MONGOLIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

MONGOLIA

We do not expect the question of US relations with the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) to arise. The matter was discussed briefly by Secretary Kissinger with Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in October 1974, at which time the Secretary referred to the possibility that we might establish diplomatic relations with Mongolia. Ch'iao replied that there are two aspects to the situation: the PRC has diplomatic relations with Mongolia, but it is just a puppet state.

Although the PRC has maintained formal diplomatic relations with the MPR since 1949, relations have been strained for some years because Mongolia faithfully echoes Moscow's foreign policy line and permits the Soviets to station forces there. (These forces consist of a tank division, a motorized rifle division, and several SAM sites totalling about 25,000 men.)

In March 1973 we initiated discussions with the MPR regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations through our respective missions to the United Nations in New York. The Mongols agreed in principle to our initial proposal, which provided for the negotiation of a joint communique announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations to be issued simultaneously with the conclusion of two agreements on the exercise of consular functions and on facilitating the operations of our respective diplomatic missions.

Subsequently, however, the Mongols suggested that the two sides first issue the communique with the understanding that the two other agreements would be concluded within sixty days thereafter. We responded that before making a decision on this proposal, we would like to know what difficulties the MPR had with the US drafts and what counterproposals the MPR might have. The negotiations have been in abeyance since April 1973 because of the Mongol failure to respond to this request, despite several nudges by the US side.

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The delay in the Mongol response undoubtedly reflects political constraints rather than any feeling that our initial proposals were non-negotiable. Although there have been hints that a "problem with China" may be involved, we believe that the most likely possibility is that the Soviets had second thoughts about the advisability of seeing a US presence established in Ulaanbaatar at this time.

You should not raise this subject. If, contrary to expectations, the Chinese raise it, you should merely state the factual situation on our efforts to establish relations with the MPR and indicate we are in no hurry about this.

Department of State
November 1975

AFRICA

ISSUES PAPER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

AFRICA

The Problem

The contradictions between US and Chinese global outlooks are particularly evident in Africa, where a degree of common interest stemming from our mutual suspicions of Soviet actions is undercut by our radically differing approaches to Third World issues. We have found it difficult to establish a useful dialogue with the Chinese on Africa, even on issues such as Angola, where we have a common interest in frustrating Soviet objectives. Secretary Kissinger's efforts to engage PRC Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in a discussion of Angola during their late-September meeting in New York did not succeed in overcoming Ch'iao's reserve, although he was clearly interested in hearing our views. We doubt that you should raise African issues, unless developments in Angola enable you to point to it as an example of our effectiveness in blunting Soviet intervention. Aside from this, the one point you could usefully make is that we should be careful not to work at cross purposes in our efforts to frustrate Soviet inroads.

Background

The PRC's approach to Africa is heavily influenced not only by its greatest foreign policy obsession, its rivalry with the USSR, but also by China's pretensions to leadership of the Third World. In Africa more than elsewhere, the paralellism of US and PRC interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is distorted by our different approaches on other matters. If our interests coincide on the crucial questions of Soviet thrusts in Angola, Soviet military facilities in Somalia, and Soviet naval expansion in the Indian Ocean, we are at loggerheads over our respective attitudes toward the use of violence to promote racial justice and majority rule in southern Africa, and in our approaches to the restructuring of African relations with the developed countries of the West.

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Both Peking and Moscow are attracted, for political and ideological reasons, to the possibilities inherent in the white-black confrontation in southern Africa. Both made substantial contributions to various liberation groups, and both have consistently supported African positions on southern African questions in the UN and other international bodies. Peking has realized, however, that its material aid can only be on a limited scale and has reiterated the importance of self-reliance to the leaders of the liberation movements.

