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PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO PEKING
DECEMBER 1 to 5, 1975

BILATERAL ISSUES

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

GENERAL SCOWCROFT



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By NARA, Date 6/22/10

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Chinese Customs and Etiquette

There are relatively minor differences between modern social usage in the PRC and more formal Western practice. Some traditional Chinese forms have carried over to the present, but they are often not evident, probably because the Chinese wish their guests to feel at ease. During the Peking visit, however, you may wish to observe the following points to avoid giving unconscious offense:

DO

-- The traditional way of toasting at banquets has changed somewhat: there is less emphasis on details, and much less actual drinking. In toasting, you may either raise your glass to your lips without drinking any wine, or take a small sip.

-- If one of the Chinese at your banquet table raises his wine glass to you, you should match the gesture, raising the glass to your lips and taking a sip if you wish; sometime thereafter, you should reciprocate the courtesy.

-- After his formal toast at the Chinese-hosted banquet, Vice Premier Teng will descend from the rostrum and toast you personally. He will clink glasses with you and sip from his. You should raise your glass to your lips and sip if you wish. He will then probably repeat the process with other Americans at the head table. He may also clink glasses with Americans at the one or two ranking tables nearby, toasting them collectively after doing so. After you complete your formal toast, you should follow Teng's lead, toasting first him, then, other Chinese at the head table, then at other tables to which he has gone. At your return banquet, you will give the first



formal toast, and should then circulate as above. Teng will reciprocate.

-- Make the first move to rise from the table when you are the guest, and wait for the Chinese to do so at your banquet.

-- Make at least token gestures of granting precedence to Chinese counterparts in passing through doors, boarding automobiles, taking seats at banquet tables (as the guest, however, you will be expected to go first, and should acquiesce after making the necessary gesture).

-- Be precise about the use of titles when known (e.g. Mr. Vice Premier), since the Chinese do not freely substitute their equivalent of "Mr." for the titles of even low-ranking officials.

DON'T

-- Clink glasses with American members of your party.

-- Drink from the toasting glass of mao-t'ai or other wines except when toasting (other beverages will be provided for non-toast use).

-- Touch or put your arm around the shoulders of Chinese (especially women), some of whom may be offended by this friendly American gesture.

-- Beckon to Chinese with hand or arm gestures (this way of calling to someone is generally reserved for inferiors and children, and may be insulting to adult Chinese).

-- Stand with hands on hips or arms folded (these are traditional Chinese postures which still denote angry defiance and arrogance, respectively, to many Chinese).

November, 1975





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Bilateral Issues

THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO PEKING
December 1-5, 1975

BILATERAL RELATIONS

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ISSUES PAPER



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 030337

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBriefing Paper

TITLE Normalization

CREATION DATE 11/1975

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MILITARY WITHDRAWALS



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
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CREATION DATE 11/1975
VOLUME 3 pages
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Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 030339

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇList

DESCRIPTION Re military withdrawals from Taiwan

CREATION DATE 11/1975

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

MISSING AMERICANS

The Problem

The Chinese indicated to Secretary Kissinger during his October trip that they might have some information to give us during your visit concerning Americans missing in the vicinity of the PRC. However, they have consistently refused to become involved in our efforts to secure additional information on our missing in Indochina.

There is continuing Congressional interest in this subject, and it would be helpful after your trip to be able to say that the subject had been raised.

Background

This problem has two separate aspects: Americans missing in the vicinity of China (these include 10 Navy men missing or believed dead in connection with the Viet-Nam conflict, as well as 12 missing since 1956 and presumed dead); and the question of our missing in action (MIA's) in South-east Asia. Both aspects are important in the Administration's relations with Congress and the public.

