The original documents are located in Box 20, folder "November 28 - December 7, 1975 - Far East - Memoranda in Support of the President's Trip to the People's Republic of China (3)" of the National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974-1976 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

1a

RELATIONS WITH US

Digitized from Box 20 of the National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974-1976 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library

1b

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 030356

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . ÇMemorandum

TITLE . . . . China's View of Relations with the United States

CREATION DATE 11/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . 7 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035800410
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF GERALD FORD
BOX NUMBER 20
FOLDER TITLE . . . . November 28 - December 7, 1975 - Far East - Memoranda in Support of the President's Trip to the People's Republic of China (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 07/01/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

Sanitized 9/23/03

Approved For Release 2003/09/23 : NLF-CODEWORD-38-31-1-5

25X1

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted
AUTHORITY RAC NLF CODEWORD-38-31-1-5
BY ___ NARA, DATE 4/26/10

November 21, 1975

CHINA'S VIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

China continues to see the United States as a major piece in the international chess game, but it seems to be more skeptical of the immediate and tactical advantages of the relationship than perhaps it was in the 1971-1973 period. The Chinese at this stage do not seem prepared to see the US connection deteriorate sharply, but they also do not seem prepared to make many sacrifices to keep it on course. Although the Soviet Union continues to receive the lion's share of adverse Chinese propaganda, in the past year the decibel level of anti-US rhetoric has risen somewhat; moreover, Peking obviously has no qualms in accepting such strains as the flaps over the Chinese cultural troupe and the US mayors' delegation have produced.

The Chinese entered into the present relationship with the Soviets very much in mind, and this consideration is still paramount in China's view of the Washington connection. Because of its possible salutary effect on Soviet attitudes the Chinese have very much wanted the President's visit to take place. Their reading of the political atmosphere in the United States in the wake of the Vietnam debacle, however, appears to have suggested to them that the trip might have been deferred. To ensure that it took place on schedule, throughout the spring and summer they were busy passing the word in all quarters that President Ford would be welcome in China, that Peking considered the visit important, and that there were no preconditions attached to it.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/23 : NLF-CODEWORD-38-31-1-5

At the same time domestic audiences were being conditioned to expect little in the way of substantive advances in the bilateral relationship as a result of the trip. Specifically, they were informed that a breakthrough on the Taiwan problem was unlikely.

These themes have also been prominent in Chinese conversations with foreigners. Chinese leaders and diplomats have stressed that China remains patient concerning the Taiwan problem and that it is in no hurry to see the issue resolved. Teng Hsiao-ping in particular has stressed, in conversations with visitors, the proposition that China would prefer a peaceful resolution of the issue; in a recent discussion with New Zealand journalists he claimed that force would be contemplated in the "liberation" of the island only if Washington refused to accept the three conditions China has set forth for US recognition: a break in relations with Taipei, withdrawal of US forces from the island, and abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty. In general, however, he and other Chinese officials have been much less specific, leaving the option of use of force open.

In contrast to this rather relaxed view, however, recent internal directives and instructions have painted a gloomier view of the Taiwan situation. One assessment, issued in conjunction with a directive calling for the streamlining and modernization of the Chinese armed forces, claimed that there was a real possibility that Taipei, and Chiang Ching-kuo in particular, would seek to establish a working relationship with Moscow, and that in this eventuality China would be compelled to use force to recover the island. Another instruction also issued in connection with the directive calling for modernization of the armed forces stated that a senior military leader had been entrusted with the task of preparing a plan for conquest of the island within a five-year period.

Approved For Release 2003/09/23 : NLF-CODEWORD-38-31-1-5

An actual attack on Taiwan would divert considerable military resources from China's defense against a possible Soviet thrust; moreover, such an attack would not only destroy the nascent relationship with Washington but also that with Japan while souring relations with Western Europe and scaring off the nations of Southeast Asia. For these reasons it is unlikely that China is actually contemplating a move against the island, particularly within the time period mentioned in the documents. Nevertheless, these directives and instructions may well represent an accommodation to those who may be arguing that the current relationship with Washington has brought recovery of Taiwan no nearer. Teng Hsiao-ping in fact is reported to have remarked in connection with the instruction to prepare plans for conquest of the island that China "will no longer allow the United States to drag China by the nose" on the subject of Taiwan. The five-year deadline mentioned in the instruction would correspond with the 1980 elections in the United States and could mean that Chinese leaders were considering stepped-up pressure on Washington if it appeared at that time that the United States was prepared to postpone resolution of the problem indefinitely.