Angola. This stance has been reflected in Peking's attitude toward developments in Angola, where despite the PRC's concern over Moscow's efforts to carve out a political foothold, the Chinese have opted out of the crucial showdown now underway. In the past, Chinese leaders have entertained in Peking representatives of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), as well as the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Peking's basic advice to all three has been that they should unite in opposing Portugese colonialism rather than fighting among themselves. The PRC states that it has provided military aid to all three factions in their struggle against the Portugese, although it has not provided any recent assistance to the Soviet-backed MPLA.

However, Peking has apparently concluded that a continuation of the armed struggle in Angola after independence would be conducive mainly to the growth of superpower (i.e. Soviet) influence. In his September speech to the UN General Assembly, PRC Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua stated that China has now stopped giving "new military aid" to the Angolan Liberation Movements, thereby indicating that China will not be drawn into a losing competition with the Soviets, who are providing tanks and other military supplies to the MPLA. Although Peking has continued to fulfill aid commitments to UNITA and FNLA forces, it has clearly decided to side with moderate African leaders, who favor an end to all foreign military aid to the Angolan liberation groups.

Peking has closely identified itself with the policies towards Angola espoused by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which is currently headed by the mercurial leader of Uganda, President Amin. The Chinese were clearly gratified when differences over Angola precipitated a recent break in diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Uganda, which has been a major recipient of Soviet arms. There have been unconfirmed reports that the Chinese subsequently invited President Amin to visit the PRC, which would constitute an obvious effort by Peking to capitalize on this situation.

Rivalry with Moscow. Sino-Soviet rivalry in Africa has been sharpened by the efforts of each to define the other as the enemy of the Third World - a contest in which Peking seems to have scored more often than Moscow. The PRC defines Third World interests as basically opposed to those of both the US and the USSR, and the Chinese frequently charge that Moscow and Washington are expanding "superpower rivalry" into the third world and are exploiting the LDC's.

Overall, Peking has gained ground at Moscow's expense throughout the continent since 1970, in part because of the relavitely low priority that the USSR has given sub-Saharan Africa (at least until the new opportunities opened up by Portugese decolonization). The PRC has edged the USSR out in the Sudan and has been making major efforts to strengthen its position in Ethiopia and Somalia (where the Chinese are concerned over Moscow's de facto base rights). The Soviets retain the upper hand in Guinea and Somalia, despite relatively large Chinese programs, but Chinese prestige remains surprisingly high even in countries where Soviet inputs are large.

Projecting a New Image. Peking's new policy toward Africa, begun in the early 1970's, has had to overcome negative African memories of subversive Chinese activities in the 1960-69 period. By abandoning its earlier involvement with subversion, Peking has done much to assuage lingering suspicions that its designs were inimical to

African interests. The PRC no longer supports insurgent movements that threaten incumbent black leaders. Nor does Peking now demand acceptance of its world views as a precondition for normalizing relations. Its principal technique in reestablishing its presence and acquiring a new image has been through economic assistance programs, most of which were established in the 1970-74 period. Peking's effectiveness as an aid donor has been dramatically demonstrated by the construction of the $400 million Tan-Zam railroad, a project which has had enormous psychological impact throughout the continent.

In contrast to the large amounts Peking spends on economic assistance, its military aid has been modest ($110 million to sub-Saharan Arica through mid-1975). Peking's reluctance to expand its military cooperation with Africa reflects in large part its inability to provide sufficient amounts of materiel and training to all who request it and to match other donors in sophisticated weaponry.

PRC Complicates US Problems. In the larger perspective, China's growing involvement in Africa has contributed to trends which hamper US efforts to maintain constructive and cooperative relations with African governments. The relative success of Chinese aid programs gives respectability to methods of development that reject cooperation with the West. It's strident political rhetoric emphasized the conflict of the LDC's with the developed world. And its active support for military confrontation with the white minority regimes has accelerated the growth of the African conviction that military action is the only viable approach to liberation. Thus, in both economic and political spheres, China is exacerbating issues on which the US position is seen by Africans as at best ambivalent and often directly hostile. This has the effect of limiting our opportunities to coordinate our policies in opposing Soviet moves in the continent.

