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JAPAN



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JAPAN

I. OCTOBER 1975 TALKS

Chinese Position in October 1975 (Mao + Teng):

- (Mao:) Japan is seeking hegemony.
- As Chairman Mao said to Dr. Kissinger in November 1973, even though the Soviet Union has a million troops on the Sino-Soviet border, they are directed against the U.S. Seventh Fleet first of all, then against Japan, and then against China.
- Because of its strategic assessment, China has often told the U.S., and Japan, that Japan should put a first priority on its relations with the U.S. and then second priority on its relations with China.
- It is evident that Japan is bowing to pressure at home and abroad. [in its negotiation with the USSR on the "hegemony clause"] The Japanese are making trouble. It does not matter to China. China is not in a hurry.

U.S. Position in October 1975

- (To Mao:) Japan is not yet ready to seek hegemony. That will require one more change in leadership. But potentially Japan has the potential for seeking hegemony. The next generation, including Nakasone, will be more ready to use the power of Japan.

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 E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
 NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; State rev. ems
 By MA NAHA, Date 6/22/12 9/18/03

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PREVIOUS TALKS



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NSC Memo, 3/30/76, State Dept. Guidelines

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State review 9/18/03

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JAPAN

I. NOVEMBER 1974 TALKS

Chinese Position in November 1974 (TENG)

- The relationship between Fukuda and the Soviets is growing closer day-by-day. Although even if Fukuda became Prime Minister, it would not be of any great consequence. There might be some twists and turns.
- One of the characteristics of Ohira is that what he says counts. If he carries out a certain policy, he might be even more firm than Tanaka.
- But no matter who comes to office, the Japanese and Soviets have a fundamental issue they cannot solve -- the question of the Northern Territories.
- China has many times expressed its wish that the US keep its good relations with both Europe and Japan, so that the US will have more assurance in dealing with the polar bear. US relations with its allies should be on the basis of equality, which is the only basis for real partnership.
- China tells its Japanese friends that first they should keep good relations with the US, and second, with China. Chairman Mao believes HAK should stay longer in Japan.

US Position in November 1974

- The US is not supporting Fukuda. Ohira would be no problem.
- We think Japan would have to be very careful to come closer to the Soviet Union. It is a very dangerous course for Japan.
- Since President Ford's visit to Japan, US-Japanese relations are much steadier. This is very important for Japan.

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SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

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- The US has encouraged Japan's improvement of its relations with China.
- We are organizing the consumers for the consumer-producer dialogue because it is important that Japan and Europe not be left in the position that they feel their future is in the hands of forces totally out of their control.
- The Soviets proposed to President Ford at Vladivostok to have consultations on Sino-Japanese relations and to prevent them from becoming too close. We refused this. We have told the Japanese about this in a general way, including the fact of our refusal.

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JAPAN

I. NOVEMBER 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in November 1973 (MAO & CHOU)

- Japan's first priority is to have good relations with the US. China only comes second. (Mao)
- Japan is afraid of the US, and the US should try to lessen their fear. The Soviet Union is doing its utmost to win them over, but Japan is not so trustful of them. (Mao)
- China encourages Japan to do things together with the US, to avoid their being taken in. Prime Minister Chou has told the Japanese that if they want to exploit Siberia, it is better to do it with the US than alone. China does not fear their exploiting Siberian resources, only that they might be taken in. (Mao)
- Japan's attitude [on the Soviet question] is also good. Japan is crucial. Japan's reaction to Soviet expansionism will not be as quick as Western European countries' reaction.
- Soviet ships often sail through the Japanese straits. Their aim is to tie down a portion of US strength in the Pacific Ocean to avoid the US sending a large number of troops westward. (Mao)
- If Japan were not under the US nuclear umbrella, it would be under a different nuclear umbrella. That is a tendency that both the US and China should try to avert. And the most farsighted statesmen of Japan must see the danger.
- The US cannot tell Japan of all its nuclear plans with regard to the US nuclear umbrella. But China feels the US can come very close to them.
- Japan will be reassured now that the US has included them in the Atlantic Charter. Japan's needs are not confined to energy but to all resources of their economy.
- Japan at present cannot leave the US nuclear umbrella or the US energy resources.

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(Chinese Position in November 1973)

- Their main shortcoming is that some of their statesmen tend to be shortsighted. But in the turmoil of the world, some persons of great stature will gradually emerge in Japan. The US cannot ask too much, out of consideration of the shallowness of their foundations and their hodge podge public opinion.

US Position in November 1973

- It is very important that Japan does not feel isolated and left alone. And we should not give them too many temptations to maneuver. (to Mao)
- We have no objection to good relations between Japan and China. We want to prevent them from moving too close to the Soviet Union. (to Mao)
- If Japan does something with the Soviet Union, we sometimes join them, so they are not all alone in facing the Soviet Union. (to Mao)
- Our relations with Japan are better than when HAK went there the previous time. They are no longer so nervous. (to Mao)
- Japan had a very bad historical experience with the Russians, and that is very fortunate for all of us. And the Russian temperament doesn't harmonize very well with the Japanese. (to Mao)
- Japan remains at a crucial point, and necessity will drive it to decide between a more traditional nationalism and maintaining its present orientation. And it has many temptations.
- Japan is very much affected by the Middle East situation, being dependent on the area for 85 percent of its oil. It has temptations from its own economic strengths. And it is concerned that it will be left alone in any arrangement that we make with the Europeans. That is why we will try to find a formula to associate Japan with our efforts in Europe -- not to link Japan militarily with Europe but primarily psychologically, to prevent a total sense of isolation.