Signs of frustration regarding current US attitudes do not appear to be confined to this bilateral issue but also seem to spill over into areas of greater ultimate importance to China. Peking seems genuinely concerned about what it considers to be a deterioration of the balance of military power between Washington and Moscow. The Chinese appear to believe that Washington's overall international posture is defensive, while that of Moscow is aggressive; they seem concerned that the United States is entering at least a temporary period of neo-isolationism and probably fear that quarrels between the executive and legislative branches could limit Washing-

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/23 : NLF-CODEWORD-38-31-1-5

Approved For Release 2003/09/23 : NLF-CODEWORD-38-31-1-5

ton's freedom of action. US congressmen have been repeatedly advised to build up the American military arsenal, particularly in the area of conventional weapons. In this connection the Chinese have generally pointed to the possibility of a conventional war in Europe.

A parallel concern for the Chinese is continuing US efforts to cement detente with the USSR. They almost certainly believe that far greater US time and energy is expended on furthering the Soviet relationship than is expended on the Chinese connection, and that this effort has tended to strengthen Soviet self-confidence while correspondingly weakening the US will to resist putative Soviet encroachments. They also seem to suspect that the Executive Branch's defense of its Soviet policy in the public forum and in Congress tends to create "false illusions" both among the US public and in Western Europe. The current negotiations concerning Soviet purchases of US wheat, for example, are almost certainly viewed in Peking as an example of US "defensiveness" and willingness to relieve Soviet distress. Given the multifaceted nature of the current US-Soviet connection compared to the much more limited connection with Peking, the Chinese probably now suspect that Washington has pursued ties with China largely as a means of securing a "better deal" with Moscow. Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan implied as much in a recent conversation with a foreign "Marxist-Leninist."

Peking, to be sure, sees such events as the Sinai II agreement as a positive development, but in the Middle East as in Europe it does not seem convinced that US staying power is very great, and the Chinese have warned the Egyptians and other Arabs to be prepared for a Soviet riposte. In any event, gains in the Middle East are probably offset in Chinese eyes by what they consider to be the deleteri-

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/23 : NLF-CODEWORD-38-31-1-5

ous effects of the Helsinki summit on the situation in Europe. They seem genuinely to subscribe to the somewhat simplistic view that at the conference the US gratuitously accepted the legitimacy of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe.

This point, of course, was made over and again by the Chinese to the Secretary's party during his recent visit. Unabashed references to "Munich" in conversations with newsmen accompanying Dr. Kissinger injected a note that had not been present in Chinese allusions to US policy since the Secretary's initial visit in 1971. This rhetorical overkill doubtless is an index of genuine Chinese concern, but the sharpness of such remarks, coupled with Chiao Kuan-hua's pointed references to detente at the opening banquet, suggests that Peking may see some utility in publicizing their differences with Washington so long as movement on fundamental bilateral issues does not seem possible and at the same time the US remains relatively "passive" with respect to the Soviets -- even though Moscow might take some satisfaction from this public display of pique. The vituperative references to detente and CSCE were almost certainly authorized well before the Secretary began his visit, but public US acknowledgement just before Dr. Kissinger's arrival that normalization would not be completed this year may have suggested to the Chinese that the Soviets were bound to draw somewhat negative conclusions as to the state of Sino-US relations in any event.