Chinese Position

Peking actively encourages those Africans who believe that their problems stem from the unrelenting greed of the "imperialists," and it engages in a brand of revolutionary

rhetoric that seems radical or dangerously inflammatory to US ears. It has actively encouraged military confrontation with the minority white regimes in South Africa. In his UNGA speech, Ch'iao Kuan-hua reiterated China's support for the use of "revolutionary dual tactics"--i.e. both peaceful and armed struggle--against the white regimes.

The Chinese claim that the Soviet Union has "infiltrated" the African national liberation movement to sow discord and stir up trouble "in an attempt to bring the movement within its social-imperialist orbit." But it also charges the United States with supporting colonial rule in Africa, and in southern Africa, and in southern Africa in particular.

On Angola, the Chinese contrast their own efforts to encourage unity among the Angolan liberation organizations with Soviet efforts to create division. To justify the Chinese decision to stop providing new military aid to the Angolan groups favored by Peking, Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua (in his conversation with Secretary Kissinger in New York) discounted the long-term significance of Soviet military involvement, arguing that the Soviet Union would eventually fail even though it might gain some military advantage for a time. At the same time, Ch'iao indicated that the PRC would not object to measures by others to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting the situation, although he predictably opposed enlisting the help of South Africa. He said that China had not given up hope that the problem could be solved between the African countries and the three Angolan liberation movements.

US Position

On African issues in general, the United States has welcomed the creation of new African states and has supported respect for their sovereignty. We have made known for years our strong condemnation of apartheid, and we have maintained certain restraints on our bilateral relations with South Africa to register our desire for a peaceful resolution of its racial problems (e.g., a ban

on naval visits, a unilateral arms embargo, and limitations on military contacts and EXIM Bank facilities). We have rejected the notion of minority white regimes, such as that in Rhodesia. We have participated in the continent's economic growth through substantial aid programs, through the Peace Corps, and through trade and investment by private American capital.

To the extent possible, we have tried to keep Africa from becoming a pawn in outside rivalries. We have no military or territorial ambitions in Africa, and with the exception of our modest communications facility in Ethiopia, we have no military facilities on the continent. Our small presence on the island of Diego Garcia, however, is a signal that we will not abandon control of the Indian Ocean to the Soviets.

On Angola, we have told the Chinese (i.e. Ch'iao Kuan-hua in New York this September) that while we support the view that the three Angolan revolutionary movements should combine, we feel that the pro-Soviet group will defeat the other two if nothing is done to maintain a balance. In that case, Zaire and Zambia will learn that forces supported by the Soviet Union can prevail, and they may shift toward the USSR. We support a negotiated outcome among the three liberation movements, but feel that unless UNITA and FNLA are strengthened against MPLA there can be no agreement between the three groups and the African governments.

6

MULTILATERAL ISSUES

ISSUES PAPER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

MULTILATERAL ISSUES

The papers listed below have been prepared for your background information. It is unlikely that the Chinese themselves will expect or contribute to a serious discussion of such questions during your talks in Peking. At best, you may wish to mention one or more of them during a general review of our world outlook.

The Chinese engage in a considerable amount of unhelpful bombast but do not play an active role in international efforts to cope with the global problems of energy, population and food. In the UN, they are increasingly active, but have not undertaken the full range of roles which might be expected of them. They have had a major political voice in the Law of the Sea negotiations, but have not been deeply involved in technical negotiations on specific issues.

As a rule, the Chinese arbitrarily take the position that global problems such as food, energy, and population result largely from "imperialist" and "colonialist" exploitation of the Third World. This not only enables Peking to disclaim any responsibility for coming up with solutions, but precludes any sort of meaningful dialogue on the substance of the issues. Although the realities of world interdependence may eventually force the PRC to adopt a more constructive approach--and as the papers note, Chinese actions frequently reflect greater realism than their public rhetoric--it is clear that nothing we say at this time will have much helpful effect on the Chinese.

