision, as in the case of any other major presidential speech.

Attachments



October 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DON RUMSFELD
THROUGH: DICK CHENEY
FROM: BOB GOLDWIN

Here is a copy of my comments on a memo
by Dick Parsons, suggesting a meeting on
the subject of school and desegregation.

Attachment



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1975

FOR: ROBERT GOLDWIN
FROM: LEE GOODELL

Mr. Rumsfeld has acknowledged the attached letter and it has been referred in the normal procedure to the Scheduling Office.

However, Mr. Rumsfeld would like your views on the merit of the suggestions and/or your suggestions.

This is an excellent idea.
The Durants really deserve
high honors.

One precaution: they should
be invited in without an entourage
so that the publishers don't turn
it into a promotional stunt.

Let it be the President paying
personal tribute to two great
Americans.

RAG

[en 11/1/75]

ACCORDING TO the postal news-
letter Post Age, Donald Rumsfeld,
who is President Ford's top assist-
ant, made a poor impression when he
addressed the Magazine Publishers
Association in Williamsburg.

Not only was Rumsfeld's speech
dull, but he was unprepared in the
question-and-answer period to an-
swer queries about postal problems.
As a result, many of the publishers
were reported affronted and unhap-
py.

In fact, when Russell Baker, the
New York Times humor columnist,
appeared at the same podium, he
opened his remarks by referring to
the "Donald Rumsfeld Memorial
Podium." The quip was greeted with
cheers and laughter.

* * * * *

Star 11/1

11/4/75
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NOVEMBER 3, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSEBIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON
DONALD RUMSFELD

Donald Rumsfeld was appointed Assistant to the President by President Ford in September 1974. In this capacity, he serves as a member of the Cabinet, Director of the White House Office of Operations, and Coordinator of the White House Staff. Previously, he headed President Ford's transition team in August of 1974.

Mr. Rumsfeld was born on July 9, 1932 in Chicago, Illinois. He received a B.A. in Politics from Princeton University in 1954. He served in the U.S. Navy as a naval aviator from 1954-1957.

Mr. Rumsfeld became active in government in 1958 when he worked as Administrative Assistant to Congressman Dave Dennison of Ohio. In 1959, he became a Staff Assistant to then Congressman Robert Griffin of Michigan. From 1960 to 1962, he was with the Chicago investment banking firm of A. G. Becker and Company.

In 1962, he was elected to the United States House of Representatives from the Thirteenth District of Illinois to serve in the Eighty-Eighth Congress. He was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968. In the Congress, he served on the Joint Economic Committee, the Committee on Science and Aeronautics, and the Government Operations Committee, and the Subcommittees on Military and Foreign Operations. He was also a co-founder of the Japanese-American Inter-Parliamentary Council.

In 1969, he resigned his seat in the House to join the Cabinet as an Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. In December of 1970, he was named Counsellor to the President and in October 1971, he was appointed Director of the Cost of Living Council.

Mr. Rumsfeld was named United States Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in February 1973. He served as the United States' Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group. In this responsibility, he represented the United States on a wide range of military and diplomatic matters.

Mr. Rumsfeld has received honorary degrees in law from Park College (Mo.); Lake Forest College (Ill.), and Illinois College (Ill.). Additional awards include the Opportunities Industrial Center's Executive Government Award and the Distinguished Eagle Scout Award.

Mr. Rumsfeld was married to the former Joyce Pierson of Wilmette, Illinois in 1954. They have two daughters, Valerie (19) and Marcy (15), and a son, Nicholas (8).

#



December 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Here is the set of materials I prepared for your confirmation hearings and which are still usable because you used them very little or not at all in the hearings.

The different parts are numbered and there is a table of contents in front.

I leave for Arizona Thursday morning, but my office will know how to find me if you need to reach me.

Robert A. Goldwin
Special Consultant to
the President

Attachment



January 26, 1976

Dear Don:

In case you haven't seen it, the latest State Department promotion list contains the names of Gerald B. Helman and Stephen J. Ledogar to FSO-2, and Ralph R. Moore to FSO-3. Mark Lissfeldt (still in Luns' office) is also on the list to FSO-3.

You may recall the conventional view that USNATO had a poor record as service leading to promotion. If I am not mistaken, just about everyone who served under you was promoted last year or this year. If the "jinx" ever existed, it has been broken.

I thought you would be pleased to know.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Goldwin
Special Consultant to
the President

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301


January 29, 1976

Dr. Robert A. Goldwin
Room 170
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bob:

Thank you for calling my attention to the State Department promotion list this year. It is a good record and they were all well deserved.

Regards,



Donald H. Rumsfeld



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

G

2/6

RG:

You are invited for lunch on Monday
with Secretary Rumsfeld and SYG Luns.

Schedule: 11:45 - Honors Ceremony,
River Entrance

12:00 - Lunch, Secretary's
Dining Room

1:30 - W.H. Car at River
Entrance

Attendees: Sec'y Rumsfeld, Donald
SYG Luns, Joseph
Paul Van Campen
Ms. Borgman-Brower
Mr. Clements, William P.
Mr. Ellsworth, Robert
Gen. Brown, George S.
Samuel Cong. Stratton (D, NY)
Bob Cong. Wilson (R, Cal.)
Paul Cong. Findley (R, Ill.)
Delbert Cong. Latta (R, Ohio)
and, possibly, two or three others.

Joe Jordan, ISA
RADM Holcomb (DR's Mil. Ass't)
Staser JK replaces Gen. Wickam



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/4/76

RG:

SYG Luns' Washington Schedule

Sunday, Feb. 8

Lunch hosted by Amb. Bruce at his home

P.M. - appointments with the Ambassadors of Iran and Great Britain

Monday, Feb. 9

1000 - Interview Air Force Ass't Sec'y Leberge for position
of ASG for Defense Support

1100 - Fred Ikle, ACDA

1200 - DOD lunch hosted by Sec'y Rumsfeld

1330 - Joe Jordan, DOD/ISA

1400 - Gen. Brown, JCS

1500 - Sonnenfeldt

Tuesday, Feb. 10

1030 - Sisco

1145 - Arthur Hartman

1230 - Kissinger

1300 - Lunch hosted by Kissinger

1500 - President Ford

1700 - Leave for Brussels



[Handwritten signature]

[2/11/76]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: Don Rumsfeld

FROM: Robert A. Goldwin Bob

COMMENTS:

The President used a
version of the first sen-
tence, and nothing else
from this draft.

I bequeath it to
you since the theme is
a strong America.



Revised

Among the many gifts of greatness of Abraham Lincoln, foremost was his ability to find deep meaning in events of the moment, ~~and then express it clearly and memorably.~~

When a crowd of well-wishers gathered to congratulate him for his election victory in 1864, he responded by congratulating all of the people for daring to hold an election in the midst of the Civil War.

"It has long been a grave question," Lincoln said on that occasion, "whether any government not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough to maintain



its own existence."

President Lincoln thought that the actions of the people had answered the question: political freedom and the national will to survive had been proven to be compatible.

But the old question remains for us today, in both aspects: In a strong nation, can the people be free? In a free nation, can sufficient strength be maintained for survival and independence?

This nation has always lived in a world hostile to liberty. ~~For hundreds of years,~~ Ever since our founding, the enemies of freedom, hating us for what we stand for, have been expecting us to sink into weakness.

²⁰⁰
For hundred~~year~~ years we have proved them wrong, but they are persistent. It is not easy for us to understand, but the enemies of freedom, the advocates of tyranny, hate "liberty for all" as much as we love it. They ~~are pledged~~ ^{seek} to destroy human ~~decency as strongly~~ ^{rights, just} as we ~~are pledged~~ ^{seek} to uphold and enhance ~~it~~ ^{them.}



The United States is powerful, and our adversaries would do well always to bear that fact in mind. But we are not power-minded. If we build our force, it is because we seek to be a force for good in the world.

Let me add that in a hostile world, to be strong for what is right, we must be strong.

We have never wanted to conquer ^{others.} ~~the world. Our ambition is quite different. We delight in the fact that there are still worlds to conquer.~~ The triumphs we seek are those of freedom over tyranny, of plenty over hunger, of health over disease, of prosperity over poverty, and of human decency over cruelty, for ourselves and all humanity.

To live up to the true meaning of the memory of Abraham Lincoln, we must remain strong--strong economically, so long as there are people needing our help, here and elsewhere in the world; strong militarily, so long as there are armed enemies of freedom in the world; and strong in our devotion to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, to



which he devoted the whole of his life.

By striving to be the strong and free nation he envisioned,
we honor well the memory of Abraham Lincoln.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301


Dr. Robert A. Goldwin
Special Consultant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bob:

Enclosed for your review is a copy of the Annual Defense Department Report which will provide you timely and comprehensive information about the proposed Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 1977.

I am confident that given the facts you will share our concern about the need to check the adverse trends of the past decade.

Sincerely,


Donald H. Rumsfeld

Enclosure



HOW U.S. SIZES UP RUSSIA NOW

"DEAD WRONG TO TRUST RUSSIA"

Interview With Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense



Mr. Rumsfeld in the magazine's conference room.

From another decision maker comes a picture of Russia as a country that preaches détente—yet arms on a massive scale. Mr. Rumsfeld visited the magazine's editors to explain the hazards of a controversial policy.

Q Mr. Secretary, we are constantly being warned by the Pentagon that Russia in the next few years may outstrip the United States as the world's leading military power. Does that mean that even a defense budget of 112.7 billion dollars—such as the one now proposed—isn't adequate?

A The first point that has to be made is that the United States does have today what can be described as "sufficiency" or "rough equivalence." That is my judgment and the conclusion of those who assess the balance—the naval balance, the strategic balance, the balance in Central Europe. By "rough equivalence," I do not mean to imply equality in each respect. I mean, in a broad sense, considering all of the elements of military capability, that we have today the strength necessary to balance the Soviet Union.

However, if the trends of the past 5 or 10 or 15 years—of Soviet military expansion and U.S. contraction—are permitted to continue, we would clearly arrive, at some point, where we could not say that we had sufficiency or rough equivalence. The long and the short of it is that, unless we act now to arrest those trends, the United States would move into a position of inferiority to the Soviet military capabilities.

Q Even with the kind of money the Pentagon is now asking?

A That brings me to a second point. So far as spending for military capability is concerned, we have observed a steady increase, in real terms, on the part of the Soviet Union over the past 10 to 15 years. During the same period, U.S. defense spending—again, in terms of real purchasing power—has decreased steadily.

This has resulted in a greatly expanded research-and-development base and production rates in the Soviet Union that, in most instances, exceed ours.

Soviet military-manpower levels have increased also, from 3.4 million to something in the neighborhood of 4.4 million—excluding some 400,000 border guards and security forces. The U.S. has 2.1 million Americans in uniform.

While the Soviet Union has been increasing its defense spending by an average of 3 per cent a year since 1965 in real terms, our baseline defense budget has been declining in real dollar terms.

The U.S. intelligence community, of course, refines the estimates of the Soviet defense effort. In the past, it was estimated that the Soviet Union was devoting 6 to 8 per cent of its gross national product to military capability. Now it appears that those figures may well be somewhere between 10 and 15 per cent.