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(US Position in November 1973)

- If Japan is not subjected to too many temptations by having too many pressures put on them from too many sides, they can be kept on their present course. The US and PRC have acted wisely in this direction. They are a tougher people than the West Europeans.
- We have agreed in principle to join with the Japanese in Siberian LNG development. We believe for political reasons it would be undesirable to have the Japanese so completely dependent on Soviet political decisions. And the Soviet Union will probably be more reluctant to tackle both the US and Japan simultaneously than Japan alone.
- We have a problem with Congress about whether we can get any support for such long-term investments in the USSR. That will not be decided until early 1974.
- We may be prepared to share with Japan in some common research and development on alternative energy sources and also on some joint ventures on nuclear energy.

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JAPAN

I. FEBRUARY TALKS 1973

Chinese Position in February (Mao + Chou)

- The U.S. should cooperate with Japan and Europe on fundamental matters. (Mao)
- When HAK passes through Japan he should perhaps talk a bit more with them. One day isn't very good for their face. (Mao)
- Japanese feelings toward the USSR are not very good. The Soviets grabbed Mongolia, half of Sinkiang, Manchukuo, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. It doesn't seem likely that Japan and the USSR will form closer political relations. (Mao)
- China would rather see Japan have better relations with the U.S. than closer relations with the Soviet Union. (Mao)
- We (the U.S. and PRC) can also do some work there. (Mao)
- The Japanese may want to grab something (economically) in Russia. (Mao)
- Maybe the U.S. plans to raise tariffs and non-tariff barriers in order to intimidate Japan and Europe. (Mao)
- Ohira seems to have a clearer idea of the Soviet Union than other Japanese.
- China has not asked Japan for indemnity. It would add to the burden of the people. Only this way can we move from hostility to relaxation. (Mao)
- It will be more difficult to settle the hostility with Japan than with the U.S. (Mao)

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(Chinese Position - Continued)

- The Sino-U.S. trade situation is the opposite of the Sino-Japanese situation, because U.S. imports from China are much less than Chinese imports from the U.S. and U.S. imports from Japan.
- China's policy with Japan is to do things step by step. China does not exclude their contacts with others.
- Since liberation, China has never ceased exchanges with Japan, and has been able to increase understanding in areas of contact. In other areas, there is still quite a large amount of prejudice.
- In the case of a Sino-Soviet war, there may be countries from the east that would like to fish in troubled waters.
- Japan is at a crossroads. China is not in favor of Dulles' US-Japan Security Treaty. But proceeding from the present situation, China did not touch on that when it established relations with Japan.
- Japan's economic development will inevitably bring with it an ideology of military expansion. That is objective. The U.S. fattened up Japan at the beginning, in order to prevent what it saw as Communist expansion. The U.S. should not have let Japan expand economically so unrestrictedly. But that is an objective development that does not heed the will of man. The U.S. also gave aid, paid its own occupation expenses, and encouraged investment and technical knowhow -- to make a better impression on the Japanese people after the atom bomb.
- What Japan has now is only an attempting, an ambition, but they want to gain more independence out of this development. Like when a young man grows up, he wants more freedom.
- A spirit of restraint would be better, but Japan's economic base doesn't allow it to restrain itself; it will compel it to develop.
- The other Asian countries have learned their lesson about Japan, and fear it. The Japanese have enough self-criticism to know

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(Chinese Position - Continued)

that if they do not obey a spirit of restraint they will become "economic animals."

- There is a way out for them but they refuse to take it. That is why they are trying to expand their investments abroad, and why Siberia is so attractive to them.
- Japan was afraid China would oppose the Siberian projects, but China said it was for them to decide. A good thing that would come from U. S. -Japanese cooperation in Siberia is mutual restraint on each other. Opposing it might have had bad results.
- The U. S. should give consideration to trying to win over Japan. We should try to harness the trend and administer them into the best channels.
- China supports Japan's recovery of its northern islands. But the Soviets put up a ferocious front.
- It is difficult to blame Japan because they have to rely on foreign raw materials and foreign markets. And their present self-defense capacity is limited, and they would meet both domestic and international opposition if they tried to develop it.
- Japan should not be allowed to enter Korea. China has told its Korean friends that.
- China agrees that the U. S. and China should both influence Japan to develop good relations.

