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INDOCHINA

PREVIOUS TALKS



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/76, State Dept. Guidelines; *state review 9/18/03*By NARA, Date 6/22/10SECRET/NODIS/XGDSINDOCHINAI. NOVEMBER 1974 TALKSChinese Position in November 1974 (tent)

- Sihanouk and the resistance forces in Cambodia are neither puppets of Hanoi nor puppets of China. They are for the independence of their own country and nation. Why does the US have to get involved? Let them solve their own problem. Since the US had the power to decide whether to get involved, the US also has the power to decide not to be involved.
- For the US to place its hopes on Lon Nol or any force it thinks would replace Lon Nol, that is not reliable.
- Whether soldiers can fight or not depends on the principle for which they are fighting, whether they are fighting for the people. America had the impression that people in Indochina couldn't fight. But it turned out that the people in Indochina fixed up the US very hard. The Cambodians can fight too.
- There is talk that the Cambodian war is being fought by the Vietnamese. There is not a single Vietnamese soldier fighting in Cambodia.
- The US relationship with Lon Nol is only four years. The US has worked with Sihanouk longer.
- China supports the many statements of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. Regardless of his changes, he is a nationalist.
- China has no further news about American MIA, but if it does, it will pass it to the USLO.
- Vietnam is to be discussed between the US, DRV, and PRG. The fundamental question is this: It is good that the US has withdrawn its forces, but the US has not really disengaged. The US's feet are still bogged down there. Probably all the current issues stem from the fact that the fundamental issue has not been completely resolved.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
 CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

2

US Position in November 1974

- Having withdrawn from Vietnam, the US can have no interest in a long-term presence in Cambodia. However, as a question of principle, the US does not simply abandon people with whom we have worked. For us to do this would have a larger significance and it is not a habit we should acquire lightly.
- The issue now is to achieve a solution on the Indochina peninsula in which each country can realize its national aspirations -- without being dominated by one of them. This is frankly in China's long-term interest. If Indochina was dominated from one center, an aggressive force, in the context of some of the schemes for Asian collective security, could cause China problems.
- Therefore we prefer a national solution for Cambodia. Sihanouk offers perhaps the best possibility for a national solution. But for Sihanouk to act effectively he must be in charge of a balance of forces in Cambodia, like Souvanna Phouma in Laos. If Sihanouk comes back as head of the insurgent forces, he will not last long; he will be a figurehead. In our analysis, the insurgents are under Hanoi's influence. So we believe it is in Sihanouk's interest to govern with some element from Phnom Penh -- not Lon Nol -- that he can use as a balance to help him preserve his position.
- The US is prepared to cooperate in a peace conference whose practical result will be the return of Sihanouk in a dominant position, the transformation of the existing structure in Phnom Penh, and the participation of the resistance forces.
- It is true that no Vietnamese are fighting in Cambodia, but the supplies come from Vietnam.
- Sihanouk is a rather changeable character, and will drive people crazy, but he is the biggest national figure in Cambodia, and the US doesn't oppose him.
- The US greatly appreciates the information given us on the last trip about US servicemen who were lost over China. It would be a great help to us and very much appreciated if any additional information about MIA's that comes available could be passed

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

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to our Liaison Office. Secondly, USLO will submit any specific questions we have and we would be grateful for any information. Thirdly, we would be grateful if the remains of any of those who crashed over China or died in China could be returned to the US, if they can still be found. Finally, we have had great difficulty in getting any answers from North Vietnam, as is called for by the Paris Agreement, and any influence or advice China could give to Hanoi we would greatly appreciate.

- The North Vietnamese have been in total violation of the Paris Agreement in building up forces in the South. We hope there will not be a major offensive because that would produce serious consequences. We will certainly prevent any offensive on the part of the South Vietnamese.
- It is not true that the US and GVN are not abiding by the Paris Agreement. President Thieu has offered negotiations which would implement all the provisions of the Agreement. We are only replacing equipment that has been lost, and therefore it is easy for North Vietnam to control the rate of loss and our replacement.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

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~~EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

SOUTHEAST ASIA

I. NOVEMBER 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in November 1973 (MAO & CHOU)

- China sees that the US is gradually realizing the Nixon Doctrine policy of putting out the flames of war in Southeast Asia. In this manner, the US will be able to achieve a greater initiative. (Mao)
- The Soviet Union made use of the opportunities when both of the US's feet were stuck in the quagmire of Southeast Asia. To enter Czechoslovakia, and also India. In this, President Nixon can't take all the blame for that. The Johnson Administration was responsible for that. (Mao)
- Some in China commented that the US lost an opportunity to take action when Egypt chased out Soviet military personnel. But the US's feet were still in the whole of Southeast Asia and the US had not yet climbed out. The US is now freer than before. (Mao)
- Compared to the overall international situation, Indochina is but a very small corner now, though it troubled the US for the 4-1/2 years since President Nixon came into office. From the point of view of the overall international strategy, the US took too much time on that small issue.
- The US direct involvement in Vietnam was left over from the previous Administration, but the Administration itself made mistakes.
- China has recently received two documents from Vietnam. They have made clear that the provocations are not from them but from Thieu. They have no intention of launching a major offensive now. They assured China of this.
- Hanoi is sending certain materials southward but that is only for building a road. China not long ago sent a ship with feed grains. The GVN attacked it saying it was filled with military equipment, but actually it was food grains.
- In South Vietnam, small frictions have never ceased.

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~~EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

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NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; state review
By NARA, Date 6/22/10 9/18/03

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

(Chinese Position in November 1973)

- The population in South Vietnam has always wanted peace so they could return to their lands and till their lands. The NLF wanted to make this possible. But Thieu is fearful of this. He has concentrated all the people in villages where there is not enough land and a lack of food. This is where the contradiction arises; this is where the friction often comes from.
- Chou does not believe there will be major fighting in Vietnam because Hanoi's views are different from those they held before the cease-fire.
- The US had mentioned an evolution. It will take several years. And exactly what the outcome will be will depend on themselves and also on the political settlement.
- China thinks it would be good if there was a political settlement.
- If we discuss Cambodia, we will have to link it to the whole of Indochina.
- China hears its Cambodian friends in Peking complain that they are not receiving enough military support from North Vietnam. According to China's account, it is extremely meager.
- In Cambodia there does not seem to be any major fighting. China thinks it would be best for the US to let go of that area. The US has no treaty obligations to Lon Nol as it has with Thieu.
- It is futile to do as Sihanouk has done. Because he knows Dr. Kissinger will not meet him, he spoke very loudly at the Non-Aligned Conference. He abused not only Dr. Kissinger but Chou.
- The only thing China wants to bring to US attention is that the Soviet Union wants to have a hand in that pie [Cambodia]. They might try to do it with the French.
- It was a humanitarian thing for the US to bring Sihanouk's mother to Peking. The US charge understood the situation and let the French doctors, who had been taking care of her for a year, accompany her.
- The military dictatorship in Bangkok has undergone changes but they won't be of very major proportions. It would be relatively better if that area could be one of peace and neutrality.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-3-

(Chinese Position in November 1973)

- Chou discussed with Whitlam whether it would be possible for China to establish relations with Singapore. Chou wonders if a communique or public declaration that none of those Singapore citizens would maintain dual citizenship might set Lee at ease. China would be willing to establish relations in a pattern which would set other countries at ease.
- It would be better for Singapore, being a free port, to maintain a neutral position. The Soviet Union is casting a covetous eye on them.
- There are perhaps some leftists in Singapore, but to Chou's knowledge there are no Communist parties in Singapore.
- Prime Minister Chou gave Whitlam a copy of Maxwell's book. Whitlam originally was more favorable to Bangladesh and did not understand the PRC position. But later, after Chou explained the PRC position, Whitlam did not say anything more.