By way of contrast, the U.S. is devoting a little more than 5 per cent of our GNP to defense. This provides some idea of the relative burden the two countries are willing to accept for national security. A Soviet level of effort of 10 per cent of their GNP to defense would be equivalent to a 200-billion-dollar defense budget in this country, instead of the 100 billion dollars the President is proposing.

The result has been a major shift in the balance of power. The United States has moved from a position of clear superiority to one of rough equivalence with the Soviet Union. If we wish to maintain rough equivalence, we cannot continue to take billions of dollars out of the defense budget year after year to fund other programs that some desire in the nondefense portion of the federal budget.

Q Will this year's defense budget reverse those trends?

A It will not reverse the trends, but it will arrest them. The budget is designed to permit us to continue our policy of maintaining rough equivalence with the Soviet Union.

Q What hopes do you have of Congress approving that budget in view of the big cuts made in Pentagon requests in recent years?

A My guess is that the Congress will come to the conclusion that it would be totally unacceptable to the American people to allow these adverse trends to continue. I see evidence that this could well be the year when the Congress will recognize the now-clear fact that the time is past when we can take billions of dollars out of the defense budget and put it elsewhere in the federal budget without

INTERVIEW WITH MR. RUMSFELD

[continued from preceding page]

having it do serious damage to the national security. That is my sense of the situation. I hope and trust I am correct. It would be foolhardy to risk waiting another year.

I think there's an appreciation of the fact that we would be living in an extremely different world if we were to send a signal that we were willing to accept those trends in the years ahead, and abandon our policy of maintaining rough equivalence. A United States that was seen as an inferior power, or moving toward an inferior position, would inject a dangerous instability in the world.

Q How do you reconcile that view with the attitude of Congress toward the Angola civil war—the vote to cut off any American support for the pro-Western forces there?

A I look at Angola, and the congressional response, as a somewhat isolated incident.

The national debate on Angola was imperfect and imprecise. It was confused in that some argued against "another Vietnam." We heard during the debate: "No more Vietnams. We don't want to get involved."

This, of course, was a terrible misrepresentation in that no one was advocating another Vietnam. However misleading, that argument had appeal in mobilizing people to the cause of opposing financial assistance to certain factions in Angola, as was proposed.

My view is that the American people are pretty wise. On an important issue, the American people will find their way to the right judgment, over a period of time. That's what our system of government is about. And it works. It has worked for 200 years, and there's no doubt in my mind but that it will work in the future.

Q Is your budget, then, based on the premise that the U.S. will continue to play a role of world policeman?

A No. We determine the necessary forces with a view to three principal balances:

One is the strategic balance, where we wish to maintain not precisely the same forces the Soviet Union has, but what can be described as equivalent forces.

Second is the naval balance, where we have a considerably different problem than the Soviets have. They are basically a continental power, while the United States, with allies and interests overseas—in Europe and Northeast Asia—requires a greater naval capability.

Finally, there is the balance in Central Europe, which is weighed not simply by looking at the considerably larger Soviet ground force, but by considering the relative strength of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO alliances.

An additional factor that influences the sizing of our forces is the number of and degree of conflicts we wish to be prepared for. In the 1960s, we maintained forces that were supposed to be capable of fighting 2½ wars. That was adjusted in the early 1970s. What has been proposed in recent budgets is that we have the capabilities for a 1-plus war crisis—that is, a major conflict plus some other problem in the world, but not 2½ as in the past. There are understandably a number of distinctions between the pre-Vietnam War force structure and what we envisage in the President's budget now before the Congress.

Q What does the large-scale Soviet intervention in Angola tell you about their policy and intentions? Was that just an isolated incident?

A Obviously not. Between 1971 and 1975, the Soviet

KEY POINTS MADE BY DEFENSE SECRETARY



Angola: Soviet intervention is a forerunner of similar moves into other areas.

Détente: It's "dead wrong" to assume that détente means that "the Russians are our friends and we can trust them . . . that they will not continue to support 'just wars of national liberation.' That is not what Soviet policy is all about."

Soviet defense outlays: Possibly as much as 15 per cent of Russia's gross national product is devoted to the military. By way of contrast, the United States devotes a little more than 5 per cent of its GNP to defense.

U.S.-Soviet balance: America today has "rough equivalence" with Russia in military strength, but "unless we act now to arrest [adverse] trends, the U.S. would move into a position of inferiority" to the Soviet Union.

Congress: "Congress will come to the conclusion that it would be totally unacceptable to the American people" to allow the drift toward military inferiority to continue.

SALT: Arms agreements with Russia will not "enable us to safely reduce spending" but could "enable us to restrain spending" on strategic weapons.

Volunteer Army: "We can afford a volunteer force. . . . Indeed, the volunteer force is working well."

Union and Cuba together provided military and economic assistance in the neighborhood of 3 billion dollars to the countries of Africa. This reflects a considerable interest on the part of the Soviet Union—and the Cubans working with them—to increase the number of airfields and port facilities available to them, and to increase the number of governments that are friendly and responsive to them. And it reflects their willingness to pay to achieve this influence and these military capabilities.

Q Are the Russians likely to have any more success in taking over and running a place like Angola than they've had in other African and Mideast countries?

A Just as other powers that have attempted to control or influence countries far from their shores, the Soviets have had an uneven history. They've had some successes and they've had some failures. The fact remains that the continent-bound—clearly second-class power—post-World War II Soviet Union is gone. Today, you see a first-rate military power from a strategic standpoint, with vast increases in its naval capabilities and its ability to project power throughout the world, and with sizable land forces.

With that growing power, the Soviets are interesting themselves to a considerable degree in nations throughout the world. The facts are that ports and airfields around Africa have considerable military value to the Soviet Union.

Q Do you see Soviet military intervention in Angola as a precursor of similar moves in other areas?

A I do. If one reads Soviet writings and their own descriptions of their opportunities in world affairs, it's clear that they consider such interventions to be fully consistent with their policy.

Q How does that jibe with the policy of détente that Russia is supposed to be pursuing with the U.S.?

A It fits their view of détente. The Soviets believe th

what they are doing in terms of their involvement in various countries around the globe and in terms of the development of their military capabilities is consistent with détente. I would anticipate that anyone who thinks that this is going to change in the period ahead is going to be found to be wrong.

Q Many people in this country assumed that détente was supposed to prevent crises of this sort—

A If one thinks that détente means that the Russians are our friends—that we can trust them, and that they will conduct themselves the way we do in our country, that they believe in freedom and individual, God-given rights of man, that they will not continue to support “just wars of national liberation,” or that they will not continue to develop substantial military strength to serve their interests—anyone who thinks that is dead wrong. That is not what Soviet policy or behavior is all about.

Détente, most precisely, from our standpoint, is an approach that the United States is using with the Soviet Union to determine if it's possible to relax tensions.

Is it sensible to try to lower the level of potential confrontation with the Soviet Union, if it can be done in a way that benefits our national interests and does not adversely affect our security? I believe the answer is “Yes.”

Does that mean that such a policy will solve all the problems of the world? No, it does not.

Does it mean that it's going to transform the Soviet Union into a system that is compatible with the beliefs of the United States? No, it does not.

Q If we are trying to lower the level of confrontation, why increase our spending on defense?

A Your question touches on what is probably the most difficult problem that we, as a free country, have to face.

That is the seeming contradiction between having a relationship with the Soviet Union that is not fully hostile and belligerent, and yet recognizing the fundamental need for the U.S. to maintain a strong defense.

We must understand that it is because of our strength that we can pursue such a policy. Free people, in our country and other free countries in the world, have to be careful to avoid a sense of euphoria that can accompany a marginally improved relationship between our countries.

We have to avoid being lulled into thinking that, because our strength has given us relative peace and stability, we therefore no longer need to be vigilant. That is just plain wrong. We *do* need to be vigilant. And we must be wise enough to realize that the reason we are at the negotiating table with the Soviet Union is because we are militarily strong.

Q Would a second Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement with the Soviets enable us to reduce defense spending?

A It's clear that no SALT agreement or negotiation of this type can do everything. No one agreement is going to dramatically reduce spending. We've seen Soviet spending continue to go up since SALT I in 1972 and, indeed, since the provisional agreement negotiated at Vladivostok in November, 1974. It is clear that the agreements have not led the Soviets to reduce their spending.

So I wouldn't look for any agreements to enable us to safely reduce spending as such. The hope is that we can reach some caps which limit some of the major systems and restrain the growth that has taken place in strategic systems. This could, in some manner, enable us to restrain the growth in spending on those systems that would otherwise be necessary.

Q Does your defense budget assume that there will be a SALT II agreement?

A The budget that we've presented is based on the need, with or without SALT, to see that our strategic forces are maintained in a fully ready posture to provide the necessary deterrence to avert a nuclear conflict.

Even with a SALT II agreement, presumably setting a ceiling of 2,400 on the number of strategic vehicles, and 1,320 on the number that can be MIRVed [multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicle], we will have to replace our aging bomber force at some point. As the Soviet Union improves the accuracies of their missiles in the late '70s and early '80s, we will have to have dealt with the problem of the survivability of our Minuteman force. That is why we are seeking funding for research and development for MX—a more survivable replacement for existing ICBM's.

Also, given the possibilities of improvements in antisubmarine warfare, it's important to produce the Trident—a better, quieter boat which will provide a more secure base for some of our submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

So it would be misleading to suggest that a SALT agreement is going to reduce defense spending in the near term. A good agreement could restrain the growth that will be needed.

However, it is not reasonable to say that, because a SALT agreement doesn't do everything, it doesn't do anything.

Q You believe then that the U.S. must maintain the “triad” of strategic forces indefinitely—that is, bombers, land-based missiles and submarine-launched missiles—

A There is no question in my mind but that we must.

Q There's considerable controversy over the B-1 as a replacement for the B-52. Is it still necessary to build such a costly and sophisticated aircraft, now that you also are developing a long-range cruise missile that can penetrate Russian air defenses?

A I've noticed that some people talk about these two as though they were duplications. They are not. The cruise missile will have a quite different use than a B-1. It is based on a new technology—essentially that of pilotless, subsonic aircraft—for which tactical doctrine has not been fully developed. We seem to have a considerable lead over the Soviet Union in this field.

Cruise missiles potentially are very accurate, but slow. They can be launched from aircraft, from land, from surface ships or from submarines. They could well have a variety of potential uses, both strategic and tactical. In our budget we are funding the air-launched cruise missile with the thought that it would be a valuable weapon to be carried by a B-52 for a variety of purposes.

But when you look at the range of the targets our various



AL UZLIAN
Soviet troops on maneuvers. Russia has increased its forces to about 4.4 million.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. RUMSFELD

[continued from preceding page]

strategic forces might be required to attack—and, for deterrence, must be able to attack—there's no doubt in my mind but that it will be necessary to have a suitable follow-on as the B-52s age. That's what the B-1 is all about.

Q Some critics say it's a luxury that we can't afford now—

A The funds that are provided in the budget are not designed for an ideal world. What they reflect is an awareness by President Ford that the strategic balance is exceedingly critical, that we must have deterrent forces that are sufficient to dissuade the Soviet Union in the years to come from believing that they could launch a disarming first strike—or accomplish the same thing by threatening to use their strategic forces.

