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MEET THE PRESS

Produced by Betty Cole Dukert SUNDAY, MARCH 7, 1976

GUEST:

RONALD REAGAN - Candidate for the Republican

Presidential Nomination

MODERATOR:

Bill Monroe - NBC News

PANEL:

Tom Pettit - NBC News

David S. Broder - Washington Post

George F. Will - Syndicated Columnist

Don Oliver - NBC News

This is a rush transcript provided for the information and convenience of the press. Accuracy is not guaranteed. In case of doubt, please check with MR- MONROE: MEET THE PRESS is originating today from the studios of WCKT in Miami, Florida.

Our guest is Ronald Reagan, Governor of California from 1967 to '75. The Florida primary day after tomorrow could prove a decisive factor in Mr. Reagan's campaign for the Republican presidential nomination.

Twelve days ago in New Hampshire, the only primary so far where both sides waged active campaigns, Mr. Reagan won 49 percent of the vote, President Ford 51 percent.

We will have the first questions now from Tom Pettit of NBC News.

MR. PETTIT: Mr. Reagan, do you expect to lose next Tuesday and, if so, why?

MR. REAGAN: No, I am going to hope to win, but I realize it is a horse race, a very close race here in Florida.

MR. PETTIT: Are you saving you will win?

MR. REAGAN: I never say that. I have always felt that you campaign on the basis that you are one vote behind. I say that I hope very much to win, but I know how close the race is.

MR. PETTIT: But the question was, do you expect to lose?

MR. REAGAN: I don't think that in a close horse race it could be a loser for a challenger.

MR. PETTIT: The President has been subject to some

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criticism from you lately, some heavy criticism. If he should be the nominee of your party instead of you, could you support him?

MR. REAGAN: Tom, I have always said that is a part of the creed we believe in out in California. Yes, I believe it is essential to have a Republican victory.

MR. PETTIT: Now, last year, Mr. Reagan, you proposed a plan to transfer some federal functions to state governments, and attached a \$90 billion figure to it.

Much later you said you were only talking theory, that the numbers didn't really mean anything.

Now, for those of us who try faithfully to report
your views, how can we tell when you are making a serious
proposal and how can we tell when you are only making a
hypothetical example? How do we know that you are leveling
with us?

MR. REAGAN: Well, Tom, I don't think that correctly states my position. I said the \$90 billion figure was used to illustrate the extent of the programs that I believe properly belong back with the state and local government.

MR. PETTIT: But you did not say that at the time.

MR. REAGAN: \$90 billion, yes, is what they cost in the present budget.

Now, I also, at the same time, said two things. I said that with the transfer of those programs to the states

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and local governments should go a transfer of the sources of revenue presently used by the federal government. I also said that there would not be a net savings of \$90 billion because very obviously the state and local governments would be taking those same tax sources and using them to pay for the present federal share, but I said there would be considerable savings because, No. 1, you would get rid of a layer of administrative overhead at the Washington level and at the same time I believe the states and local governments would run those programs far more efficiently and effectively.

There is no organization in the United States, including the United States government, that has as high an overhead, administrative overhead, as does the federal government.

(Announcements)

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MR. BRODER: Governor, I suppose the fundamental question facing your candidacy at this point is this: With the nation at peace and economic recovery obvious, why should the Republican party change nominees or why should the country change Presidents?

MR. REAGAN: Well, Dave, I disagree with the idea
that prosperity is evidently at hand. I know that just
recently some figures have been released to indicate that
possibly the cost-of-living is going down and that unemployment is dropping and so forth. At the same time that some areas

of the country, particularly in the northeast, have seen an increase of tens and tens of thousands of unemployed, but isn't it possible that we are much in the same position we were at the time of the so-called Nixon recession?

In 1970, the bi-election—that year found the Republican party suffering because we were in a recession; we had unemployment of about six or seven percent, and we had inflation of about six and a fraction percent, and then, with the 1972 election coming on they started emergency measures, anti-recession measures; not fighting the original cause of all of this which is the inflation. They brought inflation down to 2.4 percent; they brought unemployment down and everyone went into the '72 election and the campaign year talking prosperity and business upsurge.

And then in 1973 the roof fell in. Only this time inflation was 12 percent and unemployment was ten percent.

Now, I fear very much that we may be in exactly the same position. We have been resorting to recession emergency measures. Nothing has been done yet to fight the real cause of this, which is inflation.

Now, when the roof falls in again, after the '76 election, as a result of it, is it going to doble again?

Is this time the inflation going to be 25 percent? Is the unemployment going to be double the ten percent we had the last time?