In view of the attention the Chinese devoted to US detente policy during Dr. Kissinger's visit and in view of the favorable attention they had devoted to former Secretary Schlesinger's statements over the past year or two, the time of Dr. Schlesinger's departure from office -- after Dr. Kissinger's visit but before that of the President -- must have been somewhat disturbing to Peking. The evident delay in firming up arrangements for the advance technical mission's visit to China clearly was related to what must have been



Approved For Release 2003/09/23 : NLF-CODEWORD-38-31-1-5

25X1

an exhaustive examination by the Chinese of the implications of this development. Some elements of this putative review were probably embodied in NCNA's unprecedented round-up of selective -- and negative -- US and foreign reaction to Dr. Schlesinger's departure issued on November 7, but Chinese leaders almost certainly take a more sophisticated view of the direction of US foreign policy and of the current state of US domestic politics than this relatively low-level broadside would suggest.

Peking, for example, almost certainly drew some encouragement from the public disclosure of the current impasse in the SALT II negotiations and have probably concluded that a final agreement would be difficult if the present stalemate lasts appreciably into an election year; this presumably would mean that a Brezhnev visit to the United States paralleling that of the President to China would not occur. Significantly, instructions Peking has been issuing to its officials stationed abroad continue to portray the President's trip in a positive if not euphoric light. Moreover, at least one official, apparently drawing on material supplied by Peking, has suggested that US leaders privately take a more sober and balanced view of detente than the Chinese seem to think is indicated by public US statements on the subject.

In fact, the departure of Dr. Schlesinger may have caused the Chinese to examine the roots of their policy toward Washington; to the degree that they have done so they appear to have drawn the conclusion that the US connection still serves fundamental Chinese interests -- the President's visit, after all, is still going forward. However, Peking's recent return to the theme that China must be prepared for war with the Soviets, which had been in abeyance for two years, suggests that its view of the international scene, and by ex-

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/23 : NLF-CODEWORD-38-31-1-5

tension of the US connection, has darkened in the past six months or so. The Chinese, nevertheless, probably doubt that the factors they seem to believe limit US flexibility in the international sphere are permanent. And in any event they clearly do not, at this juncture, wish to run risks even greater than those they now face by reactivating an unlimited quarrel with Washington or permitting a public breach in the current relationship.



1c

RELATIONS WITH USSR

1d

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 030357

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . ÇMemorandum

TITLE . . . . Sino-Soviet Relations

CREATION DATE 11/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035800410
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF GERALD FORD
BOX NUMBER 20
FOLDER TITLE . . . . November 28 - December 7, 1975 - Far East - Memoranda in Support of the President's Trip to the People's Republic of China (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 07/01/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

Sanitized 9/10/04

Approved For Release 2004/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-1-7

SECRET

25X1



November 21, 1975

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Enmity toward the Soviet Union continues to be the mainspring of Chinese foreign policy. Peking considers itself to be in competition with Moscow everywhere in the world, gaining strength and support wherever it can, and attempting at least to limit Soviet influence and advantage elsewhere. Rivalry between the two Communist giants is a central feature of the international scene, analogous to the cold war between Washington and Moscow in the 1950s and early 1960s. In this competition the Soviets have certain built-in advantages, since they dispose of greater economic resources, much greater military firepower, and have -- in contrast to the Chinese -- truly global interests. Differences between the two parties run very deep, encompassing ideological disparities, emotional and even racial antipathies, territorial claims, and clashes of fundamental national interests. These differences are certain to continue while Mao Tse-tung, whose personal stake in the rivalry is very high, continues to live, and they will be very difficult to compose even after both he and Brezhnev have departed the scene.

Although there are no convincing signs that clashes such as those which took place in the spring of 1969 have recurred, the fundamentals of the dispute remain as intractable as ever. The Chinese have not withdrawn their demand, related to the border problem, for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from all areas designated as "disputed" by Peking. Soviet leaders have indicated that they will not comply with the demand -- except for turning over some river islands to the Chinese, an offer which Peking rejects as insufficient. The Chinese refuse to re-establish party-to-party relations, which were broken

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-TB_PF-20-3-1-7 9/10/04
state guidelines
BY ________ NLF, DATE 3/13/09

Presidential Library Review of DOS Equities is Required

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-1-7

Approved For Release 2004/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-1-7

25X1

off in 1966, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 remains a dead letter. The Soviets themselves show only minimal interest in party relations, and are presently slowly preparing for an international conference of Communist parties, through which Moscow hopes to isolate the Chinese.