Can we afford the B-1? It's clear to people who reflect on it that we cannot afford *not* to have a capable bomber force.

I recall an incident just before the Korean War in 1950 when a senior general told the House Appropriations Committee that the country simply couldn't afford a 16-billion-dollar budget. Six months later, the United States had a 48-billion-dollar budget and found, indeed, that we could afford it. A year later, we had a 60-billion-dollar budget, and found we could afford that. We can, we have found, afford to assure our freedom and security.

It strikes me that most Americans are convinced that the United States must have a strategic capability that is capable of dissuading the Soviets from believing that they could gain an advantage in using, or threatening to use, their strategic forces.

Q Mr. Secretary, in comparing the Soviet and American defense efforts, how much allowance do you make for the fact that the Russians feel they have to build up against China as well as the U.S.?

A There's no question but that the Soviets have improved their capabilities on the Chinese border, in manpower and in weapons. But it is also true that they have simultaneously improved their capabilities in Europe on the Warsaw Pact border. They have increased their troops facing the [NATO] Alliance in Western Europe by roughly 140,000. They also have improved the sophistication of their tactical air force, weapons and air defenses.

It is not factually correct to suggest that Soviet military advances can be attributed exclusively to a reaction to their relationship with the People's Republic of China. There has been far too great an expansion of the Soviet military capabilities to dismiss it on that basis.

Secondly, we already have taken fully into account any adjustment in our own military position warranted by the altered relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Thirdly, it would be exceedingly unwise for us to assume that leadership changes could not alter the present relationship between those two countries very rapidly. As is said, intent can change overnight; capabilities ~~call for the closest attention.~~ *cannot—they take much longer to change.*

Q Is the high cost of maintaining a volunteer force squeezing the defense budget in a way that you have to cut back on essential modernization of the services?

A There are few notions which anger me, but the idea that the United States has to use compulsion because we are unwilling to pay the U.S. armed forces at a level roughly competitive with the private sector is one of them.

I have no problem with using conscription to the extent we need it. But I am bothered by the idea that we have to use compulsion—in effect, taking 1 out of every 3 or 4 young men, imposing a tax on them by drafting them into



"We must have forces that are sufficient to dissuade the Soviet Union from believing they could launch a disarming first strike."

nonvolunteer service, and then, in addition, in effect paying them 50 to 60 per cent of what they would be earning in the civilian-manpower market.

Such proposals are made on the grounds that this country can't afford to pay people in the armed services a decent wage. That is simply not true. We can afford a volunteer force. And given normal circumstances, we should, in my judgment, be able to get the numbers and kinds of people we need by competing in the civilian-manpower market. Indeed, the volunteer force is working well.

Q What about the feeling you find among a lot of people that the volunteer Army has done away with the concept of national service and created a kind of mercenary service?

A Not a lot of people—a few people say that. In my view, they're wrong.

Q Have you given any thought to the idea of setting up a special budget for military-retirement pay that accounts for about 8½ per cent of the defense budget?

A Yes, I've given some thought to it. I have never been one for shell games, but it does strike me that it might be useful to do this. Retirement pay is not reflected in the budgets of other departments and agencies. We have a study in progress—looking at the specifics of the retirement program, because it is taking a substantial sum of money every year. I have examined the idea, simply because retirement pay shouldn't be considered in the balance with expenditures for current military capability.

Q Mr. Secretary, a number of studies have appeared recently suggesting that we could buy a better defense establishment with the same money by making fundamental changes—for example, by giving up big, expensive nuclear carriers, or making do with a less-sophisticated bomber than the B-1. Why isn't this being done?

A I would guess that there is not another department of our Government that gets looked at and analyzed as carefully as does the Department of Defense. We're not at a loss for suggestions of what ought to be done. However, any suggestion that there's a free lunch in life is wrong. There isn't a free lunch.

There is no magic. There is no place where someone suddenly is going to find a great bundle of billions of dollars through so-called efficiencies.

We continue to seek further efficiencies and economies, as do others. But it is past time to stop eroding U.S. military strength on the basis that we can find vast savings without compromising our national security.

Q One final personal question: What do you think of the view of some of your friends in Congress that President Ford will pick you as his running mate if he wins the nomination?

A Let's get back to the defense budget.


THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1976

Dear Bob:

Thanks so much for sending along the suggestions
to the Reuters speech. I appreciate it.

Regards,



Donald Rumsfeld

Honorable Robert Goldwin
Room 172
Executive Office Building
Washington 20006



23 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM Robert A. Goldwin *RAW*

Here is an analogy that should serve for many questions about changes in policy. The particular example I use is a question you were actually asked last week at Whiteman AFB.

Q. Does the fact that bases are being closed or realigned mean that mistakes were made in setting them up in the first place five or ten years ago?

A. The changes now being proposed or made mean that circumstances have changed, not that mistakes were made.

I had eyeglasses made three years ago and then had to have new ones made recently. The first ones were right for my eyes when they were made, but my eyes changed in three years and now I need a different prescription.

The big mistake would be to continue with an old prescription when it is outdated.

Base closings and realignments are responses to changed circumstances and changed defense needs. What we do now we do because we think it makes sense now, for greater efficiency and better defense. There is no basis for judgment about the quality of decisions made five or ten or fifteen years ago.



23 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM

Robert A. Goldwin *RAG*

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Q. Does the fact that bases are being closed or realigned mean that mistakes were made in setting them up in the first place five or ten years ago?

A. The changes now being proposed or made mean that circumstances have changed, not that mistakes were made.

I had eyeglasses made three years ago and then had to have new ones made recently. The first ones were right for my eyes when they were made, but my eyes changed in three years and now I need a different prescription.

The big mistake would be to continue with an old prescription when it is outdated.

Base closings and realignments are responses to changed circumstances and changed defense needs. What we do now we do because we think it makes sense now, for greater efficiency and better defense. There is no basis for judgment about the quality of decisions made five or ten or fifteen years ago.



Q. Retired Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, who was the deputy director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, has testified that the Department of Defense is considering revoking the authority of the North American Air Defense commander to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances without the specific approval of the President.

Does the Norad commander have this authority? And is the matter now under review?

A. There is general agreement among the American people, I think, that there are some subjects that should not be discussed in details publicly. One of these is the subject of the security of the President and the measures that are taken to protect him. Another is specific arrangements for the use of nuclear weapons.

What we all want to know, and what I can tell you with emphatic certainty, is that the decision for the use of nuclear weapons is



Q+A

The Am people have a right to know what their govt is doing, but I think the Am people have too much good sense to insist that ~~the details~~ of every subject be discussed publicly in detail.

For example, the people do ~~not~~ want public discussion of the details of how the Secret Service provides personal protection of the Pres and ~~presidents~~ other
want the Sec Serv to protect the Pres ~~etc~~

but they know that public official discussion of the details of how that protection is provided is harmful & endangers that protection and so they do not demand to know the details. And resp officials don't discuss it, no matter how much ~~speculate~~



these might be in the press or elsewhere



Q - too evasive - sounding

Retaliatory
Norsd nuc, w/o
Pres'dtl approval
Adm. Miller

- shd add every time that
most citizens understand
that some thing shd not be
discussed. Waited too long
to use analogy about Pres'
security.

Q - Who is in charge
of nuclear weapons?
People have right to know?

Bo Callaway - private
use of aircraft

Wd present regs prevent
private use, as alleged
facts in Callaway - Clements
incident

- Q2 -

Do we assume Sov missile
attack? Shd we ^{not} assume
triad attack? Are we
not vulnerable? Esp.
civil defense

If they come w bombers
is not our air defense
inadequate?

If there were nuclear
exchange today, in terms
of civil defense, wdnt
we lose many more than
the Soviets?

Q - Silber

B1 - credibility +
Currie

Problem in presenting
B1 package to Congress?

Optimistic for B1?

Young, fire-eating
Congressmen - Watergate,
anti-VN. Agnst B1:
How will you defeat that
bloc, if there is such a
bloc?

Gallup poll on support
for defense spending?

Growing employment -
tendency to cut pensions,
pay, benefits. Future of
volunteer forces?



Silber 2

What can be done to reduce %age of personnel costs? _____

Personnel costs cut into R+D and force modernizatr. Can we afford to keep this up? _____

Marine Corps - Brookings Institute report _____

Forcing eng changes in structure of armed forces? _____

What will you do if the B1 is shot down on the Hill? _____

Whiteman AFB

B-52 satellite base here.

Understand they will be phased out. Will all satellite bases be phased out? _____

Is transfer from KC to Illinois "playing politics," as local politicians have charged? _____

Is realignment now a sign of poor planning 10 or 15 years ago? _____

How much consideration is given to the local econ impact on base realignments? _____

How about cutting fat overseas instead of US bases? _____

Wh AFB 2

7/μ to Minuteman - 2^d generation or improved M-man $\frac{2}{3}$ at Whiteman? _____

US VSU - with them, ahead, behind? _____



April 30, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN
ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY

You asked me to prepare a sample Q & A on the national defense issue which would allow the President to respond to charges in the President's own terms rather than in Reagan's terms.

Please find that Q & A attached.

Kirk Emmert, my assistant, has also prepared one independently. It is also attached.

Attachments



(Goldwin)

April 30, 1976

Q. (Any question based on the Reagan charges that we have become a second-rate military power, we are not "number one.")

A. You aren't asking the right question, but I'll answer it anyhow. And then I'll explain why I think it isn't the right question.

The fact is that right now, in 1976, the military power of the United States is unsurpassed.

We are capable of deterring aggression by any adversary, or any imaginable combination of adversaries.

Our military power is awesome. Our military forces are capable of doing everything we might ask of them.

That is a full, honest, and accurate answer to your question.

But the real question, the question you and all of us should be asking, is whether the President of the United States in 1996 will be able to say what I have just said.

Those who understand national defense know how critical the time factor is. The defenses we have now, in 1976, are almost entirely none of this Administration's doing. _____ per cent of all of our planes, and tanks, and missiles, and ships, and rifles, and anti-tank weapons are the result of decisions made five, ten, fifteen, even twenty-five years ago.

There is no magic wand that can be waved, in the real world, to produce a defense system in one year or two years, no matter what anyone promises you. It has taken _____ years just to design and test the B-1 bomber, and if the test results continue to be favorable and the Congress approves the decision, we will start production this year. But even if we act without delay, production of the fleet of B-1 bombers will not be completed until _____.

For the defense forces we have today, we must thank the



foresight and the decisions of Presidents and Congressmen and military leaders and the voters of ten and twenty years ago.

Will the Americans of 1996 thank us for the defense forces we provide them by our decisions in 1976? Or will they curse us for not caring enough about them and their liberty? That is the real question we all ought to be asking ourselves.

Unless we act decisively this year to stop the adverse trends of the past ten or fifteen years, cutting our defense budgets while the Soviets increase theirs, our children and their children will not thank us. They will curse us for not having had the foresight and the will to provide them with the means to defend themselves, and our allies, and the cause of freedom in the world.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 29, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: ROBERT GOLDWIN
FROM: KIRK EMMERT *K.E.*
SUBJECT: Reply to Reagan's Critique of our
Defense Posture

I. Reagan's Critique

1. We are becoming a second-rate military power, number 2 in the world. The momentum has shifted to the USSR, and after 1977 the Soviet's military advantage will increase.