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Energy
Tab 2 - Population
Tab 3 - Food
Tab 4 - Law of the Sea
Tab 5 - United Nations

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Energy

PRC Oil Production and Exports

The PRC is essentially self-sufficient in energy. While it is not yet a significant factor in the world energy situation, it is generally accepted that it has large oil reserves, both on shore and offshore, and that it could increase its exports considerably in the future.

We estimate that China will produce about 80 million metric tons of oil in 1975, and will export about 9 million tons, largely to Japan. This constitutes only about two days of Japan's oil consumption, but negotiations are underway for a long-term agreement by which the PRC would export 30-50 million tons annually to Japan by 1980.

The main question is how rapidly the PRC will increase its oil production. In recent years, production has been growing at an annual rate of about 22%. China has been importing a considerable quantity of oil-producing equipment, but it has not yet engaged in a crash program. Development of its deep-water offshore oil deposits, which some experts say may be one of the richest unexploited reserves of oil and gas in the world, would require a tremendous investment. Moreover, the technology is complicated, and the PRC, in accordance with its policy of self-reliance, has made it clear that it is not at present interested in joint ventures with foreign companies.

Nevertheless, the Chinese are making a major effort to increase oil production and exports. With the quadrupling of crude oil prices, an increase in oil exports is one of the obvious ways in which the PRC can earn foreign exchange to finance the imports needed for its economic development. It also sees political benefits. It probably calculates that its oil exports to Japan not only strengthen the PRC-Japan relationship but also lessen Japanese interest in Siberian energy resources. In a move clearly related to the Thai and Filipino switch in diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the PRC in 1975, the PRC has sold some oil to both countries at "friendly prices."

The US has been indirectly drawn into the troublesome problem of exploration and exploitation of underwater oil reserves in areas that are in dispute between China and other countries. Korea and Taiwan have granted concessions to American companies in some areas which the PRC either claims or insists are in dispute. (The PRC, of course, claims the entire area of Taiwan.) It is our policy to caution American companies against operating in such areas, and we have told them that they cannot count on USG assistance if there should be any trouble as a result of their operations. The companies have generally accepted our advice.

The PRC and the World Energy Problems

The PRC has conflicting views on the world energy problem. Because of its own export potential, it sees fundamental strategic and economic advantages in the high level of petroleum prices. Although it has expressed no interest in joining OPEC (and is unlikely willingly to submit to its regulations), the PRC has consistently and vocally supported OPEC policies. Peking welcomes the emergence of an economically powerful Arab bloc, the diffusion of world monetary power and the prospect of a shift of development funding to OPEC nations.

Despite their categorical public stand on the issue, however, the Chinese very likely appreciate that the oil crisis can adversely affect some of their own interests. If prices were again to escalate rapidly, they might be concerned by developments that could weaken Europe or bring on an economic catastrophe in Japan. They should also be worried about being caught by a split in the Third World between the have-oils and the have-nots. Nevertheless, Peking seems to believe that the "reorganization of world forces" brought about by the petroleum revolution will be on the whole a positive process.

Although the Chinese are unlikely to be sympathetic to the goals and policies of the US-supported International Energy Agency, at some point the PRC may have to recognize the contradiction between its desire, on the one hand, for a strong, united Western Europe, an economically healthy Japan, and a close relationship with the developing Third

World and, on the other hand, its support for high oil prices which threaten these goals. At present, however, it is willing to live with this contradiction.

The Chinese have publicly criticized us for adopting what they call a "confrontation" policy with the oil-producing countries. Although they have not raised the subject in our recent talks, they would probably like us to develop a more cooperative relationship with OPEC.

Without reviewing here our overall policy on the world energy situation (an area which you know well), it is obvious that we have political reasons for wanting not to see the US, Western Europe and Japan too dependent on outside sources of energy and the decisions of those who control them. We believe that such vulnerability is not in the Chinese interest either. We seek to develop cooperation with energy producers on global energy issues, but cannot let arbitrary decisions by others affect our economic and political futures. Cooperation is a two-way street.