U. S. Position in February

- The U. S. will cooperate with Japan and Europe on all essential matters. (to Mao)
- It would be very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed closer political relations. The U. S. is prepared to exchange information with China on this. (to Mao)

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(U.S. Position - Continued)

- Japanese-Soviet relations are ambivalent. But the Japanese are tempted by the economic possibilities in Russia. (to Mao)
- We welcome the Japanese-Chinese relationship. (to Mao) We encouraged it.
- Our attitude to trade -- that it is for political, not commercial purposes -- is unlike the Japanese attitude.
- It is important that Japan be anchored with as many countries as possible that have peaceful intentions.
- The danger is that the very aggressive economic nationalism that now exists could in time become political nationalism and even military nationalism. If they pursue their economic policy so aggressively they could get sucked into arrangements in Siberia, the Mideast, and Southeast Asia that could affect their interests.
- In 1973, we will try to develop a common economic and military policy with our European allies, and have a Summit to develop a new Charter of our relations. We will ask Japan to participate in the economic aspects of this.
- We agree with Chou's analysis of the dangers. Why the U.S. didn't foresee the consequence of Japan's industrial growth is an interesting historical question. But the biggest danger is that if Japan is torn between too many conflicting pressures from too many sides, they will become more and more nationalistic. Therefore on our side we will not encourage them in an anti-Chinese direction. We should jointly encourage them to develop [good] relations.

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JAPAN

II. JUNE TALKS 1972

PM Chou's Position

-- Japan is at a crossroads and has not decided on its future course.

-- There could be no question of US-Japanese responsibilities for the defense of taiwan.

-- Normalization of Japanese-PRC relations would not exclude any other power. No country or countries should seek hegemony in Asia.

HAK's Position

-- The US favors normalization of Japanese-PRC relations and has encouraged the Japanese in this direction.

-- The US-Japan Security Treaty is the best safeguard against Japanese militarism, rather than a stimulus to it.

-- Japan is moving out in four ways: with the USSR, through Siberian development; in Southeast Asia, through its economic aggressiveness; with us, through our traditional ties; and with the PRC.

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-- Both the US and PRC must show restraint vis-a-vis the Japanese. If we were to compete over Japan, the US would win out in the short term but the eventual result would be increased nationalism. We had to keep Japan in emotional balance.

-- The US had made clear to Japan that it opposes Japanese nuclear armament or an overseas role for Japanese military forces.

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JAPAN

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NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By NARA, Date 6/22/10

I. February Talks 1972

Prime Minister Chou's Position

-- Situation has changed since 1969 Joint Communique. Japanese now face question of four islands in north.

-- Japan is at the crossroads. Its economic development is abnormal. Its great rate depends inevitably on expansion abroad, and result will be military expansion.

-- Japan is now U. S. partner but when it reaches certain point it will no longer listen to our words. This will affect security of whole Pacific, because of their tradition of militarist thinking.

-- PRC hopes for new, independent, peaceful, democratic Japan which will have friendly attitude to both PRC and U. S.

-- State of war still exists between Japan and PRC.

-- Sato Government doesn't count, and PRC places its hopes on next Japanese Government.

-- If PRC and Japan restore diplomatic ties and conclude peace treaty, PRC will even consider non-aggression pact. PRC will not be the first to use nuclear arms. Pact would not exclude Japan from relations with other countries.

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-- Gromyko told Fukuda that the USSR might consider four islands in a peace treaty but would not return them while Sino-Soviet border talks were going on.

-- If either side learns anything about Japan it should inform the other.

The President's Position

-- U.S. ties with Japan are in China's security interest even though inconsistent with its philosophy. Alternative is either assertive Japanese defense policy, or movement toward USSR.

-- U.S. will use its influence to discourage Japanese intervention in Asia. But we would have no influence if we did not have security arrangement with Japan or U.S. presence in Asia.

-- U.S. tie with Japan can restrain Japan from following course feared by Prime Minister Chou: military expansion.

-- Japan's strength comes from its own vitality, not U.S. aid.

-- U.S. values its partnership and friendly relations with Japan.

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ISSUES PAPER



BRIEFING PAPER

JAPANThe Problem

Japan is not now an issue between us and the PRC, and there is no need for extensive discussion of Japan during the talks in Peking. However, since Japan is of importance to both countries, it should be covered in the discussion of our Asian policies. Because of the impasse regarding the inclusion of an anti-hegemony clause in the treaty negotiations between Japan and the PRC, Japan will be watching what is said about hegemony in any joint statement at the end of your visit.

Background

Although strong doubts and suspicions remain below the surface, Chinese policy toward Japan has softened markedly in recent years. In our early discussions with the Chinese during the Nixon administration, the Chinese argued that Japan would revert to militarism and criticized our own security links with Japan. We pointed out the inconsistency of the position, noting that our security treaty with Japan and the nuclear umbrella which we provide constitute the best guarantee against a resurgence of Japanese militarism. In 1972, the Chinese attitude towards Japan began changing, in large part because of Japanese eagerness to normalize relations with Peking as a result of our opening to China. Our reasoning may also have had some effect, and other factors were at work. The Chinese probably recognized that an antagonistic relationship with Japan played into Soviet hands. Although there was already considerable trade between the two countries, the Chinese presumably desired the benefits of an expansion of trade and economic relations. Their ties with the Japanese Communist Party were cool, and they probably foresaw no early alternative to a conservative government in Japan. They had been

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strongly critical of Prime Minister Sato, and when he was replaced by Tanaka, they decided to respond to Japan's obvious interest in normalizing relations. They may have hoped to utilize normalization of relations with Japan to further isolate Taiwan. Diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan were established in September 1972.