2. Mr. Ford's refusal to invite Solzhenitsyn to the White House and his signature of the Helsinki Pact are evidence we are number 2. Further evidence is the numerical inferiority of our military forces. The Soviets have more tanks, ships, artillery, missiles, reserves, and regular troops than the U.S. They spend twice as much on weapons as we do.

3. It is dangerous, if not fatal, to be second best. Peace through strength is an admirable goal provided that military strength is understood to mean superiority. Equivalence is not enough. In order for the Administration's deeds to match its words, and its own goal of peace, it must restore our military superiority.

4. Congress has been remiss in not voting more for defense, but that does not excuse the Ford Administration from responsibility for our present situation. Rather than trying to deal with his old friends on Capitol Hill, the President should take the case for a stronger defense to the American people.



II. The President's Reply

The real issue in the present debate over our military strength is two opposing approaches to the conduct of defense policy. Let me describe my approach and let me start with some facts:

1. The military strength of nations is not compared by simply counting the numbers of different kinds of weapons possessed by each. The type and quality of weapons must be considered when comparing, for example, aircraft, ships or missiles.

2. When this kind of complex comparison is made, the conclusion is that our military forces are second to none.

3. Present forces are adequate, but in recent years our defense effort has not kept pace with that of the Soviet Union. From a position of inferiority they are pulling up even with us.

4. My 1977 defense budget is designed to reverse this trend. It is based on the view that we can no longer afford to finance our domestic programs by cutting the defense budget, such as Congress has done in recent years.

Defense policy is too complex and important to be dealt with by means of strident rhetoric, elementary counting, or mistaken and dangerous assertion about our inferiority to the Soviet Union. Simplistic assertions of who is number 1 are appropriate to sports fans during the heat of competition but not to serious, responsible, informed candidates for the Presidency.

Our goal should not be numerical superiority in all areas but sufficient strength to assure our security and that of our allies. To attain this mistaken goal of superiority in each area we would have to reinstitute the draft and produce many more weapons than we need. In my view wasteful spending is just as wrong when it is done in the name of defense as of any other program. Our force levels should be determined by our needs not by trying to match our adversary weapon for weapon.



My approach to defense policy is to begin with a sober, informed assessment of our present situation and of where we want to be in future years, given the effort and nature of our adversary. Having done this, my Administration is now seeking to convince the Congress and the American people to support the military budget required to keep the nation secure, now and in the future. We have done our homework and we have been effective advocates. As a result, this year, for the first time in many years, it appears that Congress will not cut the defense budget.



(Goldwin)

April 30, 1976

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1976

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Defense Posture

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3. It is dangerous, if not fatal, to be second best. Peace through strength is an admirable goal provided that military strength is understood to mean superiority. Equivalence is not enough. In order for the Administration's deeds to match its words, and its own goal of peace, it must restore our military superiority.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 _____
Memo For _____

- been Pres for - mos.
- what has happened in def since then?
- submitted budget in FY 76 for \$ _____ billion
Cong cut _____.
- budget in FY 77
fightg to get it thru Cong
- ~~have added~~
- ~~ships~~
- ~~no fundamental~~



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

- 2 -

Memo For _____

- decisions made in '75 to arrest downward trend
- if got everything asked for, wd not affect present defense capability
- takes — years to develop B-1 bombers
- years to build missiles



What makes a difference this year is governed by decisions made in 19 — .

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Memo For P.C.

2 approaches
facts

- 1- negotiated for 10 years
LA agrees
- 2- not sought term



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Memo For _____

Anyone knowledgeable
about defense knows ~~the time~~

~~are not #2~~
factor. Mil power is not turned
on or off like a TV set to watch an
old movie. Sound defense
action requires foresight, planning,
knowledge, managerial experience.

Problem is not how we
stand today. Today we are
strong x ~~If this year we see the~~
~~whole story~~ enough for every
purpose -- and the Soviets know
it.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

4/29/76

WASHINGTON

TO: Robert Goldwin

FROM: Kirk Emmert

SUBJECT: Reply to Reagan's Views on Defense

I. Reagan's critique

1. Russia has more of most military resources and weapons than the U.S. They have more tanks, artillery, missiles, ships, and men under arms. They have a much better civil defense effort. They spend about twice as much of their GNP (15%) for defense than we do.
2. We are becoming a second-rate military power. The momentum has shifted to the USSR. After 1977 the Soviet advantage mounts.
3. Equivalence will not bring peace through strength, to say nothing ~~of being #2~~ of being #2.
4. Words of the Administration are not matched by its deeds.
5. Congress has not done its part, but the Administration should take its case for a stronger defense to the American people, rather than having the President trying to make a deal with his old friends on capitol hill.

II. The President's Reply

1. We must begin with the facts of our present military situation vis a vis the USSR. The fact is our forces are second to none ~~or at least equivalent~~ in over all capability to the Soviet forces. ~~Military forces cannot be compared by a simplistic counting of~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2

Military forces cannot be compared by ~~making simplistic~~ simply counting the number of weapons on each side. The type and quality of the weapons must also be considered: ~~a~~ one of our missiles is worth more than one of theirs and one of our large ships may be worth many of theirs. The ~~ix~~ different geographic situations of the two countries must also be compared.

2. Present forces are adequate but present trends in effort are not. We must make more of an effort to match the increased effort made by the Russians. We must stop trying to finance domestic programs by cutting the defense ~~and~~ budget. The Administration's budget is designed to increase our effort, to match the increased Russian effort, and to reverse our tendency, which would become dangerous if it continued, of cutting defense spending. There will be danger in the future only if the Administration's proposals are rejected.

~~xxxx~~


~~Defence policy is too complicated and too important to dealt with~~

3. Defense policy is too complicated and too important to dealt with by strident rhetoric, simplistic counting, or ~~a~~ dangerous exaggerations ~~about~~ our inferiority to Soviet power. We need to make a sober

assessment of ^{and} where we are [^] where we want to go given the effort and nature of our adversary, ~~and~~ ^{we must} Then ask the American people and the Congress to do what is necessary to get us to where we ~~want~~ want to go.

This is the approach of this Administration as shown by our budget requests to the Congress and our success to date in getting those

^{requests approved.}



4/29/76

- Right now

- unsurpassed

- 2^d to none

- real deterrence

• ask the Soviets

• some voters may be fooled

Soviets aren't - they know

US might

- But tough question is

What about 1990? 2000?

decisions now, decide that get

- Must understand time factor

1976 defenses were decided on

5, 10, 15, 25 years ago

can't wave magic wand and

have modern weaponry o'night

- For last decade and more, Cong has

been cutting, Soviets have been increasing

~~We are~~ Trend has been against us

In 1976 we are unsurpassed, 2^d to none

- Must change trend - owe it to children

Q. National defense, Number 2, etc.

Any question based on the Reagan accusations.


Let me say a few things about how to understand national defense.

A. I have tried several times to explain the defense situation in response to charges that I have let our defenses slip and that the United States has become a second-rate military power, but I don't seem to have gotten through to at least one candidate--so I will try a different way to reassure him, and others who may be influenced by his arguments.

~~It is useful to start~~

The first thing that one must understand about ^{building} ~~defense~~ national defense is ^{the time factor--} how long it takes to produce weapons and, therefore, how far ahead one must think to make sure that our safety and the safety of our allies and others around the world is assured.

The weapons and defense systems we have now are the result of ^{decisions that were made} ~~research and development and legislation and procurement that were decided upon and acted upon~~ five, ten, and fifteen years ago. For example, our ~~fleet~~ ^{build} B-52 bombers are --- years old and the decisions to ~~have~~ them were made years ago.



The decision that I am urging on the Congress now, to ~~go ahead~~ ^{proceed} with the B-1 bomber ~~program~~ ^{program} has a background of ---- years ~~and will start giving us planes ___ years from now.~~ ^{if we go into production w/o delays,} ~~Until~~ 1990, our bomber fleet will be a combination of B-52s and B-1s, ~~if Congress agrees to go ahead with the B-1 program,~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ not because we do not want the most modern planes at once, but because it takes a long time to build them.


In the meantime, we ~~are~~ ^{will} modernizing ~~the~~ ^{well} B-52s so that they will serve ^{well} for 10 or 15 years more, until they can all be replaced by B-1s.

~~The defense decision I make, any President I give you this long example so that you, and everyone, can understand that the defense decisions I make, any President when there is no actual fighting going on, makes, can be seen and judged not while he is President, but only many years later, often after he has left office.~~ ^{makes in peacetime} ^{usually}

The forces we have at our disposal now, the planes, the tanks, the ships, the missiles, the ^{size of the} armed forces--all of these are the result of decisions made by ~~Administrations~~ ^{Presidents} and Congresses ~~five and more years ago.~~ ^{during the last 15 years-- and more.} ^{and composition and even disposition}

There is no magic wand that can produce at a wave even one Navy vessel, let alone a fleet, It takes years.

I am frank to say that the defense ~~situation at the present~~ ~~time~~ posture of the United States requires ~~imed~~ prompt action. I have told the Congress that I think we must appropriate \$ ___ billion , and the prospects are good--but not certain--that this year, for the first time in ___ years, the Congress will not cut the total proposed to them.




But what every American ought to understand is that the danger I foresee is not now, not ~~this year~~, but years ahead--if we fail to act now. What we decide this year will determine how safe we and ~~the~~ our allies and ~~all the things we seek to protect~~ will be five or ten years from now. If we cut ~~the~~ defense budget again this year, as we have for the last ___ years, those of us still alive fifteen years from now, and ~~our~~ our children, will curse us for leaving them ~~defenseless~~. That's what the danger is, not that we have inadequate defenses this year.

in 1976, *in 1985 or the year 2000*
political liberty itself
inadequately *Then the danger will be clear to everyone-- but they won't be able to do much about it.*

Right now it is accurate to say that the United States is second to none in military power.

Right now it is accurate to say that our nuclear strength, our naval strength, ~~our nuclear capability~~ in the air, are capable of every demand that might be made of them. Our military forces taken all together are unsurpassed in all the world.



The most important task of our military might is to deter attack on this country and on any of our allies. Some in this country may have an ~~interest~~ *incentive* in raising doubts about the deterrent power of the United States. But I can tell you who has absolutely no doubt about the awesome strategic force of the United States--the leaders of every adversary or potential adversary of the United States, that's who.

The only concern I have is that raising false doubts might discourage our allies and friends and make them wonder about the value of our protection. It would also encourage

The question is not whether we have enough power today. If that were the real question, we could all relax. The *our adversaries -- except that they are too knowledgeable to believe it, as much as they might wish it were true.*

Q. Mr. President, can you clear up the confusion? Is the United States Number One militarily, or is the Soviet Union? Sometimes you say we are Number One, sometimes you say we are "second to none," sometimes you say we are "unsurpassed." But Governor Reagan always says we have slipped to second place and that it is your fault. What is the right answer?



CONCLUSION OF ARTICLE ON THE NEW YORK TIMES - CBS NEWS
NATIONAL POLL, NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, APRIL 23, 1976.

Foreign Policy Issues

Why has Mr. Reagan been able to make so little of the foreign policy issues? The polls suggested that Americans have very little concern for them this year, at least compared with other issues. A heavy majority, even of Republicans, said that they considered such domestic issues as crime, energy and jobs as more important than the detente matter.