One reason for the higher decible count is apparent Chinese apprehension that in the wake of the Indochina war the Soviets are now in a better position to "surround" and isolate China. Since last spring they have been saying that Moscow had the inside track in Hanoi, and their relations with the North Vietnamese have declined markedly since that time; Le Duan's recent endorsement of detente while in Moscow has doubtless lent additional color to Chinese concerns. Their fears for their southern flank are probably compounded by the potential for friction in Laos -- dominated by Hanoi -- as well as in Vietnam. [25X1] China may eventually be obliged to withdraw its engineering units from their roadbuilding tasks in northern Laos, where they presently provide a degree of Chinese leverage on Vientiane. In any event, since last spring Peking has attempted to secure from all visitors to China some acknowledgement of Soviet "hegemonistic" ambitions. Chinese complaints about detente, of course, complicated Secretary Kissinger's recent visit to Peking; Chinese demands for an "hegemony clause" in a Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship have stalemated negotiations on that document; and similar Chinese importunings may have been the reason no communique was issued at the conclusion of Chancellor Schmidt's recent visit to China.

The Chinese sense of vulnerability has also been compounded by developments in Europe that are not to their liking. They appear to believe that the successful conclusion of CSCE has consolidated the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, thereby permitting Moscow to devote greater energy to political probes further westward in Europe.

Approved For Release 2004/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-1-7



Approved For Release 2004/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-1-7

25X1

Peking seems especially concerned about the situation in southern Europe, which it believes is generally favorable to Moscow -- not only in the Iberian peninsula, but also in Italy and Turkey. The Chinese are also concerned about the situation in Yugoslavia, fearing that after the death of Tito Moscow may attempt to establish "hegemony" over that corner of the Balkans. Given their current "zero-sum" approach to international politics, they tend to view any gain for the Soviets a consequent loss for China.

Strategically, the Chinese seem less concerned about the possibility of an imminent Soviet attack than they were in 1969-1970. They are, however, perhaps a little more concerned on this subject than they were in 1973-1974. They have begun to brief cadres on the possibility of a Soviet attack on China, and while this is not entirely a wholly new theme, a "preparations for war" movement reminiscent of that of 1969-1972 has again begun to surface. This movement was in abeyance in the intervening two and a half years. Moreover, [redacted] a decision was apparently taken to streamline and modernize the Chinese force structure over the next several years; significantly, this decision was justified in terms of the necessity to fend off a putative Soviet attack. Given the time frame suggested for this modernization program, it is likely that Peking does not rate the likelihood of an immediate Soviet attack too highly.

25X1

Soviet public lecturers and [redacted] officials, for their part, continue to claim that China has the capacity to strike Soviet territory with its missiles. At the same time, Moscow continues to give every indication that it regards China as a long-term threat -- militarily as well as politically -- to the Soviet Union. The Soviets do seem, however, less concerned about the implications of the Sino-US detente for their political and strategic position than they did several years ago. Soviet officials, for example, continue



Approved For Release 2004/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-1-7

to point to what they perceive to be difficulties in the Peking-Washington relationship. Despite the currently rather high level of public vituperation, the general position that Moscow has sought to project is one of patient, long-suffering but expectant waiting. The Soviets have surfaced from time to time variants of their proposal for a border settlement and for a nonaggression pact. [25X1] however, Soviet officials admit that they are skeptical that even the death of Mao and other senior Chinese leaders would bring about any rapid improvement in relations.

Mao, on the other hand, seems to be genuinely worried about the durability of his virulently anti-Soviet policies. While it is highly unlikely that there is any leader in China who would argue for a full-scale rapprochement with the Soviet Union, there may be some elements in the military establishment and in the government bureaucracy who in time would be willing to push for a lesser level of tension with Moscow than now exists; this was apparently the position taken by former Defense Minister Lin Piao before his fall. Mao certainly seems to think that an incipient lobby for this course of action could develop, particularly after his death. The series of campaigns China has inaugurated in the past two years seems designed in part to cauterize the country against such a possibility. Nevertheless, the Chairman's own response to the military threat posed by the Soviet Union in its own way has been as cautious as that he imputes to potential critics. The slow rate at which China has been developing and deploying its missile forces since the fall of Lin Piao tends to keep Soviet concerns about China well below the flash-point, and the Chinese are presumably aware of this.