US Position in November 1973

- We believe the resumption of large military operations in Vietnam would be extremely undesirable and have the potential of major involvement of our two countries. We would like to have normal relations [with the DRV].
- The June 13, 1973 Joint Communique was the last negotiation Dr. Kissinger will have with the North Vietnamese.
- The same qualities that make the Vietnamese a heroic people make them politically uncompromising. They sometimes combine the worst aspects of Confucianism and the French lycee. This accounts for the lack of progress in their political talks.
- Eventually the objective situation in Vietnam will change for both sides, and then there will be real negotiating possibilities.
- If the North Vietnamese had proposed the settlement we achieved in the first year, we would have accepted it at any point. Our difficulty was that the North Vietnamese always asked us to overthrow a friendly government, and that we could not do. That was a point of honor for us, as we always told the PRC.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

(US Position in November 1973)

- A major offensive in Vietnam would be against everyone's interest, especially if it were done with weapons provided massively from outside. We are certainly using our influence with our friends to maintain restraint.
- We have no objection to sending civilian equipment southward. But when it is transported in tanks, we get worried. (This does not refer to China.)
- We are prepared to help North Vietnam in rehabilitation.
- If North Vietnam does not get a major amount of military equipment from outside, then it can't start a major attack.
- Small frictions in South Vietnam are inevitable. But we would not involve ourselves in them. If it was a problem like 1972, it would present a problem for us and we would engage ourselves.
- On Cambodia, it is up to the Premier whether he wishes to have a more extended discussion. The US is not in principle opposed to Sihanouk. Sihanouk is absolutely incorrect in stating that the US is opposed to him in principle. If he could return to Cambodia in a position of real independence for himself, we would be interested in him as a leader -- not if he returns as a captive of one particular faction that is using him for a brief period in order to gain international recognition.
- Our interest in Cambodia, insofar as we have interest, is to keep it out of great-power confrontation. We are interested in a truly independent, neutral Cambodia. We want no position for the US in Cambodia. And we are not committed to any particular group of individuals in Cambodia.
- In Cambodia, if there is no major fighting, we will not interfere.
- Speaking frankly, our major problem with Cambodia is that the opponents of President Nixon want to use it as an example of the bankruptcy of his whole policy. So if there is a rapid collapse, it will be reflected in our other policies. That, frankly, is our only concern.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-5-

(US Position in November 1973)

- If Senator Mansfield goes to China, it could help us if he does not receive too much ammunition from the Chinese side on Cambodia.
- As a personal and not a governmental request, Dr. Kissinger asks if the PRC could ask Sihanouk about the fate of foreign journalists missing in Cambodia.
- Thailand will move to a more neutralist position, slowly and carefully.
- The Indians are very interested in Thailand. The Indians have told us they would offer Thailand a Friendship Treaty, and the Thai asked our opinion.
- The Thai are afraid of China in general because of their population.
- The US will talk to Lee Kuan Yew to inform him of China's interest in establishing relations with him, in a pattern that will set him at ease with respect to his Chinese population.
- Lee Kuan Yew is primarily worried about the organization of Communist groups. He is not anti-China; he is afraid China will engage in subversive activities. Dr. Kissinger knows Lee well. He is one of the few leaders with whom it is worth talking. He comes to Harvard every two years and shocks Dr. Kissinger's liberal colleagues by calling them fools.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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 E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
 NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; *State review*
 By 1/1 NARA, Date 6/22/10 *9/18/03*

INDOCHINA

I. FEBRUARY 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in February (Mao + Chou)

- The Vietnamese issue can be counted as basically settled. HAK's statement that we must now have a transitional period toward tranquility is right. (Mao)
- As President Nixon said, each side has its own means and acted out of its own necessity. That resulted in the two countries acting hand-in-hand. (Mao)
- If, as HAK says, it will take a long time to settle the questions of Indochina and Southeast Asia, won't the U.S. waste its energies in the region?
- The manpower and materiel that the U.S. poured into Southeast Asia is too much.
- Will it be so easy for the Soviet Union to reach out into Southeast Asia as in the Mideast and South Asia? Wherever the U.S. leaves, they want to go. But if there is a vacuum, the people will take their place. For instance, Cambodia. The Soviets would not have stepped in if the U.S. had not opposed Sihanouk.
- After October 26, China saw the trouble Thieu was causing and saw that Thieu had surprised the U.S. China told the DRV about this.
- Both North and South Vietnam seem willing to implement the Agreement.
- China's Vietnamese allies, because they are a small country, necessarily have a strong sense of independence and self-dignity.
- The Vietnamese have a strong inclination towards unity.
- Thieu has greedy personal ambition and is bound to fail. As HAK has said, if the evolution comes to that point, the U.S. can do nothing about it.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

(Chinese Position in February)

- It is not so easy for China's Vietnamese friends to come to see immediately that all the aid the U.S. gave Thieu will be lost eventually.
- In South Vietnam there is a sort of jigsaw pattern, but only the U.S. and DRV can talk over the question. If the U.S. shoulders the responsibility, the ceasefire can be realized. There are bound to be constant small conflicts.
- It will not be beneficial if the quarrel goes on endlessly.
- HAK's analysis is correct (of the DRV's two possible ways of using the Agreement). But the U.S. must take into account that Thieu is taking all steps to violate the Agreement in order to block the second possibility (tranquility, long-term evolution, and a U.S. - DRV relationship).
- The Soviet Union was not very satisfied to hear of the creation of the U.S. - DRV Joint Economic Commission.
- It does not seem that Nguyen Van Thieu is likely to act like Chiang Kai-shek in disrupting the Agreement entirely in half a year.
- It is unacceptable for the UN Secretary General to be able to reconvene the International Conference on Vietnam. That would indicate that the UN was in charge, and the Big Five would be involved again.
- The UN has never been in charge of the matter. Since there is now a peace agreement, why should it be referred to the UN again? In the Mideast there was a UN resolution but there is always one Permanent Member of the Security Council that disagrees, so it can never be implemented.
- If the ceasefire can be genuinely implemented, the U.S. will not be involved again in the armed conflict in Vietnam.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-3-

(Chinese Position in February)