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MR. BRODER: In 1972, if I recall correctly, you keynoted the Republican convention here and strongly supported Mr.

MR. REAGAN: Of course.

MR. BRODER: If the arguments you are making today are valid, why weren't they equally valid in 1972?

MR. REAGAN: Oh, listen, I disagreed publicly on the basis of the same thing, of fighting this. At the same time, however, let me point out that Mr. Nixon himself was willing to admit in that campaign that things like wage and price controls were temporary measures which he felt had been forced upon him and that he would not institutionalize the bureaucracy that was running those programs.

Now, organized labor, the hierarchy of organized labor, was much opposed to him for not making this permanent, and a part of our government procedure, and he wouldn't do it.

I made all of those things clear and was still speaking out against the real villain which is inflation.

Now, right now we have the figures that, under the present administration, virtually a fourth of the entire national debt has been accumulated in this brief period.

We have gone \$95 billion deeper into debt than we were just one year ago. That is not a way, I believe, for a permanent solution to our economic problems. On the international scene I have been speaking out in the last few days on what I think is wrong there. I think that internationally, in the foreign scene this country is in great danger, and I just read the interview that has been given by General Haig of NATO where he describes

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this as being at the edge of disaster.

MR. WILL: About foreing policy issues, Governor, let me ask you a few specific questions: If you were President, today, would you be prepared to tell the American farmer that you would embargo further grain sales to the Soviet Union until they and their satellite troops got out of Africa?

MR. REAGAN: I happen to believe in the free marketplace.

I have, earlier I have expressed questions as to whether we properly studied the whole matter of trade with the Soviet Union. Since that time, being interested in the farm problems as I have for many years, and being on the fringe of farming, myself, I looked into this matter.

brnly say we won't sell. I happen to believe that right now the free marketplace, allowing American farmers to sell their produce in the international market, even the Soviet Union, is a greater advantage to us than it is to the Soviet Union, and I think the mistake that was made with our farmers was when the government told them to raise everything they could, grow all the crops they could, and that they would have free access to the market; and then yielded to pressure from another direction, and after they had harvested the grain, put an embargo on, and when they were finally released to sell it, the market had shrunk because they had found other sources, but also the price had been cut virtually in half.

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I think we should turn the American farmers loose on the free marketplace to do what he can do better than any other farmers in the world.

MR. WILL: Governor, if you were President today, would you support using pressure, such as Senator Jackson's measure, to make economic cooperation with the Soviet Union contingent upon them liberalizing their immigration laws?

MR. REAGAN: Oh, I think, whether that particular specific is one or not, I think we should — well, this is what I criticized about detente. It has been a one-way street. We are making the concessions, we are giving them the things they want; we ask nothing in return. In fact, we give them things before we ask for the return. I think it has to be a two-way street, and depending on the importance of what it is they ask, I think that should measure the importance of what we ask in return.

MR. WILL: Yesterday you made a speech in which you said "If we are going to recognize Castro for the dictator that he is, we should act accordingly." You said "Let's have action match our words." What action would you use against Castro?

MR. REAGAN: Well, there has been a very strange thing about Cuba in the turn-around in our Administration. We started last May to open up relations, and we began persuading the Organization of American States to lift the embargo against it. By July we had managed to twist enough arms in that

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Russian satellite.

organization that by one vote they lifted the embargo.

And then here in our own country we appointed Senator Mc
Govern's former advisor on international affairs to a position in the State Department dealing with this subject. He went on the Hill and told the Intergovernmental Affairs Committee of

the Congress that we should be relaxing these tensions with Mr.

Our own Commerce Department opened up the trade on the part of subsidiaries of American corporations, and then, what I thought was rather significant, they transferred trade with Cuba, in the State Department, from the International Trade Division to the East-West Trade Division, which seemed to be putting an official stamp on our recognition that Cuba is a

Now, some of the things I think could be done if we really mean, now, as Mr. Ford said here in Miami just a few days ago, that he now recognizes Castro as an international outlaw and we will never recognize him, well, then, I think that means we go back to the Organization of American States and ask them to reinstitute the embargo. I think we tell our Commerce Department to go back to the embargo that we had with regard to American firms dealing with him; and we do a number of things of that kind. We might even ask Mr. Rogers, now, where he stands with regard to Mr. Castro.

MR. OLIVER: Governor, at one point in the New Hampshire

primary, in the race, it was generally conceded that you were ahead. Then President Ford won. Similarly in the Florida primary race, at one point I think most of the polls showed you to be quite a distance ahead. Now, you are said to be neck and neck. You claim to be neck and neck. Why this slippage?

What is happening to your campaign on both of these primary states?