C-17

Reagan U.S., Ford U.S. -- the Facts
(By Roscoe Drummond, excerpted, C.S. Monitor)

President Ford and Ronald Reagan are doing their level worst to confuse the American people on the state of the nation's military strength. Mr. Reagan says that the U.S. has allowed itself to drop dangerously behind the Soviets in the balance of military power. Mr. Ford says that the U.S. is on top, is comfortably in the lead. Mr. Reagan's statements, on the basis of the most knowledgeable sources, are inaccurate. Mr. Ford's statements are misleading and irrelevant as an answer because they skirt a far more crucial truth -- that the U.S. is falling so steadily behind year after year that a serious imbalance is in the making.

This creates serious confusion and it deepens distrust of leadership. It tends to misguide our allies and could tempt our adversaries -- and in today's world that's dangerous.

Ford and Reagan are not military experts. The most objective and reliable source on the comparative military strength of the U.S. and the Soviet Union is former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger.

His testimony is that at the present time the balance of military power is not on the Soviet side.

It is hard to understand why the President deems it wise to say only that the U.S. is still No. 1 militarily when this statement buries a more important fact. By repeating this limited reply he builds an opinion in the country and in Congress that if the U.S. just keeps going along as at present, we will remain No. 1. We won't. The fact is that the U.S. has been falling behind steadily for eight years and is continuing to fall behind.

A presidential campaign ought to be an instrument of public education. On defense it has thus far been an instrument of miseducation. -- (4/21/76)



April 27, 1976

Panama Canal

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB GOLDWIN

I agree completely with your memo and I have talked to Dick and the President about it. Why don't you now prepare an attached sample of how you would handle the national defense issue. The sooner you can do it the better.

7



April 24, 1976


MEMORANDUM FOR

DICK CHENEY

FROM

BOB GOLDWIN *RG*

1. We should not let Reagan set the agenda of campaign issues.
2. The NY Times-CBS poll indicates that foreign policy issues are of less concern to the voters this year than domestic issues such as jobs, prices, energy, and crime.
3. Reagan was not doing well on his foreign policy and military policy themes until the President began responding in detail and forcefully, thus drawing attention to them more effectively than Reagan had been able to do, and in Reagan's terms, not ours.
4. There is no way now, I think, to avoid answering questions about our military preparedness and the Panama negotiations, and the questions will continue to be asked. What we should aim for, therefore, is to change the terms of the discussion.
5. Reagan is accusing the President of lacking forcefulness in foreign and military matters, of shying away from being strong. The President should not allow himself to be put on the defensive, to be in the posture of denying charges.
6. The President should, instead, set forth his own position, in his own terms, and in a way that makes Reagan look ignorant, impetuous, imprudent, and in other ways unqualified to be President and Commander in Chief.
7. The attached sample of a Panama answer is designed to state the President's approach to foreign policy, in broad terms, as based on facts and objectives. By contrast, Reagan's will seem to be based on misinformation and bluster. The President will look "presidential" and Reagan will be on the defensive.



Q. The Panama Canal

A. The real issue in the present debate about the Panama Canal is two opposing approaches to the conduct of foreign policy. Let me describe my approach, and let me start with some facts:

1. The fact is that negotiations with Panama to alter the Treaty did not just start but have been going on, intermittently, for 10 or 12 years. Every Latin American country agrees that the Treaty is outdated and ought to be revised.

2. The fact is that except for disagreements over the status of the Canal, our relations with Panama are fine and could be outstanding. Panama and the United States should be friends, not enemies.

3. The fact is that the Panama Canal Zone is not part of the United States; it is part of Panama. We did not buy it and make it US territory; we paid the Panamanians for certain rights on their territory. That is why we pay a kind of annual rent to them-- because we do not own it.

4. The final fact is that the Canal was not built to be defended against modern weapons. It is vulnerable. ~~It is vulnerable.~~ Rockets fired from outside the Canal Zone, for example, could disable the equipment and put the Canal out of operation immediately and for years.



My approach to foreign policy is to start with the facts and to keep our national objectives in mind. The people of Panama want to be friendly and they want the Canal to continue to operate and to be secure. They have a big stake in the Canal, and I think it makes good sense to find ways for them to help ^{us} defend it and share in its operation. When two nations have the same interests, it is not hard to settle differences by negotiation.

My approach is not to look for trouble and enemies where they do not exist. There are enough of both in the world without making more unnecessarily.

We have no need to impress small nations that we are big and powerful. The greatest powers in the world know that well enough. About the only ones who seem to doubt it are a few in this country who want to make us believe that we are inferior to others in military strength.

Our true objective in Panama is to protect the Canal and keep it operating. In my judgment that can best be done by arranging with the people and Government of Panama for them to help, ~~make that arrangement.~~ The result will be greater security for the Canal, better relations with Panama, better relations with the rest of Latin America, and a better stance for our important relations with the rest of the world.



Panama

4/24/76

A. Let me explain briefly what we are seeking to do in the Panama negotiations, which have been going on, intermittently, for 10 or 12 years.

~~Having been working with Panama, a nation that~~ is, in all respects but one, ~~very~~ favorably disposed towards the United States, and wants to maintain ~~excellent~~ ^{amicable} relations with us. The one difficulty is the status of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone.

Our interest, ~~is to develop strong friendly relations with Panama,~~ ^{and to} keep the Panama Canal open, working, available for our use at all times, and secure from danger.

The approach, ~~we have been taking~~ ^{the U.S. has} is to seek arrangements with Panama that will give them a stake in helping to defend and operate the Canal. They don't want it closed or threatened. They want to help ~~us to operate~~ ^{they want to have a share in} it and defend ~~it~~ ^{ing}, and that makes sense to me.

The people of Panama are not ~~so~~ different from us. They resent ~~the way we would resent~~ ^{some} being kept out of ~~control~~ of their own ^{just as Americans would.} territory. Contrary to the ignorant assertions of some, the Panama Canal Zone is ~~not~~ ^{part of the} United States; ~~rather~~ ^{it and make it U.S.} it is part of Panama. We did not buy ~~the~~ territory; we ~~ought to have~~ paid for certain rights on Panamanian territory. That is why we pay rent every year--because

4. The fact is that the Panama Canal is highly vulnerable to local attack. Rockets ^{fixed} from outside the Canal Zone, for example, could disable key equipment needed to operate the Canal and put it out of operation immediately and for years. No amount of swagger and tough talk can change this fact.

My approach is to consider that the people of Panama are disposed to be friendly and want the Canal to continue to be ^{secure} ~~safe~~ and to operate. They have a stake in its continuing operation, and I think ~~we ought~~ ^{it makes good sense} to find ways for them to help ^{defend it} ~~in its defense~~ and share in its operation. We are two nations with the same interests, and ^{so we can} ~~I think we ought to~~ resolve ^{any} ~~our~~ differences by negotiation.

My approach is not to look for trouble and enemies where they don't exist. There are enough potential enemies in this world without making more unnecessarily.

The main objective is not to ^{impress small nations about} ~~show~~ how big and strong we are. ^{greatest powers in the} The world know ~~n~~ that well enough, even if there are some in this country who aren't fully aware of just how ^w ~~p~~oerful we are. The objective in Panama is to keep the Canal operating and secure, and if the people and Government of Panama can help make that more certain, I ^{favor} ~~am for~~ getting them to help.



4/24/76

The most important issue in the present debate about the Panama Canal is two opposing approaches to the conduct of foreign policy.

Let me describe mine. The facts, briefly, are that negotiations to improve our treaty with Panama have been going on intermittently for 10 or 12 years. Except for disagreements about the Canal and the Canal Zone, our relations with Panama are good and could be outstanding. There is one additional important fact:

Let me describe mine, and let me start with some facts:

The first fact is that

1. [^] Except for disagreements over the status of the Canal, our relations with the people of Panama are fine and ~~good~~ could be outstanding. They should be our friends, not our enemies.

The fact is that


2. [^] Negotiations to alter the Treaty with Panama have been going on, intermittently, for 10 or 12 years. Every ~~Latin~~ Latin American country ^{is outdated and} agrees that the Treaty ought to be revised.

The fact is that

3. [^] The Panama Canal Zone is not ~~US territory~~ part of the United States; it is part of Panama. We did not buy it and make it US territory; we paid the Panamanians for certain rights on their territory. That is why we pay a kind of rent to them every year-- because we do not own it. ~~For example,~~ ^{F.U.} under the Constitution, a

child born of foreign parents in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, is a natural-born citizen of the United States. ~~But~~ ^{but}

~~that is not the case for children born in the Canal Zone.~~ ^{children born of foreign} ~~children born of foreign~~ ^{children born in the Canal Zone.}



A child born of foreign parents in the Panama Canal Zone is not a citizen of the United States, as he would be, under the Constitution, if born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction.

we do not own it.

The facts are that

The Canal is not situated well for defending it against local attack. Rockets from outside the Zone could destroy key machinery and put the Canal out of operation for years.

It does no good to swagger and boast and ~~flex our muscles,~~ *talk tough*

as some speakers are now doing--big words don't change facts. *Strong men don't go looking for unnecessary fights just to show tough they are.*

The best way to defend the Canal and keep it operating is to ~~accept the fixer's~~ *arrange with* negotiate an arrangement for the people of Panama to join with us in defending and operating it.

We know ourselves that if we have a stake in something, and we stand to benefit from its success, we have a reason for taking good care of ~~things rather than seeking to obstruct or destroy.~~ *that thing and keeping it working.* The

people of Panama are no different, ~~from us in this respect, and if~~ *We don't have to think of using force in a case where people want to co-operate and most respects.* *be friendly.*

It is wrongheaded and irresponsible to ~~xxxxxx act as~~ *talk like* fierce enemies toward people who are naturally inclined to be our friends. My confident prediction is that when we work out the right arrangement for continuing ~~our~~ *the* operation of the Panama Canal, the United States and Panama will be strong friends. I deplore the actions of those who are trying to make them our enemies for no good reason.



CANAL ZONE: POLITICAL ISSUE IN U.S., TIME BOMB IN PANAMA

Feelings are running high in both the U.S. and Panama over the future of a key waterway. A cabled dispatch by Carl J. Migdail of the magazine's International Staff sizes up an explosive dispute.

PANAMA CITY

As a campaign issue in the U.S., future control of the Panama Canal is only now starting to strike sparks.

Here at the scene the question of who is to own, run and defend the canal has gone far beyond political oratory. It is a time bomb relentlessly ticking away.

The situation, in simplest terms: The Republic of Panama wants the U.S. to give it control of the waterway within a set time span. The Ford Administration is trying to negotiate a compromise. But many Americans consider that foolhardy, if not worse.

Republican contender Ronald Reagan, demanding an end to the talks that have been under way since 1974, says: "The Canal Zone is not a colonial possession. It is not a long-term lease. It is sovereign U.S. territory, every bit the same as Alaska and all the States that were carved from the Louisiana Purchase."

At the opposite pole is Panama's ruler, Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera.

His warning: "Patience has limits. We are now following the peaceful route of Gandhi. We are also prepared to follow the Ho Chi Minh route if necessary. That means terrorism, guerrilla operations and sabotage in a national-liberation war to regain our territory."