Should the question arise, we see no point in your getting into a rhetorical battle with the Chinese. However, you could point out, perhaps in informal conversation with Chinese leaders, the contradiction in the Chinese position and the rationale for our own approach.

2

Population

The Chinese talk one way internationally on population matters and act in another way domestically. At the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest, the PRC delegates spoke as if no global population problem existed, referring to the future of mankind as "infinitely bright" and claiming that technology and self-reliant economic development would take care of the world's growing population. However, the PRC agreed that different countries had the right to cope with their population problems in different ways, thus concurring in essence with the thesis that limitation of population growth is sometimes desirable. It joined the consensus in support of the World Population Plan of Action, one of whose main features calls on countries with high population growth rates to work for their reduction if they consider that the growth rates "hamper their goals of promoting human welfare." Although the PRC participated in the conference, it does not play an active role in international efforts concerning population.

At home, the Chinese have instituted a vigorous and pragmatic program designed to limit population growth through social and economic sanctions, enforced late marriage, and the use of contraception, sterilization, and abortion. These measures have reduced the PRC's population growth rate to a figure estimated at between 1.5 and 2 percent, a significant accomplishment for a country with a population of about 900 million (the PRC publicly claims 800 million).

The Chinese say little officially about their family planning activities. Outside sources describe China's program as effective, at least in urban areas, with ready availability of supplies and with party and government indoctrination and regimentation, peer pressure, and a large measure of coercion. For example, it is reported that maternity leave is not granted beyond the second child, and that a family having a fourth child is not provided additional rations.

While we would like to see the PRC bring its rhetoric into line with its domestic practice and take a more active role in sharing its experience and techniques with other developing countries, we see little likelihood that the Chinese are prepared to do so at this stage. Their external posture is conditioned by their propaganda line that on population policy, as on other matters, the developed countries are seeking to perpetuate their exploitation of the Third World. Accordingly, we doubt that Peking is prepared to enter into a dialogue with us on this sensitive question for the time being. Our primary interest is that Peking continue its present program, which if actively pursued appears to have some prospect of success. Simply by reducing the growth rate of its own population, the PRC can make a major contribution to reducing the rate of world population growth.

13

3

Food

The United States and the PRC agree that it is essential to raise food production levels in the developing countries, but differ widely on the causes of the world food problem and the appropriate means of solving it. The cause, the PRC holds, is developed countries' economic domination of the third world, and the solution lies in political and economic self-reliance. The Chinese have refused to participate in multilateral efforts to ease the impact of food output fluctuations, although they endorse the principles of emergency food aid and technological transfer from the developed to developing countries. It is clear that Peking's domestic approach is based on a pragmatic appreciation of China's own precarious food/population balance, which its line internationally is essentially an ideological one. There is little prospect, therefore, that the PRC will be seriously interested in cooperating with multilateral efforts such as the FAO's International Undertaking on Food Security, FAO's improved food information system, or the US-initiated London talks on creation of a world grain reserve.

Peking at the World Food Conference

At the 1974 World Food Conference in Bucharest, the PRC assigned a good proportion of the blame for the present world food problem on the developed countries, especially the two superpowers. Peking's delegate contended that the developing countries had been forced into a position of economic subservience. He charged that the US had "dumped" large quantities of grain on the developing countries, seriously damaging their own food production and exports. The Chinese emphasized Peking's view that with political and economic independence the developing countries could adopt the necessary domestic measures to improve food production. The PRC admitted that its cotntribution to solving the world food problem is small, and advocated emergency food aid and technological transfer, primarily from the developed countries. While the Chinese held out some hope that the PRC would gradually be able to do more as its own industry and

agriculture develops, our analysis of the PRC's food situation suggests that this is a long-term prospect at best.