- The Agreement leaves it to the South Vietnamese to settle their own problems. Of course, the time may be longer than as laid down in the Agreement. Unification of Vietnam will take an even longer time. So there are three stages: (1) troop withdrawal, ceasefire, and prisoner return, (2) general elections, and (3) reunification.
- Tranquility is necessary in Indochina. Chinese supplies to the DRV are very limited. China supports the Agreement, but it is quite another matter for North Vietnam because when they need weapons the emphasis is not here in China. China doesn't have sophisticated weapons.
- China's knowledge of Laos and Cambodia was very limited before the Indochina issue came to their notice.
- The PRC is not very clear about the situation in Laos. Perhaps the Soviets have had a hand in it to a certain extent. Their Ambassador is carrying on certain activities.
- Before having closer ties with Laos, China is waiting until they settle their problem, because a premature action would not be wise.
- After the PRC finishes the road in Laos, the project will be finished and the Chinese will leave. It was Souvanna who asked China to build it. After the ceasefire the Chinese troops will have no role or use there, so the anti-aircraft troops will be withdrawn.
- The roads will only reach the Mekong and do not threaten Thailand. The Thai should repatriate their ethnic Lao to Laos, to help build the road. The Thai have allowed Chiang Kai-shek's agents to use Thailand for smuggling and infiltration into China.

U.S. Position in February

- The basic Vietnam issues are settled and we must now have a transitional period of tranquility. (to Mao)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

(U.S. Position in February)

- History will not stop in Southeast Asia, and difficulties will remain. But we now have an opportunity to put SEA in the context of our larger relationship.
- The possibility of tranquility in Southeast Asia, if major countries show restraint, is one of the factors for a possible era of peace.
- It may not be so easy for the Soviets to reach out into Southeast Asia but it is their intention.
- We believe the combination of the Soviet Union and India might want to unify Indochina under one country and then create an Asian security system extending from Burma through Indonesia.
- We are trying to normalize our relations with the DRV. We have no direct interest in Indochina other than that the countries there be independent. Hanoi can never be a threat to the U.S. We can coexist with Hanoi. We are prepared to deal openly and honestly as we have dealt with the PRC, and we made a good beginning during HAK's visit to Hanoi.
- The U.S. will have to defend the Paris Agreement if it is fundamentally challenged. If it collapses, or if it collapses too quickly, this will affect our ability to conduct any effective foreign policy, and this is therefore a world interest. The transition must not invite the intrusion of other countries or the dominance of forces in the U.S. who oppose U.S. strength. This is one reason the Soviets are moving into a position of undermining the Agreement. They also seek to establish their position in Hanoi.
- The DRV has two choices: to use the Agreement as a short-term offensive weapon, or as a step toward a long-term relationship with us -- in which we both understand what will happen but it will be tranquil for a period. They have to be somewhat patient.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY


~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-5-

(U.S. Position in February)

- We are investigating the GVN's compliance with the Agreement and will use our maximum influence. We would strongly oppose Thieu's disrupting the Agreement. But the DRV has moved 300 tanks into South Vietnam in serious violation of the Agreement.
- In the International Conference, the U.S. is prepared to work in concert with the DRV and PRC to avoid any attempts to isolate the PRC.
- There should be some restraint now about the importation of arms into Indochina. We hope China will now send its MIG-19's to Pakistan instead of Vietnam. This will promote tranquility. The U.S. will be very careful now in defining replacements.
- Our best policy towards Vietnam is to be the only superpower that has no interested motives in Indochina.
- Souvanna Phouma has told us he is anxious to have closer relations with the PRC, and we have encouraged him to do so.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

CAMBODIA

I. FEBRUARY 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in February (CHOU)

- China's knowledge of Laos and Cambodia was very limited before the Indochina issue came to their notice. Even when they came to power in the late '40's, they didn't even know there was a Cambodia.
- Will it be so easy for the Soviet Union to reach out into Southeast Asia as in the Mideast and South Asia? Wherever the US leaves, they want to go. But if there is a vacuum, the people will take their place, e. g., Cambodia. The Soviets would not have stepped in if the US had not opposed Sihanouk.
- France is also active in Cambodia, as is the USSR. The Soviets are attempting to fabricate their own Red Khmer but can't find many people. The Soviets intend to send a full Ambassador to Phnom Penh. In the future if there is information the US would like to give in this respect, China can also give the US some too. It would only be information; China has not reached the stage where it could provide views or suggestions.
- Why doesn't the US accept to negotiate with Sihanouk as head of state? The PRC just raises the question to see what the US has.
- China would not establish relations with Lon Nol, even though in March 1970 he counted on China to maintain the original relationship and offered to allow the continued use of Sihanoukville.
- Neither China, nor Sihanouk, nor the Khmer Resistance in Cambodia will negotiate with Lon Nol.
- Since Sihanouk is in China, we cannot but tell him the US view, though China of course has its own position.
- China supports Sihanouk's 5-point Declaration of March 23, 1970, and Statement of Jan. 26, 1973.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 8.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/66, State Dept. Guidelines; state review
By VA NARA, Date 6/22/10 9/18/03

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

(Chinese Position in February)

- It will be difficult to make further progress on Cambodia during this visit. We now know each other's ideas. Our tendency is that the US should cease its involvement, though the US would say that others should also stop their involvement. It would be simpler if the matter were purely a civil war.
- One thing can be done, i. e., China make talk in various ways to make US intentions known to the various sides of FUNK.
- FUNK is not composed of only one party; it is composed of left, middle, and right. In the interior the strength of the left is larger. Differences also occur in the Lon Nol clique.
- China has learned of the US ideas, but at the moment perhaps this is not possible.
- China would like to take very prudent steps, to realize the final goal of peace, independence, unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cambodia. We still have to wait and see how these objectives can be realized.
- China would never want to turn Sihanouk into someone who would heed China's beck and call. That would be hegemony. Sihanouk has complete freedom to express his views in the People's Daily, but many of his views are not necessarily China's views.
- If we wish to see Southeast Asia develop along the lines of peace and neutrality and not enter a Soviet Asian security system, Cambodia would be an exemplar country.
- Lon Nol will not do, but that does not mean that the forces he represents do not count.
- It is impossible for Cambodia to be completely red now. If that were attempted, it would result in even greater problems.
- China agrees with HAK's statement that we have to find a framework for achieving these objectives in a way that takes account of all the real forces.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 3 -

U. S. Position in February

- We believe there should be a political negotiation in Cambodia. All political forces should be represented. How can we, when we recognize the GKR, engage in direct negotiation with Sihanouk? This is out of the question. But if there is a ceasefire and NVA withdrawal, we would encourage a political solution in which Sihanouk would play a very important role. We believe a solution consistent with Sihanouk's dignity is possible, and we have so far refused overtures from countries that have different views.
- The Lon Nol people would be willing to negotiate with Penn Nouth, and that might lead to an interim government which could then choose its chief of state. The end result could be without Lon Nol.
- We would be in principle prepared to discuss with China who might be acceptable negotiators on both sides and acceptable principals in an interim government.
- We have had only vague talks with the Soviets, but they seem to be leaning more towards Lon Nol.
- The major problem is not the formal position but what evolution we can foresee. We are prepared to cooperate with China.
- We completely agree with PM Chou's objectives for Cambodia of peace, independence, unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
- We now have to find some framework for achieving these objectives in a way that takes account of all the real forces.
- We have the same difficulty determining exactly where to put our influence. Before one can act on that, one has to have some idea of the alternative.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

CAMBODIA

US-PRC Exchanges since February

Behind a separate tab you have a 4 page chronology and the complete record of US-PRC exchanges on Cambodia beginning with your February talks with Chou En-lai.