Adding fuel to the controversy are the Americans employed in the Canal Zone who vigorously oppose any revision of the area's status. They are backed by a powerful lobby in Congress and by many American military men.

Measure of anxiety. The depth of their concern is described in the box on page 26. The power they pack was shown in mid-March when a wildcat strike by the American "Zonians" closed the waterway for several days.

Caught in the middle are U.S. officials who believe that the treaty must be drastically revised. As one State Department official puts it: "All hell will break loose if the negotiations fail and violence breaks out."

The Administration's position: The U.S. neither owns nor has sovereignty over the Canal Zone. As Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, chief U.S. negotiator, points out: "Contrary to the belief of many Americans, the United States did not purchase the Canal Zone in 1903. Rather, the money we gave Panama then was in return for the rights which Panama granted us by the treaty."

Congress—a barrier? Mr. Bunker, a former Ambassador to South Vietnam, has so far been unable to convince many Congressmen of the need for a new accord with Panama to terminate perpetual U.S. control over the Canal Zone. His opponents claim they have the votes to block a new agreement. Their arguments against treaty revisions are largely based on U.S. national-security and commercial needs.

All this has renewed fears of open conflict breaking out, perhaps as soon as next year, if what Panamanians consider a blight on their honor and their nation's independence is not removed.

American officials understand the Panamanian grievances. They say the treaty is out of date and has become a source of tension throughout Latin America.

Generations of Panamanians have been brought up to believe that the Canal Zone is a symbol of U.S. imperialism. And in both the United Nations and the Organization of American States, the U.S. has been urged to be responsive to the Panamanian aspirations. If this is not done, you are told here, there will again be violence, such as erupted in 1964, which led to the deaths of four Americans and 20 Panamanians.

General Torrijos knows there is little hope of getting a new agreement during the 1976 U.S. election year. He has virtually guaranteed to keep his 1.7 million people calm until 1977. But that is his deadline for a new treaty.

American officials say General Torrijos is not overstating the threat of conflict. In fact, Ambassa-

dor Bunker warns: "Unless we succeed, I believe that Panama's consent to our presence will continue to decline, and at an even more rapid rate."


"Some form of conflict in Panama would seem virtually certain—and it would be the kind of conflict which would be costly for all concerned."

There is wide agreement among both U.S. and Panamanian officials that the canal is highly vulnerable to attack. Small groups of terrorists could easily destroy the fresh-water dams, knocking out canal operations for as long as two years. Rockets fired from the Panamanian side could severely damage the locks or sink ships in transit, thus halting all traffic.

American officials here are now virtually unanimous in saying that the canal's basic security rests almost entirely on giving Panama a stake in keeping it open. And that will require changes in the administration and operations of the canal and a switch of attitudes in the Zone and outside.


In the Canal Zone itself, the U.S. has a full-fledged government with its own

BEHIND FEUD OVER THE CANAL—





Panama's strong man, General Torrijos.



Panamanians say U.S. has choice between peaceful handover of canal or guerrilla war. Waterway's dams, locks and ships in transit would be vulnerable to rocket attacks.

courts, police force and laws that are enforced against Panamanians as well as Americans.

It is the American flag that the Zonians raise over their homes each morning and salute as they leave for work. And even though wage rates are supposed to be the same, an American earns \$7.74 an hour on average and Panamanian employees in the Zone only \$3.23 an

hour. The minimum wage scale in the Republic itself ranges from 50 to 80 cents an hour.

Street slogans. In Panama City, the Zone side of the main street is President John F. Kennedy Avenue. The Panamanian side is the Avenue of the Martyrs, for the 20 Panamanians killed there in 1964. On Panama's side you read such slogans as "Kissinger remember Vietnam," "Yankees out," and "Oligarchy and imperialism are the same."

Says General Torrijos: "We experience colonialism daily. I have great admiration for the American people, but they should feel ashamed to permit the continued existence of a colonial enclave in another country, especially during their own Bicentennial freedom celebration."

Although Panama has been relatively stable in the seven years since General Torrijos seized power in a military coup, there are strong undercurrents of violence everywhere in Panama. The most dangerous are found among the hot-headed high-school students.

General Torrijos says the students are calling for immediate action and adds: "I am afraid of students. I don't want to be forced to kill them."

There is no organized opposition that General Torrijos must deal with as he waits for the U.S. to reach critical decisions on the canal. Political parties are

AT THE HEART of the increasingly bitter feuding between the U.S. and Panama is a stretch of land and water 10 miles wide and 51 miles long, including a canal that links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The U.S. acquired the land and full extraterritorial rights "in perpetuity" through a treaty signed with Panama in 1903. The U.S. paid 10 million dollars to the infant Republic, which had just declared its independence from Colombia. An additional annual payment of \$250,000 was guaranteed by the U.S.

The Panama Canal itself, started in 1879 by a French consortium, was completed by the U.S. in 1914. Total cost: 387 million dollars. The first major revision of the treaty, in 1936, dealt with some Panamanian grievances on payments and land expropriations for defense purposes. Eliminated entirely was a clause empowering the U.S. to intervene in case of civil strife in Panama.

Further treaty revisions in 1955 raised the U.S. payment to \$1,930,000. Property valued at 24 million dollars was returned to the Panamanian Government. Pay and status of U.S. and Panamanian citizens employed in the Canal Zone were to be equalized.

Tensions continued to build up, and in January, 1964, the two countries broke diplomatic relations. They were restored later in the year when the U.S. agreed to negotiate revisions of the treaty.

Three draft agreements were drawn up in 1967, but by 1970 the U.S. had taken no action whatever and all three agreements had been rejected by the Panamanian Government.

Talks were resumed in 1971, and in February, 1974, agreement was reached on a set of principles: Under a new treaty, Panama would be given jurisdiction over the Canal Zone, a share of the canal's income and a role in operating and defending the waterway.

The U.S., in return, would retain rights, facilities and land needed to operate the canal, and would have the option to enlarge the waterway or build a new one at sea level.

The most important part of the proposed treaty: It would have a fixed termination date, thereby eliminating the concept of "perpetuity" which angers the Panamanians.

Issues still to be settled:

Duration. U.S. wants a treaty giving it control over the Zone until the end of this century and a defense role there-

after. Panama wants all U.S. responsibility to end before the year 2000.

Area. There is no agreement on how many land and water-storage areas are needed to operate and defend the canal.

Construction. The U.S. wants a long-term option on enlarging the canal or building a new one. Panama wants the U.S. to make its commitment within 10 years and complete work within 20 years.

Compensation. U.S. proposes replacing the current annual payment with a royalty on tonnage that could give Panama 30 million to 40 million dollars a year. Panama has its sights set on even higher guaranteed incomes not based on royalties.

Defense. The Panamanians want U.S. to reduce military installations from the present 14 to three.

Panama also contends that the inter-American training schools run by the U.S. in the Zone violate the treaty and the canal's neutrality. The schools offer more than 40 courses, ranging from command-and-staff training to Air Force operations and maintenance.

The U.S. has not yet been officially asked to close the schools and hopes to retain some of their capabilities.

TIME BOMB IN PANAMA

[continued from preceding page]

banned, and the General consults only with a rubber-stamp assembly of community representatives. There are a President and Vice President but they have no power.

Even Panamanians who accuse General Torrijos of being a dictator admit the country is making progress. Per capita income has risen to \$939, one of the highest in Latin America.

The canal plays an important role in the country's economy. Salaries and other benefits generate 237 million dollars a year for the Republic, a substantial part of its gross national product.

Castro's path? Opponents of the regime charge that the Government has Communists in it and that the General is leading Panama down the path set by Castro in Cuba. Panamanian Communists accompanied General Torrijos on his visit to Havana last January, and the Cuban Embassy, established here in 1974, has a staff of 60, far too large for this tiny country.

The General himself is said to be disturbed by Cuban attempts to meddle in student politics and to make contacts in the National Guard. He denies that he is a Marxist and adds: "Everybody seems to be trying to push me into a marriage with Castro, but I don't want to be in that church."

Panamanian officials encourage the impression that they would prefer to keep and strengthen their economic ties to the U.S. rather than move closer to Cuba. U.S. aid runs between 15 and 20 millions a year, almost all in loans. Officials also insist that private foreign investment is needed and welcome.

Panama is in a slump, partly because of the world recession but also because of lack of business confidence in General Torrijos. As a result, the Government must borrow abroad. Unemployment is around 9 per cent.

Allies' price. Settlement of the dispute with the U.S. over the canal would free Torrijos to deal with domestic problems. Says an aide: "A new treaty would remove the only major problem between the U.S. and Panama. We would become the most loyal allies anywhere for the Americans."

Many Americans feel that a new pact would enable General Torrijos to proclaim the achievement of his most important objective and then he could start restoring civilian rule.

On the other hand, it is generally held here that endless stalemate in the negotiations would most likely force Torrijos to the far left, and that eventually he would seek outside assistance in the struggle to take over the Canal Zone.



Wives of Americans employed in Canal Zone demonstrate against cutbacks in services and job benefits. Wildcat strikes temporarily closed vital waterway.

WHY "ZONIANS" FEEL THEY'RE BEING SOLD OUT

BALBOA, Canal Zone

Talk with the "Zonians"—the Americans employed by the Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone Government—and you find two strongly held convictions:

1. They believe they are being victimized by what is called a secret plan to eliminate them as a potent obstacle to a new treaty.

2. They believe the U.S. Government is "selling out" to a man they call an "anti-American, pro-Communist dictator"—Panama's Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera.

Many of these Americans—ship pilots, teachers, engineers, shopkeepers, firemen, policemen and their families—have spent most of their lives here. Some are second and third-generation canal workers.

The handwriting they see on the wall is an end to their well-ordered and long-cherished way of life when a new treaty, now being negotiated, eventually closes out U.S. hegemony over the Zone.

The Zonians have lived in uncertainty since 1964 when the U.S. conceded the need for a new treaty. Recent actions by the Canal Zone administration—cutbacks in services and job benefits and attempts to integrate the Panamanian and American schools in the Zone—have deepened fears that Zonians are being pressured to pull out.

However, Maj. Gen. Harold R. Parfitt, Governor of the Zone, insists the cutbacks were to save money. The canal administration is in the red because of reduced ship transits and higher operating costs.

Another point that worries American residents of the Zone: They have little faith in assurances by U.S. and Panamanian officials

that jobs and careers won't be affected when present treaty arrangements are changed.

There also are complaints that Zonians are "being kept in the dark" about the negotiations. Says one resident: "Even if it is bad news we should be told the truth so we can plan for the future."

In mid-March, a wildcat strike by the Zonians shut down the canal for several days. U.S. officials say the strike, ostensibly in protest against the new pay scales, actually had its origins in the worry of employes about their future. The Zonians, it is claimed, were trying to attract attention in the U.S. and build up popular support against any basic change in the status of the Zone.

Rising tensions. The atmosphere inside the Zone is highly charged. Zonians say that morale and efficiency are fast declining. Tensions trigger family quarrels; the need for psychiatric counseling is increasing.

Of the 38,000 Americans in the Zone, only 10,000 are known as Zonians. The others are military personnel and their dependents. The civilians say they are now ashamed to be called Zonians because that identifies them as "luxury workers in a colonial enclave," which is something they deny.