PRC Food Situation

The PRC is essentially self-sufficient in food--an impressive achievement, given its immense population. However, the food/population margin is thin, and the Chinese have recently started another major political/economic campaign to increase food production.

In recent years, China has bought a significant amount of grain on the world market. In 1974, for example, grain purchases from the US totaled over $450 million (FOB). This year, however, in the expectation of a good harvest and faced with a sizeable balance of payments deficit in 1974, the PRC has bought no grain from the US and has reduced its purchases from other countries, primarily Canada and Australia.

China denies that it buys grain because its own production is inadequate. It argues, instead, that it is profitable to import wheat and corn and to export rice. The argument is partially valid, but grain imports have also been important in improving the margin between food production and population growth.

16

Law of the Sea

The PRC has played a very active role in Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations since entering the United Nations, and has generally opposed the US positions on all major issues. The PRC has supported maximum control by the coastal state of a 200-mile offshore zone (we have sought regulated, guaranteed access by others), control of straits by the adjacent countries (we and the USSR advocate unimpeded transit), and Third World positions on such crucial questions as the regime for exploitation of deep-seabed mineral resources. We see no substantial prospect that this posture will change before the next session of the Law of the Sea Conference, which will meet in March 1976 in New York. During previous conferences, our representatives have met privately with the Chinese from time to time to clarify our respective positions.

We strongly doubt that the subject will arise in Peking. If it does, we believe that the only useful position you could take would be to confirm our negotiators' willingness to discuss specific LOS issues with PRC representatives at any time.

The Chinese have less immediate interest in the outcome of the LOS negotiations than the major maritime powers since they have not yet developed a blue-water navy or far-flung maritime interests. Under the circumstances, the Chinese have been free to use the negotiations as a forum to demonstrate their identification with the interests of the developing countries. The PRC can comfortably take the side of the Third World against the two superpowers, whose efforts to secure regulated access to 200-mile coastal zones and unimpeded passage of straits are portrayed by Peking as resulting from the superpowers' competition for economic domination and hegemony. Peking's interest in the straits issue, specifically as it pertains to the Straits of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia, may be more directly dictated by anti-Soviet strategic concerns, since littoral states' control of that strait would materially impede Soviet ability to move naval forces on China's periphery.

5

The United Nations

The PRC has not assumed a constructive role in the United Nations. Since its admission to that body in 1971, it has been unhelpful to the United States on most issues of concern to us, and has used the UN primarily as a forum to attack Soviet policies and to promote its interests with the Third World. While the Chinese approach may change with time as they gain expertise on UN affairs, it is doubtful that anything we say to them at this time will affect their short-term outlook. The Chinese have told us that they do not consider the UN very important.

Nevertheless, Chinese representatives are participating more fully in major UN functions and are exhibiting increasing familiarity with UN procedures. They are also more active in the routine of establishing corridor contacts. Our private working relations with Chinese representatives in the UN itself and in the specialized agencies have been satisfactory and provide the opportunity for at least tacit cooperation on issues where our interests coincide.

The fact remains that as long as the PRC gives priority to backing elements in the UN who in our view have undermined the institution's credibility and effectiveness, we will continue to find ourselves at odds on many issues there. This was graphically demonstrated by PRC Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua's speech before the UN General Assembly on September 26, which contained more direct criticism of the United States than his presentations in 1973 and 1974, even though the Soviet Union again bore the main brunt of his attacks. His remarks were particularly unhelpful on two issues of major concern to the United States--i.e. the Korean question and the Middle East.

In other respects, Ch'iao's speech provided a good example of Chinese rhetoric in the UN, in that he stressed two themes:

-- the dangerous "superpower" preparation for war and competition for spheres of influence and hegemony; and

-- the increasingly successful Third World struggles to obtain independence and equitable treatment from the developed countries.

The PRC attended the Seventh Special UNGA Session this fall, but as with other communist nations, it conspicuously failed to engage in debate on the economic issues that preoccupy the developed and developing states. Instead, the Chinese offered uncritical support for restructuring the international economic order along lines desired by the Third World.