Chinese Criticism. -- Publicly and privately, after February, the Chinese criticized the US for its continued "wanton bombing" and support for the "Lon Nol clique," and its refusal to negotiate directly with Sihanouk. In two notes to the PRC in April, the US recommended that the PRC and US should not try to embarrass each other publicly and take such one-sided positions. The US also reiterated its offer to discuss with the PRC how to promote a Khmer negotiation leading to a coalition. The Chinese did not reply to these US notes.

US Proposals in May. -- On May 18, however, welcoming Ambassador Bruce, Chou En-lai volunteered that the only way to find a solution in Cambodia was to implement all the clauses of Article 20. He and Bruce agreed that we both shared the goal of a peaceful, neutral and independent Cambodia -- "more peaceful, neutral, and independent than ever before," Chou added.

On May 23 in Paris, you made a proposal to Le Duc Tho of a 60-day temporary ceasefire in Cambodia. You then told Huang Hua on May 27 and Huang Chen on May 29 that we were prepared to bring Lon Nol to the US for medical treatment and withdraw US advisers, in return for a 60- or 90-day ceasefire and a negotiation between Sihanouk's and Lon Nol's people. With a ceasefire, talks could also commence in Peking between the USLO staff and Sihanouk's entourage. If the process extended over some months, the US would not oppose Sihanouk's return.

The PRC in a reply on June 4 declined to substitute themselves for their Cambodian allies in talks with the US, but they stated that "the Chinese side can communicate the US tentative thinking to the Cambodian side" once Sihanouk returned from his African/European tour (expected about the end of June). The Chinese in this note went to the extraordinary length of reciting the US proposal back to us verbatim, to insure the accuracy of their report to the Cambodians.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
 NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
 By DA NARA, Date 6/22/12

state review

9/18/03

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

On June 19, you told Huang Chen that if a ceasefire existed in Cambodia by the time of your August trip to Peking, you would be prepared to meet Sihanouk there for political discussions.

After the Bombing Cut-Off. -- On July 6, four days after Sihanouk's return to Peking and five days after the enactment of the bombing cut-off, a PRC note complained of US-inspired leaks about US-PRC negotiations and the US's continued refusal to negotiate with Sihanouk, "which enraged him all the more." Nevertheless Huang Chen said the PRC would now inform Sihanouk of the US thinking. Huang flew back to China soon afterward.

After weeks of total silence, the PRC sent a second note on July 18, referring to "recent developments in the situation in Cambodia." It criticized the US for continuing the bombing, "intensifying" aid to Lon Nol, and "putting pressure" on Sihanouk and GRUNK. "Under these circumstances, the Chinese side holds that it is obviously inappropriate to communicate to Samdech Sihanouk" the US tentative thinking. The US responded to this on July 24 with "astonishment." We would now leave the negotiations to the Khmer. Orally we expressed our regret that for the first time the Chinese word had not counted. The US would not betray those that relied on us.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

INDOCHINA

II. JUNE TALKS 1972

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended), SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By NARA, Date 6/22/10

PM Chou's Position

-- The PRC has never interfered in the DRV's military actions or political negotiations. It only gets notification from them after the fact.

-- The PRC approves the concept of leaving the political solution to South Vietnamese to work out themselves, "fighting with their doors closed." But the PRC cannot impose this on Hanoi.

-- A large country like China can afford to be patient, e. g. on Taiwan. But the DRV is a small country, with 30 years of bitter experience, which feels that if the issue is not settled the only thing that remains for them is to resist and resist to the end.

-- One month would be too short an interval for the fighting to break out again. It could be longer. But the Chinese cannot impose this thinking on their ally any more than they can fight for them.

-- It is the DRV's view, on the basis of the DRV's own experience, that a political solution should be part of a settlement. The PRC does not necessarily object to this. The PRC does not believe that a tripartite government would necessarily be communist-controlled.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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-- The PRC has no special insight into Vietnam and therefore does not meddle in the questions. It will say only that it favors a negotiated solution.

-- The PRC understands that the US subjectively does want to withdraw from Indochina and to try to create an environment where neutrality is practiced.

-- Neither McGovern nor anyone else could actually proceed to overthrow the Thieu Government.

-- Even if the war continues, the US and PRC should try to maintain the relaxation in our relations.

-- After a settlement, China will reduce military aid to the DRV, e. g., it will give Pakistan the MIG-19s that are now going to the DRV.

-- The US bombing and mining are equivalent to a provocation against China because only the land routes are now open, and the US is bombing China. The PRC cannot abandon its ally. And the DRV will go desperate if the US forces them into a corner.

-- The Soviet Union and India are happy that the war is continuing.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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3

-- Southeast Asia should be a buffer zone of neutrality and relaxed tensions. If the US and PRC showed restraint and opposed outside intervention, it would be difficult for other powers to intrude.

-- The Vietnam war is the "single knot" in the region, which affected many other problems: the turmoil in Southeast Asia in general, Taiwan, Korean tensions, the future of Japan. Untying this knot would enable the US and PRC to reduce regional tensions and safeguard a regional zone of neutrality and independence.

HAK's Position

-- Dean Rusk thought the war was masterminded in Peking and was part of a plot to take over the world. The mere fact HAK is sitting in this room changes the objective basis of the American involvement in Vietnam.

-- Our objective has been to liquidate the war in a way that did not undermine our entire international position or domestic stability.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

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-- It is the Soviets and the Indians, not the US, that have long-term designs on Southeast Asia. The US has no permanent objectives in Indochina. Our policies are not those of the 1950's.

-- The DRV acts as if it still has to protect itself against Dulles. It seems to have no confidence in itself or in historical evolution.

-- At some point in the future, the US might even be supporting Hanoi against outside pressures. We don't want Hanoi to be weak. The intensification of the war forces us to do things incommensurate with our long-term purposes.

-- The US can never make peace at the price of overthrowing its own ally. A country cannot be asked to engage in acts of betrayal as a basis of its policy.

-- The quickest solution would be the May 8 approach.

-- The US has no interest in challenging the PRC directly, and any intrusions are unauthorized and accidental.

-- We do not believe the PRC is interested in an intensification of the war, because we believe the PRC takes us seriously when we say we will react strongly.

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-- Had it not been for the March offensive the US would have withdrawn more and more troops and aircraft.