MR. RFAGAN: I never thought that it was slippage. Certainly you have got campaign people and campaign aides who joyously come out and proclaim when a poll reveals, if those people who will state, now that more of them are stating in my way than in the other way and they do the same thing.

But in each instance there was a large block of undecided. Now, no one could realistically believe that that block of undecided would not polarize and begin to take sides.

My own feeling has been that it is an uphill fight against an incumbent. An incumbent has a great many things that he can do. For example, he can make news and be virtually on the network news and on the front page of the papers every day without moving out of the Oval Office. In addition, an incumbent can go into an area and announce that the shipyard is going to stay open. He can go to another area and say that the highway is going to be built. He can stand in front of a group of disabled veterans and tell them he is going to build a new hospital. And these are all the things that go with

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an incumbency that a challenger can't do.

Now, I have only met Mr. Ford in one contest and that was in New Hampshire, and Mr. Oliver, if you will forgive me for correcting you here, the unofficial tally had him at better than 50 percent. The official tally is that this is the first President in the history of the New Hampshire primary who did not get 50 percent of the vote. He got 49.4 and I got 48 percent, and then there were write-ins for 2 or 3,000 other Republican candidates. I outnumbered him better than two to one in Democratic write-ins on the Democratic ballots. I came away from New Hampshire, I think, as a challenger, with a victory.

MR. OLIVER: You think the same thing is going to happen to you in Florida?

MR. REAGAN: If it should happen in Florida, again, we go by delegates. And right now we are ahead of our own projections in the number of delegates that we thought we would have at this particular point, not lifting a finger in Massachusetts

MR. OLIVER: No, I am asking about Florida, Governor.

Do you think the same thing will happen among those voters who have not indicated a preference?

MR. REAGAN: That is the mystery. That is the thing you don't know. That is the thing that makes it a horse race.

I know that we have a fine campaign. I know that the people working for us have done everything possible to do, and I

wes, we still had an edge. But that block of undecided is big not enough to turn that edge. And as I have said right now, not getting the press attention in the primary is in a number of states where they are having caucuses, choosing convention delegates, we are running ahead in those states that are going at that right at the moment.

MR. MONROE: Governor, in connectionwith your criticism of detente and talking about taking a tougher line with Russia, would you have challenged the Soviet Union and the Cuban troops in terms of their interference in Angola the way President Ford and Secretary Kissinger did?

MR. REAGAN: Well, was that really a challenge, or did they
go before the Congress and ask the Congress to support them
in trying to arrange a coalition government which would include
the Communists?

MR. MONROE: What would you have done?

MR. REAGAN: Well, the point that I have been making to audiences here, and I have to include myself with the audiences in this, the argument that went on in Washington was done without any -- well, without the American people being provided any information on the strategic importance of Angola. This again is a part of the weakness of our national policy, or our foreign policy. We have not been told the facts as to where are the strategic areas that are important to our national security.

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We weren't told, is Angola important? Does Angola with a Russian presence there in any way endanger our national security? If it does, the people have a right to know this. If it doesn't, then I don't know what the argument was all about. We shouldn't have bothered. But I think to say that the Ford Administration was defeated by Congress on the matter of whether we should help and try to defeat the Soviet influence ignores the fact that, no, they had already agreed that they would go for a coalition government involving the Communists, and we found out in Laos that when you have a coalition government with the Communists that means the Communists eventually run the country.

MR. MONROE: In terms of your own assessment of the importance of Angola, would you have done anything specific, anything different from what the President and Secretary Kissinger did?

MR. REAGAN: I have to tell you that I don't have the facts on that. At one time I thought I did, but this was prior to this particular trouble. Back when it looked like Angola was going to be released as a colony from Portugal control, I had a briefing from Navy sources that indicated the Navy had great concern about the ability of force on Angola being able to control the south Atlantic sea lanes, particularly our tankers coming around the tip of Africa.

Since that time with Russia's activity up in Somolia and up in the Indian Ocean, the same people have revealed Angola did not loom so important because Russia can head off those

tankers without letting them come around the tip of Africa. So I don't know what the other facts were that were involved.

MR. PETTIT: Governor, you consider yourself to be a

staunch anti-communist, I would guess?

MR. FEAGAN: Yes.

MR. PETTIT: Ever since your days in the Screen Actors' Guild when routing the Communist influence in that union was important in Hollywood. Let me ask you about your views of Henry Kissinger and what he thinks about communism. Do you think that Henry Kissinger is naive about the Soviet Union, or do you think he knows what he is doing?