Since 1971 the PRC has joined a number of UN specialized agencies. In doing so, a major Chinese objective has been to secure the expulsion of Taiwan representatives, an effort which Peking has recently extended to the non-government organizations which are affiliated with several of these agencies. We have sought to use procedural methods to prevent Taiwan's expulsion from these agencies but have not confronted Peking head-on over the issue.

ARMS CONTROL

20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

The Problem

We see no possibility that the Chinese would be responsive to any suggestions we might make for agreements in this field. You may wish briefly to cover SALT II in your explanation of our Soviet policy (see paper on the Soviet Union). Otherwise, we should not initiate general discussion of arms control and disarmament issues. In the unlikely event that the Chinese raise the subject, you could explain U.S. concepts and policies in general terms.

The PRC has consistently refused to participate in arms limitation efforts associated with the USSR and the U.S. and has denounced such initiatives as devices employed by the superpowers to perpetuate their nuclear monopoly and as "smokescreens" for heightened arms competition. In practice, however, Chinese actions have reflected a more pragmatic appreciation of the dangers involved in an unchecked expansion of nuclear arsenals.

Background

The People's Republic of China has devoted substantial resources to developing a credible nuclear deterrent, and it has refused to participate in any agreements that might inhibit that effort. At the same time, the PRC is anxious to pose as the leader of "small and medium-sized" countries in a common struggle against alleged "superpower" world domination. The Chinese use this rationale in rejecting negotiations on arms control exclusively among nuclear powers, characterizing such negotiations as a form of collusion to preserve the superpowers' nuclear monopoly. Their own nuclear testing program is repeatedly defended as an effort to break that monopoly.

The PRC argues that partial measures such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty tend to support the status quo and that the only

legitimate disarmament goal is the simultaneous and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Following each of its announced tests, Peking has reiterated its pledge never, at any time or under any circumstances, to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has challenged the other nuclear powers, at least as a first step, to issue similar "no first-use" pledges and to bring all nuclear forces and weapons back within the borders of their own countries. The Chinese have stated that whether the nuclear powers issue such statements will be a test of their true intentions regarding nuclear disarmament.

The PRC has been harshly critical of bilateral US-Soviet arms control measures, including the SALT I agreements, the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War and the Vladivostok Agreement. Its public line is that the slow progress on SALT II proves that the superpowers are using the negotiations as "a veil to cover up the truth" of their heightened competition for nuclear supremacy. (One exception to the Chinese line was the comment to you by Ch'iao Kuan-hua, then a Vice Foreign Minister, during your 1972 trip to China that he approved of SALT because the money which the U.S. and the Soviets would spend for more nuclear weapons could be better spent for the welfare of the peoples of the two countries. That statement is so out-of-line with Peking's current position that mentioning it would undoubtedly embarrass Ch'iao and possibly get him in trouble.)

On the other hand, the Chinese have supported a number of Third World arms limitation initiatives which do not impinge directly upon Chinese weapons activities. For example, the PRC ratified the Geneva Protocol on the use of Chemical and Biological Weapons and has voted in favor of UN resolutions recommending a ban on the use of napalm. The PRC has also supported regional nuclear-free zone arrangements, and itself signed the protocols to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

On non-proliferation, there has been considerable evolution of the Chinese attitude. They no longer brazenly proclaim as they did in 1965 that "it would be better for a greater number of countries to come into possession of atom bombs," but they have not altered their opposition to the NPT. They have drawn a distinction, however, between the indigenous development of nuclear weapons, which Peking insists is the sovereign right of any state, and proliferation through aid to non-nuclear states -- refusing to engage in nuclear exports to third countries and even proposing in the 1960's that all nations "refrain from exporting or importing in any form nuclear weapons and technical data for their manufacture."