Rather patronizingly, Mao, Chou and Teng have all emphasized in our recent visits to Peking the importance of close US-Japan ties and the need for us to pay more attention to Japan. In 1973, for example, Mao scolded Secretary Kissinger for not visiting Tokyo enough. Our ties with Japan have greatly improved in the last few years, and Peking recognizes and welcomes this.

Peking sees close US/Japan ties as a means of limiting Soviet political opportunities in Northeast Asia, lending steadiness to Japan's foreign policy and defense orientation, and facilitating the continued presence of strong US naval and air forces in the Northwest Pacific as a counterweight to the Soviets. Indeed, PRC leaders repeatedly stress to Japanese politicians and journalists that Japan's relations with the US are even more important than Sino-Japanese relations. Since 1972 the Chinese have rarely criticized our security relationship with Japan; in fact they have quietly supported it.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, both countries have wanted to maintain a momentum in the relationship. In 1974 bilateral trade reached \$3.1 billion, making Japan by far China's largest trading partner. China will export 8 million tons of oil to Japan this year. This constitutes only 2 1/2 percent of Japan's oil agreement projecting oil imports from China of 30-50 million tons annually by 1980. Japan looks on oil imports from China not only as an increasingly important factor in Japan-PRC relations, but also as a means of diversifying its sources of oil, which is crucial to Japan's economy, and perhaps neutralizing the political impact on China of its gradually expanding role in the development of Siberian resources. For its part,

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China sees oil exports to Japan not only as a means of earning foreign exchange, but also as a way to reduce Japanese interest in Siberian energy resources.

In mid-August, the PRC and Japan concluded a fisheries agreement and authorized a new consulate in each country. Earlier, there were civil air and shipping agreements. The PRC has not pressed its claim to the Senkakus, small uninhabited islands near Okinawa significant primarily because there may be oil in the area. Travel between the two countries is extensive, and growing. In short, Japan has a web of relationships with China not matched by any other country.

There has been no significant friction between Japan and China over Asian political or economic questions, and the discussions between Foreign Ministers Miyazawa and Ch'iao last September in New York were the most extensive political exchanges to date. Japan recently established diplomatic relations with Hanoi and granted recognition to Phnom Penh, and the PRC apparently welcomes Japanese involvement there as a potential counter to Soviet influence. Differences exist over Korea, but these have not created a strain in the relationship. There has been no public reaction by the Chinese in recent months to Tokyo's deliberations over the NPT and the more open debate in Japan on security issues. China does not now express concern about Japan's economic role in Asia, perhaps because the Japanese have not tried to translate their economic power into correspondingly significant political influence. The single discordant note the Chinese have struck in the past couple of years was Chairman Mao's remark to Secretary Kissinger on this last trip (which he did not elaborate) that "Japan is seeking hegemony."

Despite Peking's currently benign public attitude toward Japan and US-Japanese relations, Chinese leaders are still cautioned by the history of Japan's aggression against China. They are not confident they understand Japan, and they continue

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to harbor uncertainties over Japan's long-term course. At present, they have some doubts about Prime Minister Miki's will and/or capacity to follow through on steps subsequent to the normalization agreement in 1972. Their apprehensions of a more manipulative and bold Japanese role are surely fueled by Japanese responsiveness, however cautious, to current Soviet efforts to carve out a wider regional role, including the development of wider economic and political links with Japan. And the Chinese probably fear that Japanese uncertainties about future American intentions in the Far East may precipitate unexpected shifts in Japanese attitudes, including the possibility of a more active regional policy or large-scale rearmament. Such developments would deeply disturb the Chinese and would complicate their position in Asia.

The PRC's hope of creating a strain in Japan-Soviet relations is apparent in its insistence on including an "anti-hegemony" clause in the Peace and Friendship Treaty which Japan and China have been negotiating. Prime Minister Miki would like to conclude the Treaty as soon as possible, but is not prepared to accept an outcome on this issue that could be portrayed by his opponents as "capitulation" to the Chinese. He also wants to minimize the impact on Japan-Soviet relations, and preserve maximum freedom of action for Japan's diplomacy in the future. For some months, this issue has created an impasse in the formal Treaty negotiations. However, there were lengthy discussions on the subject between the two Foreign Ministers when they were in New York for the UNGA session, and in a recent statement to the Diet, Foreign Minister Miyazawa pointed the way to a possible compromise: inclusion of the clause in the treaty, but with a unilateral Japanese statement primarily designed to interpret "anti-hegemony" as a universal principle not directed specifically at any third country, and not implying any joint Sino-Japanese action against any attempt to gain hegemony.