-- We did not consider it a disadvantage that the bombing and mining might strengthen PRC influence in Hanoi.

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

INDOCHINA

I. February Talks 1972

Prime Minister Chou's Position

-- Indochina is key to relaxation of tensions in Far East.

-- Only the Indochinese people have right to negotiate with U.S.

But Indochinese area is of concern to China and China has obligation to give support and assistance.

-- If U.S. policy is to withdraw and accept area's nonalignment, U.S. should act more boldly. Otherwise, it only facilitates furthering of Soviet influence there.

-- As long as U.S. Vietnamization policy continues and they continue fighting, PRC can do nothing but support them. PRC will continue support for its friends even after U.S. leaves completely.

-- The PRC wants war to end, and the Soviet Union wants war to continue.

-- U.S. has cast aside many friends; we should choose our friends carefully. U.S. is in Vietnam by accident. Why not give this up?

-- The later we withdraw, the more serious the U.S. - Soviet contention will be, and another Middle East will develop.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

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-- PRC will not get involved in Vietnam unless U. S. attacks it.

-- PRC supports the PRG seven points and two-point elaboration, and also the Joint Declaration of Summit Conference of Indochinese Peoples.

-- PRC supports Sihanouk because he is a patriot, even though his ideology is completely different and his views are independent.

-- North Vietnam used Cambodian territory only after U. S. brought about war. PRC knew about this only in 1969. So if war comes to an end and Sihanouk returns, Vietnamese forces will surely withdraw from Cambodia.

-- The U. S. would suffer no losses if it had not bombed North Vietnam just before Peking Summit. But now we have given USSR chance to say that music welcoming President to Peking is accompanying bombs exploding in North Vietnam.

The President's Position

-- U. S. withdrawal is a foregone conclusion and only a matter of months. Difficulty now is North Vietnam's insistence on imposing a

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political settlement. Withdrawal is inevitable but it must be done in the right way.

-- U.S. agrees with PRC that people should decide their own future. We have offered that. We have offered total withdrawal, with no "tail" behind.

-- Only USSR gains from continuation of war, because it wants U.S. tied down and wants greater influence in Hanoi.

-- Because so much depends on U.S., we cannot end war dishonorably.

-- We offer to settle military issues alone, or political settlement as we have suggested.

-- Total withdrawal will occur only with an agreement, and in exchange for return of POW's.

-- We will do what we have to do to defend our interests, protect our forces, and get back our POW's. If we cannot get negotiations, it is not we but North Vietnam who has forced us to continue military action.

-- U.S. had nothing to do with Sihanouk's ouster.

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BRIEFING PAPER

INDOCHINAThe Problem

Indochina was discussed during Secretary Kissinger's late September meeting with Ch'iao Kuan-hua in New York, but the subject did not arise during his subsequent talks in Peking. There is no need for a detailed discussion of our views, but the Chinese will be looking for insights into our intentions in the area. The Chinese have urged us to initiate discussions with the Cambodians but have been silent on Viet-Nam, where their own relations are strained. Peking probably has mixed views on US contacts with Hanoi: It would welcome moves that would undercut the Soviet position in Viet-Nam or cause strains in Soviet-DRV relations, but it would not wish the US to act in a way that would strengthen Hanoi's pretensions to regional hegemony. Any remarks you make on the subject should seek to reinforce the impression that we are willing to look to the future in our relations with former adversaries but need to have some reason to believe that they will be acting responsibly in the region.

Background

The PRC is pursuing a differentiated policy toward the three Indochinese states in which the common threads are Peking's desire to assert Chinese influence, to keep the Soviet presence to a minimum, and to prevent Hanoi from dominating the area.

PRC-Viet-Nam Relations

Peking's relations with Hanoi are showing increasing signs of strain. While the two powers are likely to try to keep their differences within bounds, they are clearly emerging as rivals for political influence in the region. One intelligence report quotes a Chinese official as saying relations between Peking and Hanoi are "appalling," and Thai Prime Minister Khukrit returned from Peking in July convinced that the PRC would back Thailand against any Vietnamese aggression.

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XGDS-3

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

9/18/03

By

NARA, Date

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The visit to Peking by North Vietnamese Party First Secretary Le Duan in September did not succeed in resolving Sino-Vietnamese differences. The tone was markedly cooler than on Le Duan's last visit in 1973; in the banquet speeches, Teng Hsiao-p'ing warned about "superpower hegemony" while Le Duan toasted the "further consolidation and development of solidarity among Socialist countries and in the International Communist and Workers' Movement"; and most significantly there was neither a communique nor the traditional return banquet hosted by Le Duan. Lengthy aid negotiations have produced a small number of agreements, but Peking seems to have been less generous than Hanoi would have liked. The terms of Chinese aid have reverted from a war-time gratis basis to the pre-war no-interest long-term credit basis that is Peking's standard practice for aid to most less developed countries. And the Chinese apparently declined to make a commitment for an aid plan covering the next five years.

The marked chill in Peking's relations with Hanoi contrasts sharply with the growing cordiality in Viet-Nam's ties with Moscow. Le Duan's visit to the USSR in late October was marked by unusually warm Soviet praise for the Vietnamese. The concluding joint declaration noted the "completely identical views" of the two sides on the matters discussed, explicitly endorsed the Soviet policy of detente (unprecedented for the Vietnamese), and committed Hanoi to expanded ties and consultations with Moscow. The economic assistance package signed during the visit included an agreement on Soviet assistance to Viet-Nam during 1976-80 and a protocol on the coordination of Soviet and Vietnamese five-year plans.

These signs of closer Soviet-Vietnamese political and economic cooperation are certain to irritate Peking, which is obviously concerned at Hanoi's role in facilitating Soviet inroads into the area. Repeated Chinese references to alleged Soviet ambitions to secure a base at Cam Ranh Bay reflect Peking's anxiety that with the collapse of the US position in Indochina, the Soviets now have enhanced opportunities to "encircle" China, both politically and through the acquisition of bases in nearby countries.

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- 3 -

These political differences are developing against a background of conflicting territorial claims that have deep historical roots. Peking's unilateral seizure of the Paracel Islands in January 1974, despite Chinese knowledge that the islands are also claimed by the Vietnamese, provided an early signal that Peking was not prepared to sacrifice concrete interests to the desire to maintain "fraternal solidarity" with Hanoi. The Vietnamese reciprocated in April 1975 by occupying six Chinese-claimed islands in the Spratleys. The possibility of offshore oil in the South China Sea will only exacerbate this contentious issue.

PRC-Cambodian Relations

If Peking's relations with Hanoi can best be described as correct but cool, the PRC has better opportunities in Cambodia. While the hyper-nationalism of the Khmer Communist leaders will pose problems for Peking, it is even more likely to contribute to contentious relations with the Vietnamese, which will provide Peking with some assurance of a role as a counterweight to Vietnamese pressure.