MR. REAGAN: Well, I am quite sure that Mr. Kissinger knows what he is doing, but whether what he is doing is to the best interests of the United States or not in the long run. I am not challenging his sincerity or his honesty.

MR. PETTIT: How about his patrictism?

MR. REAGAN: Or his patriotism. But he might conceive a more pessimistic view than I have. He might believe that the time has come in which it is necessary to make concessions to the Soviet Union bec ause we are no longer the No.1 nation in military strength. My own view is that we become once again the No. 1 nation, as the greatest guarantee for peace, and freedom of this country.

MR. PETTIT: Do you think Kissinger has too much influence on Mr. Ford?

MR. REAGAN: Well now, I think that is a question you would have to ask Mr. Ford or Mr. Kissinger. I am not privy

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to their meetings.

MR. PETTIT: Do you think they are soft on communism?

MR. REAGAN: Not in the sense of agreeing with

communism or being sympathetic to it, in other words. That

term "soft on communism" I think has a connotation in the way

it was used some several years ago, that someone is leaning

that way or does not believe that it is such a harsh

philosophy, or totalitarianism. No, I wouldn't say that

about either one of those men; whether, as I said before,

there is a pessimistic view in which we have deviated from

the belief that our greatest ability to maintain the peace

depends on our maintaining military supremacy in the world.

MR. BRODER: Governor, you spoke of the power of incumbency and we have seen Mr. Ford do a number of things from granting television interviews to making a judicial appointment with an eye to the Florida voters. Has he done anything in the course of this campaign that seems to you to be an abuse of the presidential office for political purposes?

MR. REAGAN: No, as I said before, these are the powers the incumbent has. I would hope, however, that our electorate would be sophisticated enough to recognize the use of those powers.

MR. BRODER: Now, you have used hard language in referring to his leadership, calling it timid and vascillating.

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Mr. Ford go on inside the Republican party, without denying either of you a chance to win the general election?

MR. REAGAN: Oh, I don't think this can deny either one of us a chance to win the general election because you only have to compare the record of the preent Democratic-dominated congress to see that whatever I said about Mr. Ford goes double for them. I think this Democratic congress, under its leadership, is the most imesponsible that I can remember in my lifetime, and I would do everything I could, if I were the nominee of our party, to help campaign, and, with others, as a member of a team and see if we couldn't get a change in that congress.

MR. MONROE: We have a little more than two minutes.

MR. WILL: Governor, if you had become President when Mr. Nixon resigned, would you have granted him a full, free and absolute pardon?

MR. REAGAN: I don't think there is any way to answer that question from outside where you don't have access to the facts that the Vice President had at the time. After all, Mr. Ford had been appointed Vice President; he was a part of that administration for many months. He was closely associated with the President and he went through the last horrendous hours leading up to the resignation, and what information he had I have no way of knowing.

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MR. WILL: But is there some information that you think is missing now? On the basis of the evidence you have now? Do you have any objection to the pardon?

MR. REAGAN: I have to say at the time I thought it was a humane thing to do.

MR. WILL: Have you changed your mind at all?

MR. REAGAN: Well, no, other than I have to -- I
do have to have, I think, that proviso, that I don't know
upon what facts other than humanity it was based upon.
Now, I don't know whether some of the charges that have been
made that there were still unexplained things that were
hemed off by that, whether that is true or not. I think
maybe in the near future history and the revelations of
others, including President Nixon, we will be able to shed
some light on this.

that former President Nixon was summoned to China because, "The Chinese hoped he could explain to them why America seems to be unwilling to play her part as a super power." What is your

MR. REAGAN: Well, the source is an accumulation of sources. I have had no conversation with Mr. Nixon. I don't know why he was invited to China. I haven't talked to him since I called him on November 19th, along with Mr. Ford and a number of other people to tell them I was going to make a declaration of candidacy.

But I think this comes from, obviously the knowledge that the Red Chinese are interested in the United States because of their fear of Russia, based on their belief that we are a great super power, number one militarily four years ago when they opened these negotiations.

MR. OLIVER: Have you been in contact with the Chinese government?

MR. REAGAN: No.

source for that claim?

MR. OLIVER: Then how can you make a specific charge like that, if you haven't talked to Mr. Nixon or to the government?

MR. REAGAN: No, I said I gave a supposition that they possibly sent the jet for Mr. Nixon because they wanted to know: Is the United States still the super power it was;

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is it going to hold firm, or are we going to continue making concessions to the Soviet Union to the point that maybe one day they might be one of the concessions.

MR. MONROE: I am sorry to interrupt, but our time is up.

Thank you, Governor, for being with us today on MEET THE PRESS.

Next Week: Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson, D. Washington)

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