Average wages are \$7.74 an hour and life for many, though comfortable, is hardly luxurious. Many houses are small and substandard.

Some residents express fears about the safety of their families as more Panamanians move into security jobs. A worried father asks:

"What happens if fighting breaks out? Would Panamanian guards protect Americans?"

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
RICHARD CHENEY
JAMES CONNOR
JERRY JONES
DAVID GERGEN

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN *RG*

This new article on the unreliability of polling is important reading. The evidence is that pre-primary polling is especially unreliable, that even people with opinions don't report them accurately, and that there is no public opinion on most issues. See the marked passages on pages 72-73, 87, and 89.

Attachment

5/7/76

*Copy of article by Lipset
from The Public Interest*



Who's No. 1? Don't Ask Rumsfeld

By KENNETH H. BACON

WASHINGTON — Donald Rumsfeld knows how to walk through a political understorm without getting wet enough to smother his crisp confidence or dull his tight smile.

In the early days of the Nixon administration he left a safe congressional seat to the Office of Economic Opportunity and the antipoverty program was under attack from the right and the left—and Rumsfeld emerged with his reputation unscathed. Then, as director of the Cost of Living Council, he supervised a complex system of wage and price controls while working to convince businessmen that the Nixon administration really did believe in free markets. He continued to serve the Nixon regime during the Watergate scandals but managed to watch safely from Europe, where he was Ambassador to NATO.

Now Mr. Rumsfeld, as Secretary of Defense, finds himself in the middle of a debate about America's military strength. He will be President Ronald Reagan's first pick for the job. He argues that the U.S. lags dangerously behind the Soviet Union in armed might; but some analysts agree that charge helped to lead to a smashing victory in the Texas primary last Saturday and to his upset win in the Indiana primary on Tuesday. President Ford sharply denies what he calls Mr. Rumsfeld's "distorted allegations" and asserts that "the United States today is the single most powerful nation on earth, unmatched in all history, and we're going to keep it that way."

Rumsfeld's Reply

But as the question of Soviet military superiority has become the most emotional issue in the Republican presidential primaries and has helped rejuvenate Mr. Rumsfeld's campaign, Secretary Rumsfeld avoids complete support of his boss in the White House. He has criticized Mr. Ford for "simplistic formulations" about defense but, when asked directly if the U.S. is second to the Soviet Union, Mr. Rumsfeld typically gives an answer that differs considerably from Mr. Ford's response to the same question.

"There's no way to take a complicated subject that involves a whole host of measurements and categorize it with a phrase or word," Mr. Rumsfeld says. "The specific words I've used in testimony before Congress are that we have what I describe as 'rough equivalence.' This is a net assessment phrase. It's a suggestion that there are certainly areas where the Soviets are ahead; there are certainly areas where the U.S. is ahead; there are certain areas where we have approximate parity. But the important point is today we do have the capability of doing the job."

As to Mr. Rumsfeld's credit, his assessment is based on the rational, unemotional analysis that should characterize the Defense Department's presentation of the military picture to the Congress and to the public. But its very balance makes the Rumsfeld response sound rather tepid next to Mr. Ford's ringing assertion that the U.S. "is unsurpassed militarily." The disparity between the statements by the President and his Secretary of Defense seems rather puzzling as Mr. Ford's Republican challenger continues to exploit the military weakness charge. Why the difference? One reason might be simply that the defense chief has sworn off political activ-

ity in this election year. But there's a deeper explanation: President Ford and Secretary Rumsfeld are courting different audiences. While Mr. Ford is trying to win support from the moderate and right wings of the Republican Party, Mr. Rumsfeld is working to persuade a Democratic Congress to pass a sharply increased defense budget in the fiscal year starting Oct. 1 while laying the ground work for a series of additional increases during the next five years.

The Ford administration has asked Congress to approve military outlays of \$100.1 billion in fiscal year 1977, up about \$8.9 billion from the current year.

When asked if the U.S. is second to the Soviet Union militarily, Mr. Rumsfeld typically gives an answer that differs considerably from Mr. Ford's.

In terms of total obligational authority—amounts to be approved or already approved by Congress for spending both in fiscal 1977 and later years—the administration proposes \$112.7 billion, up \$14.4 billion from this year. Within five years, the administration sees the annual outlay rising to \$141.3 billion and the obligational authority to \$149.7 billion. Most of the increase would go for new weapons, such as the B1 long-range bomber.

To sell this increase in defense spending in a year when the administration is proposing restraint in a number of popular social programs, Mr. Rumsfeld has emphasized that during the last decade the Soviet Union has been gaining on the U.S. in military strength. Starting from a position of clear inferiority, the Soviet Union has reached parity and, unless Congress agrees to significant boosts in defense funds, could surpass the U.S., he says.

To back up his contention, Mr. Rumsfeld has given Congress a sobering array of data. Between 1965 and 1975 the "established real resources allocated to Soviet national defense grew from about \$107 billion to about \$144 billion in constant fiscal-year 1977 dollars, an annual average change of about 3%" based on Central Intelligence Agency estimates, the Secretary says. In the same 1977 dollars, U.S. defense spending has gone from about \$110 billion in 1965 to slightly less than \$101 billion in 1975. "Since about 1970, the Soviet program has exceeded that of the U.S. in every year; in 1975 it did so by approximately 42%," according to Mr. Rumsfeld. "This pattern of Soviet effort outstripping that of the U.S. is reflected in practically every major component of the military programs."

While Democratic Rep. Les Aspin of Wisconsin and other liberals have noted that differences between the American and Russian economies and budgeting processes make it difficult to compare military spending figures, there is widespread agreement in Congress that the Soviet Union has made strong gains in several areas, particularly in intercontinental ballistic missiles and in naval strength. So far Congress appears willing to give the administration the defense budget it wants. Both the House and the Senate Budget Committees have set defense spending tar-

gets close to what the administration seeks, and the House has passed a defense procurement and research bill that's more generous than Mr. Ford requested.

"We have made defense take the cuts in the last few years to find money for social programs, but no longer," says Democratic Sen. Lawton Chiles of Florida; now defense appears more urgent. "There's no great desire to take money from defense funds," reports Rep. Aspin, a frequent Pentagon critic; whereas military spending used to be assailed as too lavish, "what's happened now is that domestic programs are under attack" as too costly and ineffective. "Everybody is walking on eggs when you talk about cutting defense spending" this year, adds Rep. Thomas Downey, a liberal Democrat from New York.

The basic reasons for the shift in congressional leanings are the concern over increased Soviet military strength, a rising public skepticism of the benefits of arms control and other agreements with the Soviet Union, and Mr. Reagan's ability to win political support by charging U.S. inferiority.

A Voter Switch

Many politicians are learning that their constituents are abandoning their post-Vietnam disenchantment with military spending and beginning to favor bigger defense budgets. A recent survey by Sen. Chiles found that 25% of those sampled favor an increase in defense spending and 33% think the defense outlays shouldn't be cut, while 42% favor cutting spending. A survey two years ago showed voters favoring cuts by a three-to-one margin, he says. A Gallup Poll released last month showed that "public support for defense spending has increased to the highest point" in seven years.

Members of Congress have been swayed, too, by Secretary Rumsfeld's skillful use of the "adverse trends" argument. But his steadfast adherence to this unfavorable comparison for the U.S. makes it hard for him to turn around and support the President's theme of unquestioned American superiority. Mr. Rumsfeld would risk losing the credibility he has carefully nurtured during his five months as Defense Secretary.

Clearly Mr. Rumsfeld is caught between the position of his chief and that of the Republican challenger. While the figures the Secretary presents to Congress add up to clear superiority on Mr. Ford's calculator and to "rough equivalence" on Mr. Rumsfeld's, Mr. Reagan concludes that the U.S. is a "second-rate power." And he blames Mr. Ford, although the President has been in office less than two years and has had a strong defense record both in Congress and in the White House.

Mr. Reagan's loudly trumpeted charge contributed to the President's defeats in Texas and Indiana, and it's sure to remain a strong talking point for his Republican challenger. But the allegation that the U.S. is no longer No. 1 is helping the Ford administration win a big boost in defense spending from Congress. The question is: How long can Mr. Rumsfeld remain the man in the middle?

Mr. Bacon, a member of the Journal's Washington bureau, covers the Defense Department.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

6 MAY 1976

Dr. Robert A. Goldwin
Special Consultant to the President
The White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bob:

Since President Truman's 1951 Proclamation establishing the third Saturday of May as Armed Forces Day, each succeeding President has reaffirmed this observance.

This year, in recognition of the Nation's Bicentennial, the Department of Defense has expanded the traditional observance into an Armed Forces Week.

The Military Services in the National Capital Area will conduct a week-long joint observance of Armed Forces Week at the Washington Monument starting Saturday, May 8. This will consist of displays and exhibits from all the uniformed services and a daily schedule of appearances by military and ceremonial units. I plan to open the area officially at 9:30 a.m., Saturday, May 8.

You are invited to attend a special ceremony for the President's visit scheduled for Monday, May 10, at 11:00 a.m.

I will appreciate it if you can let my office (OXford 5-4965) know by May 7 whether you will be able to attend.

Sincerely,

Goldwin

MB: accept



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1976

Dear Bob:

Sorry to hear about the eye. I hope that, as you anticipated, you are back in good health by the time this note reaches you.

See you soon.

Warm regards,



Donald Rumsfeld

Honorable Robert A. Goldwin
Adviser to the Secretary of
Defense
Room 3E941
The Pentagon



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7/23/76

TO: DR

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

Bob

COMMENTS: I came across
this piece on "the most
important thing" that
I wrote a year or more
ago.

I recommend that
you use it.



(Goldwin) *RAG*

BIG THEME Q AND A'S

Q: Mr. President, a frequent criticism heard against you is that you express no long-range view of America, that you have no grand vision of the future of America, that you have no blueprint, no sense of direction for the long-haul, that your view is limited by the day-to-day business of the White House. Can you tell us what your long-range hopes are for America?

A: It isn't easy to answer such a question in a few sentences, but I will try.

No matter how many detailed matters are always being brought before me every day for decision, I try to keep in mind the most important thing about America.

We are a democratic republic. We stand for liberty, equality, and justice for all. Those are our principles. We fall short in practice, but those are our standards. That is what is special about this nation, and that is what must be protected, encouraged, and spread.

Representative democracy is endangered almost everywhere in the world today, and there is a real threat that political liberty, our basic principle, our national lifeblood, the best hope of the world, may disappear. That would be a calamity for all mankind.

Through all of the domestic problems we face--economic, social, political--I try to keep foremost in my mind that what we are really struggling to do is preserve political liberty.

In all of our international dealings--with allies, with potential adversaries, with the uncommitted nations, in bilateral relations, in international organizations, everywhere and in every way--I try always to remember that political liberty is our cause, that is what we are struggling for, that is what we stand for.

Now, it isn't easy when you have a tricky technical problem of arms control or export policy or monetary policy to know which decision helps or hurts the cause of political liberty, and some times we make mistakes.



But my point is that we do not advance our military policy or our economic policy because we want to dominate the world and tell everyone else what to do--I would be ashamed of such an America. Our political and economic and military policies exist for the sake of our principles: liberty, equality and justice, for ourselves and for the world.