Moreover, through their early support for Sihanouk and their subsequent ties with the Khmer Communist leaders, the Chinese have clearly established the best entree to Phnom Penh of any outside power. The PRC was the first country to provide aid and technicians to Cambodia's new regime, and they are still the only country with a diplomatic presence in Phnom Penh. For the moment, however, Sihanouk has become more of an albatross than an asset, although the Chinese seem to have worked out a face-saving compromise with the new Khmer leaders that will retire the Prince not too gracefully to the sidelines.

As Cambodia's principal foreign mentor, Peking has taken an interest in facilitating Phnom Penh's reentry into the international community. Ch'iao Kuan-hua urged us to take the initiative in seeking to reopen a dialogue with Cambodia during his September meeting with Secretary Kissinger in New York and expressed confidence the Cambodians would respond. Assistant Secretary Habib

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subsequently met with the Cambodian Foreign Minister in New York and said we were willing to open discussions, but we have still received no reply. (We have also raised with the Cambodian delegation in New York the question of missing Americans in Cambodia. The Cambodians accepted our list of missing personnel but without any indication of their intent.) Peking also looked with favor on the recent decision by Cambodia and Thailand to resume diplomatic relations, as demonstrated by its provision of one of its Boeing 707's (aircraft) to fly the Cambodian delegation to Bangkok.


None of this suggests that Peking is in a position to call the tune in Phnom Penh. Indeed, to preserve their position the Chinese must now adjust to Phnom Penh's actions and needs, and this adjustment may require Peking to take a more explicitly anti-US position on certain issues, thus cutting across their interests vis-a-vis us. Some easing in US-Cambodian hostility would make this contradiction easier for Peking to manage, which may explain their interest in promoting renewed contacts between us and the Cambodians.

PRC-Lao Relations

In Laos, Peking's situation is less clear cut. The Chinese have preserved good relations with the Pathet Lao, but they have deferred to Hanoi's patronage of the Lao Communists and have shown no inclination to challenge the dominant Vietnamese position. The principal Chinese interests are in north and northwest Laos, where their road-building activities have been concentrated. This area provides Peking with a limited buffer zone along its border and with possible entry points to Thailand and Burma.

The influx of Soviet advisers to Laos--although dismissed by Ch'iao Kuan-hua as of no special significance--may change Peking's calculations and force it

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- 5 -

into a more openly competitive position with Hanoi. A primary Chinese goal with the Communist-dominated regime in Laos is undoubtedly to deter it from becoming a complete puppet of Hanoi, with a pro-Moscow tilt. For the moment, however, the Chinese seem to be watching developments, and we have seen no indications of any major new departures in PRC policy toward Laos.

Chinese Position

The Chinese do not appear ready for a completely frank dialogue on our respective approaches to the region. They will stop short of explicitly agreeing that the PRC and the US have a strong mutuality of interest regarding Viet-Nam, and they would be embarrassed by too strong a US pitch on the commonality of our interests in the area. At the same time, they would welcome indications that the US approach is compatible with China's own objectives.

In general, the Chinese have restricted themselves to suggesting that we "learn our lesson" from the past in dealing with Indochina. They appear confident that the force of local nationalism, which has fired thirty years of Vietnamese armed struggle, will prevent outside powers--and specifically the USSR--from gaining more than a temporary foothold in the area. The furthest they have gone is Ch'iao Kuan-hua's admission to Secretary Kissinger in New York that Hanoi may have certain hegemonic aspirations with regard to Laos and Cambodia "as a result of the influence of outside forces"--i.e., the USSR. They criticized our action on the Mayaguez, which Ch'iao called "totally unnecessary." They have encouraged us to reestablish contact with Cambodia despite the intensity of Khmer feelings against the US.

US Position

We are prepared to look to the future in our relations with the Indochina countries. But we are not going to move precipitously and will want to have reason to believe that there is some foundation for constructive

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relationships and that these countries will exercise restraint in their policy toward the region. We have taken into account such recent Vietnamese gestures as the presence of nine Americans on October 30, the acceptance of the Vietnamese repatriates, and the reestablishment of postal service. We have approved licenses for the American Friends Service Committee to send additional items to Viet-Nam and have indicated that we have no objection to Congressional contacts with the Vietnamese.

We have taken Chinese advice in initiating contacts with the Cambodians. We had hoped that Cambodia would moderate its public attitude toward us, but Prince Sihanouk gave a very harsh speech at the United Nations. The Pathet Lao also continue to harass us in Vientiane despite professions of wanting better relations with us. We have noted a very sizeable increase in the Soviet presence there.

We no longer have a major role in the three Indochina countries. However, we are opposed to efforts by any country to establish a position of hegemony in the area, and are concerned that Hanoi, perhaps with outside encouragement, may have some hegemonic hopes. We think this should be discouraged and that the various nations of the area should retain their independence.

Department of State
November 1975

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SOUTHEAST ASIA



PREVIOUS TALKS



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

THAILAND

I. FEBRUARY 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in February (C4600)

- The Chinese roads being built in Laos will only reach the Mekong and do not threaten Thailand.
- The Thai should repatriate their ethnic Lao to Laos to help build the road.
- The Thai owe the PRC a debt: that they have let Chiang Kai-shek use Thai territory for smuggling and infiltration into China.
- The Thai's greatest fear is the large number of overseas Chinese in Thailand. But the tradition of overseas Chinese is to be very conservative, and the PRC thinks they should be citizens of the country where they reside.
- The manpower and materiel that the US poured into Southeast Asia is too much.
- Others in Southeast Asia, e. g., Thailand, are imitating Indonesia's methods of military dictatorship and brutal suppression.
- China is not in a hurry for diplomatic relations in Southeast Asia. China would wish to see a natural development of the situation. There are bound to be some revolutionary movements but they will not probably be maturing very quickly.

U. S. Position in February

- The US has the impression that Thailand is in principle willing to improve its relations with China, and the US has no objection.
- If China approves, the US will mention China's concerns to the Thai.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EO 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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(U. S. Position in February)

--We will gradually withdraw our forces from Thailand, but there should not be sudden changes. The long-term trend is clear, but sudden changes would accelerate the impact of countries seeking blocs there and encourage the isolationist element in America.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

EAST ASIA

I. FEBRUARY 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in February (MAO + CHOU)

- US force deployment to Asia and the Pacific Ocean is too scattered. That was all begun by Truman and Acheson. (Mao)
- Truman and Johnson are dead now.
- The US commitments in Southeast Asia came from Dulles' policies.
- If, as HAK says, it will take a long time to settle the questions of Indochina and Southeast Asia, won't the US waste its energies in this region?
- If US policies in Southeast Asia are not Dulles', the US will have to change the atmosphere in the region.
- The countries of Southeast Asia have not entirely decided in which direction they are going to move, though they have held a lot of meetings and have a lot of organizations.
- Indonesia massacred many of Chinese origin. Others in the area (Thailand and Philippines) are imitating Indonesia's methods of military dictatorship and brutal suppression. Therefore, while they express the desire to restore diplomatic relations with China, it is going to be a difficult step for China. There were mistakes on both sides in 1965. It was intrigue, not revolution. Movements that do not rely on the masses are bound to fail.
- China is not in a hurry for diplomatic relations in Southeast Asia. China would wish to see a natural development of the situation. There are bound to be some revolutionary movements but they will not probably be maturing very quickly.