Between 1963 and 1968 there was sporadic mention at the Warsaw Talks of various arms control and disarmament matters, but these failed to narrow our differences with the Chinese. Following the PRC's admission to the United Nations in 1971, however, there have been private contacts between our two delegations on arms control matters which have produced a degree of tactical coordination on such issues as a special UN session on disarmament (which neither of us considers useful) and a UN-sponsored World Disarmament Conference (about which we both have strong reservations).

In various visits to Peking, Secretary Kissinger has made clear that we would never make agreements with Moscow that could be turned against Peking, that we would keep the Chinese informed of our dealings with the Soviets, and that we would be prepared to make any agreements with Peking that we make with Moscow. In November 1973 we specifically proposed a hot line agreement and Chou En-lai evinced considerable interest. However, the Chinese have never come back to this proposal. This past October we suggested a hot line agreement again in the draft communique we gave them for your visit. Again they showed no interest.

Secretary Kissinger has also made clear to the Chinese that we maintain a strong defense even as we negotiate to limit the arms race. He has explained

why SALT I and the Vladivostok agreements are in our interest and why our national defense remains second to none.

The sterility of our exchanges with the Chinese on arms control matters has given us little feel for the degree of sophistication that Chinese leaders bring to the strategic issues at stake. During a discussion with an American delegation this October, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, whether deliberately or not, showed no understanding of the problem of accidental launch and brushed aside several questions on the matter with the observation that countries "would not dare" to engage in such activities. While it is probably safe to assume that the Chinese leaders appreciate the destructive power of nuclear weapons, they may well lack the conceptual framework which we have sought -- with some success -- to instill in the Soviets in the course of the SALT negotiations. If and when the Chinese are ready to talk seriously with us on arms control matters, our first task may be to find a common conceptual language.

The Chinese Position

The Chinese are unlikely to depart from their standard line, reiterated by Teng Hsiao-p'ing to a group of non-official Americans this October, that the most important thing would be for the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake a no-first-use pledge and to genuinely reduce and then destroy their nuclear arsenals. Teng treated the Vladivostok Agreement as leading to both a quantitative and qualitative increase in the arms race. On non-proliferation, Teng said the Chinese do not encourage and do not engage in nuclear proliferation, but they will not agree that other countries can be deprived of their right to develop nuclear weapons. (They will not disagree, of course, with the proposition that Taiwan should not acquire nuclear weapons, although in a conversation with a Congressional delegation this fall they adopted, somewhat disingenuously, a "shrug-of-the-shoulders" position on this point. In this connection, both France and the U.S. have prevented the ROC from acquiring a pilot reprocessing plant which would have produced weapons-grade plutonium.)

The Chinese view test ban proposals as designed to maintain the nuclear monopoly of the superpowers and have stated that agreement of the destruction and prohibition of nuclear weapons should precede a ban. The PRC is not opposed in principle to a world disarmament conference, but it has insisted on preconditions -- i.e. a superpower pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of all armed forces stationed abroad -- which would effectively prevent a conference. They hold that the aim of such a conference must be the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and not the limitation of strategic arms.

US Position

We are prepared to undertake a discussion of arms control issues with the Chinese any time they are ready. We are also prepared to consider restructuring of the CCD (e.g. by abolishing the US/Soviet co-chairmanship) if the PRC is prepared to participate in its multilateral sessions. But we recognize that they do not want such discussions now. We do not believe that their stated approach to the control of nuclear weapons is realistic. A pledge of non-first use of nuclear weapons would, for example, have undesirable strategic effects because it would benefit the USSR which maintains such large conventional forces. We feel that the only hope for genuine progress is through a series of small but meaningful steps rather than through seeking to do away with all nuclear weapons at one blow. We will never make any agreements with Moscow that could be directed against Peking (the Soviet Union has on occasion suggested such agreements). In our dealings with the Soviet Union we have no illusions and will keep our defenses strong. We will keep the Chinese informed of developments in this field.

Department of State
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