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The Soviets of course know that the Chinese are insisting on the anti-hegemony clause because of its anti-Soviet connotation, and they have warned the Japanese publicly and privately that inclusion of the clause in the Treaty could affect Soviet-Japan relations adversely. However, despite its proclaimed policy of "equidistance" in its relations with China and the Soviet Union, Japan is clearly more interested at this point in filling out its relations with Peking than in upgrading its ties with Moscow, not least because Japanese officials hope Soviet fears of growing Sino-Japanese collaboration may eventually produce more flexible Soviet attitudes on the key bilateral issues between them. But for the moment, the chronic impasse over the Northern Territories, the relatively slow pace of negotiations on joint economic projects for Siberian resource development projects, persistent Soviet diplomatic heavy-handedness with Tokyo, and a basic Japanese distrust of the Soviet Union combine to limit prospects for early significant improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations.

Just as there is at present no Japan issue in US-PRC relations, there is no China issue in US-Japan relations. The Japanese were upset by what they called the "Nixon shock"--the failure to inform them in advance of the announcement that President Nixon would visit China. But that is now past history, and we have kept the Japanese meticulously informed of our dealings with China. (Secretary Kissinger has been continually stopping in Tokyo to brief them on his annual Peking trips.) Nevertheless, their only major concern regarding the US-PRC relationship is that they not be caught again by surprise by some major development. More immediately, the Japanese probably hope that any joint statement issued at the end of your visit will reaffirm opposition to hegemonism, as this might help to counter domestic and Soviet pressures against inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in the Treaty.

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Chinese Position

There was no significant discussion of Japan in Secretary Kissinger's talk with Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in New York in September or in his recent discussions in Peking.

The Chinese may reiterate the importance they attach to US-Japan relations, noting they do not criticize the security relationship. They will probably express satisfaction about their own relationship with Japan and minimize the significance of the anti-hegemony issue by saying that they are in no hurry and are prepared to wait until the matter is resolved to their satisfaction.

US Position

We welcome the PRC's support for close US-Japan ties and have no problem with the good relations which have developed between the PRC and Japan. In effect, the currently smooth triangular relationship serves as a tacit check on Soviet ambitions in Asia. And it is clearly in our interest that Peking not try to play us off against the Japanese.

Regarding the anti-hegemony issue, the Chinese know that we have told the Japanese that we could not object to inclusion of such a clause in the PRC-Japan Treaty so long as it is not directed at us, particularly since the concept was included in the Shanghai Communique.

We will want to assure the Chinese that our relations with Japan have very greatly strengthened and have never been better, and that we will continue to give high priority to maintaining close relations with Japan. There are no contentious bilateral issues between us. Opposition in Japan to the Security Treaty has abated, partly because it is no longer a domestic issue linked to Japan-PRC relations. Your trip to Japan and the Emperor's visit to the U.S. were highly successful in symbolizing the excellent relations which we enjoy.

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Increased Soviet ability to project its military power into the Pacific, the collapse of Indochina and Japanese anxieties about rising tensions in Korea have led to some reexamination of the premises underlying Japan's defense thinking. Japan feels a greater vulnerability now that the focus of tension in Asia has shifted from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, and public acceptance of closer US-Japan defense cooperation has increased. There may be some qualitative improvement in Japan's defense posture, particularly in air and maritime defense, but we foresee no basic shifts in that posture. We hope the PRC will recognize that these developments are compatible with its interests.

The Japanese are concerned that increased instability in the Korean peninsula will impact on their own security, and we should impress this point upon the Chinese.

If asked for our views on the internal situation in Japan, we should indicate our expectation that the balance of forces within the Liberal Democratic Party on which Miki's position depends may endure for some time and that even if there should be early elections, these are not likely to alter the complexion of Japanese policy in any fundamental way.

Department of State
November 1975

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KOREA





~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~KOREAI. OCTOBER 1975 TALKSChinese Position in October 1975 (Mao + Teng):

- An armistice agreement cannot go on forever. There is bound to come a day when it will be turned into a situation of peace. China's view is that once the Armistice Agreement is replaced by a peace agreement, it will not be difficult to settle the issue in principle. China's understanding of the North Korean position is that the Armistice Agreement will be replaced by a peace agreement.
- As for the concrete issue of dissolving the U. N. Command, it is something for the U.S. to discuss with North Korea. It seems the time is not yet ripe for solving this issue.
- The U.S. has sufficient channels to North Korea.

U.S. Position in October 1975

- On Korea we clearly have different views. The U.S. is not opposed to reunification or to a dialogue, but we are opposed to having separate talks with North Korea to the exclusion of South Korea. It is possible that by forcing the pace of events too far, geopolitical realities could be created that are not always to the benefit of those who force the pace.
- The U.S. is prepared to talk to North Korea, in any forum that includes South Korea. If the U. N. Command is abolished before there is a peace agreement, there will be no legal status at all.
- We hope that the U.S. and PRC won't fire too many "empty cannons" at each other in the U. N. debate on this issue.