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

U. S. Position in February

- A strong, self-reliant, independent China in control of its own destiny is in our own interest and is a force for peace in Asia.
- We want to bring about a situation in which it becomes clear to our people that an attempt at hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region is contrary not only to the Shanghai Communique but to a basic US interest.
- It is important that the transition between the present and what will work in Southeast Asia occur gradually. The transition must not invite the intrusion of other countries or the dominance of forces in the US who oppose US strength.
- Our objectives in Southeast Asia are quite different from Dulles'. They are obviously not directed against the PRC.
- We will put our Southeast Asian policy on a new basis so it doesn't absorb all our energies. But if we are challenged quickly, we will have to react strongly in order to protect the possibility of conducting a strong foreign policy.
- On neutralization of Southeast Asia, we should separate the middle- and long-term evolution from the immediate future. It is clear that the Dulles conception of an anti-Communist bloc is no longer valid. Therefore institutions like SEATO have lost their vitality and much of their meaning.
- But precipitate US withdrawal from Asia would be a disaster: It would encourage the isolationist element in America.
- The danger is that the USSR and India want to unify Indochina and create an Asian security system extending from Burma to Indonesia. India has proposed the same treaty with Indonesia that it has with the Soviet Union.
- The Soviets wanted a naval facility at Singapore. We prevented it.
- Now that Australia has a new government of limited vision, pressures on Singapore will increase. Australia is withdrawing its

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(U. S. Position in February)

ground forces but still maintains the 5-Power defense arrangement. They may be under the illusion that China approves what they are doing.

--Indonesia has been playing a constructive role in Southeast Asia now.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



ISSUES PAPER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPERSOUTHEAST ASIAThe Problem

We wish to reinforce Peking's estimate of our value as a counterbalancing factor in Southeast Asia while encouraging the PRC to pursue policies that are compatible with our own objectives in the area. We believe that our common interest in preventing the expansion of Soviet influence, and our mutual concern over Vietnamese ambitions in the area, provide a basis for us to pursue separate but parallel policies in the region that will avoid major conflicts of interest. You should seek to convey the impression that we have significant assets and interests in the area, that we are opposed to the hegemonic aspirations of others, and that a principal US goal is the preservation of the independence of the Southeast Asian nations.

Background

Despite China's deep historical involvement with Southeast Asia, the PRC has been largely excluded from the area until recent years by our efforts and the anti-communist orientation of most of the local governments. With the sole exception of Burma, until 1974 Peking did not have diplomatic relations with any government in Southeast Asia (as distinct from Indochina) following the break in relations with Indonesia that was precipitated by the abortive communist-backed coup there in 1965. The PRC indulged itself in scathing attacks on US allies and defense pacts in the area and threw its support to local Peking-oriented insurgent groups, a course whose practical drawbacks far outweighed whatever ideological satisfactions Peking may have derived.

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EO 12958 (Prescribed) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

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Since 1972, however, when a degree of Sino-US rapprochement converged with growing Chinese concern about Soviet ambitions in Asia, this picture has sharply changed. As the Soviet Union has replaced the United States as the main danger in Chinese eyes, Peking has moved to a relatively benign view of the US presence, in large measure because it fears that the Soviets are trying to move into the vacuum left by the rapid drawdown of US power in Indochina. The Chinese suspect that the nations of Southeast Asia will be tempted to use better relations with the USSR as a balance to Chinese influence, a trend already evident in Viet-Nam. Peking regards any expansion of Moscow's presence in the region as a highly dangerous element of Moscow's "encirclement" policy aimed at the PRC.

Peking has reacted on a variety of fronts to strengthen its position in the area:

-- It has sought to upgrade its government-to-government relations with Southeast Asian states. It established diplomatic relations with Malaysia in 1974 and followed suit with the Philippines and Thailand this summer. The joint communiques negotiated with all three countries included anti-hegemony clauses clearly directed at the Soviet Union.

-- The PRC has moderated its attitude toward regional groupings, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which it now publicly supports. It implicitly accepts the ASEAN concept of establishing a zone of peace and neutrality in the region.

-- Peking has dropped criticism of US bilateral defense pacts and US naval activities in the area (with the important exception of the Mayaguez incident), while continuing to denounce Moscow's Asian collective security scheme in virulent terms.

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The PRC has made substantial progress in expanding its influence in the area, but there are problems for Peking. Some of the Southeast Asian governments are trying to balance their new Chinese connection with improved relations with Moscow. Moreover, most of them, and particularly their internal security authorities, worry that improved relations with the PRC, especially where an official PRC presence is established in the capital, will lead to enhanced Chinese efforts to manipulate overseas Chinese communities against the interest of the host government. These fears have caused Singapore and Indonesia to hold back from establishing formal diplomatic ties with Peking.

An added complication derives from the Chinese ideological commitment to support indigenous revolutionary movements. Although Peking has reduced material support to such movements in Southeast Asia and is pursuing good state relations as its main policy line, it has not foreclosed the option of reverting to a destabilizing "revolutionary" policy. Rivalry among Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow for control of these movements could prove troublesome over time, especially if the established governments are ineffective in dealing with their domestic problems.

Over the longer term, Peking probably hopes to encourage developments in Southeast Asia that will make it a buffer zone, free of other great power influences and with the independence of action of governments in the region constrained by the proximity of Chinese power. Peking recognizes, however, that present day realities limit its ability to attain this goal, and as a minimum it accepts the utility of a US presence for short-term tactical purposes.

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Bilateral Relations

Thailand -- Bangkok established diplomatic relations with the PRC in July 1975. With the reduction in the US regional presence, a prime consideration in Bangkok's approach to Peking is hope that the PRC will restrain or offset threats from Viet-Nam. As was the pattern with Malaysia and the Philippines earlier, the Chinese in private meetings downplayed the importance of their support for communist insurgents, said nothing critical of the US military presence, implied they might even assist Thailand militarily if it were attacked by the Vietnamese, and publicly pledged non-interference in Thailand internal affairs. In Bangkok as elsewhere, there is considerable skepticism about the Chinese pledge, though North Viet-Nam is mainly responsible for material support to the Northeastern Thai insurgency, and the Northern insurgency which Peking has backed in the past is currently simmering at a relatively low level.

Peking's propaganda line on Thailand has varied with the tactical situation; since Kukrit began to move toward normalized relations with Peking early this year, the PRC media have not criticized Thai leaders by name. However, they continue to support the clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand, which maintains harsh invective against the Bangkok authorities.

