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
[Fred Curtier ?]

Yes
confirmed
by Mary
Lukens
1/2/106

Notes from FC's 176
post election speech
at Econ. Club



1976 GENERAL ELECTION: FORD vs CARTER



	Carter	Ford	Other	Not Sure
Oct 29-31	46%	45%	4%	5%
Oct 23-26	45	44	4	7
Oct 19-20	45	42	6	7
Oct 7-11	44	40	7	9
September	46	39	6	9
Late Aug.	49	38	6	7
Early Aug.	58	29	7	6
July	62	27	5	6

PRESIDENT FORD GENERAL ELECTION POLLING FROM AUGUST TO NOVEMBER



Ill. Tenn.	Colo. Iowa N.Y. Va. Wash. Wisc.	Natl. Cal. Fla. Md. Miss. Mo. N.J. Ohio Penn. Tex.	Ind. Ky. N.C.	Conn. N.M.	Cal. La. Mich. R.I.	Conn. Ill. Iowa Md. Miss. Mo. N.J. N.Y. Ohio Oreg. Penn. Tenn. Tex. Wisc.	Ala. Fla. Ind. N.C. Okla. R.I. S.C. Tex.	Conn. Fla. Ill. Ind. Iowa Mo. N.J. N.M. N.Y. N.Y. Ohio Penn. Tenn. Tex. Va. Wisc.	R.I. Wisc. Tracking
									Oct. 27 to Nov. 1

Number of Interviews: 1400 (phone)


PRESIDENT FORD'S SCHEDULE IN SUMMARY FOR OCTOBER

President Ford's Schedule for October				
1 - 9	10 - 16	17 - 23	24 - 31	
D.C.	Dallas	D.C.	Orange,	Milwaukee
D.C.	D.C.	D.C.	San Diego,	St. Louis
D.C.	N.Y.C.	D.C.	Cal.	Houston
San Fran	Rockland-	D.C.	Seattle,	Phil., Pa.
San Fran	Westches-	D.C./NYC	Wash.	Syracuse
L.A.	ter, N.Y.	William-	Portland,	Buffalo/
Okla	D.C.	sberg, Va.	Ore.	Rochester
Dallas	Iowa/Ill	Richmond,	Pitts, Pa.	Suffolk
		Va.	Chicago	County/
		Raleigh,	Atlantic	NYC/Nau-
		N.C.	City, N.J.	sau Co.,
		Columbia,	Phil., Pa.	NY.
		S.C.	Indianap-	Nov 1
			olis, Ind.	
			Cinnin-	Akron/
			ati &	Canton/
			Cleveland,	Columbus,
			Ohio	Detroit,
				C. Rapids

Sources: Harris-ABC News Poll, MOR, and Various newspapers



1976 REPUBLICAN PRIMARY FIGHT: FORD vs REAGAN



PRIMARY STATES

CONVENTION/CAUCUS STATES

Key: _____ indicates primary/convention/caucus won by Ford

Sources: Congressional Quarterly, MOR, and Various newspapers


Oct 75	Jan 76	Feb 76	Mar 76	April 76	May 76	June 76
N.H.	N.C.	Fla	Fla Tr-	Neb.		Mo.
Fla	Wisc	Ind	acking	Texas		
Ill	Mich	N.H.-	Fla-	Texas-		
		Post	Post	Track-		
			Ill.-	ing		
			Track-			
			ing			
			Texas			
			Wisc.-			
			Track-			
			ing			



U.S. National -- November 22 through December 13, 1975

I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.

- a. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
- b. Where would you place Congress?
- c. Where would you place Gerald Ford?
- d. Where would you place Hubert Humphrey?
- e. Where would you place Ronald Reagan?



I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.

- a. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
- b. Where would you place Ronald Reagan?
- c. Where would you place Nelson Rockefeller?
- d. Where would you place Gerald Ford?

Republican Primary Voters






Figure 8. Ford's and Reagan's Semantic Differential Profiles: Republicans




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Figure 16. Total Electorate's Perceptions of Self, Congress and the President on Four Issues and Liberal/Conservative Continuum



KEY
 Self - - - - -
 Ford - - - - -
 Congress

Figure 17. Republicans' Perceptions of Self, Congress and the President on Four Issues and Liberal/Conservative Continuum.



KEY

Self - - - - -

Ford - - - - -

Congress

TO: ~~AG~~
FROM: ~~ML~~

PRESIDENT FORD'S SCHEDULE FOR OCTOBER, 1976

9/23 - 1st debate



1. D.C.
2. D.C.
3. D.C.
4. San Francisco
5. San Francisco
6. San Francisco (2nd debate - E. Europeans)
7. Los Angeles
8. L.A. & overnight in Oklahoma (unemployment figures released - bad news)
9. Dallas, Texas (Earl Butz "joke" released)
10. Dallas & D.C.
11. D.C.
12. D.C. & NYC
13. Rockland & Westchester Cos., N.Y. and Bergen & Union cos., N.J.
14. D.C.