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 NSC Memo, Sec 6.6, State Dept. Guidelines ; state review
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KOREA

I. NOVEMBER 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in November 1973

(C Hou)

- We have reached a compromise, but the PRC believes the speed has to be slowed down. I. e., the time when the draft resolution should be put to the First Committee and the Chairman of the UNGA will be postponed. The PRC has to consult with other sponsor countries that [North] Korea had mobilized, and assumed the U. S. had to do the same.
- The main thing is we should give them some time, because the PRC's Korean friends need to discuss and persuade some other sponsor countries. It would be very bad if we decided after discussing it and tried to impose it on others. We don't think it need be done in such a hurry.
- The Soviet Union is one of the sponsor countries, and Dr. Kissinger's presence in China might create some confusion in other countries. The Soviet group will definitely try to create trouble on this issue and they will stand on the so-called left. They constantly forget that UN troops were sent into Korea when they were absent from the Security Council.
- What should we do about the Armistice Commission?
- It is fortunate that the Soviet Union was not a participant in the armistice agreement.
- Over the last 20 years no troubles have occurred with the armistice agreement. Even though Dulles refused to settle this question, peace has been maintained. This has given Korea an opportunity to move towards peaceful communication.
- Of course, this is something that will call for a long period of time before it can be settled.
- The members of the four nations with the Advisory Committee are very comfortable. They were just stationed there, without asking to withdraw from Korea.

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 E.O. 13526, SEC 3.3
 NCC Memo, 8/20/74, State Dept. Guidelines
 By DA Date 6/23/10

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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US Position in November 1973

- We had been under the impression the PRC was in a hurry. We are in no particular hurry. The U.S. will accept any schedule given by the PRC.
- One problem with respect to the UN is that its disappearance would also remove the legal basis for the armistice.
- We will work with the PRC during the next year to find a solution to the question of the legal basis of the armistice. We will make a major effort before the next General Assembly to come to an agreement with the PRC on that issue.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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KOREA

I. FEBRUARY 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in February (C400)

- It hasn't been easy for Korea to have remained without any major incident these 20 years. There is only an armistice.
- In retrospect it was good that Dulles broke up the 1954 Geneva Conference discussion about Korea. It meant we were not fettered, and both sides have maintained the desire to maintain a status of peace there.
- It is 15 years since Chinese volunteers left, but US troops remain. The DPRK has neither Chinese nor Soviet military advisers.
- In principle there will be a day when US troops will be totally withdrawn, so it is not incorrect for the DPRK to put forward that principle.
- The Soviet Union is now trying to exert pressure on the DPRK but the Koreans resist them.
- It would indeed be best if the proposal to abolish UNCURK came from the South Koreans. If the US can promise that, China will do its best to avoid the issue becoming acute. We could avoid a debate in the UN.
- It is reasonable for the DPRK to request a gradual US troop withdrawal because the US is going to do it anyway. The US wants to use the period to increase the self-confidence of the South Koreans to make sure they can defend themselves. But there is no one who is going to commit aggression against them.
- The Japanese should not be able to force themselves on the Koreans.
- China has told its Korean friends that the US withdrawal should be gradual and that Japan should not be allowed to enter.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/88, State Dept. Guidelines
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(Chinese Position in February)

- The Koreans don't have a good impression of the Japanese. Many Koreans were trained by the Japanese.
- South Korea is now doing its utmost to establish a dictatorship and suppress the people.
- The two parts of Korea have only an initial contact, and how is it possible to fundamentally change a system by initial contact? And even if a confederation were established between two states of different social systems, it would only be outward appearances. It would not be possible to immediately obliterate the differences. The only thing that could be done is to give the people hope that in the future unity would be achieved; this would add to the atmosphere of national harmony.
- The South Koreans are afraid of that because they lack self-confidence. Their new dictatorship shows a lack of self-confidence. The present manner of conducting affairs in South Korea is to rely on foreign forces. If they don't pay too much attention they will allow Japanese economic forces to enter the area.
- South Korea should be made to understand that abolition of UNCURK should not impair their self-confidence, if they are able to manage their part of the country well.

U. S. Position in February

- We envisage we can get UNCURK abolished probably in the second half of this year. We will talk to the ROK first to see if they are willing to propose it. HAK is almost certain we can bring it about.
- We agree with China that the Japanese should not be able to force themselves on the Koreans. We have an understanding on that. That makes it important that US withdrawal be gradual and not sudden.
- By this time next year, the US will be able to give China a better understanding of the direction in which the US is moving in troop withdrawal.

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(U. S. Position in February)

-- We encourage the North-South political talks. Each side claims the other is the obstacle. Perhaps we should exchange information. If China can tell us the concrete issues that are creating difficulty, we will know where to use our influence.

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KOREA

II. JUNE TALKS 1972

PM Chou's Position

- The US in principle should withdraw, but should also guarantee that there not be a vacuum to be filled by Japanese forces. A period of time will be required.
- North and South Korea should reunify peacefully, but the time is not yet ripe.
- For now, it is important that there be conciliatory contacts between the two.
- The PRC will not encourage a military reunification of Korea.
- The US and PRC should exercise restraint in military aid to the two Koreas.
- The UNCURK should be abolished at the 1972 UNGA.

HAK's Position

- The US welcomes the North-South talks and is encouraging them.

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NSC Memo, 3/30/88, State Dept. Guidelines

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-- Korea is one area where Japanese feel clear security implications. An aggressive North Korea is likely to stir Japanese involvement in the peninsula.