Americans Missing in the Vicinity of China. We have been trying for a number of years to secure additional information from the Chinese on these Americans. Secretary Kissinger has raised this subject on each of his trips to Peking. Prior to Secretary Kissinger's November 1973 visit to the PRC, we gave the Chinese detailed information on American servicemen (all Navy) missing in the vicinity of the PRC. During that visit, the Chinese told us that they had been carrying out investigations and searches based on the information

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we had provided, that they had as yet found no bodies nor turned up any other kind of information, but that they were continuing their investigations and would let us know if they discovered anything more. The Chinese agreed that we could place the substance of their response on the public record, which we did in December 1973. The Chinese had already informed us privately that they were not holding any American servicemen.

We gave the Chinese some additional details in February of this year but we heard nothing more from them until Secretary Kissinger's visit this October, when the Chinese indicated that they might have some information on these Americans to give us during your trip. We believe the Chinese should be able to provide us with additional details since their press agency reported at least some of the incidents involving the missing men shortly after they occurred. There is strong evidence, including material in PRC publications, that one Navy man died in a plane crash on PRC soil, and the Chinese themselves announced that two American civilians were killed in a plane crash dating back to 1952. We have asked for the return of any remains.

Americans Missing in Southeast Asia. Both Congress and the families involved have urged us to use the Chinese as a channel to obtain more information concerning American MIA's in Indochina. Just prior to Secretary Kissinger's October trip, Congressman Montgomery, the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, sent him a list of detailed questions concerning American MIA's in Indochina to which he hoped the Chinese leaders could supply the answers. He subsequently sent a list of these questions to the White House asking that they be presented to the PRC during your trip. Vernon Leon of your staff wrote Montgomery on November 11 noting that you had directed the appropriate members of the staff to give this request priority attention.

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We have also told the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the subject would be kept in mind in preparing briefing materials for your trip and that we would bring to your attention the introduction of S. Res. 251, which asks you to request PRC assistance in obtaining an accounting of the MIA's in the Indochina countries.

The Chinese have consistently refused to become involved in this aspect of the problem on the grounds that we should handle the matter directly with the countries concerned. They again took this position during Secretary Kissinger's visit in October. We frankly doubt that the Chinese would be willing to press the Vietnamese, particularly in light of Peking/Hanoi strains, but as a minimum you may wish to note our continuing interest in obtaining a proper accounting for these men.

Chinese Position

The Chinese have told us that they will provide us with any additional information they uncover concerning Americans missing in the vicinity of China. They refuse to intercede for us on matters concerning Americans missing in Southeast Asia.

US Position

We consider this a humanitarian issue. The American public responded favorably to our announcement in December 1973 that the PRC had agreed to provide us with any additional information turned up concerning Americans missing in the vicinity of China.

Any additional information concerning men lost in the China area, and especially the return of any remains that can be located, would be appreciated by their families.

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The Secretary indicated interest in any information the Chinese could make available during your trip. He told the Chinese that if they did provide some information, there need not be a reference to this subject in any communique issued at the end of your trip. Should they do so, we will of course inform the families, and would wish to make it known publicly in some way that the PRC had furnished the information.

With respect to American MIA's in Indochina, we have tried to pursue this directly with the countries involved, although our approaches thus far have not been productive. We recognize that they should be aware of the strong hope in Congress and our public that they can find some way to be helpful.

Department of State
November 1975

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EXCHANGES



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

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US-PRC CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM

The Problem

We see no need for you to give more than passing mention to this subject. The Chinese rejected any expansion of the exchange program during Secretary Kissinger's October visit and made it clear that they are not prepared to go beyond the previous levels of exchanges in the absence of further progress towards normalization. In our discussions with the Chinese, we have noted the value of the exchanges in fostering the right psychological climate in the United States for progress in the normalization process. The forced cancellation of two exchanges this year over political issues has been unhelpful in this respect, as has the Chinese refusal to be responsive on certain matters of importance to the US participants. While the Chinese attitude has been less forthcoming than we had hoped, it is unlikely that further discussion will alter the Chinese position. We should not appear to be overly anxious on this issue.