(Goldwin)

for DR, SecDef

First Draft
7/7/76

General speech: "What's Important?"

It is often said of some high offices that they are "unmanageable"

That they are more than any one person can bring under control

Some say it of the presidency, for example

Often it is said of positions like Secretary of HEW or Defense

In a sense, perhaps, it is true

For example, consider some of the things that SecDef is responsible for:

- Budget over \$100 billion
- civilian personnel of _____
- armed force of _____
- (laundry list)

And the argument goes that by the time one learns enough about these matters to get control of them, his time is up and someone else moves in to start all over again

I, obviously, don't think there is merit in this assertion

Compare it to the demands on a thoughtful and attentive citizen

What does he have to think about and consider concerning military policy?

- who the Commander in Chief ought to be
- size of defense budget
- volunteer armed forces or draft
- military aid and sales to foreign powers
- transfer of technology
-
- (laundry list)
-

Compare the responsibilities of the SecDef and a citizen:

- SecDef has more direct personal and official responsibility
- SecDef has more expert assistance at his disposal



But the citizen has an ultimate responsibility, and plenty of expert information, analysis, and advice from newspapers, magazines, TV, and books.

In fact, both the SecDef and the citizen suffer from the same difficulty: more information, analysis, and advice than can be easily assimilated. But I think both jobs are manageable

The big problem, the reason that it is said that the jobs of SecDef and citizen are thought to be more than one person can manage, is that there is too much to absorb, too much to keep in mind, too much to relate to the other relevant factors.

What can be done? The answer is simple to give, hard to follow. But there is an answer and it is the reason that I think the jobs of SecDef and citizen are manageable, can be done well, and should be acknowledged as manageable.

The essential first step is simply to ask, What is most important? What comes first?

What comes first, what is most important is this: The United States stands for political freedom, at home and throughout the world.

Our objective is to preserve freedom, enhance freedom, and spread freedom--for ourselves, for our friends and allies, and ultimately, for all mankind.

The central tenet of US foreign and military policy is that we are freedom's great champion. Without us, the cause of freedom would be doomed in the world. With us, as the world stands now, we decidedly have a fighting chance.

Let me show you how a firm grasp of this principle helps to give shape to thinking, and deciding, and acting on defense questions--for a SecDef or for a thoughtful citizen:

detente
 Western Europe
 China
 Middle East
 Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
 Franco Spain, Salazar Portugal, Greek Colonels
 Chile



Oil on the Waters 7/28/76

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—The Greco-Turkish crisis is again heating up just two years after the neighboring states, whose ancient quarrels dominate national emotions far more than their theoretical alliance in NATO, came to the verge of war over Turkey's military landing in Cyprus.

Now, with the formally announced intention of sending a Turkish seismic vessel, Sismik 1—Hora, to explore for oil on the Aegean Sea floor, Athens officially indicates it will oppose any intrusion by the ship in maritime areas considered Greek. Ankara has responded that interference with Sismik's probes will be held an act of piracy.

Meanwhile, an appalled NATO is trying to head off a possible clash. Athens has informed allied headquarters it will use force to prevent the seismic ship's trespass into waters considered Greek. Ankara, however, insists it only intends to survey the continental shelf extending under the Aegean from the Anatolian mainland. NATO urges caution on both but neither country is famous for heeding that particular word.

To make matters worse, religious warfare has been tragically spreading in the eastern Mediterranean. The Arab-Israeli conflict has always had such undertones; the thought of an Islamic *jihad* (holy war) against the Jews often bubbles beneath the surface. The crucial struggle over Jerusalem is immediately involved in this aspect of the quarrel because of the significance of that city's holy places.

Now the Lebanon is bloodily ravaged by continuing slaughter of and by Moslems and Christians. All this adds an ever more imminent encroachment of the saddest of reasons for battle—disagreements on divine credomoving northward to the area of Turkey and Greece, where Christianity has been pitted in the battle against Islam (and vice versa) since the days of Byzantium.

Turkey has been rendered giddy by success in seizing a chunk of Cyprus by force in 1974. This released all kinds of revived resentment against what once was termed the *megala idea* or "great idea" (long since abandoned) of Greek expansion into Anatolia. Ankara resents the fact that Athens possesses islands only a few miles from continental Turkey and, disregarding treaty pledges, has militarized them.

For their part, the Greeks are genuinely convinced the Turks are deliberately seeking to isolate the offshore islands, such as Mytilene, Chios and Samos, by gaining control of the air

space above them and the sea shelf beneath them before grabbing the territories themselves. Athens asserts Ankara is harking back to Ottoman imperial days of expansionism, nationalism and Islamic power.

The fundamental Greek policy response is to try to integrate itself ever more closely into Western Europe through the European Community. For its part, Turkey seems to be leaning more on both the Soviet Union and the Moslem Arab states, even though the latter are edging away from Moscow.

An additional nasty factor is the total absence of international agreement on the laws of sea and subsea space, despite numerous international conferences. After Greece discovered Aegean petroleum deposits in 1974, this further poisoned Greco-Turkish relationships. No accord anywhere defines precisely what a continental shelf is when it borders two or more countries—as for example the straits leading between Denmark, Norway, Sweden and West Germany into the Baltic.

Efforts have been going on for months to submit the Athens-Ankara argument to the World Court at The Hague but the two capitals have never even managed to agree on terms of reference. Now both countries are mobilizing their military forces, not against some anti-NATO adversary but against each other, in what is called a "state of advanced alert."

Moreover, the Turks—who have been consistently anti-Russian for centuries—are cozying up to Moscow as a kind of reinsurance policy, despite the fact that the key small minority keeping the present Ankara Government in power is strongly right-wing. Turkey even went so far as to violate the 1936 Montreux Convention governing the Black Sea straits and permitted the Soviets to send an aircraft carrier into the Mediterranean.

Each day that passes makes the split seem more dangerous, more imminent in terms of crisis, and more potentially widespread in terms of international danger should a misplaced spark ignite a misjudged fire. And public opinion in both countries has become so passionately excited that cool heads in each Government have a steadily diminishing influence.

Now is a time for tough talk by friends and allies of both emotional peoples and a recourse to the machinery of peacekeeping among civilized nations, which have already agreed on a system of judicial modalities that often proved valid in the past.

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DR-

7/28/76

There is no solution to the Aegean oil problem through the World Court, or any other method designed to give exclusive rights to one or the other.

Why not advocate a truly bold solution: that they develop Aegean oil jointly.

Sulzberger's advice is sound, that their allies should talk tough to them about their importance to each other and to NATO. But "tough" is to be not content.

The content should be: you'll never benefit from the oil if you compete. Share it!
Bob G.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

8/6/76

Tank Trouble

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The refusal of Rep. Sam Stratton of New York, a Democratic power on military affairs, to breakfast privately with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld last Monday sounded an alarm from here to Bonn signalling a dangerous impasse on production of a new battle tank for the U.S. and NATO.

"Rummy wanted to romance Sam," a Stratton intimate told us, "and Sam isn't in the mood."

Stratton's grim mood assures bitter political warfare—with legal and international overtones—over the long new delay ordered by Rumsfeld in production of the army's XM-1 battle tank.

Rumsfeld's delay publicly and angrily resisted by Stratton and other military experts on the House Armed Services Committee (and privately by many officials in the army itself), reopens specifications for the new tank in an effort to assure standardization or interchangeability of key parts—tracks, fuel, night vision technology, telescope and main gun—with a new West German tank called the Leopard II.

Thus, it once again puts off the long-delayed decision on a new battle tank to replace the aging M-60, America's main battle tank first produced 16 years ago. That delay, imposed on the army by Rumsfeld, raises new questions about the capabilities of American arms versus Soviet arms. Moving dangerously ahead of the U.S. in both surface and sub-surface naval vessels, the Soviets also have an immense superiority over the U.S. in battle tanks (estimated by the Library of Congress at 30,000 Warsaw Pact tanks to a mere 9,000 NATO tanks in the Central European sector alone).

Rumsfeld, a former American ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is understandably commit-

ted to maximum joint development of NATO arms by the U.S. and its European allies. It was that commitment, certainly no desire within the army, that compelled army Secretary Martin R. Hoffman to announce a minimum four-month delay in awarding final production contract for the new tank.

Hoffman's explanation: the two competitors for the U.S. contract, Chrysler and General Motors, would have to come up with new "additional, alternative proposals" for assuring maximum interchangeability with the German Leopard, after which the army will decide whether to choose Chrysler's XM-1, GM's XM-1, the German Leopard II or a hybrid of all three as its new tank.

The political problem with this stunningly unexpected decision is that House Democratic leaders view it as directly violating the will of Congress, reached last fall after major disagreement between the House and the Senate Armed Services committees. The House position won, directing the administration to choose either GM or Chrysler by July 1976 and to go ahead full speed on final engineering work and assembly line production.

All that went down the drain with the Rumsfeld-imposed decision to seek major changes in XM-1 specifications from the two U.S. bidders—and from the German Leopard II, which is behind the XM-1 in development—to achieve maximum standardization.

What is so deeply troubling about Rumsfeld's decision ("Rummy's gamble," according to critics) is this: while a "standardized" tank is obviously a worthy goal, recent history shows it to be beyond reach with so complex a weapon as a battle tank.

That raises the real danger that in-

stead of a four-month delay (the shortest conceivable), the actual delay in starting full-scale production of the new tank will be closer to a year—or even more.

That is Stratton's nightmare and it mirrors the private view of army tank experts, some of whom have threatened to quit in anger. As Rep. Mel Price of Illinois, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told us: "We've been fighting a long time for a modern tank and this means one more delay of unpredictable duration. It could be critical."

Yet, Rumsfeld never checked with House leaders before his decision totally committed to standardization from his NATO days, Rumsfeld was dealing quietly with German defense minister Georg Leber in June as the July deadline for awarding the contract to GM or Chrysler approached. Then he ordered Undersecretary of the Army Norman Augustine to Bonn late last month to sign the memorandum of understanding with Leber committing the two countries to the radically different approach.

In the background are dismal failures to develop a common U.S.-German tank. More pressing is the immediate future. The House may deny Rumsfeld the several hundred million dollars needed for the new standardization—interchangeability studies.

Such political warfare is precisely what may now be expected in the wake of Rumsfeld's decision. Accordingly, no matter how worthy his motive, Rumsfeld may rue his failure to consult with the House before making his decision, a decision that embroils the new U.S. battle tank in political warfare at home and an uncertain future abroad.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

13 SEP 1976

Dr. Robert Goldwin
Special Consultant
Room 170
Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Bob:

In conjunction with the visit to Washington of Secretary General Luns and the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council of the fifteen member countries, the Department of Defense will dedicate a Pentagon corridor in honor of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We plan to officially dedicate this NATO Corridor, which is located on the 2nd floor, A Ring, between Corridors 1 and 10, on Wednesday, September 15, 1976, at 4:45 p.m.

You are cordially invited to attend this ceremony and the reception following.

Parking will be arranged for you at the River Entrance.

Sincerely,

Donald H. Rumsfeld



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

13 SEP 1976

Dr. Robert Goldwin
Special Consultant
Room 170
Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500


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