During the period of active US involvement in the Viet-Nam war, Thailand came under heavy verbal attack from Peking for allowing US bases to remain. Following the US withdrawal from Indochina, the Chinese have continued to replay reports of Thai demonstrations against US military bases, most recently in connection with the Mayaguez incident. But speaking for themselves, the Chinese have shifted the focus to warning the Thai to guard against Soviet political and economic penetration, and they have applauded Thai public rejection of the Soviet collective security proposal.

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Malaysia -- Peking's establishment of diplomatic relations with Malaysia in May 1974 was the first such breakthrough in Southeast Asia in almost two decades, and set the stage for parallel developments with the Philippines and Thailand later. The relationship also illustrates, however, the pitfalls inherent in Peking's dual-track approach. While PRC leaders disclaimed interest in Malaysia's huge Chinese minority and endeavored initially to reassure the Malaysians about Chinese intentions toward the small but simmering pro-Peking Malayan insurgency, NCNA in April 1975 gave banner treatment to the Chinese Communist Party message congratulating the Malayan Communist Party on its 45th Anniversary, provoking a sharp Malaysian private reaction and casting a pall over state relations which were just getting started. The Malaysian authorities are also concerned about the intensive proselytizing being conducted among Overseas Chinese organizations in Malaysia by the newly-established PRC Embassy. And finally, Peking continues to support the clandestine Voice of the Malaysian Revolution, which broadcasts acerbic attacks on Malaysia's leadership, especially Prime Minister Razak.

Philippines -- Soon after the fall of Indochina, President Marcos moved rapidly to establish ties with Peking, motivated by his perception of the changed balance of power in the area and by a "third world-ish" desire not to be left standing as the bandwagon moves on. Peking was prepared to reciprocate for different reasons: to balance any increase in Philippine-Soviet relations, to erode Taiwan's international position, and to enhance the PRC's diplomatic standing.

Relations were established in June 1975. The Chinese have tried hard to downplay their support for Communist insurgents in the Philippines; in fact the Philippine insurgency has never received much attention from Peking, although the PRC media have

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occasionally given favorable coverage to statements by insurgent leaders. Nevertheless, Marcos appears to have some realistic doubts about Chinese sincerity on this point.

The Chinese reportedly made no mention of US bases in the Philippines during Marcos's visit but did express, in general terms, support for a continued US presence in Southeast Asia. By contrast, the Chinese were sharply critical of Soviet hegemonic ambitions, and the decision to postpone Marcos's planned 1975 visit to Moscow may have been influenced at least in part by concern over the PRC's reaction to such a step.

Burma -- After a series of difficulties during the 1960's, Burma and the PRC again normalized their relations in August 1971, and Peking extended \$57 million in aid to its southern neighbor. Since then Peking has generally characterized its relations with Burma as "warm and friendly," even while continuing to provide significant rhetorical and material support to the Burmese Communist Party insurgents. Burmese President Ne Win again visited the PRC in November this year, and while he referred to the existence of differences between the two countries, the general tone of the visit was cordial. Teng Hsiao-p'ing somewhat disingenuously stressed that "in state relations" with Burma the PRC had always strictly observed such principles as non-interference in internal affairs.

In fact, Peking's support for the Burmese insurgents is the most extensive which Peking currently provides to any Southeast Asian rebel group, and includes extensive training and supply efforts across the Sino-Burmese border. Although some analysts believe that the Burmese insurgency would effectively fold without Chinese support, the Rangoon authorities seem unwilling to press very hard for Peking to relent. The USSR, however, has scathingly denounced the Chinese for interfering in Burma's internal affairs "under cover of official statements of friendship."

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Singapore -- Despite a March 1975 visit to the PRC by its Foreign Minister, Singapore remains wary of Chinese intentions and is in no apparent hurry to establish formal ties. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is known to be particularly concerned about the impact that an official Chinese presence could have on his predominantly Chinese citizenry. While he reportedly views eventual normalization with Peking as inevitable, he is obviously not anxious to accelerate the process.

Indonesia -- Similar considerations motivate Jakarta's reluctance to respond to Peking's advances. Bitterness towards the PRC is still widespread in Indonesia (especially in the dominant military circles) because of Peking's former close ties with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and alleged Chinese complicity in the abortive 1965 coup. In the aftermath of that coup, thousands of Indonesians of Chinese descent were slaughtered, the pro-Peking PKI was banned and relations with the PRC were suspended in 1967.

Peking's hostility toward the Suharto government has gradually abated as Peking has moved to improve its relations with the GOI, largely because it sees Indonesia (with its potentially predominant role within ASEAN) as a counterweight to Soviet influence in the area. Peking has adopted a gradualist approach to Indonesia to allay lingering suspicions. It has dropped unfavorable coverage of Indonesian internal affairs in recent years and has approvingly reported Indonesian diplomatic initiatives in ASEAN and various international fora.

Indonesia for its part can be expected eventually to resume diplomatic relations with the PRC, but there is reportedly considerable difference of opinion within the government on how fast to move toward normalization with Peking (Foreign Minister Malik favors a more rapid resumption of ties while several of President Suharto's key military advisors

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remain opposed.) The Chinese Communist Party's anniversary greetings to the PKI last May has been cited by opponents of rapprochement as evidence that extreme caution is warranted.

Chinese Position

The Chinese favor the retention of a residual US presence in Southeast Asia as a deterrent to Soviet adventurism. However, on ideologically troublesome issues such as US bases in the area, Peking prefers to leave its position unstated, although it has made clear by indirection that it is relaxed on the matter. Chinese leaders have repeatedly warned visiting Southeast Asian dignitaries that in the wake of the US withdrawal from Indochina, they must guard against "letting the tiger (i.e. the USSR) in through the back door, while repelling the wolf (i.e. the US) through the front gate." To reassure Southeast Asian apprehensions about their large Chinese communities, Peking has adopted a policy of encouraging overseas Chinese to accept the nationality of their country of residence. It has unconvincingly sought to disclaim responsibility for its reduced but continuing rhetorical and material support for local communist-led insurgencies by arguing that government and party matters are completely separate.

US Position

We are conscious of the ideological and historical differences that shape our two approaches to the region, but we do not believe that either the United States or the PRC would benefit from developments that would heighten feelings of insecurity on the part of regional governments. For this reason, we should do what we can to ensure that our respective policies do not work at cross purposes in the area, which would play into Soviet hands.

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The nations of Southeast Asia are going through a period of transition toward greater self-reliance and lessened dependence on outside powers. Our own role in Southeast Asia is also changing, but we will continue to work in close cooperation with the local governments. We have and will continue to have important interests in Southeast Asia for the indefinite future.

We remain opposed to efforts by any country to establish a position of hegemony in that region and are impressed by the determination of local governments to preserve their independence. We strongly support this objective.

Over the last few years there has been a trend toward regional cooperation, as expressed in the formation and continued vitality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). We consider this a positive development, since local rivalries and domestic instabilities could give the Soviets opportunities to exploit.

We are opposed to the Soviet scheme for an Asian collective security system and have said so both publicly and privately. None of the SEA countries appears interested in this idea.

Department of State
November 1975

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