Background

In accordance with our agreement in the Shanghai Communique to facilitate cultural contacts and exchanges, the US and the PRC since 1972 have sponsored approximately 60 exchanges involving over 900 people in such diverse fields as science, education, medicine, public affairs, performing arts and athletics. The exchanges on the US side have been managed by two private committees representing the American scientific and scholarly community. The two committees receive their financial support from the US Government and from private sources.

These exchanges have helped to build and sustain the remarkable domestic consensus in favor of our normalization policy. Nearly two million Americans viewed the Chinese Archeological Exhibition during its US visit this year, and a US track and field team played to 250,000 Chinese spectators during a three-city tour last spring.

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The Chinese clearly see utility in the exchanges, which they have used to project a favorable image of the PRC in the United States and to extract scientific and technological information of interest to them. The benefits for us have been in less tangible political areas -- e.g. the exchanges symbolize our developing relationship with the PRC and provide opportunities for mutual exposure to our respective countries and societies that have been absent for over two decades. While we have accommodated PRC interests in technical fields, the Chinese have been distinctly less responsive in meeting US desires, particularly for exchanges in the social sciences and the humanities.

American scholars and scientists are increasingly expressing dissatisfaction with the superficiality of the scientific exchanges. They are pressing for cooperative research programs, longer visits, more emphasis on seminars and symposia, and the removal of PRC-imposed obstacles to the development of sustained relationships with Chinese counterparts.

In addition, Chinese injection of political elements into the exchanges has at times eroded the good will the exchanges are designed to build. The visit of a PRC performing arts troupe, scheduled for a US tour in April 1975 was cancelled when the Chinese, three weeks before the troupe's arrival, insisted on altering the program to include a song calling for the liberation of Taiwan. A tour of the PRC by a delegation of US mayors that was scheduled for September this year was called off when the Chinese informed the tour sponsors that the deputy leader of the group, the mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, would not be welcome. However, both sides have kept these difficulties from affecting other aspects of our relations.

This fall, the two US Committees submitted proposals to the Chinese for next year's program designed to expand the exchanges and make them more responsive to the interests of the US participants. During Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking in October, we supported these proposals, offered several of our own, and urged that we find ways to improve the pattern of exchanges. The Chinese were

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unwilling to consider an increase in the exchanges and would only agree to continuing the program at the same level as the previous year. The US Committees are unhappy with these results but are prepared to live with them. They are increasingly inclined, however, to take a tougher line with the Chinese on reciprocity issues.

Chinese Position

The Chinese have made clear that the present level and pattern of exchanges is as far as they will go in the absence of further progress towards normalization. They also tend to dismiss our view about the psychological benefits of greater exchanges to the normalization process, arguing that the Chinese are not obliged to help us convince our people on something that is so obviously in our national interest. While they will permit Members of Congress and Governors to visit the PRC, they have insisted on keeping their own groups at the people-to-people level and will not agree to reciprocal visits by officials from their own leadership organs because of the continued presence in Washington of an Embassy representing the Government on Taiwan. There is little likelihood that the Chinese will ease the political constraints on the exchange program at the present stage in our relationship.

US Position

We believe that the exchanges should be conducted in a manner that will contribute to our mutual policy objectives. One of the most important of these is to create the psychological conditions in the United States for more active cooperation with the PRC on international issues of common concern and for further steps in the normalization process. Overall, we think the exchange program has been constructive and has contributed to this purpose. The two cancellations this year were not helpful, however, and we believe it would be wise for both sides to keep our political differences out of the exchange program and to handle these through government channels. We

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also feel that the exchanges should be conducted on the basis of reciprocity, equality and mutual benefit. For this reason, we favor moving to more active and substantive programs in the scientific and cultural exchanges. We consider it in our mutual interest to avoid conveying the impression that our relations are stagnating, but we are prepared to proceed on the same basis as in past years.

Department of State
November 1975

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