-- The US and PRC should both restrain their Korean partners.

-- The US and PRC should avoid public debate so as not to poison the atmosphere.

-- The US will oppose any Japanese military role in Korea.

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KOREA

I. February Talks 1972

Prime Minister Chou's Position

-- Desirable to promote contacts between North and South Korea.

-- Also will be good when UN Commission for Unification and

Rehabilitation of Korea ends.

-- PRC appreciates gradual reduction of U. S. forces in Korea.

-- Japanese military involvement in South Korea would create

tension.

The President's Position

-- Both sides should exert influence to restrain our allies. Korean peninsula was once scene of conflict between us and it must never happen again.

-- U. S. will use its influence to discourage Japanese intervention in Korea.

-- U. S. is examining question of termination of UNCURK.

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ISSUES PAPER



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KOREA

The Problem

The PRC clearly does not want the resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and would probably act to restrain North Korea from major military adventures threatening a US military reaction. Moreover, the PRC is not pressing us in more than a rhetorical way to withdraw our forces from Korea. At the same time, however, the PRC has been unwilling to take much responsibility for the Korean question on such key matters as how to terminate the UN Command without jeopardizing the armistice agreement. It also seems to be locked into firm support of North Korea's tough diplomatic policies which are aimed at isolation of the ROK and international acceptance of North Korea as the legitimate government of the Korean people. These contrast sharply with our desire to reduce tensions between North and South Korea and to stabilize the situation in and around the Korean Peninsula.

It is important that we continue to impress upon the PRC that while we will be flexible in our approach our commitment to the Republic of Korea is firm, that our search for easing of tensions in Korea does not mean that we will yield to pressure tactics, and that we believe it is in the PRC's interest to help us reduce tensions in Korea.

Background

After playing a constructive role in handling the Korean question at the UN in 1973, the Chinese position with regard to Korea has steadily toughened in tone. The Chinese have given no indication that they are willing (or able) to induce the North Koreans to a more flexible stance. Sino-Soviet rivalry and the

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consequent Chinese interest in preventing Russian inroads in Pyongyang exclude any early prospect of their support for any arrangements which are stridently opposed by North Korea (e.g., dual membership of the two Koreas in the UN, indefinite US troop presence on the Peninsula, recognition of the ROK).

While there is a discernible element of prudence and caution in their private position, the Chinese public stance on Korea and the US force presence has become consistently harder. The Chinese have publicly supported Pyongyang's extremist contention that it is the sole legal sovereign government on the Peninsula. Chinese public statements on Korea in this year's UNGA were tough and at times gratuitously vitriolic. To be sure, they have been rather careful in our private meetings to let us know they are convinced North Korea is not planning aggressive military moves. This assurance presumably reflects their own discussions with North Korea on the need to exercise restraint and avoid provocative behavior. However, the Chinese have shown no give in substantive support for North Korea and have made clear that they do not intend to play a behind-the-scenes role other than to communicate the standard North Korean proposals (i.e., direct meeting contact between US and North Korea.)

Since the Chinese do not view the security situation on the Korean Peninsula as threatening their own interest, they apparently do not see the need to--or wish to pay the costs of--pressing North Korea to respond more flexibly to our proposals. An additional factor inhibiting Chinese influence on North Korea is the string of international successes North Korea has scored over the past years. This year Pyongyang has gained admittance to the non-aligned conference and has successfully allied itself with the radical non-aligned leadership, particularly Algeria, Yugoslavia and the more

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radical African states. In this year's General Assembly, North Korea was able for the first time to secure passage of a resolution embodying their basic objectives, i.e., dissolution of the UN Command, withdrawal of foreign troops, inclusion of a peace treaty between the "real parties" to the armistice, defined by North Korea as itself and the US.

The UN result was a standoff because we also secured passage of our contradictory resolution embodying our position, calling for continuation of the South-North dialogue; linkage of UN Command termination to the preservation of the Armistice Agreement; and negotiations on arrangements to replace the Armistice Agreement, reduce tensions and assure a lasting peace. However, in political terms this was the first time that North Korea, condemned in 1950 for its invasion of the ROK, secured a majority vote for their position--at least a qualified victory.

In his address to the General Assembly, Secretary Kissinger proposed convening of a conference of the parties to the Armistice (US, ROK, PRC, North Korea) to discuss the Armistice Agreement. He further indicated that at such a meeting we would also be prepared to explore other measures to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula, including the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement. Our proposal has been rejected by both the North Koreans and the Chinese who have reiterated North Korean demands that the US and North Korea alone should negotiate the peace treaty. We cannot accept this proposal since it would exclude ROK from negotiations vitally affecting its own future. Moreover, the North Korean proposal is patently designed to establish it as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula and to drive a wedge in our relations with Seoul.

We have publicly stated our willingness to take reciprocal gestures towards North Korea if North Korea and its allies would move to improve their relations

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with the ROK. Reflecting North Korean pressure, neither the PRC nor any other Communist power has accepted this proposal. To date there have been neither significant contacts nor trade between the PRC and ROK and there is no evidence that the Chinese would contemplate a change in their position on this in the absence of North Korean prior agreement.