Despite the Chairman's evident fears of backsliding in the anti-Soviet effort after his own demise, it is most unlikely that the Soviets have in fact identified a given individual whom they


GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

Approved For Release 2004/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-1-7

25X1

believe would adopt an essentially pro-Soviet stance after Mao's death. It is likely, however, that the Lin episode and subsequent Chinese warnings about "capitulationism" have suggested to the Soviets that future disagreements in the Chinese leadership could involve quarrels over policy toward Moscow. Soviet officials [redacted] talk continually about what Moscow seems to believe are serious leadership problems in Peking, sometimes painting them in very lurid colors. There therefore may well be a temptation in Moscow to fish in troubled Chinese waters after Mao's death; the problem the Soviets will face -- and it may be an insuperable one -- is how to go about this successfully. A more rewarding proposition, and one the Soviets are likely initially to pursue after the Chairman's death, is to explore the possibilities for easier relations, much as the Chinese did after the fall of Khrushchev.

25X1

25X1

The problem for the Chinese, on the other hand, will be the fact of continuing Soviet military superiority over China. Mao himself has frequently stressed this point, arguing that any agreement with the USSR would have to be concluded from a position of Chinese inferiority, thereby permitting Moscow to exact unacceptably disadvantageous terms from China. A good number of Mao's successors are likely to continue to find this argument compelling. The Soviets would therefore probably have to make a fairly spectacular gesture indicating a large measure of "good faith" before the Chinese would be seriously tempted to consider an offer to compose differences. The obvious gesture the Soviets could make would be a pullback of at least some of their forces along the border without a prior Chinese commitment. But the Soviets, conscious of possible Chinese leadership problems and as acutely aware of their superior position as the Chinese, might find more than a token pullback difficult to make.



Approved For Release 2004/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-1-7

SINO-SOVIET BORDER

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

1f

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 030358

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . ÇMemorandum

TITLE . . . . The Military Balance Along the Sino-Soviet Border

CREATION DATE 11/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035800410
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF GERALD FORD
BOX NUMBER 20
FOLDER TITLE . . . . November 28 - December 7, 1975 - Far East - Memoranda in Support of the President's Trip to the People's Republic of China (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 07/01/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

'g

THE SUCCESSION

14

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 030359

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . ÇIntelligence Report

TITLE . . . . The Succession in China

CREATION DATE 10/1975

VOLUME . . . . 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035800410
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF GERALD FORD
BOX NUMBER 20
FOLDER TITLE . . . . November 28 - December 7, 1975 - Far East - Memoranda in Support of the President's Trip to the People's Republic of China (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 07/01/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

Sanitized 9/10/07

No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

25X1

OCI No. 1031/75

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1975

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The Succession in China

The issue of the succession to Mao Tse-tung--and more recently to Chou En-lai as well--is one of the most troublesome in Chinese politics. In one form or another it has been a cause of disputes in the Chinese leadership for more than a decade, and the issue today is by no means completely resolved. Problems concerning the succession were a major factor in the fall of both Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, each of whom had been successively designated as Mao's "chosen" successor; they also helped precipitate not only the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69 but also the anti-Confucius campaign of 1974. The disarray these two movements engendered in part suggests the high stakes for which the major contenders for ultimate power believe they are playing, but at the same time the contentiousness which the movements revealed and exacerbated has made resolution of the central problem more difficult. Teng Hsiao-ping, who now runs the country on a day-to-day basis, recently remarked to foreign newsmen that he expected difficulties in the transition period following the death of Mao and Chou.

There are three essential problems impinging on the succession question. One involves policy, one is largely institutional, and one is primarily personal in nature. All three issues interact with one another, and the leading figures among the Chinese leadership probably do not entirely separate them out at any given moment. The policy issue basically revolves around differing views about how China should be run and how its institutions should be organized. Should, that is, China follow

Note: This publication has been prepared jointly by the Office of Current Intelligence and Central Research Staff.