Debate

15. Iowa and Illinois overnight (called Iowa State Univ Ohio State Univ) - *v.p. debate*
16. Illinois - train trip from Joliet to St. Louis (Sometime in here, 12-17 ~~is~~ the Gen'l Geo. Brown ~~Jewish/Israeli~~ comments *in mail*)
17. D.C.
18. D.C.
19. D.C.
20. D.C.
21. D.C. & NYC

Debate

22. D.C. & Williamsburg (3rd debate)
23. Richmond, Vir., Raleigh, N.C. & Columbia, S.C.
24. Orange & San Diego Cos., Calif. (½ hr. T.V.)
25. Seattle, Wash. and Portland, Ore.
26. Pittsburgh and Chicago (½ hr. T.V. in Chicago)
27. Atlantic City, N.J., and Philadelphia suburbs (½ hr. T.V. in Penn)
28. Indianapolis, Ind., Cincinnati and Cleveland, Ohio (½ T.V. in Cleveland)
29. Milwaukee, Wisc., St. Louis, Mo., & Houston overnight
30. Houston, Philadelphia suburbs, and Syracuse, N.Y.
31. Buffalo, Rochester, Suffolk Co., N.Y.C. & Nausau Co. (½ hr. T.V. in NYC)
1. Akron, Canton, Columbus, Ohio and Detroit suburbs, Grand Rapids

Debate

What did we learn ---

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

1976 Campaign Theme/Advertising Research for the President Ford Committee

Research on President Ford's campaign theme and advertising was undertaken by Market Opinion Research under Bob Teeter's supervision and by Schrader Research [of New York] under the supervision of Campaign '76. Schrader Research was responsible for basic ad testing of all pro-Ford ads, concentrating especially on the effects of using regional spokesmen advocating the Ford position. Schrader utilized a research design which called for the recruitment of 600 registered voters in four sites around the country. Recruited in on-site locations, they completed a pre-test questionnaire, viewed films of the ads imbedded in a series of various commercials and responded to a post-test questionnaire. The purpose of this research was to eliminate any advertisements which were ineffective.

The research task of Market Opinion Research was to assess the drawbacks of a campaign theme tied to the concept "freedom" and of advertisements which utilized some negative element, such as an attack on Carter. The campaign theme of "freedom" was tested in two focus groups held during the week prior to Ford's campaign kick-off in Ann Arbor. In-depth discussions were held to illuminate the concept of "freedom," the changes that the concept has undergone in the past decade, and the meaning that Ford and Carter are perceived to ascribe to the concept. Based on this research, a report was made to Doug Bailey which recommended that the proposed campaign theme of "A New Generation of Freedom" could be used without a serious negative attached. The proposed theme

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

did not actually become the theme of the campaign, but it was used frequently in the commercials and in President Ford's speeches.

MOR advertising testing was done with focus groups recruited in the Detroit area. A self-administered questionnaire was given to each respondent before viewing any advertisements. Following each commercial, respondents filled out a post-test questionnaire which relied heavily on open-ended inquiries. In addition, in-depth discussions were held as a means of further illuminating questionnaire responses. All data from these focus groups was analyzed within twenty-four hours of collection and a verbal report with recommendations for further action was delivered to Doug Bailey.

Recommendations were made to refilm part of one ad which was found to be offensive, not to air one of the commercials as it was perceived to be objectionable and to air two other ads as they were. All four of these recommendations were followed.

mistakes, tactics and strategy.



2. The general election campaign -- the polling

data base, its use and mis-use, the relation

to advertising, place strategy, and issue

formation --- in other words, where to go,

what to say, to whom, and when.

3. Analysis of the tactics and strategy from

President Ford's side only --- obvious mis-

takes, successful tactics and successful

strategy.

Of course, as Napoleon said after Waterloo and Lee after Gettysburg, "Hindsight is not only better, it makes you feel better."

Typically, when two challengers' elections in the United States are extremely close, in 1960 won by .2 of one percent, in 1968 by .7 of one percent, and in 1976 by a shift of about 8,000 votes in Ohio and Hawaii, Ford would have had 270 electoral votes, and Jimmy Carter would undoubtedly have been seriously considering recounts in some states.



Primary Campaign

First, let's look at the primary campaign, and I want to pass out among you a few key pages that show how the primaries themselves worked, the kind of data we collected, and what was happening to the delegate count. This is the period from February through late June.

As you will notice on the chart (Hand out chart), some interesting key points for Ford were the North Carolina primary, and the Wisconsin primary.



During the Wisconsin primary, Reagan unveiled his strong attack on Ford's foreign policy --- i.e. who was stronger, U.S.A. or Russia, particularly in terms of Helsinki agreement on Eastern European countries and former Secretary of Defense, Schlesinger's observations?

This nationwide television address, and the capsule half hour of television questions and answers, affected the Wisconsin data immediately. If Reagan had hit Wisconsin, he could have put his North Carolina win

with Wisconsin and Texas to produce an even stronger movement upward.



In terms of strategy, Ford's campaign, with the fumbling in North Carolina, allowed Reagan to get off the ground and compete right to the end. Secondly, in terms of research data, the strategy team involved three people as managers: "Bo" Calloway, Stu Spencer and Rogers Morton. Spencer and Bill Roberts saved Florida for Ford, and gave his campaign a critical upward push.

This period of the campaign is particularly tricky because Ford was what I call a half incumbent. He was perceived as an incumbent but was also a

challenger, and so he had to campaign for the presidency
against a very competent campaigner who was better on
television.



Primary data as accurate, and Ford/Reagan perception in ~~DATE~~ ^{U.S.}

An example of Ford's problem is this data from ~~New Hampshire~~ ^{a national wave.}

A further problem was that the research information
based on the primaries was, at best, a C+ effort in terms
of gathering accurate data because the number of differ-
ent possibilities. Whether a person votes in a primary,
depends on each state's individual restrictions, and the
decision process --- a day-to-day planning and evaluation
from one state to the next . . . to the next . . . so

you are always thinking two states ahead when they all

fall so fast.

Reagan's attack on Ford's foreign policy perceived weakness and was probably effective in keeping his campaign alive; but the fact of the matter is that Ford's record on voting for a strong national defense in Congress was unchallenged. The fact that Reagan could have mounted such a campaign is incredible and must be laid to the poor reporting by the media.

Another fascinating possibility is that the New Hampshire vote, the first state close to a ____% to ____% split, and the final delegate vote in Kansas



City were extremely close, a ____% to ____% split,

which means, of course, that New Hampshire may be an

indicator in some crude way.



Convention --- Organization

It primarily did one clear thing for Ford. He emerged as the party nominee from the convention, but he also learned just in time, I think, what kind of an organization he needed for the general campaign. He finally, after the convention, was left with an experienced group of professional people to run the campaign. When he named his five key people as a coordinating group, they were: James Baker, in charge of delegates and now chairman, Stu Spencer,

Robert Teeter, Elly Peterson, and Richard Cheney, who had replaced Rumsfeld as the chief of staff.



2. General Campaign

The period from the national convention to November 2, the day of the election (PASS OUT 2 MORE KEY SHEETS). One shows the vote pattern since 1952 from the Republican point of view, and the other shows the polling evidence and strategic information from, essentially, immediately following the national convention until November 1 (a nine-week period).

Now, for this discussion, I want you to remember that in 1972 Nixon spent \$60 million dollars. Each

candidate, this time, spent 21.8 million dollars, plus
\$3 million dollars in support from each national committee.

This means, and the campaign manager was well aware of it,
that it was also a horse race in terms of strategy and
research.

Now, what do we see in looking at these pages. . . .

1.



2.



3.

Strategy and Tactics



Looking at the period in October of the three debates, September 23, October 6, and 22, it is clear that Ford was on the rise up to the second debate, then flat, then came back, and closed in the last 10 days.

Secondly, it is fascinating that our data assembly phone work, done the night of the second debate, showed that up to the morning after the debate, Ford was perceived as the leader in the four general areas we were polling: 1) Who do you think is most concerned about problems of the average citizen? 2) Who would you most trust to do the right thing when making a difficult decision?

3) Who do you think would be the most effective in getting results on a tough problem? 4) Who do you think would do the best job of handling our economic problems?



5) Who do you think would be the most effective in handling foreign affairs and our national defense?

and as soon as the media discussed his misstatement

regarding the Eastern European countries, his rating

started to move down for the next two days. In other

words, the media perception of the event clearly

influenced, more than the event itself, the final

result.

See data

Another interesting example that makes you believe

this is a 1960-68 pattern is that the idea basis in

terms of what each candidate "stood for" was low ---

the knowledge about each candidate was low, compared to previous races. You had the possibility for potentially challenging a person's position on a candidate. In other words, they could take a position for Carter or Ford, but the advertising could move them from one to the



other or undecided. *This is Steeper's basic idea to explain the high level of "undecideds."*

If this is true that the idea base about these candidates was low in terms of the mind set that people had about them, then it would also account for a large undecided block of voters, which was certainly a phenomenon of 1976.

Now, let's get to the big state strategy. Let's talk about what everybody tried to do in the last five weeks, which was to win 5 of the big 8 states.

Here is the information they had:



Strategy and Tactics