President Park has written to you asking that we make clear to the Chinese that we will not accept any negotiations on Korea's future which exclude the ROK. He has also requested that we reiterate our position linking UNC termination to preservation of the Armistice Agreement. Park's letter reflects the ROKG preoccupation that Korea might be a major subject of discussion during your Peking visit. We have told the ROK we do not expect that the Chinese will wish to engage in any extensive discussions on Korea. Although Park knows that we do not rule out all direct contact with the North Koreans, we have assured him we will make clear to the Chinese that we cannot accept the exclusion of the ROKG from negotiations on Korea and that the UN Command termination is linked to preservation of the Armistice

Chinese Position

Korea was covered briefly during Secretary Kissinger's talks with Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in New York in September. At that time, Ch'iao said that Korea is a "small problem", urged us to withdraw our troops and initiate talks with North Korea, and commented that while the Korea issue would have to be settled some time, it need not be settled in the UNGA this year.

During the Secretary's recent visit to Peking, Korea was again briefly discussed. Teng, who exhibited little sense of urgency, said we should talk to the North

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Koreans, and that the Armistice Agreement should be replaced by a peace treaty (presumably between the US and North Korea.) He suggested that this would solve the problem of finding a way to maintain the Armistice Agreement when the UN Command is dissolved. Mao made a brief--and puzzling--allusion to the US-sponsored resolution in the UN in 1950 branding China as the aggressor in Korea. He said that he enjoyed the honor of being so labeled and that we should not worry about changing that resolution.

In your talks in Peking, the Chinese will probably suggest that the Korean security situation does not warrant the degree of concern which we manifest. They will probably once again urge that we meet directly with the North Koreans. They may say, as they charge publicly, that our policy tends to perpetuate the division of Korea and that we should not insist on retention of the UN Command or on indefinite presence of American forces on the Peninsula. However, they will not express their views intemperately.

U.S. Position

Our primary objective is to find ways to reduce tensions in Korea, in order to reduce the risk of hostilities and to encourage North and South Korea to resume the dialogue which was started in 1972 but which has now stalled. We are willing to talk directly with North Korea, but not in a forum which excludes South Korea. Just as Peking thinks we should have some contact with North Korea, we believe North Korea's friends should have some contact with South Korea. We consider the presence of our troops in South Korea to be a bilateral matter between the US and South Korea, and their presence is linked to the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. We are willing to terminate the UN Command if a way can be found to keep the Armistice Agreement in force. (The original UN Commander

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was the only signatory to the Armistice Agreement on our side, and terminating the US Command, in the absence of prior arrangements, could have the effect of ending the Armistice Agreement.)

Our proposal for a meeting between North and South Korea, the US and the PRC was a serious one; it still stands, and we continue to hope there will be a constructive response. However, we want North Korea to recognize that its current pressure tactics, in the UN and elsewhere, will not be successful. We will not accept the exclusion of the ROK from negotiations relating to the future of the Korean Peninsula.

We recognize that on many aspects of the Korean situation, the PRC view differs from ours. However, we believe it is in the PRC's interest as well as ours to search for more durable arrangements to assure lasting peace on the Peninsula.

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MONGOLIA



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

MONGOLIA

We do not expect the question of US relations with the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) to arise. The matter was discussed briefly by Secretary Kissinger with Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in October 1974, at which time the Secretary referred to the possibility that we might establish diplomatic relations with Mongolia. Ch'iao replied that there are two aspects to the situation: the PRC has diplomatic relations with Mongolia, but it is just a puppet state.

Although the PRC has maintained formal diplomatic relations with the MPR since 1949, relations have been strained for some years because Mongolia faithfully echoes Moscow's foreign policy line and permits the Soviets to station forces there. (These forces consist of a tank division, a motorized rifle division, and several SAM sites totalling about 25,000 men.)

In March 1973 we initiated discussions with the MPR regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations through our respective missions to the United Nations in New York. The Mongols agreed in principle to our initial proposal, which provided for the negotiation of a joint communique announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations to be issued simultaneously with the conclusion of two agreements on the exercise of consular functions and on facilitating the operations of our respective diplomatic missions.

Subsequently, however, the Mongols suggested that the two sides first issue the communique with the understanding that the two other agreements would be concluded within sixty days thereafter. We responded that before making a decision on this proposal, we would like to know what difficulties the MPR had with the US drafts and what counterproposals the MPR might have. The negotiations have been in abeyance since April 1973 because of the Mongol failure to respond to this request, despite several nudges by the US side.

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The delay in the Mongol response undoubtedly reflects political constraints rather than any feeling that our initial proposals were non-negotiable. Although there have been hints that a "problem with China" may be involved, we believe that the most likely possibility is that the Soviets had second thoughts about the advisability of seeing a US presence established in Ulaanbaatar at this time.

You should not raise this subject. If, contrary to expectations, the Chinese raise it, you should merely state the factual situation on our efforts to establish relations with the MPR and indicate we are in no hurry about this.

Department of State
November 1975

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