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt
AUTHORITY NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6 9/10/07
BY ___ NLF, DATE 3/13/09

25X1

MORI/CDF

No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

redacted form scanned Sept. 2010

No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

25X1

a course that is essentially "pragmatic," building a modern economy, encouraging technical skills, pursuing the goals of a modern nation-state under strong central direction and control, or should "shortcuts" be attempted through stress on revolutionary elan, ideological purity and mass effort, even at the expense of institutional cohesion, rational planning and the rapid development of technical expertise.

The institutional issue involves essentially a question of how power should be distributed among the major organs of state--the party, the government and the military. Should, that is, authority reside primarily in the party, as was the case in the 1950s and early 1960s, should it lie primarily with the military, as was the case in the late 1960s, or should it be distributed among all three institutions, as has been the case in the past four years. This issue is further complicated by divisions within the major institutions themselves. The party and to a lesser degree the government, for example, has long been split between a majority group devoted to the "pragmatic" tasks of modern nation-building under close centralized control who suffered greatly during the Cultural Revolution but have more recently been resurgent, and a smaller, ideologically-oriented "radical" group advocating the efficacy of mass enthusiasm who did well in the Cultural Revolution but have recently been partly eclipsed, while the military is divided between a technically-oriented group stressing the importance of modern weapons and a group stressing the importance of ideological motivation in warfare, as well as between the friends and enemies of the late defense minister, Lin Piao.

Personal issues, while real, are more shadowy. In retrospect it seems likely that personal differences long existed among the Chinese leadership; these differences were greatly sharpened and intensified by the struggles of the Cultural Revolution and more recent squabbles; some of these antipathies probably run too deep for any but the most temporary amelioration or truce. Those who were attacked in 1966-68 resent their accusers; those who did the attacking are fearful that old scores will eventually be paid off.

Formally at least, the Chinese envisage some form of collective leadership to succeed Mao and Chou. This collegial group is likely to be composed of a half

25X1



No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

dozen or more leaders who now occupy important positions in Peking. Apart from the fact that all are now individuals of great importance in China, however, the members of this group are a disparate lot, varying greatly in age, experience, ideological outlook and institutional loyalities. Strains tending to pull them apart are already visible. These strains are likely to intensify once the charismatic authority of Mao and to a lesser extent Chou is no longer a factor in leadership politics. It is unlikely that the collegial group will immediately split apart following these two leaders' death, however. All members of the collective leadership will be acutely aware of China's weakness in the early post Mao/Chou period, and all have been traumatized by the divisions engendered by the Cultural Revolution and would probably hope to avoid a new and ungovernable upheaval of similar magnitude. The prospect then is for a period of behind-the-scenes maneuvering as individuals and shifting groups jockey for advantage.

The trend at present is toward a return to a "pragmatic" and authoritarian ordering of the Chinese state along lines similar to those prevalent in the 1950s and early 1960s. This trend accords with the known views of Chou En-lai and appears to have the backing of Mao; it is unlikely to be reversed prior to the death of both these men, but the current pace of restoration of the *status quo ante* is such that it is also unlikely that the process will be complete before the succession takes place. The return to pragmatism and order has been accomplished largely at the expense of the "radical" wing of the party, which has already been so weakened that it probably will not be in a position to make a bid for power in the immediate succession period. However, the movement toward more traditional ways of doing business also involves a strengthening of the party apparatus at the expense of the military. Here the issue is in greater doubt. The military has been considerably weakened politically in the past four years, but senior commanders, of course, control troops and a number probably have unappeased political ambitions. Strains between the party and the military establishment could develop early in the succession period, particularly if military leaders believe army prerogatives are being whittled away and military concerns are being given short shrift.



No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

In the immediate succession period a key role will undoubtedly be played by Teng Hsiao-ping. He is slated to assume Chou's position as premier, and he also holds important party and military posts. In the latter capacity he now serves as army chief of staff. Teng, however, is far from the universally-admired figure Chou En-lai has been. He was purged and reviled in the Cultural Revolution and still bears political scars from that period of upheaval. As a former secretary-general of the party he is a strong advocate of party domination of the affairs of state, but he seems sensitive to the crucial role of the military in current Chinese politics and has been inserting supporters in the central military establishment and, in particular, appealing to the technically-oriented military group that hopes to modernize China's armed forces. In the effort both to control and appease the military, the role of Chen Hsi-lien is likely to be of major importance. Chen is probably anxious to protect military prerogatives and as commander of the crucial Peking Military Region his troops are in a position to overawe the capital. If reports that he is charged with China's military procurement program are correct he probably has a vested interest in the modernization of the armed forces.

Teng will also have to look over his shoulder at Chang Chun-chiao once the succession period has begun. In his mid-60s, Chang is significantly younger than the 71-year-old Teng, he is an adroit politician in the mold of Chou En-lai, and he also holds important posts in the government, military and party apparatus--the only leading figure other than Teng to hold jobs in all three major institutions. Chang is in an excellent position to gather in most of the marbles in the longer run, and developments in the succession period may well turn on his relations with Teng. Although he holds a high military position as chief of the military's General Political Department, Chang's relations with the military have generally been unfriendly--a significant disability. He is probably acting as secretary-general of the party, however, and in this capacity may well have inserted supporters in the middle and lower ranks of the party apparatus. Moreover, although he has generally adopted moderate and "pragmatic" political positions in recent years, he first made his mark in the Cultural Revolution and unquestionably has closer ties to the "radical" wing of the party than does Teng.



No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

Over the longer run these ties could prove important. Historically, the authoritarian, centralized and party-dominated approach to running the Chinese state has proved inflexible and unresponsive to the needs and concerns of the lower ranks of the political machine; counterpressures could easily rise again as they did in the mid-1960s. In the past several years there have been numerous signs of dissatisfaction with Peking's relatively "conservative" domestic politics on the part of the "radical" wing of the party, and recently there have been some indications that pressures also exist for a more "revolutionary" foreign policy. As political "outs," the left wing of the party has something in common with the military, which has also suffered reverses in recent years, and over the longer term an alliance of convenience is possible. Such an alliance helped launch the Cultural Revolution, and there were signs in 1974 that a similar marriage of convenience was being attempted in the course of the anti-Confucius campaign. In this shadowy infighting Chen Hsi-lien--a classic "swing man"--appeared to play an important role.

The major representatives of the left in the post Mao/Chou collective leadership will be Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) and Yao Wen-yuan. Neither is an especially impressive politician and Chiang Ching in particular has recently suffered political reverses that are probably irreparable; Mao has disassociated himself from her, and she cannot claim to be the trustee of his "thought" in the succession period. Yao, still in his early 40s, could, however, play the part of spokesman for the "radicals" if pressures start building on the left. This is also true of Wang Hung-wen, nominally the third-ranking member of the party. Wang is even younger than Yao, and like Chiang Ching is partly discredited at present. His present political position is ambiguous, but he has good "radical" credentials and could play a part in a coalition of "outs" although he is unlikely to be a mover and shaker in his own right.

Over the longer term divisions also may develop along age lines as older leaders such as Teng Hsiao-ping and others of his generation grow more feeble. In this regard two younger party functionaries, Chi Teng-kuei and Hua Kuo-feng could prove of considerable importance. Both rose to prominence in the Cultural Revolution but have subsequently adopted relatively "pragmatic" political



No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

25X1 

positions. Hua in particular, as head of China's security organs, is likely to play an important role in the succession collective.

25X1 



No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/10 : NLF-TB_PF-20-3-2-6

li - IP

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 030360

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . ÇBiography

DESCRIPTION . . . . Members of Politburo

CREATION DATE 10/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . 13 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035800410
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF GERALD FORD
BOX NUMBER 20
FOLDER TITLE . . . . November 28 - December 7, 1975 - Far East - Memoranda in Support of the President's Trip to the People's Republic of China (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 07/01/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG